The -- Triangle: The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols Zaur SHIRIYEV* & Celia DAVIES** Abstract Key Words

This paper analyses the domestic and regional Zurich Protocols, Turkish-Armenian impact of the Turkish-Armenian normalisation rapprochement/normalisation, Russo- process from the Azerbaijani perspective, with Georgian War, Nagorno- conflict, a focus on the changing dynamic of - Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. relations. This line of enquiry is informed by international contexts, notably the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the respective roles Introduction of the US and . The first section reviews the changed regional dynamic following two regional crises: the August War and the Turkish- Between 2008 and 2009, Azerbaijan’s Armenian rapprochement. The second section foreign policy was thrown into a state analyses domestic reaction in Azerbaijan among of crisis. The Russo-Georgian War in political parties, the media, and the public. The third section will consider the normalisation August 2008 followed by the attempted process, from its inception through to its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement suspension. The authors find that the crisis in process (initiated in September 2008) Turkish-Azerbaijani relations has resulted in an intensification of the strategic partnership, unsettled geopolitical perspectives across concluding that the abortive normalisation the Caucasus and the wider region, process in many ways stabilised the pre-2008 throwing traditionally perceived axes status quo in terms of the geopolitical dynamics of the region. of threats and alliances into question. Before the dust had settled on the first conflict, another was already brewing, * Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst based destabilising many of Azerbaijan’s in Azerbaijan, a columnist for Today’s Zaman, basic foreign policy assumptions. and serves as Editor-in-Chief of Caucasus International. Baku was confronted with the difficult ** Celia Davies is an Associate Editor at and traumatic task of redrawing its Caucasus International and an LLM candidate in International Law at the University of psychological map of the region, and, . consequently, its foreign policy agenda.

185 PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 1, pp. 185-206. Zaur Shiriyev & Celia Davies

The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement suspension of their ratification process. process generated serious concerns President Sargsyan’s statement did, in Azerbaijan, at both the public and however, express ’s “desire to governmental levels. The particular maintain the existing momentum for worry was how the improvement in normalizing relations”.1 The partial Turkish-Armenian relations would rapprochement led to vociferous debate affect the resolution of the Azerbaijani- in Azerbaijani society, paralysing political Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. groups in their visions of Turkey. The immediate cause of the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border was Armenia’s Two Crises: Redrawing the 1993 occupation of Kelbajar, one of the Political Landscape seven adjunct districts to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh region. Baku’s In geopolitical terms, the immediate resistance to the normalisation process casualty of Russia’s intervention in was and is based on the argument that was regional energy security. In the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan’s eyes, the events of August conflict and the opening of the Turkish- 2008 revealed some uncomfortable Armenian border should, given their realities: first, that Georgia could no connection, move forward in parallel. longer be considered an entirely reliable The normalisation process saw an transit route for Azerbaijan’s oil and agreement to establish mutual diplomatic gas, and second, that Russia would be recognition, culminating in the Zurich willing to use its military and political Protocols in October 2009, signed in the arsenal for the destruction of Azerbaijani presence of the Russian, French and Swiss and Caspian hydrocarbon exports.2 foreign ministers and the US Secretary of Furthermore, the war significantly State. However, neither party has ratified changed Azerbaijan’s perceptions of the the protocols, and the process has EU, NATO and the US in terms of their essentially been frozen pending progress political clout and regional strategies. on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Six Many among the Azerbaijani political months after the signing, Prime Minister elite were convinced that the EU was ill- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s declaration that prepared to deal with a major crisis in its Turkish parliamentary ratification was eastern neighbourhood, that the price of contingent on the conflict resolution NATO membership was too great, and progress prompted condemnation that the US would struggle to balance from the Armenian side, and an official ’s influence in the Caucasus.

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In the end, Georgia’s physical energy Azerbaijan, and Russia following talks in infrastructure was essentially unharmed, Moscow in November 2008 sent a clear though total conflict-related damage was signal regarding Russian influence and estimated at US $38 million.3 The real its continued position as chief peace- damage was to international perceptions broker, bolstering President Medvedev’s of the region’s energy security, the cost of claim in late August 2008 that Russia which remains hard to gauge. had “privileged interests” in its bordering countries. The war significantly changed Azerbaijan’s perceptions of the The August War also led Baku to EU, NATO and the US in reconsider its faith in the nature of US terms of their political clout and regional engagement. Prior to August regional strategies. 2008, Baku had seen Washington as a potential deterrent to Russian regional supremacy, and despite the political The war compelled Baku to abandon support enjoyed from President its assumption that Russia would Bush at the height of the conflict,5 refrain from acts of aggression against Baku struggled to revise its impression its neighbours. Russia’s willingness to with the Russian reset policy initially deploy military force- even after the pursued by the Obama administration. signing of the EU-brokered Six Point Azerbaijan was frustrated by what it saw Peace Plan4- revealed new regional as a shift in US regional engagement, realities, whereby Moscow’s grip on the whereby the Georgian-Azerbaijani region is arguably stronger than ever. tandem was replaced by a focus on the Russia’s recognition of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. That of the breakaway territories of Washington was pressing Ankara to and was worrying for normalise relations with Yerevan without Azerbaijan in the context of another making any causal link to the unresolved territorial conflict: Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict- the reason Though Moscow hastened to say that that Turkey had originally closed its the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should borders in 1993- angered Azerbaijan and be considered as a separate issue, Baku seriously threatened relations with the perceived an implicit threat. The Erdoğan . signing of the Moscow Declaration “On Regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh Baku perceived Washington’s Conflict” by the presidents of Armenia, rapprochement initiative as the flashy

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centrepiece in complex negotiations expressing wariness. Though there was between the Obama administration, no explicit rejection of the initiative by Armenian advocacy groups in the US, Tbilisi, Georgian analysts feared that a the Armenian government, and Turkey. significant component of the CSCP, the The US administration, unable to deliver proposed Turkish-Armenian deal, would on promises of genocide recognition, pose a threat to Georgia’s economic and instead sought to alleviate Armenia’s security interests.9 economic predicament by opening the Turkey-Armenia border. A significant The US administration, unable improvement in relations between to deliver on promises of Ankara and Yerevan, argued many genocide recognition, instead US strategists, would not only help to sought to alleviate Armenia’s stabilise the volatile South Caucasus but economic predicament by would also reduce Armenia’s political and economic dependence on Russia opening the Turkey-Armenia and , which would clearly serve border. American interests. For Ankara, the Russo-Georgian Primarily, the normalisation of conflict provided a catalyst for regional Turkish-Armenian relations would rapprochement. After a ceasefire stopped weaken Georgia’s position as a major the violent five-day war, Prime Minister transit country in the region and Tbilisi Erdoğan released his proposal for a could lose its dominant position in “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation energy projects. Secondly, if Armenia Platform” (CSCP), aimed at fostering were to become less dependent on peaceful relations across a region Georgia, it could become more active that had become increasingly vital to in supporting the demands of Armenian Turkey’s energy interests, in line with nationalist groups active in the Georgian his Foreign Ministry’s “zero problems province of Samtskhe-Javakheti, with neighbours policy”.6 Ankara sought threatening domestic and regional to work in close cooperation with stability. Furthermore, the whole process Moscow on the details of the initiative,7 was perceived by Tbilisi officials as part and Russia, happy to see a regional of a common Russian-Turkish agenda to initiative untainted by Western hands, reduce the influence of Western powers pledged its support.8 The three South in the region, which would in turn make Caucasus countries, however, were less it easier for Russia to turn Georgia into a enthusiastic, with Georgia in particular satellite state.

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The fallout from the August War Armenia’s occupation of the Azerbaijani transformed the geopolitical realities district of Kelbajar. The UN Security of the South Caucasus, and in this Council adopted Resolution 82211 on 30 regard Ankara found itself juggling April 1993, condemning the occupation the potentially conflicting demands of of Kelbajar, demanding respect for multiple relationships: with Russia, with the political sovereignty and territorial the West, and with each of the three integrity of Azerbaijan, and supporting South Caucasian states. The Turkish the immediate, full and unconditional government’s strategic objective has been withdrawal of all occupying forces to turn the country into a major energy from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. hub, and the obvious vulnerability of the In 2001, a Turkish-Armenian transit lines running through Georgia Reconciliation Commission was prompted Ankara to rethink its overall established with a view of normalising Caucasus strategy.10 Ankara’s leading bilateral relations and, in the longer foreign policy makers- flying the flag of the “zero problems” policy- recognised term, achieving historical reconciliation. that in the wake of the August War, land- The commission functioned until 2004. locked Armenia was even more isolated, Throughout this time, the air space due to the severance of ties with Russia remained open, civil society initiatives via Georgia. As mentioned above, this were ongoing, and most importantly, situation created immediate impetus for trade via Georgia continued. However, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement the border remained closed, and official process. On the other hand, Ankara relations were frozen. faced a strategic dilemma: how could Turkey normalise relations with Armenia Despite this increasing contact, without ruining the strategic partnership Baku did not voice any with Azerbaijan, which remained crucial detailed position on Ankara’s to its energy ambitions? role in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement until April The Attempted 2009. Rapprochement and the Azerbaijani Response From the Azerbaijani perspective, the The Turkish-Armenian border was rapprochement process emerged over closed by Turkey in 1993 following three stages:

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i. September 2008 - April 2009: month, and his statements regarding the “Football diplomacy”; opening of the Turkish-Armenian border to promote development, which upped ii. April 2009 - October 2009: The the ante and significantly increased build up to the Zurich Protocols; concerns in Azerbaijan. Thus, as Turkish- iii. October 2009 - April 2010: The Armenian talks played out behind closed failed ratification and suspension of doors, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations the process. reached a near crisis point. The problem As Turkey’s ambitions to become a was the source of Baku’s information: regional leader and economic power Russian intelligence. It was widely 12 grew, the blockade became to be reported in the Azerbaijani media that perceived as increasingly troublesome, a Azerbaijani officials had received detailed perception which created the conditions information on the secret negotiations for reconciliation and normalisation. between Ankara and Yerevan- Private meetings between Turkish specifically that progress on Nagorno- and Armenian officials began prior to Karabakh was not a pre-condition for 2008, and contact intensified when rapprochement- during a visit by the President Gül sent an unusually Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) supportive message to congratulate Director Alexander Bortnikov to Baku. President Sargsyan on his election in Bortnikov came to Baku at the end of th February 2008. Then in what has since March 2009 on the occasion of the 90 been termed “football diplomacy”, in anniversary of the Azerbaijani National September 2008, President Gül accepted Security Ministry. During this visit he an invitation from his Armenian apparently met with President Aliyev to counterpart to visit Yerevan for a FIFA inform him about the Turkish-Armenian World qualifying match between talks. Thus in the first weeks of April, the two national teams, Armenia and the Azerbaijani government remained Turkey. Gül was the first Turkish head unconvinced by declarations by Turkish of state to visit Yerevan. Despite this officials regarding the existence of a increasing contact, Baku did not voice proviso on Nagorno-Karabakh, and it any detailed position on Ankara’s role in was not until the visit of Prime Minister the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement Erdoğan in May 2009 that the situation until April 2009. The likely catalyst began to change. for Baku’s harsh reaction was President The concern in Baku was that the Obama’s visit to Turkey in that same normalisation process was not being tied

190 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols to the immediate cause of the breakdown sponsored initiative. Tensions continued in relations back in 1993. The crisis to increase, with, as mentioned above, officially began when Azerbaijani President Aliyev announcing that he President Aliyev cancelled his trip to was boycotting the April 2009 Istanbul for the Alliance of Civilisations Summit of the Alliance of Civilisations Summit, held on 6 April 2009. For Baku, in reaction to the possible Turkish- it was worryingly late in the day that they Armenian reconciliation being discussed finally received official assurance from in the absence of a breakthrough on the Ankara that normalisation would not Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Shortly take place in isolation of the Nagorno- after the summit, Aliyev publicly Karabakh issue. That finally happened in condemned the rapprochement May 2009, and was also followed up by initiative, calling it “a mistake”.15 He a prime ministerial visit to Baku, with a expressly criticised Washington’s role in delegation that also included a number encouraging Turkey to open the border of high profile ministers: in addition with Armenia, despite the continued to Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and Davutoğlu, the energy, foreign trade, the seven adjunct districts. Importantly, transportation, and culture and tourism the normalisation process was not an ministers journeyed to the city.13 During exclusively US-driven initiative; private the visit, Prime Minister Erdoğan held negotiations had already started in a joint press conference with President Zurich between the two parties long Aliyev, during which he made the before Obama’s election, and actors unambiguous declaration that “[t]here is within the EU also played important 16 a relation of cause and effect here. The roles. Again, Obama’s 2008 election occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh is the campaign had included a declaration to cause, and the closure of the border is the the powerful Armenian diaspora in the effect. Without the occupation ending, US that the April 1915 events should the gates will not be opened.”14 be recognised as genocide. As expected, Turkey balked at this, but tempered its Reaction of the Azerbaijani refusal with what was arguably a much Government more significant gesture, an agreement to cooperate with a US-led peace and Azerbaijan saw Obama’s visit to Turkey normalisation process. and his statements on rapprochement as In this context, President Gül’s evidence that Turkey was realising a US- statement that “Turkey thinks of

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Azerbaijan in her every act”17- following agreed to until after the resolution of the his meeting with Obama on 6 April- Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. failed to reassure the Azerbaijani government, which remained firm in its demand that the resolution of the In the initial stages of this Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be a diplomatic crisis, the Azerbaijani necessary pre-condition to the opening government pursued a three- of the Turkish-Armenian border. That pronged strategy that avoided this was not the case caused outrage direct engagement with the and disappointment in Azerbaijan Turkish government. at both the public and official levels. Many felt that Ankara was Following this development, Baku distancing itself from Azerbaijan through stressed its official position on a these actions, and the announcement possible rapprochement. After noting that Ankara and Yerevan had held that he was not in a position to tell secret talks and openly committed to a Ankara how to handle its relations with roadmap for normalisation fuelled this Yerevan, President Aliyev, during a press sense of betrayal. On 22 April 2009, the conference in with European foreign , Armenia Commission President José Manuel and issued a joint statement Barroso on 28 April 2009, shared Baku’s saying that “[t]he two parties have main concerns: achieved tangible progress and mutual We are getting a lot of official and understanding in this process and non-official information about what’s they have agreed on a comprehensive happening between Turkey and Armenia. This is a deal between two framework for the normalisation of sovereign countries, and we have no their bilateral relations in a mutually strategy to stop or impede it, but we, satisfactory manner. In this context, a the Azerbaijani people, want to know answer to one very simple question: 18 road-map has been identified”. The is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a official statement on the Turkish- pre-condition for the rapprochement process or not?19 Armenian rapprochement was widely perceived in Azerbaijan as a betrayal In the initial stages of this diplomatic of the key principle on which the crisis, the Azerbaijani government partnership between Ankara and Baku pursued a three-pronged strategy that was based, which was that no accords avoided direct engagement with the between Armenia and Turkey should be Turkish government. Firstly, it mobilised

192 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols public opinion through media reports made it clear that as far as they were on the negative implications of an aware, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was unconditional Turkish-Armenian not on the agenda of the normalisation rapprochement on Turkish-Azerbaijani talks. Government representatives stated relations. Secondly, it fostered that “the negotiations between parties “independent” links between Azerbaijan will continue under the scope of the MPs and the leadership of the Turkish Group”, and “the Nagorno- opposition, namely the Republican Karabakh issue was not presented as a People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist pre-condition within in Turkey-Armenia Movement Party (MHP). Both negotiations”, raising fears among parties believed that unconditional Azerbaijani officials.20 rapprochement with Armenia would damage Ankara’s alliance with Baku. Each of the parties made Thirdly, at official meetings and clear its concerns about conference across the EU, Azerbaijani officials suggested that Azerbaijan might the normalisation process consider shifting the direction of its taking place in the absence of energy cooperation toward Russia. conditions pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Prior to President Aliyev’s statements in April 2009, the government refrained from directly expressing its position. The In mid-April 2009, a delegation first strategy was the mobilisation of the of Azerbaijani ruling and opposition largely state-controlled media in order to party MPs flew to Ankara to discuss persuade the Azerbaijani public that the recent developments and share their unconditional normalisation of Turkish- concerns with Turkish politicians, Armenian relations would damage its mainly from the opposition party. national interests. Despite the Turkish Turkey’s intensifying bilateral relations government declaring that they had with Armenia had been discussed in the not overlooked the Nagorno-Karabakh Milli , the Azerbaijani parliament, issue, statements to the opposite effect as early as December 2008, and the made by Armenia’s Foreign Minister, position had always been clear. In rare Eduard Nalbandyan, caused confusion agreement, the ruling New Azerbaijan and distrust. From the beginning of the Party and the opposition declared that negotiations and throughout the ensuing this intensification would jeopardise diplomatic crisis, Armenian authorities Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.21 While

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the Azerbaijani delegation was in Ankara, With regard to Baku’s trump card, Azerbaijan MP Ganira Pashayeva, on 14 October 2009, the State Oil who is pro-government but officially Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) non-partisan, issued a press release on signed an agreement to sell 500 million behalf of the delegation, stating that cubic meters of gas a year to Russia’s the opening of the Turkish-Armenian Gazprom starting in 2010, at a price of border prior to the liberation of the US $ 350 per thousand cubic meters. occupied territories would constitute Azerbaijan made it clear: either Turkey a major disappointment to the Azeri ensured that Baku’s demands were met people, and that it was their “hope and in its negotiations with Armenia, or absolute belief that since the only party else Azerbaijan would continue to court that stands to benefit from this solution Russia and send its Caspian energy is Armenia, the will not supplies elsewhere. The threat and indeed let this happen”.22 concrete action suggested significant political and in The period between October 2009 punishment for Turkey’s policy shift. and May 2010 was a time of active shuttle diplomacy for Azerbaijan. The Domestic Political Reactions in country used Turkish public opinion as Azerbaijan well as its energy card to try to persuade Turkey to reconsider its rapprochement The situation offered a rare alignment strategy. Baku reached out to Turkey’s of opposition and government positions, government, political parties, civil at least once the reality of the situation society, and the public, asking them to had hit home. It was not until Obama’s consider Azerbaijan’s interests. The more visit to Turkey (6-7 April 2009) that nationalistic members of Turkey’s ruling the opposition spoke out against the party and the main opposition parties, Turkish position. Prior to that, there the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had been a feeling that the ruling and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), party was overreacting, and that anti- opposed the Armenian deal on the Turkish sentiment was being stirred grounds that such a deal would be akin up by pro-Russian groups. Opposition to selling out their Turkic brethren in groups stood by the belief that Turkey Azerbaijan, and that further, absolutely would not act against Azerbaijan’s no compromise should be made on the national interests. The opposition media genocide debate. portrayed Turkey as naive rather than

194 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols politically calculating, with Armenia, Ankara in return for the rapprochement, Baku’s traditional enemy, as the source and continued to condemn Turkey’s role of blame. However, after the signing of in the 1915 events. From this angle, there the Zurich Protocols in October 2009, was perhaps a failure among Azerbaijani Turkey’s active participation in the politicians to understand the extent of rapprochement process could no longer Turkey’s ambition as a major regional be denied. political and economic power. As fears grew, unconfirmed rumours about trade relations between Armenia and Turkey The chain of causality has began to fly, including allegations that been an important factor, with trade between Turkey and Armenia had a focus on the notion that hit US $185 million, and that Turkey was without addressing the original host to 70,000 Armenian citizens who problem that led Turkey to close were working illegally.24 The domestic its borders in 1993, no further opposition had harboured animosity action should be taken in this towards the Turkish government since direction. the October 2008 presidential - condemned by the Thus on 8 April the Azerbaijan OSCE as not reflective of the principles opposition parties, including , necessary for a meaningful and pluralistic 25 the Azerbaijan National Independence democratic election - when Turkey did Party and the National Democratic not respond to their pleas for support. Party, issued statements against the The ruling party implicitly supported opening of the Turkish-Armenian the opposition’s growing sense of anger border, declaring that Turkey’s actions and confusion about the rapprochement would do “an incurable harm” to process, though stopping short of relations with Azerbaijan.23 Each of the explicit agreement. Political analyst parties made clear its concerns about the Zerdusht Alizade has assessed this as a normalisation process taking place in the clever bit of strategic manipulation on absence of conditions pertaining to the the part of the government. He argued Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Politically, that by encouraging increasingly harsh this was perceived as a concession by condemnation of Turkey by the media Turkey to Armenia. The sense of betrayal and in the public sphere, the government stemmed in part from the perception succeeded in portraying Azerbaijan as that Yerevan had not offered anything to strongly opposed to the normalisation

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while retaining fully plausible deniability. would abandon Azerbaijan for the second Indeed, it publicly disassociated itself time, the first being the Soviet invasion from “the level of aggression and reactions in 1920.27 Among academics, opinion in Azerbaijan media against Turkey’s varies regarding the degree of Turkey’s recent involvements; nonetheless, we responsibility for Azerbaijan’s inclusion cannot directly intervene and shape in the USSR.28 The analogy is weak, and the public opinion.”26 Given that the the trend of historical interpretation of local media is majority state-owned, it the 2008-9 crisis reflected an inability is difficult to accept this statement at or perhaps merely an unwillingness face value. To Alizade, the government among Azerbaijanis to acknowledge deliberately sought to fuel tension and a new regional dynamic. It is also influence public opinion, for which worth mentioning that accusations of purpose the opposition played a crucial Turkish betrayal were limited to the role. The mutual intelligibility of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Turkish and Azeri languages meant that government, rather than the nation as media coverage was easily accessible to a whole, suggesting the depth of feeling Turks. that is involved in the oft-cited Turkic brotherhood. Turkish intellectuals Public Opinion reacted to these accusations by suggesting that the Turkish-Armenian normalisation The public debate in many ways was being manipulated to support pre- reflected the abovementioned tendency existing anti-Turkish sentiment among 29 to pursue a historicised and highly some circles in Azerbaijani society. reductive interpretation whereby Others saw Azerbaijan’s reaction as a villainous Armenia and politically naive clear indication that it had “decided Turkey had conspired to make Azerbaijan to flirt with Russia in order to make the victim of their machinations. As the progress in its relations with Armenia,” situation developed, with the signing of i.e. to use Russian influence to unfreeze 30 the Zurich Protocols marking the peak the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. in the Turkish-Azerbaijani crisis, public Within public discourse, the chain of debate increasingly turned to historical causality has been an important factor, interpretations rather than new and with a focus on the notion that without possibly uncomfortable political realities. addressing the original problem that led For instance, a central debate was based Turkey to close its borders in 1993, no on the question of whether Turkey further action should be taken in this

196 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols direction. Nonetheless, the majority From another angle, there are those- upheld the notion that Turkey had not, particularly among historians and public in fact, “betrayed” Azerbaijan, arguing intellectuals- who argued that this move that there was no indication of a long- by Turkey would ultimately support the term change or shift in Turkey’s historical conflict resolution process with regard pro-Azerbaijan stance, and that the to Nagorno-Karabakh. Political scientist public should not rush to judge Turkey’s Leyla Aliyeva suggested that the Turkish- short-term foreign policy manoeuvres. Armenian rapprochement was driven by This line of thinking was based on the two primarily pragmatic concerns: notion that first of all, Turkey’s attempts i. In the long term, the continued to increase its stature as a regional leader political and economic isolation of had hitherto respected Azerbaijan’s Armenia will increase the likelihood 31 interests, and secondly, that there had of aggression; been multiple occasions where Baku’s own foreign policy had diverged from ii. History shows that politically Turkish national interests. One question isolated states have never sought out that has been raised repeatedly is why reconciliation with their neighbours. Azerbaijan has not formally recognised By opening the border with Armenia, the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) as Turkey will gain an opportunity to a terrorist organisation.32 Others have put pressure on Armenia in regard to pointed to the Northern issue; the deadlocked Nagorno-Karabakh 34 though the Azerbaijani leadership conflict resolution process. promised in 2004 to provide economic Aliyeva added that regardless of these and diplomatic assistance to Turks living external developments, the Azerbaijani under tough conditions in Cyprus, it government must take a more active role refused to recognise the independence in the development of the events and of , sensitive to the evaluate its own position.35 It is worth possibility that Cyprus would retaliate reiterating at this juncture that among by recognising the authorities Azerbaijani political circles the majority in Nagorno-Karabakh.33 The Turkish did not oppose the normalisation of liberal media has tended to be quicker to Turkish- relations per se; the blame Azerbaijan, concluding that while issue was rather that they felt it had to Baku expected support from Ankara on be linked to the withdrawal of Armenian foreign policy issues, it was not stepping military forces from the occupied in when Turkish interests were at stake. Azerbaijani lands.36

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Local Media Coverage Turkey’s opening of her border with Armenia is nothing but a betrayal of Azerbaijan.38 Similar to the opposition’s approach, the initial tendency toward scepticism In the more staunchly nationalist publications, such as the pro-government of a genuine act of betrayal by Turkey daily Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan), on the part of the politically moderate Turkey garnered a good deal less media in Azerbaijan was borne out sympathy. Under a similar title to the one by headlines such as “Has Azerbaijan cited above- “Would Turkey betray?”- an lost her closest ally to Armenia? Is article from this paper examined the that realistic?”,37 published as late as 8 Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the context April. The headline reflected general of Turkey-Armenia negotiations.39 The public discourse, where Armenia is the author reflected: villain, not Turkey, though ultimately The belief that the Nagorno-Karabakh the conclusion was the same as that of problem will be resolved more smoothly the government: making concessions to due to the opened borders is over- a party that blocks any possibility for optimistic and moreover a complete fallacy. The only action that would conflict resolution would constitute a bring peace to the region is opening total fiasco of historical proportions. the border in tandem with the gradual withdrawal of the Armenian presence The prevailing emphasis in local news from the Nagorno-Karabakh. However, coverage was this narrative of betrayal, as the Armenian president’s remarks on the issue indicate, this was not even whether or not any such betrayal was on table during the final agreement, declared. This was reflective of the and thus [the Armenian president] generally emotional response to political continues to blocks all possibilities for peaceful resolution. events, as seen in an 8 April article from Olaylar, a moderate opposition news The author also found “upsetting” the agency, titled “Turkish government’s discussions of the Nagorno-Karabakh betrayal of the people of Azerbaijan”. problem in the Turkish media, where, he says, the tendency was to describe the Karabakh Here, the near-hysterical rhetoric conflict as an unfortunate obstruction to portrays a frenzy of ethnic hatred: the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, Armenians, who are claiming the occurrence of a genocide [perpetrated with the latter being Turkey’s priority. From by Turkey in 1915] are in a bloodthirsty the Azerbaijani point of view, generally state. They do not differentiate between speaking, the Karabakh issue should trump Azerbaijani Turks and Turkish Turks. To realize their claims, they fight with all else when it comes to regional relations us simply because we are Turks. Thus with Armenia.

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one exists. This tie must be preserved The Zurich Protocols: and the two questions must be resolved Crossing Baku’s Red Lines in a parallel fashion and at the same time.40 The rapprochement process After the signing of the Armenian- culminated, and in one obvious sense Turkish protocols, the Azerbaijani perished, in the Zurich Protocols. On Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press 10 October 2009, Turkish Minister release declaring that Turkey’s decision of Foreign Affairs “directly contradicts the national interests and his Armenian counterpart Edward of Azerbaijan and overshadows the spirit Nalbandyan signed two documents, of brotherly relations between Azerbaijan the “Protocol on the Establishment of and Turkey built on deep historical Diplomatic Relations” and the “Protocol roots”.41 Despite Ankara’s moves to on the Development of Bilateral realign itself with Baku’s red lines, the Relations”. US Secretary of State Hillary Turkish decision to sign the protocols in Rodham Clinton, Russian Foreign the first place and Azerbaijan’s reaction Minister Sergey Lavrov, French Foreign to that left bitterness on both sides. The Minister Bernard Kouchner, and Swiss attendance in Zurich of high officials Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey from countries that represent the OSCE oversaw the signing of these protocols, Minsk Group co-chairs was interpreted and hailed the end of a gruelling by Baku as an indication of their support diplomatic struggle and the beginning for Armenian interests, despite the fact of a new era for the region. To date, that the major international sponsors however, neither party has proceeded of the bilateral agreement, the US, the with the domestic ratification process. EU, and Russia, all appear to favour the Like the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the separation of the rapprochement from the normalisation process remains frozen. Nagorno-Karabakh issue. These factors The day before the signing of the intensified both government and public protocols, President spoke disagreements in Azerbaijan on Turkish- from Chisinau where he was attending Armenian normalisation. Baku’s negative the CIS Summit: reaction at first glance would seem both predictable and justified. Indeed, how I am absolutely convinced that the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and could one view the improvement of the opening of the Turkish-Armenian relations between Azerbaijan’s closest border must proceed in a parallel fashion... Between these two processes ally and its opponent as anything but there is no official link, but an unofficial a weakening of Azerbaijan’s position in

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the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute? The Nagorno-Karabakh issue to encourage concern in Baku was that by lifting Armenia on the one hand, and to urge the sanctions against Armenia, Turkey Minsk Group’s co-chair countries to would be implicitly tolerating what it increase pressures on Armenia on the deemed unacceptable in 1993, and this other. But after the signing of the move would run counter to the interests protocols, which increased domestic of Azerbaijan, a country that perceives tensions in Turkey, Ankara could only Turkey as its chief ally. link the ratification to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in loose The main criticism was focused on the terms: “If the process [of Armenian text of protocols, which did not include and Azerbaijani negotiations] speeds any reference to the resolution of the up, the ratification of the protocols Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Arguably, with Armenia will also accelerate,” said Turkey’s perceived obligation to link the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan the day normalisation process to the Karabakh after signing the protocols.42 issue should have been indicated before the start of negotiations, given that the For the most part, the Azerbaijani closure of the borders between Armenia government’s position was shared by and Turkey was itself the result of the domestic political leaders, analysts, and occupation of Azerbaijani territory by the public. Vaga Guluzade, ex-national Armenian forces. But the nature of the security and foreign policy adviser of long-frozen diplomatic relations, which former President , said continued to cause problems right up publicly that “I consider this to be a until the actual signing of the protocols, betrayal of Azerbaijan’s interests and a made this extremely precarious. deception of the Turkish and Azerbaijani Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether public. This contradicts the promises the “condition” of Nagorno-Karabakh made personally by Turkish Prime was brought up after the reaction of the Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to MPs Turkish and Azerbaijani populations, as and the public in Baku.”43 claimed by the Armenian media and as stated by Armenia during the signing The Turning Point of the protocols, or whether it had been broached at an earlier stage at the Just days after the signing of the Zurich government level. Opinions expressed Protocols, the emotional dimension of by the Turkish media and in official Turkey-Azerbaijan bilateral relations statements argued that during the signing became very apparent. In a second round of protocols, Turkey wanted to use the of “football diplomacy”, the Turkish and

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Armenian presidents were present at a rapprochement with Armenia. Support World Cup qualifying match between in Turkey for Azerbaijan was driven their teams in .44 When officials in by pragmatic concerns as much as the Bursa did not allow the Azerbaijani flag proclaimed brotherhood; there was a to be brought into the stadium- in line real fear that the ruling party was tearing with a decision by FIFA officials- and the country away from its most valuable when a Turkish police officer showed strategic partner. While the incident disrespect for the flag, a diplomatic crisis damaged Azerbaijan’s image in Turkey- ensued. The Azerbaijani media erupted, with Turkish nationalists warning Baku and in retaliation for the “flag scandal” “not to mess with the Turkish flag”45- in Bursa the Azerbaijani authorities its ultimate effect was to shock both lowered the Turkish flags that fly in countries into their own rapprochement. Baku’s ’ Alley, the burial place The brief taste of animosity had been of Turkish soldiers who fought for the sufficiently unpleasant to scare them liberation of Baku in 1918. back into friendship.

It is clear to Russia and to many Conclusions: Realities others that peace with Turkey Revealed, Lessons Learned alone is not enough to integrate Yerevan into the West or to Following this unexpected sea change reduce Russian influence there. in diplomatic relations, the Nagorno- Karabakh peace process, which Turkey had initially sought to disentangle from The flag crisis marked a turning point the negotiations of the two protocols, in the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Armenian was revitalised. Turkish Prime Minister dynamic. Prior to the insult at Martyrs’ Erdoğan called for the combination of Alley, Turkish public opinion was for the two peace processes when he met the most part pro-Azerbaijani. Beyond with US President on 7 the public, Turkish opposition parties December 2009, and again at a meeting had harshly condemned Erdoğan with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir and the AKP government, accusing Putin on 13 January 2010. them of selling out their allies for the rapprochement process. This public and Armenia did not immediately halt political support pushed both Erdoğan the ratification process; the protocols and Gül to reiterate that Nagorno- were approved by the Constitutional Karabakh was a pre-condition for Court on 12 January 2010. In Armenia

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every international agreement must suspended. Accordingly, on 26 April, the first be examined by the Constitutional bill on the ratification of these protocols Court before being passed on to the was withdrawn from the agenda of the parliament. The court approved the National Assembly. Thus less than a year documents, though marked parts of the after the signing of the protocols, the preamble based on three main concerns. region’s pre-2008 geopolitical dynamic Firstly, Armenia would continue in its had been restored. The process revealed efforts to gain worldwide recognition of the political and diplomatic realities of the 1915 events as genocide. The ruling the region, providing guidance for future reminded President Sargsyan that “the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. of Armenia stands in support Turkish political elites had believed of the task of achieving international that the Ankara-Yerevan rapprochement recognition of the 1915 Genocide in would help reduce Russian influence in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia” Armenia, with some parties suggesting as regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian that pro-Russian groups in Baku opposed Declaration of Independence. Secondly, the normalisation on those grounds. In it rejected any connection between the the end, Russia actually supported the new agreement with Turkey and the process, arguably for the purpose of Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Thirdly, and creating tensions between Turkey and most significantly, it stated that the Azerbaijan, and damaging their energy implementation of the protocols did not cooperation. imply Armenia’s official recognition of Better relations between Ankara and the existing Turkish-Armenian border as Yerevan, most US strategists contended, established by the 1921 Treaty of . would help not only to stabilise the In doing so, the Constitutional Court volatile South Caucasus but also reduce rejected one of the main premises of Armenia’s political and economic the protocols, “the mutual recognition dependence on Russia and Iran, which of the existing border between the two clearly serves American interests. countries as defined by relevant treaties However, as long as there are Russian of international law”. military bases inside Armenia and along On 22 April 2010, President Sargsyan its borders, and Armenian airspace is issued a decree whereby the ratification under the protection of Russian forces, procedure of the Armenia-Turkey Armenia can easily resist any sort of protocols on normalisation of relations pressure from Azerbaijan or Turkey, between the two countries was formally and can safely push back any threat of

202 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols military force to liberate the occupied stated ambitions to become a regional territories. It is clear to Russia and to energy hub.47 But with the suspension many others that peace with Turkey alone of the rapprochement, strategic relations is not enough to integrate Yerevan into between Turkey and Azerbaijan have the West or to reduce Russian influence intensified, particularly in the energy there. This was amply demonstrated sector. In September 2010, the two by the agreement Armenia signed to countries signed a bilateral Agreement prolong the lease for Russian military on Strategic Partnership and Mutual bases shortly after the normalisation Support, and since then, relations have process was suspended.46 continued to bounce back with vigour. The signing of the intergovernmental One consequence of the whole crisis agreement on the Trans Anatolian gas has been the deterioration in US- pipeline (TANAP) on 26 June 2012 Azerbaijani relations. Baku criticised the signalled a high degree of mutual trust, policy the US pursued in pushing Turkey as well as the persuasive power of the to open the border with Armenia, despite energy card. the non-resolution of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. From Baku’s point The full impact of what now seems of view, Washington’s failure to appoint an intense but fleeting crisis remains a US ambassador to Azerbaijan during to be seen, and meanwhile, Turkey has this period was a further insult. It was been able to pursue its ambitions as an only after the rapprochement was international peace-broker over another border, in . The violence emanating suspended that visits by high-level US from Syria, compounded by the influx of officials started to increase, and at the refugees and the diplomatic and military end of 2010, the US finally appointed a demands entailed in its Middle Eastern new ambassador to Azerbaijan, though role have occupied Ankara almost without ultimately Obama was unable to secure a break. However, 2015, the centenary his reappointment following pressure of the 1915 events in Armenia, is likely from the Armenian lobby. to bring about renewed pressure on Energy relations played a crucial role in Ankara to consider diplomatic relations the process. During the crisis in Turkish- with Armenia. The challenge for Turkish Azerbaijani relations, Ankara had feared policy makers will be to negotiate a range that by signing energy contracts with of competing and conflicting political, Russia’s Gazprom, and not explicitly diplomatic, and economic demands- supporting the Nabucco project, Baku within a neighbourhood and region that was distancing itself from Turkey’s is certainly less stable than it was in 2008.

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Endnotes

1 The full text of President Sargsyan’s statement is available at http://www.armenianweekly. com/2010/04/22/president-sarkisian-announces-suspension-of-protocols/ [last visited 21 December 2012]. 2 Paule Goble, “Azerbaijan after Georgia: Ten Shattered Assumptions of Azerbaijani Foreign Policy”, ADA Biweekly, Vol. 1, No. 14-15 (1 September 2008). 3 Mamuka Tsereteli, The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor, Washington DC, Jamestown Foundation Publication, 2009, p. 13. 4 Andrew Kramer, “Peace Plan Offers Russia a Rationale to Advance”, New York Times, 13 August 2008. 5 “Bush condemns ‘bullying’ Russia”, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ /7563452.stm [last visited 21 January 2012]. 6 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa [last visited 22 December 2012]. 7 Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey’s Push for Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”, ADA Biweekly, at http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/issues/154/20090327042427262.html [last visited 20 January 2012]. 8 Igor Torbakov, The Georgian Crisis and Russia–Turkey Relations, Washington DC, Jamestown Foundation Publication, 2008, p. 23. 9 Zaur Shiriyev’s interview with Georgian political analyst Professor Ghia Nodia, 16 August 2011, Tbilisi, Georgia. 10 Igor Torbakov, “Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April- June 2010), pp. 31-39. 11 Archive of the US State Department, “1993 UN Security Council Resolutions on Nagorno- Karabakh”, at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm [last visited 27 December 2012]. 12 “Turkish-Armenian Secret Talks Wiretapped”, Musavat, at http://www.musavat.com/new/ G%C3%BCnd%C9%99m/51432-T%C3%9CRK%C4%B0Y%C6%8F-ERM%C6%8F N%C4%B0STAN_G%C4%B0ZL%C4%B0_DANI%C5%9EIQLARI_D%C4%B0NL %C6%8FN%C4%B0L%C4%B0B [last visited 20 January 2012]. 13 “Erdoğan in Bid to Mend Fences with Baku”, Today’s Zaman, 13 May 2009. 14 “Erdoğan Puts Baku’s Armenia Concerns to Rest”, Today’s Zaman, 14 May 2009. 15 “Azerbaijan Seeks to Thwart Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement”, RFE/RL, at http:// www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Seeks_To_Thwart_TurkishArmenian_Rapprochement/ 1603256.html [last visited 26 December 2012].

204 The Unexpected Outcomes of the Zurich Protocols

16 Hasan Selim Özertem, “The Impasse in Turkish-Armenian Relations, Armenia 2010: Previous Activities Future Prospects”, , University of Tehran, at http://www.usak.org. tr/EN/makale.asp?id=1679 last visited 26 December 2012]. 17 “Abdullah Gül’den Önemli Açıklamalar”, Yeni Şafak, 29 April 2009. 18 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-april-2009_-press- release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa. [lat visited 10 January 2013]. 19 President’s Library, Ilham Aliyev’s Meetings in 2009, p. 89, at http://files.preslib.az/site/ ialiyev/2009.pdf [last visited 3 January 2013]. 20 “Armeniya Vidit Reseniya Karabaxskom Probleme Tolko v Ramkax Minskoy Gruppu”- (Armenia sees Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Framework of OSCE Minsk Group), News Armenia, 27 April 2009. 21 “MPs Accuse Ankara of Treachery”, Azadliq Radiosu, at http://www.azadliq.org/content/ article/1606342.html [last visited 3 January 2013]. 22 “Azerbaijani MP’s visit Bahçeli”, Cihan Haber Ajansı, at http://www.haberler.com/azeri- milletvekilleri-bahceli-yi-ziyaret-etti-haberi/ [last visited 4 January 2013]. 23 “Azerbaijani Opposition Leaders Believes in Ankara’s Statements on Impossibility of Opening Turkey-Armenia Border Without Solving Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, APA, at http://az.apa.az/news.php?id=151162 [last visited 4 January 2013]. 24 “Türkiye’den Ermenistan’a Geçen yıl 11 bin Tır Sefer Yapmıştır”, Bakı Haber, at http://baki- xeber.com/2009/03/04/get=24374 [last visited 5 January 2013]. 25 OSCE/ODIHR, Election Observation Mission Final Report: Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Election, at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/35625 [last visited 4 January 2013]. 26 “Government and Pro-Government Media are against Turkey’’, Azadlıq Daily, 10 April 2009. 27 See, “AKP Betrays Azerbaijan”, Yeni Musavat, at http://www.musavat.com/new/wapread. php?news_id=47910 [last visited 5 January 2013]. 28 Ismayıl Musayev, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy (20th Century), Vol. 1, Baku, Economic University Publication, 2001, p. 226. 29 Sedat Laçiner, “Russia Dupes Azerbaijan?”, USAK, at http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale. asp?id=962 [last visited 4 January 2013]. 30 Cengiz Çandar, “Does Azerbaijan Follow ‘One Nation-Two States’ Concept?”, Hürriyet, 23 April 2009. 31 “Is Turkey Sinner?”, Azadlıg Daily, 11 April 2009. 32 Konul Shamilgizi, “Why Azerbaijan Don’t Recognize PKK as Terrorist Organization?”, Mediaforum, at http://www.mediaforum.az/az/2009/05/21/

205 Zaur Shiriyev & Celia Davies

AZ%C6%8FRBAYCAN-N%C4%B0Y%C6%8F-PKK-n%C4%B1-TERRO%C3%87U- T%C6%8F%C5%9EK%C4%B0LAT-K%C4%B0M%C4%B0-TANIMIR-061018677c. html [last visited 5 January 2013]. 33 “8 Million Azerbaijan have, 70 million Turkey Haven’t National Interest?”, Mediaforum, at http://www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?article_id=20090313074421596&page=02&lang =az [last visited 5 January 2013]. 34 Leyla Aliyeva, “Historic Breakthrough Controversies: Will Azerbaijani Lands be Free Soon?”, Today’s Zaman, 10 November 2009. 35 “Regionda Proseslər dəyişir”, Şərq Qəzeti, updated version published 25 December 2009, at http://www.sherg.az/2009/12/25/read=24155 [last visited 5 January 2013]. 36 Fariz Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan Nervously Watching Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 166 (11 September 2009). 37 “En Yaxın Müttəfiqimizi Ermənistanda Itirəcəyimiz Doğrudurmu”, Bizim Yol, 8 April 2009. 38 “Turkish Government’s Betrayal of the People of Azerbaijan”, Olaylar Daily, 8 April 2009. 39 “Would Turkey Betray?”, Yeni Azerbaijan, 9 April 2009. 40 Interview with Ilham Aliyev, at http://www.day.az/news/politics/176095.html [last visited 6 January 2013]. 41 Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, at http://old.mfa.gov.az/eng/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id=580&Itemid=1 [last visited 7 January 2013]. 42 “Turkey Repeats Azerbaijan Condition to Normalize Armenia Ties”, Hürriyet Daily News, 11 October 2009. 43 “Azeri Experts Comment on Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement”, UNDP, at http://www. un-az.org/undp/bulnews75/A4.php [last visited 7 January 2013]. 44 “Diplomatic Coup at Football Match”, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ europe/8307259.stm [last visited 7 January 2013]. 45 “Bahçeli’nin Azerbaycan Eleştirisi”, Posta Gazetesi, 20 October 2009 46 “Russia to Prolong Military Presence in Armenia”, Armenian Weekly, 18 August 2010. 47 “Azerbaijani President No Fan of Turkey’s AKP, Say US Diplomats”, Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, 29 November 2010.

206 Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict

Cory WELT* Abstract Key Words

Over three years after the signing of protocols Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Nagorno- on opening diplomatic relations and land Karabakh, Minsk Group, Turkey-Armenia borders, the prospects for Turkish-Armenian normalisation, conflict resolution. normalisation in the absence of progress on the Karabakh conflict are slim. But there is also little sign of a breakthrough in the Karabakh Turkish- Armenian conflict-resolution process. Given these impasses, this article proposes an alternative way forward: Normalisation and the an unconditional opening of Turkish-Armenian Karabakh Conflict1 diplomatic relations followed by a retooling of the Basic Principles. This retooling would accept a linkage between the border opening Over three years after Turkey and and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Armenia signed two landmark protocols territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh. It would on opening diplomatic relations and also reduce ambiguities in the Basic Principles their land border, the prospects for a that have stalled the peace process to date. The article first analyses the failure of the Turkish- full normalisation of Turkish-Armenian Armenian protocols, then justifies a change in relations in the absence of progress on policy, and finally, proposes a retooled set of the Karabakh conflict are slim.2 The interim principles and focuses on intermediate steps that would help normalise Armenian- efforts of many Turks, Armenians, and Azerbaijani relations while deferring the final outside stakeholders to comprehensively settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s political decouple Turkish-Armenian relations status for a later time. from the Karabakh conflict have not borne fruit. But there is also little sign * Associate Director of the Institute for of a breakthrough in the Karabakh European, Russian and Eurasian Studies and Professorial Lecturer of International Affairs at conflict-resolution process, spearheaded George Washington University’s Elliott School by the OSCE Minsk Group, which has of International Affairs and Adjunct Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Law at the the , Russia, and as University of Edinburgh. co-chairs.

207 PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 1, pp. 207-221. Cory Welt

to forgo its policy of conditionality. It To assert the absence of a link- next justifies a change in the current age between Turkish-Armenian international approach, explaining why normalisation and the Azer- arguments for dropping the linkage baijani-Armenian conflict over are not fully compelling, and why the Nagorno-Karabakh is to depart Basic Principles have run aground. It from a longstanding reality of concludes by proposing a retooled set of Turkish foreign policy. interim principles, which includes the opening of the Turkish-Armenian land Given these impasses, this article border and focuses on intermediate steps proposes one alternative way forward: that would help normalise Armenian- an unconditional opening of Turkish- Azerbaijani relations while deferring the Armenian diplomatic relations followed final settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s by the retooling of the Basic Principles political status for a later time and underpinning the Minsk Group-led context. Karabakh peace process into a set of “interim principles” that can guide the The failed Diplomacy of the work of international peacemakers. These interim principles would accept Turkish-Armenian Protocols a linkage between the Karabakh “We will not sign a final deal with conflict and the opening of the Turkish- Armenia unless there is agreement Armenian border while reducing certain between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno Karabakh.” Turkish Prime ambiguities that have stalled the peace Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (10 process to date. At the same time, they April 2009).3 are more modest than the Basic Principles “The United States welcomes the in their pursuit of the intermediate goal statement made by Armenia and Turkey on normalization of their bilateral of conflict transformation rather than a relations. It has long been and remains final settlement of the conflict. the position of the United States that normalization should take place The article first analyses the failure of the without preconditions and within a Turkish-Armenian protocols. It argues reasonable timeframe.” US Department of State Press Statement (22 April).4 that the Turkish government erred by “Our borders were closed after the gambling on the success of the Karabakh occupation of Nagorno Karabakh. We peace process, allowing Armenia and will not open borders as long as the occupation continues. Who says this? international mediators to persuade The prime minister of the Turkish themselves that Turkey was prepared Republic says this. Can there be any

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guarantee here apart from this?” Turkish eager gaze of top diplomats from the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (13 May).5 United States, Russia, the , and Switzerland, the Turkish “I want to reiterate our very strong support for the normalization process and Armenian foreign ministers that is going on between Armenia and signed two protocols for establishing Turkey, which we have long said should take place without preconditions and diplomatic relations and opening within a reasonable timeframe.” US the land border that contained no Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (28 September).6 preconditions regarding the Karabakh conflict.10 Many assumed that Turkey To assert the absence of a had dropped its longstanding insistence linkage between Turkish-Armenian that normalisation was contingent on normalisation and the Azerbaijani- Armenian troop withdrawal. Armenian conflict over Nagorno- Karabakh is to depart from a longstanding reality of Turkish foreign The sea change in Turkey’s Ar- policy. In 1993, Turkey sealed its land menia policy in 2009, therefore, border with Armenia, previously open was not to delink Turkish-Ar- to humanitarian shipments of wheat, menian normalisation from the after Armenian forces seized the large Karabakh conflict but to open mountainous Azerbaijani region of negotiations. Kelbajar, sandwiched between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.7 The Turkish government said the border would Within a few weeks, however, it remain closed- and diplomatic relations was clear that conditionality had not unopened- until Armenian forces been dropped. Instead of ratifying the withdrew from Azerbaijani territory.8 protocols, Turkish parliamentarians This policy has remained in place for 20 from the ruling party and the opposition years. insisted that normalisation would proceed only after progress was made on In April 2009, after months of quiet the Karabakh conflict, a position Turkish preparation, Turkey appeared to reverse officials subsequently affirmed. course, issuing a joint statement with Armenia that the two countries had What went wrong? Did the Turkish “agreed on a comprehensive framework government intentionally mislead its for the normalization of their bilateral Armenian counterpart and international relations.”9 Six months later, under the mediators, who had been regularly

209 Cory Welt

insisting upon normalisation “without This, however, was not the way many preconditions and within a reasonable supporters of normalisation understood timeframe”?11 Not if you judge by the the disconnect between Turkish officials’ public statements of Turkish officials. public statements and their seemingly Throughout the process, Prime Minister sincere pursuit of normalisation. One Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly reading was that Turkish officials may linked a successful conclusion of the have been insisting on progress in normalisation process to progress on Karabakh for domestic purposes or Karabakh (see, for example, his quotations to reassure Azerbaijan, but they had at the top of this article). While Turkish genuinely embarked on a new course Foreign Ministers and, and were committed to seeing it through after him, Ahmet Davutoğlu were more to its end. Another was that the Turkish circumspect in their public statements, political elite was divided, but that the observers interpreted their statements “doves”, including President Abdullah emphasising the importance of achieving Gül, supported normalisation and parallel solutions as an echo of the Prime would ultimately be victorious.13 Yet Minister’s assertions.12 another was that the government had The sea change in Turkey’s Armenia belatedly come under heavy pressure policy in 2009, therefore, was not to from Azerbaijan President Ilham delink Turkish-Armenian normalisation Aliyev, who came to the realisation that from the Karabakh conflict but to open Turkey might actually move forward negotiations- carry them, really, to their with normalisation if he did not derail very end- without waiting for signs of the process, but that Baku’s efforts to progress on Karabakh. While some in the influence Turkish decision making, Turkish government may have supported including threats to divert natural gas the dropping of conditionality, in the exports passing through Turkey, were end official policy only sought to make destined to fail. The Turkish government’s conditionality more respectable. The decision to let Davutoğlu sign the Turkish leadership appears to have protocols in a high-profile international believed that participating in negotiations venue inescapably strengthened the view would allow it to signal a sincere desire to that the government was serious about normalise relations, chart a clear vision normalisation without preconditions. for the future of Turkish-Armenian relations, and, possibly, ease the way for But in the end, the government did Armenia to adopt a more pliable position not try very hard, if at all, to secure on the Karabakh conflict. parliamentary approval of the protocols.

210 Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict

One day after signing the protocols, on a set of so-called Basic Principles for Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasised settling the Karabakh conflict, could be the linkage that had been conspicuously brought to a successful close before the absent from the documents themselves, Turkish parliament was to ratify the noting that “as long as Armenia does protocols.16 In this way, Turkey would be not withdraw from occupied territories able to square the circle of its Armenia in Azerbaijan, Turkey cannot take up policy: conditionality would be satisfied a positive position.”14 This statement informally without it having been made led many to conclude that the Turkish an explicit part of the process. government had been misleading While there were some grounds to Armenia and international supporters of believe progress on the Basic Principles normalisation all along.15 might be possible, the prospect of an Insincerity, however, is not the only agreement was still highly uncertain. possible explanation for the protocols’ The chances for success were certainly failure. One might say that the Turkish not so great as to make a prominent government was instead guilty of endeavour like the normalisation process sloppy diplomacy. It expected Armenia dependent upon it. But it was either this and international mediators to treat or ending the “feel-good” diplomacy its representatives’ informal public of the protocols, an outcome that no statements with the same significance stakeholder wanted. as their formal negotiating stance. It Subsequently, Turkish officials also failed to directly counter Armenian blamed the Armenian government and US government assertions that for the protocols’ fate. In January normalisation was to be achieved without 2010, Armenia’s constitutional court preconditions. Most astonishingly, ruled that the protocols “cannot be Turkish officials do not appear to have interpreted or applied… in a way that warned the Armenian government would contradict” an article in Armenia’s or international mediators that the declaration of independence underlining protocols, if signed, would almost Armenia’s support for the “international certainly not be ratified. recognition of the 1915 Genocide At the same time, the Turkish claims in Ottoman Turkey and Western government appears to have been Armenia.”17 Following this decision, playing a risky game- betting that the Turks accused Armenia of belatedly latest stage of the Karabakh conflict introducing its own precondition for resolution process, specifically agreement implementing the protocols, namely

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Turkish genocide claims recognition. normalisation in the absence of progress However, the ruling did not in fact change on the Karabakh conflict remain the status quo: clearly the Armenian slim. At a press conference in Baku government had not repudiated the in September 2012, Prime Minister country’s declaration of independence Erdoğan emphasised that the withdrawal when it signed the protocols. of Armenian forces from at least “one or Nonetheless, Turkish dissatisfaction with two districts” is a precondition for the the constitutional court’s ruling ensured opening of the Turkish border.19 that the government would make no This may be disappointing but it is not further effort to have parliament ratify that surprising. Indeed, arguments for the protocols. opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally may be attractive, but Supporters of normalisation they have never been fully compelling. rightly seek to implement more One argument is that Turkey has long modest steps to incrementally had new economic and foreign policy regain confidence and trust. priorities that would benefit from the border opening. But economic interests and Turkey’s aspirations to become a In the end, the diplomatic consensus regional “center of gravity” are equally to ignore Turkey’s consistent, if informal, well served by keeping the interests of linkage between normalisation and Azerbaijan, their co-religious and co- conflict resolution alienated Turkey ethnic neighbour and energy partner, from Azerbaijan; lent Armenia an close to heart. A second argument is unwarranted optimism that change was that the border closure has failed as a in the air; made Turkish policymakers look inconsistent, duplicitous, or mechanism of conflict resolution. But uncertain; reinforced the fragmentation while this is demonstrably true, Turkey of US policy across the region; and, in might still wish to implement it as a the end, had terminal consequences for punitive sanction, until Armenia decides the Turkish-Armenian protocols.18 for other reasons to withdraw from Azerbaijani territory. What Now? A third argument is that opening the border could facilitate conflict More than three years later, the resolution. Armenia’s sense of security prospects for full Turkish-Armenian might increase, which could lead it

212 Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict to impute a lesser sense of risk in its allure of trying to retake at least some dealings with Azerbaijan and enable territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh all Turkey to become productively increase the odds of an eventual renewal involved in the Karabakh conflict- of conflict. In this context, supporters of resolution process. Normalisation’s role Turkish-Armenian normalisation need as an element of conflict resolution not guarantee it will have a positive has had great rhetorical appeal for the impact on the Karabakh peace process; US government, a principal backer of they simply have to suggest that it might. normalisation without preconditions. On the other hand, the border opening In two speeches in 2010 and 2011, could also have the unintended effect of Assistant Secretary of State Phillip H. increasing Azerbaijani desperation to the Gordon noted that normalisation is “a point that Baku concludes that war is its step towards genuine reconciliation in best option. the region”, a “contribut[or] to further So, while there are good arguments trust and peace and stability, not just for opening the border without making for Turkey and Armenia but elsewhere progress on the Karabakh conflict, none as well”, “the true path to peace and are so compelling to push Turkey toward stability and reconciliation in the full normalisation. This does not mean region”, and something that “holds out that the process of Turkish-Armenian the prospect of positive transformative rapprochement must be halted change in the region”.20 However, these however. In the absence of forward laudable sentiments remain untested: movement on Karabakh, supporters of increased security on Armenia’s western normalisation rightly seek to implement front could just as well provide Yerevan more modest steps to incrementally with the “strategic depth” it needs to regain confidence and trust. Thomas avoid making compromises on its eastern de Waal, for example, has proposed an front. appealing list of measures that include A final argument is simply that increased Turkish connections to the something must be done, as the status Armenian diaspora (primarily via quo is increasingly tenuous and risks tourism), direct Turkish Airline flights renewed war.21 An Azerbaijani-Armenian to Yerevan, limited border crossings, arms race, Azerbaijan’s loss of faith in and electricity sales.22 It is also vital to negotiations, the ambiguity of Russian continue efforts to promote cross-border treaty obligations to Armenia in the business, civil society, academic, media, event of an internal conflict, and the film, and cultural connections, along

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the lines of the multifaceted “Support From Basic Principles to for Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement Interim Principles (SATR)” project that the US Agency for International Development funded, A further- if more controversial- way with implementation by the Eurasia forward would be for international Partnership Foundation and Armenian peacemakers to accept a linkage between 23 and Turkish partners from 2010-2012. the border opening and the Karabakh At the same time, irrespective of conflict. This does not mean positioning the fate of the protocols, it would be the border opening as some kind of prudent to continue pushing for at least looming demand or precondition. one of the two goals of the protocols: Instead, it could be included as one the unconditional establishment of element of several in a retooled set diplomatic relations between Turkey of “interim principles” peacemakers and Armenia. In retrospect, the absence could use to guide their work rather of diplomatic relations appears to than continue to push for Armenian have been more a casualty of the early and Azerbaijani acceptance of the more decision to close Turkey’s borders than ambitious Basic Principles that have the reasoned intervention of an external underpinned the Karabakh conflict actor seeking leverage. The Armenian resolution process for years. state has lost little from the absence of While laudable in intent, the Basic diplomatic relations and has relatively Principles have proven too difficult to little to gain from their establishment. At swallow. The main problem lies with what the same time, establishing diplomatic originally must have seemed their greatest relations would offer a promising strength: a “constructive ambiguity” that foundation for Turkish-Armenian creates the appearance of agreement rapprochement. It would provide by papering over critical differences consular and representative services to between Azerbaijan and Armenia.24 For assist travellers, workers, and businesses instance, the Basic Principles call for of both countries; establish a mechanism “return of the territories surrounding for formal communication between Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani Turkey and Armenia that could maintain control” and the establishment of “a momentum for full normalisation; corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno- and conceivably help facilitate Turkey’s Karabakh,” but Azerbaijan and Armenia productive engagement in the Karabakh have been unable to agree on the timing peace process. of the return of territories (whether

214 Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict or not to allow Armenia to hold some Rather than continuing to search territories as “insurance” pending a final for the magic formula that will secure settlement) and the size of the corridor agreement on the Basic Principles as they (a road? a region? two regions?). While stand, it may be time to contemplate a set the Basic Principles call for “the right of more explicitly interim principles. The of all internally displaced persons and aim of such interim principles would not refugees to return to their former places be to establish a framework for finalising of residence”, they fail to address the Nagorno-Karabakh’s political status. It is timing and sequence of that return. Most much too early for that. importantly, while the Basic Principles Instead, the aim is to achieve a feasible call for a “future determination of the interim stage that would increase security final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh for all parties, redress at least some of through a legally binding expression of the consequences of conflict, catalyse will”, this principle has run aground on trans-boundary activity, and ultimately the details of its referendum-sounding transform the conflict environment in measure (who will vote? when?). In a way that could facilitate the parties’ essence, Armenia seeks guarantees that eventual entry into the final, more the population of Nagorno-Karabakh difficult, stages of a political settlement. will be able to vote for independence Such interim principles would accept at a specified time in the future, the existing linkage to the opening of while Azerbaijan seeks to promote an the Turkish-Armenian border while intentionally ambiguous proposal on reducing the number of unbridgeable Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status that, ambiguities enshrined in the Basic in President Aliyev’s words, is to be Principles. At the same time, they would “put forward at an unspecified time in not be complete: they would not resolve the future and in an indefinite form”.25 the Karabakh conflict in its entirety, and Other principles- an “interim status for they would not strive to give Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees or Armenia all that they have sought in for security and self-governance” and the negotiations to date. They also would “international security guarantees not represent a package to be delivered that would include a peacekeeping to the Armenian and Azerbaijani operation”- are less disputed on the for their formal consent. surface, although these terms also hide Instead, they would serve as mutually differences that will emerge in efforts to agreed-upon guidelines for the work make these elements more concrete.26 of the OSCE Minsk Group and other

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international peacemakers, who would removal of snipers and mines along then convey to Armenia and Azerbaijan the line of control; their intention to direct resolution - an interim status for Nagorno- efforts towards achieving these interim Karabakh that provides guarantees elements of a peace process. for security and self-governance; - international security guarantees After raising hopes, the Turkish- that would include a peacekeeping Armenian normalisation process operation. of 2009 failed to come to Such retooled interim principles fruition or spur a breakthrough would be of benefit to both Azerbaijan in the Karabakh peace process. and Armenia. Azerbaijan will have retained Turkey’s commitment to make One set of interim principles that fits the opening of the border contingent this bill is the following: on the withdrawal of Armenian forces. It will have the prospect of receiving - the opening of the Turkish-Armenian land border; much of its territory outside Nagorno- Karabakh, enabling the return of - the return of all territories internally displaced persons (IDPs). surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia to Azerbaijani control, except the will be allowed to assert their right Lachin and Kelbajar districts, which of return or restitution.27 Finally, the will remain under interim Armenian agreement would not bring about any control; change in international interpretations - the right of all internally displaced of Azerbaijan’s de jure territorial integrity. persons and refugees to voluntarily Armenia would also gain from such an return to their former places of agreement. It would receive the expected residence or seek property restitution, benefits of a border opening with with the modalities of return to Turkey and it would continue to retain Lachin, Kelbajar, and Nagorno- control (on an interim basis) of the two Karabakh to be determined at a later territories it deems most strategic for time; the defence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The - a commitment by all parties to the latter would receive an internationally- non-use of force, including the mandated codification of its rights

216 Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict of self-government (“interim status”) These interim principles also do not for the foreseeable future. Armenian resolve all ambiguities. They do not insist refugees and IDPs from Azerbaijan upon a specific formula for the timing of Armenian withdrawals from the rest of would be able to assert their right of the occupied territories outside Nagorno- return or restitution, while the return Karabakh, for example. They also do not of Azerbaijani IDPs would be managed clarify the content of “interim status” in phases. Nagorno-Karabakh would and “international security guarantees”. be provided with international security Hammering out the details of such points guarantees to prevent Azerbaijan from in mutually acceptable fashion and with deploying military forces against it. a unified approach by the international actors who will have roles in these This does not mean it will be easy to structures will remain challenging.28 reach an agreement on or implement a retooled set of interim principles. The Conclusion Armenian government has long insisted that any linkage between the border After raising hopes, the Turkish- opening and the Karabakh conflict is a Armenian normalisation process of 2009 failed to come to fruition or spur non-starter, and the US government has a breakthrough in the Karabakh peace repeatedly and vocally agreed with that. process. With neither the protocols nor Armenia has also long been unwilling the Basic Principles offering a promising to give up territory outside Nagorno- way forward along separate tracks, it is Karabakh without a clear guarantee worthwhile to consider how the two that the breakaway autonomous region processes might be constructively linked. will eventually have the opportunity to At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that neither track is ripe for a opt for formal independence. For its “grand” solution. part, the Azerbaijani government will not want to risk signalling any kind of The above analysis offers one way to weave the two processes together with consent to the continued occupation an eye toward gradual- and, in the case of Lachin and Kelbajar, the drawing of Karabakh, open-ended- resolution. of distinctions among groups of IDPs, Other models, for instance alternating or the right of IDPs to seek restitution incremental steps on each track, might instead of return. also be worth considering: for starters,

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Armenian withdrawal from one or two substantial and courageous on-the- territories in exchange for the Turkish ground efforts to prepare populations border opening, for example. for peace that, to varying degrees, the Turkish, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Any such approaches will encounter governments have not been willing (or many challenges, as have the approaches able) to make. But the protocols and the before them, and success is not Basic Principles have run their course. guaranteed. At the same time, all formal It’s time to find something to take their conflict-resolution processes require place.

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Endnotes

1 This article is a revised and updated version of “To Link or Not To Link? Turkey-Armenia Normalization and the Karabakh Conflict”, Caucasus International, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 53-62. The author thanks the editorial board of Caucasus International for their reprint permission. 2 In this article, “Karabakh” refers to all the territories that are the focus of conflict, including the territory of what was known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region) in Soviet times and the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that are presently occupied by Armenian forces. “Nagorno-Karabakh” refers to the territory of the Soviet-era Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. 3 “Turkish PM Sets Conditions to Armenia Reconciliation: Report”, Agence France Presse, 10 April 2009. 4 US Department of State, “Press Statement: Turkey and Armenia: Normalization of Relations”, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/122065.htm [last visited 22 January 2013]. 5 ANS TV (Baku), 13 May 2009. 6 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Armenian Foreign Minister H.E. Edward Nalbandian After Their Meeting”, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129687. htm [last visited 12 January 2012]. 7 Armenian forces captured a smaller amount of territory, the so-called “Lachin corridor”, outside Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, and additional territories later in the war. For a history of the Karabakh conflict, see, Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York, NYU Press, 2003. 8 “Turk Says Russia is Tangled in Caucasus War”, New York Times, 15 April 1993. 9 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-april-2009_-press- release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa [last visited 28 January 2013]. 10 The protocols are available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?93e41cc9-832f-4ec7-a629- a920bfdbb432. 11 See, the two US Department of State statements that opened this article, as well as, “President met in with the , Abdullah Gül”, Office to the President of the Republic of Armenia ,at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/ item/2009/05/07/news-511/ [last visited 03 February 2013]. 12 See, for example, Charles Recknagel and Andrew Tully, “Turkey Signals Opening to Armenia Must Include Nagorno-Karabakh Process”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Signals_Opening_To_Armenia_Must_Include_ NagornoKarabakh_Progress/1613844.html [last visited 21 January 2012]; “Turkey Still Committed to Preconditions in Armenia Talks”, Asbarez, at http://asbarez.com/68790/

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turkey-%e2%80%98still-committed%e2%80%99-to-armenia-talks-with-preconditions/ [last visited 22 January 2012]. 13 Turkish President Abdullah Gül avoided making explicit statements linking the two processes and did not attempt to debunk the notion put forward by Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian in May 2009 that the two had agreed to “move forward with normalization without preconditions and within a reasonable time frame”. See the two US Department of State statements that opened this article, as well as “President Serzh Sargsyan met in Prague with the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül”, Office to the President of the Republic of Armenia, at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2009/05/07/news-511/ [last visited 03 February 2013]. 14 See, for example, “Little Fun for Soccer Fans, Giant Leap for Rapprochement”, Today’s Zaman, 13 October 2009. 15 In particular, the suspicion was that the Turkish government had agreed to declare the formal start of the normalisation process only to avoid a vote in the US Congress on recognising the claims. Many believed it was no coincidence that the Turkish-Armenian statement was issued just two days before the annual 24 April commemoration of the genocide claims. For an expression of such suspicion prior to the signing of the protocols, see the US Congressional letter reprinted in Armenian National Committee of Armenia, “Over 80 House Members Slam Turkey’s Reversal on Proposed ‘Roadmap’”, at http://www. anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1745 [last visited 12 January 2013]. 16 The last publicly available statement of the Basic Principles is the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries”, at http://www.osce.org/item/51152 [last visited 20 January 2013]. 17 The text of the constitutional court’s ruling is available at http://www.concourt.am/english/ decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf [last visited 08 January 2013]; The text of Armenia’s declaration of independence is available at http://www.gov.am/en/independence/ [last visited 08 January 2013]. 18 For a detailed account of the rise and fall of the Protocols, see, David L. Phillips, Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols, New York, Columbia University, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, March 2012; Also see, Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergei Minasyan, “Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations”, Caucasus Institute Research Papers, No. 1 (January 2010); Aybars Görgülü, Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergei Minasyan, “Assessing the Rapprochment Process”, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme- Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series, May 2010; D. Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Armenia Post-Protocols: Back to Square One?”, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, Istanbul, Turkey, October 2012. 19 “Joint press conference of Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was held”, at http://en.president.az/articles/6053 [last visited 27 December 2012]. 20 See, U.S. Department of State, “The U.S. Relationship With Central Europe Under the Obama Administration”, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2011/157707.htm [last visited 12 January 2013]; “The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama

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Administration”, at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/138446.htm [last visited 12 January 2013]. 21 To these justifications might be added two others that could help explain US support for dropping conditionality: responsiveness to domestic lobbying and a possible opportunity to shift the balance of influence in the Caucasus away from Russia and toward the West. These, however, have not been publicly articulated justifications. 22 See, Thomas de Waal, “Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap”,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/05/armenia-and-turkey- bridging-gap/22p [last visited 25 January 2013]. 23 Information about the project is available at http://armturkdialogue.net/. Also see, Sinem Cengiz, “Turkish, Armenian Journalists Want the Border Opened”, Today’s Zaman, 3 June 2012; Susanne Güsten, “Using Cheese To Bridge the Turkey-Armenia Gap”, The New York Times, 24 October 2012; Göksel, “Turkey and Armenia Post-Protocols: Back to Square One?”. On a separate EU-funded collaborative film endeavour by the UK-based NGO Conciliation Resources, see, Laurence Broers, “Turks, Armenians and Azeris: Mirrors and Memories”, Journal of Conflict Transformation (Caucasus Edition), 1 November 2012, at http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/turks-armenians-and-azeris-mirrors-and-memories [last visited 12 January 2013]. 24 On the “constructive ambiguity” of the Basic Principles, see, Thomas de Waal, “The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”, Conciliation Resources, December 2008, p. 10. 25 “Opening speech by Ilham Aliyev at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers”, at http:// en.president.az/articles/4105 [last visited 22 December 2012]. In an earlier interview with Russian state television, President Aliyev also said that the determination of final status “could happen in one year, maybe in ten years, or in 100 years, or this could never happen. Time will tell”, Azertag, at http://www.azertag.com/ru/newsarchive?mod=1&date=2009- 7-6&id=252&=1 [last visited 11 December 2012]. The quotation is cited in translation in, “Nagorno-Karabagh: Getting to a Breakthrough”, International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 55 (October 2009), p. 7. 26 See, for instance, the discussion of “interim status” in, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond Exclusion: Rethinking Approaches to Status in the Nagorno Karabakh Peace Process”, Discussion Paper (February 2012). 27 On problematising the issue of “return” and a discussion of restitution and other alternatives, see Gerard Toal, “Return and its Alternatives: International Law, Norms and Practices, and Dilemmas of Ethnocratic Power, Implementation, Justice and Development” and the other contributions in Forced Displacement in the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Return and its Alternatives, , Conciliation Resources, August 2011. 28 See, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond Exclusion”, p. 7.

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