EDITORS: RAINER ARNOLD INGRIDA DANĖLIENĖ
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS DEVELOPED BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law Vilnius, 4–5 October 2019 THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS DEVELOPED BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law Vilnius, 4–5 October 2019
LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE DÉVELOPPÉ PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
XXIIe Congrès international de droit constitutionnel européen et comparé Vilnius, les 4–5 octobre 2019
EDITORS: Rainer Arnold, Ingrida Danėlienė
Vilnius 2020 The bibliographic information about the publication is available in the National Bibliographic Data Bank (NBDB) of the Martynas Mažvydas National Library of Lithuania
All rights reserved. None of the parts of this work nor its entirety may be reproduced, stored in information systems, or transmitted in any form without the prior consent guaranteed by the copyrights owners. The author is accountable for the professional level and language corrections.
ISBN 978-9955-688-46-4 (print) ISBN 978-9955-688-47-1 (online)
© Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Rainer Arnold Preface 7
Dainius Žalimas Foreword 8
Rainer Arnold The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court 11
Dainius Žalimas The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges 22
Andrej Abramović The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector 45
Luiz Cláudio Allemand Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy 56
Baron André Alen La judicialisation de conflits politiques 66
Zlatan Begić European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles 69
Toma Birmontienė The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania 97
Alexander Bröstl and Ľudmila Gajdošíková The concept of democracy and its relevant aspects in the constitutional justice of the Slovak Republic 106
Eugen Chelaru and Ramona Duminică Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national 119 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270 137
Mircea Criste Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine 149
Ingrida Danėlienė Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience 159
Francis Delaporte Le concept de démocratie développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Rapport luxembourgeois 171
Mathieu Disant Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française 178
Marcelo Figueiredo Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle 186
Selvete Gërxhaliu Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases 199
Constance Grewe Democracy in European constitutional law: A comparative perspective 221
Enver Hasani Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo 226
Cristina Hermida Del Llano Conscientious objection in democratic systems 253
Nikola Ivanovski Constitutional court protection of the principle of the rule of law as a fundamental value of the democratic order 263
Manana Kobakhidze The role of the Constitutional Court of Georgia in protecting democratic values and fundamental rights 269 César Landa Challenges of judicial appointment in Peru 283
Gabriella Mangione Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration 297
Viktor Muraviov and Nataliia Mushak The EU Court of Justice as a guardian of supranational and national democracies 310
Joakim Nergelius The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ 316
Sandrine Perera Démocratie, droits fondamentaux et justice constitutionnelle en France 342
Sophie Perez La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes 349
Étienne Picard Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit 364
Joêl Rideau Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne 388
Anna Rytel-Warzocha A priori constitutional review – Pros and cons in the light of doctrinal opinions and practical experience 410
Siniša Rodin Judicial neutrality 416
Ihor Slidenko The concept of democracy in the context of new horizons of the Ukrainian Constitution. The philosophical and conceptual basis of the new Constitution 422 Gheorghe Stan The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court 426
Andrzej Szmyt Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland 435
Arta Vorpsi (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion 450
Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec Standards of ‘indecent legislation’ in Poland 460
Jiří Zemánek The contribution of the Czech Constitutional Court to the development of democracy 466 Rainer Arnold Preface
PREFACE
Democracy is the basis of contemporary constitutionalism. It enables the individual to co-determine the essential conditions of life as they are shaped by politics. To participate in the formation of the political will is an essential aspect of individual freedom and, therefore, closely connected with human dignity. The exercise of public power must be legitimated substantially and personally by the consent of the individuals, the people. The basic principles of democratic constitutionalism are linked together: human dignity as the value basis, the principle of freedom as the twin concept of dignity, the rule of law and social justice form a functional unit. Democracy is institutionalised by a large spectrum of provisions in the constitution and in implementing legislation, in particular on the electoral system, on political parties, on the organisation and function of the parliament. How democracy as a basic idea has to be understood in detail and whether the institutions function in accordance with it has been examined by constitutional justice. The role of constitutional courts in specifying the concept of democracy is of great importance and has been, for this reason, the main topic of the XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law, co-organised with the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, which took place in Vilnius on 4–5 October 2019. The Congress has continued the long tradition of an international forum of debate and exchange of ideas for constitutional judges and academics from many countries, having taken place for 18 years in Regensburg, co-organised with the Constitutional Court of Moldova in Chisinau in 2017, with the University of Gdansk in 2018, and with the World Jurist Organisation in Madrid in February 2019. Highest gratitude is owed to the Constitutional Court of Lithuania for financing and organisation, in particular to President Prof. Dr. Dainius Žalimas and to Secretary General of the Court Dr. Ingrida Danėlienė.
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Rainer Arnold University of Regensburg, Germany
7 Dainius Žalimas Foreword
FOREWORD
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania is proud to have been able to host the XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law ‘The Concept of Democracy as Developed by Constitutional Justice’, which took place in Vilnius in October 2019. Having evolved from the idea put forward by Professor Rainer Arnold of the University of Regensburg more than twenty years ago, this Congress (sometimes also referred to as the Congress of Regensburg) has become a unique traditional annual academic forum, bringing together constitutional law scholars of universities and judges of constitutional courts from Europe and other continents to discuss the most relevant issues of constitutionalism. The Congress has greatly contributed to the reintegration of the constitutional thought of Central and Eastern Europe into the western tradition of constitutionalism. Today, both the academic society in Central and Eastern European countries and their respective constitutional courts have an opportunity to provide their input in fostering the tradition of the Congresses of Regensburg. It is no coincidence that the XXII Congress of Regensburg was hosted in Vilnius – the city that has for centuries been well-known for its multiculturalism and tolerance and has, therefore, provided a great venue to discuss the concept of pluralistic democracy. The Congress was symbolically organised in October – the month in which the Lithuanian Constitution that is currently in force was adopted, because it is precisely then that the most favourable opportunity comes to draw the attention of the national and international academic and judicial society to the common democratic values, forming the foundations of our constitutions. Obviously, the topic of this Vilnius-based Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law was not coincidental, either. In general, the rich history of the Congresses of Regensburg proves that contemporary constitutional law can no longer be solely part of the national identity, but it comprises a vast number of internationally discussed universal concepts and is based on the values and traditions of European and global constitutional heritage. Democracy is one of these concepts. The topic of the XXII Congress – ‘The Concept of Democracy as Developed by Constitutional Justice’ – will never lose its relevance since, despite national particularities, democracy everywhere entails a constant search for an optimal, constitutionally based, balance between the political will of the majority and the legitimate interests of the minority. Therefore, when we talk about democracy, it is not infrequent that we describe it as pluralistic democracy, parliamentary democracy, constitutional democracy, etc. As it was once pointed out by a famous Lithuanian philosopher, Leonidas Donskis, ‘democracy is not “democratorship”, whose entire essence lies in the logic of “50 + 1”; but democracy is respect for minorities, including the clear perception that a political majority is nothing else than a constantly changing coalition of minorities’. Most
8 recently, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania faced the need to note it explicitly that, in fact, a state can be democratic only if it respects the human dignity of everyone. This concept of democracy, which is opposite to democratorship, is also linked to the concept of the Constitution as an anti-majoritarian act. Modern constitutionalism is inconceivable without democracy, and the concept of democracy permeates specific constitutional issues. After all, we are talking about the principles that stem from the constitution in relation to elections and referendums as institutions of direct democracy. Notably, such, democratic, principles of elections and referendums must prevent the use of these institutions for destroying the foundations of democracy through populist promises and ideas. We are also talking here about the democratic law-making principles deriving from the constitution, which must ensure the participation of citizens in the legislative process, as well as the publicity and transparency of this process. The axiom is that no pluralistic democracy is possible without free and independent media, and no parliamentary democracy can be achieved without the guarantees for the activity of the opposition. Unfortunately, in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe, we still have to remember the importance of the independence of courts in ensuring constitutional democracy. In our world that is changing at the speed of lightning, democratic principles face demanding challenges, which require an effective response without changing the essence of these principles. We do not need to look far to find examples – we can recall social networks, where the spread of societal faults has already been legally restricted, and yet these networks are still used as a convenient ground for the exchange of disinformation and the dissemination of propaganda glorifying totalitarian ideologies. Although the states must prevent this, they may not impose just any type of measures, such as those that would disproportionately restrict freedom of expression. A legal system does not change at the speed of modern technologies; hence, urgent solutions are not always found and are not always the best. All these and other issues related to the protection of democracy in constitutional justice were discussed during the XXII Congress of Regensburg in Vilnius. I believe that the aim of this Congress is accurately conveyed through the idea expressed by early 20th-century U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: ‘the great thing in the world is not so much where we stand, as in what direction we are moving’. Indeed, we will all probably acknowledge that democracy is an eternal and irreplaceable constitutional value (this is how it is perceived in Lithuania as a result of the activity of the Constitutional Court). It is, therefore, particularly important to assess where we are heading in response to the challenges arising to democracy and whether we are not departing away from what may not be denied – the essence of true democracy and its principles. The Congress provided an excellent opportunity not only to discuss different aspects of democracy along with the arising challenges, but also to compare the directions of our countries, through the exchange of experience
9 and ideas on how to counter these challenges. Evidently, as it was also shown by the discussions of the Congress, the direction that we have to take in defending democracy as an eternal value is protecting it by fostering its spirit and, at the same time, complementing it with modern colours. This publication has been prepared with a view to enabling the ideas expressed by the participants of the XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law to reach as many readers as possible. Here you will find the contributions presented by the speakers of the Congress and participants of the discussions, as well as the galleries of photographs, reminding us of the moments of the Congress. Particularly profound gratitude is owed to Professor Rainer Arnold, who has inspired and fostered the Congresses of Regensburg, both for the very idea of the Congress and for having chosen the capital of our country as the host of the XXII Congress. I am also very grateful to all the guests who honoured the event with their participation. I hope that this publication will not only remind you of the meaningful discussions of the Congress but will also encourage you to come back to Lithuania once again.
Prof. Dr. Dainius Žalimas President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
10 Rainer Arnold The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Rainer Arnold University of Regensburg, Germany I. DEMOCRACY AS A BASIC VALUE OF CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONALISM I.1. GENERAL REFLECTION Liberal constitutionalism is individual – oriented, anthropocentric and based on fundamental values that are interconnected and form, altogether, a ‘functional unit’. Each of these values is indispensable for the existence of the other. These values are: human dignity, which implies the principle of freedom of the individual, democracy and the rule of law. Democracy, the subject of our Congress, means political self-determination of the individuals who, in their entirety, form the people whose sovereignty is the basis of legitimation for the exercise of public power. It is ultimately Rousseau’s idea that the individual is born free and has to consent to the necessary restrictions in favour of the common interest, which basically results from the equality of all the members of society, of the people as a whole. However, freedom is clearly the principle and restriction of freedom is the exception that is only legitimate if there is the consent of the individuals. This consent is expressed by a law that is made by the people, regularly, by its representatives in the parliament or, in some systems, by the people’s direct vote. The process of democracy is, therefore, essentially individual-related, aiming at producing the consent for the necessary restrictions of freedom. It is quite convincing, what the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has declared, that democracy (in the relevant case, the Lisbon Treaty case referred to the aspect of the electoral system) is close to human dignity.1 Self-determination as far as freedom restrictions are concerned gives legitimation through the democratic process. Even without the direct restriction of freedom, codetermination of the political destiny of the individuals by themselves is indispensable. What is essential in life cannot be determined without the decisive influence of the individuals; politics must for this reason lie in the hands of the people. The rule of law institutionalises the individual-related values, gives them constitutional, that is supreme, rank in the normative hierarchy and provides
1 The FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (English translation by the Court), para. 211.
11 Rainer Arnold institutions that are able to realise these values adequately, in conformity with the separation of powers and with the principle of value efficiency. The functional unit of these basic values, which are indispensable for a liberal democracy, is reflected in Germany by Article 20 BL, the key article of the constitutional order. Democracy, as well as the rule of law and human dignity, are even basic elements of the German constitutional identity and, therefore, in the view of the FCC,2 these values are exempt from constitutional reform, as well as from the impact of supranational EU law.
I.2. THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRACY For the institutional implementation of democracy, the German BL provides quite a number of provisions, as they are common to most constitutions: provisions on the Parliament,3 the electoral system,4 the political parties,5 on the status and functions of the representatives of the people,6 the deputies, etc. Specific rules also result from the standing orders of the Parliament.7 Constitutional jurisprudence has developed details of high importance and, by this, contributed to the refinement of the democracy concept. In this context, it must be underlined that the multiple legislation on democracy-related matters have essential influence on the concept of democracy in its details. Of particular importance are the laws on the political parties, the electoral system, on the parliamentary committees of inquiry8 and many others. However, these laws must comply with the constitution, what is finally controlled by the FCC. Often jurisprudence had influence on the drafting and the modification of democracy-related legislation. The impact of jurisprudence of the FCC on the concept of democracy is, to a certain extent, limited insofar as the legislator disposes of the discretionary power to shape the relevant matters in a way that is compatible with the constitution. Though the legislator is the ‘first interpreter of the constitution’, as the FCC says,9 constitutional justice determines and explains by interpretation what the constitution requires for the realisation of democracy.
2 See the FCC jurisprudence on constitutional identity, http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000 208en.html (English translation), para. 218 and passim. 3 See Arts. 38–48 BL. 4 Art. 38(1) BL as to the election principles; to most details, see the Federal Election Law, https://www. gesetze-im-internet.de/bwahlg/. 5 See Art. 21 BL and the Law on Political Parties, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/. 6 See Art. 38(2) BL, the Standing Orders of the Federal Parliament, as well as the Law on the Members of Parliament, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_abgg/index.html (English translation by the Language Service of the Federal Parliament in collaboration with Raymond Kerr). 7 https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/go_btg 8 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/puag/, as well as Art. 44 BL. 9 The FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/fs19991111_2bvf000298.html, para. 338.
12 The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
II. ANALYSING AND REINFORCING DEMOCRAY IN GERMANY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONTITUTIONAL COURT II.1. Analysing the jurisprudence of the FCC on democracy, we can distinguish two important fields: (1) jurisprudence on the question what the essence of democracy is and (2) even in a more detailed way, jurisprudence on the specific democracy-realising rules concerning the electoral system, the political parties, the members of the Parliament, etc. In view of this complexity, it is not possible to deal with all these matters; it is necessary to select some issues in order to show how far jurisprudence specifies the democracy-related principles and rules.
II.2. THE DEFINITION OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY II.2.1. Democracy that defends itself – the basic definition of democracy in the initial phase of jurisprudence The concept of democracy that defends itself (‘wehrhafte Demokratie’) was developed in the 1950s, in the political situation of tension with the German Democratic Republic. In the case concerning the prohibition of the communist party KPD,10 the Court explained the central importance of democracy and defined as the essential elements of democracy: the values of freedom, human dignity, equality, the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial independence, multi-party system, etc. The concept of the ‘liberal democratic basic order’ (‘freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung’) became the motto for the defence of constitutionalism. Democracy was equated with this formula. In substance, this formula has been maintained until today for describing the various aspects of democracy. The formula clearly shows that democracy is not only a question of majority, it is embedded into the rule of law and its essential elements, which are the separation of powers and judicial independence, and it is inseparably connected with the anthropocentric foundation of constitutionalism, human dignity, freedom and equality. It can be stated that the core of liberal constitutionalism as the functional unit of dignity and freedom, democracy and the rule of law is reflected in this definition of the democratic basic order. Liberal democracy is the rule of the people based on the recognition of individual freedom.
10 The FCC, Vol. 5, 85; Decision of 17 August 1956. See, in particular, Part C II.
13 Rainer Arnold
II.2.2. Democratic legitimation Democracy is essentially linked with people’s sovereignty (Art. 20(2) BL). The exercise of all public power must be legitimated by the people’s will. There must be a link of legitimation between the people and the institution that exercises public power. This link creates a chain of legitimation (‘Legitimationskette’)11 in a personal and substantive way, which must not be interrupted. Personal legitimation12 means that the acting institution and the person who acts through the institution are legitimised by the people directly (deputies elected by the people) or indirectly (institutions/civil servants nominated by a minister installed by the Chancellor who is elected by the Parliament). Substantive legitimation means that the public power action has to be conform to the people’s will. It must be based on a law, which is adopted by the people’s representatives in the Parliament (primacy of the law; today, also primacy of the Constitution).13 Restrictions of freedom require a law as a legal basis for the intervention into freedom. Legitimation also means control and responsibility.14 However, there are reflections to substitute (at least in part) or to complement the ‘monistic’ concept of hierarchical legitimation by a more ‘pluralist’, participatory model.15 The FCC does not exclude such elements from its democracy concept:16 ‘Both the principle of democracy in its traditional form of an uninterrupted chain of legitimation between all the officials exercising a public function and the people as well as the functional self-administration as the organised participation of those who are closely concerned in deciding the matters which affect them realise the common idea of the self-determining human being in an order of freedom (article 1.1 BL …)’.
II.3. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF DEMOCRACY What is particularly important for democracy? Democracy is a continuous process formation of the political will,17 which is based on elections in regular
11 See the FCC, Vol. 107, 59–103 (http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20021205_2bvl000598.html/, para. 156 with references to the FCC, Vol. 47, 253, 275; Vol. 52, 95, 130; Vol. 77, 1, 40; Vol. 83, 60, 72–73; Vol. 93, 37, 66). See also the FCC, Vol. 20, 56, 98–99; Vol. 44, 125, 140–141 and Vol. 107, 339, 361. 12 See the FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20021205_2bvl000598.html (footnote 11), paras. 157–158; Zippelius, R. and Würtemberger, T., Deutsches Staatsrecht, 33rd ed., C. H. Beck, 2018, München, p. 81 (para. 15); Grzeszick, B., ‘GG Art. 20 II’, in Maunz, T. and Dürig, G., Kommentar GG, 88.EL, August 2019, para. 121; Maurer, H., Staatsrecht I, 6th ed., C. H. Beck, München, 2010, p. 183 (§ 7/para. 28). 13 Zippelius, R. and Würtenberger, T., footnote 12, p. 82 (para. 17); Grzeszick, B., footnote 12, para. 122; Maurer, H., footnote 12, ibid. 14 The FCC, Vol. 93, 37, 67; Grzeszick, B., footnote 12, ibid. (para. 122), see also para. 127. 15 Zippelius, R. and Würtemberger, T., footnote 12, pp. 82–83 (paras. 20–21). 16 The FCC, Vol. 107,59, 92. See also Zippelius, R. and Würtenberger, T., footnote 12, p. 83. 17 The FCC, Vol. 107, 339, 360 referring to the FCC, Vol. 8, 51, 68; Vol. 20, 56, 98–99.
14 The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court periods.18 Political parties essentially contribute to this process and influence the decisions of the constitutional organs, in particular of the Parliament.19 It is evident that freedom of expression, especially freedom of press, and freedom of information are indispensable elements of democracy.20 Democracy is based on the principle of publicity (‘Öffentlichkeitsprinzip’);21 the decision procedures of the public institutions into political orientations must be generally invisible and understandable.22 Transparency is a precondition for the functioning of democracy.23 That democracy is based on majority vote in the Parliament (if the constitution does not provide a qualified majority for important matters) is legitimate if the political and, in particular, the electoral process is free, fulfils the above-mentioned conditions and gives the political minority the chance to obtain a majority.24 The existence of a plurality of political parties (which have themselves a democratic structure) is also indispensable for democracy, as well as the protection of parliamentary minorities and the right to form and to exercise in opposition.25 The electoral system and its compliance with the basic principles of democratic election, such as expressed in Article 38(1) BL, is evidently essential for democracy. Its egalitarian structure has to be ensured. Furthermore, the status and the functions of the people’s representatives in the parliament have to be guaranteed by the constitution, by ordinary legislation and the standing order in a way that they can efficiently exercise their tasks. It can be stated that the concept of democracy, which is functionally interconnected with human dignity, the principle of freedom and the rule of law, is institutionally specified in a great number of fields (electoral system, political parties, parliamentary processes) and confirmed by freedom of press and information. The legislative specifications have to comply with the concept of democracy as foreseen by the constitution.
II.4. PLURILEVEL DEMOCRACY In Germany, democracy is plurilevel, at the level of the Federation, of the member States and in form of local and regional self-government. It is a representative democracy in the Federation, a mixed system in the member States of the Federation,
18 The FCC, Vol. 123, 267, 340. As to the requirement of free elections, the FCC, Vol. 73, 40, 85. 19 The FCC (footnote 18), ibid., referring to decisions from the first period of constitutional justice, when the basic reflections on democracy and politics had already taken place (FCC, Vol. 3, 19, 26; Vol. 5, 85; Vol. 14, 121, 133; Vol. 20, 56, 99). 20 The FCC, Vol. 27, 71, 81. 21 The FCC, Vol. 70, 324, 358. 22 The FCC, Vol. 89, 155, 185; Vol. 97, 350, 369. 23 See also Zippelius, R. and Würtemberger, T., footnote 12, p. 84 (§ 10/para. 28). 24 See the FCC, Vol. 29, 154, 165 and Grzeszick, B., footnote 12, para. 42 (with further references to jurisprudence). 25 The FCC, Vol. 2, 1, 13; Vol. 44, 308, 363; Vol. 70, 324, 363; Vol. 123, 267, 367.
15 Rainer Arnold which foresee plebiscitary elements by the possibility of referendum.26 There are also attempts at the federal level to complement the representative democratic system by elements of direct democracy. It is disputed whether such a new dimension could be introduced by legislation or only by constitutional reform. Article 79(3) BL would not hinder a constitutional reform. Article 20(2) BL could be regarded as a constitutional basis for such a reform (‘through elections and votes’ (‘Abstimmungen’)). The reform commissions have finally refused to propose such a step.27 It shall be mentioned that democracy is indispensable for the constitutional structure of the Federation, as well as of the member States, despite the fact that the latter enjoy constitutional autonomy according to Article 28(1) BL. Of course, they can establish their own democracy model under the condition that the concept of real democracy is maintained. As to local and regional level, Article 28(1), second phrase, BL establishes the obligation that people is represented by an assembly constituted through democratic elections.
II.5. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL AND OPPOSITION Efficient control of public power, exercised by the Parliament and by the public, is indispensable for democracy. In this context, the existence and the functioning of a parliamentary opposition are crucial. The FCC has confirmed a ‘general constitutional principle of an efficient opposition’,28 which derives from the BL, to be regarded as an indispensable element of democracy. It corresponds to the recognition of the majority vote principle as the regular vote modality in democracies, on the one hand, and the respect of the parliamentary minority, on the other hand. Majority vote is only acceptable to the minority and, therefore, democratic if there is a realistic chance for the parliamentary minority to get the majority. Both aspects, outvoting the minority by the majority vote and respecting the minority as the possible future majority are essential for democracy. Both elements are interdependent. One of the main consequences of this interdependence is the necessity to attribute to the parliamentary minority the right to form an ‘organised opposition’.29 The parliamentary control is in the hands of the whole parliament, but also in the hands of those parliamentary groups and deputies that do not support the government. 26 See, e.g. Arts. 71, 74 of the Bavarian Constitution on referendum and petition for a referendum, as well as the relevant ordinary law (‘Landeswahlgesetz’); https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/ Document/BayLWG. Furthermore, a reform of the Bavarian Constitution has to be voted by two thirds of the members of the Bavarian Parliament and confirmed by a referendum (Art. 75(2) Bavarian Constitution). 27 Maurer, H., footnote 12, pp. 188–190 (§ 7/paras. 39–42), as well as pp. 193–198 (§ 7/paras. 50–57, in particular para. 51); see also Zippelius, R. andWürtemberger, T., footnote 12, pp. 87–88. 28 ‘The Basic Law contains a general constitutional principle of effective opposition which has been further defined by the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court’ (http://www.bverfg.de/e/ es20160503_2bve000414en.html/, para. 85). 29 The FCC, Vol. 123, pp. 267, 341–342.
16 The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
As the FCC puts it: ‘As parliamentary opposition, they act as the natural opponents of the government and the parliamentary majority supporting it (so-called new or intra-parliamentary dualism).’30
II.6. PARTY DEMOCRACY Many decisions of the FCC concern the field of political parties, which have the function, according to Article 21 Basic Law, to participate in the formation of the political will. They are bodies of the civil society, in their basic elements defined by the federal law on political parties.31 They enjoy freedom in every respect: they can be freely established and exercise their functions without hindrance, the individual can be a member of whatever party of his or her own choice. However, if a political party combats the constitutional order, they can be prohibited exclusively by the FCC. This has happened only twice, at the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany (SRP in 1952 and KPD in 1956). The NPD was not prohibited in the 2017 proceedings, for the reason that this party had lost importance for the current political process but was declared unconstitutional.32 The legislator has regulated the particularly delicate questions related to democracy: the State financing, which is, on the one hand, necessary for anchoring the parties in society and must be limited, on the other hand, in order to maintain their independence from the State. The relevant principles in this context have been developed by jurisprudence transformed into law by the legislator: the financing is only a partial one and corresponds to the votes the party obtained in the elections, as well as to the membership fees and the donations to this party. For 2019, it was fixed the absolute limit of 190 million euros for all parties. Furthermore, it exists a relative limit insofar as State financing for one party must not exceed the total sum of the party’s income (as indicated in section 24.4 numbers 1–7 (mainly membership fees and donations).33, 34 A further sensitive issue is the transparency of financial support for the party so that the electors know who possibly influences the party’s orientation. Detailed
30 The FCC, ibid./para. 87 referring to the FCC, Vol. 49, 70, 85–86; Vol. 129, 300, 331; Vol. 135, 259, 293–294. 31 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/ 32 The FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/bs20170117_2bvb000113en.html. The fact that this political party has been declared unconstitutional made it possible to stop the financing of this party (see Art. 21(3) BL; this third paragraph of Article 21 BL was inserted into the constitution as a reaction to the above-mentioned judgment). 33 See sections 18 and 24 of the Law on Political Parties, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ partg/__18.html and https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/__24.html. 34 See the essential jurisprudence of the FCC: Vol. 8, 51; Vol. 20, 56; Vol. 24, 300; Vol. 52, 63; Vol. 85, 264.
17 Rainer Arnold rules can be found in the law on the political parties on this matter, prepared by jurisprudence on the relevant constitutional requirements.35 The internal structure of a political party must be democratic. This includes that the internal decisions of the party have to be taken from below (that means from the members’ assembly up to the top, to the leading group; a party in which the leader has the only or the primordial decision power would be unconstitutional). This so-called privilege of the political parties, as enshrined by Article 21 BL, expresses that the prohibition of the party falls within the exclusive competence of the FCC; before the prohibition sentence is rendered, the party has to be regarded as constitutional. Members of the parliament belonging to the party that is prohibited lose their function (in contrast to a deputy who leaves his or her party because he or she represents the people as a whole and not a specific party).
II.7. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM II.7.1. The overhang mandates The electoral system is crucial for democracy. In Germany, this system is based on proportionality vote but combined with personality election. The system is specified by the Federal Election Law (‘Bundeswahlgesetz’)36 and not enshrined in the Constitution. This law foresees 589 as the total number of Federal Parliament members, the half of them being elected in constituencies by majority vote, the other half on the basis of lists for a member state of the Federation. Each elector has two votes, the first for the direct candidate and the second for the list. The number of second votes is decisive for the number of seats in the Parliament for a certain party. This results from a proportional electoral system. Those who are directly elected in a constituency with the first vote always have access to the Parliament independently from the total number of votes this party obtained. It seems that the personal contact between the deputy and the people in the constituency is regarded as legitimation and even as a requirement to give access to the Parliament to them. For various reasons, the number of deputies as foreseen by the electoral law can vary. One of these reasons that is actually much disputed and has even launched a legislation reform is the question of the so-called overhang mandates. Constitutional jurisprudence has various times challenged German electoral law with regard to these mandates. They result from the fact that the directly elected persons always will be members of the Parliament. If the amount of the second votes, which determine the number of parliamentary seats for a party, corresponds to an inferior number of seats than the number of the direct mandates, then this party gets more seats in the Parliament than it should get according to the number of the second votes.
35 See s. 25 of the Law on the Political Parties, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/__25.html, and the FCC, Vol. 20, 56, 106; Vol. 24, 300, 332–333; Vol. 85, 264, 323; Vol. 111, 54, 83. 36 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bwahlg/
18 The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court
These additional mandates are the so-called overhang mandates. In former times, the existence of such mandates was tolerated up to a certain number. Several legislative reforms on these issues, initiated in part on the request of the FCC, had been declared unconstitutional by the FCC.37 This legislative process ended up into the nowadays existing model, which is based on the idea to maintain the overhang mandates but still compensate them by additional mandates. This has increased essentially the number of Parliament’s members (today 709 members due to the existing compensation mandate model). It is understandable that, for this reason, the initiative to diminish the number of Parliament members has been launched, in particular from the side of the Federal Parliament’s president, Mr Schäuble.
II.7.2. Other questions of the electoral system A rich FCC jurisprudence exists on the electoral law principles as enshrined in Article 38(1) BL. These principles are regarded as general principles, which are applicable beyond the federal level also for the electoral systems in the member states and at the regional and local levels. They are necessary specifications of the principle of democracy and have, therefore, universal relevance for all liberal democratic orders.38 It is not possible, in this context, to analyse the multiple facets of this jurisprudence39 but to select, beyond the above considered issue of the overhang mandates, a question that affects the aspect of electoral equality, namely the 5 per cent of second votes hurdle for a political party to have access, with the full amount of second votes given to the list of this party, to the corresponding number of seats in the Parliament (the directly, with the first vote elected candidates have always access to the Parliament independently whether the party has fulfilled the 5 per cent requirement for the second votes or not). The 5 per cent hurdle foreseen in the ordinary federal election law has been confirmed by the FCC given its legitimation by the reason that a great variety of splinter parties would seriously affect the efficient functioning of government, a bad experience during the Weimar Republic.40 However, the FCC has
37 Highly important the FCC decision of 25 July 2012 (Vol. 131, 316–376, in particular 316, 361–362, 365 et seqq., 368 et seqq., http://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20120725_2bvf000311.html). See also the FCC, Vol. 7, 63, 74–75; Vol. 16, 130, 139–140; Vol. 79, 169, 171, 172; Vol. 95, 335, 358, 360–361, 383. (Overview in Bundesverfassungsgericht (Graßhof, K. (ed.), Nachschlagewerk der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, C. F. Müller, Karlsruhe, Art. 38, pp. 86–87 (Aktualisierung 2013)) 38 The FCC, Vol. 47, 253, 276–277 as to the general character of these principles. A certain exception could be stated for the principle of direct elections as systems exist in which persons directly elected by the people elect themselves a power exercising institution such as the US President or the mayor in local entities, a sort of indirect democratic legitimation. 39 See for the details Risse, H. and Witt, K., ‘Art. 38’, in Hömig, D. and Wolff, H. A., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 12th ed., Nomos 2018, Art. 38, paras. 2–18 (pp. 415– 425). 40 The FCC, Vol. 1, 208, 256–257; Vol. 95, 408, 419, 420; Vol. 82, 322, 338; Vol. 135, 259, 287–288, etc. It shall be mentioned that the federal election law foresees, as the hurdle for the access of a political party to the federal parliament, that (1) the second votes for this party are at least 5 per cent of all
19 Rainer Arnold not accepted such a hurdle for the elections to the European Parliament, neither a 5 per cent clause in 201141 nor a 3 per cent clause in 2014.42
II.7.3. The organisation and functioning of the Federal Parliament. The status and competencies/rights of Deputies A great complexity of aspects characterises this area, which is very scarcely regulated in Article 38(1) BL, second phrase, which only says that the members of the Federal Parliament are ‘representatives of the whole people and not submitted to orders or instructions but only to their conscience’. This lays down the principle of the free mandate. However, constitutional jurisprudence has specified the rights and competencies of the deputy deriving them from the fact that the deputy represents the people and must have the functions to fulfil this task: the right to speak before the Parliament,43 the right to vote, to participate in legislative initiatives, to ask questions and to be informed,44 the right to participate in elections to be made by the Parliament and to associate with other deputies to constitute a parliamentary group.45, 46
II.8. NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRACY Democracy is important in the context of European integration in various respects: Article 23(1) BL authorises Germany to participate in the European Union only if the Union has, on the one hand, a democratic structure and does not, on the other hand, affect by its law democracy in Germany. The principle of democracy is part of constitutional identity in the sense of Article 79(3) BL, what has been pointed out by the FCC, particularly in its decision on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Reform Treaty.47 This decision is focused on the question whether the election of the European Parliament complies with the principle of electoral equality. This has been confirmed by the FCC with the main argument that the intergovernmental structure of the EU, being an association of sovereign
the valid second votes cast in the entire electoral territory or (2) 3 directly elected candidates of this party (see s. 6.3 Federal Election Law). 41 The FCC, Vol. 129, 300, 324, 332 (dissenting opinion 346, 353). However, see also the FCC, Vol. 51, 222 (1979): 5 per cent clause for the European Parliament election as enshrined in the German Law on the European Parliament Election conforms to the BL. 42 The FCC, Vol. 135, 259, 291–292 (dissenting opinion 299, 302, 305). 43 The FCC, Vol. 10, 4, 12; Vol. 60, 374, 379; Vol. 80, 188, 218. 44 The FCC, Vol. 13, 123, 125; Vol. 57, 1, 5; Vol. 67, 100, 129; Vol. 70, 324, 355. 45 The FCC, Vol. 43, 142, 149; Vol. 70, 324, 354. 46 Referring to these decisions specifying the status of the deputy, the FCC, Vol. 130, 318, 342. 47 The FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html/, para. 218 (English translation by the FCC of the Lisbon Treaty decision).
20 The concept of democracy in the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court states (‘Staatenverbund’)48 and not (yet) a federal state,49 legitimises that the equality principle is not completely realised with regard to the European Parliament.50 The FCC accepts the primacy of supranational over national law, even over national constitutional law; however, in the perspective of the FCC, insofar diverging from the view of the ECJ, the area of constitutional identity as defined by the FCC is not comprised by the EU law primacy.51 Democratic legitimation in the European Union is twofold: through the national Parliaments of the Member States and through the European Parliament. The FCC puts it clearly: ‘The source of the community power and of the European Constitution in a functional sense which constitutes it are the peoples of Europe democratically constituted in their States. The “Constitution of Europe”, international treaty or primary law continues to be derived basic order.’52 The FCC has resolutely carried out its specific function, which resulted from the complex and challenging process of European integration: to safeguard the own constitution, particularly its democratic orientation, and at the same time to duly promote this process clearly requested by the same constitution.
CONCLUSIONS Democracy is the fundament of the constitutional order and is functionally interconnected with the other basic values of the Constitution. Democracy has a conceptual dimension and an institutional dimension, which are also dependent one from the other. The legislator has the primordial task to implement democracy, for example, by the electoral law, the law of the political parties, laws that guarantee freedom of information and communication, etc., according to the constitution and supervised by constitutional justice. The task to review the legislator and to interpret the constitutional principles and rules is up to the Constitutional Court. In Germany, the FCC has explained in detail what democracy is and what it requires. It has developed a rich jurisprudence in this respect, which duly reflects the supreme importance of democracy. This helps for developing and maintaining the culture of democracy as a stronghold against populism and the manifold dangers of erosion.
48 The FCC, Vol. 123, 267, 348. 49 The FCC, Vol. 123, 267, 350. 50 The FCC, http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (English translation by the FCC), paras. 264 et seqq. 51 The FCC, footnote 51, paras. 239 et seqq. 52 The FCC, Vol. 123, 267, 348–349. ‘In a functional sense, the source of Community authority, and of the European constitution that constitutes it, are the peoples of Europe with democratic constitutions in their states. The “Constitution of Europe”, international treaty law or primary law, remains a derived fundamental order’ (English translation of the Lisbon Treaty decision of 30 June 2009 by the FCC); http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html/, para. 231.
21 Dainius Žalimas The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS SAFEGUARDED BY THE CONSTITUTION: REGIONAL AND NATIONAL CHALLENGES
Prof. Dr. Dainius Žalimas President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Professor at Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania
INTRODUCTION The theme of the XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law was devoted to the concept of democracy that is established by the constitution and has to be defended by the constitutional courts. The direct meaning of democracy as rule by the people serves only as the point of departure in disclosing further inseparable elements of this concept, which are not less important. Indeed, democracy has many meanings and denominations. I would like to quote one of the rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter also referred to as the Constitutional Court) of 2002, in which it is stated that the provision of Article 1 of the Constitution that the State of Lithuania shall be democratic means that it is requisite in the state to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, the protection of human rights and freedoms, the equality of all persons before the law and the court, the right to judicial protection, free and periodic elections, the separation and balance of powers, the responsibility of the authority before the citizens, the democratic process of decision making, political pluralism, opportunities for the development of civil society, etc.; it is the constitutional obligation not to deviate from the requirements of democracy, which is applicable to all state institutions, including the legislature.1 Apart from this, in a number of cases, the Constitutional Court has specifically referred to such notions as parliamentary democracy, which is rational and moderate, and it is not ‘convent rule’, i.e. it is not a system where the parliament directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or may, at any time, interfere with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) that implement public power.2 The Constitutional Court also addressed the concept of direct democracy while dealing with elections and referendums. Under the Constitution, there are two
1 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 19 September 2002, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1210/content. 2 E.g., the decision of the Constitutional Court of 21 November 2006, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court- acts/search/170/ta1328/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 30 December 2015, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1554/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 May 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1942/content.
22 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges forms of direct democracy – national elections and referendums; both of them are necessary for the people to express their sovereign power. Therefore, there may not be and there is no confrontation between the supreme sovereign power executed by the people directly and the supreme sovereign power executed by the people through their democratically elected representatives (members of the Parliament): the Parliament (Seimas) implements those powers that have been assigned to it by the people in the Constitution, adopted by the people.3 Consequently, when the Constitution is interpreted, the direct (through a referendum) and indirect (through the representation of the people – the Seimas) forms of democracy may not be opposed against each other.4 The indirect form of democracy is also referred to as representative democracy, which means the exercise of popular sovereignty through the freely elected institutions. In particular, the Constitutional Court stressed that Lithuania is a pluralistic democracy, the necessary elements or even foundations of which are the recognition of parliamentary opposition and freedoms of the mass media and assembly.5 I would particularly note one of the recent rulings on the independence of the national broadcaster, in which the Constitutional Court emphasised that freedom of the mass media, which is enshrined in the Constitution, is one of the foundations of a pluralistic democracy.6 In another recent ruling, the Constitutional Court described Lithuania as a pluralistic parliamentary democracy, whose conditio sine qua non is the parliamentary minority, inter alia, the parliamentary opposition: the mission of the parliamentary minority, inter alia, that of the parliamentary opposition, is to reflect the diversity of political views in the parliament, thus ensuring political pluralism in the parliament of a democratic state under the rule of law and creating the preconditions for such a parliament to fulfil its functions; meanwhile, the mission of the parliamentary opposition is, inter alia, to propose a political programme alternative to that of the parliamentary majority, as well as political decisions based on it, to monitor the political activities of the parliamentary majority, inter alia, to criticise it.7 There is also the concept of constitutional democracy, denominating the functioning of the democratic system within the limits of the Constitution, which is
3 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 25 May 2004, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta1269/content. 4 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 11 July 2014, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta859/content. 5 E.g., accordingly, the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 25 January 2001, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/ court-acts/search/170/ta1172/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 21 December 2006, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1325/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 7 January 2000, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1154/content. 6 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 May 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta1942/content. 7 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 18 December 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta2055/content.
23 Dainius Žalimas perceived as a social contract and supreme law. In its recent case law, the Constitutional Court underlined that the State can be truly democratic only if it is guided by respect for the dignity of each human being, as well as that the Constitution should be perceived as an anti-majoritarian act, which safeguards the individual against the dictate of the majority.8 I fully realise that it is impossible in a single article to cover all the elements of the concept of democracy. Therefore, this article touches upon only a few of them, which, I believe, are most important for the effective functioning of democracy: representative democracy and pluralistic democracy, in particular the practical challenges relevant to both these elements, which can be identified in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. These challenges are common to a number of European countries, in particular those that belong to the EU Eastern Partnership.
I. THE CHOICE OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM First, one of the most important issues for representative democracy is the choice of the electoral system. As it was noted already in 1996 by the Constitutional Court, one of the fundamental characteristics of a democratic state is democratic elections to the representative institutions of state authority; it is through elections that every citizen accomplishes the right to participate in running his or her country along with other citizens.9 However, democratic elections can be organised in different ways using different electoral systems. Therefore, I believe that, in order to reflect the needs of pluralistic democracy, we should seek to establish such an electoral system that would suit best the common national interests and the possibilities for each person to participate in running his or her country, which is an essential right in the democratic governance of the state. Certainly, the choice of the electoral system, first and foremost, is within the competence of the state concerned; it depends on the historical and legal traditions, as well as the practical considerations of each individual country. The Lithuanian Constitutional Court also noted that, under the Constitution, both proportional and majoritarian systems, as well as the mixed electoral system (in which the proportional and majoritarian systems of elections are combined), may be chosen by the legislator, provided that the principles of democratic, free and fair elections are observed.10
8 The conclusion of the Constitutional Court of 19 December 2017, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1778/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 11 January 2019, https://www. lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1915/content. 9 The conclusion of the Constitutional Court of 23 November 1996, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1011/content. 10 The Constitutional Court noted a number of times that neither the proportional system, nor the majoritarian system, nor the mixed system of elections in which the proportional and majoritarian systems of elections are combined, can be regarded, in itself, as creating the preconditions for violating the requirements of free and democratic elections, universal and equal suffrage, secret
24 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges
I respect this binding interpretation of the Constitution, which justifies the current mixed system of parliamentary elections in Lithuania. However, in my opinion, it is rather the reflection of a political compromise reached between the proponents of proportional and majoritarian systems at the time when the text of the Constitution was under preparation (therefore, the text of the Constitution is silent on the electoral system). If to look more carefully at the overall constitutional regulation, one can find a number of arguments for changing the mixed system. Consequently, it is not the question of compatibility with the principles of democratic elections when the selection of the electoral system is discussed. However, the majority of European states (at least 31 out of 47, or even up to 40, if to count together with the countries that have the mixed system) have the proportional system of parliamentary elections.11 Lithuania is one of a few states that have the mixed electoral system; Georgia is going to change the mixed system into proportional; it is likely to be followed by Ukraine; the same change is also under consideration in Moldova. I think this prevalence of the proportional system is not accidental. This is one of the reasons why I decided to provoke the discussion whether Lithuania should also consider the change of the current mixed system into the proportional one. Among other reasons why this change should be considered is the recent additional elections in three single-member constituencies in Lithuania, where the turnout was less than 20 per cent of voters. Such poor turnout cannot be wealthy for representative democracy. It also seems that, in reality, people are not so much interested in the election of personalities in their respective constituencies. One more reason to raise the question of the adequacy of the mixed electoral system is the public messages from some members of the Seimas elected in single-member constituencies whereby they consider serving the local needs of their respective constituencies, such as the construction of schools or swimming pools, to be even more important than their legislative duties. Thus, the question is rather which system serves better the constitutionally important objectives, such as ensuring fair representation of various political views in the parliament. I think there is no doubt that the proportional system ensures the fairest representation; while, under the majoritarian system, the votes cast for others than the winner are not taken into account. It is the rationale of the proportional system to distribute seats in the parliament in accordance with the proportion of
ballot, or other standards of elections in a democratic state under the rule of law. E.g., the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 9 February 2007, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1407/ content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 1 October 2008, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1415/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 9 November 2010, https:// www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1215/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 20 October 2015, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1547/content. 11 Counted according to Palese, M., ‘Which European countries use proportional representation?’, 2018, https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/which-european-countries-use-proportional-representation/.
25 Dainius Žalimas the votes received by different political forces. Therefore, the proportional system much more than any other system minimises the risk that comparatively significant segments of the population can feel unrepresented in the national parliament. Another important question is which of the electoral systems more suits the logic of the Constitution or the best possible realisation of constitutional duties of the members of the Seimas. The most relevant constitutional provision here is laid down in Articles 55 and 59 of the Constitution, according to which the members of the Seimas are treated as representatives of all the People (civil Nation). The Constitutional Court stated a number of times that each member of the Parliament represents all the People; all members of the Parliament are the representation of the People; therefore, according to the Constitution, a member of the Seimas is not a representative of any territorial community, a community or group of citizens, a political party or some other organisation; what is most important, he or she is not a representative of the respective single-member electoral constituency (the respective territorial community).12 Thus, under the Constitution, a member of the Seimas should be guided by national rather than local interests. The lobbying of the particular local interests could even amount to a breach of the Constitution and the oath of the member of the Seimas. However, the question can only rhetorically be posed how is it practically possible for a member of the Seimas who is elected in a single-member constituency to represent only the national interests and to abstain from lobbying the interests of a purely local character of the respective constituency. I think the tension between the constitutional duties to represent all the People and the practical necessity to lobby the local interests is simply inevitable in reality. The ambiguity of the real status of a member of the Seimas who is elected in a single-member constituency leads to the risk of balancing at the edge of a breach of the Constitution and the oath while pursuing the interests of the respective local communities or individuals. The question can also be raised whether, in practice, under the mixed electoral system, it is really possible to ensure the constitutional principle of the equality of all members of the parliament, which follows from the same status of members of the parliament as representatives of all the People.13 As it was stated by the Constitutional Court, the constitutional status of all members of the Seimas is the same, regardless of whether they were elected while applying one (either proportional or majoritarian) electoral system or different electoral systems (where the legislator chose the so-called mixed system of parliamentary elections).14 However, it is only logical that
12 E.g., the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26 November 1993, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta945/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 30 May 2003, https://www.lrkt. lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1244/content. 13 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26 November 1993, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta945/content. 14 The conclusion of the Constitutional Court of 10 November 2012, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1047/content.
26 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges the practical needs and requirements of those members of the parliament who are elected in single-member constituencies (under the majoritarian system) and those who are elected in a multi-member constituency (under the proportional system) may significantly differ, in particular with regard to material and human resources, as well as communication with local authorities and communities. My arguments for the choice of the proportional system may be strengthened by the position of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law, acting as the advisory body of the Council of Europe on constitutional matters). This position seems to be more favourable to the proportional system, although it is expressed in the opinions on the regulation of electoral systems in individual states, such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Though the Venice Commission acknowledges that majority or plurality systems in single-member constituencies may improve and further strengthen the link between citizens and their representatives, it also pays attention that this is not always the case.15 In general, the Venice Commission supports the introduction of the proportional system, as it might help to strengthen the representation of a plurality of political views in the parliament; party systems will be more competitive and fragmented in proportional systems, whereas majority/plurality systems usually restrict opportunities for minor parties.16 The Venice Commission noted a few possible threats posed by the majoritarian system to representative and pluralistic democracy itself when, in specific political contexts, this system may instead weaken or distort the link between the citizens and their representatives. First, the election stakeholders in single-member constituencies could be vulnerable to undue influence and manipulation by well-resourced local business people or other influential individuals, e.g. at the constituency level, independent majoritarian candidates may develop links with or be influenced by business people or other actors who follow their own separate interests; if there is influence from local business people or other non-electoral stakeholders on their communities, this could potentially serve to negatively develop links with or have influence on independent majoritarian candidates more than between the local members of the parliament and the citizens.17 Second, the mixed electoral system may lead to an overwhelming majority of a single party, which is prejudicial to
15 Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Electoral Systems, adopted by the Venice Commission, Strasbourg, 18 March 2019, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/ documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2019)001-e. 16 Ibid. 17 Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Electoral Systems, footnote 15; Republic of Moldova: Joint Opinion on the Law for Amending and Completing Certain Legislative Acts (Electoral System for the Election of the Parliament), adopted by the Council for Democratic Elections at its 61st meeting, Venice, 15 March 2018, and by the Venice Commission at its 114th Plenary Session, Venice, 16–17 March 2018, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/ documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2018)008-e.
27 Dainius Žalimas pluralism in the parliament.18 I would not be sure that, in certain Lithuanian regions with the mayors occupying their office for a long time (more than a few consecutive terms) or influential local businessmen, the situation is really different from that specific political context as referred to by the Venice Commission. In addition, the parliamentary election results in Lithuania usually are a clear demonstration of how significantly the majoritarian element of the mixed system can influence the number of seats in the parliament in favour of one party. One more argument for the option of the proportional system can possibly be found in the text of Article 57 of the Constitution, which provides for only one voting day in parliamentary elections (the second Sunday of October of the election year). This is usually typical of the proportional system. No day for the second round of parliamentary elections is expressly foreseen by the Constitution. Does it really mean that the legislator enjoys the complete discretion for the regulation of this issue, e.g. by providing that the second round can be held not after two weeks (as it is now), but after a week, three weeks or a month following the day of the first round of elections? It is doubtful that the answer can be affirmative, if to take into account the constitutional regulation of presidential elections, which expressly provides for the voting day in the first round (the last Sunday two months before the expiry of the term of office of the President of the Republic) and the second round (two weeks later than the first round) of the elections (Arts. 80 and 81 of the Constitution). Such a precise regulation of elections in the Constitution is not accidental. It is aimed at ensuring the implementation of the necessary condition of democracy – free and periodic elections and the democratic process of decision making during elections: establishing, in the Constitution, the precise day for regular elections and limiting, under the Constitution, the discretion to choose the day and duration of runoffs or early elections precludes the state authority institutions that, under the Constitution, are vested with the powers to call elections from abusing these powers, in particular from influencing the election results; at the same time, this constitutes one of the preconditions for ensuring the fairness and transparency of the electoral process and revealing the actual will of voters in elections.19 The last argument for the introduction of only the proportional system in Lithuania is the practical difficulties that Lithuania has had in administering and organising elections due to the mixed system. It is clear that, under the proportional system, there would be no need to hold additional elections (runoffs) in the case of the withdrawal of certain members (elected in single-member constituencies) from the Seimas, as their vacant seats would immediately be filled by next candidates on the respective party lists. Moreover, it would not be necessary each time before elections to review single-member constituencies and to correct their borders so as to form constituencies in such a way 18 Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports Concerning Electoral Systems, footnote 15. 19 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 15 February 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1922/content.
28 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges that ensures, to the greatest possible extent, the even distribution of the number of voters among constituencies, taking account of all the significant circumstances (e.g. the migration of voters, other demographic factors, the principle of connectivity); as it was stated by the Constitutional Court, this is an essential precondition for ensuring the equality and equal weight of all votes when the results of voting are determined.20 The question of ensuring the equal number of voters in single-member constituencies would not arise at all. In particular, there would be no need to establish any single-member constituencies for a few hundred thousand Lithuanian nationals residing abroad or to assign them artificially to one of the constituencies in Lithuania.
II. DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES The second challenge that can be seen in relation to the imperatives of both representative and pluralistic democracy is the quality of democratic decision making or, more precisely, the transparency and publicity of legislative activities. As it was stated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the constitutional requirement that the power of the State of Lithuania should be organised in a democratic way and that the democratic political regime must be in place in the country, as well as the constitutional principle that state institutions serve the people (together with the implied constitutional principle of responsible governance), presupposes the requirement to apply democratic principles to the legislative procedure.21 This means that the regulation of the legislative procedure must establish the preconditions for the democratic consideration of draft laws, the transparent and public procedure, as well as the involvement of experts and the public.22 It is underlined that the stage of the deliberation of draft laws guarantees the application of the principles of democracy in the process of legislation; the remarks, proposals, amendments and supplements submitted by the parliamentarians, as well as by experts and other interested persons at this stage, are important elements for the consideration of a draft.23 As it follows from the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019,24 only the legislative procedure that meets the above-mentioned requirements can in the best possible 20 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 20 October 2015, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1547/content. 21 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 8 July 2016, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta1631/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/ court-acts/search/170/ta1930/content. 22 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 19 November 2015, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1550/content; the decision of the Constitutional Court of 27 February 2014, https:// www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1093/content. 23 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 8 November 1993, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta947/content; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 19 November 2015, https:// www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1550/content. 24 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1930/content.
29 Dainius Žalimas way ensure the quality of legislation and, what is most important, the realisation of the requirements of pluralistic democracy and such constitutional rights as the right to participate in the governance of the State and the right to criticise the activity of public authorities. Otherwise, public trust in state authorities and law, which is also an essential precondition for real democracy, can be compromised. Until the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019, the situation with the legislative practice in Lithuania was far from that meeting these requirements of democracy. As it was noted by the National Audit Office,25 the number of adopted legislative acts was constantly increasing, while nearly half of them were adopted under special extraordinary (expedited) procedures; one of them (special urgency procedure) even allowed the legislature to adopt a draft over one day. In comparison with neighbouring states, this percentage of the laws adopted under special extraordinary procedures was extremely high (e.g. in Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Sweden or the United Kingdom, these procedures are applied in adopting 5–10 per cent of laws).26 Meanwhile, I can presume that this Lithuanian practice resembled those existing in some EU Eastern Partnership countries. Therefore, there is no surprise that, when the respective case came before the Constitutional Court, the legal regulation providing for the unlimited possibility of applying the extraordinary legislative procedures without serious reasons was found to be unconstitutional. This was done precisely by the ruling of 16 April 2019.27 The Constitutional Court had to reiterate in this ruling that none of the stages in the legislative process or rules for adopting laws, which are enshrined in the Constitution, the Statute of the Seimas or another law, may be ignored; the necessity to pass laws consistently following the stages and rules of the legislative process stems from the Constitution. Consequently, the Constitutional Court concluded that the extraordinary (urgency and special urgency) procedures in the legislative activity cannot be applied as usual practice, since they usually render the stage of the deliberation of a draft, which is the most important stage for ensuring the democratic nature of the whole legislative procedure, entirely formal. The application of extraordinary procedures implies shortening the stages of the legislative process, especially the stage of the deliberation of a draft; these procedures usually exclude the involvement of experts and the public in the legislative activity and preclude the due consideration of a draft (as a consequence, only limited possibilities remain for ensuring that the requirements of the publicity and transparency of the legislative process, as well as the quality requirements for laws, are fulfilled). Thus, unless it is justified by the constitutionally important reasons, the use of the extraordinary
25 The statistics provided by the National Audit Office can be found in the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1930/content. 26 Ibid. 27 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1930/content.
30 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges
(urgency or special urgency) procedure is not in line with the constitutional requirements of the transparency and publicity of the legislative process, nor with the constitutional requirement of the quality of laws, i.e. it is contrary to the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law and responsible governance. Taking into account these considerations, the Constitutional Court also formulated the criteria for the constitutionality of the extraordinary (urgency and special urgency) legislative procedures. The Court stated that the extraordinary procedures can be applied only in the constitutionally justifiable cases, when the vital interest of the State and society can outweigh the requirement to fully comply with the principles of transparency and publicity. That is why the urgency procedure, according to which a draft can be adopted over three days, can be applied in special cases, when the political, social, economic or other circumstances require that, as a matter of urgency, a new legal regulation be established or an effective legal regulation be amended in order to ensure the important interests of society and the State or to protect other constitutional values. Meanwhile, the special urgency procedure (that allows a draft law to be adopted over one day) can be applied only in exceptional constitutionally justifiable cases, where it is necessary to immediately ensure the vital interests of society and the State in the event of such a threat to the security of the State and society the elimination of which requires decisions of utmost urgency by the legislature (e.g. while imposing or upon the imposition of martial law or a state of emergency, while announcing or upon the announcement of mobilisation, while adopting a decision to use the armed forces, due to natural disaster or under other extreme circumstances). In any case, internal preventive control over the compliance of draft laws with the Constitution must be ensured. No doubt, the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 April 2019 has significantly contributed to the strengthening of pluralistic representative democracy in decision making. It virtually stopped the conveyor belt in the legislative activity. Thus, it can also serve as an example of response to similar challenges in other states.
III. THE PREVENTION OF DISINFORMATION The last issue that I would like to briefly address is also based on one of the recent rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, i.e. the ruling of 16 May 2019 regarding the national radio and television broadcaster.28 It concerns not only the freedom of the activities of the national broadcaster in general. This is the first ruling of the Constitutional Court in which the Court underlined that one of the constitutionally important tasks of the national broadcaster, once it is established under the Constitution in order to disseminate important information to society, is to prevent disinformation. According to the Constitution, which was drafted already 28 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 May 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta1942/content.
31 Dainius Žalimas in 1992, there is the absolute prohibition to disseminate disinformation and war propaganda; both disinformation and war propaganda are considered incompatible with freedom of information (Arts. 25(4) and 135(2)). Initially, these constitutional provisions seemed to be obsolete and declaratory. However, the developments in international relations and the rise of populism proved the opposite. Now response to disinformation and war propaganda can be regarded as one of the most important challenges to the foundations of the democratic order not only in Lithuania, but also in other countries of our region. We all can recall the disinformation and war propaganda campaign by the state controlled Russian mass media, attempting to justify the annexation of Crimea and the aggression against Ukraine and some other countries. We all discuss the illegitimate interference into electoral processes in a number of countries, including by means of disinformation. The recent examples of disinformation in Lithuania include the dissemination of false news about the alleged crimes and radioactive pollution committed by the NATO forces.29 Disinformation is also used for depicting Lithuania and other Baltic States as a kind of ‘neo-Nazi states’, or even ‘artificial temporary entities’, or ‘failed states’, which allegedly lost their sovereignty with accession to the European Union and NATO.30 Many more examples from the specific context of other countries, including those of the EU Eastern Partnership, can be provided.31 As Timothy Snyder noted, ‘the Russian invasion of southern and then south-eastern Ukraine involved the most sophisticated propaganda campaign in the history of warfare. The propaganda worked at two levels: first, as a direct assault on factuality, denying the obvious, even the war itself; second, as an unconditional proclamation of innocence, denying that Russia could be responsible for any wrong. No war was taking place, and it was thoroughly justified.’32 No doubt, the dissemination of disinformation and war propaganda is aimed at diminishing the people’s trust in the democratic order and the viability of their countries. It may interfere with democracy in two ways: first, disinformation and war propaganda dominate and distort public discourse and corrupt the process of democratic decision making; second, when this process leads to political success, the political force that won the elections through manipulation might capture the
29 Beniušis, V., ‘Įsilaužus į naujienų portalus paskelbtos melagingos žinios apie karines pratybas Lietuvoje’ [‘Attempt to publish fake news about military exercises in Lithuania’], 19 June 2019, https://www.delfi.lt/spausdinti/?id=81509727. 30 Rusijos propaganda: analizė, įvertinimas, rekomendacijos [Russian Propaganda: Analysis, Evaluation, Recommendations], Vilnius, Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2017, pp. 57–62, http://www.eesc.lt/ uploads/news/id987/RESC%20monografija_propaganda.pdf. 31 See, e.g. Disinformation and Propaganda – Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law in the EU and Its Member States (the study requested by the LIBE committee), Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, February 2019, pp. 22–50. 32 Snyder, T., The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, London: Vintage, 2018, p. 162.
32 The concept of democracy as safeguarded by the Constitution: Regional and national challenges state and deconstruct the constitutional system.33 Therefore, in this context, the tools of the so-called militant democracy or democracy capable of defending itself (the self-defending constitutional state) should be developed.34 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 May 2019 can be seen precisely in the light of the concept of the self-defending democratic constitutional order. As stated in this ruling, under the Constitution (its provisions declaring the dissemination of disinformation to be illegal and prohibiting war propaganda), the State has the obligation to take all effective measures against disinformation and war propaganda. Disinformation is defined as including the organised dissemination of false or misleading information with the aim to manipulate society, thus prejudicing the constitutional values (this definition includes the dissemination of fake news organised from abroad); whereas war propaganda is defined as including the instigation of aggression in international relations (this definition includes, e.g. the incitement or positive coverage of the Russian military actions against Ukraine). Certainly, the measures against disinformation and war propaganda have to comply with the constitutional requirements for the restriction of human rights and freedoms. However, fight against disinformation and war propaganda is in itself considered to be the constitutionally justifiable purpose for restrictive measures or even sanctions against those who are involved in the dissemination of disinformation or war propaganda. This is also implied by the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice in the case of Baltic Media Alliance Ltd v Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija.35 However, more important is that the above-mentioned constitutional duty of the State to take all effective measures against disinformation and war propaganda requires not only prosecution and sanctions. It also requires the positive action aimed at strengthening democratic resilience by social inclusion, education and empowerment of citizens.36 Therefore, the State should also promote active counteraction against disinformation and war propaganda, including activities aimed at the disclosure of disinformation and war propaganda (one of the tools here is state support for the effective conduct of the constitutional mission of the national broadcaster, which includes the prevention of disinformation37). However, the topic of counteraction
33 Disinformation and Propaganda – Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law in the EU and Its Member States, footnote 31, p. 11. 34 Ibid. 35 The CJEU, 4 July 2019, Baltic Media Alliance Ltd v Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija, case C-622/17. 36 Disinformation and Propaganda – Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law in the EU and Its Member States, footnote 31, p. 131. 37 In its ruling of 16 May 2019, the Constitutional Court defined the constitutional mission of the national broadcaster as follows: ‘the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, gives rise to the mission of the national public broadcaster to ensure the public interest – the interest of society to be properly informed (which is enshrined, protected and defended by the Constitution), i.e. to impart information to society at the national level by fostering constitutional and common human values, inter alia, by protecting national interests, strengthening democracy, promoting civic consciousness,
33 Dainius Žalimas against disinformation and war propaganda deserves special attention and should be the subject of further articles.
CONCLUSIONS As it can be seen from the challenges presented above, democracy, including direct democracy, consists of more elements than majority rule; it is not only voting and adopting decisions by the majority. It also requires the democratic procedures of decision making with due deliberation and pluralistic debate based on verifiable information. As Tomáš Masaryk stated already in 1928, we should be convinced democrats and accept the given difficulties of democratism; ‘there is no State form without defects, and this is in the nature of things. Our difficulties arise from the high demands of democracy which requires a body of citizens who are truly educated in the political sense and an intelligent electorate, both men and women.’38 I believe constitutional courts can, within the limits of their competence, effectively respond to the challenges arising to democracy, by defending democratic constitutional values, provided that they are able to identify those challenges and stick to the concept of the self-defending democratic constitutional order.
building respect for law, developing the openness and tolerance of society, fostering the language and culture, and preventing disinformation; the activity of the national public broadcaster in the implementation of this mission must be based on the principles of, inter alia, pluralistic democracy, objectivity, impartiality, respect for human dignity and rights, inter alia, freedom of convictions and their expression, as well as moral and ethical principles’. 38 Qvortrup, M., The Referendum and Other Essays on Constitutional Politics, Oxford: Hart, 2019, p. 196.
34 Moments from the XXII International Congress
35 36 Moments from the XXII International Congress
37 38 Moments from the XXII International Congress
39 40 Moments from the XXII International Congress
41 42 Moments from the XXII International Congress
43 44 Andrej Abramović The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector
THE ‘IMMATURE’ DEMOCRACY AND ITS PROTECTOR
Andrej Abramović Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
INTRODUCTION The constitution is static, democracy is dynamic. Democracy is acquired, the constitution is homeostatic. The constitution is both the frame and the canvas, democracy is the colour and the figures in the picture. ‘Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time,’ Winston Churchill said, cynically aware of the flaws of democracy. The constitution is at the same time a list of ideals aspired to by a political nation. The constitutional court is the constitution’s Praetorian Guard. This gives it a dual role in relation to democracy: that of a guardian and also of a corrective force. The constitutional court is both the child of democracy and its caregiver, that is, democracy appoints its members with the objective and hope that they will be ungrateful and disloyal to it. Thus, democracy, the constitution and the constitutional court form a dialectic chain in which the first and every odd-numbered member is democracy, while the constitution (more frequently) and the constitutional court (occasionally) alternate in the positions of its even-numbered members. In this regard, democracy is the thesis and the constitution (constitutional adjudication) is the antithesis, and both are required to synthesise constitutional social values. This relationship, which is complex in and of itself, is complicated further by European integration and its judicial institutions that add a new dimension to the functions of the guardian and corrective of democracy. European courts continuously attribute new meanings to legal standards, primarily conventions, but also to other standards. Consequently, the new meanings forcibly acquire constitutional categories in the constitutions of the signatories of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and of the Member States of the European Union.
I. THE GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY The constitutional court appears, first and foremost, as the guardian of democratic procedure. A famous French jurist, a well-known attorney, once said in words to this effect: ‘Above us only sky, and everything else is procedure.’ The constitution most often includes, or rather prescribes, democratic procedures, such as the procedure for
45 Andrej Abramović adopting or amending the constitution, organic laws and ordinary laws, the required majority for such cases, framework provisions for elections and referenda, etc.
I.1. So, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has reacted and cautioned the Parliament in its written communications on several occasions (to be exact, nine times!) that too many laws were being adopted in so-called summary proceedings, which means skipping the first debate on a bill, which is contrary to the principles of legislative procedure. Still, no law has yet been repealed as a result of this. The Constitutional Court has acknowledged that the dynamics of politics often requires a legislative rhythm faster than the one provided for in the Constitution. This issue is important because the duration of a public debate and a sufficient or constitutionally prescribed number of readings of a bill in the parliament are directly related to the quality of that law and the extent to which the public is informed about the legislative solution. This is why it will probably be necessary ultimately to take stronger action than a cautionary letter.
I.2. It has been known to happen that the Constitutional Court repeals a law only because it was not enacted by the required qualified majority. In the case of the so-called organic laws, which regulate the rights of national minorities, the Constitution prescribes a two-thirds majority of all Members of the Parliament.1 A majority of all Members of the Parliament is required for the enactment of laws that regulate constitutionally established human rights and fundamental freedoms, the electoral system, the organisation, scope and manner of work of state authorities, as well as the organisation and scope of local and regional self-government.2 In decision no U-I-5654/2011,3 the Constitutional Court found that the Ombudsman Act4 was not adopted as prescribed in Article 83(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. The Court provided the following grounds for its decision: Starting from the above findings, the Constitutional Court concludes that the Ombudsman shall be deemed a state body established by the Constitution. The impugned Ombudsman Act was passed after the Amendments to the Constitution/10 which essentially changed the constitutional competences of the Ombudsman and explicitly provided him with autonomy and independence. In addition, the Ombudsman Act elaborates the organisation, jurisdiction and
1 Art. 83(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette nos 56/90, 135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10 and 5/14. 2 Art. 83(2) of the Constitution. 3 Decision no U-I-5654/2011 of 15 February 2012, Official Gazette no 20/12. 4 Official Gazette no 125/11.
46 The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector
operation of this governmental body in a manner that essentially changes the present position of the institution of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia. Therefore, the impugned Ombudsman Act must be deemed ‘organic’, i.e. one that elaborates the organisation, jurisdiction and operation of a state body within the meaning of Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. In other words, a ‘majority vote of all the representatives’ was required for the Ombudsman Act to be passed in a valid procedure within the meaning of Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court recalls that 76 representatives voted for passing the Ombudsman Act, and that ‘the majority vote of all the representatives’ in the 6th convocation of the Croatian Parliament was 77 representatives (see point 8 of the statement of reasons of this decision). Therefore, the Ombudsman Act was not passed with the required majority vote of all the representatives within the meaning of Article 83 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. In a second identical decision U-I-292/2011,5 the Constitutional Court instituted proceedings and repealed the Act on Amendments to the Act on the Right of Access to Information,6 which the Parliament had enacted with 73 votes (instead of the required 77) although it was an organic law. It is a pity that there are several examples like this. However, it should be pointed out that the last, in other words, the most recent, example is one from 2012, which means that the Constitutional Court has (re-)educated the Parliament concerning the required legislative majority for enacting certain laws with specific subject matter.
II. BORDERLINE CASES Not all cases for protecting democracy before the Constitutional Court are this clear and simple.
II.1. Relatively recently, the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the Act on Amendments to the Local Elections Act,7 which prohibits persons convicted by a final judgment for any of a prescribed list of criminal offences from running as a candidate at local elections. The contentious matter was primarily extensive interference with the matter of passive voting rights, as well as the fact that stricter conditions are required for candidates at local elections than those prescribed for candidates at state elections. Following a long discussion, the Court rejected the proposal to institute proceedings to review the conformity with
5 Decision no U-I-292/2011 of 23 March 2011, Official Gazette no 37/11. 6 Official Gazette no 144/10. 7 Official Gazette no 35/17.
47 Andrej Abramović the Constitution of the said amendments in decision U-I-246/20178 stating, amongst other things, that: The Constitutional Court held that the impugned prohibition on running in local elections for persons who committed the listed criminal offences and were convicted by a final and effective court decision (including a suspended sentence) to imprisonment for a minimum of six months satisfied the constitutional and European legal standards and that it was in conformity with the previous Constitutional Court decision for the following reasons: – it is prescribed by law; – it has a legitimate aim, which is to avoid the active role of convicted persons in public life and participation in politics as a pledge to regain citizens’ trust in public officials who protect the legal order and establish democracy; – it is proportionate because it refers to a wide circle of offenders who have committed any of the listed criminal offences; – it is limited in time (although this is not expressly prescribed) because the Act on the Legal Consequences of a Conviction, Criminal Records and Rehabilitation (Official Gazette 143/12) states that it lasts until rehabilitation is achieved. I have personally found the ratio for interventions in the matter of passive voting rights – which I hold to be an important element of democracy, especially at the local level – to lie in the equivalently restrictive electoral threshold, although I am not happy at all with the solution that the passive right of participation in general elections should warrant milder conditions than local elections.
II.2. The second interesting case (which is interesting not only in the legal sense) concerns the right to use a minority language and script. In decision U-II-1818/2016,9 the Constitutional Court rejected the request to review the conformity with the Constitution of Article 5(3) and (4), Article 6 and Article 7(2) of the Statutory Decision on Amendments to the Statute of the City of Vukovar,10 which was passed by the Vukovar City Council, with several dissenting and one supporting separate opinion. Legally speaking, the most interesting problem in the case was the problem of the hierarchy of legal regulations. The provisions of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities11 and the provisions of the Act on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia12 partly collide. Most 8 Decision no U-I-246/2017 of 4 April 2017, Official Gazette no 35/17. 9 Decision no U-II-1818/2016 of 2 July 2019, Official Gazette no 78/19. 10 The Statutory Decision on Amendments to the Statute of the City of Vukovar, class 012-03/09-01/01, no 2196/01-01-15-47 of 17 August 2015, Official Gazette of the City of Vukovar no 7/15. 11 Official Gazette nos 155/02, 47/10, Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no U-I-1029/07 et al.; 80/10 and 93/11, Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no U-I-3597/10 et al. 12 Official Gazette nos 51/00, 56/00 – corrigendum, and 155/02.
48 The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector based their decision on the presumption that the two basic legal acts regulating the position of national minorities and stipulating the level of protection of their rights were legal acts having the same legal force and that there was no relationship of legal superiority or inferiority amongst the respective provisions. This conclusion was embraced by most in the Court by comparing the way in which the said regulations appeared, which was identical for both, despite the prefix ‘Constitutional’ in the title of one of them. For an act to be a ‘true’ constitutional act, it must be enacted in a constitution-development procedure and, in the case of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, the first phase of the procedure, that is, the adoption of a decision on the intention to adopt the act, was missing. I embraced the position that such an interpretation – or the title of the act – was impermissibly misleading. Judges Selanec and Kušan provided an even more detailed argumentation, so they stated in their separate opinion regarding the chronology of adopting the act: The Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities was enacted in the context of the beginning of the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union after the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed with the European Union and its Member States (October 2001), before the submission of the application that the Republic of Croatia submitted for membership in February 2003. Considering that the protection of the rights of national minorities was an important condition from the so-called Copenhagen criteria that Croatia had to fulfil to enter into negotiations on membership of the European Union, the legislator, by enacting the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, obviously wanted to improve the current level of protection set out in the Act on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. Further, the unusual adjective ‘Constitutional’ in the title of the Act, despite the fact that it is an act pertaining to the organic category referred to in Article 83 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, expresses the commitment of the legislator, symbolically at least, to protect the rights of national minorities at the highest possible level. We hold that the position of the majority, which is based on the ‘flexible’ relationship between the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities and the Act on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia does not correspond to the purpose and aim used to design the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities. It is for this reason that we point out that the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities was supplemented in 2010, again in the context of accession to the European Union, that is, within the framework of the negotiations on Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Human Rights’. The significance that the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities had in the context of the accession of the Republic of Croatia is clearly reflected in the fact that by the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union Croatia expressly assumed the obligation ‘[t]o continue to strengthen the protection of minorities, including through effective implementation of the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities’. Considering that the Treaty of Accession
49 Andrej Abramović
forms part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, we hold that the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities also enjoys special legal status under Article 141.c of the Constitution. It is important to note that politics (democracy?) called an organic act ‘constitutional’ for external, European, uses, without any intention of implementing it as such. This practice is not something of which our democracy can be proud.
II.3. The third borderline case concerns the question of competence for making a decision on the exemption of the Chair of the Conflict of Interest Commission. A proposal for the Constitutional Court to proceed was submitted by Members of the Parliament from the opposition who had firstly tried to raise the question of competence for making a decision on the request for the exemption of the Chair of the Commission before the Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political System. They made a proposal to the Committee to conclude as follows: ‘It is hereby ascertained that the Elections, Appointments and Administration Committee of the Croatian Parliament is competent to decide on issues concerning the exemption of the Chair of the Conflict of Interest Commission.’ The same Members of the Parliament attempted to discuss the proposal to request the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia to decide on the request for the exemption of the Chair of the Commission at the following session of the Committee. It was proposed to adopt the following conclusion: ‘Pursuant to Article 82 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, the Committee on the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political System of the Croatian Parliament submits to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia a request for the resolution of the conflict of competence so that the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia might establish the competence for deciding on the request for the exemption of the Chair and members of the Conflict of Interest Commission.’ In a communication of 4 September 2019, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia issued a negative response to the applicants of the proposal for action by the Constitutional Court under the powers arising from Article 104 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court in case no U-X-2886/2019, that is, there is no reason to notify the Croatian Parliament that unconstitutionality and unlawfulness were detected in its work, because, in the case at hand, the Parliament had acted in accordance with laws and its Standing Orders. Both issues were included in the agenda of the 54th and 55th session of the Committee, but they were immediately withdrawn from the agenda on an objection to the agenda, without discussion, by a majority vote. Therefore, most members of the Parliamentary Committee avoided a discussion on both issues, interpreting the regulation in a way that
50 The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector the required minority might place a topic on the agenda, but that the topic might be withdrawn from the agenda without a discussion by a majority vote. Thus, it seems that the Constitutional Court failed to protect democracy so thoroughly that by a single decision it refused to resolve two important problems: the problem of procedure in the Parliament and the problem of the competence for decision making essential for the functioning of a standing, independent and autonomous state body vitally needed in the fight against corruption.
III. THE COURT AS A CORRECTIVE FORCE OF DEMOCRACY The development of constitutional law, the growing role of the protection of human rights and the ever-expanding area of responsibility of the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg) and the Court of Justice (Luxembourg) have led to concepts that sometimes interfere with the fruits of democratic institutions.
III.1. ‘Proportionality’ as a court concept for the application of laws is sometimes in juxtaposition to legislative solutions. In some laws, the acknowledgement of proportionality is evident: for example, the range of punishments in the Criminal Code. This range enables a punishment to be ‘personalised’ by taking into consideration the special circumstances of the criminal offence and the particular personal characteristics of each perpetrator. However, the introduction of this solution in the civil branch of law and of the judiciary opens many questions, such as: (1) Did the legislator already have proportionality in mind when enacting the law? (2) Is the impact of the application of the principle of proportionality on the postulated equality of citizens before law disproportionate? (3) What will be the impact of the extensive application of the principle of proportionality on the legal certainty of citizens, the duration of court proceedings and the system of democratic decision making?
III.2. I shall mention one recent decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia as an example. It was a case with a ‘media background’. In the so-called media disputes, compensation lawsuits are most commonly instigated by citizens against the publisher of a medium and almost always they concern either one of the two competing rights: the right to the protection of honour and reputation and the right of the public to information. Whenever the protection of competing rights is concerned, proportionality
51 Andrej Abramović is essential from the legislative procedure. The legislator is asked and obligated to foresee when and in which cases one of the competing rights should have priority. In case no U-III-964/2017,13 the Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional complaint filed by a newspaper publisher and quashed judgments ordering the payment of damages – this is a decision I agree with – with a statement of reasons with which I, for the most part, do not agree. It was a complaint filed by a judge against a newspaper on account of the publication of information faithfully transmitting a statement by the president of the court about the judge concerned. In the decision of the Constitutional Court, it was found: The Constitutional Court finds that for the time being the impugned decisions do not establish a convincingly necessary social need for granting priority to the legal protection of the guarantee of respect of the plaintiff’s dignity, reputation and honour rather than to the applicant’s freedom of opinion and expression of thought and the award of compensation of damages in the amount of HRK 50 000.00. The grounds provided by the courts may not be regarded as sufficient and relevant for this type of interference in the applicant’s freedom of expression. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the courts have achieved a fair balance between the constitutionally guaranteed competing rights of the plaintiff and of the applicant. The Constitutional Court thus ignored the fact that Article 21(4)(3) of our rather modern and solid Media Act14 stipulates that the publisher is not responsible for damage if the information that caused the damage is based on truthful facts or facts that the author had a justified reason to believe were truthful and he undertook all necessary measures to verify their truthfulness, while there was a justified interest on the part of the public for the publishing of that information, and if the activity was undertaken in good faith. In my understanding, this legal solution already entails the test of proportionality and, in the described case, the right of the public to information had priority over the right to the protection of honour and reputation. To push courts to weigh the competing rights again, despite such a legal solution, seems comparable to splitting hairs, not into two but four, and is most certainly a path toward legal uncertainty and a shortcut to endless disputes. However, first and foremost, within the meaning of the topic of this paper, this is unjustified impingement in the domain of the legislator.
III.3. The so-called concept of ‘excessive formalism’ in the application of laws has a similar effect. One should differentiate between two basic variants: when the court finds that a legislative norm was applied excessively formalistically or when it finds that the norm of a lower-ranking regulation was applied in that way.
13 Decision no U-III-964/2017 of 26 June 2019, at www.usud.hr. 14 Official Gazette nos 59/04, 84/11 and 81/13.
52 The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector
In the latter case, the solution is relatively straightforward because lower-ranking regulations may not be in contradiction with laws and must be interpreted in the spirit of the law they serve to elaborate. So, in case U-III-4257/2018,15 the Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional complaint of a foreigner whose extension of stay was rejected because he had supposedly not demonstrated that he had the means for his own upkeep in the prescribed way (as required by law), since he could not attach salary payment slips (as required by the ordinance) because of his employer’s omission. The actions taken by the administrative bodies and by the Administrative Court in its review of the decisions of the administrative bodies were found to be excessively formalistic, so the Constitutional Court remanded the case for renewed proceedings.
III.4. The concept of excessive formalism is much more controversial, at least in terms of the mutual relationship between democracy and constitutional judicature in the application of laws. Should the constitutional court, upon encountering such a possibility in its review of constitutional complaints, first quash the legal provision? If the application of a law is not good as it is written in the law, how does one apply it in a way where it is not written? Who has the legitimacy to replace a law with their own solutions? There is an old saying that goes: durum hoc est sed ita lex scripta est. This was not said without reason, especially today when we have democratic legitimation in the background of laws.
III.5. In the case law of the Croatian Constitutional Court, there was recently a case proposed by the Croatian Radio and Television and the Croatian Bar Association to review the conformity with the Constitution of the Act on Amendments to the Act on the Croatian Radio and Television.16 The Constitutional Court accepted the proposal and quashed the impugned regulation.17 The case concerned the collection of unpaid radio-television fees, which the disputed regulation, for the purpose of cutting costs, had exempted from the domain of lawyers and notaries public and transferred to the resources of the Croatian Radio and Television. The reason why the Constitutional Court quashed the disputed regulation is interesting: it found that the legislative solution was not – economical. The statement of reasons of the decision reads: Starting with what the proponent of the law stated in the explanation of the Final Proposal of the Act on Amendments to the Croatian Radio and Television Act,
15 Decision no U-III-4257/2018 of 9 October 2019, at www.usud.hr. 16 Official Gazette nos 46/17 and 73/17. 17 Decision nos U-I-3197/2017 and U-I-3949/2017 of 16 October 2018, Official Gazette no 94/18.
53 Andrej Abramović
the Constitutional Court concludes that the purpose of its adoption was, first and foremost, to contribute to the easing of the difficult social situation of a large number of citizens by releasing them from the obligation to pay part of the costs incurred by forcible collection, especially the costs of notarial and legal services. Therefore, it can be concluded that the primary objective is to reduce the total amount of the cost that the payer is obligated to pay in the event of enforcement. Further, the second objective would be preventive action, that is, to encourage citizens to meet their legal obligations in due time (for that reason an additional lump-sum compensation of HRK 100.00 is prescribed) … Where amicable collection of fees was unsuccessful, the old model provided that forcible collection was to be conducted in enforcement proceedings via the issuing of a writ of execution further to an authentic document, while according to the new model it begins with the issuing of a payment order which, under certain preconditions, acquires the capacity of an enforceable document, or the Croatian Radio and Television is instructed to pursue its claims in a civil lawsuit. Although the two models are not totally comparable, so that the calculations made by the Ministry of Culture do not provide a complete picture on the costs that the payers must eventually pay under each of the two models, it is indisputable that the said calculation shows that the costs for payers under the new model would be even higher than those under the old one (based on the old model, in all phases of enforcement they would be around HRK 806.05, while based on the new model the cost of a civil lawsuit would be around HRK 825.00). I am not certain whether the court should venture into an appraisal of the cost-effectiveness of a regulation, but I am certain that it may not venture into that. What the court does not have, and the legislator does have, is active legitimation. The Constitutional Court may be a negative legislator, but it may not be a positive one, especially not a competing legislator.
CONCLUSIONS The fundamental difference between democracy and constitutional law lies in the fact that democracy is essentially the rule of law of the majority, while constitutions and constitutional courts essentially serve to protect an individual or a minority. This places democracy and the constitutional court at opposing ends, except in cases where democracy must be protected as such, that is, as a constitutional category. Where it acts to protect an individual or a minority, the constitutional court finds itself on a slippery slope. Sometimes it is difficult to resist the temptation to act as a double for or to compete with the legislator. However, to tacitly assume the role of a subsidiary legislator undermines the reputation of both the court and democracy. A possible reason for the slide, where the constitutional court assumes the role of the court in a precedent-based legal system, can be found, presumably, in both the state and form of modern democracy.
54 The ‘immature’ democracy and its protector
Democracy as a system presumes that its fundamental part is an individual who is aware and capable of making decisions about his or her own interests and those of the community. There is a question mark over both elements today: the individual and his or her awareness. The well-known Russian-American historian Slezkine18 wrote that nationalism is the only true religion of the modern age. In the era of national homogenisation, the individual is pushed into the background. The thinking of a homogenised group is essentially what the majority thinks, so that it inevitably falls away from constitutional values. However, this leaves constitutional courts exposed on the bulwark, protecting something fewer and fewer citizens respect or believe in. Things are not much better when it comes to the awareness of individual voters concerning their best interests. Gustave le Bon wrote: ‘The majority of men … do not possess clear and reasoned ideas on any subject whatever outside their own speciality. They are incapable of self-leadership. The leader serves them as guide. It is just possible that he may be replaced, though very inefficiently, by the periodical publications which manufacture opinions for their readers and supply them with ready-made phrases which dispense them from the trouble of reasoning.’19 Ne sutor ultra crepidam? The average voter is easy prey for the demagogue. Still, to come full circle back to the introduction of this paper, democracy is a poor system but, for the time being, there is no better. No matter how sensitive to deviations and aberrations, we should not give up on democracy, explicitly or tacitly. We should insist on representativeness, being informed and social tolerance in the system of democracy to internalise those values. The role of constitutional courts should be to focus on the protection of democracy both from its opponents – who are not in short supply these days – and from itself, that is, from its inherent flaws.
18 Slezkine, Y., The Jewish Century, Princeton University Press, 2011. 19 Bon, le G., The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, Batoche Books, Kitchener 2001, p. 69.
55 Luiz Cláudio Allemand Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy
FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC RIGHTS – A GUARANTEE OF DEMOCRACY
Dr. Luiz Cláudio Allemand LL.M. Steinbeis University, Germany Member of the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association Legal Director of the Federation of Industries of São Paulo
INTRODUCTION To ensure the development of the future at a time when humanity is entering into the 4th Industrial Revolution becomes fundamental for governments that declare themselves democratic, because respect for human rights or social rights cannot be conceived without the observance of economic fundamental rights. Failure to comply with economic fundamental rights compromises the national development, with the closing of companies and an increase in informal activity, directly reflecting the internal market, which fails to achieve the concepts of the 4.0 Industry. It is certain that, in order to organise our society, we need the state, which assures us sovereignty, security and development, all funded by taxes, because ‘Without money there is no state … It is of utmost importance that society itself provide for the support of the State, because otherwise it would be society itself that would cease to be politically directed and would end up in anarchy and decomposition.’1 Hence, the need for an analysis of fundamental rights under an economic viewpoint, which are also fundamental precepts foreseen in the constitutions of the Member States of the European Community and in the country of Brazil, according to the statement of Portilla,2 such as the principles of human dignity, free initiative, the social values of work, national development, the eradication of poverty and the reduction of social and regional inequalities. In order for these principles to be effective, it is necessary to respect the economic rights of the domestic market. Only in this way will it be possible to have that respect, in its total constitutional breadth and through a systematic interpretation of ‘fundamental economic rights’. Thus, the objective of this work is to present the importance of the ‘internal market’, the guardian of fundamental rights, of a democratic state and of future generations, because we cannot look only at the present, without taking responsibility for the future. Given the complexity of the themes presented in this work, there is no pretence of constructing a theory on the subject, much less being pragmatic to the extreme, but bringing to the debate the need to observe intrinsic fundamental economic rights.
1 Royo, P., Curso de Derecho constitucional, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016, p. 652. 2 Portilla, F., Libertades y Derechos Económicos, Arraes Editores, Belo Horizonte, 2016, p. 77.
56 Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy
FUNDAMENTAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS In this phase of the technological evolution of humanity, it is important to analyse the achievements in the field of law and how they will interact with fundamental and social rights. To do so, it is important to find the generation of fundamental rights that connect to the 4th Industrial Revolution, not without first conceptualising fundamental and social rights. We know that fundamental rights are genus, being one of the species of social rights. However, much has been debated about the origin of fundamental rights, with Canotilho having presented a history on this right, which began in ancient Greece, since, although Plato and Aristotle considered the natural statute of slavery, it is acknowledged that, in classical antiquity, the Sophistic thought, which was developed from the common biological nature of men, approximates to the thesis of natural equality and the idea of humanity,3 which demonstrates that, identifying the origin of fundamental rights in classical antiquity, even if guided by the principle of equality, is not the simplest task. In turn, social law only began to acquire a legal dimension when the constitutions systematically disciplined these rights, which occurred in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. In Brazil, the first Constitution to launch a title on social law was that of 1937, under the influence of the German Constitution of the Weimar Republic.4 With the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, the world began to rely on a catalogue of rights, as expressed in Article 25(1): ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.’5 In the Lithuanian Constitution of 1992, in Chapter II, human rights are listed starting with Articles 18 and 19, which also deal with the freedoms and protection of life, in particular the principle of human dignity, described in Article 21 on the right to privacy, the non-infringement of property, the right of ownership, the right of expression, freedom of thought, belief, the principle of equality, the principle of innocence, the principle of due process, the right to elect their representatives, among others listed and no less important. The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 listed fundamental rights and social rights in separate articles. The first ones were listed in Article 5 and the second ones were in the ‘caption’ of Article 6, which ensured to Brazilians the rights to education, health, work, housing, leisure, security, social welfare, protection to motherhood
3 Canotilho, G., Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição, Coimbra, Almedina, 1999, pp. 356, 357. 4 Afonso, J., Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo, Malheiros, São Paulo, 1999, p. 288. 5 Costa, R., Princípio da Capacidade Contributiva, Malheiros, São Paulo, 2003, p. 78.
57 Luiz Cláudio Allemand and childhood and assistance to the helpless.6 From the reading of the Fundamental Text, it is evident that ‘the Brazilian constitutional legislature went beyond, when it elevated typical norms for the infra-constitutional ordering to specifically categorise those to be inserted into the Constitution’.7 Although the norms of ‘social rights’ have been elevated to the category of constitutional norms, it is certain that they are characterised as being programmatic norms – vague standards, of high semantic density, but with low social and legal effectiveness, because they do not generate, in a strict sense, public subjective rights for the population, i.e. they do not confuse and identify themselves with the classic declarations of individual rights for the reason that they impose abstentions to the State, thereby implying a negative action, contrary to those of the social type, unlike those which will necessarily imply positive actions, that is to say, they will imply obligations and duties of the State.8 Hence, it is possible to conclude that, by being categorised as social rights, ‘constitutional norms that take effect as specific dimensions of the fundamental rights of man, reflecting positive benefits of the State and allowing more humane living conditions to the working class’,9 requiring infra-constitutional rules for the enjoyment of the guarantees listed in Article 6 of the Constitution, exist, as they signify that the holder of the right has something to obtain from the State (health, education, security, housing, welfare, etc.).10 José Afonso da Silva exemplarily conceptualised social rights as ‘the dimension of the fundamental rights of man, are positive benefits provided by the State, directly or indirectly, enunciated in constitutional norms … therefore, rights that bind with the right of equality’11 and such personal subjective situations or a group of concrete character are characterised as positive benefits provided by the State, directly or indirectly, with constitutional prediction.12 In turn, fundamental rights are attributable to every human without any distinction, since the human being has dignity that is his own, deserving respect as a free moral subject, which the right must protect;13 that is, as Robert Alexy says, ‘fundamental rights are “intended, in the first instance, to protect the sphere of freedom of the individual against interventions of the public authorities; they are rights to defend the citizen against the state”. Rights of defence of the citizen against the state are rights to negative actions14 (abstentions) of the state. They belong to
6 Cretella, J., Comentários à Constituição de 1988, Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 1989, pp. 875, 876. 7 Bastos, C. and Gandra, I., Comentários à Constituição do Brasil, Saraiva, São Paulo, 1989, p. 398. 8 Ferreira, P., Comentários à Constituição Brasileira, Saraiva, São Paulo, 1989, p. 222. 9 Ferreira, P., footnote 8, p. 223. 10 Ferreira, P., footnote 8, p. 223. 11 Afonso, J., Comentário Contextual à Constituição, Malheiros, São Paulo, 2012, pp. 186, 187. 12 Afonso, J., Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo, Malheiros, São Paulo, 1999, pp. 289, 290. 13 Perelman, Ch., Ética e Direito, Martins Fontes, São Paulo, 2005, p. 400. 14 Alexy, R., Teoria de los Derechos Fundamentales, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, 2007, p. 196.
58 Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy the negative status, more precisely to the negative status in the broad sense.15 Its counterpoints are the rights to a positive action of the State,16 which belong to the positive status, more precisely to their positive status in the strict sense.’17 It may seem that, diversely from social rights, the standards guaranteeing fundamental rights do not require infra-constitutional rules and may be formally settled in the Constitution, since they are enunciated and protected in the Constitutional text, nonetheless also may not have a constitutional form, such as those rules laid down in international laws, which Canotilho calls materially fundamental rights, but, as being broad in the catalogue of fundamental rights, it is certain that it is not exhausted in those specific parts, intended to shelter them in the Constitution, since it is possible to identify them dispersed in the constitutional text, also formally called constitutional fundamental rights, but outside the catalogue, as it is taught by Professor Lusitano.18 However, fundamental rights are characterised as subjective rights and are invoked by the administration, which must deliver the supply of public service, independent of any payment, inclusive of its taxing nature, even in the absence of any affirmation, since the violation of this right, whether by omission or commission, will be subject to jurisdictional control.19 Hence the basic distinction between a fundamental right and social law, since that, unlike the latter, does not require formal law, albeit budgetary,20 and ceasing to be an end to be achieved by the action of the legislator so as to be transformed into a constitutionally ensured right.21 With a much broader view, Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet, following the same current as defended by José Afonso da Silva, in which I join, supports that ‘all social rights are fundamental, having been expressed or implicitly affirmed, are based on the constitutional text or dispersed by the remainder of the constitutional text, or even, if they are found in the international treaties regularly consolidated and incorporated by Brazil’.22 Thus, overcoming the initial considerations on fundamental rights and social rights, it is important at this moment to present the generations of fundamental rights and underscore the 4th Industrial Revolution in one of these moments. Fundamental rights already have five (5) generations, according to the best doctrine on the subject, being that the first generation had as the holder of mankind, because it sought to guarantee the rights to freedom, political rights and was marked
15 Alexy, R., footnote 14, p. 196. 16 Alexy, R., footnote 14, p. 196. 17 Alexy, R., footnote 14, p. 196. 18 Canotilho, J., footnote 3, pp. 379, 380. 19 Torres, R., ‘O Mínimo Existencial e os Direitos Fundamentais’, Revista de Direito Administrativo, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 1989, p. 208. 20 Torres, R., footnote 19, pp. 206, 207. 21 Torres, R., footnote 19, pp. 206, 207. 22 Sarlet, I., Dimensões da Dignidade – Ensaios de Filosofia do Direito e Direito Constitucional, Livraria do Advogado, Porto Alegre, 2005, p. 560.
59 Luiz Cláudio Allemand by the prevalence of individual freedoms against the power of the states; in turn, the second generation of fundamental rights has come to guarantee workers’ rights, in the first Industrial Revolution, but has opened up that space already from the period of the First World War for achievements of social, cultural and economic rights, not only for equality, as can be seen in the Weimar Constitution (Weimarer Verfassung); the fundamental rights of the third generation, which are associated with the transformations by which countries have experienced through an increase in the use of technology and scientific advancement, with a humanistic and universal bias, guaranteeing environmental and consumerist rights; the fundamental rights of the fourth generation are characterised by political globalisation, with emphasis on the guarantees of a direct democracy, information and pluralism; and, finally, the fundamental rights of the fifth generation are those marked by the evolution and acceleration of new disruptive technologies, in scale and unprecedented in the history of mankind, such as nanotechnology, neurotechnology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, storage systems of energy, drones, 3D printers, internet browsing speed and data storage baring (the Cloud). This new generation of fundamental rights will make all the others achieved become strengthened, so that mankind can prevail over these new technologies, while ensuring that these technologies are inducing improvements in the quality of life of citizen. An example of rights that must be protected in this 5th generation of fundamental rights, as presented above, is well justified in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR) of 27 April 2016, which well demonstrates the level of concern with the protection of data, elevated to the category of a fundamental right: ‘(1) … Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union … provide that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.’ A simple reading of this justification demonstrates the need to protect the data of the citizen, thus guaranteeing the observance of the principles of the dignity of the human being and privacy, the latter, a corollary of the principle of freedom, rights guaranteed in other generations of fundamental rights, but duly observed on this threshold of a new industrial revolution.
1. ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS Among the various interests of society that are guaranteed by the Brazilian Federal Constitution, one draws specific attention: the internal market, a system of economic organisation in which the citizen himself ensures, independently of any intervention by the State or monopolies, the permanent balance of supply and demand, as inserted in Article 219, which integrates national heritage and should be encouraged to enable cultural and socio-economic development, the welfare of the
60 Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy population, the technological autonomy of the country and a strong international market and regulator. Article 219 of the CF/88 integrates the list of fundamental rights guaranteed to all of society, in particular those listed in the Constitution, such as the dignity of the human person, the social values of work and free enterprise (Subsections III and IV of Article 1 of CF/88), the guarantee of national development and the eradication of poverty and the marginalisation and reduction of social and regional inequalities (Sections II and III of Article 3 of CF/88), and, as the State being a creation of the social group, it is the public administration’s responsibility to act in order to develop within a market economy. In the Constitution of Lithuania, in Chapter IV, which deals with the national economy and work, we can also verify that the principles and guarantees are foreseen, so that the economy can be based on private property, freedom of economic activity of the person and the initiative, with full support from the state to the efforts and economic initiatives of Lithuanian citizens aiming to benefit society (Art. 46), on the freedom to choose a profession or business and to have the right to the conditions of adequate and safe work, with a dignified remuneration (Art. 48), as well as their own social rights of welfare and health (Arts. 52 and 53). The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, in a judgment on the importance of an economic project (case no 14/2017; 12 April 2018, no KT6-N4/2018), confirmed the understanding that the principles enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitution of Lithuania form the constitutional basis of the national economy, for it is fortunate that the state will support and promote economic efforts beneficial to the public: ‘The evaluation of economic activity provides the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of the provision of Paragraph 3 of Article 46 of the Constitution that the state regulates economic activity to serve the general welfare of the Nation.’23 In the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the internal market is also protected, as can be seen through the following constitutional provisions: Article 1(1), guaranteeing the dignity of the human person; Article 2(1) on the free development of personality; Article 12(1), allowing all Germans to have the right to freely elect their profession, the place of work and learning; Article 14(1), guaranteeing the right of ownership and the right of succession; as well as Article 104B(1)3, which guarantees the States and municipalities the financial support of the Federal Government to promote economic growth. Nowadays, it is not so much that there are conceivable adventures in the economies of countries that can generate economic problems, because if, as such, the public administration will be violating the limits imposed on the state, in total collision with fundamental rights. The example is expressed in the Brazilian Constitution, since, making the existence of the ‘internal market’ an asset of the Federal Union (Art. 20c/c, Art. 219 of the Federal Constitution), the same should be protected to
23 www.lrkt.lt/lt/teismo-aktai/paieska/135/ta1815/content
61 Luiz Cláudio Allemand ensure the social values of work and free initiative (Section IV of Art. 1 of CF/88), as well as to ensure the national development and the eradication of poverty (Sections II and III of Art. 3, both of CF/88). The development of the internal market is a strategic policy of a Nation, because, with the increase of industrial activities, it will, therefore, be guaranteeing jobs and consumption, with increased tax revenues, which are the returns earned from the promotion of the activities of work, in a virtuous national development, which, in turn, allows for the progress of a strong international trade and, thus, of a considerable surplus balance, reflecting the growth of small and medium-sized trading. Reading about the importance of the internal market leads us to the conclusion that we are facing a fundamental economic right, which guarantees employability, the eradication of poverty, national development and social rights. Thus, observing the generations of fundamental rights, to guarantee individual freedoms (1st generation), the right of workers (2nd generation), scientific advancement, consumerist and environmental rights (3rd generation), the rights to direct democracy, information and pluralism (4th generation) and, finally, the advances and the development and use of new technologies (5th generation) warrant the necessity to give attention to what we call ‘fundamental economic rights’, guaranteeing all fundamental and social rights, as Peter Häberle teaches: ‘Freedom is now more than ever the freedom to access a job, a freedom that is at the same time the exclusive “property” of citizens. The substrate of property and freedom is the very condition of the worker, so education and vocational training must necessarily be adequately protected. The basis of freedom of development is, however, the indispensable existence of a flourishing economy in dignity.’24 What we dare call ‘fundamental economic rights’, Eros Roberto Grau identifies as fundamental precepts inscribed in the Brazilian Constitution (also present in the Constitution of Lithuania and Germany), identifying these principles in the economic order, such as: (i) the dignity of the human person; (ii) the social values of work and of free initiative; (iii) the construction of a free, fair and solidary society; (iv) the sureness of national development; and (iv) the eradication of poverty and marginalisation and the reduction of social and regional inequalities.25 Eros Roberto Grau presents a greater weight to conceptualise the principle of the dignity of the human person, since it is a foundation of the Brazilian Republic, which, alongside the right to life, constitutes the nucleus of human rights,26 even foreseen in all the constitutions of the countries of the European Community. The failure to observe these principles in the economic order affronts, in a systematic interpretation, all others that guarantee the welfare of society, the dignity
24 Häberle, P., Pluralismo y Constitución – Estudios de Teoria Constitucional de La Sociedad Abierta, Tecnos, Madrid, 2013, pp. 196, 197. 25 Grade, E., 2001, pp. 229, 230. 26 Grade, E., footnote 25, p. 231.
62 Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy of the human person and the development of a nation. Finally, the jurist Eros Roberto Grau drew attention to the judgment of the German Constitutional Court, which, in a decision given in 1976, stressed the need to affirm economic rights, as set out in the text of the Fundamental Law (BVerfGE, 4, 17 ss.),27 as a guarantee to man.28 It is the economy that will guarantee human satisfaction and, for this reason, is that the economy aims to satisfy human needs, guaranteeing to them the existence of well-being.29 However, for an economy to develop to the point of guaranteeing man’s well-being, freedom is necessary, but not only political freedom, but also that of economic freedom, which can ensure the rights of all, whether they are fundamental or social. On the other hand, economic freedom does not survive the absence of political freedom, both are guaranteed in the first and fourth generations of fundamental rights, since authoritarianism has already demonstrated that it suffocates economic activity and, consequently, affronts the principle of the dignity of the human person.30 Hence, fundamental guarantees and social rights are not prevalent in authoritarian and extremely nationalised regimes. The internal market, a fundamental right in Brazil, as well as in Germany and Lithuania, will only develop if economic fundamentals are respected in a market economy, with freedom, political rights and respect for private initiative. An authoritarian and nationalised state will necessarily be a fiscal state, because, in order to afford the expenditures and the public deficit, it certainly needs to justify its own self-existence in itself, with harmful consequences for a market economy. As a consequence of an unstructured economy, history shows that taxation will take the economic scenario to cover elevated spending in the public sector, inefficiency and corruption, which will always lead the way to popular upheavals, well reported in the book by David F. Burg, entitled A World History of Tax Rebellions in the Encyclopaedia of Tax Rebels, Revolts, and Riots from Antiquity to the Present. The conjugation of authoritarianism, fiscal state, corruption, inefficiency and a high tax burden is a given certainty that the economy is not observing those fundamental economic rights, which guarantee the dignity of the human person, development, employability, freedom, privacy, among other rights, no less important.
2. ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A GUARANTEE OF DEMOCRACY This year, the German Fundamental Law completed its 70 years and, over that time, has irradiated its principles to other states around the world, especially the ‘structuring principles, human dignity, democracy, federalism, as well as the rule
27 Reich, N., Mercado y Derecho, Editorial Ariel, Barcelona, 1985, p. 75. 28 Reich, N., footnote 27, p. 75. 29 Son, M., 1990, p. 35. 30 Son, M., footnote 29, p. 35.
63 Luiz Cláudio Allemand of law and the social state’, which form the basis of almost all constitutions of the free world.31 It occurs from these principles, which compose the structure of the constitutions around the world, that it is imperative that we observe what we dare call economic fundamental rights can be affected. The report of Freedom House 2019, which carried out an annual research on freedom in the world, recorded, for the 13th consecutive year, a decline in global freedom, pointing out that democracies are suffering from populism and nationalism: ‘The reversal covered a variety of countries from all regions, those of long-standing democracies, like the United States, to consolidated authoritarian regimes, like that of China and Russia. The total losses are still superficial, compared to the gains of the late 20th century, but the pattern is consistent and threatening. Democracy is in retreat.’32 However, most of these countries have in common the market-based economy, a genuine guarantee against setbacks. In an article entitled ‘Promoting Human Rights through Economic Development’, Kim G. Davis wrote that: A market-based economy can only work within a state of clear law and an independent judiciary which imposes legislation governing the vis-à-vis corporate behaviour of other corporations, consumers and the States … A market economy and human rights set limits to the authority of the State and empower individuals: they are two sides of the same currency. Capitalism is the only form of political economy that can produce an independent power centre to function as a critical government check. However, capitalism without democracy will inevitably experience monopolistic exploration, patronage and corruption of government officials. Further, democracy without capitalism is simply authoritarianism waiting to happen, with a stagnant economy as a bonus … If individuals are not safe in their properties, and if they come to the government as controlling their economic destiny, then their control over basic human rights is, at best, tenuous.33 In fact, freedom protected by democracy cannot just be political politics. This does not survive without economic freedom, which also does not materialise without political freedom, since contemporary authoritarianism will always aim at its expansion in the state of the economy, which is why all democratic states are worth the economic system of the market. Thinking differently would be the same as elevating totalitarianism, which, under the judgment of guaranteeing the good of the nation, deploys the political and economic system from top to bottom with effects that we already know from the history of mankind and from those contemporary examples, certain, still, that the state can never be excluded from its performance,
31 Sarlet, I., 2019, www.conjur.com.br/2019-mai-31/direitos-fundamentais-lei-fundamental-alemanha- aos-70-anos-vale-apenas-comemorar [accessed 28 July 2019]. 32 Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/ democracy-in-retreat [accessed 28 July 2019]. 33 Davis, K., 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/blog/promoting-human-rights-through-economic- development [accessed 28 July 2019].
64 Fundamental economic rights – A guarantee of democracy because it will always be correcting the distortions that occur in the market, but, of course, the performance of the state in the economy will always be there to facilitate the free market, guaranteed social justice.34 The concept of democracy is not based solely on the secret vote and on the freedom to choose a candidate, since this concept would be inappropriate for the contemporary world in which we live, because this guarantee is already totally fragile, before the electoral victories, even without apparent coercion in the electoral process, suffice to suppress the electoral debates and freedom of the press, as stated by Amartya Sen:35 There is, of course, the earliest and most formal view of democracy that characterises it primarily with regard to elections and secret voting, rather than the broader perspective of government through debate. However, in contemporary political philosophy, the understanding of democracy has widened enormously, so that it is no longer seen only in relation to the demands for universal exercise of the secret vote, but, in a much more open way, in relation to that which John Rawls calls the ‘exercise of public reason’. Indeed, a major change in the understanding of democracy has been provoked by the works of Rawls and Habermas, and by a vast amount of recent literature on this subject, including the contributions of Bruce Ackerman, Seyla Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, among others. Thus, it is possible, in the words of Sen and Davis, to acknowledge that contemporary democracy is not only based on direct voting and political freedom, but on the freedom of the market.
CONCLUSIONS Respect for fundamental and social rights necessarily involves market freedom. The leader in the 4th Industrial Revolution should observe the fundamental economic rights, identifying them in the economic order through the principles of the dignity of the human being, of the social values of work and of free initiative, of the construction of a free, fair and solidarity supportive society, the guarantee of national development, and the eradication of poverty, the marginalisation and reduction of social and regional inequalities. Market freedom, provided for among the economic rights found in the constitutions of truly free states, is presented as the only way to produce well-being for society and the guarantee of human rights. The rule of law, which guarantees a market economy, is the unique guarantee of man against authoritarianism and the certainty of living in a democratic regime.
34 Son, M., footnote 29, 1990, pp. 27, 30, 31. 35 Sen, A., A Ideia de Justiça, Companhia das Letras, São Paulo, 2011, p. 358.
65 Baron André Alen La judicialisation de conflits politiques
LA JUDICIALISATION DE CONFLITS POLITIQUES
Prof. Dr. Baron André Alen Président de la Cour constitutionnelle belge Le titre de cette modeste contribution est inspiré par Karl Loewenstein, le grand philosophe et politologue allemand (1891-1973) qui est allé en exil aux Etats-Unis après la prise de pouvoir par le parti nazi en 1933 et qui est aussi le père de la « démocratie militante ». D’après lui, la démocratie doit être armée pour combattre le fascisme et le nazisme qui pouvaient, en vue de la détruire, utiliser les droits démocratiques et politiques. Dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, la conception de la démocratie militante s’est concrétisée par son article 171. Dans un article célèbre, publié en 19522, il parlait de la « judicialisation » du pouvoir politique, c’est-à-dire « les efforts accomplis pour canaliser les conflits du pouvoir, en les soumettant aux décisions d’un corps judiciaire ». Il écrivait à cet égard : Tant qu’il est possible de juger de tels conflits par des règles constitutionnelles positives (mais il n’en est ainsi que dans des cas très rares) la ‘ judicialisation ’ peut conduire à des résultats appréciables. Si au contraire, les attributions juridictionnelles prévues par la Constitution sont utilisées par les divers organes de l’Etat l’un contre l’autre (par exemple le Président contre le gouvernement ou le gouvernement contre le parlement) c’est sans doute trop demander à la fonction judiciaire que de la croire capable de ‘ décontaminer ’ les aspirations au pouvoir, par des formules légales. […] Dans les Etats plus vieux et plus expérimentés, les tribunaux excluent eux-mêmes de leur compétence les ‘ questions politiques ’ ou ‘ actes de gouvernement ’, ou justizlose Hoheitsakte comme disent les Allemands. Les problèmes politiques fondamentaux ne relèvent pas du judiciaire. S’en remettre à une légalité normative peut contrarier plutôt que favoriser le besoin de compromis politique qu’éprouve toute société3. En effet, la classe politique est parfois incompétente pour résoudre certains problèmes politiques, avec pour conséquence qu’elle doit faire appel aux juges pour que ceux-ci trouvent une solution. Je ne donnerai qu’un seul exemple typique en Belgique : depuis la fédéralisation du pays, l’environnement est une compétence régionale, qui comprend la fixation des normes de bruit des avions. A défaut d’un consensus politique entre les Régions concernées en ce qui concerne les normes applicables à l’aéroport national de Zaventem (aéroport national mais situé en Flandre), la Région bruxelloise a imposé des normes strictes sous peine d’amendes 1 Pour plus de détails : voir Kilinç, U., « La conception de la démocratie militante dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme », Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2012, pp. 297-328. 2 Loewenstein, K., « Réflexions sur la valeur des Constitutions dans une époque révolutionnaire. Esquisse d’une ontologie des Constitutions », Revue française de science politique, 1952, p. 325. 3 Ibid.
66 La judicialisation de conflits politiques très élevées. Il en résulte que chaque sanction bruxelloise est attaquée en justice par les sociétés aériennes concernées et que chaque litige devant un juge donne lieu à des interventions tant des autres autorités (fédérale et régionale) que des citoyens.
Cet exemple prouve l’impuissance de la justice face à l’absence d’un consensus politique.
Les Cours constitutionnelles traitent évidemment des litiges dans lesquels « la politique » ou les choix politiques joue(ent) toujours un certain rôle. Mais devant les Cour constitutionnelles aussi, l’impuissance de la classe politique à résoudre des problèmes de société en concertation avec les groupes intermédiaires peut avoir pour conséquence que ces groupes intermédiaires soumettent de plus en plus de litiges à la Cour constitutionnelle. Mon attention a été attirée par une lettre ouverte de la part d’associations, syndicats et mutuelles publiée aux journaux belges4. Ils allèguent que nombreuses tentatives de concertation avec le pouvoir politique étaient échouées parce que « L’Etat entend les associations mais ne tient pas compte de leur avis », avec comme conséquence qu’elles se sentaient obligées d’attaquer les lois concernées (par exemple la suppression de la gratuité de l’aide juridique) devant la Cour constitutionnelle (en invoquant parfois l’article 23 de la Constitution qui garantit le respect du droit à la dignité humaine). La Cour constitutionnelle leur a donné parfois raison. C’est surtout la hausse du phénomène qui doit alerter d’après les associations. Je cite : Quatre éléments sont frappants. – Le nombre d’arrêts dans lesquels des personnes morales étaient à l’initiative augmente, et tout particulièrement depuis 2009. En 2009, 19 arrêts sont rendus dans lesquels des personnes morales étaient à l’initiative, en 2010, 24 ; en 2015, 59 et en 2016, 33. – Plus frappant encore, le nombre d’annulations prononcées augmente : on passe de 7 et 6 annulations en 2009 en 2010 à 23 et 29 annulations pour 2015 et 2016. – La proportion d’annulations prononcées en moyenne annuelle augmente : s’il était fréquent de ne pas dépasser les 20 % d’annulations avant 2010, après 2011, il y a toujours eu, à une exception près, 30 % d’annulations prononcées au moins. – Sur le fond, l’article 23 de la Constitution, qui protège les droits dits économiques et sociaux, est de plus en plus mobilisé. Alors que les arrêts y faisant référence étaient relativement peu fréquents jusque dans la seconde moitié des années 2010, depuis 2015, les arrêts dans lesquels des requérants invoquent le droit à la dignité humaine sont en forte hausse.
La lettre ouverte parle explicitement de la « judiciarisation d’un conflit politique » qui devrait rester l’exception pour les associations, et ceci pour deux raisons. Je cite :
4 Par ex. Le Soir du 23 mai 2019.
67 Baron André Alen
D’abord, sur le fond : les outils qui sont mobilisés en justice constitutionnelle touchent aux fondamentaux de notre société. Si une règle est contestée devant la Cour constitutionnelle, ce n’est pas en raison d’un simple désaccord politique : c’est parce que les requérants estiment que la mesure adoptée par le politique viole des droits à ce point essentiels qu’ils ont été gravés dans le marbre des normes constitutionnelles ou supranationales. […] L’attaque d’une autorité et sa condamnation en justice constitutionnelle n’ont donc rien d’anodin ni de banal. Dans quelle société vit-on si le politique, pour gouverner, joue sans cesse avec la limite des droits fondamentaux ? Ensuite, sur le processus : une bataille en justice commence lorsqu’une loi, un décret ou une ordonnance ont déjà été adoptés, voire sont déjà entrés en application. L’ensemble du processus de concertation, de dialogue entre les autorités et les acteurs concernés est pourtant censé avoir eu lieu dans la phase de conceptualisation et de mise en œuvre de la politique publique en cause. Si l’associatif doit aller devant une Cour pour contester une mesure malgré tout ce processus, c’est que l’ensemble des mécanismes d’audition et de conciliation en place n’ont visiblement pas permis aux acteurs d’être entendus sur des enjeux aussi élémentaires que le respect de droits fondamentaux. […].
La lettre ouverte finit comme suit : La judiciarisation du rapport au politique dont témoigne cette situation doit nous alerter. Lorsque les recours en justice se multiplient et que les décisions des hautes cours donnent de plus en plus souvent raison aux requérants sur l’inconstitutionnalité des normes édictées, c’est le marquer d’une nouvelle réalité : celle d’un Etat dans lequel les droits fondamentaux ne constituent plus la ligne directrice des décisions prises au niveau politique. Cela nous inquiète. Les associations veulent continuer de croire que le plaidoyer a du sens, que le dialogue entre la société civile et le monde politique n’est pas mort et enterré. C’est la démocratie qui est en jeu, L’Etat de droit qui est en danger. La tâche d’un juge n’est pas de résoudre des « conflits politiques ». Mais l’impuissance du monde politique à maîtriser certains problèmes de société peut pousser les citoyens à faire appel aux juges pour que ceux-ci tranchent certains litiges. L’absence d’un consensus entre le monde politique et les groupes intermédiaires au sujet de certains problèmes de société peut inciter ces groupes à faire appel au juge constitutionnel pour attaquer la législation adoptée par les autorités politiques qui n’ont pas voulu tenir compte des désidérata, parfois légitimes, des groupes intermédiaires, dans la plupart des cas pour des raisons budgétaires. Il s’agit de deux situations dans lesquelles un juge doit trancher un conflit devenu de plus en plus politique. Le Président émérite de la Cour constitutionnelle belge P. Martens a écrit à juste titre : « On est encore en démocratie, mais celle-ci est de moins en moins représentative et de plus en plus juridictionnelle »5. Mais où se situent les limites pour ne pas compromettre l’équilibre des pouvoirs ?
5 Martens, P., « Les juges ne gouvernent pas : ils gèrent tant bien que mal une démocratie du ressentiment, de la controverse et de la défiance », http://dev.ulb.ac.be/droitpublic.
68 Zlatan Begić European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NEEDED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: REFORMS VERSUS OBSTACLES
Prof. Dr. Zlatan Begić University of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina
INTRODUCTION In 1994, the Washington Peace Agreement and, then in 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement established peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These Peace Agreements, however, were not aimed at establishing an effective and functional democratic order and democratic institutions of government. The basic intention was contained in the establishment of sustainable peace; thus, both Peace Agreements are full of inconsistent solutions, which, to a significant extent, represent objective obstacles to the functioning of institutions and the constitutional order. In addition, the introduction of the so-called principle of the constituency of peoples as the dominant principle that should ensure the equality of the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats) has led to discrimination against a wide circle of citizens on the basis of their ethnicity, which is in direct conflict with generally accepted international democratic standards. The desire for the broad autonomy of ethnic groups in the parts of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina where particular constituent peoples constitute a majority was realised through the transformation of the internal constitutional order. The current constitutional organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was imposed by the Washington and Dayton Peace Agreements, which established the five levels of government. Thus, in addition to the state level of government, there are two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of which is the Republika Srpska organised on a unitary principle, while the other entity is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which consists of ten cantons that have the status of federal units of this entity. Regarding the above-mentioned, this paper is thematically divided in two parts. The first part is devoted to discrimination in the constitutional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter BH) as a very serious obstacle on the BH path to the European integration process and the development of democratic society. The second part of this paper consists of considerations related to the institutional mechanisms of blockades that disable any effort directed at the implementation of obligations from the European integration process.
69 Zlatan Begić
I. BASIC NOTIONS The primary intention, when signing the Washington and Dayton Peace Agreements – the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter WPA and DPA), was to set the government organisation at three levels – the level of local self-government, the cantonal level – as the middle level of government that would guarantee some kind of autonomy within BH – and the state level.1 In that sense, the WPA was signed in 1994, which stopped the conflict in parts of the territory of BH with a Bosniac and Croat majority, and cantons were established in that part of the territory. The intention was that the remaining part of the BH territory under Serb military control would also be organised in the form of cantons, which together with the already established cantons in the above-mentioned part of the BH territory, would jointly form the Federation of BH as a federal state. Instead, the Republika Srpska entity (hereinafter RS) was established by the DPA as a unitarily organised entity within BH – which was a cession to the Serb side, and the Federation of BH became the second entity within the BH state. In this way, an extremely complicated, irrational and dysfunctional structure was established within the BH state, both territorially and institutionally. Thus, today BH consists of two entities that have their own constitutions and a complex apparatus of constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial power within the competencies assigned to the entities by the BH state Constitution as a part of DPA (Annex IV). In the entity of the Federation of BH, which is an entity of about 26 000 square kilometres and with approximately 2.3 million inhabitants, currently there are 11 governments and 11 parliaments, with 11 prime ministers, about 150 ministers and more than five hundred members in 11 parliaments. There are also eleven constitutions in force with the complete infrastructure of the executive, legislative and judicial branches in this small area. The two largest cantons – Tuzla Canton and Sarajevo Canton – have a population of one million approximately, while the remaining eight cantons have
1 For the DPA and WPA and the internal constitutional structure of BH, see Reilly, B., Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 143–144; Manning, C., The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development, New York, pp. 73–85; Chandler, D., Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, London, 2000, pp. 66–89; Chollet, D., The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft, New York, pp. 133–181; Bieber, F., Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance, New York, 2006, pp. 40–86; Friedman, F., Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink, New York, 2005, pp. 60–76; Marković, G., BH federalizam [BH Federalism], Beograd and Sarajevo, pp. 69–74; Ibrahimagić, O., Državno uređenje Bosne i Hercegovine [The State Organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Sarajevo, 2005, pp. 79–84; Trnka, K., Ustavno pravo [Constitutional Law], Sarajevo, 2006, pp. 103–106; Miraščić, Dž., Bosanski model demokratske vlasti [The Bosnian Model of Democratic Government], Tuzla, 2009, pp. 109–111; Wheatley, S., Democracy, Minorities and International Law, New York, 2005, pp. 161–162, pp. 171–177; Ibrahimagić, O., 2005, Državno uređenje Bosne i Hercegovine [The State Organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Sarajevo, 2005, pp. 79–84; Kurtćehajić, S. and Ibrahimagić, O., Politički sistem Bosne i Hercegovine [The Political System of Bosnia and Hercegovina], Sarajevo, 2007, pp. 176–217, etc.
70 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles approximately 1 300 000 inhabitants. So today, in the FBH, there exist several cantons that have only 30 000 to 100 000 inhabitants with their own constitutions and complete organisation of the legislative, executive and judicial branches and institutions. Such constitutional organisation is cause for the flourishing of government administration, with the largest part of the budget being spent on funding government institutions.2 Furthermore, local self-government is organised on two levels – the level of municipalities and the level of cities. BH today is a state with the state, entity and cantonal level of government (in the Federation of BH), two-level local government, and Brčko District as a separate unit of local self-government – which, however, also has a complete legislative, executive and judicial apparatus, and its own statute, which by its characteristics and content has the characteristics of a constitutional act rather than a statute of a local self-government unit.3
II. CONSTITUENT PEOPLES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CITIZENS The above-mentioned Peace Agreements introduced the principle of the constituency of peoples, as mentioned before, which is realised within the BH legal order in two ways – through the structure of public authorities and the mechanisms of protection within the procedures of their decision-making.4 A combination of ethnic and territorial representation has introduced a system of institutional selection based on multiple ethnic discrimination. Thus, in accordance with Article V of the BH Constitution, i.e. Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the function of the collective head of state is exercised by a three-member Presidency of BH, consisting of one Serb, one Bosniac and one Croat. A member of the Presidency from among the Serb constituent people is elected from the territory of the entity of the RS, while members of the Presidency from among the Croat and Bosniac constituent peoples are directly elected from the territory of the entity of the Federation of BH. The election of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH is similarly stipulated. Legislative power at the state level is exercised by the
2 Begić, Z., ‘One More Attempt by the US Administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Constitutional Reform of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Mission Impossible or Back to the Future?’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No 4, London, 2017, pp. 427–428. 3 For the territorial organisation of the Federation of BH and functioning costs, see more ibid. 4 For the principle of the constituency of the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs in BH, see Begić, Z. and Delić, Z., ‘Constituency of Peoples in the Constitutional System of BH: Chasing Fair Solutions’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 11, No 2, New York, 2013, pp. 447–465; Ribičič, C., Begić, Z., et al., Bosnia and Herzegovina after Sejdić-Finci Case, Regensburg, 2016, pp. 8–35; Trnka, K., Konstitutivnost naroda [The Constituency of Peoples], Sarajevo, 2000, pp. 47–58; Ademović, N., Marko, J., et al., Ustavno pravo Bosne i Hercegovine [The Constitutional Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Sarajevo, 2012, pp. 133–135, etc.
71 Zlatan Begić
BH Parliamentary Assembly, which consists of two Houses: the directly elected lower house – the House of Representatives and the upper house – the House of Peoples, elected indirectly. The House of Peoples consists of 15 delegates – 5 Bosniacs, 5 Croats and 5 Serbs. The delegates of this House are elected indirectly by entity-level representative bodies. Thus, 5 Serb delegates are elected by the RS National Assembly, while 5 Bosniac and 5 Croat delegates are elected by Bosniac and Croat caucuses in the House of Peoples of the entity of the Federation of BH Parliament. However, it should be considered that, unlike other democratic countries, the position of the indirectly elected House of Peoples of the BH Parliamentary Assembly at the state level is stronger than that of the House of Representatives directly elected by citizens, which also represents a kind of democratic deficit. By the manner of election of the BH Presidency and the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH, which is established by the Dayton Constitution, the right to stand for election of BH citizens who do not belong to constituent peoples is directly violated, that is, the right to stand for election of persons belonging to national minorities and part of citizens who bind their nationality to the state of BH (Bosnians and Herzegovinians). Additionally, these constitutional solutions directly violate the right to stand for election of members of the constituent peoples – Serbs from the entity of the Federation of BH and Bosniacs and Croats from the entity of the RS. Four judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg have been enacted, finding a violation of the right to stand for election of a broad circle of BH citizens and, in this connection, a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ECHR) and its Protocol 12.5 Similar discriminatory solutions exist at the entity level in the election of the President and two Vice-Presidents of the entities of the Federation of BH and RS, who are elected exclusively from among the members of the three constituent peoples. This situation is the result of a deficit in the rule of law in BH. Since BH ratified the ECHR as well as its Protocol 12 (in 2005), the obligation to harmonise the entire legal order and discriminatory norms with the assumed international obligations occurred a long time ago. However, the competent institutions never eliminated discrimination regarding citizens’ passive electoral rights by harmonising the Constitution and BH Electoral Law with the ECHR and its Protocols. It is interesting that the Constitution of BH, in Article II/2, refers to the direct application of the ECHR and its Protocols in BH and stipulates that this Convention, together with its Protocols, will have priority in application in relation to BH internal law. However, in practice, the interpretation is different; thus, regarding the validity and application of the ECHR and its Protocols, it is interpreted that these acts have priority
5 The judgment of 22 December 2009, Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos 27996/06 and 34836/06; the judgment of 15 July 2014, Zornić v Bosnia and Herzegovina, no 3681/06; the judgment of 9 September 2016, Pilav v Bosnia and Herzegovina, no 41939/07; the judgment of 26 May 2016, Šlaku v Bosnia and Herzegovina, no 56666/12.
72 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles over internal Acts of Law, but not over the BH Constitution. Moreover, there is some argumentation that follows the factual situation of complex political relations in BH. Namely, if the above-mentioned article of the BH Constitution is interpreted in such a way that the ECHR and its Protocols take precedence over the entire law of BH – including the BH Constitution, then it implies that the BH Constitution is an act of lower legal force than the ECHR and its Protocols, and the BH Constitution should be harmonised with the provisions of this Convention and its Protocols. This would, in the first place, question the existence of an entity within BH called ‘the Republika Srpska’, because the name of that entity is in itself discriminatory and it implies that it is an entity of only one constituent people. In contrast, the constituency of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs is stipulated as a constitutional principle that applies to the entire BH territory, regardless of the internal entity and territorial organisation of the BH state, and implies the mutual equality of all constituent peoples throughout the BH territory. There is also the practice of the BH Constitutional Court in that sense. Furthermore, it is quite clear that the very name of this entity is discriminatory, because it bears the name of only one constituent people, although the RS Constitution stipulates that the RS is the entity of the Bosniac, Croat and Serb constituent peoples and all citizens who live in it.6 However, if the above-mentioned provision of Article II/2 of the BH Constitution is interpreted in the way that the ECHR and its Protocols have legal force stronger than internal Acts of Law, but not than the BH Constitution, then the BH Constitution has legal force stronger than the ECHR and its Protocols, and there is no legal obligation of its alignment with the ECHR and its Protocols with regard to the name ‘Republika Srpska’, as well as other provisions of a discriminatory nature contained in this Constitution. In that sense, where the ECHR and its Protocols are applied by virtue of the BH Constitution, there is interpretation according to which the provisions of the ECHR and its Protocols have the character of ‘lex generalis’ provisions in relation to the provisions of the BH Constitution contrary to those provisions, which have a ‘lex specialis’ character in that case. In accordance with the general rule ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ according to the practice, these discriminatory provisions are applied, as is the case in practice determined by the political reality and specific occasions, but obviously not with the rule of law and citizens’ rights and freedoms. However, all of these interpretations arising from the application of the ECHR and its Protocols (by the force of the BH Constitution) fall where the ECHR and its Protocols are applied on the basis of the act of ratification, which is the second basis on which the ECHR and its Protocols are applied in BH. Namely, the provision of Article III/3(b) of the BH Constitution is of special significance for the obligation to apply the ECHR and its Protocols (as well as other ratified international agreements!) and harmonisation of BH internal law, including the BH Constitution. This article stipulates: ‘The general principles of international law shall be an integral part of the
6 See Art. 1(4) of the Constitution of RS.
73 Zlatan Begić law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entities.’7 One of these principles, which has a particular importance in a situation where BH needs to implement an internationally committed obligation, is the principle of pacta sunt servanda, according to which ‘every treaty in force binds members and they are bound to perform it in good faith’. It is a rule of principle that is aimed at the consistent fulfilment of obligations of an international legal character, that is, obligations from international treaties concluded or acceded by the state, whose non-performance or breach may lead to the state’s liability under international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and other applicable rules and principles of international law. The fulfilment of these obligations in the case of BH, however, is at the same time an obligation under internal law, that is, under the BH Constitution itself. In this connection, there is also the practice of the BH Constitutional Court, which concluded in case no U-5/09 that Article III/3(b) of the BH Constitution was violated in every situation where internal law is not in accordance with the provisions of the general rule pacta sunt servanda of international law and when it is not in accordance with the provisions of an international treaty to which BH has acceded. Therefore, it is indisputable that any Act of Law, which may be contrary to the ECHR and its Protocols, is also unconstitutional from the standpoint of Article III/3(b) of the BH Constitution. The key issue, however, lies in the inconsistency of certain parts of the BH Constitution itself with obligations arising from ratified international treaties, including the ECHR and its Protocols. In this regard, failure to fulfil international obligations from the ratified international treaties automatically leads to an unconstitutional situation and violation of Article III/3(b) of the BH Constitution, which, as mentioned earlier, imposes an obligation to harmonise the legal order of the state with the assumed international obligations. In addition to the explicit constitutional provision, the act of ratification in this case operates on the principle of lex posterior derogate legi priori (later rule/legal act derogates the earlier rule/legal act), because the discriminatory provisions of the BH Constitution represent an earlier rule with respect to the act of the ratification of any international agreement, as well as the ECHR and its Protocols –which in this context is a ‘later rule’. All this implies the obligation to harmonise the entire legal system of the state, including the BH Constitution, with obligations from ratified international agreements, including
7 For more on the general principles of international law, see Miéville, C., Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law, Brill, Leiden–Boston, 2005, p. 72 and pp. 166–167; Degan, V. Đ., Međunarodno parvo [International Law], Univerzitet u Rijeci, Rijeka, 2000, pp. 70–76, 233–240; Weinert, M. S., Democratic Sovereignty Authority, Legitimacy, and State in a Globalizing Age, UCL Press: London, 2007, pp. 101–102; Shaw, M. N., International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 103–104; Shea, D. R., The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1955, p. 179; Guzman, A. T., How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 204–209; Henderson, C. W., Understanding International Law, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex, 2010, p. 72.
74 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles the ECHR and its Protocols, according to Article III/3(b) of the BH Constitution, as well as according to international law.8 However, despite a clear legal obligation to harmonise the state Constitution as well as Acts of Law with the ECHR and its Protocols, in particular with its Protocol 12, state institutions have not yet fulfilled this obligation dating back to 2005. From then, four general election cycles were held on the basis of the constitutional rules that should have ceased to be valid according to the BH Constitution itself (i.e. Art. III/3(b)) and, in this regard, the ECHR and Protocol 12, which are ratified by the state of BH. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has found a violation of the ECHR and its Protocols in four cases regarding passive electoral rights of BH citizens. However, to date, the obligation to harmonise the internal legal order in terms of abolishing ethnic discrimination against BH citizens has not been fulfilled. A special case is the case of the City of Mostar, in which elections have not been held for ten years, because the BH Constitutional Court repealed the provisions of the Statute of the City of Mostar and the related provisions of the BH Electoral Law due to the inequality of votes. Mostar City has a special strategic and symbolic significance in the very difficult current political circumstances burdened with the war past. It is a divided city with a majority of Bosniac and Croat inhabitants living in almost equal numbers, with a history of severe war conflicts.9 Croat nationalists
8 For more on this, see Begić, Z., ‘Opšta načela međunarodnog prava u ustavnom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine’ [‘General Principles of International Law in the Constitutional System of Bosnia and Herzegovina’], Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Zenici, Vol. 5, No 9, Zenica, 2012, pp. 66–71; Begić, Z., ‘Legal Capacities of the Dayton Constitution in the Process of Accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union’, Journal of Politics and Law, Vol. 9, No 1, Toronto, 2016, pp. 13–14. 9 Regarding the structure and manner of election of city authorities, the case of the City of Mostar is specific, where there are guarantees and institutional mechanisms in place to ensure ethnic equality. Thus, Article 14 of the City of Mostar’s Statute, imposed by the High Representative’s Decision, stipulates that the City Council shall consist of 35 councillors, who shall be elected in free, democratic and direct elections, subject to the obligation laid down in Article 16(1) of the same act, and that at least four representatives from the constituent peoples and one representative of ‘Others’ will be represented in the City Council of Mostar. The same article, in its Paragraph 2, prescribes a restriction according to which none of the constituents can be represented with more than 15 representatives in this body. The provisions of Articles 16 and 17(2) of the Statute of the City of Mostar, which established the minimum and maximum national quotas in the City Council, were the subject of a dispute before the Constitutional Court of the Federation of BH, which in case no U-31/06 of 2007 took the following position: the provisions of Article 16 and Article 17(2) of the Statute, which stipulate that, out of a total of 35 members of the City Council of the City of Mostar, at least 4 representatives of each constituent people and one representative from ‘Others’ will be in this body and that none of the constituent people cannot have more than 15 councillors, they are not contrary to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the Court, they are not only not discriminatory and do not violate the principle of equality, but, on the contrary, are in the function of ensuring these constitutional principles. However, in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court of BH in case no U-9/09, the position has been taken that the provisions of Article 17(1) and the provisions of Article 38(1) of the Statute of Mostar are not in conformity with Article II/4 of the Constitution of BH and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
75 Zlatan Begić see this city as the capital of the Croats in BH. These political options advocate the establishment of the so-called ‘third entity’, in addition to the existing two entities (RS and the Federation of BH), in areas where the Croat constituent people represent a numerical majority. This is a key political objective of Croat nationalist policy in BH, supported by the official institutions of the neighbouring Republic of Croatia – which, of course, requires a change of the Dayton Constitution, which establishes the existence of two entities in BH. This would, however, lead to further division and further discrimination against BH citizens and further violation of the ECHR and its Protocols, since political options advocating further ethnic divisions in BH also advocate the so-called ‘legitimate representation of constituent peoples’, implying that not one Croat in BH who would have his/her place of residence outside the so-called ‘third entity’ would be eligible to run or be elected as a representative of the
and Political Rights part of the Constitution of BH. These provisions relate to the distribution of council seats in city areas and to the structure of the Committee for City Areas comprising three city councillors, selected from the territory of the relevant city area pursuant to Article 17(1) of the Statute. With regard to the violation of the BH Constitution, the Constitutional Court made the following argument: ‘From the decision of the Central Election Commission on the identification and publication of voters registered in the Central Voters Register by basic constituencies for local elections 2008 (Official Gazette of BH, No 74/08), it appears that the constituency of city area 1 (former Mostar North municipality) 8 866 registered voters, in constituency 2 (former Mostar Stari Grad) 18 977 voters, in constituency 3 (former Mostar Southeast) 6 869 voters, in constituency 4 (Mostar South) 6 989 voters, in constituency 5 (former Mostar city municipality Southwest) 29 522 voters and in constituency 6 (former Mostar West municipality) 17 406 voters. The Constitutional Court notes that the number of voters in constituencies in the urban areas of Mostar varies from 29 522 voters in Mostar Southwest to 6 869 voters in Mostar Southeast. These numbers vary quite a bit: a higher number by 400 per cent exceeds a lower number. However, each constituency elects three members of the Council, so that the value of the vote in Mostar Southeast is four times the value of the vote in Mostar Southwest. It follows from Article 7 of the Statute of the City of Mostar that the constituency boundaries were simply borrowed from the former municipalities within Mostar, which became urban areas (Article 7.1), which, in turn, became constituencies for election to city councils. Noting that, under Article 7.1, three constituencies are assigned to each constituency, the historical boundaries become a cause of considerable inequality. The Constitutional Court considers that this inequality requires justification if it is not to be considered unconstitutional … The Constitutional Court considers that the need to address the post-war social and political conditions affecting the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, the City of Mostar remains a legitimate objective, which could justify a departure from the normal democratic principle according to which each electoral vote should have a similar weight to the extent possible. However, the Constitutional Court does not find it satisfactory that the differences between the values of voters in different constituencies are proportional in that they relate objectively and rationally to the legitimate aim of developing a multi-ethnic power-sharing structure that can reasonably be hoped to gradually improve the quality of the political process in the city … Accordingly, the Constitutional Court holds that variation on this scale cannot be justified in the sense that it is necessary or proportionate to any legitimate aim. Therefore, the Constitutional Court finds that the provisions of Article 19.4(2) of the Electoral Law and Article 17(1) of the Statute, in the part that reads “In each metropolitan area, three (3) councillors are elected”, are not in accordance with Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’ See for that Ribičič, C., Begić, Z., et al., footnote 4, pp. 26–29.
76 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles
Croat people, because he or she lives in the parts of the BH territory where the Croat people do not represent a majority. In its eventual further development, this political stand could constitute further discrimination against citizens that have been targeted by nationalist political forces against members of their own people – in this case, the Croat Democratic Union (hereinafter the CDU) as the biggest ethnic Croat political party, whose policy is clearly directed against Croats living in the parts of BH where Croats do not represent a numerical majority. At the same time, such policies ignore the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases mentioned previously, and such policies seek to directly introduce new forms of discrimination by nationalist political projects, this time aimed against members of their own people. The European Court of Human Rights also ruled failure to hold elections in the City of Mostar in the case of Irma Baralija v BH. Irma Baralija is a BH citizen residing in the City of Mostar, who appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, because she could not vote and be elected in elections because of the failure to implement the Decision of the BH Constitutional Court enacted in 2010, which made it impossible to organise and hold local elections in this city in two cycles. The Court decided that the defendant State had breached its obligation to take measures to protect the applicant from discriminatory treatment based on her place of residence and to hold a democratic election in Mostar, thereby violating Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the European Convention. The European Court held that the defendant State must amend the Electoral Law no later than six months after judgment in theBaralija case becomes final in order to allow local elections in Mostar. What is new in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the proceedings before it concerning the violation of the voting rights of BH citizens and their discrimination is that this Court has taken the position that, if BH fails to implement the amendments to the Electoral Law, which would create conditions for holding elections in the City of Mostar, in that case the BH Constitutional Court should issue a provisional decision on the basis of which it would be possible to hold elections in this city. The Court appears to have been guided by negative experience in previous similar cases relating to the violations of the electoral rights of BH citizens, where there was no response from the BH legislature to enforce the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. This Court identified the possibility of overcoming the possible similar situation in the case of Baralija v BH in such a way that it provided for the possibility for the BH Constitutional Court to establish a transitional ruling with the aim of facilitating elections in the City of Mostar. The European Court of Human Rights obviously had in mind the lack of political will of the ruling ethnic political parties to harmonise, through the legislature, the BH electoral system with generally accepted international democratic standards, and reached for a solution that is objectively possible given all circumstances in BH, guided by the doctrine of positive
77 Zlatan Begić constitutional justice activism, where the Constitutional Court is not only a negative legislator, but can also be a regulator of the processes by making its own rules. This situation regarding discrimination against BH citizens and the violation of their electoral rights is certainly a major obstacle to holding democratic elections in BH and to basing the democratic legitimacy of the institutions of government on generally accepted international democratic standards. It is also very important fact for the process of European integration of BH. This situation must be overcome as BH cannot become an EU member with widespread discrimination on such a sensitive issue as citizens’ voting rights. However, at the same time, these are major political issues, whose solution lies precisely in the implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and to which the ruling ethnic political parties are reluctant, because it would mean humanising overall relations and changing the political climate that does not correspond to the ruling ethnic parties and their nationalistic policies based on the dispersion of ethnic intolerance and on further ethnic divisions within BH supported with the discriminatory constitutional provisions on the basis of which elections in BH have been conducted since war was stopped.
III. INSTITUTIONAL (IN)EFFECTIVENESS III.1. THE MECHANISMS OF BLOCKADES – THE ENTITY OF THE FEDERATION OF BH The WPA and DPA, as mentioned before, imposed the extremely complicated procedures of post-election establishment of the institutions of authorities, as well as introduced extremely complex decision-making procedures. Because of this, the establishment of government a year or more after the election is regularly delayed. This is because the constitutional and electoral systems are so tuned that nationalistic political parties, which have been ruling in BH since the time of war and aggression, have multiple opportunities to block the establishment of government. Thus, the pyramid of government begins to be constituted from the level of cantons in the Federation of BH. As already mentioned, BH consists of two entities – the Federation of BH, which consists of ten federal units – the cantons, and the RS, which is organised on a unitary basis. The cantons in the Federation of BH have their own constitutions and very broad competencies, as well as the complete structure of legislative and executive authorities. Legislative power at the level of the cantons is exercised by the Cantonal Assemblies, which are elected in direct elections for a term of four years. Each Cantonal Assembly elects a cantonal government that exercises executive power. Cantonal Assemblies, in accordance with the Electoral Law, should be constituted after the announcement of the official election results. Within the Cantonal Assemblies, caucuses of the constituent peoples and the caucus of the so-called ‘Others’ (who do not belong to the constituent peoples) are constituted,
78 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles provided that at least one Bosniac, Serb and Croat is elected in the direct elections to the Cantonal Assembly. Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs from each Cantonal Assembly elect delegates of the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH – from that constituent people in the cantonal legislature.10 The House of Peoples is the upper House of the Parliament of the Federation of BH – at the entity level of constitutional organisation. The Parliament of the Federation of BH, beside the upper House of Peoples, consists of the House of Representatives (lower House), which is elected directly in elections. Both Houses have an equal position in decision-making procedures and passing the acts of law. For any act of law to be passed, it needs to be adopted in both Houses in the same text. However, unlike other democratic states, the House of Peoples as an indirectly elected upper House has an even stronger position than the directly elected lower House of Representatives. Thus, in addition to all the powers assigned to the House of Representatives, the House of Peoples also has jurisdiction over the protection of the vital interests of the constituent peoples, the function of proposing a list of candidates for the president and two vice-presidents of the Federation of BH, and elect Bosniac and Croat delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH – at the state level of constitutional organisation. The House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH is one of the neuralgic points in the constitutional organisation of BH. To dominate over this House also means domination over all political processes in the state. This is because the caucuses of Bosniac and Croat constituent peoples from this House propose and elect delegates to the House of Peoples of the BH Parliamentary Assembly, which exercises constitutional and legislative power at the state level of BH and which also consists of the House of Peoples – as the upper House and the directly elected House of Representatives, which represents the lower House of the state legislature. Similar to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH, the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH has stronger position than the lower House of Representatives, although the House of Representatives is directly elected. Therefore, the one who has dominance in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH controls and can block the establishment of legislative power at the state level. Furthermore, without the House of Peoples of the entity Federal Parliament, it is impossible to elect the executive branch at the entity level of the Federation of BH. Thus, the process of nominating candidates for the position of the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH takes place precisely in the House of Peoples, where at least one third of the delegates of the constituent peoples caucuses can nominate candidates for these functions.11 After the joint lists of candidates have been
10 See Art. IV.A.2.8 of the Constitution of the Federation of BH and Art. 10.11 of the Electoral Law of BH. 11 See the Constitution of the Federation of BH, Art. IV.B.1.2(1).
79 Zlatan Begić established, they must be confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Federal Parliament, with the majority in the House of Peoples having to include a majority of delegates from each constituent people.12 In the event that the proposed list does not receive the required majority in the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples, the nomination process shall be repeated.13 In the process of declaring the lists from the repeated nomination process, the nominated candidates are elected if they are confirmed in at least one of the Houses.14 In addition to the fact that the indirectly elected President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH have very broad competencies, which does not correspond to the level of legitimacy or their method of indirect election, without the President and two Vice-Presidents, it is impossible to elect the Government of the Federation of BH. This is because the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH by consensus appoint the Prime Minister and the Government of this entity, which shall take office after confirmation by the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the Federation of BH. Thus, the political option or political party that controls the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH also controls the establishment of the entity-level executive branch (Government, President and Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH), the establishment of the state legislature and the structure of the House of Peoples at the state level and all other significant processes, including the entity and state-level legislative procedure, given the strong position of the House of Peoples in the Federation of BH and the House of Peoples at the state level of constitutional organisation. At the same time, the structure of the House of Peoples at the level of the entity of the Federation of BH and, in that way, at the state level depends only to a small extent on the will of the citizens. This structure is predominantly dependent on the provisions of the electoral rules governing the allocation of seats in the House of Peoples of the Federation Parliament by cantons. It should be taken into consideration that, in four cantons, the Croat constituent people represent a numerical majority; while, in the remaining six cantons, the Bosniac constituent people represent a majority. In addition, about 1.5 million Bosniacs live in the Federation of BH, less than half a million Croats, close to 60 000 Serbs and about 100 000 citizens who do not belong to the constituent peoples. The constituency of peoples, among other things, is achieved through parity in representation in certain institutions, regardless of the number of citizens who belong to each constituent people, including the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH, consisting of 17 Bosniacs, 17 Serbs and 17 Croats, and 7 delegates from among ‘Others’. The key political issue is the allocation of these seats in the cantons. Since the electoral system favours the ethnic and nationalistic political options and thanks to the fact that belonging to one of the constituent peoples is a prerequisite 12 See ibid., Art. IV.B.1.2(2). 13 See ibid., Art. IV.B.1.2(3). 14 See ibid., Art. IV.B.1.2(4).
80 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles for candidacy and carrying out some of the most important public functions, the ethnic political parties represent the dominant political options that draw its electoral power in the parts of the BH territory where certain constituent peoples represent a numerical majority and, mainly, fostering ethnic intolerance. Thus, the CDU is the absolute ruling political party in the four cantons with a Croat majority and one of the key political factors in two cantons with a significant number of inhabitants from the Croat constituent people. Its political power extends from the cantons to the level of the entity of the Federation of BH and to BH state institutions – at the state level of constitutional organisation, not because of the support enjoyed by the citizens since this political party has the support of less than 10 per cent of voters in BH, but thanks to the position of the House of Peoples at the level of entity of the Federation of BH and, at the first place, thanks to the allocation of seats among the cantons for this House of the Federal Parliament. Hence, the thesis of the so-called ‘legitimate representation of Croats’ with which this political party denies the right of Croats from cantons in which the Croat constituent people do not represent a numerical majority to be candidates for the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament at all, thus seeking to secure all seats or, at least, the majority in this House for representatives from the CDU, or from four cantons with a Croat majority in which the CDU has absolute power, or in cantons where this political option is a significant political factor, thus ensuring that parliamentary seats are available in the House of Peoples exclusively for members of this political party. Such an undemocratic concept, based on the introduction of new forms of discrimination – this time against members of their own people if they do not live in cantons where the CDU dominates or represents an important political factor, went a step further; however, holders of these policies openly speak of the so-called ‘true Croats’ and those are only Croats who, according to the CDU, the ones coming from the CDU and accept this concept of political action. Identical views are shared by the CDU 1990 as well, a political party formed as a cleaved fraction of the CDU, but with identical positions and directions of political action. In fact, it is an attempt to preserve the political positions of power of a political organisation that is only masked by the ‘fight for the interests of Croats in BH’, since this political concept tries to exclude from political and voting rights all those Croats who do not live in cantons with a Croat majority, i.e. all Croats who belong to other political options or who support other political parties, or who support a civic rather than ethnic or nationalistic concept, and are elected as representatives of those political options in one of the Cantonal Assemblies, thereby also acquiring the possibility to be delegated to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH. Thus, the political struggle of ethnic and nationalistic political parties is directed to stop the creation of a critical mass that could secure at least six delegates from each of the constituent peoples in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation
81 Zlatan Begić of BH from other political parties of civic orientation, i.e. one third of the delegates of each constituent people to determine the candidates’ nomination for the election of the President and Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH, thereby beginning the establishment of executive power at the entity level of the Federation of BH. It would be an end the monopoly held by the CDU (but also other ethnic parties!) in this House for many years, secured not by the will of the citizens, but by the electoral geometry and the distribution of seats in the cantons. Otherwise, due to the fact that the CDU and CDU 1990 regularly have more than two thirds of the delegates in the House of Peoples from the Croat constituent people, they are an indispensable partner in the ruling majority as, without the consent of their delegates, it is not possible to elect the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH, the Government of the Federation and the state legislature. They regularly use this position for various types of political blackmails – from the formation of the so-called ‘third Croat entity’ to the adoption of the Electoral Law that would put into practice their political concept of the so-called ‘legitimate representation’ that would constitute a new form of discrimination in the BH constitutional system. With the aim of the realisation of these imaginary political goals was the process of reviewing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the BH Electoral Law, which was enacted in 2014. Decision U-23/14 in this case was made in 2016, but this decision and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have not been conducted to date. In the BH political and professional public, there is a serious debate especially regarding the above-mentioned decision of the BH Constitutional Court (in case no U-23/14) related to its interpretation and possible implementation. This decision was enacted on the request for the review of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the BH Electoral Law submitted by the Chair of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH, Mr Božo Ljubić. By this decision, Article 10.12(2) and Article 20.12.A(2)(a–j) of the BH Electoral Law were declared unconstitutional. These are the provisions of the BH Electoral Law stipulating the formula for constituting the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH, i.e. the distribution of delegate seats through the cantons in the Federation of BH. At the session of the BH Constitutional Court held on 6 July 2017, it was noted that the BH Parliamentary Assembly failed to harmonise the provisions of the BH Electoral Law that the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional by the decision in case no U-23/14 and, for that reason, the Constitutional Court issued a new decision by which these provisions were put out of power. As it is mentioned before, the delegates of the House of Peoples of the Federation Parliament were delegated from the Cantonal Assemblies according to the formula stipulated by the provisions of the BH Electoral Law, which were put out of power by the above-mentioned decision of the Constitutional Court. These are the provisions
82 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles of the Electoral Law that stipulated that at least one delegate from each constituent people shall be elected from each Cantonal Assembly/canton (Art. 10.12(2) of the Electoral Law) and the provisions of Article 20.16.A(2)(a–j), which determines the exact number of Bosniacs delegates, Croat delegates, delegates of Serbs and delegates from ‘Others’ who will be delegated from each Cantonal Assembly to the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament. So, by this provision of the BH Electoral Law, it was stipulated that the delegates of all three constituent peoples shall be delegated to the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament from each Cantonal Assembly/canton and this is what has been a cause of disturbance of the holders of the politics of further ethnic divisions in BH for years. The thesis of ‘legitimate and illegitimate’ representatives of constituent peoples according to the canton in which they reside and given the ethnic structure of the cantons also undermines the legitimacy of Serb representatives in the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH, since there are no cantons with a Serb majority, as well as the legitimacy of representatives of ‘Others’ in the same way. The ultimate goal of such undemocratic policies is contained in the territorialisation of ethnic interests and in the formation of the so-called ‘third Croat entity’ in BH as a ‘state in the state’, which is heavily supported by the official institutions of the neighbouring Republic of Croatia, as well as by the ruling Serb ethnic political parties in BH – with their common intentions directed at weakening BH state institutions. In that sense, there was also the proposal of the Law on Amendments to the BH Electoral Law, which the proponents of the so-called ‘legitimate representation policy’ submitted to the parliamentary procedure for adoption by emergency procedure. Thus, the proposal provided for the Croat delegation of the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BH to be elected from seven cantons, while citizens belonging to the Croat constituent people from the remaining three cantons would not be eligible to run for this position. It is the Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, West Herzegovina, Zenica-Doboj, Tuzla, Posavina Canton and Canton 10. In this case, 11 delegates of total 17 delegates would be elected from the four cantons where the CDU has absolute power (Herzegovina-Neretva, West Herzegovina, Posavina Canton and Canton 10). At least one more delegate seat under the current political circumstances the CDU would easily realise in one of the remaining three cantons – that is necessary for exercising absolute control over this House given that one third of the delegates (6) from each constituent people have the right to nominate candidates for the President and the Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH – thus allowing the establishment of the entity Government. This, especially in Central Bosnia Canton, from which, according to the proposal of amendments to the Electoral Law, four Croat delegates would be delegated for the House of Peoples of the Federation of BH – where approximately 150 000 Bosniacs and 100 000 Croats live and where the CDU traditionally and based on the decades-long
83 Zlatan Begić control of all the resources has good election results and has traditionally been one of the key political factors. This distribution of delegate seats is even more interesting when compared to the distribution of Bosniac delegate seats and the population structure in individual cantons. Thus, although in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton there is almost an equal number of Croats and Bosniacs (according to the latest census – 92 005 Bosniacs and 118 297 Croats), the above-mentioned CDU proposal stated that as many as five delegates from the Croat constituent people would be delegated from this canton and only one of the Bosniac constituent people for the Federal House of People. To compare, in the Central Bosnia Canton, according to the most recent census, there are 146 662 Bosniacs and 97 629 Croats. However, the CDU proposal established that as many as four Croat delegates would be delegated from this Canton for the Federal House of Peoples and only one is Bosniac, although the Bosniac constituent people represent a majority in this canton!? In fact, in this way, the CDU, by proposing the above-mentioned amendments to the Electoral Law, denied its own thesis about the so-called ‘legitimate representation of the people’, however unacceptable in civilisational, democratic and any other sense, and fully revealed its true intentions – retaining and strengthening the importance of this political party in the political life of BH. Thus, invoking the ethnic interests of Croats in BH can only be considered as an attempt of a kind of strained alibi for the anti-democratic and discriminatory concept advocated by this political option, which is aimed only at saving political and party positions and narrow interests of the ruling political elites. It is not insignificant that the CDU sees the Central Bosnia and especially Herzegovina-Neretva Canton as its bastion and the heart of the so-called ‘third entity’ with the City of Mostar, which, according to this concept, should be the capital city of all Croats in BH and the capital city of that ‘third entity’, although it is a city in which Croats and Bosniacs live in equal numbers with the citizens of other ethnicity. According to these amendments to the BH Electoral Law, delegates from the Bosniac and Serb people in the House of Peoples were also to be delegated from seven cantons; while, in three cantons, BH citizens belonging to the Bosniac and Serb constituent peoples would not be eligible to run for this position. Delegates from the so-called ‘Others’ in the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament under this proposal were to be delegated from four cantons; while, in the other six cantons, these BH citizens would not be eligible to run for this position. Therefore, it is quite clear that the intentions and proposals of the CDU and other smaller political parties gathered around the CDU are in direct conflict with generally accepted international democratic standards regarding the equality of citizens’ active and passive electoral rights and contrary to the judgments already passed by the European Court of Human Rights. This proposal, which reveals the political concept of the CDU in BH, was not passed in parliamentary procedure
84 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles because of the lack of parliamentary support. The CDU was well aware that this proposal cannot get support in the Parliamentary Assembly of BH, but the aim was not to change solutions or implement the decision of the BH Constitutional Court, but to bring the whole constitutional order in blockade with political demands, which would assure control over the Federal House of Peoples by the CDU and their followers. That was also intention of Mr Ljubić with the submission of the request for the review of constitutionality in case no U-23/14, with the aim of bringing the whole system in the status of blockade, since there is no formula for the establishment of the Federal House of Peoples if the Constitutional Court determines that the challenged provisions are not in line with the BH Constitution. However, as the BH Constitutional Court in case no U-23/14 declared the above-mentioned provisions of the BH Electoral Law unconstitutional and these provisions ceased to be valid in 2017, this created a legal gap regarding the allocation of seats for the Federal House of Peoples. This situation threatened to block the establishment of government institutions since the formula for the distribution of delegate seats among the cantons in the Federal House of Peoples did not exist and, bearing in mind that the general elections in BH were scheduled for October 2018, with the lack of willingness of key political actors to align the disputed provisions of the BH Electoral Law with the Constitutional Court’s decision, taking also into account the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights already enacted, and the special central and very important position of the Federal House of Peoples in the establishment of the complete pyramid of government institutions after elections. After the general elections in 2018, due to the absence of legislative action, the BH Central Electoral Commission enacted the Instruction for the distribution of delegation seats by cantons, pursuant to Article 10.12(1) of the BH Electoral Law, which provides, inter alia: ‘The BH Central Electoral Commission determines, after each census, the number of delegates elected from each constituent people and from among the Others, who are elected from the legislative body of each canton.’ Interestingly, the applicant for constitutional review in case no U-23/14, Mr Ljubić, who is one of the most ardent advocates of the policy of further ethnic divisions in BH, also demanded that this provision of the Electoral Law be declared unconstitutional, which the Constitutional Court rejected. His intention obviously was to completely block the system of establishing government institutions after elections, since, without the formula for the establishment of the Federal House of Peoples, neither the executive power of this entity, nor the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BH, is not possible to be established in a situation in which the Central Electoral Commission would be deprived of the competence to determine this formula by declaring unconstitutionality and the termination of the cited provision of the BH Electoral Law (Art. 10.12). Such a total blockade of the implementation of election results would serve to strengthen the position of the CDU
85 Zlatan Begić and the parties gathered around their politics in terms of bringing to an end and the eventual accepting of their demands, as well as further blackmailing for making inconsistent political concessions. However, the content of the above-mentioned Instruction produced numerous controversies. In the first place, despite Article 10.12, the CDU challenged the competence of the Central Electoral Commission to determine, by its decision, the formula for the establishment of the Federal House of Peoples, arguing that this type of regulation could be stipulated solely by a legislative act/act of law, but not by an act of lower legal power than an act of law, with a clear intention to bring the system into a state of total blockade and with the completely inappropriate approach to the undoubted legitimate aim in this case – which is to ensure that elections are conducted and government institutions are formed. Then, the question of the relationship between the provisions of the state Electoral Law and the Constitution of the entity of the Federation of BH arose. This is because the above-mentioned provision of the BH Electoral Law – which is a state Act of Law – stipulates that the BH Central Electoral Commission, after each census, establishes a formula for allocating delegate seats among cantons for the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament. A simple linguistic interpretation of this provision would suggest that the formula for this allocation of delegate seats should be made according to the 2013 census, since it is the last census conducted in BH. However, the Constitution of the Federation of BH – which is the entity Constitution – as a separate constitutional principle, establishes the obligation of proportional representation of constituent peoples and ‘Others’ in institutions in accordance with the 1991 census, until the final implementation of Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BH, which stipulates the right to return to the pre-war places of residence of displaced and refugee persons. In fact, the 2013 census actually showed that Annex 7 has not been implemented yet. This constitutional principle, which is in accordance with Annex 7 of the DPA, has its full meaning, bearing in mind the systematic ethnic cleansing and expulsion of the population during the aggression and war, as well as a legitimate goal aimed at the return of refugees and displaced persons. This would allow proportional ethnic structure and multi-ethnicity of government institutions that, as such, would guarantee the security and human rights and freedoms of all citizens without discrimination or other types of pressure. In this respect, the provision of the BH Electoral Law referring to the last census should be interpreted as referring to the last relevant census for this type of the allocation of delegate seats for the Federal House of Peoples, which is the 1991 census – taking into account the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation of BH. However, the BH Central Electoral Commission, when adopting the Instruction for the allocation of delegate seats among the cantons for the Federal House of Peoples, completely disregarded the provisions of the Constitution of the
86 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles
Federation of BH and the 2013 census was taken as the relevant census based on which the allocation of delegate seats was stipulated. With concrete solutions in terms of the formula for the establishment of the Federal House of Peoples, the BH Central Electoral Commission undoubtedly favoured the CDU and their policies rather than the real population structure in individual cantons. For example, in the two cantons to which the CDU has territorial aspirations and in which it has a strong electorate base, the division of delegate seats that is not in accordance with the structure of the population is established. According to the Instruction of the Central Electoral Commission, three Croat delegates, two Serb delegates and one Bosniac delegate are elected from the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, although, according to the last census, there are 92 005 Bosniacs, 118 297 Croats and only 6 432 Serbs. From the Central Bosnia Canton, where, according to the latest census, 146 652 Bosniacs, 97 629 Croats and 3 043 Serbs live, one delegate from the Bosniac, as many as three from the Croat and one from the Serb constituent peoples (in addition to one from ‘Others’) are elected, according to the above-mentioned Instruction. In this way, the dominance of the CDU and other smaller parties assembled around the CDU in the House of Peoples is again secured, whereby it is not possible to secure in this institution at least one third of Croat delegates belonging to political options of civic orientation thanks to the allocation of seats for the House of Peoples among the cantons. As mentioned before, this one third is necessary to determine the proposal for the election of the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH, who appoint the Prime Minister and the Government of the Federation of BH. This has again secured the dominance of the CDU and other holders of further ethnic division policies in BH by pure electoral engineering, resulting in this political party blocking the establishment of the government for 14 months after the election, and it is uncertain whether and when the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Federation of BH and the Government of this entity will be elected. As a condition for unblocking the establishment of the government and the implementation of the election results, this political party is seeking the adoption of amendments to the Electoral Law that would implement their political concept of the so-called ‘legitimate representation of the constituent peoples’, the concept of further ethnic division, the introduction of new forms of discrimination and the creation of preconditions for the establishment of the so-called ‘third Croat entity’ under the absolute authority of the CDU. Had the BH Central Electoral Commission differently allocated delegate mandates in cantons where the CDU traditionally among Croats has no significant support, it could have opened the door to citizens from the ranks of the Croat people who belong to other political options and parties of mainly civic orientation for eventual membership in the Federal House of Peoples. This would defeat the policy of ethnic divisions, the spread of ethnic intolerance and discrimination, because the CDU owes its political position not to the support of the
87 Zlatan Begić electorate (which is approximately 10 per cent of the total number of voters), but to the special position and competencies of the Federal House of Peoples and electoral engineering based, among other things, on the division of delegate mandates for this House. In fact, the structure of government institutions in BH and the dominant policies pursued or to be pursued depend not on the electoral will of the citizens, but on the administrative decisions and the will of the ruling political parties, which, through members in the Central Electoral Commission under their control, have modelled the structure of the Federal House of Peoples, thus determining the content of policies to be pursued in the coming period and the dynamics of all other processes, including the process of European integration. The principle of the constituency of peoples, defined by the European Court of Human Rights as a discriminatory principle, has been intended solely for the post-war period to achieve the legitimate goal of ending the war and establishing sustainable peace and security. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the establishment of sustainable peace and stability in BH has eliminated all reasonable reasons for further maintaining this principle in force and further discrimination against citizens on ethnic grounds. In fact, having in mind the ethnic structure of the population, tying ethnic representation to the territorial representation of cantons and entities, the number of individual ethnic groups and the obligation of parity representation not only constitutes an undemocratic principle of a discriminatory nature, but also makes it very difficult – if not impossible – to make such a mathematical calculation of the distribution of delegate seats for the House of Peoples among the cantons without serious violation of the rights of citizens, whether they belong to constituent peoples or not. The point is that democratic society implies respect for democratic principles, especially at the stage of the election and legitimation of public authority institutions. However, democracy as a form of a political system and democratic society as an ideal cannot be built on undemocratic principles. Any such attempt inevitably leads to the annulment of any logic and violations of human rights and freedoms and the equality of citizens before the law, as is the case with the principle of the constituency of peoples, which undoubtedly constitutes an obstacle to building democratic values and democratic society in BH.
III.2. BLOCKADE OF BH STATE INSTITUTIONS Similarly, as is the case with the entity of the Federation of BH, there are numerous blockade mechanisms at the level of BH state institutions. Thus, the Parliamentary Assembly of BH consists of two Houses – the House of Representatives (lower House) and the House of Peoples (upper House). Article IV/3(c) of the BH Constitution provides that ‘all legislative decisions must be approved by both Houses’. In addition to the fact that each decision/act of law must be adopted in the same text in both Houses, the BH Parliamentary Assembly passes its decisions
88 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles following a very complicated procedure, colloquially referred to as ‘entity voting’. This mechanism, as a regular form of decision making in both Houses, leads to the inequality of vote of Members of the House of Representatives and delegates in the House of Peoples. Thus, Article IV/3(d) of the BH Constitution stipulates that decisions are made by a majority of votes of representatives and delegates present and voting, but that majority in both Houses must include at least one third of the representatives in the House of Representatives, or one third of the delegates in the House of Peoples from the territory of each entity. Bearing in mind that the House of Representatives consists of 42 MPs, 14 of which are directly elected from the territory of the RS and 28 from the territory of the Federation of BH, this means that there must be at least 5 votes of the representatives elected from the territory of the RS entity and at least 10 votes of deputies from the entity Federation of BH; otherwise, no decision can be made in the House of Representatives. For example, in a hypothetical case, all the MPs from the Federation of BH and 4 from the RS may vote for a particular decision, which makes 32 votes out of a total of 42 MPs, the decision cannot be passed in the House of Representatives. The situation is even more dramatic in the House of Peoples, which consists of a total of 15 delegates, of which 10 delegates (5 Bosniacs and 5 Croats) who are delegated from the Federation of BH and 5 Serb delegates from the RS. Without the vote of at least two delegates from the RS and at least 4 delegates from the Federation of BH, a decision cannot be passed even if it was unanimously adopted in the House of Representatives. If a majority vote does not include one third of the votes of delegates or members from the territory of each entity, in accordance with Article IV/3(d), the Chair and Deputy Chairs shall meet as a commission and attempt to obtain approval within three days of the vote. If those efforts fail, decisions shall be taken by a majority of those present and voting, provided that the dissenting votes do not include two thirds or more of the delegates or Members elected from either entity. However, in practice, this kind of unblocking mechanism gives almost no result in terms of removing entity blockage. Thanks to such constitutional solutions, only in the period of 1997–2007, the adoption of as many as 59.9 per cent of key reform laws was blocked, of which 136 due to the absence of an entity third from the RS and 20 due to the absence of an entity third from the Federation of BH. It is largely a case of substantive reform laws relevant to the process of European integration.15 Simply put, this means that the vote of two indirectly elected delegates from the House of Peoples is worth more than the votes of all 42 directly elected deputies of the House of Representatives including other delegates of the House of Peoples. This ultimately calls into question the equality of citizens represented by elected representatives and seriously violates the democratic capacity and legitimacy of this 15 See for that Trnka, K., Miljko, Z., et al., Proces odlučivanja u Parlamentarnoj skupštini Bosne i Hercegovine [Decision-Making Process in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Sarajevo, 2009, pp. 77–100.
89 Zlatan Begić institution. It should be added to this that ethnic discrimination in the election of the delegates of the state House of Peoples has been confirmed before the European Court of Human Rights, as mentioned before. In addition to this method of regular decision making by the Houses of the BH Parliamentary Assembly, it is possible to block the adoption of any decision/act of law in the House of Peoples by using the mechanism of the protection of the vital interest of the constituent peoples. Namely, according to Article IV/3(e) and (f), the proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may be declared destructive to the vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat or Serb people by a majority of votes from the Bosniac, Croat or Serb delegates in the House of Peoples. Such a decision requires the approval of the House of Peoples, voted by a majority of the Bosniac, of the Croat and of the Serb delegates present and voting. When a majority of the Bosniac, of the Croat or of the Serb delegates objects to the invocation of this issue, the Chair of the House of Peoples immediately convenes a Joint Commission comprising three delegates, one each selected by the Bosniac, by the Croat, and by the Serb delegates, to resolve the issue. If the Commission fails to do so within five days, the challenged decision will be referred to the Constitutional Court, which, in an expedited process, will review it for procedural regularity. However, the vital interest protection mechanism is relatively rarely used, because nationalistic political parties, whose political interest is not contained in strengthening state institutions, exercise control over the legislative process in the state legislature through the use of entity voting mechanisms. This is because the use of entity voting, unlike the vital interest mechanism, does not envisage constitutional judicial control, because it is a regular way of deciding; thus, the possibility of misusing this mechanism for purely political purposes is open. The above-mentioned mechanisms relate to decision-making procedures when the BH Parliamentary Assembly is in session. However, after the last elections in October 2018, for the first time, another opportunity to block government institutions was exploited. After the establishment, the BH Parliamentary Assembly was under full blockade for more than a year, which was used for the purpose of extorting major political concessions such as the abandonment of the NATO integrations path by Serb-led parties, as well as the extortion of the amendments on the BH Electoral Law, by which the concept of further ethnic divisions created and supported by the CDU would be imposed. Namely, according to the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives, functioning of this House depends crucially on parliamentary committees, without which the regular functioning of this House and, thus, the entire legislative branch is impossible. Parliamentary committees are constituted on the proposal of political parties participating in the House of Representatives and according to the achieved election result, two thirds of the members of committee representatives are elected
90 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles from the territory of the Federation of BH and one third from the territory of the RS. It is enough that political parties seeking to block the functioning of the House of Representatives do not submit their members’ proposals for parliamentary committees, so that they cannot be constituted, thus blocking the work of this House, since, without these committees, it is impossible to carry out the procedure of passing acts of law and other decisions. Dominant political parties from the RS blocked the establishment of parliamentary committees and, thus, the work of the House of Representatives for more than a year after the 2018 elections, seeking to get BH to withdraw from NATO integrations. The Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives did not foresee the possibility of unblocking in such situations. However, with the support of opposition parties from the RS and their representatives in the House of Representatives of the BH Parliamentary Assembly and representatives from the Federation of BH in November 2019, amendments to these Rules of Procedure were adopted. These amendments stipulated unblocking mechanisms where political parties block the functioning of the House of Representatives by not proposing members of parliamentary committees. Thus, these amendments stipulate that, if any political party fails to nominate members of parliamentary committees within the set deadline because the caucuses of representatives of those political parties have not submitted their proposal, the House decides on membership in the committees on the proposal of the House Collegium, consisting of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. If caucuses and the Collegium of the House do not act or if they do not propose the missing members of the committees, the House will decide on the membership of these committees on the proposal of caucuses who have submitted their proposal for membership in the committees, on a temporary basis – until the caucuses or the Collegium of the House nominate candidates for membership in parliamentary committees. This intervention in the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives is more than welcome and is an institutional form of eliminating opportunities for future blockages by forcing political concessions. The decision-making process in the BH Presidency, which has significant foreign policy competencies, is the supreme commander of the armed forces, etc., also abounds with blockade mechanisms. Thus, the BH Constitution stipulates that the Presidency, consisting of three members – one Bosniac, one Serb and one Croat, will endeavour to adopt all decisions by consensus. Decisions of the Presidency, in accordance with the same article, may be adopted by two members if all attempts to reach consensus fail. In such cases, as prescribed by the Constitution, a member of the Presidency who does not agree with the decision may declare the Presidency’s decision destructive to the vital interest of the entity for the territory from which he was elected, provided that he does so within three days of its adoption. Such a statement shall be immediately forwarded to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska if
91 Zlatan Begić the statement is made by a member from that territory; to the Bosniac delegates of the House of Peoples of the Federation if it was made by a Bosniac member; or to Croat delegates in the same institution if it was made by a Croat member of the Presidency. The Presidency’s challenged decision, passed by outvoting, will not have effect if such a proclamation is confirmed by a two-thirds majority of the votes within ten days of the referral.16 Therefore, besides the Federation of BH, the state level of government institutions also abounds with blockades where a minority can block any decision of a majority, imposing its will on the absolute majority. In that sense, the question is what kind of political system is imposed with peace solutions for BH with the DPA and WPA? This kind of minority rule over the majority can by no means be called democracy and is a novelty in the theoretical and practical sense on which the theory, as well as the international democratic public, has yet to take its stand.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND COMMITMENTS FROM THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS In its Opinion on EU membership from 29 May 2019, the European Commission outlined a number of objections and tasks that BH must take on the path of European integration. However, the question is whether and to what extent BH can take these obligations seriously in the context of a constitutional framework abounding with blockades and undemocratic mechanisms that seriously threaten not only the efficiency of public authorities, but also call into question any form of institutional action and functioning. These are very demanding reforms that BH must implement and that, in certain segments, can jeopardise the ruling nationalistic paradigms and party clientelism; therefore, it should come as no surprise that the ruling key political subjects that base their position on ethnic divisions and inconsistencies of the current constitutional framework are ignoring the obligations from the European integration process, including the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, in its 2019 Opinion, the European Commission stated that BH still does not meet the criteria relating to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities, set by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, and that BH must make the necessary efforts to remedy this situation. This Opinion further states that BH must reform its institutions so that it can participate effectively in EU-level decision making and fully implement the acquis and that it must improve its electoral framework and the functioning of the judiciary. According to this Opinion, necessary reforms include strengthening, prevention and combating corruption and organised crime, including
16 See Art. V/2(c) and (d) of the BH Constitution.
92 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles fight against money laundering and terrorism, and ensuring the effective functioning of the border, migration and asylum management systems; in particular, the European Commission has emphasised the need to intensify the protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens, including the provision of a favourable environment for civil society and reconciliation, and the protection and inclusion of vulnerable groups. The need to take key steps in the public administration reform was also highlighted. With regard to economic criteria, the European Commission has particularly emphasised the need for BH to pay particular attention to accelerating decision-making processes and improving the business environment, as well as the efficiency and transparency of the public sector, especially public enterprises, in order to move towards a functioning market economy, which is a criterion set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. In particular, the European Commission warned of the need to take action at the institutional level to remove obstacles to the proper functioning of market mechanisms – such as weakness of the rule of law, extensive bureaucracy, corruption, lengthy and overly complex administrative procedures and the great fragmentation of the state’s internal market. Improving the quality of education and focusing on the needs of the labour market, the underdevelopment of transport and energy infrastructure and the slow adaptation of the country’s economic structure are also problems the European Commission has pointed out. The Opinion also emphasised the need to improve BH’s performance in implementing the obligations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, especially with regard to establishing the parliamentary dimension of the Agreement and adopting a national plan for the adoption of the acquis, while significantly speeding up the process of alignment with the acquis and adopting relevant legislation. In accordance with the stand of the European Commission, special attention should be paid to the areas of free movement of goods, freedom to provide services, information society and media, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, energy, economic and monetary policy, statistics, social policy and employment, entrepreneurship and industrial policy, regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, education and culture, consumer and health protection and financial control. Therefore, these are almost all areas of importance for the country’s internal development and standard of citizens, but also for the European integration process. It is quite clear that such demanding reforms require efficient and functional institutions and it is even more clear from the foregoing that such a decision-making system is burdened with numerous blocking mechanisms at each stage of decision-making procedures, a system burdened with discrimination and policies developed on the basis of undemocratic constitutional solutions from the Peace Agreements that favour further ethnic divisions and the spread of ethnic hatred. However, it is clear that such a system cannot meet the obligations of the European integration process without the support and assistance of the international community – which has imposed the current constitutional
93 Zlatan Begić framework of BH. In the same context, the European Commission in the 2019 Opinion referred to the issue of institutional dysfunction within BH, especially regarding the internal decision-making process, as well as legal uncertainty and overlaps between different levels of government over a range of competencies, which adversely affects the decision-making process, as well. Therefore, the European Commission particularly emphasised the need to improve the functionality of BH institutions in order to meet the requirements for EU membership and the corresponding obligations, concluding that the negotiations for BH’s accession to the European Union should be opened once the country has reached the required level of compliance with the criteria for EU membership and, especially, with the Copenhagen political criteria that require the stability of institutions that in particular guarantee democracy and the rule of law. In addition to these observations, the European Commission has identified key priorities. Among these priorities are reforms related to the implementation of European standards in the electoral process, in line with the recommendations of the OSCE and the Venice Commission, raising the level of functionality of government institutions, improving the institutional framework to ensure legal certainty and ending discrimination against BH citizens, all to the advancement of the judiciary and public administration reform.17
17 The European Commission’s Recommendations from the Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application for EU Membership: ‘Democracy / Functioning – 1. Ensure that elections are conducted in accordance with European standards by implementing relevant OSCE / ODIHR and the Venice Commission recommendations, ensure the transparency of political party financing and hold local elections in Mostar; 2. Ensure visible results when it comes to the functioning of the coordination mechanism on EU-level issues at all levels, including the preparation and adoption of a national programme for the adoption of the acquis; 3. Ensure the proper functioning of the Parliamentary Stabilisation and Association Committee; 4. Thoroughly improve the institutional framework, including at the constitutional level, in order to: (a) ensure legal certainty in terms of the division of competences between levels of government; (b) introduce a substitution clause to allow, upon accession, the provisional exercise of powers by other levels of government to prevent and remedy infringements of EU law; (c) guarantee the independence of the judiciary, including its independent institution (HJPC); (d) reform the Constitutional Court, including addressing the issues of international judges and ensuring that its decisions are enforced; (e) guarantee legal certainty, including through the establishment of a judicial body entrusted with ensuring a consistent interpretation of rights throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; (f) ensure the equality and non-discrimination of citizens, in particular the treatment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić and Finci case; (g) ensure that all administrative bodies in charge of implementing the acquis are based solely on professionalism and that the right of veto in the decision-making process is abolished, in accordance with the acquis; 5. Take concrete steps to improve a reconciliation environment to overcome the legacy of war; Rule of law – 6. Improve the functioning of the judiciary by adopting new laws on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and the courts of BH in accordance with European standards; 7. Strengthen the prevention and fight against corruption and organised crime, including against money laundering and terrorism, primarily through: (a) adopting and implementing regulations on conflict of interest and protection of whistle blowers; (b) ensuring the effective functioning and coordination of the anti-corruption body; (c) the harmonisation of legislation and strengthening of public procurement capacities; (d) ensuring effective cooperation
94 European integration and needed constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reforms versus obstacles
CONCLUSIONS The WPA and DPA stopped the aggression and war in BH and restored sustainable peace. An integral part of these agreements were the Constitution of the entity of the Federation of BH and the Constitution of the state of BH, which defined a very complicated internal constitutional order of the country, with five levels of organisation, with competencies in key areas that are scattered from the state level, across the entities and cantons – all the way to local self-governments, which often overlap, with the existence of multi-level regulations that are often in conflict. This produces a state of expressed legal uncertainty, with the massive, expensive and inefficient apparatus of government institutions at the five levels of its organisation. Additionally, there are discriminatory provisions of a constitutional nature that place BH citizens in an unequal position with respect to their ethnicity, favour the territorialisation of ethnic interests, further ethnic divisions and represent an undoubted obstacle to a more serious role of political parties whose political programmes are based on civic principles and European legal heritage. On the contrary, the discriminatory provisions of the Constitution and the complex and irrational internal organisation of the country through cantons and entities and, in particular, the linking of ethnic and territorial representation in institutions (for example, a Serb Presidency member is elected from the territory of the RS entity, a Bosniac and Croat member from the territory of the Federation of BH entity), facilitate the development and dominance of nationalistic political projects that, at
between law enforcement authorities and prosecutors’ offices; (e) demonstrating progress in achieving the results of proactive investigations, confirmed indictments, prosecutions and final convictions in organised crime and corruption cases, including high-level ones; (f) the depoliticisation and restructuring of public enterprises and ensuring transparency of the privatisation process; 8. Ensure the effective coordination of border management and migration management capacities at all levels and ensure the functioning of the asylum system; Fundamental rights – 9. Strengthen the protection of the rights of all citizens, in particular by ensuring the implementation of anti-discrimination and gender equality laws; 10. Ensure the right to life and the prohibition of torture, in particular (a) by abolishing the reference to the death penalty in the Republika Srpska Constitution and (b) by designating a national mechanism for the prevention of torture and inhumane treatment; 11. Provide a supportive environment for civil society, in particular respecting European standards on freedom of association and freedom of assembly; 12. Guarantee freedom of expression and of the media and the protection of journalists, in particular by (a) ensuring the proper prosecution of cases of threats and use of violence against journalists and media workers and (b) ensuring the financial sustainability of the public service broadcasting system; 13. Promote the protection and inclusion of vulnerable groups, especially disabled persons, children, LGBTI persons, members of the Roma community, detainees, migrants and asylum seekers, as well as displaced persons and refugees, with a view to closing Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement; Public administration reform – 14. Complete necessary steps in public administration reform to improve the overall functioning of public administration by ensuring a professional and depoliticised civil service and a coordinated policy-making approach across the country.’ (See for that the Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, COM (2019) 261 final, 29 May 2019).
95 Zlatan Begić the heart of their activities, have never forgotten the war goals of the division of the BH state. Thanks to the numerous blockades in the decision-making process within institutions of legislative and executive power, where during the decision-making process the vote of elected representatives is not equally valued, it is possible to completely block the adoption of any decision/act of law. Then it is quite clear that, thanks to the solutions contained in the DPA and WPA, BH does not have the internal constitutional capacity for the harmonisation of its internal constitutional order with generally accepted international democratic standards and then for the implementation of numerous reforms in key areas for the European integration process. BH and its citizens are hostage to poor constitutional solutions imposed by the above-mentioned Peace Agreements, as well as current policies that have strengthened such discriminatory and try to preserve these undemocratic solutions. In this regard, a more meaningful engagement of the international community in BH would be necessary to take this country on the path of European and civilisational values.
96 Toma Birmontienė The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania
THE CONCEPT OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTER AS DEVELOPED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF LITHUANIA
Prof. Dr. Toma Birmontienė Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania Former justice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
INTRODUCTION The populist ideas upheld by politicians of some democratic states in the 21st century have with ever increasing frequency turned against institutions consolidating and protecting democracy, among them courts and the media. In the adjudication of constitutional justice cases, constitutional review institutions are increasingly facing the striving by politicians to undermine the principles of democracy through the attempts to limit the independence of constitutional institutions and exert influence on their activity and decisions. It is not infrequently that, following elections, the parliamentary majority under populist slogans seeks to influence the independence of constitutional institutions by setting up various control authorities and proposing new organisational or financial models restricting the autonomy (independence) of constitutional institutions. While developing, specifically in its rulings of 21 December 2006 and 16 May 2019,1 the constitutional doctrine in relation to the national public broadcaster, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Court) dealt with similar issues. The article will, in greater detail discuss, the doctrine developed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the principle of the independence of the national public broadcaster, including the constitutional foundations of forming ad hoc investigation commissions as parliamentary control institutions.
I. THE NATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTER AND POLITICAL PROCESSES Parliamentary elections not infrequently become a major challenge not only to politicians but also to the media, and not only because this is the period when politicians have a particular interest to be favourably featured in the media and seek to attract its attention. It is the period when the media and, in particular, the national public broadcaster face the challenge to cover the electoral process in a
1 The rulings of the Constitutional Court of 21 December 2006 and 16 May 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/.
97 Toma Birmontienė comprehensive and objective way, among other things, by providing society with the so-called sensitive information, which is not always favourable to politicians participating in the election. Not only during elections, but also after elections, it is quite common that politicians tend to associate their failures with the insufficient or unsuitable media attention with respect to them, while political parties forming a parliamentary majority often try to realise their painful grievances by placing blame on the national broadcaster for inadequate management etc. They also seek instruments that would help them shape favourable opinions expressed through the media in the future and attempt to present this process to the public as aimed to achieve transparency, financial efficiency and effective governance. The media in Hungary, Poland and some other democratic states have not escaped such initiatives. Even the United Kingdom’s centuries-old democratic traditions of press freedom have not protected the national broadcaster – the BBC – from criticism and initiatives to limit its funding, by underlining as one of the arguments its privileged position over private media outlets.2 Privately-managed media are likewise not protected from various restrictive initiatives, but the national broadcaster not infrequently becomes the most vulnerable media link. After the election to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Seimas) in 2016, a newly formed parliamentary majority, which had received considerable media criticism, was dissatisfied with the activity of the Lithuanian National Radio and Television (hereinafter referred to as the LRT). On 12 January 2018, the Seimas passed the resolution (No XIII-1022) on forming an ad hoc investigation commission of the Seimas and mandating it to conduct a parliamentary investigation into the management of the LRT and its financial and economic activities. In the preamble to the said resolution of the Seimas, it was indicated that the parliamentary investigation into the management and financial and economic activities of the LRT, i.e. the national broadcaster, was based, among other things, on the fact that, after the receipt of the 2016 annual activity report submitted by the Council of the LRT, as well as the replies by the LRT to the questions of a group of members of the Seimas, the need arose to analyse them in greater detail and assess the application of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Lithuanian National Radio and Television (hereinafter referred to as the Law on the LRT) and other legal acts regulating the management of the LRT and its financial and economic activities. In
2 During the 2019 parliamentary election campaign, Boris Johnson, Prime Minister, threatened to take the BBC’s licence fee away as he called into question its status as the publicly funded broadcaster. He suggested the licence fee, which is guaranteed to continue until at least 2027, was a general tax that could no longer be justified when other media organisations had found other ways of funding themselves (The Guardian, 15 December2019, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/dec/15/ boris-johnson-threatens-bbc-with-two-pronged-attack). The Government agreed the license fee would stay in place until at least 2027, when the BBC’s Royal Charter ends.
98 The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania the resolution of the Seimas, the LRT is defined as a state-owned public establishment financed from the state budget. Thus, the formal need for such a parliamentary investigation became the fact that, following the exercise of parliamentary control by the members of the Seimas in accordance with the traditional form of written questions or inquiry addressed to the heads of state institutions, as prescribed under the Statute of the Seimas, inter alia, certain details governing the management and financial and economic activities of the LRT remained unclear. It should be noted that the attempts by politicians to influence the activities of the national public broadcaster in Lithuania by proposing changes to its funding model had already occurred before; in this respect, the ruling of 21 December 2006 of the Constitutional Court is particularly significant, as it set out the constitutional foundations for the independence of the national public broadcaster. On 17 January 2018, a group of members of the Seimas, composed of representatives of the parties in the opposition, by invoking, inter alia, the doctrine previously formulated by the Constitutional Court, applied to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting an investigation into whether the above-mentioned resolution of the Seimas of 12 January 2018 was in line with Article 25 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law. In its ruling of 16 May 2019, the Constitutional Court recognised that the resolution of the Seimas of 12 January 2018 on forming an ad hoc investigation commission of the Seimas and mandating it to conduct a parliamentary investigation into the management of the LRT and its financial and economic activities was in conflict with the Constitution. While developing the constitutional doctrine in relation to the national public broadcaster, the Constitutional Court placed strong emphasis on the independence of the public broadcaster, as well as on control over its activity, provided that this control is based on the principle of the independence of the public broadcaster and is not exercised directly by state authority institutions. According to this doctrine, the formation by the Seimas of ad hoc investigation commissions must not produce for the Seimas any conditions for taking over the constitutional powers of other institutions, thereby violating the imperatives stemming from the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution consolidates parliamentary democracy; but parliamentary democracy is not ‘convent rule’, which would create the preconditions for disregarding the Constitution. The Constitutional Court emphasised that Lithuania as a state that fosters pluralist democracy is under the obligation to strengthen media freedom provided for by the Constitution, as this freedom constitutes one of the essential foundations of democracy.
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II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR THE ACTIVITY OF THE MEDIA The Constitutional Court, in its ruling of 16 May 2019, following the constitutional doctrine established in its previous acts, inter alia, the rulings of 19 September 2005, 21 December of 2006, 26 January of 2004 and 23 October 2002, emphasised the importance of freedom of information. While forming this doctrine, the Constitutional Court also took into account certain acts of the European Union and the Council of Europe.3 In its ruling of 16 May 2019, the Constitutional Court summed up the previously developed constitutional doctrine and highlighted the significance of freedom of information as innate freedom of an individual and as a constitutional value; the Constitutional Court held that this freedom is one of the foundations for an open, fair and harmonious civil society and a democratic state, as well as that it is an important precondition for implementing various constitutionally consolidated rights and freedoms of a person, since a person can implement most of his or her constitutional rights and freedoms in a fully fledged manner only if he or she has the freedom to seek, receive or impart information unhindered. The Constitution guarantees and protects the interest of society to be informed, inter alia, it guarantees and protects freedom of the media. Article 25 of the Constitution4 and other provisions of the Constitution consolidating and guaranteeing the freedom of an individual to seek, receive and impart information give rise to freedom of the media. In its doctrine on freedom of information, the Constitutional Court emphasises, in particular, the importance of Lithuania as a pluralistic democracy. Freedom of the mass media, which is enshrined in the Constitution, inter alia, in Article 25 thereof, is one of the foundations of pluralistic democracy. The constitutionally guaranteed and
3 In the course of the examination of this constitutional justice case, the Constitutional Court analysed some relevant provisions of European Union legislation and documents adopted by the institutions of the Council of Europe: inter alia, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the European Parliament resolution of 21 May 2013 on the EU Charter: standard settings for media freedom across the EU, etc. 4 Article 25 of the Constitution prescribes: ‘Everyone shall have the right to have his own convictions and freely express them. No one must be hindered from seeking, receiving, or imparting information and ideas. The freedom to express convictions, as well as to receive and impart information, may not be limited otherwise than by law when this is necessary to protect human health, honour or dignity, private life, or morals, or to defend the constitutional order. The freedom to express convictions and to impart information shall be incompatible with criminal actions – incitement to national, racial, religious, or social hatred, incitement to violence or to discrimination, as well as defamation and disinformation. Citizens shall have the right to receive, according to the procedure established by law, any information held about them by state institutions.’
100 The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania protected interest of society to be informed, in the same way as constitutional freedom of information, can be ensured only if various types of the mass media operate in the state. A well-developed system of the mass media is a necessary condition for ensuring the public interest, i.e. the interest of society, to be informed; this also determines the importance of the market of radio and television broadcasting services. In terms of freedom of information, mention should also be made of other constitutional provisions: inter alia, Article 44 of the Constitution provides that censorship of mass information is prohibited (Paragraph 1) and that the state, political parties, political or public organisations, or other institutions or persons may not monopolise the mass media (Paragraph 2). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court pointed out that freedom of information is not absolute and that its limits are defined in the Constitution. It was held that any restrictions on freedom of information must be based on the same constitutional criteria as restrictions on the exercise of other fundamental human rights and freedoms; freedom of information may be limited only if the following conditions are followed: this is done by law; such restrictions are necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the rights and freedoms of other persons, the values entrenched in the Constitution, as well as the constitutionally important objectives; these restrictions do not deny the nature and essence of freedom of information; and the constitutional principle of proportionality is observed.5 The public broadcaster, inter alia, the national public broadcaster, is not expressis verbis mentioned in the Constitution, but the Constitution implicitly presupposes its necessity. As stated by the Constitutional Court back in its ruling of 21 December 2006, the duty stems from the Constitution for the state (its institutions) to provide the public through the mass media (inter alia, radio and television) with information that is related to fostering various values consolidated, protected and defended by the Constitution and to implementing various principles of the Constitution; nevertheless, the fact that the possibilities of the state to entrust private broadcasters with imparting such information and providing respective public services for society are limited, implies the constitutional necessity to establish the public radio and television broadcaster and to regulate the relationships connected with its activity in such a manner that the said duty of the state would be properly fulfilled. The Constitution gives rise to the requirements for the public broadcaster, which are determined by the specific characteristics of the public broadcaster, compared to other – private (commercial) – broadcasters. Interpreting the special mission of the public broadcaster, arising from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, the Constitutional Court held that the raison d’être of the public broadcaster is to ensure the public interest – the interest of the public – to be informed, which is consolidated, protected and defended by the Constitution; the broadcasting of programmes and
5 The rulings of the Constitutional Court, inter alia, of 16 May 2019, 24 January 2004 and 23 October 2002.
101 Toma Birmontienė broadcasts by the public broadcaster must constitute the rendering of public services, i.e. the rendering of services to the public; the public broadcaster expresses the public interest; the public broadcaster must always remain independent of any particular – private or group – interests (political, economic or other interests). In its ruling of 21 December 2006, the Constitutional Court also stressed that the mere fact that the state is the founder of the public broadcaster does not in itself mean derogation from the imperative of the independence of the public broadcaster.
III. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTER AS A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE The independence of the national public broadcaster determines that its activity must be based on objectiveness, impartiality and justice and it may not depend on any party or other political preferences; the activity of the public broadcaster must bring together and not divide society. The law must ensure the independence of the public broadcaster from interference with its activity by state authorities, officials or other persons in order that the public broadcaster could fulfil its mission; this is a conditio sine qua non. The constitutional mission of the public broadcaster implies ensuring material, organisational and financial conditions, enabling the public broadcaster to successfully fulfil its mission. The Constitutional Court held in its ruling of 21 December 2006 that the nature and constitutional mission of the public broadcaster entail not only the duty of the state to found the public broadcaster, but also the duty to ensure its activity, inter alia, the duty to allocate proper financing to the public broadcaster so that it could carry out the said mission and render respective public broadcasting services. In the doctrine developed by the Constitutional Court, the independence of the national public broadcaster is understood primarily as institutional and editorial independence. The public broadcaster must be guaranteed the right to organise and conduct its own activity in an autonomous manner in accordance with the procedure established in laws, through its own managing bodies that are independent of state authorities, officials, political parties and organisations, other persons, including private (commercial) broadcasters (institutional independence). The public broadcaster must be ensured the right, without external interference and having regard to its constitutional mission, to freely determine the structure of its programmes, as well as the content, timing, etc. of its broadcasts, and to operate independently from the point of view of freedom of information (editorial independence). The imperative of the independence of the national public broadcaster also implies that a law must establish such a model of governance of the public broadcaster that ensures that there is no derogation from the constitutional mission of this
102 The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania broadcaster to ensure the public interest – the interest of the public – to be informed, which is consolidated, protected and defended by the Constitution. The independence of the public broadcaster and the public interest that is implemented by it presupposes the accountability of the public broadcaster, inter alia, the national public broadcaster, to the public. This independence does not deny the duty of the public broadcaster to account to the public for the implementation of its constitutional mission. The state, as the founder of the public broadcaster, is under the obligation to control how the public broadcaster implements its constitutional mission and uses the resources, inter alia, state funds, allocated for the purpose of implementing this mission.
IV. THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTER AND CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITY In its ruling of 16 May 2019, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the accountability of the public broadcaster (inter alia, the national public broadcaster) to the public, which is implied by the mission of this broadcaster, arising from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, means not only that the public broadcaster, inter alia, the national public broadcaster, is required to make public its activity reports containing information on the fulfilment of its constitutional mission and the use of the state budget appropriations allocated for implementing this mission; it also means that, in accordance with the procedure laid down in laws, the public broadcaster, inter alia, the national public broadcaster, is obliged to account for its activities to the Seimas as its founder, including how it implements its constitutional mission and how the state budget appropriations allocated for implementing this mission are used. The Constitutional Court underlined the need for an appropriate model of control over the activities of the national public broadcaster, which comprises internal and external control. This model cannot create the preconditions for such control to become the censorship of programmes and broadcasts of the national public broadcaster. Having regard to the imperative of the independence of the national public broadcaster, which is implied by its mission stemming from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, the activity of the national public broadcaster must be controlled by such state institutions and/or officials that, in accordance with the Constitution and/or laws, exercise their powers independently, primarily, from political authorities.6 In the above-mentioned ruling, the Constitutional Court formulated the criteria of parliamentary control over the national public broadcaster.
6 In its ruling of 16 May 2019, the Constitutional Court held that, under the Constitution, inter alia Article 134 thereof, the National Audit Office has the power to exercise external control over the activities of the national public broadcaster – to conduct state audit, inter alia, to inspect the
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Against this background, parliamentary control over the national public broadcaster exercised by the Seimas, inter alia, its structural units, cannot in itself be understood as control, prohibited by the Constitution, exercised over the activity of the national public broadcaster by persons who pursue their own interests in connection with the activity of the national public broadcaster. However, since the Seimas is by its nature and essence a political institution whose decisions reflect the political will of the majority of members of the Seimas and are based on political arrangements and compromises, control over the activity of the national public broadcaster must not violate the imperative of the independence of the national public broadcaster, which is implied by its mission stemming from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof. Parliamentary control exercised by the Seimas over the activity of the national public broadcaster may violate neither the institutional nor editorial independence of the national public broadcaster. Under the Constitution, inter alia, the constitutional principles of responsible governance and a state under the rule of law, and having regard to the independence of the national public broadcaster, which is implied by its mission stemming from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, it is not allowed to establish such ad hoc investigation commissions of the Seimas that would be given the task of carrying out an investigation that could create the preconditions for taking over the powers, enshrined in the Constitution and/or laws, of other state authorities, inter alia, the powers of the National Audit Office, to exercise external control over the activity of the national public broadcaster, inter alia, such ad hoc commissions of the Seimas that would be assigned the task of preparing decisions that, under the Constitution and/or laws, may be adopted only by the state authorities (their officials) vested with the respective competence. On the other hand, having regard to the imperative of the independence of the national public broadcaster, which is implied by its mission stemming from the Constitution, inter alia, Article 25 thereof, the Seimas, under the Constitution, inter alia, Article 76 thereof, whenever the implementation of its constitutional powers requires it to collect comprehensive and objective information, may establish an ad hoc investigation commission for the purposes of a special issue, i.e. an issue of state importance, which is related, for instance, to a threat to the independence of the national public broadcaster. In the light of the foregoing, having analysed all significant circumstances in relation to parliamentary control in the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court drew the conclusion that Article 1 of the resolution of the Seimas of 12 January 2018, insofar as it provided the basis for setting up the commission mandated with carrying out a parliamentary investigation into the activities of the national public broadcaster, among other things, in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, inter alia, by assessing the lawfulness of the management and use of state assets entrusted to this broadcaster.
104 The concept of the independence of the national public broadcaster as developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania management of the LRT and its financial and economic activities, was in conflict with Article 25 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principles of responsible governance and a state under the rule of law.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS It is not uncommon even in countries fostering democratic values that political processes may bring the national public broadcaster amidst a political whirl; as a result, the national public broadcaster may become one of the first targets for those seeking to limit information unfavourable to the ruling political majority. In order to limit the institutional and editorial independence of the national public broadcaster, a variety of legal and political arguments can be employed. In such situations, the role of the Constitutional Court in safeguarding freedom of information and media freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as the independence of the national public broadcaster, is particularly significant. The constitutional doctrine and precedents developed by the Constitutional Court often serve as exceptional and, sometimes, the only argumentation to counter political action incompatible with the Constitution. However, such a mission of the Constitutional Court in safeguarding constitutional values is possible only if the Constitutional Court itself is independent. The independence of democratic institutions is interdependent; thus, only an independent Constitutional Court can be capable of protecting other democratic institutions.
105 Alexander Bröstl and Ľudmila Gajdošíková The concept of democracy and its relevant aspects in the constitutional justice of the Slovak Republic
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS RELEVANT ASPECTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Alexander Bröstl Former judge of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic Director of the Gustav Radbruch Institute of Legal Theory at the Faculty of Law of Šafárik-University of Košice, Slovakia
Dr. Ľudmila Gajdošíková Former judge of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic Senior Researcher of the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava
Democracy rests on two bases: the first is the sovereignty of the people (exercised in free elections); this aspect is manifested in the majority rule … The second aspect is reflected in the rule of values that characterise democracy (rule of law, separation of powers, judicial independence, human rights, and basic principles that reflect other values (such as morality and justice), social objectives (such as the public peace and security), and appropriate ways of behaviour (reasonableness and good faith). (Barak, A., The Judge in a Democracy, Princeton and Oxford, 2008, pp. 23–24)
An activist judge is one who understands the alternatives open to him and chooses that which advances the law. (Barak, A.)
Judicial activism … isn’t it just taking human rights seriously? (Bröstl, A., Toronto, 22 October 2016)
INTRODUCTION The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter ‘Constitutional Court’) dealt with the basic questions of the concept of democracy/democratic state ruled by law already during its first decade (after the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1993). It is linked with the proceedings on the compliance of laws (first of all, the Acts of Parliament) with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter ‘Constitution’) according to Article 125 of the Constitution, including the interpretation of the question of direct democracy (right
106 The concept of democracy and its relevant aspects in the constitutional justice of the Slovak Republic of petition and of referendum) and representative democracy, with the proceedings on constitutional complaints (Art. 127(1) and (3) of the Constitution) on objected violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms concerned, and in connection (from time to time following the periodicity of elections) with the proceedings on electoral complaints (Art. 129 of the Constitution) as a special field of competence of the Constitutional Court.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT The Slovak Republic is, by its Constitution, defined as a sovereign, democratic state governed by the rule of law, which is not bound by any religion or ideology. One of the requirements of such a state, ‘based on the principle of sovereignty of the people declared by Article 2 Section 1 of the Constitution, according to which the state power originated in the citizens, who exercise it by their elected representatives or directly … is that the public (state) authority can be exercised exclusively on the basis of democratic legitimation’ (I. ÚS 238/04). According to the Constitutional Court, the attribute of democratic legitimation understood in this way is the constitutional requirement that the origin (of public offices) could be, by a feedback, brought to their source, thus to the citizen, respectively to the people.1 The democratic principle as a basic constitutional principle is reflected in several constitutional provisions. So far, it is also reflected in the structure of Chapter 5 of the Constitution: it is divided into two sections; one concerning the principle of representative democracy and the other one dealing with direct democracy. The concept ‘democratic state’ includes some principles, such as the principle of the division of powers, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is very important when identifying a state as a democratic one. The Constitutional Court has confirmed the constitutional acceptance of the principle of the division of powers, sometimes using also the concept ‘a constitutional state’. The Constitution determinates the proportions and limits of the separation of powers between different branches of government. The one-sided exercise of the competences of one branch of government may disturb the constitutionally established relationships among them but also their relationship towards citizens. The National Council (Parliament), by the enlargement of its competences beyond the Constitution, cannot restrict the competences of other state authorities or take over their competences in a way that is not in compliance with the principle of the rule of law, the principle of the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances in setting the competences of state authorities (PL. ÚS 29/95).
1 Drgonec, J., Ústava Slovenskej republiky. Komentár [The Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Commentary] (2nd edition), Šamorín, 2007, pp. 24.
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‘The legislative authority is also bound by the Constitution and its principles, the changes of which are not permitted by the Constitution, because they are of constitutive importance for the democratic nature of the Slovak Republic, as it is declared in Article 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic’ (PL. ÚS 16/95 of 24 May 1995). This decision, in fact, refers to the unwritten ‘material core’ of the Constitution. The elements that are considered to be included in the protection of the democratic form of government, first of all, concern the free and equal participation of the public in decision making. ‘In this respect it means a guarantee to participate directly in the exercise of each branch of the public authority’ (II. 31/97). One remark concerning the relationship between the democratic state and the rule of law: it does not automatically follow from the democratic structure of the state that this state does also comply with the requirements of the rule of law. The majority does not always decide in favour of the law. Democratically adopted majority decisions may also be contrary to the principles of the rule of law. That is why it is important to be explicitly bound by the rule of law.2 Democracy is substantially linked with the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms, which belongs to the courts and, especially, to the Constitutional Court.3 The concept of fundamental rights and freedoms declares one key problem in a democratic state: the constitutional rules that are binding on the legislator set up what a democratically legitimated legislator may not decide and what it must (has to) decide. Robert Alexy, in this respect, speaking about the ‘necessary’ collision between the principle of democracy and the fundamental rights, which implies the problem of the division of competences between the directly democratically legitimated so as – in the sense of recall – responsible parliamentary legislator and the only indirectly democratically legitimated and not recallable Constitutional Court, underlines that it is an inevitable and a permanent problem:4 to solve it, according to John Hart Ely, is a ‘tricky task’.5
2 Bröstl, A., et al., Ústavné právo Slovenskej republiky, Plzeň, 2010, p. 45. 3 Directly expressed, e.g. in Art. 4 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic: ‘The fundamental rights and freedoms are under protection of the judicial power.’ 4 Alexy, R., Theorie der Grundrechte, Baden-Baden, 1994, p. 407. 5 Ely, J. H., Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge, Mass., 1980, p. 7. ‘Representative government must represent both the majority and minorities, and the Court is to enforce this duty where, in its judgment, a minority lacks the power to enforce the duty itself’, ibid., p. 169. For critical opinions on Ely’s views, see Cox, P. N., ‘John Hart Ely: Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review’, Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No 3, Spring 1981, p. 637; Posner, R., ‘Democracy and Distrust Revisited’, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, 1991. Comments on Ely’s opinion: ‘We may grant until we’re blue in the face, that legislators aren’t wholly democratic, but that isn’t going to make courts more democratic than legislatures’, found in Ely, J. H., ibid., p. 67: ‘Representative government presupposes two values: both of which are procedural in a broad sense. They are participation and representation – participation by all competent adults in the election of governmental officials, and fair representation for all by those officials. Judicial decisions that
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Courts should intervene when the political process fails,6 either when power holders obstruct it to preserve the status quo or when the government denies minorities the same protection it grants to the majority. Through judicial intervention, the court prevents the tyranny of the majority. Courts are the appropriate institutions to carry the counter majoritarian role, since they are not directly and immediately dependent on approval by or support of the public’s majority for their decisions. It may be similarly argued that, in a democratic society, a court has the inherent authority to annul even constitutional amendments when a failure exists in the work of democratic institutions.7 For such a failure to occur, usually two conditions need to be fulfilled: first, the work of the amendment authority must contradict the basic principles of the democratic system; second, the nature of this failure is such that its correction cannot be made through the political institution itself, but rather through an independent agent that is detached from the ordinary representative political system.8 Richard Posner, in his criticism of Ely’s position, states: ‘(T)here are … two ways that he stresses … in which judges can go wrong. The first way, what he calls the “fundamental values” approach, is by being too willing to make political judgements (in favour of women, of freedom of contract, of blacks, of foetuses, of labour unions; against criminals, big businessmen, Communists – whatever); the second is by not being willing enough, so that substantive injustices are ratified, even revelled in, in promote these values not only are lawful because they are consistent with the spirit of the document being interpreted; they also cannot be criticised as antidemocratic because the values they promote are quintessentially democratic ones.’ ‘Ely’s trick is to argue that the Court, far from acting in elitist fashion with or without permission as it were of the framers, was making America more democratic by promoting the foundational democratic principles of participation and representation’ (p. 643). 6 Landau, D., ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’, Davis Law Review, Vol. 47, 2013, p. 189.UC 7 Lithuania is also among the countries whose Constitutional Courts have overruled attempts to amend the Constitution (e.g. the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania of 24 January 2014 on the Law Amending Article 125 of the Constitution, where the Constitutional Court held that, in view of its content, Draft Law No XP-799(2) Amending Article 125 of the Constitution, which had been voted upon by the Seimas, differed in substance from Draft Law No XP-799, which had been submitted by the group of 45 members of the Seimas, who had initiated the amendment to Article 125 of the Constitution, although both draft laws in question sought the same objective, i.e. to create the legal preconditions for adopting the currency of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union – the euro, the scope of the constitutional regulation proposed by Draft No XP-799 was altered by Draft No XP-799(2), which also contained the proposal on the alteration of a different provision of the Constitution, as well as proposed the essentially different means to achieve the aforesaid objective if compared to Draft No XP-799. In the light of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court recognised that the Law Amending Article 125 of the Constitution, in view of the manner of its adoption, was in conflict with Art. 147(1) of the Constitution. 8 See and compare Roznai, Y., Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments. The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford 2017, p. 184. Here, the discussion quoted in the respective section is evaluated with the opinions of John Hart Ely (in the work mentioned above, in footnote 5) and Nicholas W. Erickson. Erickson, N. W., ‘Break on Through: The Other Side of Varnum and the Constitutionality of Constitutional Amendments’, Drake Law Review, Vol. 59, 2011, pp. 1242–1244.
109 Alexander Bröstl and Ľudmila Gajdošíková the name of the rule of law. The first mistake invites charges that the judges are being lawless, the second one that they are being legalistic.’9 From another point of view, democracy is a rule of values. In this connection, there is discussion continuing on the above-mentioned problem of the material core of the Constitution (Verfassungskern) or of the democratic state ruled by law linked with the prohibition to change it (Ewigkeitsklausel, clausulas petras).10 A few months ago, the Constitutional Court came one step closer in defining the material core of the state under the rule of law as built by a set of principles (decision of the Constitutional Court No PL. ÚS 21/2014 of 30 January 2019).11 At the same time, it opened the question of the relationship between the constituent power12 and the judiciary (represented, in this respect, by the Constitutional Court) as the guardians of the Constitution,13 the question that arises in a different way also in ancient Athenian democracy – who is kyrion panton (Lord of Everything), the last instance in the creation of law at the constitutional level (amendment of the Constitution via a constitutional act in the case of the Slovak Republic to become/not to become subject of judicial control), linked with the problem when the amendment of the Constitution is in contradiction with the material core of the Constitution of a democratic state ruled by law.14
9 Posner, R., footnote 5, p. 642. 10 Germany and Brazil are concerned here. See, e.g. Starck, Ch., Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Band 3: Artikel 79–146, München, 2001, Artikel 79 Absatz 3, 36, p. 40.; Scotti, R. V., ‘Constitutional Amendments and Constitutional Core Values: The Brazilian Case in a Comparative Perspective’, Revista de Investigacoes Constitutionais, Vol. 5, No 3, Curtiba, September/December, 2018, online version, pp. 1–15. 11 By this plenary decision, the Constitutional Court abolished part of the Constitutional Amendment (Constitutional Act No 161/2014 Coll.) concerning the Security Examinations of Judges of Ordinary Courts, because of its contradiction with the Body of the Constitution and its violation of the constitutional principle (not written, but derived from the general principle of the rule of law) of the separation of powers. More information on the question can be found in the paper from the IVR World Congress in Luzern of 8 July 2019: Bröstl, A., ‘Ekklesia and Dikasterion – Which Body Is Considered To Be Kyrion Panton; Recent Dimensions of an Old Problem’ (to be published in Prague in 2020). 12 Constituent power is understood here as the power to establish the constitutional order (it may be classified as primary and secondary constituent power). Constitutive power is the power created by the Constitution and is ordinary limited power, which functions according to the forms and mode that the nation grants it in positive law. See Roznai, Y., footnote 8, pp. 105, 106. 13 ‘Who is the guardian of the Constitution?’ can be seen as a variety of the universal and timeless application of the phrase ‘Quis custodiet ipso custodes?’ (‘Who will guard the guardians themselves? Who will watch the watchmen?’) from Juvenal’s Satires (VI, 346–347). 14 Here I would like to quote – maybe a bit surprisingly – from a court case (a speech) with Demosthenes as the orator: ‘For in fact, if you (jurors) cared to consider and investigate the question of what it is that gives power and control (ischyroi kai kyrioi) over everything in the polis to those of you who are jurors at any given time – you would find that the reason not that you alone of the citizen are armed and mobilised in ranks, that you are physically the best and strongest, not that you are youngest in age, nor anything of the sort, but rather you would find that you are powerful (ischyein) through the laws (nomoi). And what is the power of the laws? Is it that, if any of you is attacked and gives a shout,
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A related problem should be touched upon in the respect mentioned above. Of utmost importance for securing the democratic state ruled by law in general – and in the Slovak Republic with regard to Article 1(1) of the Constitution – is the clause concerning the question of changing/amending the Constitution according to the status quo (its written text in force). The basic requirement is the one expressing the defined quorum, the number of members of the National Council needed for adopting a change/an amendment of the Constitution (at least 90 of 150, in other words at least a three-fifths majority). With regard to the experience of the Slovak Republic, we would like to emphasise that, from another point of view, there are other constitutional matters when an introduced simple-majority rule may be not good enough, e.g. in the election of candidates for the positions of judges of the Constitutional Court, when a preferable qualified-majority rule as a sufficient guarantee of democratic legitimation, which includes the protection of minorities, could help to solve the long-lasting problem. This could, for example, be done in a step, which has been recommended also in the opinion of the Venice Commission, that could lead to the solution of the problem by introducing a qualified three-fifths majority in the voting procedures.15 In this respect, we could even call introducing a simple-majority rule for such a matter an initial error (proton pseudos) of the Constitution of 1992.
II. THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN A DEMOCRACY Focusing on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court concerning Part Three ‘Political Rights’ of the Constitution (Arts. 26 to 32 of the Constitution), on different aspects of democracy, we would like, in a brief summary, to recall some important cases in this respect (which already have got attention in earlier contributions).
they will come running to your aid? No, they are just inscribed letters and have no ability (ouchi dynaint) to do that. What then is your motive power (dynamis)? You are, if you secure them and make them authoritative (kyrioi) whenever anyone asks for aid. So the laws are powerful through you and you through the laws. You must therefore stand up for them in just the same way as any individual would stand up for himself if attacked; you must take the view that offenses against the law are public concern.’ Demosthenes, Against Midias (translation by Murray, A. T.), London, 1939, pp. 223–225. 15 Art. 84(3) of the Constitution speaks about the requirements to pass or to amend the Constitution by the consent of at least a three-fifths majority of all Members of the National Council: the recommendations and attempts are linked with the enlargement of this provision and include also the proposal on the elected candidates for the judges of the Constitutional Court among matters for which a qualified majority is foreseen as needed. The Constitution is silent in the part on the election of the judges of the Constitutional Court in Art. 134. Another example could be the election of the Prosecutor General, where, in our opinion, there is another need of a qualified three-fifths majority to be introduced (by change of the Constitution).
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Back to the roots: isegoria was seen as a hallmark and outstanding feature of Athenian democracy in the fifth and the fourth century B. C. ‘Who wishes to address the Assembly?’ (‘Tis agoreuein bouletai?’) the herald asked marking the opening of deliberations by the Assembly. The capacity of a free man to address the People was fundamental to the Athenian democracy and to prevent a man from speaking was an assault not only on ‘rights’ of the individual,16 but on democracy itself. Such is the complaint made by Demosthenes against Aeschines: ‘It is not right to debar a man from access to the Assembly and a fair hearing, it is neither just, nor constitutional, nor honest!’17 While isegoria referred to the right to address the polis’ governing bodies, parrhesia referred to the content of what could be said and included the right to criticise both – persons and policies – and to censure, admonish, berate, shame and insult one’s fellow citizen and the leaders of the polis.18 Recently, Article 26 of the Constitution is about the freedom of expression (speech) and the right to information (special attention to it will be offered in the enlarged written form of presentation with cited and commented cases like II. ÚS 7/00 etc.). Freedom of speech enables the man to express or to conceal his or her emotions, ideas and opinions (II. ÚS 28/96). Petitions are a symbolic shining light of democracy; a way people can demonstrate their beliefs and feelings on a matter outside a regular voting every several years. Article 27 of the Constitution states: ‘The right of petition as a fundamental right included into political rights is one of the forms of direct democracy. It is part of the principle of sovereignty of the citizens which enables them to participate in the administration of public affairs’ (PL. ÚS 42/95 of 2 May 1995; also I. ÚS 44/00 of 5 January 2001 on restraint on the right of petition). The decision in the so-called ‘Tibet case’ (I. ÚS 44/00 of 5 January 2001 on restraint on the right of petition) is to be mentioned as an example concerning the alleged violation of Article 27 of the Constitution by improper actions taken by the City Police in Prešov. The following events led to the accusation against the City Police: on 10 March 2000 in the afternoon, in the Main Street, the petitioners (together with other persons) organised a petition ‘For Hanging Out the Flag of Tibet’. During this activity, some participants occasionally played tam-tams (this performance was by the City Police called ‘musical production’). The petitioners declared that the performance had become a subject of attention of the City Police three times when
16 Although not regarded as a ‘right’ in Antiquity, the terms isegoria and parrhesia express our modern ideas of free speech most closely. Thus, they are the ultimate origin of a concept underlying notions of freedom and democracy. In Sluiter, I. and Rosen, M. (eds.), Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, Leiden–Boston, 2004, Preface, IX. 17 Demosthenes, On the Crown (translation by Vince, C. A., et al.), Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1926, pp. 13, 18. 18 Roisman, H. M., ‘Women’s Free Speech in Greek Tragedy’, in Sluiter, I. and Rosen, M. (eds.), footnote 16, p. 91.
112 The concept of democracy and its relevant aspects in the constitutional justice of the Slovak Republic it asked for various kinds of permissions (permission for public space, permission to a petition, permission for musical production), despite the arguments used by the petitioners that the exercise of the petition right guaranteed by the Constitution does not submit to any permission or duty to announce (report) it. From another point of view, some recent petitions considered to be racist and transphobic have called the system into question. Should the parliamentary website host ‘objectionable’ positions? At what point does free speech become hate speech? And how does the petition system work anyway?19 The right to peaceful assembly shall be guaranteed according to Article 28(1) of the Constitution (I. ÚS 193/03 of 30 March 2004 on street procession and street-crossing cyclists).20 On the initiative of the civil association ‘Live and Let Live’, on 11 June 2001, in Bratislava, a properly announced assembly took place (a street procession is in this sense also qualified as an assembly). Its aim was, in a street-crossing of cyclists at chosen communications in the capital, to point out the need of full support for public transport and a more systematic solution of the situation in transport in the city. Part of the assembly, with the nature of a happening, was also the blocking of a crossing of the central square for about five minutes (including one minute of silence offered to all the victims of automobilism in Slovakia). In an administrative proceeding, the Mayor of the City, on the initiative of the District Directory of the Police, fined the association the sum of SKK 30 000, because the complainant had used several communications ‘without a permission of the respective Road administration authority’ and ‘in another than usual way’, when consequently such acts had led to an interruption of the road traffic and to threatening its security and flow. After a recall had been lodged, the District Office confirmed the decision of the Mayor. Afterwards, the accusation concerning the legality of the decision of the District Office was dismissed by the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court stated that the complainant (the respective civil association), due to the known facts, could realise the assembly including the street procession and it had to be sanctioned afterwards. These circumstances it considered irrelevant from the point of view of the evaluation whether the right of the petitioner had been violated or not, because, as a limitation, only the public authorities’ measures that are taken in advance or during the course of the procession or after the end of it can be considered. Thus, the Regional Court, by its judgment by which it ‘confirmed’ 19 One example among others from New Zealand: on 2 April 2019, National Member of the Parliament Hayes presented to the Parliament the petition entitled ‘Stop transgender teaching in New Zealand schools’. It had 40 668 signatures. See more information on petitions at stuff.co.nz/national/ politics/112264808/democracy-freedom-and-friction-how-does-a-petition-work. 20 In a more elaborated version, the above-mentioned cases have been analysed in Bröstl, A. and Gajdošíková, Ľ., ‘Constitutional Justice and Protection of Individual Rights and Freedoms in the Slovak Republic’, in Arnold, R. and Tanase, A. (eds.), Constitutional Justice and Evolution of Individual Rights: 19th Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law, Chisinau, 8–9 June 2017, pp. 361, 363.
113 Alexander Bröstl and Ľudmila Gajdošíková the fine directed at the petitioner by the respective administrative authority in a direct connection with the assembly, had – according to the decision of the Constitutional Court – violated the right to peaceful assembly of the civil association ‘Live and Let Live’, guaranteed in Article 28(1) of the Constitution. Article 29(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to freely associate. Everyone has the right to associate with others in clubs, societies or other associations. Its constitutional regulation has been confronted with the prohibition of multiple membership in political parties by Act No 404/2000 (Coll.), by which Act No 424/1991 (Coll.) on associating in political parties and political movements was amended (PL. ÚS 3/01). Regarding Article 30(1) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has stated: ‘The fundamental right of the citizen to participate in the administration of public affairs in a direct way according to Article 30 Section 1 of the Constitution is one of the fundamental political rights of citizens in a democratic society’ (II. ÚS 37/1998, II. ÚS 9/2000). Never-ending considerations on the right to access to elected and public offices under equal conditions (Art. 30(4) of the Constitution). The remaining question also in the light of the very recent jurisprudence from the last years: does the ‘right to be appointed to a constitutional office’ really exist or not? Article 31 of the Constitution is on the interpretation and use of all political rights and freedoms in the way that enables and protects the principle of the free competition of political forces in a democratic society (interpreted by the Constitutional Court not in the sense of an individual constitutional right, but as an obligation of the National Council when adopting laws on political rights; PL. ÚS 15/1998 of 11 March 1998). The rights to elect and to be elected are protected by the Constitutional Court in the proceedings on electoral complaints (Art. 129 of the Constitution). ‘Elections are a means of a regular renewal of the public power by the citizens … The essence of the protection of the constitutionality in electoral matters is the protection of the rights guaranteed in Article 30 of the Constitution, the active and passive electoral right’ (PL. ÚS 21/94). The competence of the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality and legality of elections to the National Council, European Parliament and authorities of territorial self-administration and presidential elections includes, among others, the possibility of declaring elections void and/or of abolishing the objected result – just in cases when the violation was evidently done in a way that had rudely or seriously or repeatedly influenced the free competition of political forces in a democratic society (plenary decision PL. ÚS 17/94). As an example, when the elections have been invalidated, the case of the elections of the Mayor of the City-Part Bratislava-Petržalka can be mentioned here: the reason was the flights over the relevant part of the City showing up an air banner saying ‘Bratislava votes for M.’ and on the ground offering presents and refreshments, including alcoholic beverages, during the time of the officially declared moratory of campaigning (within
114 The concept of democracy and its relevant aspects in the constitutional justice of the Slovak Republic the period of 48 hours before the election).21 In the reasoning of decision PL. ÚS 6/06 of 22 August 2006, the violation of the free competition of political forces in this election and the improper and not allowed spreading of information in favour of one of the candidates were explained. After a period of focusing consequent and strict attitude in the last decade, with hearings at the relevant electoral districts and looking for evidence, it is more practical in the evaluation of electoral complaints (i.e. not entering into the proceedings of re-evaluation or introducing new evidence, just focusing on delivered facts). The citizens’ right in Article 32 of the Constitution to put up resistance against anyone who would eliminate the democratic order of human rights and freedoms listed in the Constitution if the activity of constitutional bodies and the effected use of legal means are rendered impossible did not really become a topic of interest of the Constitutional Court until now. In a reaction towards a petition, the Constitutional Court stated that ‘inactivity/passivity of a state authority, which was called/requested by a person to exercise (put on) its competence, does not establish the right to put up resistance’ (I. ÚS 32/96).
III. REFERENDA IN THE LIGHT OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT Referenda are considered to be an essential part of democracy. A relevant part of the contribution is offered here to some chosen problems linked with a referendum (Arts. 94–100 of the Constitution). They concern, for example, the content of the right to participate in a referendum, questions asked in a referendum, the declaration of a referendum, the violation of the right to vote in a referendum – the case of the ‘blocked’ referendum, and special questions like the possibility of changing the Constitution via referendum. The constitutional regulation is a basis for an obligatory referendum in Article 93(1) of the Constitution: ‘A referendum is used to confirm a Constitutional Act on entering into a union with other states, or on withdrawing from that union.’ The second paragraph of the same article refers to a facultative referendum, stating that ‘a referendum can be used to decide also on other important issues of public interest’. The provision of Article 93(3) of the Constitution concerns questions of public interest, which may not become a subject of a referendum: ‘Fundamental rights and freedoms, taxes, levies and the state budget may not be the subject of a referendum.’ 21 The National Council has recently adopted a new law as an amendment of Act No 180/2014 (Coll.) on the conditions of the exercise of the electoral right, which has enlarged the period of the moratorium on publishing the results of public opinion poll before the day of election from 14 to 50 days. On the proposal of the President, it became a pending case at the Constitutional Court, which adopted a preliminary measure to stop its coming into force.
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There have been repeated attempts by political elites of the Slovak Republic to put through an interpretation by which a referendum will be changed into a plebiscite (II. ÚS 31/97).22 In the proceedings of the interpretation of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, in its first attempt in its resolution from 21 May 1997, defined the referendum in an unambiguous way: ‘The referendum is a constitutionally regulated legal institution the aim of which is to safeguard/secure the citizens that they may directly participate in the creation of the will of the state. Citizens in the referendum realise their respective right by voting, which should have a legal effect. Voting of citizens without legal effects is people’s initiative’ (II. ÚS 31/97). In states that enable their citizens to participate in the administration of public affairs by voting in a referendum, there is more often no possibility of expressing their opinion on the change of the Constitution. Only in some states, they have the right to confirm by voting, in a referendum, such a change of the Constitution, which has been before approved by the Parliament (e.g. Ireland, Poland, Slovenia). Exceptionally, there are states that guarantee to the citizens the right to change the Constitution without the previous voting in the Parliament. The Constitutional Court declared: The state power originates from citizens, who exercise it through their elected representatives or directly (see Point 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution). This means that also when the citizens delegate their rights to the Parliament, they keep their right – as holders of the primary, original power – to decide upon several crucial questions concerning the public interest in the referendum, independently from the Parliament. The right of the citizens to address a petition on a declaration of a referendum offers them the possibility to realise their primary, not-derived power also in such cases when the Parliament would not proceed in compliance with the ideas of the citizens, that is when it does not want or would not be able to decide on some important matters. Theoretically the referendum is a certain ‘fuse’ of the citizens towards the Parliament, to let them to accept ‘advice’ in crucial questions or to let the citizens to take responsibility, which the Parliament cannot, does not want, or is not able to bear. (PL. ÚS 42/95 of 2 May 1996)
22 Just to draw attention to a difference between a referendum and a plebiscite in the constitutional law theory in the United Kingdom: referenda are binding on the government. A plebiscite is something called ‘advisory referendum’, because the government does not have to act upon its decision. Plebiscites do not deal with constitutional questions, but issues on which the government seeks approval to act or not to act. ‘Since the word “plebiscite” has undemocratic connotations, it is often used by critics to reject popular consultation, whether fair or unfair. Traditionally, proposals for British referendums were considered inconsistent with the idea of representative parliamentary democracy. The increase of proposals for a referendum has introduced confusion in place of principle. It would be an abuse of rhetoric for critics of the EU referendum to allege that it will be a plebiscite. However, a Google search shows that the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the same story by such media as the BBC, the Financial Times, the Guardian and the Independent.’ Compare with http://ukandeu.ac.uk/referendum-or-plebiscite-whats-the-difference and, as an example, the European Union Referendum Act 2015, UK Public General Acts, 2015, c. 36.
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The referendum in 1997 was connected with the proposal directly to change the Constitution (according to the supplemented wording of the Constitutional Act on direct elections of the President of the Slovak Republic). The Constitutional Court was challenged with the situation and it stated: ‘The Constitution does not forbid/does not exclude that the subject of referendum according to Point 2 of Article 93 of the Constitution shall be the question of the change of the Constitution or its part’ (II. ÚS 31/97) and the story of the real outcome of the respective attempt. The real situation in this context led to the so-called ‘blocked referendum’. The recent Minister of Interior had not printed question No 4 on the direct election of the President and people had voted only on three questions except this one, although the Constitutional Court had said that it is not a forbidden question to ask. It is important to add, just to know, that, except the only one referendum on joining the European Union from 16 to 17 May 2003,23 there was only one successful referendum from eight attempts in the Slovak Republic (from the point of view of its outcome) in the history of this democratic institution. According to Article 95(1) of the Constitution, the President calls a referendum if there is/upon a request of at least 350 000 citizens or when a respective resolution of the National Council is adopted. The Constitutional Court explained that, in connection with Article 95(2) of the Constitution, both reasons for calling a referendum are linked with the right of the President to ask the Constitutional Court to review whether the proposed referendum is in compliance with the Constitution or with a constitutional act. This, in fact, means that the concept of the protection of the Constitution (Art. 95(2) of the Constitution) has deviated from the ex post to ex ante protection of the Constitution (I. ÚS 38/94). In the case from 1994, the president of the Petition Committee objected in his motion according to Article 130(1) of the Constitution that the President had violated the Constitution, because he, after accepting the petition, had reviewed/proved the number of undersigned citizens on the petition sheets. As a result of this procedure, he had not recognised untrustworthy signatures and, in consequence, refused to call a referendum with the opinion that the petition had not been undersigned by a constitutionally foreseen number of electors (the constitutionally required preconditions as they follow from Article 95 of the Constitution had not been fulfilled, because there were only 232 957 signatures considered valid and supporting the petition). Two final remarks are concerning the topics linked with voting and public discussions (consultations!) in a democracy. Recently, in connection with the elections of candidates for the judges of the Constitutional Court in and by the National Council, one of the main questions concerned the voting procedure: public voting or secret ballot voting (also due to the controversial statutory legal regulation); the
23 The participation in this referendum fits with the conditions and, in the outcome, 52.15 per cent electors voted in favour of Slovakia’s joining the European Union.
117 Alexander Bröstl and Ľudmila Gajdošíková request of interpretation has not reached the Constitutional Court yet. The question is a matter of dispute and, in fact, it hampers the whole constitutional procedure (as a result of vacant seats ‘on the bench’ at the Constitutional Court).
FINAL REMARK ON OPEN POSSIBILITIES From an overview, there are certainly more elements included in the protection, support and development of the principles of a democratic state, which are linked with the democratic form of government, for example, the participation of the public in decision making apart from a referendum. Not only this practice of participatory democracy, but also public discussion on questions of serious importance, is guaranteed either directly via the Constitution or indirectly via international treaties.24 Article 28 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Announcement No 40/2000 (Coll.)) could serve as an example. According to the respective article, Parties to the Convention should safeguard that ‘fundamental questions … are the subject of appropriate public discussion in the light … of relevant medical, social, economic, ethical and legal implications, and that their possible application is made the subject of appropriate consultation.’25
24 The following example is mentioned by Drgonec, J., The Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Commentary, 2007, p. 31. 25 Art. 28 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine.
118 Eugen Chelaru and Ramona Duminică Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE ROUMANIE EN MATIÈRE DE RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF NATIONAL
Prof. univ. Dr. hab. Eugen Chelaru Doyen, Faculté des Sciences Économiques et de Droit, Université de Pitești
Chargé de cours, Dr. Ramona Duminică Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Droit, Université de Pitești
PROPOS INTRODUCTIFS Du point de vue étymologique, dans le domaine du droit roumain, le terme « referendum » dérive du verbe « referare » qui désigne la manière dont une proposition était « ramenée » au peuple (Propositum qui referendum est populo), plus précisément l’électorat était consulté directement sur un certain thème, donnant ainsi de la légitimité à la décision à adopter. Dans le langage juridique actuel, l’on s’accorde sur le sens de ce terme en tant que moyen à travers lequel la souveraineté du peuple est exprimée. Toutefois, compte tenu des formes multiples que revêt le référendum et des conséquences qu’il engendre, lesquelles varient d’un État à l’autre, ainsi que de l’absence d’un consensus de la doctrine sur la typologie des consultations référendaires, il est difficile d’en élaborer une définition qui soit acceptée de manière générale1. Pour les mêmes raisons, les principaux actes normatifs internationaux ne définissent pas le référendum, mais se limitent à sa consécration. Ainsi, par l’art. 21, la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme stipule que « toute personne a le droit de prendre part à la direction des affaires publiques de son pays, soit directement, soit par l’intermédiaire de représentants librement choisis […] la volonté du peuple étant le fondement de l’autorité des pouvoirs publics »2 et l’art. 25 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques stipule que « tout citoyen a le droit et la possibilité […] de prendre part à la direction des affaires publiques, soit directement, soit par l’intermédiaire de représentants librement choisis ». Dans la Constitution de la Roumanie, le règlement à caractère général du référendum est représenté par l’art. 2 alinéa 1 conformément auquel « la souveraineté
1 À ce sens, voir aussi Uşvat, L. F., Referendumul (Le référendum), Ed. Universul Juridic, București, 2012, p. 10. 2 Adoptée et proclamée lors de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU par la Résolution 217 A (III) du 10 décembre 1948. La Roumanie a signé la Déclaration le 14 décembre 1955, quand l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a décidé, par la résolution 955 (X), l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’ONU.
119 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică nationale appartient au peuple roumain, qui l’exerce par ses organes représentatifs, constitués à voies d’élections libres, périodiques et correctes, ainsi que par référendum ». La conséquence normative directe de l’introduction de cette procédure par le législateur constituant est « l’établissement d’une démocratie semi-directe et d’un droit constitutionnel du peuple à exercer sa souveraineté nationale par voie référendaire »3. D’autres dispositions constitutionnelles relatives au référendum peuvent être trouvées dans l’art. 73 alinéa 3 sous d), l’art. 90, l’art. 146 sous i) et l’art. 151 alinéa 3 de la Constitution. Les dispositions de l’art. 73 alinéa 3 sous d) de la loi fondamentale conformément auxquelles « par la loi organique sont réglementés : l’organisation et le déroulement du référendum » ont été matérialisées par l’adoption de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum4. Conformément à l’art. 2 alinéa 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000, le référendum est la forme de consultation directe et le moyen d’expression directe de la souveraineté du peuple. À partir des réglementations légales en vigueur, plusieurs définitions du référendum ont été élaborées dans la littérature de spécialité roumaine. Rappelons, à titre d’exemple, deux d’entre elles, notamment celle qui définit le référendum comme « le processus par lequel le peuple est associé au pouvoir de décision, le modèle classique, se présentant comme une participation directe du corps électoral au processus législatif »5 et celle qui le considère comme « un moyen d’exercice direct du pouvoir de l’État »6. Selon l’étendue du territoire sur lequel ils sont organisés, les référendums peuvent être en Roumanie, tel qu’il résulte de l’ensemble des réglementations, nationaux et locaux ou départementaux, selon le cas. De même, du point de vue du contenu, les référendums peuvent être obligatoires ou facultatifs. A partir de ces deux classifications, on obtient la typologie suivante : – le référendum national, lequel constitue la forme et le moyen de consultation, de décision directe et d’expression de la volonté souveraine du peuple. Le référendum national peut être obligatoire (organisé en vue de la révision de la Constitution et de la destitution du Président de la Roumanie, après approbation par le Parlement de la suspension de la qualité détenue par celui-ci) ou facultatif (organisé pour des problèmes d’intérêt national)
3 Dănişor, D. C., Gârleșteanu, G., « Procedura referendumului. Comentariul Deciziei Curții Constituționale nr. 147/2007 » (Procédure référendaire. Commentaire de la Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle n° 147/2007), in Curierul Judiciar, n° 4/2007, p. 21. 4 Publiée au Journal officiel n° 84 du 24 février 2000 telle que modifiée et complétée ultérieurement. 5 Dănişor, D. C., Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, Teoria generală (Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques. Théorie générale), vol. 1, Ed. C. H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 100. 6 Muraru, I., Tănăsescu, S. E., Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice (Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques) ed. a XII-a, vol. II, Ed. C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 134.
120 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
– le référendum local, qui peut être, à son tour, facultatif, lorsqu’il est organisé pour des questions présentant un intérêt particulier pour l’unité administrative-territoriale, ou obligatoire, utilisé en vue de modifier les limites territoriales d’une unité administrative-territoriale7. En ce qui concerne le référendum consultatif, objet de la présente étude, la littérature de spécialité a souligné le fait que ce type de référendum est utilisé afin que les électeurs expriment leur volonté sur un problème donné, mais que la consultation n’a pas de valeur contraignante et donc ses résultats n’imposent aucune décision aux autorités8. Selon les dispositions de l’art. 90 de la Constitution, le Président de la Roumanie, après consultation du Parlement, peut demander à la population d’exprimer, par référendum, sa volonté sur des sujets d’intérêt national. Dans une telle situation, nous sommes en présence d’un référendum facultatif. En tant que forme d’intervention directe des électeurs dans la prise de décision, le référendum a été utilisé plusieurs fois en Roumanie, après 1989, à savoir : en 1991, pour l’approbation de la Constitution; en 2003, pour l’approbation de la révision de la loi fondamentale; en 2007, pour l’introduction du scrutin uninominal majoritaire; en 2007, pour la destitution du Président de la Roumanie ; en 2009, pour la réduction du nombre de parlementaires de 471 à 300 et pour la transformation du Parlement de la Roumanie en un parlement monocaméral; en 2012, pour la destitution du Président de la Roumanie ; en 2018, pour la modification de l’art. 48 de la Constitution ; en 2019, le référendum sur la justice. Parmi ceux-ci, quatre référendums ont été des référendums consultatifs et deux seulement ont répondu aux conditions prévues par la loi et ont été validés par la Cour constitutionnelle, plus précisément celui de 2009 visant à réduire le nombre de parlementaires de 471 à 300 et à transformer le Parlement de la Roumanie en un parlement monocaméral et celui de 2019 sur la justice. Le référendum consultatif du 22 novembre 2009 organisé en Roumanie en même temps que le premier tour de l’élection présidentielle, validé par la Cour constitutionnelle roumaine par la Décision n° 37 du 26 novembre 20099, qui a soumis à l’électorat deux problèmes – la transformation du Parlement roumain bicaméral en parlement monocaméral et la réduction du nombre de parlementaires de 471 à 300 – n’a produit aucun effet concret. Ses résultats sont restés au niveau d’une simple enquête officielle menée dans tout le pays, car, selon les normes actuelles, un référendum basé sur les dispositions de l’art. 90 de la Constitution a une valeur
7 Iancu, Gh., « Referendumul în România » (« Le Référendum en Roumanie »), Analele Universităţii Bucureşti, Seria Drept, nr. 4/2009, p. 1. 8 Aubert, J. F. « Le référendum populaire », Revue de droit suisse, n° 5, 1972, p. 481. 9 Relative au respect de la procédure d’organisation et de déroulement du référendum national du 22 novembre 2009 et à la confirmation des résultats, publiée au Journal Officiel n° 923 du 30 décembre 2009.
121 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică purement consultative et n’oblige pas les autorités de l’Etat à adopter des décisions conformément à la volonté exprimée par l’électorat10. Le référendum organisé le 26 mai 2019, parallèlement aux élections européennes, validé par la Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle n° 2 du 27 juin 2019, a soumis au vote populaire deux questions, à savoir, d’une part, l’interdiction de toute amnistie et de grâce pour faits de corruption, et, d’autre part, l’interdiction de l’adoption par le gouvernement d’ordonnances d’urgence dans le domaine des infractions pénales et de l’organisation judiciaire, corrélée au droit d’autres autorités constitutionnelles de saisir directement la Cour constitutionnelle en matière d’ordonnances. Ces référendums consultatifs ont donné lieu à de vives discussions au niveau doctrinal et à de nombreuses questions portées à l’attention de la Cour constitutionnelle. Ainsi, à partir de la jurisprudence de la Cour telle qu’elle a été évoquée au cours de ces dernières années, il peut émerger des éléments qui illustrent la manière dont l’institution du référendum consultatif a évolué. Que l’on se réfère à la manière dont le référendum est réglementé, à la procédure elle-même ou aux modifications qui ont été apportées à cette procédure, le sens de l’évolution de cette institution a été donné, dans une large mesure, par la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie.
I. RÉGLÉMENTATION DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF La manière dont une institution juridique est réglementée influence sa mise en œuvre. La procédure d’organisation du référendum consultatif national requiert deux étapes, prévues à l’art. 11 de la Loi n° 3/2000. La première étape c’est la consultation du Parlement qui, dans les chambres réunies, adopte une décision avec le vote de la majorité des députés et des sénateurs présents, dans un délai maximum de 20 jours à compter de la demande du président. La deuxième étape est représentée par la consultation des citoyens, qui répondent par oui ou non aux questions d’intérêt national soumises par le président. Dans le même sens, la Décision n° 567 du 11 juillet 200611 de la Cour constitutionnelle roumaine prévoit que : La procédure référendaire initiée par le Président sur des « problèmes d’intérêt national » […] comporte deux phases : a) la consultation du Parlement, qui doit adopter une décision lors de la séance commune des deux Chambres, avec le vote de
10 Pour une présentation plus détaillée, voir Dumitru, R., (Duminică), « Rezultatele referendumului din 2009 – fundament al unei viitoare revizuiri a Constituţiei? » (Les résultats du référendum de 2009 : fondement pour une future révision de la Constitution ?), in Revista de Ştiinţe Juridice n° 1/2011, pp. 119-131. 11 Relative à l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité des dispositions de l’art. 12 par 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, publiée au Journal Officiel n° 613 du 14 juillet 2006.
122 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
la majorité des députés et des sénateurs sur le référendum proposé par le Président de la Roumanie. Faute de consultation du Parlement, le Président ne peut procéder à l’initiation du référendum ; b) la consultation des citoyens, lesquels expriment leur volonté sur les problèmes d’intérêt national soumis par le Président. En ce qui concerne les conditions de validité, la Loi n° 3/2000 stipule actuellement que le référendum est valable si au moins 30 % du nombre de personnes inscrites sur les listes électorales permanentes y participent, et son résultat est validé si les options valablement exprimées représentent au moins 25 % des personnes inscrites sur les listes électorales permanentes. Malheureusement, la loi-cadre en matière de référendum, la Loi n° 3/2000, l’acte normatif le plus ancien en matière électorale, n’a pas joui de stabilité et a subi plusieurs modifications au fil des ans, notamment par le biais d’ordonnances d’urgence12, qui ont été adoptés sans de véritables débats sur le contenu des réglementations futures. L’utilisation d’ordonnances d’urgence implique en quelque sorte une perte de la qualité de l’acte normatif, lequel devient ainsi susceptible de donner lieu à des controverses et à de diverses interprétations dans sa mise en pratique. En outre, comme nous allons le montrer plus loin dans notre étude, un certain nombre de dispositions relatives au référendum consultatif ont été déclarées inconstitutionnelles par la Cour constitutionnelle et leurs effets ont cessé. La Constitution de la Roumanie13 énumère les domaines dans lesquels l’ordonnance d’urgence ne peut être adoptée et les droits électoraux (qui font partie des droits et des libertés fondamentaux) en ont été indiqués séparément justement pour renforcer ces interdictions, car le « législateur a voulu souligner une fois de plus que les ordonnances d’urgence ne doivent surtout pas porter préjudice au régime de réalisation des droits électoraux, en d’autres termes, les ordonnances d’urgence ne peuvent pas être utilisées en vue d’adopter des lois électorales ou des codes électoraux »14. Pourtant, à plusieurs reprises, les gouvernements roumains ont eu recours à l’ordonnance d’urgence pour modifier la législation en matière électorale. Même si le législateur constituant a prévu que la législation électorale soit réservée au Parlement, sans l’intervention du gouvernement, en pratique, la modification des lois électorales au moyen d’ordonnances d’urgence s’est généralisée, ce qui est inconstitutionnel. Malheureusement, à cet égard, la Cour constitutionnelle a renoncé à son rôle de gardienne du respect de la Constitution, ayant une jurisprudence vague 12 O.U.G. n° 92/2003 ; O.U.G. n° 99/2005 ; O.U.G. n° 27/2007 ; O.U.G. n° 34/2007 ; O.U.G. n° 103/2009 ; O.U.G. n° 41/2012 ; O.U.G. n° 15/2016 ; O.U.G. n° 86/2018. 13 L’art. 115 par. 6 stipule que « les ordonnances d’urgence ne peuvent être adoptées dans le domaine des lois constitutionnelles, ne peuvent porter préjudice au régime des institutions fondamentales de l’Etat, aux droits, aux libertés et aux devoirs prévues par la Constitution, aux droits électoraux, ni viser des mesures de saisie de certains biens dans la propriété publique. » 14 Constantinescu, M., Iorgovan, A., Muraru, I., Tănăsescu, E. S., Constituţia României revizuită, Comentarii şi explicaţii (Constitution de la Roumanie, telle que modifiée et complétée par la Loi de revision de la Constitution. Commentaires et explications), Editura All Beck, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 228.
123 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică en la matière15 et, par conséquent, il est seulement souhaitable que la modification de la législation électorale par des ordonnances d’urgence soit évitée. Cette façon de réglementer a conduit ainsi à l’adoption d’une loi qui régit de manière rapide et peu claire des éléments extrêmement importants dans l’organisation et le déroulement du référendum. C’est, par exemple, le cas des aspects liés à la campagne référendaire ; les moyens d’empêcher l’exercice du droit de vote à plusieurs reprises par la même personne ; le suivi du référendum ; la mention dans les modèles des procès-verbaux conclus par les bureaux de vote du nombre de personnes inscrites sur les listes électorales spéciales et sur les listes supplémentaires. La littérature de spécialité a montré à juste titre que : L’absence d’une infrastructure juridique et organisationnelle spécifique du référendum national, marquée par l’abondante utilisation de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, de manière non systématique, des normes de renvoi à de diverses autres lois électorales, en vigueur ou abrogées, est susceptible de créer de multiples dysfonctionnements dans l’organisation effective d’un référendum national16. Un autre exemple de manque de cohérence de la législation en la matière est la non-concordance entre les dispositions de l’art. 45, lesquelles établissent que le respect de la procédure d’organisation et de déroulement du référendum national est confirmé par la Cour constitutionnelle, et les dispositions de l’art. 43 1 par. 5 de la Loi n° 3/2000, lesquelles prévoyaient que l’Autorité Electorale Permanente vérifiait les listes électorales supplémentaires afin de détecter l’existence d’éventuels votes multiples, dans un délai de 60 jours à compter de la date du référendum. Bien qu’une modification législative ait été apportée dans le but d’éliminer cette incohérence, la situation ci-dessus n’a pas été résolue de manière satisfaisante. Plus précisément, l’art. 43 1 alinéa 5 de la Loi n° 3/2000 a été abrogé par l’O.U.G n° 86/2018, mais l’hypothèse discutée se retrouve dans l’art. 43 1 paragraphe 4 de la même loi. Même si dans la forme actuelle de l’acte normatif la vérification des listes électorales permanentes et des listes électorales supplémentaires utilisées dans les bureaux de
15 Dans le même sens, voir Popescu, C. L., « Instabilitatea legislaţiei electorale » (L’Instabilité de la législation électorale), in Noua Revistă a Drepturilor Omului, n° 3/2009, pp. 8-9. En ce qui concerne la jurisprudence récente de la CCR, voir la Décision n° 1.189 du 6 novembre 2008, publié au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, partie I, n° 787 du 25 novembre 2008, la Décision n° 361 du 26 mai 2016, publiée au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, partie I, n° 419 du 3 juin 2016, la Décision n° 143/2019 relative à l’objection d’inconstitutionnalité de la Loi pour l’approbation de l’O.U.G. n° 86/2018 pour modifier et compléter la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, ainsi que pour certaines mesures visant l’organisation et le déroulement, dans de bonnes conditions, du référendum national sur la révision de la Constitution, publiée au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, partie I, n° 331 du 2 mai 2019. 16 Niță, A., « Referendumul la confluența normelor dreptului național și a reglementărilor Comisiei de la Veneția » (Le référendum à la convergence des normes du droit national et des règlements de la Commission de Venise), Revista Universul Juridic nr. 5/2019, pp. 14-15.
124 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national vote se fait après la clôture de la procédure référendaire, la Cour constitutionnelle a toutefois déclaré que « conformément à la nouvelle réglementation, introduite par l’art. I point 15) de l’Ordonnance d’urgence, l’art. 43 1 paragraphe 5 de la Loi n° 3/2000 a été abrogé, la situation en discussion se retrouve à l’art. 43 1 paragraphe 4 de la même loi, mais la solution législative est différente»17et elle est conforme aux dispositions constitutionnelles. La Cour a également ajouté que : …actuellement, aux termes de l’Ordonnance d’urgence du Gouvernement n° 86/2018, l’Autorité Electorale Permanente ne vérifiera que sur notification des personnes intéressées les listes électorales permanentes et les listes électorales supplémentaires utilisées dans les bureaux de vote auxquels se réfère la saisine, afin de découvrir les cas où une personne a voté sans en avoir le droit ou a voté plusieurs fois. Dans ce cas aussi la vérification intervient après la clôture de la procédure référendaire – dans un délai de maximum 15 jours à compter de la date de constatation de la validité du référendum national – les saisines doivent être accompagnées des preuves sur lesquelles elles se fondent. De cette façon, les citoyens participent eux-mêmes au déclenchement des contrôles et ils se voient donc attribuer un rôle important dans cette entreprise.
II. LE RÔLE DE L’AVIS DU PARLEMENT DANS LA PROCÉDURE D’OUVERTURE DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF Comme nous l’avons montré ci-dessus, le Président de la Roumanie, après consultation du Parlement, peut demander aux citoyens d’exprimer, par référendum, leur volonté sur des questions d’intérêt national. Sur la base de ces dispositions, le Président de la Roumanie nous a informés le 22 septembre 2009 qu’il avait adressé au Parlement une lettre lui demandant l’avis sur l’organisation d’un référendum consultatif national sur la transformation du parlement roumain en parlement monocaméral et sur la réduction du nombre de parlementaires de 471 à 300, le même jour que l’élection présidentielle. Les arguments avancés à l’appui de cette proposition étaient les suivants : renforcement de l’efficacité du Parlement ; réduction des dépenses ; renforcement des pouvoirs du Parlement européen, lequel deviendrait co-auteur des décisions par l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne ; abaissement de la corruption par la réduction du nombre de parlementaires pouvant faire trafic d’influence. L’avis du Parlement a été négatif, mais
17 Décision de la CCR n° 143/2019 relative à l’objection d’inconstitutionnalité de la Loi relative à l’approbation de l’O.U.G. n° 86/2018 pour modifier et compléter la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, ainsi que pour certaines mesures visant l’organisation et le déroulement, dans de bonnes conditions, du référendum national sur la révision de la Constitution.
125 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică du point de vue de la procédure, le président était en règle, comme nous le verrons plus loin, et le référendum a été organisé. De même, dans le cas du référendum organisé le 26 mai 2019, le président a envoyé, le 4 avril 2019, aux présidents des deux Chambres du Parlement la lettre concernant les sujets du référendum national, à savoir l’interdiction de l’amnistie et de la grâce pour des infractions de corruption; l’interdiction pour le gouvernement d’adopter des ordonnances d’urgence relatives aux domaines des infractions pénales et de l’organisation du système judiciaire, corrélée à l’extension du droit de saisir directement la Cour constitutionnelle au sujet de ces ordonnances18. Cette fois-ci, les commissions juridiques réunies du Sénat et de la Chambre des députés ont rendu un avis favorable à l’organisation du référendum. Selon la Constitution, les questions soumises au référendum et la date de son organisation sont fixées par le Président de la Roumanie, par décret, après consultation du Parlement. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, la Cour constitutionnelle a établi par la Décision n° 567 du 11 juillet 2006 que la procédure du référendum consultatif ouverte par le Président de la Roumanie comportait deux étapes : la consultation du Parlement et la consultation des citoyens, lesquels expriment leur volonté sur les questions d’intérêt national soumises par le Président. La consultation du Parlement s’effectue par une lettre que le Président de la Roumanie lui adresse. L’adresse en question suit les étapes de la procédure législative ordinaire ou de la procédure législative spéciale d’urgence, devant les chambres réunies en séance commune. À la suite des débats qui se tiennent lors de la séance commune des deux chambres, celles-ci doivent se prononcer sur le référendum initié par le Président de la Roumanie, par une décision adoptée à la majorité des voix des parlementaires présents. Bien que la consultation du Parlement soit une obligation constitutionnelle, le point de vue de celui-ci n’est pas contraignant pour le Président de la Roumanie. Par la Décision n° 567 du 11 juillet 2006, la Cour constitutionnelle a conclu que si cette consultation n’était pas menée, le président ne pourrait pas organiser le référendum en question. Ainsi, étant donné que le président n’est pas lié par le contenu de l’avis du Parlement, nous considérons qu’il ne s’agit en fait que d’une simple étape de procédure dépourvue de substance. Dans le même sens, il est apparu dans la littérature de spécialité que « cette consultation du Parlement par le Président de la Roumanie dans le cadre de l’exercice de la compétence exclusive prévue à l’art. 90 n’a pas le sens d’une collaboration entre les deux autorités en matière de référendum, encore moins d’une compétence constitutionnelle partagée entre les deux autorités »19.
18 Conformément à la Constitution, seul l’Avocat du people peut faire appel directement devant la Cour constitutionnelle concernant les ordonnances d’urgence rendues par le gouvernement. 19 Varga, A., « Referendumul consultativ în probleme de interes național. Unele aspecte teoretice de interpretare și de jurisprudență constituțională » (Le référendum consultatif sur des questions d’intérêt
126 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
Alors, à quoi bon cet avis, quel en est le fondement? L’avis consultatif du Parlement peut être justifié tout premièrement par le fait que le Parlement doit être informé de manière officielle sur le problème d’intérêt national qu’il a probablement ignoré et, deuxièmement, pour qu’il ait la possibilité d’accepter le point de vue du Président, et, dans ce cas-ci, le référendum devient inutile. C’est pourquoi l’avis du Parlement ne présente pas de grande importance et insister pour l’organisation du référendum lorsque le Parlement a adhéré à l’initiative est un acte dépourvu de sens et implicitement un détournement de compétence.
III. L’OBJET ET LA DATE DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF III.1. LES SUJETS POUVANT FAIRE L’OBJET DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF L’analyse des dispositions légales en la matière relève de la compétence exclusive du Président de la Roumanie de demander au peuple d’exprimer, par référendum (consultatif), sa volonté au sujet de problèmes d’intérêt national. Cette exclusivité concerne tant le contenu, le sujet abordé par le président et soumis à l’attention du peuple, que la date de déroulement du référendum, conférant ainsi au président un pouvoir discrétionnaire en la matière, aspect confirmé par la Cour constitutionnelle par plusieurs décisions. La cour a insisté à plusieurs reprises sur le droit du chef de l’Etat d’établir les questions d’intérêt national. Ainsi, par la Décision n° 70 du 5 mai 1999, la Cour constitutionnelle a souligné que : Le Président de la Roumanie est le seul qui a le droit de décider quels sont les problèmes d’intérêt national et, dans le cadre de ceux-ci, d’établir, par décret, le problème concret qui est soumis au référendum et la date de celui-ci. Suivant ce règlement, le Président est le seul justifié à établir les problèmes d’intérêt national sur lesquels il peut demander au peuple d’exprimer sa volonté par la voie du référendum. En 2006, par la Décision n° 567 du 11 juillet, la Cour se réfère à la compétence exclusive, à l’attribution et au droit exclusif du président de déterminer les problèmes d’intérêt national qui sont soumis au référendum. Cette décision revêt une importance particulière car elle déclare comme inconstitutionnelles les dispositions de l’art. 12 de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, lesquelles énuméraient de manière limitative les problèmes d’intérêt national. La Cour constitutionnelle a estimé que, suite à l’analyse de l’art. 90 de la Constitution, il résulte, d’une part, qu’il ne définit pas « les problèmes d’intérêt
national. Quelques aspects théoriques liés à l’interprétation et à la jurisprudence constitutionnelle), in Revista Transilvană de Ştiinţe Administrative 2 (37), 2015, pp. 221–222.
127 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică national » et, d’autre part, qu’il ne prévoit pas que ces problèmes soient établis ultérieurement par la loi. En l’absence de telles spécifications, les dispositions de l’art. 12 alinéa 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000 complètent de manière inadmissible le texte constitutionnel invoqué, lequel ne prévoit que la procédure référendaire initiée par le Président sur des « problèmes d’intérêt national » […]. On en déduit que l’art. 90 de la Constitution établit la compétence exclusive du président à déterminer les problèmes d’intérêt national pouvant faire l’objet du référendum, même si la consultation du parlement est obligatoire. À cet égard, la Cour a constaté que l’énumération limitative, dans l’art. 12 par. 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000, des situations considérées comme étant des « problèmes d’intérêt national » est susceptible de restreindre le droit du président de consulter le peuple, étant donné que l’intérêt national peut changer d’une époque à l’autre, puisqu’à tout moment de nouvelles situations peuvent survenir, des situations exigeant l’organisation d’un référendum. Toute énumération des situations considérées comme des questions « d’intérêt national » au moment où le législateur adopte le règlement peut, par la suite, se transformer en une restriction, une limitation portant atteinte au droit constitutionnel du président de décider seul des questions sur lesquelles il veut consulter le peuple. Ce droit exclusif du président est soutenu aussi par les dispositions constitutionnelles de l’art. 80 concernant le « rôle du président », de l’art. 2 alinéa 1, de l’art. 81 alinéa 1, concernant la légitimité électorale du président de la Roumanie, laquelle est égale à la légitimité du Parlement, et de l’art. 1 alinéa 4, […]. L’établissement, par la loi, des problèmes d’intérêt national représente une immixtion du parlement dans l’exercice des attributions exclusives constitutionnelles du président et, par conséquent, une méprise du principe de la séparation et de l’équilibre des pouvoirs dans la démocratie constitutionnelle. Les dispositions de l’art. 12 alinéa 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000 ne sont soutenues par les dispositions de l’art. 73 alinéa 3 de la Constitution non plus, car, conformément à ces dernières, par la loi organique est réglementée « l’organisation et le déroulement du référendum », le texte dudit article visant à établir certaines mesures techniques, procédurales requises dans le processus de consultation du peuple au moyen du référendum. À la lumière des considérations ci-dessus, la Cour conclut que « les dispositions de l’art. 12 alinéa 1 de la Loi n° 3/2000 […] limitent de manière injustifiée les prérogatives constitutionnelles du président de la Roumanie dans ce domaine et sont, de ce fait, inconstitutionnelles »20. La Cour maintient ce point de vue dans sa jurisprudence ultérieure. Par la Décision n° 355 du 4 avril 200721, la Cour constitutionnelle déclare l’inconstitutionnalité de l’article 12 alinéa 1 de la Loi portant modification et complément de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum, article stipulant que : « Les questions visant la révision de la Constitution ne constituent pas de problèmes d’intérêt 20 Décision n° 567 du 11 juillet 2006 relative à l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité des dispositions de l’article 12, par. 1, de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et au déroulement du référendum. 21 Publiée au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, Ière Partie, n° 318 du 11 mai 2007.
128 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national national au sens de l’article 11 et ne font pas l’objet du référendum en vertu de l’article 90 de la Constitution roumaine, telle que republiée ». La décision de la Cour a été fondée sur les mêmes considérations relatives à l’impossibilité de limiter le droit du président de demander au peuple d’exprimer sa volonté par la voie du référendum. La même conclusion quant à la compétence exclusive du président en matière de référendum consultatif sur des problèmes d’intérêt national résulte de la Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle n° 33 du 26 novembre 200922 et de la Décision de la Cour n° 2 du 27 juin 2019. Une autre question qui a été soulevée est de savoir si nous pouvons inclure dans le contenu de l’expression « problèmes d’intérêt national » les initiatives ou les problèmes liés à la révision de la Constitution. La solution de ce problème peut être trouvée dans les dispositions de l’art. 150 alinéa 1 de la Constitution, conformément auxquelles la révision de la Constitution peut avoir lieu à l’initiative du Président de la Roumanie, sur proposition du Gouvernement. En l’absence de proposition du Gouvernement, l’intention du Président ne reste qu’un souhait inassouvi. De ce fait, le Président de la Roumanie ne peut engager la révision de la Constitution que si le Gouvernement le propose et, par voie de conséquence, il ne peut pas organiser un référendum ayant un tel objet. Dans cette situation, il est applicable le principe selon lequel ce qui ne peut pas être obtenu par des moyens directs ne peut pas être obtenu par d’autres moyens. Cependant, aucune disposition constitutionnelle expresse n’empêche le Président de la Roumanie de soumettre au référendum consultatif la question de la révision 23. La Cour constitutionnelle a rectifié cette situation en décidant que: Quel que soit le contenu des questions adressées à la population à l’occasion d’un référendum consultatif, la révision de la Constitution suit la procédure régie par les dispositions des articles 150-152 de la Loi fondamentale, textes établissant les initiateurs, les règles de débat, d’adoption et d’approbation de la loi de révision de la Constitution, ainsi que les limites de la révision. Ainsi, la révision de la Constitution peut être initiée à la fois par les citoyens (dans le respect des règles concernant le nombre minimal de partisans et la dispersion territoriale), et par le président, sur proposition du gouvernement, et suppose l’organisation obligatoire d’un référendum, conformément à l’article 151. par. 3 de la Constitution selon lequel « la révision est définitive après son approbation par un référendum, organisé dans un délai maximum de trente jours à compter de la date de l’adoption du projet ou de la proposition de révision ». Ce référendum à caractère décisionnel, qui a pour effet de réviser la Constitution, ne se confond pas avec le référendum consultatif, lequel, quelles que soient les questions posées au peuple et le sujet, demeure une consultation à effets politiques.
22 Publiée au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, Ière Partie, n° 918 du 29 décembre 2009. 23 Iancu, Gh., op. cit., p. 5.
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En effet, la révision de la Constitution est un problème d’intérêt national, mais ce n’est pas un problème quelconque, elle représente LE problème d’intérêt national le plus important et se distingue nettement par rapport aux autres. C’est pourquoi la révision constitutionnelle est considérée comme une exception à la procédure de référendum consultatif, ayant un régime juridique spécial. Dans cette affaire, le peuple n’est pas consulté, mais il a un droit de veto, c’est-à-dire c’est lui qui prend la décision finale. Par ailleurs, tant le président que le peuple (un quorum de 500 000 citoyens) ont le droit d’initier la révision de la Constitution. Il en résulte donc qu’une consultation là-dessus est dépourvue d’efficacité, représentant un coût social et matériel non justifié et une manifestation inutile de la division de la population par « oui » et « non »24. D’autre part, l’art. 74 de la Constitution stipule que les questions fiscales, les questions ayant un caractère international, l’amnistie et la grâce ne peuvent faire l’objet de l’initiative législative des citoyens. Pour cette raison, la doctrine a montré que ce qui ne peut pas faire l’objet d’une initiative législative citoyenne, ne peut faire l’objet d’une expression par référendum non plus25. En conclusion, même si nous comprenons que le concept de « problèmes d’intérêt national » a un contenu évolutif, nous ne pouvons ne pas remarquer que l’absence de critères ou de limites dans la détermination des sujets pouvant faire l’objet d’un référendum consultatif peut transformer cette institution d’un moyen de mise en œuvre de la souveraineté du peuple dans un instrument utilisé afin de s’emparer du pouvoir politique.
III.2. LA DATE DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF En ce qui concerne la date du référendum consultatif, la Cour constitutionnelle a montré que « afin d’assurer la cohérence de la procédure, il est logique que l’autorité qui engage l’organisation du référendum soit également celle qui fixe la date et l’objet du référendum » et que « ce qui est important, en termes de conformité de la procédure d’organisation et de déroulement du référendum à l’esprit de la Constitution, c’est la légitimité et la force juridique de l’acte par lequel le référendum est déclenché et par lequel sont établis les aspects définitoires, tel que la date à laquelle le référendum aura lieu. L’essentiel c’est que cet acte émane de l’autorité qui a le droit constitutionnel d’initier le référendum, en conformité avec la spécificité de ce type de référendum […] »26. En outre, en ce qui concerne l’organisation du référendum en même temps que les élections présidentielles, législatives, locales ou autres, la Cour a déclaré que :
24 Constantin, V., Referendumul şi ficţiunea democraţiei directe (Le référendum et la fiction de la démocratie directe), Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, n° 4/2009, p. 7. 25 Voir Criste, M., Dreptul constituțional. Un drept al cetățeanului (Le droit constitutionnel. Un droit du citoyen), Ed. Universul Juridic, București, 2019, p. 62. 26 Décision n° 612 du 3 octobre 2017, publiée au J.O. n° 922 du 23 novembre 2017.
130 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
Conformément à la Constitution, aucune autre condition n’interdit l’organisation et le déroulement du référendum en même temps que les élections présidentielles, législatives, locales ou les élections au Parlement européen ou dans un certain délai avant ou après les élections susmentionnées. Par conséquent, lorsque la loi ne distingue pas, l’interprète ne peut le faire non plus27. Sans nier le droit du président de définir, par décret présidentiel, le sujet d’intérêt national qu’il soumet au vote des citoyens, ainsi que la date du référendum, nous considérons que le fait d’avoir lié le référendum à un type d’élections, qui a statistiquement prouvé une présence au vote plus grande que les autres, influence la légitimité de la procédure. Il est possible que certains de ceux qui ont voté lors du référendum ne se soient pas rendus au bureau de vote pour exprimer leur opinion sur le sujet consulté par la procédure référendaire, mais, puisqu’ils y étaient, ils aient exprimé une opinion là-dessus également, une opinion plus ou moins réfléchie, plus ou moins influencée par l’initiateur du référendum. Dans le même sens, il a été soutenu que : Le référendum ne devrait pas être traité comme un autre type de « bus électoral », dont le but est d’amener le plus d’électeurs possible aux élections législatives, nationales ou européennes […]. S’il y a réellement un problème national extrêmement important, qui nécessite l’organisation d’un référendum (et non pas d’une simple enquête d’opinion nationale), le référendum doit alors être traité en fonction de son importance et doit être organisé séparément, et non pas comme une simple annexe électorale28. Cette opinion a été soutenue par l’art. 3 du Protocole n° 1 à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, qui consacre le droit à des élections libres et qui prévoit, à cet égard, que les Etats parties à la Convention s’engagent à organiser, à des intervalles raisonnables, des élections libres au scrutin secret, dans les conditions qui assurent la libre expression de l’opinion du peuple sur le choix du corps législatif. La libre expression de l’opinion implique d’abord que l’expression de l’opinion soit faite sciemment, notamment que l’électeur ait bénéficié d’une information correcte et complète. Cela soulève la question de savoir si cette injonction relative à l’information a été respectée dans le cas des deux référendums consultatifs validés par la Cour constitutionnelle, l’un en 2009 et l’autre en 2019. Dans le cas du référendum de 2009, à notre avis, l’électorat roumain n’a pas été suffisamment informé quant aux avantages et aux désavantages de l’introduction d’un système monocaméral en Roumanie. Le sujet, d’une importance incontestable pour la démocratie roumaine, n’a été débattu que par quelques messages populistes,
27 Décision n° 147/2007, publiée au Journal officiel n° 162 du 7 mars 2007 ; Décision n° 146/2019, publiée au Journal officiel, n° 240 du 28 mars 2019. 28 APADOR-CH concernant l’organisation du référendum national en même temps que d’autres élections, opinion disponible sur : www.apador.org/tag/apador-ch/.
131 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică typiques à la campagne électorale, qui visaient à remporter le suffrage et non pas à participer à la construction institutionnelle à long terme. Certes, connaître implique avoir de l’information, mais celui qui est informé ne devient pas pour autant connaisseur dans le domaine concerné, de sorte qu’il puisse exprimer une opinion correcte. Exprimer son opinion lors d’un référendum sur une question tellement importante pour la démocratie et l’état de droit n’est pas la même chose que voter. Le problème soumis au référendum devrait être toujours extrêmement simple. En ce qui concerne le référendum organisé le 26 mai 2019 sur le thème de la justice, la Cour constitutionnelle a elle-même déclaré qu’ « il n’y a pas eu une information complète sur tous les détails juridiques et techniques impliqués par les deux questions, les recommandations retenues par la Commission de Venise dans les documents cités n’ayant pas été respectées. De même, les questions comportaient plusieurs hypothèses qui auraient nécessité un traitement séparé, selon les mêmes recommandations »29, mais vu « que le référendum est consultatif et que la volonté exprimée, même dans les conditions des lacunes évidentes dans la rédaction des questions posées, offre aux autorités une orientation en ce qui concerne la volonté exprimée par la majorité, il n’y a pas de fondement constitutionnel pour invalider le référendum ». Nous devons également voir si l’on propose à l’électorat une alternative réelle ou si, au contraire, celui-ci se trouve devant un « vote bloqué ». Cet aspect nous dirige vers la manière dans laquelle les questions ont été structurées. Face aux réponses sur le bulletin, le peuple n’a pas une troisième option, mais il est obligé de choisir entre les deux formes alternatives de la volonté des gouverneurs. Les doctrines contemporaines30 soulèvent la question de savoir si cet aspect peut être considéré comme un vice majeur de l’institution ou si c’est le seul moyen d’obtenir la réponse ? On y affirme que « donner au peuple la possibilité de compléter les réponses engendrerait une situation de chaos, ce qui paralyserait la procédure, mais avec deux variantes seulement, peut-on toujours parler de la libre expression de la souveraineté ? » Bien sûr, il y a la possibilité de ne pas voter, mais cette passivité est en contradiction avec les valeurs démocratiques, acquises avec tant de peine. Une solution pour échapper à l’alternative « oui-non » serait de formuler plusieurs réponses, mais il n’y a pas de certitude quant à un résultat cohérent et réel. Tout comme l’auteur cité, nous ne pensons pas qu’en offrant seulement deux variantes de réponse, on porte atteinte au fondement et au but de l’institution, mais on résout les réalités pratiques de la procédure. Le peuple doit se référer à la question et aux réponses, telles qu’elles ont été conçues par les autorités, à condition qu’elles soient explicites et pertinentes. « Quelle que soit la réponse, cela implique une solution instantanée », conclut l’auteur cité. 29 Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie n° 2 du 27 juin 2019, non publiée. 30 Uşvat, L. F., « Pro sau contra referendumului » (Pour ou contre le référendum), Revista de drept public, n° 3/2008, p. 71.
132 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
Dans la même perspective, la réponse de l’électorat variera d’un moment historique à l’autre, en fonction du contexte socio-économique et pas seulement. Selon la doctrine, l’apparente légitimité d’une décision prise antérieurement sur la base d’un tel référendum-plébiscite peut être renversée à tout moment. Le peuple est libre à tout moment d’exprimer son opinion et de changer d’avis, rien ne peut lui limiter cette liberté. C’est ce qui rend le référendum consultatif attractif, mais également dangereux31. La réponse par « oui » et « non » à un référendum initié par le président qui se soumet lui aussi au vote est certainement une réponse équivoque. Il est évident qu’une partie des répondants s’exprimeront par « non », se dissociant ainsi de manière symbolique de la personne qui a initié le référendum, alors qu’une partie des répondants choisissent le « oui », tout en adhérant à l’opinion de l’initiateur du référendum. Par conséquent, l’on a eu affaire à deux types d’acquiescement, notamment, une adhésion à la personne et une adhésion au problème, du moins dans le cas du référendum de 2009. Afin d’éviter de telles situations, la Cour constitutionnelle souligne, dans ce contexte, « la nécessité de mettre en place un cadre juridique rigoureux afin que de telles défaillances n’existent plus à l’avenir, dans le sens de la réglementation de l’obligation des autorités publiques de fournir des informations détaillées et complètes à l’électorat, conformément au Code de bonne conduite en matière référendaire et aux autres recommandations de la Commission de Venise en la matière »32.
IV. LES EFFETS DU RÉFÉRENDUM CONSULTATIF En ce qui concerne les conséquences du référendum consultatif il y a deux opinions. Selon la première, les résultats du référendum sont des éléments déterminants pour une future révision de la Constitution dans le sens donné par la volonté des citoyens, alors que selon la seconde le référendum consultatif est inefficace33. À l’appui de l’opinion selon laquelle les résultats de la consultation populaire en question ne constituent pas un élément déterminant pour la révision de la Constitution, nous commençons par la nature du référendum régi par l’art. 90 de la Constitution de la Roumanie, lequel est consultatif. Par conséquent, les résultats n’obligent pas les autorités de l’État à prendre des décisions conformes à la volonté exprimée par l’électorat à l’occasion du référendum, sinon il s’agirait d’attribuer au peuple des attributions expresses déléguées par la Constitution aux différentes institutions de l’État34.
31 Muraru, I., Tănăsescu, S. E., op. cit., p. 141. 32 Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie n° 2 du 27 juin 2019, non publiée. 33 Pour plus de détails voir Roussillon, H., Contre le referendum !, Pouvoirs, Revue française d’études constitutionnelles et politiques, n° 77, Seuil, 1996, pp. 181-193. 34 Voir à ce sujet : Muraru, I., Tănăsescu, S. E., op. cit., p.848.
133 Eugen Chelaru et Ramona Duminică
Dans la doctrine, il a également été montré que, dans le cadre du référendum régi par l’art. 90 de la Constitution, le peuple est seulement consulté sur un problème d’intérêt national, son opinion pouvant constituer tout au plus un repère dans une future activité législative du Parlement sur ce problème35. Dans le même sens, la Cour constitutionnelle s’est prononcée sur les effets du référendum consultatif par la Décision n° 682 du 27 juin 201236 dans laquelle elle a soutenu que : Contrairement au référendum décisionnel, le référendum consultatif produit un effet indirect, en ce sens qu’il nécessite l’intervention d’autres organes, le plus souvent législatifs, pour mettre en œuvre la volonté exprimée par le corps électoral […]. Cette interprétation repose également sur le principe de loyauté constitutionnelle, détaché et interprété en corroborant les dispositions constitutionnelles de l’art.1 – L’État roumain, de l’art. 2 – La Souveraineté et de l’art. 61 – Le rôle et la structure (du Parlement), principe qui impose en la matière que les autorités disposant de compétences décisionnelles dans les domaines couverts par la question référendaire (en l’occurrence le Parlement) prennent en compte, analysent et identifient des moyens de concrétiser la volonté exprimée par le peuple. […]. La Cour constitutionnelle a réitéré ces considérations dans la Décision n° 80 du 16 février 201437, ainsi que dans la Décision n° 2 du 27 juin 2019, qui souligne que « Le résultat du référendum consultatif n’offre qu’une orientation politique sur les problèmes d’intérêt national qui ont fait l’objet de la consultation. La décision quant à la manière dont la volonté exprimée lors du référendum sera mise en œuvre incombe toutefois aux autorités publiques compétentes en la matière ». Dans le même temps, la Cour a rappelé que « le référendum consultatif n’a pas d’effets juridiques directs, car la Constitution le définit comme une forme de « consultation » de la population sur des problèmes que le président considère d’intérêt national. Le texte de référence constitutionnel ne présente aucune circonstance en ce qui concerne le domaine ou les conséquences juridiques de la consultation, ce qui permet de conclure que les effets d’un tel référendum sont politiques et non pas juridiques ». Cependant, la Cour estime que « …la volonté majoritaire exprimée lors du référendum consultatif ne peut être ignorée ». Dans le même esprit, le Code de bonne conduite en matière référendaire, adopté par la Commission de Venise en mars 2007, suggère que les effets des référendums juridiques obligatoires ou consultatifs soient clairement définis dans la Constitution ou dans la loi. De préférence, les référendums sur des questions de principe ou des propositions formulées en termes généraux ne devraient pas être obligatoires.
35 Deleanu, I., Instituţii şi proceduri constituţionale – în dreptul român şi în dreptul comparat (Institutions et procédures constitutionnelles – dans le droit roumain et dans le droit comparé), Ed. C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 738. 36 Publiée au Journal officiel de la Roumanie, Ière Partie, n° 473 du 11 juillet 2012. 37 Publiée au Journal Officiel, Ière Partie, n° 246 du 7 avril 2014.
134 Jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie en matière de référendum consultatif national
« S’ils ont un caractère décisionnel, des règles précises doivent régler la suite de la procédure »38.
CONCLUSIONS Dans la société roumaine contemporaine, une partie des hommes politiques et même des doctrinaires voient dans le référendum le signe spécifique d’une vie politique moderne et démocratique. C’est ce que le référendum représente d’ailleurs, mais seulement dans une certaine mesure. Nous ne pouvons pas placer cette forme d’intervention du peule sur un piédestal sans en remarquer les inconvénients. C’est précisément pour cette raison que nous partageons l’avis de ceux qui affirment que le référendum n’est pas un progrès de la démocratie, car il ne connaît pas les fondements du processus décisionnel démocratique. Dans un environnement collectif, toute prise de décision, quelle que soit son importance, implique, si elle est démocratique, une phase de délibération et de débat, avec la possibilité de la modification, de l’amendement du projet initial39. Dans le contexte constitutionnel national actuel, le référendum consultatif prend la forme d’un instrument à la disposition du président de l’État. Conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle, le président a la compétence exclusive de demander au peuple d’exprimer, par référendum (consultatif), sa volonté sur des problèmes d’intérêt national. Cette exclusivité concerne à la fois le choix du thème et la date du référendum, conférant ainsi au président un pouvoir discrétionnaire en la matière. Fondamentalement, le président apparaît comme le pion principal de ce type de référendum. Il est le seul à pouvoir déterminer la manière dont le référendum pourra influencer la volonté politique des citoyens, surtout si nous prenons en compte le manque d’éducation politique et d’informations claires et précises sur les questions soumises au référendum. L’absence de limites qui empêchent l’exercice abusif de cette compétence transforme le référendum consultatif d’un instrument mis au service de la démocratie et de la légitimité en un moyen facile de mise en œuvre des réformes fondamentales réclamées par notre société, à travers lequel les hommes politiques déclinent leur responsabilité, plus précisément la décision et la responsabilité reviennent au peuple, ou pire encore, le référendum consultatif et la décision et la responsabilité est utilisé comme un simple outil de manipulation afin de remporter les différentes élections40.
38 CDL-AD (2008) 010, Avis concernant la Constitution de la Finlande, point 25. 39 Roussillon, H., op. cit., p. 186. 40 Dans la doctrine, on a d’ailleurs affirmé que tous les référendums organisés en Roumanie, à commencer par le plébiscite de mai 1864 (qui consacrait le système parlementaire bicaméral), « semblent plutôt jouer un rôle de discréditation de la démocratie que constituer une forme de démocratie participative ». Criste, M., op. cit., p. 60.
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Nous acceptons le fait que le rôle du référendum dans les démocraties modernes est controversé, mais notre plaidoirie est pour son utilisation en tant qu’élément d’équilibre politique et social, sans qu’il soit transformé en un simple moyen de manipulation de la volonté du peuple, car l’on sait déjà que la démagogie, la manipulation de l’opinion publique, l’exploitation de la passion temporaire des citoyens sont des éléments couramment utilisés par les initiateurs des référendums. L’institution qui pourrait imposer plus de rigueur dans l’utilisation de cet instrument démocratique, mais qui s’est montrée, jusqu’à présent, très accommodante envers le président, même lorsqu’elle a saisi l’intention de ce dernier de manipuler la volonté populaire dans le but d’accumuler du capital politique, c’est, bien sûr, la Cour constitutionnelle.
136 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE TIME OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE ITALIAN CASE OF STATE COUNCIL JUDGMENT NO 2019/2270
Dr. Valentina Colcelli Researcher at the Italian National Research Council, Institute IFAC
Dr. Laura Burzagli Researcher at the Italian National Research Council, Institute IFAC
INTRODUCTION The EU opened discussion on leading the way on artificial intelligence regulation through the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG).1 The Group has comprised representatives from academia, civil society, as well as industry, and has as a general objective to support the implementation of the European Strategy on Artificial Intelligence, according to ethics and legal requirements. The work includes the elaboration of recommendations on future policy developments and on ethical, legal and societal issues related to artificial intelligence, including socio-economic challenges regarding requirements that any artificial intelligence system should meet to be trustworthy. The idea is to create a new culture for artificial intelligence2 through a design incorporating the principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.
1 The final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2018) 237 (Brussels, 25 April 2018) defines artificial intelligence as: systems that display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things applications). We are using AI on a daily basis, e.g. to translate languages, generate subtitles in videos or to block email spam. Many AI technologies require data to improve their performance. Once they perform well, they can help improve and automate decision making in the same domain. For example, an AI system will be trained and then used to spot cyber-attacks on the basis of data from the concerned network or system. 2 See ‘A Definition of AI: Main Capabilities and Scientific Disciplines’ by High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence: ‘Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are software (and possibly also hardware) systems designed by humans that, given a complex goal, act in the physical or digital dimension by perceiving their environment through data acquisition, interpreting the collected structured or unstructured data, reasoning on the knowledge, or processing the information, derived from this data and deciding the best action(s) to take to achieve the given goal. AI systems
137 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli
In this elaborate contest, during the last year, the Italian State Council spelled out, for the first time, the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence timing of administrative measures that would impact on citizens’ rights. The Italian Court defined the so-called electronic administrative document and established the conditions for which it would be possible to use artificial intelligence for the adoption of an administrative act. Thus, the paper aims to analyse the Italian State Council judgment no 2019/2270. It clarifies the conditions under which it is possible to use automated decision-making processes within administrative procedures. To reach the paper’s goals, we organise it as follows. In section I, we define extensively the problem of the relationship between technological development and its impact on society and the legal framework, underlining how the path ‘technology–law–technology’ is not a new issue. The connection between technology and law is repeatedly made over time because of progressive developments. A common element is the multidisciplinary skills necessary for facing the issue, as well as for defining its contours and finding the appropriate solutions. This point is particularly relevant in the judgment we are analysing: not everything permitted by technology is possible within the law, or within the values that a law historically incorporates within itself, and judges do not always possess the interpretative instruments necessary for sorting out several particularly problematic knots. In this framework, we introduce (see section I) why, in an AI society, we move towards more autonomous processing systems able to optimise the results of processing and to reduce human intervention. In addition, in the case of public administrations, the reason for using algorithms is to create procedures for decision-making processes that are more rapid and automated, thanks to the type of information obtained, which would lead to the introduction of new methods and developments in the operation of public administrations. Before analysing the judgment no 2019/2270, we introduce the state of the art to support the implementation of artificial intelligence in the EU legal framework, according to ethics and legal requirements (see section I.1). In section II, we introduce cases submitted to Italian administrative judges. The judgment defines what is an electronic administrative document and whether an administrative act produced by an automated decision-making process has the
can either use symbolic rules or learn a numeric model, and they can also adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is affected by their previous actions. As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, such as machine learning (of which deep learning and reinforcement learning are specific examples), machine reasoning (which includes planning, scheduling, knowledge representation and reasoning, search, and optimisation), and robotics (which includes control, perception, sensors and actuators, as well as the integration of all other techniques into cyber-physical systems).’ At https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index. cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=30466.
138 Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270 value of an administrative document. In section II.2, we introduce more problems connected with the use of algorithms in administrative proceedings. In the third section, we conclude, according to the judgment, that an artificial intelligence (AI) system could be used by public administrations to reach their own goals if and only if (a) ex ante (at the moment of the algorithmic design) the AI system guarantees the transparency principle and the rule of law and (b) ex post, the algorithm is understandable, predictable and controllable.
I. ETHICS VS. TECHNOLOGY The relationship between ethical aspects and technology arouses great interest today, since the latest developments in artificial intelligence have produced results that affect society immensely. The problem of technological development and, in particular, the development of new technologies is often discussed as a topic completely separated from its social components. Attention is mainly focused on the difficulties connected with the technological development of the product or with the subsequent steps related to the process of industrialisation. These approaches neglect the vast majority of social aspects on both personal and collective levels. This problem is often taken into consideration only in the evaluation phase, thus adopting a reactive approach, which implies time delays and greater resources used. However, the processes of the development of new technologies always imply social aspects. The advent of ICT technologies from the late 1990s to 2000, for example, raised the problem of access to information in electronic format. Information, which is available on the internet, is full of textual, graphic and/or sound components. All of these components must be introduced according to redundancy criteria in order to allow different renderings, depending on the physical or contextual abilities of the people. Otherwise, even an image can represent an access barrier, for example, for persons with sight problems who cannot see the picture but can hear a textual description of it. Such a description must be added to the picture during the development of the website to avoid elements of exclusion. An exhaustive technical solution was provided by the Web Accessibility Initiative, which published a set of guidelines3 in 1999 that became an international standard a few years later. Based on this standard, several laws at national and international levels were also enacted, such as the Italian 4/2004 ‘Provisions to support the access of disabled people to IT t o o l s’. 4 Even for the web accessibility problem, the solution came from the synergy of an international multidisciplinary community that defined the terms of the problem in a structured way, defined the possible solutions in an organic way and provided the legislators with the tools to be able to draft the appropriate documents. 3 http: www.w3.org/wai 4 https://www.w3.org/WAI/policies/italy/
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Like the one just mentioned, many other examples could be provided in this regard, but we will limit ourselves to reiterating that the technology–right–technology path is not new but is proposed periodically, following the developments in progress. Without a doubt, a common element is the multidisciplinary nature necessary for identifying the problem, defining its contours and finding the appropriate solutions. The contribution of experts to sociological, psychological, economic, as well as political, legal and technological aspects is obviously fundamental.5
I.1. INFORMATION SOCIETY TO AI SOCIETY At the present time, the technical and scientific developments that lead us from an information society to an AI society offer new challenges in the relationship between ethics and technology. To optimise the results of processing and reduce human intervention, often considered too subjective, slow and reduced in terms of processing power, we move towards increasingly autonomous processing systems. First of all, it is necessary to specify how the concept of autonomy differs greatly from automation. Automation indicates a process in which a machine, a device or a system takes the place of a person to carry out a limited number of actions, sometimes with a considerable expenditure of physical energy. Examples could be the automatic switching on of lights when people pass by, typical of energy saving in hotels, or the switching on of lights based on the light intensity of the environment (twilight). Industrial automation components are more decisive: they act in a much more impactful way, for example, on the entire production component. However, automation remains conceptually distinct from autonomy, because the latter adds the capacity for autonomous behaviour (self-governing behaviour) and requires decision-making skills. If we consider examples in the field of health and well-being, we can refer to a support system for the non-autonomous elderly. Their condition of increasing loss of physical and cognitive abilities can derive utility from the use of services able to provide suggestions about the actions to be performed in daily life, such as nutrition or physical activities or the use of medicines. This information can be simple reminders, based only on the information provided a priori by caregivers, but can also be based on the monitoring of the person’s presumed behaviour, which is recorded and processed by a machine. Another particularly illustrative example comes from the medical field. In the context of therapies for cancer patients, the activity of the human operator in the selection of anatomical contours to be treated can be replaced, to an ever-greater extent, by AI systems for optimised contour selection, which are based on the analysis of a number of examples available.
5 Leikas, J., Koivisto, R., et al., ‘Ethical Framework for Designing Autonomous Intelligent Systems’, Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity, Vol. 5, No 1, 2019, p. 18, doi:10.3390/joitmc5010018 [accessed 20 December 2019].
140 Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270
The ever-increasing presence in number and in application contexts of systems designed to make decisions autonomously with respect to the behaviour of people give rise to problems relating to their short- and long-term impacts on individuals and society.
I.1.1. The interest of the technical-scientific community The importance of the problem is demonstrated by the interest that was aroused in the technical-scientific community on the subject. A large number of documents are provided by different organisations. Floridi6 (20 December 2019) lists seven different documents regarding ethics in AI, which highlight the different perspectives: (1) the Asilomar AI Principles, which were developed in conjunction with the 2017 Asilomar conference in January 2017, under the auspices of the Future of Life Institute;7 (2) the Montreal Declaration for Responsible AI, produced by Université de Montréal, in collaboration with the Fonds de recherche du Québec, 5 December 2018;8 (3) the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems and particularly the Ethically Aligned Design document;9 (4) the Statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems, published by the European Commission’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies in March 2018;10 (5) the Artificial Intelligence Committee’s report ‘AI in the UK: Ready, Willing and Able?’, published in April 2018;11 and (6) the Tenets of the Partnership on AI, Partnership on AI 2018.12 An addition to this list is represented by the AI HLEG ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’,13 which were published in 2019. The main ethical principles do not change, but the aspects of a trustworthy AI include three components: lawful, ethical and robust. The last aspect, more technical than social, moves the document towards a more holistic perspective. Each of the documents provided in the previous list identifies a number of principles, depending on the editors of the document. Forty-seven different principles
6 Floridi, L., et al., ‘AI4People – An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations’, Minds and Machines, Vol. 28, Issue 4, December 2018, pp. 689–707, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5. 7 https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ 8 https://nouvelles.umontreal.ca/en/article/2018/12/04/developing-ai-in-a-responsible-way/ 9 https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org/ 10 http://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf 11 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/10002.htm 12 https://www.partnershiponai.org/tenets/ 13 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai
141 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli are presented. Anyway, the authors show how it is possible to connect all these different principles to the four bioethical principles – beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice: (1) beneficence – promoting well-being, preserving dignity and sustaining the planet; (2) non‑maleficence – privacy, security and ‘capability caution’; (3) autonomy – the power to decide (whether to decide); and (4) justice – promoting prosperity and preserving solidarity. Explicability is a principle that enables the other principles through intelligibility and accountability. After the identification of the main principles, which, for example, in the AI HLEG ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’, are translated into requirements, it is also important to define how to proceed in the implementation phase. The above-mentioned document includes two different paragraphs relevant to technical methods and non-technical methods. Among the technical methods, it is important to cite: (a) architecture for trustworthy AI; (b) ethics and rule by design; (c) explanation methods; (d) test and validating; and (e) quality of services. For the non-technical methods, they list: (a) regulation; (b) code of conduct; (c) standardisation; (d) certification; (e) accountability via governance frameworks; (f) education and awareness to foster an ethical mind-set; (g) stakeholder participation and social dialogue; and (h) diversity and inclusive design teams. The sets of all the items show how many different possibilities can be adopted in order to approach ethical aspects in AI.
II. CASES SUBMITTED TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES The judges of the Regional Administrative Tribunal of Region Lazio (TAR) found themselves having to make a decision, as anticipated, regarding the release on the part of the Ministry of Education, University and Research (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca or MIUR) of a copy of the so-called ‘source code’ of the algorithms utilised in the procedure for the mobility of teachers for the 2016–2017 school year. The Ministry of Education, University and Research had denied to the teachers (claimants) access to several documents concerning the inter-provincial transfers
142 Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270 of teaching personnel in the school, especially the ‘source code’ of the algorithms utilised in the procedure for mobility. In September 2016, claimants presented a transcript from MUIR that they used as a basis for their appeal to the Tribunal. Access to this algorithm had, in fact, been denied, having to reporting the mere regulatory references of the material and an example of the computer procedure utilised in the case in point. A ministerial note was made to follow the aforesaid transcript, which, by confirming the refusal, demonstrated how the source code of the algorithms could not be considered in the manner of administrative documents according to Article 22 and following of Law no 241/199014 and that, furthermore, the same had to be evaluated as intellectual work safeguarded by regulation on the subject of intellectual
14 No 241, dated 7 August 1990, is the Italian Administrative Procedure Act Law. See the translation of the Law’s original text, as subsequently amended up to 1 July 2010, English translation of Legge 7 agosto 1990 n. 241 by Catharine de Rienzo (nee Everett-Heath), A.I.T.I., at https://www. legislationline.org/download/id/5393/file/Italy_Law_Administrative-procedure_1990_am2010_ en.pdf: Chapter V ‘Access to Administrative Documents’, Section 22 (‘Definitions and Principles Regarding Access’): ‘1. For the purposes of the present chapter: (a) “right of access” shall mean the right of interested parties to inspect and take copies of administrative documents; (b) “interested parties” shall mean all private parties (including those having interests that are public or diffuse) who have a direct, concrete and currently existing interest corresponding to a legally protected situation that is linked to the document to which access is requested; (c) “parties with conflicting interests” shall mean all those parties who have been identified or are easily identifiable on the basis of the nature of the document requested and whose right to privacy would be compromised by exercise of the access right; (d) “administrative document” shall mean every graphic, film-based, electromagnetic or other kind whatsoever of representation of the content of instruments, including internal instruments and those not relating to a specific procedure, that are held by a public authority and concern activities of public interest, independently of whether the substantive law governing them is public law or private law; and (e) “public authority” shall mean all natural or juristic persons governed by public law and natural or juristic persons governed by private law, in the limited context of those of their public-interest activities that are governed by national or community law. 2. In consideration of its important public-interest objectives, access to administrative documents shall constitute a general principle underpinning administrative action, with the aim of guaranteeing its impartiality and transparency and fostering participation. 3. All administrative documents shall be accessible, with the exception of those referred to under section 24, subsections (1), (2), (3), (5) and (6). 4. Information in the possession of a public authority that is not in the form of an administrative document shall not be accessible, save as provided for by Legislative Decree no 196, dated 30 June 2003, governing access to personal data by the person to whom the data refer. 5. The acquisition of administrative documents by public parties that does not fall within the scope of section 43(2) of the Law consolidating the provisions in Laws and Regulations governing administrative documentation, referred to in Decree no 445 of the President of the Republic, dated 28 December 2000, shall be guided by the principle of loyal institutional co-operation. 6. The right of access shall be exercisable for as long as the public authority has the duty to hold the administrative documents to which access is being requested.’ Section 23 (‘Scope of the Access Right’s Application’): ‘1. The right of access referred to in section 22 shall be exercised vis-a-vis authorities, independent or special agencies, public bodies and public service providers. The right of access vis-a-vis independent regulatory authorities shall be exercised within the framework of their respective internal rules, in accordance with the provisions of section 24.’
143 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli property rights. For these reasons, the refusal of access to the source code proposed by the claimants was confirmed. In the first place, the main theme that emerged is in itself a source code of the programmes utilised by the Administration in its own procedural course. It can be assimilated or not within an ‘administrative act’ for purposes of accessibility to the same, in accordance with the principles expressed by Law no 241/1990. In the second place, we need to ask ourselves whether the mere description of the functioning of algorithms that are utilised without issuing the so-called source code is enough for the purposes of safeguarding the claimant and full knowledge of the procedural course adopted, which is supplied by the Administration.
II.1. THE DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENT The judges provided a solution to the aforesaid de quo points that emerged in the case, above all by rebutting the reasoning adopted by the MIUR, for which a source code of an algorithm would not be assimilable with an administrative document, according to Law no 241/90. In the opinion of the TAR, since the algorithm ends up completely substantialising the procedure attached to the identification of the seat of a teacher, it can only lead to Letter (d) of Article 22 of Law no 241/90 and, for this reason, to the outline of the right of access. In this regard, it is worthwhile recalling that regarding the interpretation of the notion of an electronic administrative document – that is, in an extensive sense – the doctrine is often found to be discussed: in particular, according to some of the interpreters, only administrative acts in electronic forms – those that are drawn up by using a computerised instrument – would be considered as strictly administrative documents. They would, however, be excluded from the bounds identified by Letter (d) of Article 22 of Law no 241/90 that documents the contents – and not only the exterior form – where track down processing by means of electronic instruments, as well as AI systems. In this second hypothesis (administrative act electronic processing), the peculiarity is thus given by the determination of the public administration in the act entrusted to an electronic processor. This proceeding makes reflected also on the pathologies of an administrative act entrusted to an electronic processor, as well as on the connected instruments of jurisdictional protection and the right of access. Accepting one rather than another does not lead to indifferent repercussions as far as the accessibility on the part of citizens to determine categories of acts is concerned. If, for example, we take the case in point, only an extensive interpretation of the electronic administrative document – as well as documents that are processed through computerised systems adopted by the public administration in the sense just
144 Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270 shown – would open up the path of access to the same, in accordance with the Italian Administrative Procedure Act Law. In order to arrive at such a practical result, it is then necessary to reflect on the legal nature of software – which is the basis of the functioning of the algorithm of the de quo case – in order to include or not include the same in the category just described. It is indeed important to the programme processor of a certain course of procedure that the claimant have an interest in gaining access in order to guarantee his or her own rights. Above all, the fact that a software may not be directly processed on the part of the administration – which limits itself to utilising the product of a private subject with appropriate specific competencies – does not assume importance. Since, if they are a direct expression of the functions performed by the administration for a case of public interest, even acts having an origin in private law can be fully inserted into the realm of the right to access. It is also true that, unlike acts with a ‘classical’ determination of their contents, software uses languages known for the most part only to subjects who are experts in computerised programming. However, this circumstance is not capable of restraining only by itself the possibility of access to a private person. In this regard, as the judges point out, nothing prohibits the claimant from having recourse to the activity and the competence of a specially consulted computer technician. What was established in the case under examination represents one of the very first rulings among Italian Administrative Tribunals, since it had, as its object, the discipline of access with regard to software and algorithms. This is a question that, as we shall very soon see, represents a central element in other regulations, to the point of leading to the processing of special programmes aimed at formulating access applications referred to as ‘algorithms’.
II.2. FURTHER PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE USE OF ALGORITHMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS The other question dealt with by the TAR is the one relative to the protection of the source code of the algorithm as an intellectual work, which is thus covered by Authors’ Rights. As anticipated, in order to deny claimants the right of access to acts, the Ministry of Education assumed the protection of computerised instruments by claiming the right to privacy. In the opinion of the judges in the case in point, nevertheless, the requisites of creativity and originality are necessary so that a given property – including software – can be protected as an intellectual work. It is worthwhile studying the question in depth, given that the mandatory access to public documents, provided for since 2013, is called civic access, while the new civic access introduced by Legislative Decree No 97/2016 is referred to as generalised access.
145 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli
It precludes the so-called civic access generalised to cases in which the same is going to damage ‘the economic and commercial interests of a physical or judicial person, therein including intellectual property and authors’ rights’. Then, without going into the merit of originality or lack thereof of the source codes requested by the applicant, the TAR emphasises – justly – that the protection of authors’ copyrights is functional in guaranteeing the economic interest of the creator – or of the owner of source codes: something that would not be placed at risk by allowing access. The detrimental reproduction of the original would indeed be the only referred at an economic sole right and not the one qualified for guaranteeing the personal interest of the claimants, even if the possibility of obtaining a copy of source codes have been provided for. As far as the above-mentioned regulation referring to the so-called generalised civic access that is precluded, as said, where the same is prejudicial to damaging Authors’ Rights. This is due to the fact that, only in the latter, does the claimant requesting the exhibition of a certain document – or of a piece of software – is the person in charge of a qualified legal position, as well as the diversity of the interests at stake protected by the law (which, indeed, permits more greatly penetrating access in the hypotheses contemplated by Law no 241/90). Nonetheless, despite this substantial differentiation, the future scenarios dictate thinking about possible full accessibility also for what concerns hypotheses currently relapsing into generalised civil access aimed at favouring widespread forms of control. Indeed, in addition to the ideas already mentioned, which are connected to the definition of the electronic administrative document, the protection of the right of access and that of software as original works, other and more important ones are emerging with ever greater force, such as the admissibility of electronic processing in the case of the discretional activity of the public administration. The prevailing doctrine considers that, in the case of discretional power being exercised, the use of algorithms and programmes of automation for the procedure or part of the same is to be excluded. The concept of discretionary power would conflict with the logic of the programming of the computer, which is based on the rigid predetermination of a decision if, in fact, the programme is based on the existence of two activities of formalisation: one with the element of fact and of law and one relative to the reasoning process. In addition, if these activities have need of re-formalisation into a formal language with unequivocal meanings, it follows that the discretional proceeding based on careful consideration is going to contrast with the programmed activity. Therefore, at this time, it does not seem possible to us to request administrative acts of a discretional nature entirely from a computer. Vice versa, the restricted activity should not create problems of this kind, since it is compatible with the logic peculiar to computerised systems. This above-mentioned approach no longer can be applied because one of the main characteristics of AI systems is that they learn a numeric model and they can also
146 Public administration and technology in the time of artificial intelligence: The Italian case of State Council judgment No 2019/2270 adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is affected by their previous actions. Thus, the correct answer could depend on the types of the algorithms used by the public administrations, that is, the introduction of expert systems or of intelligent machines capable of reproducing cognitive systems in an advanced manner. For some time now, our science has been able to process computerised models of intelligent behaviour in such a way that the processing can carry out tasks that would need intelligence on the part of man.
CONCLUSIONS The Italian judicial system is found to be fully involved in the current debate on the use of algorithms by public bodies as evidenced in judgment no 2019/2270. The TAR Lazio considered the claim against the MIUR, which had denied the claimant access to several documents concerning the inter-provincial transfers of teaching personnel in the schools to be valid. The case in point examined an algorithm utilised by the MIUR in order to draw up the classification list relative to the transfers of school teachers, which replaced the bureaucratic procedure performed by the administration. This is connected to the theme of the use of algorithms by public administrations in order to reach their own measurable performance and, even more generally, their judgment is placed within the debate on the technological question that is pervading our administrative systems with multiple implications derived from this using. Quite a few reflections develop from the judgment. Some are connected, first of all, with the extensive debate on digitalisation within the public administrations and, more specifically, with the use of software and other computerised instruments inside the administrative process: what boundaries are left to the discretion of the administrative organ? Which physical subject is traceable and made aware of his or her responsibilities in the case of mistakes on the part of algorithms? Scenarios that the technical evolution apply to public administration are undoubtedly numerous, as well as in other organisations, especially private legal entities. The ‘Cambridge Analytica’ case shows us how, by violating privacy and data protection laws, voters are profiled and targeted with fake news, as well as how artificial intelligence can be used for distorting the democratic process in each country. An algorithm was realised for the manipulation of the opinions through fake news during the election in the United States. Artificial Intelligence was faced with huge problems, among others, the sovereignty and the right to vote in the democratic process. If an algorithm is able to distort a democratic process, sovereignty is no longer grounded in constitutional principles but in technical power able to control the information. This technical power is able to change the location of the sovereignty: from the state to unknown hands.
147 Valentina Colcelli and Laura Burzagli
In the light of these considerations, it becomes fundamental to trace a transparent prescriptive context for a trustworthy AI that means: (1) lawful – respecting all applicable laws and regulations; (2) ethical – respecting ethical principles and values; and (3) robust – both from a technical perspective while taking into account its social environment. There is great fear on the part of many people that premature and invasive legislation might hinder scientific progress and cancel potential advantages. Or, worse still, it could cause inefficient economies or something else. At the same time, in some paradoxical way, it is admitted that the lack of a reliable and sure juridical environment could also obstruct technical innovation. The ethical use of technology is not a new problem. In the case of a sudden and impacting technological development, such as the development of AI-based products today, the problem of ethics assumes greater importance. However, it does not represent a novelty. Therefore, it can be approached with previously used methodologies. Starting with the identification of the ethical-social principles that are involved in such a technological process, it is possible to define a set of technical and non-technical tools that are necessary for solving the problem. This is the path that a number of international organisations are following with the publications of specific documents on this theme. We focus our attention on the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI provided by the European Commission (2019), since it also introduces a ‘non-exhaustive Trustworthy AI assessment list (pilot version) to operationalise Trustworthy AI’.
148 Mircea Criste Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine
LE RÉFÉRENDUM, EXPRESSION DE LA DÉMOCRATIE. L’EXPÉRIENCE ROUMAINE
Mircea Criste Professeur à la Faculté de droit et sciences administratives de l’Université de l’Ouest de Timisoara La question du référendum ne peut pas être approchée autrement que liée à l’exercice de la démocratie. Dans son sens classique, scolastique, la démocratie est aperçue comme une imposition de la volonté de la majorité. Or, comment on peut mieux déterminer cette volonté sinon par une large consultation, autant large que possible ? Le référendum est rattaché aux régimes de démocratie directe et semi-directe. La première est référendaire par sa nature, l’autre combine la démocratie directe avec la démocratie représentative : s’il n’est pas possible de réunir toute la population votante dans un même endroit, on peut toutefois lui donner la chance de décider sur des sujets majeurs. Dans ce dernier cas, le référendum est soit obligatoire, soit facultatif. Le référendum obligatoire concernant les actes adoptés par le législatif vise, en règle générale, les révisions constitutionnelles. Ainsi, conformément à l’art. 151/3 de la Constitution roumaine, la révision de celle-ci n’est définitive qu’après elle fut approuvée par référendum, organisé dans les 30 jours suivant le vote dans le parlement. Le référendum facultatif est organisé à l’initiative des autorités, le plus souvent du chef d’État, mais aussi du Gouvernement, du parlement ou même des assemblées locales. Il est utilisé dans les régimes représentatifs, avec modération toutefois, comme un moyen pour mieux communiquer entre le corps électoral et les élus, en vue de révéler la volonté populaire dans une question de grande importance.
I. L’ÉVOLUTION DU RÉFÉRENDUM EN ROUMANIE Dans l’histoire de la Roumanie, le référendum semble d’avoir plutôt un rôle de discréditation de la démocratie, que d’être une forme de la démocratie participative. Si on fait un panorama des consultations populaires organisées en Roumanie1, on va avoir le tableau suivant : le premier plébiscite est organisé par le prince Couza le 10-14 mai 1864, le deuxième le 2-8 avril 1866 pour l’élection du Charles Ier, le troisième le 24 février 1938, pour la Constitution de Charles II, le quatrième et le cinquième organisé par Antonescu après la rébellion légionnaire pour élargir ses pouvoirs (2-5 mars et 9-16 novembre 1941) et le sixième organisé par Ceausescu pour réduire les
1 Voir Chiriac, L., « Des considérations sur l’organisation et le déroulement du referendum en Roumanie », Curentul Juridic, 4/47, 2011.
149 Mircea Criste frais militaires (le 23 mars 1986). Ont suivi le référendum sur la Constitution de 1991 (le 8 décembre 1991), celui sur la révision de cette constitution (18-19 décembre 2003), le référendum sur l’introduction du vote uninominal (le 25 novembre 2007) et du parlement unicaméral (le 22 novembre 2009) et le référendum pour excepter les infractions de corruption du droit de grâce et de l’amnistie et pour limiter les cas dans lesquels le Gouvernement peut adopter des ordonnances, ainsi que pour donner le droit de les contester devant la Cour constitutionnelle à plusieurs sujets (le 26 mai 2019). Selon la Constitution roumaine (art. 2), la souveraineté nationale appartienne au peuple roumain, qui l’exerce par ses organes représentatifs et par référendum. L’organisation et le déroulement du référendum, selon l’art. 74/3 de la Constitution, est légiféré par une loi organique, qui fut adoptée en 2000 (la Loi n° 3/2000), et qui distingue entre le référendum national et celui local, la population pouvant être consultée sur une ou plusieurs questions, d’intérêt national ou local ou bien toutes les deux en même temps. Le référendum est valide si y participent au moins 30 % de ceux inscrits sur les listes électorales permanentes et les options valides exprimées représentent au moins 25 % de ces personnes (art. 5/2). Le référendum local peut concerner des problèmes d’intérêt particulier pour les collectivités locales, établis sous proposition du maire, voire du président du conseil départemental ou d’un tiers des conseillers locaux, selon le cas (art. 14 de la loi n° 3/2000). Le référendum national représente la forme et le moyen de consultation directe et d’expression de la volonté souveraine du peuple roumain sur : a) les questions d’intérêt national, b) la révision constitutionnelle2 et c) pour démettre le Président de la Roumanie3. Le premier cas est l’un de référendum facultatif, alors que les autres deux sont exemples de référendum obligatoire.
a) Référendum sur des questions d’intérêt national
L’art. 90 de la Constitution prévoie que le Président de la Roumanie, après consultation du Parlement, peut demander au peuple d’exprimer sa volonté, par 2 Art. 151 – LA PROCÉDURE DE RÉVISION (1) Le projet ou la proposition de révision doit être adopté par la Chambre des Députés et par le Sénat, à une majorité d’au moins deux tiers du nombre des membres de chaque Chambre. (2) Si un accord n’est pas obtenu par la procédure de médiation, la Chambre des Députés et le Sénat, en séance commune, décident par un vote d’au moins trois quarts du nombre des députés et des sénateurs. (3) La révision est définitive après son approbation par référendum, organisé dans un délai maximum de 30 jours à compter de la date de l’adoption du projet ou de la proposition de révision. Art. 153 – L’ENTRÉE EN VIGUEUR La présente Constitution entre en vigueur à la date de son approbation par référendum. À la même date, la Constitution du 21 août 1965 est et demeure intégralement abrogée. 3 Art. 95 – LA SUSPENSION DE LA FONCTION (3) Si la proposition de suspension de la fonction est approuvée, dans un délai maximum de 30 jours un référendum est organisé pour démettre le Président.
150 Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine référendum, sur des problèmes d’intérêt national. L’appréciation des tels problèmes qui seront soumis au référendum représente la compétence exclusive du Président, même si la consultation du parlement est obligatoire. Seul le Président de la Roumanie, et pas le Parlement, a le droit de décider quels problèmes sont d’intérêt national et d’établir la date du référendum, ainsi que de formuler la question qui fera le sujet de celui-ci. La Cour constitutionnelle a décidé que si une loi détermine les problèmes d’intérêt national, cela représenterait une ingérence du Parlement dans l’exercice des attributions exclusives conférées au Président par la Constitution et, par conséquence, une atteinte au principe de la séparation et de l’équilibre des pouvoirs dans le cadre de la démocratie constitutionnelle4.
b) Référendum pour la révision constitutionnelle
Une révision constitutionnelle n’est définitive qu’après son approbation par référendum, organisé dans un délai de maximum 30 jours à compter de la date de l’adoption du projet ou de la proposition de révision par le Parlement. Toutefois, les dispositions portant sur le caractère national, indépendant, unitaire et indivisible de l’État roumain, la forme républicaine de gouvernement, l’intégrité du territoire, l’indépendance de la justice, le pluralisme politique et la langue officielle ne peuvent pas faire l’objet du référendum. De même, selon l’art. 3 de la loi du référendum on ne peut pas arriver par consultation populaire à la suppression des droits et des libertés fondamentales des citoyens ou de leurs garanties. On peut se demander quelle et la valeur juridique des limites imposées à la révision de la Constitution ? Selon l’art. 146 (a) thèse dernière de la Constitution de la Roumanie, la Cour constitutionnelle se prononce d’office sur les initiatives de révision de la Constitution, à la voix de deux tiers des juges, après quoi le projet, accompagné de la décision de la Cour, sera présenté au Parlement pour délibérer. D’autre part, une fois adoptée la loi de révision de la Constitution, la loi organique de la Cour constitutionnelle lui confère la compétence de se prononcer d’office sur la loi adoptée dans un délai de 5 jours (art. 19-23 de la loi n° 47/1992 republiée). Si celle-ci constate qu’elles n’étaient pas respectées les dispositions constitutionnelles concernant la révision, la loi est renvoyée à la Chambre des députés et au Sénat, pour être réexaminée et mise en accord avec la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle. On ne peut que constater que, de la même manière que s’était déjà passé en d’autres situations5, on tente à remédier une omission du texte constitutionnel en
4 DCC n° 567 du 11 juillet 2006 sur l’exception d’inconstitutionnalité des dispositions de l’art. 12 alin. (1) de la Loi n° 3/2000 relative à l’organisation et le déroulement du référendum. 5 Voir Criste, M., « Discuţii referitoare la concordanţa articolului 23 alin. 3 din Legea nr. 47/1992 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Curţii Constituţionale cu dispoziţiile Constituţiei României », Dreptul n° 8, 1995, p. 20.
151 Mircea Criste glissant la partie qui manque dans la loi organique de la Cour constitutionnelle et cella à des courtes délais après l’adoption ou l’adaptation du texte constitutionnel. Les dispositions de l’article 23 de cette loi organique sont à notre avis inconstitutionnelles parce que, introduisant le contrôle d’office de la Cour sur les lois constitutionnelles adoptées déjà, elles ajoutent à la Constitution. L’article 146 (a) première thèse de la Constitution6 donne à la Cour constitutionnelle la compétence d’un contrôle a priori des lois qui font l’objet de la promulgation, exercé seulement sur saisine des sujets spéciaux. Par conséquence, la loi de révision constitutionnelle ne peut pas arriver sous la loupe des juges constitutionnels sur la base de ce texte constitutionnel7. La seconde thèse de l’art. 146 (a) de la Constitution institue aussi un contrôle a priori d’office, mais seulement des initiatives de révision de la Constitution et pas de la loi de révision adoptée par le parlement8. On ne croît pas qu’il pourrait être invoquée ni la lettre l) de l’art. 146, relative à la possibilité d’introduire par la loi organique de la Cour constitutionnelle d’autres compétences que celles prises en considération par le constituant. Et cela parce que dans notre cas il ne s’agit pas d’une autre attribution donnée à la Cour par sa loi organique, mais d’une modification, par adjonction, d’une attribution reconnue expressément par le texte constitutionnel. Or, ajouter au texte constitutionnel par la loi organique de la Cour constitutionnel ne peut être qu’inconstitutionnel9.
6 Art. 146 – LES ATTRIBUTIONS La Cour Constitutionnelle a les attributions suivantes : a) elle se prononce sur la constitutionnalité des lois, avant leur promulgation, sur saisine du Président de la Roumanie, du président de l’une des Chambres, du Gouvernement, de la Haute Cour de Cassation et de Justice, de l’Avocat du Peuple, de 50 députés au moins ou de 25 sénateurs au moins, ainsi que d’office, sur les initiatives de révision de la Constitution 7 « On ne pourrait retenir la compétence de la Cour constitutionnelle d’examiner la saisine relative à l’inconstitutionnalité de la loi de révision, sur la base des dispositions de l’art. 144 (a) première thèse de la Constitution [texte ancien], étant donné que ce texte vise expressément les lois soumises à la promulgation après leur adoption par le parlement, c’est-à-dire aux lois organiques et lois ordinaires, pour lesquelles le processus législatif est prévu dans les article 73-78 de la loi fondamentale. Or, la loi de révision constitutionnelle fait partie de la catégorie des lois constitutionnelles, selon l’art. 72 (2) de la Constitution et la procédure de son adoption et de son entrée en vigueur est prévue par les dispositions à caractère spécial de l’art. 146 et 147 de la Constitution [texte ancien], qui ne prévoient la procédure de la promulgation de la loi par le Président de la Roumanie. Cette loi devient définitive comme conséquence du référendum et entre en vigueur à la date de la publication au Moniteur Official de la Roumanie, première partie, de l’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle de validation du résultat du référendum » (DCC n° 385 du 15 octobre 2003 sur la saisine d’inconstitutionnalité de la Loi de révision de la Constitution de la Roumanie, Monitorul Oficial n° 728 du 17 octobre 2003). 8 Dans l’opinion du professeur Deleanu aussi, un contrôle de constitutionnalité ultérieur à l’adoption de la loi de révision, mais avant le référendum, n’est pas possible (Instituții și proceduri constituționale, C.H. Beck, Bucarest, 2006, p. 869). 9 Constation fait aussi par le Rapport de la Commission présidentielle d’analyse du régime politique et constitutionnel de Roumanie : « la loi ne peut pas ajouter à la Constitution, mais seulement détailler certaines des compétences de la Cour constitutionnelle », www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/ CPARPCR/Raport_ CPARPCR.pdf, p. 67.
152 Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine
A-t-il le juge constitutionnel la légitimité de contrôler et, le cas échéant, de censurer une loi de révision, adoptée par les élus du peuple ou par le peuple lui-même ignorant les limites imposées par la Constitution ? Dans l’affirmatif, la Constitution cessera d’être le joujou du politique, mais le juge constitutionnel deviendrait « le maître de la Constitution », avec le risque qu’un « Gouvernement des juges » remplacerait les Gouvernements élus démocratiquement. Qu’est-ce que se passe dans la situation contraire, quand, passer outre la décision du juge constitutionnel, un projet qu’ignore les limites de la révision est soumis au référendum ? Deux hypothèses peuvent être retenues : 1) le projet est rejeté par le vote populaire ou 2) le projet est validé par ce vote. 1) Dans le cas du rejet, l’efficacité de la disposition constitutionnelle qui prévoie la limitation de la révision dépende de la possibilité d’engager la responsabilité des ceux qui sont coupables d’avoir ignoré ces dispositions. Cette exigence serait satisfaite si on donne efficacité à la responsabilité du chef de l’État pour haute trahison (art. 96 de la Constitution de la Roumanie), à la responsabilité ministérielle (art. 109/2 de la Constitution de la Roumanie et la loi n° 115/1999) ou à l’interdiction des partis qui se placent en dehors de la Constitution par le non-respect des valeurs et des principes de la démocratie (art. 8 et art. 146 (k) de la Constitution de la Roumanie). 2) Dans le cas où la violation des limites établies à la révision constitutionnelle serait confirmée par le vote populaire (référendum), il surgit la question à savoir si un tel vote peut couvrir la fraude à la Constitution. Bien que du point de vue strictement juridique on peut soutenir que les dispositions constitutionnelles doivent être respectées aussi dans le cas où le peuple exerce son droit souverain de modifier la Charte solennelle de la nation, nous considérons qu’en fait on vérifie l’affirmation de l’abbé Sieyès, à savoir que si la nation veut, sa volonté est suffisante et constitue toujours la loi suprême10. L’organisation et le déroulement du référendum sur la révision de la Constitution, ainsi que le résultat de celui-ci sont obligatoires (art. 6/2 de la loi n° 3/2000). D’autre part, on peut s’interroger qui est visé par les dispositions qui limitent la révision? Serait-il possible que celles-ci s’adressent aux seuls titulaires du droit de l’initiative dans le domaine des lois constitutionnelles et pas au pouvoir constituante ? Cette conclusion peut être déduite aussi d’une ancienne décision de la Cour constitutionnelle, n° 35 du 2 avril 199611 relative à la constitutionnalité de certaines dispositions de la loi sur les partis politiques, où, bien qu’elle ne visait la question qui fait l’objet de notre analyse, on affirme que les dispositions de la loi fondamentale, « instituant les limites de l’objet de la révision, regardent uniquement certains sujets
10 « De quelque manière qu’une nation veuille, il suffit qu’elle veuille ; toutes les formes sont bonnes, et sa volonté est toujours la loi suprême » (Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État ? Flammarion, Paris, 1988, p. 132). « Non seulement la nation n’est pas soumise à une constitution, mais elle ne peut pas l’être, mais elle ne doit pas l’être, ce qui équivaut encore à dire qu’elle ne l’est pas » (Idem., p. 162). 11 Publiée au Moniteur Official de la Roumanie n° 75 du 11 avril 1996.
153 Mircea Criste qui peuvent demander la révision – le Président de la Roumanie sous proposition du Gouvernement, un quart au moins des parlementaires de chaque Chambre ou minimum 500.000 citoyens ayant le droit de vote, dans une certaine dispersion territoriale ».
c) Référendum pour démettre le Président de la Roumanie
Le Président de la Roumanie fut suspendu de sa fonction deux fois par le parlement (le hasard fait qu’il s’agissait de la même personne dans deux mandats successifs) : – le 19 avril 2007, 332 parlementaires ont voté en faveur, 108 contre et 10 se sont abstenus. Au référendum organisé le 19 mai 2007, 74 % de ceux qui s’avaient exprimé ont été contre la destitution ; – le 6 juillet 2012, le parlement avait voté de nouveau en faveur de la suspension du Président de sa fonction par la voix de 256 parlementaires. Au référendum qui s’ensuit le 29 juillet, de la totalité du corps électoral (18.292.464 citoyens) se sont présentés au vote 46,24 %. Un nombre de 7.403.836 (87,52 %) avaient voté pour la destitution du Président, tant que 943.375 (11,15 %) de votants ont été contre cette destitution. Le principal problème qui s’est posé relatif à cette variété de référendum était lié à la majorité requise à l’époque pour la destitution du Président, c’est-à-dire la majorité absolue. Pour son élection, une telle majorité n’est prévue que pour le premier tour de scrutin. Si cette condition n’est pas remplie, dans le deuxième tour elle est suffisante une majorité simple. Dans l’histoire post-décembriste de la Roumanie, aucun Président n’été pas élu dès le premier tour de scrutin. L’exigence d’une majorité absolue fut imposée dans un premier temps par la loi n° 3/2000 pour la destitution du Président qui fut suspendu par le parlement, sans la possibilité d’organiser un deuxième tour de scrutin. Vu que la Constitution roumaine, quant au référendum, ne prévoie rien lié à l’exigence d’un quorum, ni de participation, ni d’approbation, par conséquence, sur ce palier, toute décision législative ne peut être que constitutionnelle. En se rapportant aux standards des autres pays de l’Union européenne, on peut constater que l’exigence d’une majorité absolue ne se retrouve pas dans la législation de ceux-ci. Seulement en Autriche il est prévu un référendum pour la destitution du Président, mais sans qu’une certaine majorité soit demandée. Dans une telle situation, un point de repère pouvait être l’expertise fournie par la Commission européenne pour la démocratie par le droit (Commission de Venise), qui recommande qu’aucune décision ne soit prise relative aux règles du quorum, parce qu’elle encouragerait soit l’abstention au vote, soit l’imposition du choix de la majorité et ni l’une, ni l’autre des variantes ne serait bénéfique pour la démocratie.
154 Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine
Après ce référendum, le texte de la loi nº 3/2000 relatif à la majorité nécessaire pour la destitution du Président a fait l’objet de plusieurs révisions. La dernière, par la loi n° 341 du 16 décembre 2013, prévoie que la destitution du Président de la Roumanie peut être décidée si y participent au moins 30 % des citoyens inscrits sur les listes électorales et les options valides exprimées représentent au moins 25 % de ces personnes.
II. LE RÉFÉRENDUM, MOYEN DE MANIPULATION Présenté dans la doctrine juridique comme une prémisse pour un exercice démocratique du pouvoir, le référendum est en réalité rarement une garantie dans ce sens. En ignorant le fait que la grande majorité de ceux qui sont appelés à se prononcer n’ont pas la formation nécessaire pour une analyse solide et pour comprendre toutes les conséquences découlant du texte voté, la décision populaire est influencée dans une mesure qui n’est pas du tout négligeable par les médias et la propagande idéologique (les derniers référendums organisés en Roumanie en octobre 2003, novembre 2007, novembre 200912 et mai 2019, ne contredissent pas, malheureusement, cette conclusion, par contre la confirment). En plus, alors que le référendum est organisé à la hâte, sans qu’on fasse une présentation suffisante et sans passer par un débat public des spécialistes, le recours au vote populaire, loin d’offrir l’occasion d’un exercice démocratique, semble plutôt au geste de Pilate. Particulièrement les consultations populaires organisées dans les années 2007, 2009 et 2019, constituent exemples de la façon dont on peut détourner le référendum du son rôle originaire pour l’utiliser dans le sens de la manipulation de la masse électorale dans un but politique propre. Le 25 novembre 2007, la Roumanie organisait les premières élections pour le Parlement européen, après que, au début du même année, elle est devenue État membre de l’Union européenne. Le score qui se préfigurait était assez étroit entre le Parti social-démocrate, opposé au Président et le Parti démocrate du Président13. Vu qu’après deux ans il devra se présenter devant l’électorat pour obtenir un deuxième mandat, le Président en fonction, qui avait une meilleure position dans les sondages
12 « Plus de 33 % des roumains ne savent pas quel a été le sujet soumis au vote au référendum du 25 novembre, selon un sondage d’opinion rendu public hier par Insomar. 66,2 % parmi ceux interviewés ont affirmé que le sujet de la consultation populaire, qui s’est superposé aux élections euro-parlementaires, a été le changement du système de vote. En revanche, 33,8 % avaient déclaré qu’ils ne savent pas, qu’ils ne répondent pas ou que le sujet du référendum serait « l’élection du Basescu » ou „les élections euro-parlementaires » (« Un roumain sur trois ne sait pas quelle fut la question au référendum », Gardianul du 17 décembre 2007). 13 En fait, cette association est l’une de facto, car, selon la Constitution, le Président de la Roumanie ne peut pas être membre de parti une fois qu’il était élu par vote universel, devenant le Président de tous les citoyens et ayant, entre autres, le rôle de médiateur entre les pouvoirs de l’État (modèle français adapté).
155 Mircea Criste que le Parti démocrate, a décidé d’organiser un référendum consultatif national pour l’introduction du vote uninominal, dans le même jour avec les élections, les électeurs recevant en même temps deux bulletins de vote, pour chaque scrutin. Ainsi, il fut introduit dans l’équation électorale un élément nouveau, un vote pour (ce qu’il veut) le Président, qui finalement a fait que son parti ait avec 5 % plus des voix que le parti opposant, et que le Président se situe en poll-position pour les élections présidentielles qui suivront. Mais, outre les jeux politiques, était-t-elle la consultation populaire urgente (pour être organisée dans le même jour avec les élections) et/ou nécessaire (ayant des conséquences directes et immédiates) ? Pas du tout. Elle visait le changement du système de vote qui fonctionnait en Roumanie depuis 1990. Le système du vote uninominal a été utilisé dans seulement deux scrutins (2008 et 2012), et la faillite du celui-ci fut constatée par le Président même qui l’avait promu et qui a qualifié plus tard cette idée, à l’occasion du bilan des deux mandats présidentiels, comme l’une « malheureuse », qui lui a provoqué « une frustration extraordinaire »14. Le 22 novembre 2009, le même Président organise un nouveau référendum, dans le même jour avec les élections présidentielles où il était candidat pour un deuxième mandat. Le thème soumis à la consultation était un populiste, qui exploitait la sensibilité de la population face à l’inefficacité, sinon l’inutilité du Parlement, surdimensionné et gaspilleur des ressources budgétaires. L’électorat fut appelé à se prononcer s’il faut passer d’un parlement bicaméral à l’un unicaméral formé de maximum 300 parlementaires (à un nombre de 18.293.277 des électeurs). Ce référendum, dans lequel le Président se présentait en tant que défenseur de ceux nombreux contre les politiciens corrompus, a été organisé sans des vrais débats pour déceler les conséquences d’un tel changement, le seul argument invoqué étant l’efficacité budgétaire. En revanche, il eut comme effet indirecte, par la mobilisation de l’électorat du Président, sa réélection à une différence de 0,68 % par rapport au candidat du Parti social-démocrate. Encore une fois, nous nous interrogeons sur la nécessité et l’utilité du ce référendum. Outre le fait qu’elle n’était pas faite une analyse sérieuse et qualifiée qui ait soutenu le passage à un législatif unicaméral, il faut préciser que, pour donner efficacité à ce projet il était nécessaire une révision constitutionnelle, ce qui suppose l’intervention parlementaire et une majorité de 2/3 de la totalité des parlementaires. Un tel scénario et l’un utopique en Roumanie, raison pour laquelle il ne s’était passé. Parce que 72,32 % (6.740.213 citoyens) des votants se sont exprimés en faveur d’un passage à un parlement unicaméral, on avait affirmé que la volonté de la majorité doit être respectée. Mais, si on observe qu’ils ont voté 50,16 % de l’électorat, ça veut dire que seulement 37 % du celui-ci et pas la majorité était favorable au changement de la structure du législatif.
14 www.ziare.com/articole/basescu+vot+uninominal
156 Le référendum, expression de la démocratie. L’expérience roumaine
Enfin, le 26 mai 2019, en même temps avec les élections pour le Parlement de l’Union européenne, où le Parti libéral du Président en fonction jouait sa carte face au Parti social-démocrate mieux situé dans les sondages d’opinion, il est organisé un nouveau référendum consultatif avec deux questions : 1. Êtes-vous d’accord avec l’interdiction de l’amnistie et de la grâce pour les infractions de corruption ? et 2. Êtes-vous d’accord avec l’interdiction fait au Gouvernement d’adopter des ordonnances d’urgence en matière des infractions, des peines et de l’organisation judiciaire, ainsi qu’avec l’extension du droit d’attaquer les ordonnances directement à la Cour constitutionnelle ? Le référendum fut finalement validé par une mobilisation extraordinaire de l’électorat des partis de l’opposition, mais surtout des électeurs de la diaspora. La participation au référendum a été de presque 8 millions des votants (c’est-à-dire, pas plus de 40 % de l’électorat), mais comme ceux-ci avaient voté presque tous « Oui » aux questions posées, ça vérifie le fait que par l’organisation du référendum on a poursuivi d’obtenir aux élections euro parlementaires le plus grand nombre des voix possible en faveur des partis qui soutiennent le Président dans sa lutte avec le Gouvernement. Mais, était-t-il le référendum nécessaire et utile ? On trouve la réponse dans deux décisions (464 et 465 du 18 juillet 2019) par lesquelles la Cour constitutionnelle s’est prononcée sur l’initiative de révision de la Constitution, conformément au référendum du mai. Sur l’interdiction de l’amnistie et de la grâce pour les infractions de corruption, la Cour a décidé que les effets de l’interdiction préconisée se répercute sur le principe de l’égalité, garantie des droits et des libertés fondamentales, et, implicitement, sur la dignité humaine, la source des droits et des libertés publiques, ainsi que des garanties associées aux celles-ci, en introduisant un traitement différent pour deux catégories de citoyens : la première catégorie, les personnes condamnées pour infraction de corruption, ne peut pas bénéficier de l’amnistie et de la grâce collective ou individuelle, tant que la seconde catégorie, qui inclue les personnes condamnées pour toute autre infraction que celle de corruption, peut bénéficier de l’amnistie et de la grâce. Une telle différenciation de traitement n’a pas une justification objective et raisonnable, car le but de l’amnistie, respectivement de la grâce, ne vise pas, principalement, l’infraction commise, mais les aspects extra pénaux, même extrajudiciaire, d’humanité, d’opportunité, de perception publique ou autres circonstances qui justifient l’exercice de cette prorogative de l’État. Par conséquent, ces mesures, par principe et par leur nature, ne tiennent compte de la nature des infractions commises. Le législateur constituant originaire, en reconnaissant à la charge de l’État l’attribution d’accorder l’amnistie et la grâce, l’avait reconnu dans sa plénitude, en tant que mesures qui visent la totalité des infractions.
157 Mircea Criste
Il est vrai que, dans un moment de l’évolution de la société, on peut apprécier – même sur voie du référendum consultatif, comme fut celui du 26 mai 2019 – qu’il ne doit pas être accordée la grâce individuelle pour toutes ou certaines infractions, mais une telle appréciation se réfère à l’abstention de l’autorité compétente d’exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire dont celle-ci dispose en cette matière, et pas de tout à la limitation de son pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par la Constitution même. En ce qui concerne la révision proposée par rapport à la deuxième question, la Cour retiens que la limitation de la sphère de réglementation de l’ordonnance d’urgence en matière des infractions, des peines, du régime de l’exécution de celles-ci et de l’organisation judiciaire, ne viole pas les limites de la révision, le législateur constituant dérivé ayant la compétence de limiter la sphère d’application de l’ordonnance d’urgence. Mais d’autre part, la Cour observe que le texte de l’art. 115 alin. 6 de la Constitution se réfère, en principe, au fait que les ordonnances d’urgence ne peuvent pas affecter le régime des institutions fondamentales de l’État. Or, le texte préconisé, surtout quant à l’organisation judiciaire, vise une interdiction générale de réglementation, n’étant pas dans une unité conceptuelle avec le texte constitutionnel, la limitation absolue de la sphère d’incidence de l’ordonnance dans le domaine mentionné pouvant avoir des conséquences négatives sur l’activité de l’autorité judiciaire. Bien que ni la réglementation d’un contrôle de constitutionnalité exercé directement par rapport aux ordonnances du Gouvernement ne contrevient aux limites de la révision de la Constitution prévues par l’art. 152 alin. 2 de la Constitution, toutefois, la Cour constate que le texte est rédigé d’une façon déficitaire, car, on ne peut pas déterminer s’il est réglementé un contrôle de constitutionnalité a priori ou a posteriori sur l’ordonnance.
Le référendum est présenté et assimilé dans les systèmes démocratiques contemporaines comme un moyen d’expression directe de la population et de contrôle de la décision politique, repères découlant du fait que le corps électoral s’assume un certain choix. En fait, le détournement de ce caractère et le pervertissement du référendum dans un instrument de manipulation d’une large masse populaire dans le bénéfice d’une seule personne ou d’un groupe restreint des personnes a un degré élevé de possibilité et de probabilité. Ce que nous amènent finalement à nous interroger d’une façon : le référendum, allié ou ennemi de la démocratie ?
158 Ingrida Danėlienė Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience
DEMOCRATIC REFERENDUMS IN THE EU MEMBER STATES: EUROPEAN STANDARDS AND NATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Dr. Ingrida Danėlienė Secretary General of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Senior researcher at Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania
INTRODUCTION The European constitutional tradition rests on the foundation of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. In its interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,1 the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter also referred to as the Constitutional Court) stressed in 2014 that the innate nature of human rights, democracy and the independence of the state are those constitutional values that form the foundation of the Constitution and the whole State of Lithuania.2 No one may deny the provisions of the Constitution that consolidate these fundamental constitutional values; otherwise, the essence of the Constitution itself would be denied. Democracy, as one of the three constitutional values mentioned above, is inconceivable without democratic elections and, in most countries, without referendums. The article confirms that democratic elections and referendums are both based on the same constitutional foundations: the sovereignty of the people, democracy and the constitutionally guaranteed electoral rights. The constitutionally consolidated democratic principles governing elections to political representative institutions are, therefore, mutatis mutandis applicable to referendums. Some of these universal principles underlying the European electoral tradition, as well as examples of national experience in applying these principles, are discussed in the article.
I. COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS According to the national official constitutional doctrine, in the Republic of Lithuania, the People directly exercise supreme sovereign power through two main
1 The Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 1992, No 33-1014 (for the text in English, see https://www.lrkt. lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192). 2 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 11 July 2014, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta859/content.
159 Ingrida Danėlienė organisational forms: national elections and referendums. The principles and main conditions of organising national elections and referendums are consolidated in the Constitution; the procedures for conducting national elections and referendums are regulated by the respective laws. In order to deal with the question of the common constitutional foundations of the electoral and referendum rights, the following provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania should be singled out: (1) the provision of Article 2, which provides, inter alia, that sovereignty belongs to the People; (2) the provision of Article 4, under which the People exercise supreme sovereign power either directly or through democratically elected representatives; (3) the provision of Article 33, which lays down, inter alia, the right of citizens to participate in the governance of their state both directly and through their democratically elected representatives (Para. 1); (4) the provision of Article 34, which consolidates the constitutional foundations of the active and passive electoral rights of citizens. In its ruling of 15 February 2019,3 the Constitutional Court underlined very clearly that both these forms of exercising the supreme sovereign power of the People and direct democracy – national elections and referendums – are based on the same constitutional foundations, i.e. the sovereignty of the People, democracy and the electoral rights; therefore, they may not be opposed against each other in interpreting the Constitution. Thus, the constitutionally consolidated democratic principles of elections to political representative institutions should mutatis mutandis be applicable also to referendums. Among other things, the same body of citizens with the active electoral right can vote both in elections and referendums under the Constitution. Already in 2004, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the Constitution provides for the following electoral principles: elections must be conducted on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.4 In addition, the Constitutional Court has more than once noted that the electoral (or referendum) process is also subject to the requirements of fairness, publicity and transparency.5 In its ruling of 15 February 2019, the Constitutional Court held that, once a referendum is called, it is permitted to provide that the referendum is to take place over only one day.
3 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 15 February 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1922/content. 4 The conclusion of the Constitutional Court of 5 November 2004, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1277/content. 5 Ibid., also the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 1 October 2008, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court- acts/search/170/ta1415/content.
160 Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience
II. EUROPEAN STANDARDS AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRATIC REFERENDUMS These initial observations, thus, bring us to the next question: how can the provisions of the national official constitutional doctrine discussed above be assessed in a broader, i.e. European, context? Does Lithuania meet the relevant European standards? Are there any common standards for referendums in general? The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), acting as an advisory body to the Council of Europe, has made a substantial contribution to systemising the principles, provisions and the so-called ‘good practice’ in the area of conducting referendums. In 2005, when submitting its opinion on the respective recommendation of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly,6 after having analysed the respective legislation providing for the referendum procedures and the practices of organising referendums in European states, the Venice Commission noted that the legal regulations (from the constitutional level to the doctrine of the constitutional courts and the national laws), as well as the practices of implementing referendums, significantly vary depending on the country concerned. First of all, it is pertinent to note that decision making on the necessity of the institution of referendums lies within the discretion of each state; the states use this discretion in the light of their specific historical, cultural, legal and other traditions. In some countries, such as Germany, national referendums are not held; elsewhere, on the contrary, referendums are widely used to tackle a vast range of issues. Second, the legislation of a number of the EU Member States provides for the possibility of holding only consultative referendums or only legally binding referendums. For example, in Belgium, referendums of only a certain type are possible: namely, consultative ones; while referendums resulting in legally binding decisions would be in conflict with the Constitution. Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have held only consultative referendums. Other countries provide for the possibility of holding only legally binding referendums: this is the case in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Latvia. The Czech Republic has organised the sole referendum to date – on accession to the EU.7 The constitutions in other states, such as in Lithuania, set out precise issues that may be put to legally binding referendums, although other referendums, both consultative and binding ones, may also be organised in accordance with the law. Finally, the states are also free to determine a quorum of participation and a quorum of approval for referendums. It is uncommon for the constitutions or special laws of the EU Member States to set a quorum of participation for referendums. However, in Denmark, for example,
6 Referendums: Towards Good Practices in Europe, 29-04-2005, Rec No 1704 (2005). 7 Ibid.
161 Ingrida Danėlienė a referendum on constitutional amendment requires the participation of at least 40 per cent of citizens eligible to vote; while the positive outcome requires that more than half of those participating in the referendum vote in favour of the proposal. In the case of referendums other than constitutional ones, a quorum of participation of 50 per cent of the electorate is established in Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Malta and Lithuania. The requirement of a quorum of participation is slightly different in Latvia: in order for a referendum to take place, this quorum is at least half of the persons with the electoral right who participated in the last parliamentary election. In Poland and Portugal, if turnout in a referendum is less than 50 per cent, the referendum is considered to be consultative. A quorum of approval is known in Denmark, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. It has to be noted that, although a quorum of participation is given priority over a quorum of approval in expert assessments,8 both these criteria should be viewed critically from the point of view of constitutional law. First, there are grounds for criticism of a quorum of participation, because it equates those who did not go to the polls with the persons who came and voted against; moreover, it can encourage citizens not to participate solely for the purpose of making the referendum invalid as a result of its failure to reach the required voter turnout. Such non-participation in itself should not be regarded as a ‘healthy’ democratic process: non-participation in a referendum becomes more powerful than the vote against, as the latter legitimises the outcome of a referendum. Second, a quorum of approval likewise falls under criticism, because it can lead to a difficult political situation, in which, after a simple majority of voters are in favour of the referendum proposal, it still fails to be adopted if the required minimum quorum is not reached; in this case, the votes in favour – even though cast by a majority of voters – remain apparently unnoticed and are not taken into account at all. The quorum of participation and the quorum of approval established in Lithuanian law were particularly relevant in the context of two referendums held in May 2019 on constitutional amendments. The Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania, by its resolution of 18 October 2018, initiated a mandatory referendum on amending Article 12 of the Constitution.9 The substance of this referendum motion was to replace the rule, laid down in the Constitution since 1992, that a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania has the right to hold citizenship of another state only in individual exceptional cases by the rule providing the preconditions for multiple citizenship to become a widespread phenomenon. According to the wording of Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Constitution as proposed for the referendum, a person who is a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania by descent would not lose citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania after having acquired citizenship of a state chosen by the Republic of Lithuania and compliant with the criteria of European and
8 Ibid. 9 The resolution (No XIII-1537) of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 18 October 2018 on calling a mandatory referendum on amending Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. The Register of Legal Acts, 23-10-2018, No 16530; 10-03-2019, No 3891.
162 Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience transatlantic integration. By its resolution of 14 February 2019, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania decided that a second constitutional referendum be held on the same day, i.e. 12 May 2019.10 It was determined to call a mandatory referendum on amending Article 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, i.e. to provide in Paragraph 1 of this article that the Seimas shall be composed of 121 members of the Seimas (instead of 141 members of the Seimas as provided for in the corresponding constitutional provision currently in force). It is noteworthy that the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the sole referendum threshold – a quorum of approval, which applies to the provision of Article 1 of the Constitution, stipulating that ‘The State of Lithuania shall be an independent democratic republic’. Under Paragraph 1 of Article 148 of the Constitution, the above-mentioned provision of Article 1 of the Constitution may be altered by referendum if not less than three fourths of the citizens of Lithuania with the electoral right vote in favour thereof.11 In accordance with the provisions of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Referendums,12 this quorum of approval also applies to decisions regarding the Constitutional Act of 8 June 1992 on the Non-Alignment of the Republic of Lithuania to Post-Soviet Eastern Unions, which can likewise be amended solely by means of a referendum (Art. 8(2)). It should be noted that a quorum of participation is provided for in the event of all other mandatory constitutional referendums: a mandatory referendum is considered to have taken place if it secures the turnout of more than half of the citizens who have the electoral right and are registered on the electoral roll (Art. 8(1)). Under the Law on Referendums, the quorum of approval with respect to mandatory referendums, inter alia, on amending the provisions of Chapter I ‘The State
10 The resolution (No XIII-1979) of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 14 February 2019 on calling a referendum on amending Article 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. The Register of Legal Acts, 15-02-2019, No 2454. 11 In 2014, the Constitutional Court held that no constitutional amendment may be adopted (either by the Parliament or by referendum) if it were to destroy the essence of the Constitution, i.e. denounce democracy, independence or the innate nature of human rights. The Constitutional Court emphasised that the innate nature of human rights and freedoms, democracy and the independence of the state are those constitutional values that constitute the foundation for the Constitution as a social contract, the foundation for the People’s common life, which is based on the Constitution, and the foundation for the State of Lithuania itself. The Constitutional Court stressed that denying the provisions of the Constitution that consolidate these fundamental constitutional values would amount to the denial of the essence of the Constitution itself, since it would lead to the preconditions for repealing the restored ‘independent State of Lithuania, founded on democratic principles’ and proclaimed by the Act of Independence of Lithuania of 16 February 1918. Accordingly, the provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution have, thus, been given the status of eternal clauses and may not de facto be amended at all, with the theoretical exception perhaps being the clause establishing that Lithuania is a republic. See the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 11 July 2014, https://www.lrkt. lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta859/content. 12 The Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania’s Law (No IX-929) on Referendums. The Register of Legal Acts, 28-12-2018, No 21715.
163 Ingrida Danėlienė of Lithuania’ (Arts. 2 to 17) of the Constitution, is equal to the quorum of participation, i.e. the decision is deemed to be adopted if it is approved by more than half of the citizens who have the electoral right and are registered on the electoral roll (Art. 8(3)). These quora also applied to the referendum held on 12 May 2019 on amending Article 12 of the Constitution (i.e. the referendum on multiple citizenship). The other constitutional referendum that was held on the same day (i.e. the referendum on reducing the number of parliamentarians) was subject to a slightly lower quorum of participation: the decision on the issue put to the vote would have been deemed adopted if it had been approved by more than half of the participating citizens, but not less than one third of the citizens who had the electoral right and were registered on the electoral roll (Art. 8(3)). According to the data published by the Central Electoral Commission on the results of these referendums,13 in the referendum on amending Article 12 of the Constitution (i.e. on multiple citizenship), the turnout was 1 322 135 out of 2 486 915, i.e. 53.16 per cent of the voters, of whom 956 564 supported the amendment, i.e. 72.35 per cent of the citizens who cast their vote or 38.46 per cent of all citizens with an active electoral right. This means that, during this referendum, the quorum of participation was reached, but the quorum of approval, i.e. the positive outcome, lacked almost 12 per cent of the votes of the citizens with the electoral right. The other referendum (on reducing the number of members of the Seimas) held on the same day failed to take place, because, after 47.80 per cent of the electorate cast their votes, the quorum of participation was not reached. Interestingly, given that 73.76 per cent of the voters who participated in this referendum approved the proposal to reduce the number of members of the Seimas, a slight increase in the turnout – even if all additional voters had voted against the said proposal – would have determined a successful outcome of the referendum, i.e. the referendum would not only have taken place, but the proposed amendment to the Constitution would have also been adopted. In the light of this, the question, among others, could also be raised in the context of Lithuanian law as to what extent (or if at all) the establishment of the above-mentioned quorum of participation and quorum of approval is compatible with the constitutionally consolidated principle of democracy, which, inter alia, entails the democratic process of decision making.
III. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE EUROPEAN ELECTORAL TRADITION Despite national particularities and differences, there are principles that form part of the European electoral heritage and are universally recognised in a democratic Europe; these principles are common to European countries and mutatis mutandis
13 The official website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, https://www. vrk.lt/ankstesni.
164 Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience apply to referendums. What are they in particular? Referendums held in all countries of the Council of Europe and, therefore, in all Member States of the EU are subject to the following constitutional electoral principles: universal, equal, free, direct and secret suffrage.14 Three of the above-mentioned principles will be briefly discussed below, as well as their significance, inter alia, in the context of Lithuanian constitutional law. The first principle is universal suffrage. Both under the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, this principle means that referendums must be conducted on the basis, inter alia, of the universal right to vote, i.e. by allowing participation of all persons who satisfy the requirements laid down in the constitution and/or laws of the respective state. In the Republic of Lithuania, the right to vote is guaranteed to citizens who have the active electoral right (who, on the day of the election, have reached 18 years of age and are not declared by a court to be legally incapacitated) (Art. 34 of the Constitution). The first two of the above requirements, i.e. citizenship and age requirements, should be seen as common legitimate and objective criteria, which are generally recognised in European states and determine the right of individuals to vote in elections and referendums. The third criterion – the requirement of habitual residence – is also fully in line with the European standard; however, it applies only in some European states: primarily, in Ireland, whose legal provisions provide for the right to take part in elections only for those citizens who, inter alia, are habitually resident in this country15 (another example is Israel). It should be pointed out that the restriction of the active electoral right in European countries is considered permissible in two cases – due to mental incapacity and due to a criminal conviction for a serious offence, but only subject to certain conditions: the restriction must be provided for by law; the proportionality principle must be observed; and the restriction must be imposed by a decision of a court of law. The second principle is equal suffrage, which is, in its turn, based on the principle of equal voting rights and the requirement to ensure the equality of opportunity for referendum participants. It should be noted that, in interpreting the principle of equal voting rights, this principle – both in the European context and under the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania – first of all, means that citizens who are
14 Referendums in Europe – An Analysis of the Legal Rules in European States, report adopted by the Venice Commission at its 64th plenary session on 21–22 October 2005,
165 Ingrida Danėlienė eligible to participate in elections and referendums are treated on an equal footing and have equal votes. The minimum standard for the equal participation of supporters and opponents in a referendum is ensured, in particular, through the requirement of a neutral attitude by the state authorities during the referendum campaign, the balanced coverage of the referendum by means of the mass media (especially, in broadcasts by the publicly owned media), the transparent funding of political campaigns and the equal opportunity to participate in them. The third principle is free suffrage; it implies ensuring, primarily, freedom of voters to form an opinion, as well as freedom to express one’s will, inter alia, by securing equal opportunities for the supporters and opponents of the decision put to the referendum. The state authorities should also remain relatively neutral in this context, so that voters can form a free opinion on the issue to be voted on. This relative neutrality means that, although it is not prohibited for the state authorities to express their support or disapproval of the proposal submitted to the referendum, they are not allowed to influence the outcome of the vote by over-campaigning for one side or another. Although the vote in a referendum in most states takes place over one day, some states provide that a referendum may be held on more than one day (usually on two days); however, it is in all cases organised without any break. In Poland, a referendum can take place over one or two consecutive days, without coordinating it with the days of voting in elections. In Finland, a referendum is held over one day; it may also take place on two consecutive days, but only if it is conducted at the same time as national elections. The Czech Republic holds local referendums over one day, but they may be scheduled for two consecutive days if the vote in a referendum coincides with local, regional or parliamentary elections or elections to the European Parliament. As can be seen from the analysis of the practice of holding referendums in European states, in no European state may referendums take place over more than two consecutive days or on a few days with a break. Precisely because of this, the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Referendums as set out in its new wording in 2018, which allowed holding a referendum on an unlimited number of days with an unlimited number of breaks and left the issue regarding the duration of a referendum to the full discretion of the Parliament, was unique on a worldwide scale. Based on the provisions of this law and seeking as high voter turnout as possible in the referendum on amending Article 12 of the Constitution, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, by its resolution of 18 October 2018, provided that a mandatory referendum would be called and scheduled it to be held on 12 May 2019 and 26 May 2019 (i.e. on the days that coincided with the first and second round of voting in the presidential election). On the one hand, such an objective pursued by the legislator could not in itself be regarded as negative. On the other hand, the fact that the established legal regulation created the conditions for the differentiation of referendums from the very
166 Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience entry into force of the law and at any time in the future, by giving a starting advantage to some referendums over others, is also evident in the resolution of the Seimas of 14 February 2019, whereby the Seimas approved the proposal to hold another mandatory referendum – on reducing the number of members of the Seimas, and scheduled that it would take place over only one day, i.e. 12 May 2019. In its ruling of 15 February 2019,16 therefore, the Constitutional Court noted that the Constitution gives rise to the requirement that, once a referendum is called, it must be provided that it is to take place over one day; this requirement creates the preconditions for ensuring the fairness and transparency of the referendum process, inter alia, that the same procedure for calling and conducting referendums is applied in deciding all the most significant issues concerning the life of the State and the People; at the same time, the preconditions are thereby created for ensuring the imperative, stemming from Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution, to determine the actual will of the People in a referendum. This interpretation of the Constitutional Court should also be linked to the principle of fairness, which is considerably developed in the Lithuanian constitutional doctrine. Apparently, with regard to the specific practice of organising and regulating referendums, the principle of fairness is considered to be intrinsically related with the constitutional imperative to determine the true will of the people. This has also been emphasised by the Constitutional Court. For instance, as held by the Constitutional Court in its ruling of 11 July 2014,17 Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Constitution, interpreted in conjunction with the provision of Article 2 of the Constitution that sovereignty belongs to the People and with the provision of Article 4 of the Constitution that the People execute supreme sovereign power directly, gives rise to the imperative to create the preconditions for determining the actual will of the People in a referendum. The process of an unfair referendum as such eliminates the actual will of the people. The clarity of the question. In order for a referendum to be conducted fairly and to allow the actual will of the people to be determined, a clearly worded question must be put to the vote. As held by the Constitutional Court, under the Constitution, several issues unrelated by their content and nature, or several unrelated constitutional amendments, or several unrelated provisions of laws may not be put to the vote in a referendum as a single issue. The Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National Level, adopted by the Venice Commission in 2001,18 indicate the following: a text submitted to a referendum
16 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 15 February 2019, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/ search/170/ta1922/content. 17 The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 11 July 2014, https://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ ta859/content. 18 The Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National Level, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 47th plenary session on 6–7 July 2001,
167 Ingrida Danėlienė must respect, among others, the formal requirements – the same question must not combine a specifically-worded draft amendment with a generally worded proposal or a question of principle (unity of form); except in the case of the total revision of the constitution, there must be an intrinsic (essential) connection between the various parts of the text, in order to guarantee the free suffrage of the voter, who must not be called to accept or refuse as a whole provisions without an intrinsic link (unity of content); the same question should not simultaneously apply to the constitution and subordinate legislation (unity of hierarchical level); the question submitted to the voters must be clear (not obscure or ambiguous); it must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer; and the voters must be informed of the consequences of the referendum. An example of a referendum that failed to meet these requirements could be the referendum held in Greece in 2015, in which the Greek citizens with the right to vote had to decide whether to accept the agreement plan submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund to the Eurogroup on 25 June 2015 and the package of reforms proposed to the country.19 These documents comprised a list of at least ten prior actions published by the European Commission, including a VAT reform to be carried out in Greece, the proposed fiscal measures, proposals on the labour market, the trade regulation, a pension reform, a public administration reform, anti-corruption measures, etc. By their content and nature, the proposals put to the referendum were particularly complex and diverse – the ordinary voter hardly even had a theoretical possibility of getting familiar with them or, still less, gaining an understanding of them. Finally, 62 per cent of all of the voters took part in the referendum: 38 per cent of them voted in favour of the proposals, while 61 per cent were against. Another referendum similar in terms of its complexity was held on 6 April 2016 in the Netherlands on the approval of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. The question put to the referendum was the following: ‘Are you for or against the Approval Act of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine?’. The agreement was concluded between the EU, Euratom, Ukraine and the 28 EU Member States. The parties committed to co-operate and converge economic policy, legislation and regulation across a broad range of areas, including equal rights for workers, steps towards visa-free movement of people, the exchange of information and staff in the area of justice, the modernisation of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, as well as other issues. With the turnout of the referendum being sufficient at 32.28 per cent, 38.21 per cent of the participating voters voting for
19 See https://web.archive.org/web/20150701094649/http://www.referendum2015gov.gr/wp-content/ uploads/2015/06/P.S.A.pdf; https://web.archive.org/web/20150701094650/http://www.referendum2015gov. gr/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/REFORMS-FOR-COMPLETION-OF-CURRENT-PROGRAM-1. pdf.
168 Democratic referendums in the EU Member States: European standards and national experience and 61 per cent voting against, the result of the referendum meant the non-approval of the agreement, which left the whole association agreement in uncertainty.20 The main issue, nevertheless, is what questions can be put to a referendum in general. As a referendum is an institution of direct democracy, it may not be used to prejudice the very essence of democracy itself, that is, to destroy democracy. It is inadmissible, by recourse to the institution of a referendum, to deny the concept of pluralistic democracy, which entails respect for the rights of the opposition and minorities; it is equally inadmissible thereby to deny the requirement inherent in democracy to respect the dignity of every person, or to deny the essence of the rule of law. It is no coincidence that the Venice Commission has emphasised that a text submitted to a referendum must also meet the substantive requirements: it must comply with the fundamental (intrinsic and extrinsic) limits on constitutional revisions and must not be contrary to international law or to the Council of Europe’s statutory principles (democracy, human rights and the rule of law); texts that contradict the formal and/or substantive requirements may not be put to the vote in a referendum. The constitution and laws, therefore, may impose the substantive limits on questions submitted to referendums. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has held that the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, inter alia, gives rise to the imperative not to put to a referendum any such possible decisions that would not comply with the requirements of the Constitution. Thus, according to the Constitution, it is also impermissible to submit to a referendum any such draft constitutional amendment that disregards the substantive limits set with respect to amending the Constitution. Otherwise, the preconditions would be created for denying the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and for disregarding the imperative, stemming from Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Constitution, that no amendments to the Constitution may violate the harmony of constitutional provisions and the coherence of the values consolidated in these provisions. Notably, in its ruling of 11 July 2014, the Constitutional Court formulated the doctrine of eternal provisions, i.e. the absolute prohibition of any such amendments to the Constitution that would deny the innate nature of human rights and freedoms, democracy or the independence of the state. Therefore, the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 148 of the Constitution, under which the provision ‘The State of Lithuania shall be an independent democratic republic’ of Article 1 of the Constitution may be altered only by referendum if not less than three fourths of the citizens of Lithuania with the electoral right vote in favour thereof, should not be understood to mean that it is allowed, by means of a referendum, to repeal or deny independence or democracy, or respect for human rights and freedoms, which is inherently related to democracy.
20 Consequently, the Dutch government resolved the situation by adopting an additional agreement between the 28 EU Member States, which, according to it, addressed the concerns of the failed referendum. For more, see, e.g. https://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/eu-solution- deal-dutch-referendum-result-on-the-eu-ukraine-association-agreement.
169 Ingrida Danėlienė
In other words, the Constitution must not become a tool for committing ‘democratic suicide’; democracy enshrined in the Constitution must be able to defend itself (i.e. it must be the so-called ‘militant democracy’). These eternal clauses derive from the Act of Independence of Lithuania of 16 February 1918, which is considered to be a supra-constitutional act, undeniable by any constitution or referendum. Having regard to the integrity and coherence of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has identified a total of five substantive limits applicable with respect to amending the Constitution and, thus, also with respect to possible questions that may be submitted to referendums: the prohibition of denying the constitutional values constituting the foundation of the State of Lithuania; the prohibition of denying the constitutionally consolidated geopolitical orientation of the State of Lithuania; the prohibition of denying the constitutional principle of respect for international law (pacta sunt servanda); and the prohibition of denying the constitutional provisions of a greater level of protection. Furthermore, no referendums may be called on questions that fall within the exclusive competence of the Parliament, i.e. the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, such as in relation to approving financial indicators of the state budget and municipal budgets, establishing taxes or appointing officials.
CONCLUSIONS There is no absolute right to a referendum in Europe. This right is ensured (limited or prohibited) by the national constitution. Neither there is the absolute right to decide on any type of issues by means of a referendum. However, there are common principles deriving from the European electoral heritage, which also apply to referendums. With a view to preserving the fundamental structural principles of democracy (pluralistic democracy, respect for human dignity, innate rights, international obligations), the requirements stemming from the rule of law limit the range of questions put to referendums. The principle of fairness implies the necessity for submitting clear and unambiguous questions, whereby the actual will of the people could be determined. Apparently, as a result of the specific challenges to democracy and the increased populist initiatives in the given period, the Lithuanian official constitutional doctrine is one of the most developed in Europe. In certain respects, it has even enriched European case law, for example, in terms of the substantive limits on constitutional referendums, respect for international obligations, equal conditions for referendums, such as the requirement of conducting a referendum over one day. However, it must be ultimately admitted that the vast regulation of referendums as well as a large body of the related practice is a feature characteristic of new, rather than developed, democracies; therefore, at least in this respect, Lithuania is still somewhere in between the former and the latter.
170 Francis Delaporte Le concept de démocratie développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Rapport luxembourgeois
LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE DÉVELOPPÉ PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE. RAPPORT LUXEMBOURGEOIS
Francis Delaporte I. LA NOTION DE DÉMOCRATIE DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
A. De l’interprétation littérale…
Créée en 19961, la Cour constitutionnelle du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg ne dispose somme toute que d’une jurisprudence relativement peu étoffée2. Dans la mesure où le Constituant et le législateur ont attribué à la Cour constitutionnelle luxembourgeoise des compétences plutôt limitées, celle-ci n’agit en somme uniquement que par rapport à des questions préjudicielles lui posées concernant la conformité de dispositions de la loi par rapport à la Constitution chaque fois que la réponse à cette question est nécessaire pour le juge de renvoi afin de solutionner son litige3. La question qui s’était posée était celle de savoir si au niveau de la Constitution la Cour constitutionnelle ne prenait en considération que les seuls articles expressément libellés au niveau de la Charte fondamentale ou, si, elle tenait également compte de principes généraux, voire de principes fondamentaux qu’elle dégagerait implicitement du texte même de la Constitution voire d’autres corps de règles essentiellement d’ordre international4.
B. …Vers une consécration progressive des principes non écrits
Pendant les dix premières années de son existence, la Cour constitutionnelle s’est strictement tenue à l’application des seuls articles expressément libellés dans la Constitution. Ce n’est qu’à travers un arrêt d’octobre 2010 qu’elle a5, pour la première
1 Loi du 27 juillet 1997 portant organisation de la Cour Constitutionnelle, (Mémorial A – n° 58, 13 août 1997, p. 1724). 2 Les arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle sont en libre accès sur le site internet: www.justice.public.lu. 3 Selon l’article 6 de la loi du 27 juillet 1997 précitée, une juridiction est dispensée de saisir la Cour constitutionnelle lorsqu’elle estime que : a) une décision sur la question soulevée n’est pas nécessaire pour rendre son jugement; b) la question de constitutionnalité est dénuée de tout fondement ; c) la Cour constitutionnelle a déjà statué sur une question ayant le même objet. 4 Sur ce sujet, voir la thèse de Sauer, C., Contrôle juridictionnel des lois au Luxembourg, Larcier, 2019. 5 Cour constitutionnelle, 1 octobre 2010, n° 57 du registre.
171 Francis Delaporte fois, consacré un principe général du droit qu’elle a déduit à partir des règles de l’article 51 de la Constitution prévoyant que le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est soumis au régime de la démocratie parlementaire. Le principe général ainsi affirmé est celui de la séparation des pouvoirs. Il est vrai que ce principe n’a pas été consacré directement par la Constitution. Cependant, en raison de la structure même de la Constitution et des trois pouvoirs y distinctement encadrés par les dispositions constitutionnelles expresses, la Cour constitutionnelle a pu induire l’existence de ce principe général. Le point intéressant est, celui que la Cour l’a fait à partir des dispositions de l’article 51 telles qu’introduites dans la Constitution en 1948 qui a prévu alors pour la première fois de manière expresse que le Luxembourg est placé sous le régime de la démocratie parlementaire. Il est vrai que cette consécration explicite du régime parlementaire démocratique par le Constituant est en retrait par rapport à la réalité. En effet, pour le moins à partir de la révision constitutionnelle du 15 mai 1919, de manière substantielle, même si la Constitution ne l’énonçait pas auparavant, la démocratie parlementaire a été consacrée par ces nouvelles dispositions adoptées il y a tout juste un centenaire. Dans les situations extrêmement tendues de l’après-guerre, en 1919, à un moment où l’existence-même du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg était en jeu, le Constituant est venu consacrer le principe inscrit à l’article 32, paragraphe 1, de la Constitution, suivant lequel la puissance souveraine réside dans la Nation. Il a ainsi repris quasiment à l’identique le principe parallèle déjà inscrit dans la Constitution belge depuis 1831 qui veut que la puissance souveraine émane de la Nation. Parallèlement en 1919, le Constituant a introduit le suffrage universel à la fois pour les hommes et les femmes de nationalité luxembourgeoise. C’est surtout le droit de vote des femmes qui a été introduit au Luxembourg de manière beaucoup plus précoce que pour la plupart des pays voisins. Cette consécration du suffrage universel s’explique par l’action du gouvernement de l’époque tendant à voir organiser un référendum sous l’inspiration des 14 points du président Wilson en permettant au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg de montrer à la communauté internationale que ses électeurs entendaient continuer à vivre dans un Etat souverain et qu’ils étaient à même de déterminer la forme constitutionnelle – monarchie ou république – à revêtir au niveau des structures de l’Etat indépendant qui, de la sorte, était d’autant plus fermement ancré dans les réalités politiques de ce temps. Il résulte très clairement de ce contexte politique que c’est la possibilité d’organiser un référendum qui a motivé le Constituant de l’époque à adopter le suffrage universel sans distinction de sexe. Une trame important était jetée : la Cour constitutionnelle, en 2010, a créé un lien ferme entre la disposition expresse de la Constitution prévoyant que le Luxembourg est placé sous le régime de la démocratie parlementaire, d’un côté, et la consécration d’un principe général du droit, en l’occurrence celui de la séparation des pouvoirs, de l’autre.
172 Le concept de démocratie développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Rapport luxembourgeois
Il a fallu attendre presqu’une décade jusqu’à ce que la Cour constitutionnelle consacre à nouveau un principe général du droit, en l’occurrence le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit. Le point absolument intéressant dans cette seconde démarche de consécration d’un principe général du droit est celui qu’à nouveau la Cour constitutionnelle se place au niveau du texte de la Constitution traitant du régime démocratique. Cette consécration s’est effectuée par un arrêt tout récent de mai 20196. L’autre élément particulièrement percutant est celui que la Cour constitutionnelle n’a cette fois-ci non seulement appuyé sa consécration du principe général de l’Etat de droit sur les dispositions de l’article 51, paragraphe 1er, de la Constitution prévoyant que le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est placé sous le régime de la démocratie parlementaire, mais que cette fois-ci elle s’est également et en plus appuyée sur les dispositions de l’article 1er de la Constitution y introduites en 1998 suivant lesquelles le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est un Etat démocratique. La Cour constitutionnelle, par une formule brève, retient que le principe de l’Etat de droit est inhérent à la démocratie. Elle a pu ce faire d’autant plus fermement que lors des débats parlementaires menés autour de l’adjonction à l’article 1er de la Constitution du qualificatif « démocratique », plusieurs parlementaires se sont exprimés en ce sens que la notion de démocratie était à comprendre dans un sens très large et qu’elle comprenait notamment, de manière implicite, l’affirmation suivant laquelle le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est à considérer comme un Etat de droit. La Cour constitutionnelle, dans sa motivation, ne fonctionne nullement à l’instar d’une Cour constitutionnelle telle celle de Karlsruhe, mais plutôt à l’instar d’une Cour de cassation de type français ou belge en ayant généralement pour habitude d’appuyer ses arrêts sur des motivations à la fois relativement courtes et denses. Dans ce contexte, la Cour constitutionnelle a néanmoins pris soin de relever que les règles de primauté du droit et de soumission de tout acte public ou privé à la règle de droit, toutes deux caractérisent le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit, sont inhérentes à l’article 1er de la Constitution suivant lequel le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est un Etat démocratique et à son article 51, paragraphe 1er, suivant lequel le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est placé sous le régime de la démocratie parlementaire. Etant donné que les juges de renvoi, le tribunal administratif du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg7, avaient également invoqué le principe de légalité et les dispositions de l’article 95 de la Constitution suivant lesquelles les Cours et tribunaux ne sont appelés à appliquer les dispositions réglementaires que pour autant qu’elles sont conformes à la loi, la Cour constitutionnelle a répondu qu’à la fois le principe de légalité et l’article 95 de la Constitution constituent une émanation du principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit auquel ils participent. L’affaire au principal concerne un article de la loi suivant
6 Cour constitutionnelle, 28 mai 2019, n° 146 du registre. 7 Trib. adm., 10 janvier 2019, n° 37014a du rôle. La jurisprudence des juridictions administratives est librement accessible sur le site internet : www.justice.public.lu.
173 Francis Delaporte lequel en matière d’échange de renseignements à caractère fiscal8, aucun recours juridictionnel n’était plus possible au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Etat requis, contre une injonction du directeur de l’administration des Contributions directes faite à un contribuable ou à un détenteur d’informations à la requête d’une administration fiscale étrangère formulant une demande de renseignements. Dans la mesure où le juge de renvoi entendait savoir si l’absence de pareil recours, et partant l’absence d’accès à un juge et plus loin l’absence de recours effectif de la sorte, étaient conformes au principe de l’Etat de droit et au principe de légalité, la Cour constitutionnelle a encore pris position par rapport à ces aspects de la question en consacrant non seulement le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit, mais encore en précisant que le principe de l’Etat de droit est à considérer sous les aspects d’accès à un juge et de recours effectif en découlant directement. Cette formulation laisse présager que d’autres aspects de l’Etat de droit se trouvent implicitement mais nécessairement consacrés à travers le principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit dont ils découlent parallèlement. Il est intéressant de s’attendre à de futurs renvois préjudiciels permettant à la Cour constitutionnelle de dégager précisément des aspects complémentaires découlant parallèlement du principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit9. Il est encore remarquable que les deux arrêts précités ( n° 57 et 146) non seulement sont les seuls à consacrer un principe général du droit contenu implicitement, mais nécessairement dans la Constitution sans y être expressément énoncé, mais encore se réfèrent à chaque fois à l’article de la Constitution prévoyant que le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est soumis au régime de la démocratie parlementaire et, pour le dernier arrêt, également à l’article 1er de la Charte fondamentale prévoyant que le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est un Etat démocratique. Mais encore s’agit-il des deux seuls arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle qui aient jamais statué par rapport au principe de démocratie. Il n’est dès lors pas permis de tracer des lignes de conduite complémentaires au niveau de la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle concernant le sujet précis qui nous occupe de savoir quel est le concept de démocratie développé par la Cour constitutionnelle luxembourgeoise, en l’absence de plus amples références faites par celle-ci par rapport à ce même principe.
8 Loi du 25 novembre 2014 prévoyant la procédure applicable à l’échange de renseignements sur demande en matière fiscale et modifiant la loi du 31 mars 2010 portant approbation des conventions fiscales et prévoyant la procédure y applicable en matière d’échange de renseignements sur demande, (Mémorial A – n° 214, 27 novembre 2014, p. 4170). 9 Dans un arrêt du 26 novembre 2019, la Cour administrative a saisi la Cour constitutionnelle d’une question préjudicielle dans le cadre d’une affaire portant sur les effets de la rétroactivité d’une loi fiscale. Dans son renvoi préjudiciel, la Cour s’interrogeait, notamment, sur la conformité de ladite loi au principe fondamental de l’Etat de droit et aux principe de sécurité juridique et de confiance légitime. Si la Cour constitutionnelle s’est déjà prononcée sur la valeur constitutionnelle du premier principe, elle n’a encore jamais eu l’occasion de se prononcer sur la valeur des principes de sécurité juridique et de confiance légitime. Pour l’arrêt de renvoi, voy. Cour adm., 26 novembre 2019, n° 42582C.
174 Le concept de démocratie développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Rapport luxembourgeois
II. LA NOTION DE DÉMOCRATIE DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE Il est intéressant de noter que c’est la Cour administrative du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg qui, à notre connaissance, en tant que seule juridiction du GrandDuché, a dégagé directement de l’article 1er de la Constitution, prévoyant que l’Etat du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est un Etat démocratique des conséquences directes en faveur d’un justiciable dans une affaire portée devant elle. Cette affaire a pour contexte une loi de 1924 portant sur le régime des chambres professionnelles tel qu’il existait à l’époque en Autriche10. Il existe dès lors au Grand-Duché toute une série de chambres représentant les différentes catégories de professions présentes au pays. Ces chambres professionnelles sont assimilées à des établissements publics, revêtent la personnalité juridique de droit public et participent notamment à la procédure législative en étant habilitées à formuler leur avis par rapport à des projets de loi leur soumis, sinon spontanément par elles fournis. Ces chambres professionnelles sont constituées par des membres issus de la profession concernée élus pour un terme périodique. Dans cette affaire11, il s’agissait en l’occurrence de l’élection pour la chambre des fonctionnaires et employés publics. La Chambre des fonctionnaires et employés publics connaissait plusieurs catégories de membres dont plus particulièrement les membres de la carrière supérieure, c’est-à-dire élues par les fonctionnaires occupants des postes pour lesquels des études universitaires achevées sont requises. Pour ne pas créer de déséquilibre, une loi prévoyait notamment qu’aucune profession ne pouvait être représentée par plus de deux élus à la Chambre. Au niveau de la réglementation, c’est-à-dire des mesures d’exécution, a été formulée une autre règle suivant laquelle lorsque plus de deux membres de la même profession se trouvaient élus, seulement les deux qui avaient recueilli le plus de voix pouvaient entrer à la Chambre comme membres, tandis que les subséquents ne pouvaient pas obtenir de mandat. Une difficulté est apparue lors des élections de la Chambre des fonctionnaires et employés publics de l’année 2010. Trois listes étaient présentées et deux listes avaient obtenu des sièges étant donné que trois membres étaient à désigner. La liste généraliste comportant des membres de toutes sortes de professions avait remporté deux sièges, tandis qu’une liste comportant uniquement des professeurs de l’enseignement secondaire avait obtenu un siège. Nous l’appellerons « liste spécialiste ». La situation était telle que les deux membres élus au niveau de la liste généraliste étaient également des professeurs de l’enseignement secondaire. Voilà donc trois professeurs élus.
10 Loi du 4 avril 1924 portant création de chambres professionnelles à base élective (Mémorial A – n° 21, 3 mai 1924, p. 257). 11 Cour constitutionnelle, 9 mars 2012, n° 53 du registre.
175 Francis Delaporte
Ce fait se heurtait, pourtant, à la règle inscrite dans la loi suivant laquelle aucune profession ne pouvait avoir plus de deux élus dans la Chambre. En clair, seuls deux professeurs de l’enseignement secondaire pouvaient y siéger. Jouait alors la règle réglementaire : les deux personnes a priori élues ayant obtenu le plus de voix pouvaient seules exercer leur mandat d’élu, tandis que le troisième ne le pouvait pas. Des règles de proportionnalité simples s’appliquaient alors : la liste ayant obtenu deux des élus avait nécessairement obtenu beaucoup plus de voix que celle à laquelle un seul élu correspondait. Or, si l’on appliquait le règlement littéralement, c’étaient les deux élus de la liste généraliste qui pouvaient entrer à la Chambre, tandis que celui de la liste spécialiste n’y entrait pas. Par conséquent, le troisième élu pouvant accepter un mandat devait nécessairement résulter d’une autre profession. Cependant, sur la liste spécialiste il n’y avait que des professeurs de l’enseignement secondaire. Aucun candidat de cette liste ne pouvait donc accéder au mandat pourtant attribué à cette liste en raison des résultats de l’élection. Toujours en suivant la réglementation applicable, c’était le troisième élu de la liste généraliste, médecin, qui obtenait le mandat jusque lors vacant et les trois élus dépendaient de la liste généraliste qui, toutefois, n’avait obtenu que deux sièges12. C’est contre cette décision que la liste spécialiste et ses membres formaient un recours devant le tribunal administratif. Dans un premier stade, le tribunal s’est demandé si la disposition de la loi qui prévoyait qu’une profession ne pouvait être représentée que par deux élus au plus à la Chambre des fonctionnaires et employés publics était conforme à la Constitution. La question préjudicielle soumise par le tribunal administratif a été posée par rapport à l’article 10bis de la Constitution13. Dans un arrêt du 9 mars 201214, la Cour constitutionnelle a répondu en substance que le législateur pouvait très bien, dans un esprit de pluralisme et de représentativité limiter le nombre d’élus par profession. La disposition de la loi afférente a dès lors été considérée comme conforme à la Constitution. Tirant les conséquences de ce renvoi préjudiciel, le tribunal administratif a confirmé la décision du premier ministre entérinant le résultat des élections suivant une attribution de trois sièges à la liste généraliste. Appel fut formé devant la Cour administrative. C’est cette dernière qui va alors poser le principe qu’en application directe des dispositions de l’article 1er de la Constitution15, suivant lequel le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg est un Etat
12 Le ministre d’Etat, c’est-à-dire le premier ministre, appelé à entériner les résultats de l’élection avait appliqué la réglementation dans ce sens que par rapport à une élection ayant donné deux sièges à la liste généraliste et un siège à la liste spécialiste, en raison de la réglementation telle que décrite ci-dessus, les trois sièges étaient attribués à la liste généraliste. 13 Trib. adm., 12 octobre 2011, n° 27116 du rôle. 14 Cour constitutionnelle, 9 mars 2012, n° 70 du registre. 15 Cour adm., 20 décembre 2013, n° 32864 du rôle.
176 Le concept de démocratie développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Rapport luxembourgeois démocratique, le résultat des élections était à respecter dans le sens que la liste généraliste n’obtenait que deux sièges et que la liste spécialiste devait obtenir un siège. La Cour administrative annula en conséquence la décision du premier ministre entérinant le résultat des élections dans le sens de trois sièges à la liste généraliste. Cette affaire a été l’occasion pour la Cour administrative d’affirmer, pour la première fois, qu’on pouvait non seulement déduire directement de l’article 1er de la Constitution des conséquences en droit par rapport à des justiciables, mais encore que ce principe démocratique emportait nécessairement, au-delà de toute disposition législative et réglementaire, qu’en toute occurrence, pour des élections menées, le résultat obtenu en termes de sièges devait être respecté sur le terrain. Voilà une consécration remarquable du principe démocratique intervenue de manière substantielle…
177 Mathieu Disant Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française
LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE TEL QUE DÉVELOPPÉ PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE. TRIPTYQUE SUR LA SITUATION FRANÇAISE
Mathieu Disant Agrégé des Facultés de droit Professeur à l’Université Lyon Saint-Etienne Directeur du Centre de recherches critiques sur le droit (CERCRID) – UMR CNRS 5137 Le 22ème Congrès international de droit constitutionnel européen et comparé porte sur « Le concept de démocratie développé en matière de Justice constitutionnelle ». Il s’agit d’aborder une question fondamentale : Comment la justice constitutionnelle contribue-t-elle à renouveler le concept de démocratie ? Comment ce concept politique est-il judiciarisé ? Comment est-il mobilisé par le juge constitutionnel ? Pour tenter d’y contribuer, le présent rapport analysera telle que se présente la référence à la notion de démocratie dans le corpus de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel français. Ce dernier n’a pas érigé de « principe démocratique » en tant que principe d’interprétation des normes constitutionnelles. Toutefois, si elles demeurent hétéroclites, les références à la démocratie dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle sont assez nombreuses. Au-delà, évaluer si la justice constitutionnelle est habitée par un concept de démocratie requiert d’élargir les approches du problème.
I. L’ABSENCE DE PRINCIPE DÉMOCRATIQUE DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTIONNELLE FRANÇAISE En France, la pensée constitutionnelle s’est assez peu consacrée à l’idée même de démocratie, sauf à souligner son caractère indéterminé1. Il est à peu près acquis qu’elle est tributaire de représentations, du contexte et du milieu dans lequel le projet démocratique et ses réalisations juridiques s’insèrent. L’intérêt pour l’entreprise de définition juridique de la démocratie se limite à l’analyse des discours juridiques en
1 On lira notamment, sous diverses approches, Pinon, S., « La notion de démocratie dans la doctrine française », Politeia, n° 10, p. 408 ; Pfersmann, O., « Normes juridiques et relativisme politique en démocratie », Cités, 2011, n° 47-48, p. 275 ; Denquin, J-M., « Que veut-on dire par Démocratie ? L’essence, la démocratie et la justice constitutionnelle », Jus Politicum, 2009, n° 2 ; Le Pourhiet, A-M., « Définir la démocratie », RFDC, 2011, n° 87.
178 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française compétition pour différencier le modèle de la « Démocratie constitutionnelle » de celui du « Constitutionnalisme démocratique »2. Bien sûr, la Constitution française situe, de différentes façons, le pouvoir comme devant être exercé en vue de répondre à l’exigence démocratique, et sur la base de la légitimité démocratique, la souveraineté nationale appartenant au peuple qui l’exerce par ses représentants et par voie de référendum (article 3 alinéa 1er). Mais ce n’est que l’illustration du mécanisme de légitimation que met en place tout système juridique se revendiquant de la démocratie. La Constitution établit un système de production de normes qui doit convaincre ses destinataires qu’ils en sont les auteurs. Ces mentions, à texture ouverte et à vocation procédurale (au sens de Niklas Luhmann), fondent un principe démocratique engageant d’abord (sinon exclusivement) le système politique, et la symbolique de légitimation qui l’accompagne. En cette matière, le Conseil constitutionnel garde ses distances avec toute initiative de juridisation et plus encore de judiciarisation. Il faut dire que, de façon générale, il ne s’est jamais senti l’âme de se faire l’interprète du droit politique constitutionnel, ce qui explique par exemple qu’il n’ait jamais produit une lecture des rapports entre le premier ministre et le président de la République. Il y a sans doute, dans cette réticence générale, probablement héritée de la théorie de l’acte de gouvernement, un attachement au refus – confortablement entretenu par le juge lui-même – de s’immiscer dans l’activité politique des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels. C’est plutôt une position sage. De fait, la notion de démocratie est rarement utilisée par le juge constitutionnel français. Elle n’est pas concrétisée de manière précise, comme elle peut l’être de façon si singulière par la Cour constitutionnelle allemande3 où le principe démocratique procède d’une « chaîne de légitimation » élaborée. Vue de France, cette concrétisation sans retenue est le signe de la méthode systématique, et d’une appétence non partagée pour une forte juridicisation de la politique (la fameuse « démocratie décrétée » selon le terme de Schwarze). En France, la notion constitutionnelle de démocratie demeure essentiellement politique, y compris dans son traitement doctrinal. Lorsqu’un litige constitutionnel survient, le juge recourt à la notion plus traditionnelle de souveraineté (plus ancienne que celle de démocratie puisque la notion de démocratie n’apparaît pour la première fois que dans le préambule de la Constitution de 1848). C’est une différence d’approche très nette avec la Cour allemande. Bien entendu, cela n’est pas sans lien avec la différence de légitimité des juridictions constitutionnelles.
2 Par exemple, et pour une synthèse, Klein, L., « Démocratie constitutionnelle et constitutionalisme démocratique : essai de classification des théories juridiques de la démocratie », RFDC, 2017, p. 121. 3 On lira Classen, C. D., « La notion constitutionnelle de démocratie en Allemagne et en France. Remarques sur la concrétisation d’une notion ouverte dans l’espace juridique européen », Jus Politicum, n° 18.
179 Mathieu Disant
Ainsi, par exemple, c’est l’idée traditionnelle de la loi comme expression de la volonté générale (article 6 de la Déclaration de 1789) qui fonde la théorie de la réserve de loi (la soumission à la loi suffit alors à garantir le caractère démocratique) ; là où la Cour constitutionnelle allemande a développé la « théorie de l’essentialité » (Wesentlichkeitstheorie) en la rattachant aux principes de la démocratie et de l’Etat de droit. De même, la légitimité de l’administration de la justice – en présence d’une Conseil supérieur de la magistrature prévu par la Constitution et d’une Justice qui en principe n’est qu’une « autorité » – s’apprécie sur les terrains de la séparation des pouvoirs et de l’indépendance des juges, sans que ne soit mobilisé le principe démocratique sur lequel l’Allemagne questionne l’autogestion judiciaire. En outre, on peut penser que la puissance matricielle de l’article 16 de la Déclaration de 1789 – qui affecte à la Constitution le soin de faire « société » en assurant la garantie des droits et en déterminant la séparation des pouvoirs – se substitue, en France, à l’idée allemande selon laquelle toute la Constitution serait orientée vers la réalisation de la démocratie. Le caractère démocratique est bien inscrit au frontispice de la Constitution de 1958, dont l’article 1er affirme que « La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale ». Mais comme l’écrivait si bien Guy Carcassonne, « l’affirmation démocratique est la pétition d’un principe que toute la Constitution a vocation à mettre en œuvre ». Des quatre adjectifs, celui de « démocratique » est d’ailleurs le seul à n’être jamais commenté en tant que tel dans les ouvrages de référence.
II. LES RÉFÉRENCES DÉMOCRATIQUES DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTIONNELLE FRANÇAISE Pour autant, la notion de démocratie n’est pas absente de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle française4 – sans même évoquer le contentieux électoral5. On la retrouve principalement à cinq égards. En premier lieu, la démocratie est inscrite, à l’article 4 alinéa 1er de la Constitution6, à côté du principe de souveraineté nationale, comme une limite posée à la liberté des partis et groupements politiques de se former et d’exercer leur activité. Cette réserve a 4 La présente étude jurisprudentielle s’arrête au 1er novembre 2019. 5 La démocratie est une référence naturelle dans le cadre du contentieux électoral qu’a à connaître le Conseil constitutionnel. Un exemple explicite : n° 98-2562/2568 AN du 3 février 1999, s’agissant d’une fraude électorale affectant des bureaux de vote qui porte atteinte « au principe même de la démocratie ». Il n’en reste pas moins qu’une requête qui se borne à invoquer « le manque de débats et de démocratie », sans assortir ces allégations générales de précisions et justifications permettant d’en apprécier la portée, ne peut qu’être rejetée, par ex. n° 2007-3424 AN du 28 juin 2007. 6 Article 4 alinéa 1er de la Constitution : « Les partis et groupements politiques concourent à l’expression du suffrage. Ils se forment et exercent leur activité librement. Ils doivent respecter les principes de la souveraineté nationale et de la démocratie ».
180 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française
été très largement vidée dès 1959 (décision 59-2 DC) lorsque la Conseil constitutionnel a exclu que les autorités parlementaires puissent contrôler le respect par un groupe politique, au moment de sa formation, des principes de souveraineté nationale et de la démocratie. Rappelons simplement qu’en France, les partis n’ont pas de véritable statut constitutionnel et, en dehors des lois de financement depuis 1988, ne sont pas soumis à des obligations dont le respect serait susceptible de contrôle, contrairement à ce qui existe en Allemagne où l’interdiction d’un parti est prévue. La jurisprudence est rare, pour ne pas dire quasi-inexistante sur ce point7. Le Conseil constitutionnel n’a pas directement apporté de droits aux partis politiques, ni construit en retour de limites fondées sur le principe de démocratie. En deuxième lieu, depuis la révision de 2008, la « vie démocratique de la Nation » est mentionnée dans un nouvel alinéa in fine de l’article 4 (alinéa 3), comme l’objectif pour lequel est affirmé la garantie des « expressions pluralistes des opinions et la participation équitable des partis et groupements politiques ». Disons-le franchement, une telle mention n’engage pas à grand-chose. Sauf si le Conseil constitutionnel venait un jour en décider autrement, ce qui n’a pas été le cas jusqu’alors, en dehors de son contrôle de proportionnalité des conditions d’accès des partis aux antennes du service public en fonction de leur représentativité8. Une telle insertion est essentiellement le produit de tractations visant à atténuer l’opposition de ceux qui, lors du débat constitutionnel, souhaitaient l’introduction d’une dose de proportionnelle. Le débat se poursuit aujourd’hui. En troisième lieu, la démocratie locale est la source d’une jurisprudence abondante et assez variée du Conseil constitutionnel. Sans pouvoir l’examiner ici dans le détail, cette jurisprudence résulte aujourd’hui principalement du principe de libre-administration des collectivités territoriales inséré en 2003 (article 72 alinéa 3 de la Constitution9). Elle n’y est toutefois pas réductible et concerne aussi bien le statut et mandat des élus locaux, les modes de scrutin, l’égalité du suffrage, les modalités d’élections locales, le droit de pétition, le référendum local. En quatrième lieu, la référence démocratique est mobilisée en droit parlementaire. Depuis 1995, le Conseil constitutionnel juge que « le bon déroulement du débat démocratique » et, partant, le bon déroulement des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels supposent que soit pleinement respecté le droit d’amendement conféré aux parlementaires par la Constitution, tant pour sanctionner les entraves à
7 Pour une application en QPC : ex. 2014-407 QPC du 18 juillet 2014, à propos du rattachement des parlementaires d’outre-mer à un groupement politique de son choix. 8 N° 2017-651 QPC du 31 mai 2017 ; rapport n° 2014-407 QPC du 18 juillet 2014, s’agissant de l’octroi par l’Etat d’une aide financière aux partis et groupements politiques qui concourent à l’expression du suffrage, qui ne saurait « compromettre l’expression démocratique des divers courants d’idées et d’opinion ». 9 « Dans les conditions prévues par la loi, ces collectivités s’administrent librement par des conseils élus et disposent d’un pouvoir réglementaire pour l’exercice de leurs compétences ».
181 Mathieu Disant l’exercice de ce droit que pour en sanctionner l’usage excessif10. Plus implicitement, la jurisprudence qu’il a élaborée quant à l’exigence de clarté et de sincérité des débats parlementaires s’inscrit dans le même standard11. Il est à noter que la démocratie est ici utilisée pour encadrer la liberté du Parlement. Enfin et surtout, depuis 1986, le Conseil constitutionnel utilise la notion de démocratie dans la motivation des décisions relatives au pluralisme et à la liberté d’expression. Il a expressément reconnu que le pluralisme des courants d’expression socio-culturels est en lui-même un objectif de valeur constitutionnelle. « Le respect de ce pluralisme est une condition de la démocratie » précise-t-il. S’ensuit par exemple une jurisprudence régulière sur l’effectivité de la libre communication des pensées et opinions, qui serait remise en cause « si le public auquel s’adressent les moyens de communication audiovisuels n’était pas à même de disposer, aussi bien dans le cadre du secteur privé que dans celui du secteur public, de programmes qui garantissent l’expression de tendances de caractère différent dans le respect de l’impératif d’honnêteté de l’information »12. Très récemment, ce rôle des « sociétés de l’audiovisuel » a été confirmé dans le cadre spécifique du référendum d’initiative partagée (RIP)13, pour mieux exonérer le gouvernement de la fonction d’information exigée par le principe de pluralisme. Le Conseil constitutionnel juge également que la liberté d’expression et de communication (article 11 de la Déclaration de 1789) est « d’autant plus précieuse que son exercice est une condition de la démocratie et l’une des garanties du respect des autres droits et libertés ». Il en résulte un niveau élevé de contrôle puisque les atteintes portées à l’exercice de cette liberté doivent être nécessaires, adaptées et proportionnées à l’objectif poursuivi. Cet examen se déploie aussi bien en contrôle a priori14 qu’en contrôle a posteriori15. On notera qu’a été récemment jugée inconstitutionnelle, sur cette base, par la décision n° 2019-780 DC du 4 avril 2019, une disposition de la loi dite « anti-casseurs » qui laissait à l’autorité administrative une latitude excessive dans l’appréciation des motifs susceptibles de justifier une interdiction de manifestation. De même, par la décision n° 2016-611 QPC du 10 février 2017, le Conseil constitutionnel
10 N° 95-370 DC du 30 décembre 1995, cons. 8 à 12 ; n° 2003-468 DC du 3 avril 2003, cons. 2 à 4 ; n° 2012-662 DC du 29 décembre 2010, cons. 2 à 6. 11 N° 2005-512 DC du 24 avril 2005, cons. 4. 12 N° 93-333 DC du 21 janvier 1994, cons. 3 ; n° 2000-433 DC du 27 juillet 2000, cons. 8 à 10 ; n° 2001-450 DC du 11 juillet 2001, cons. 15 ; n° 2004-497 DC du 1er juillet 2004, cons. 23. 13 N° 2019-1-2 RIP du 15 octobre 2019. 14 N° 2009-580 DC du 10 juin 2009, cons. 15 ; n° 2012-647 DC du 28 février 2010, cons. 5 et 6 ; n° 2018-773 DC du 20 décembre 2018, paragr. 15. 15 N° 2010-3 QPC du 28 mai 2010, cons. 6 ; n° 2011-131 QPC du 20 mai 2011, cons. 3 ; n° 2013-319 QPC du 7 juin 2013, cons. 3 ; n° 2016-611 QPC du 10 février 2017.
182 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française a sanctionné les dispositions instituant un délit de consultation habituelle de site internet terroriste16. Un double flottement résulte toutefois de la jurisprudence. D’une part, il existe une hésitation sur la qualification retenue, car de « condition » de la démocratie, le pluralisme des courants d’idées et d’opinion est, depuis les années 2000, parfois mentionné comme un « fondement » de la démocratie17. On n’est pas sûr de pouvoir en tirer une distinction ou évolution signifiante. D’autre part, la référence à la notion démocratie n’est pas systématique. Elle est parfois absente lorsqu’est mobilisé l’objectif ou le principe du pluralisme des courants de pensées et d’opinion18, ou même lorsque le Conseil opère une conciliation entre les exigences constitutionnelles de pluralisme des courants d’idées et d’opinions et la liberté de communication19. Cette mobilisation épisodique témoigne de l’absence de systématisme sur le sujet. En revanche, on notera que le Conseil constitutionnel prend en compte les modalités d’exercice de la démocratie, comme il l’a fait en examinant des dispositions de dématérialisation du vote. Il a jugé qu’« en l’état actuel des moyens de communication au public en ligne ainsi qu’à l’importance prise par ces services pour l’exercice de la démocratie, le législateur pouvait, sans méconnaître aucune exigence constitutionnelle, prévoir que l’information serait communiquée par voie électronique aux électeurs »20. C’est la même logique qui l’a conduit, en 2009, à consacrer la liberté d’accéder à internet, en soulignant que l’importance prise par les services de communication au public en ligne « pour la participation à la vie démocratique et l’expression des idées et des opinions »21. En somme, au-delà ou en dépit de cette richesse, il n’est pas possible d’identifier une notion élaborée de démocratie dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel français, ni même le besoin ou l’intention d’y procéder. La notion de démocratie
16 La motivation de cette décision est surtout liée aux caractéristiques de l’incrimination, à l’incertitude entourant la notion de « bonne foi » de la consultation permettant d’y échapper, et aux moyens juridiques déjà à disposition qui ont incité le Conseil constitutionnel à considérer que cette incrimination n’était pas nécessaire. 17 N° 2003-468 DC du 3 avril 2003, cons. 12, à propos de règles électorales relatives aux conseils régionaux ; n° 2004-490 DC du 12 février 2004, cons. 84 ; n° 2007-559 DC du 6 décembre 2007, cons. 12 et 13 ; puis 2017-651 QPC du 31 mai 2017, paragr. 4, à propos des conditions d’accès aux émissions du service public de la communication audiovisuelle ; n° 2017-4977 QPC / AN du 7 août 2017, paragr. 9. En dernier lieu, n° 2019-1-2 RIP du 15 octobre 2019, paragr. 3 ; n° 2019-811 QPC du 25 octobre 2019, paragr. 7. 18 Par ex. n° 2009-576 DC et 2009-577 DC du 3 mars 2009 ; et n° 2015-511 QPC du 7 janvier 2016 : « le pluralisme et l’indépendance des quotidiens d’information politique et générale constituent des objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle ». 19 N° 2016-729 DC du 21 avril 2016, cons. 8 à 13. 20 N° 2013-673 DC du 18 juillet 2013, cons. 5. 21 N° 2009-580 DC du 10 juin 2009, cons. 12 ; repris en dernier lieu n° 2018-773 DC du 20 décembre 2018, paragr. 15.
183 Mathieu Disant n’est pas génératrice d’un principe d’interprétation de la Constitution. Elle est essentiellement subsidiaire et confortative d’autres normes constitutionnelles. C’est sans doute une façon de ne pas trop l’exposer, comme si elle demeurait auréolée de son absence contentieuse. C’est peut-être aussi une façon de la préserver si l’on accepte l’idée que la démocratie est une notion qui gagne à ne pas être définie en droit et dont le force est précisément de ne point l’être.
III. AU-DELÀ DE LA JURISPRUDENCE… LE CONTENTIEUX Cette situation m’invite, pour conclure, à souligner que la mobilisation de la notion de démocratie mérite d’être examinée au-delà de la jurisprudence, entendue comme corpus des solutions décisionnelles. Cela nous obligerait à dépasser la délimitation posée par l’intitulé du présent ouvrage. Sans aller jusqu’à ce point, l’intervention de la juridiction constitutionnelle et le contentieux qu’elle développe soulèvent plusieurs situations critiques. L’étude du cas français pourrait se prolonger notamment sous deux facettes, l’une relevant de la légitimité fonctionnelle, l’autre de l’environnement culturel.
III.1. D’une part, je pense que le principe démocratique pourrait être une clé d’analyse de la fonction spécifique que le Conseil constitutionnel exerce pour constater l’existence d’une situation de droit en situation de controverse. Je pense en particulier à la compétence dévolue au Conseil d’émettre un avis rendu public sur la réunion des conditions nécessaires à la mise en œuvre et au maintien de l’article 16 de la Constitution relatif aux pouvoirs exceptionnels du Président de la République en temps de crise. Le principe démocratique pourrait nous permettre de mieux qualifier cette fonction déclarative, à la lisière de la fonction de contrôle des infractions à la Constitution. On souffre précisément d’une absence de systématisation de la notion d’abus de droit en droit constitutionnel. La théorie de l’abus de droit a connu un développement sensible dans un grand nombre de discipline, depuis les travaux du Doyen Louis Josserand il y a plus d’un siècle. Mais cela demeure un défi pour le constitutionalisme : se saisir du droit subjectif (condition sine qua non de l’abus) dans un cadre objectif. Ce n’est pas indépassable si un consensus est trouvé quant à l’évaluation de l’usage normal d’un droit constitutionnel. Le principe démocratique pourrait-il nous aider à situer quand cette normalité est dépassée ? Pourrait-il tout bonnement nous inviter à relire la controverse fondamentale sur la fonction de surveillance du gardien politique de la Constitution par son gardien juridique ?
184 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle. Triptyque sur la situation française
III.2. D’autre part, la place désormais occupée par la Justice constitutionnelle renouvelle la représentation culturelle de la démocratie. Nous savons que la notion constitutionnelle de démocratie est à la fois juridiquement autofondée et fondatrice pour le discours des droits fondamentaux22, avec les dangers que ce type de définition substantielle implique. Or, le développement de la justice constitutionnelle favorise aujourd’hui une culture instrumentale de la constitutionnalité. On le constate nouvellement en France, particulièrement depuis l’instauration de la QPC (Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité). Il faut y être attentif car cela risque de faire de la Constitution la nouvelle victime de l’insatiable « maximisation des possibles individuels » (pour reprendre un précepte à la mode), et de faire du juge constitutionnel le fragile réceptacle des doléances sociétales toujours plus virulentes. On peut d’ailleurs se demander si la culture contentieuse est un progrès de la démocratie…
Car l’essentiel n’est pas le statut instrumental de la démocratie, mais que celle-ci se maintienne comme un objet cosmogonal, une référence universelle au cœur de l’identité de la communauté.
22 En ce sens, not. Doré, L., La notion de démocratie dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel. Contribution à l’étude de l’ordre constitutionnel des droits fondamentaux, Thèse, Montpellier, 2003.
185 Marcelo Figueiredo Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE TEL QUE DÉVELOPPÉ PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
Marcelo Figueiredo Avocat et conseiller juridique à São Paulo (Brésil) Professeur associé de droit constitutionnel dans des cours de premier, deuxième et troisième cycle à PUC-SP et directeur du cours de droit (2005-2009/2009-2013) Président de l’Association brésilienne des constitutionnalistes démocrates (ABCD), section brésilienne de l’Institut ibéro- américain de droit constitutionnel basé au Mexique Vice-président de l’Association internationale de droit constitutionnel (IACL-AIDC) Professeur invité de plusieurs universités d’Amérique du sud et d’Europe Le thème « Le concept de démocratie » développé par la justice constitutionnelle sera abordé dans la conception de notre région, de l’Amérique latine et plus particulièrement du Brésil, mon pays d’origine. Il n’y a aucun doute que la démocratie peut être comprise de nombreuses manières. Nous ne nous préoccuperons pas de sa conceptualisation ni de la formulation de théories juridiques, politiques ou sociologiques sur sa portée et sa valeur1. Nous supposons que la démocratie a essentiellement une valeur positive. Nous savons tous que la démocratie, sous ses diverses formes et dimensions, est la seule forme de gouvernement acceptable. Personne d’autre ne doute aujourd’hui – à l’exception des tyrans – que tous les hommes sont libres et égaux, sans maîtres, et qu’ils doivent avoir la possibilité de participer aux gouvernements de leurs pays2. Il est bien connu qu’il n’y a de démocratie « authentique » ou acceptable que lorsque le peuple, qui soutient le pouvoir politique, est capable de l’exercer directement
1 Sur le thème : Nino, C. S., La constitución de la democracia deliberativa, Gedisa, Madrid, 1996. 2 L’indice de perception de la corruption 2018 (IPC) de Transparency International révèle que l’incapacité persistante de la plupart des pays à contrôler de manière significative la corruption contribue à une crise mondiale de la démocratie. L’analyse croisée avec les données de la démocratie mondiale révèle un lien entre la corruption et la santé des démocraties. Les démocraties pleines ont marqué en moyenne 75 points dans l’IPC ; les démocraties défaillantes ont enregistré une moyenne de 49 ; les régimes hybrides – qui comportent des éléments de tendance autocratique – obtiennent un score de 35 ; et les régimes autocratiques avaient les pires scores, avec une moyenne de seulement 30 points dans l’IPC. Le Brésil a perdu deux points depuis l’an dernier, atteignant un score de 35, ce qui a impliqué également son score le plus faible en sept ans pour l’IPC. Parallèlement aux promesses de mettre fin à la corruption, le nouveau président du pays a clairement indiqué qu’il gouvernerait avec une main forte, menaçant de nombreux jalons démocratiques du pays. (INTERNATIONAL TRANSPARENCY. Indice de perception de la corruption 2018 (IPC) Disponible à l’adresse : www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/indice_de_percepcao_da_corrupcao_2018 [Consulté le 20 juillet 2019].
186 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle ou indirectement par le biais de la représentation. De la Grèce antique à nos jours, l’idée et le concept ont subi de nombreuses mutations et adaptations. La voie de la « démocratie » et de la « république » a été parsemée de hauts et de bas, comme nous le rappelle Robert Dahl3. Nous passons au Parlement des différents types d’assemblées pour décider des divers problèmes de la ville ou du village. La démocratie politique n’a pas été instituée pour légitimer toutes les revendications du pouvoir. Ce n’était pas une fin en soi dans sa conception initiale, mais un moyen dont le but était de limiter le champ d’action des dirigeants. Nous passons de la notion de souveraineté individuelle (Jean-Jacques Rousseau) à la souveraineté de la nation (article 3 de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme de 1789). Nous nous souvenons également de John Locke, qui présente sa théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs et de ses piliers, l’égalité des hommes, le contrat social et la loi comme garantie de la sécurité et de la propriété privée. Dans cette perspective, l’État sera chargé de rédiger les lois par l’intermédiaire de son pouvoir législatif, en fournissant des juges impartiaux pour régler les conflits concrets conformément aux lois en vigueur et en fournissant un pouvoir exécutif capable de garantir l’exécution des décisions proférées par les magistrats. John Locke confère au pouvoir d’élaborer les lois une place prépondérante par rapport aux autres. Montesquieu, tout en n’acceptant pas l’idée de contrat social ou d’égalité naturelle des hommes, souligne que l’édition et l’exécution des lois doivent être confiées à différents organes et personnes. Les juges ne devraient être que la bouche qui prononce la loi. Nous rappelons George Burdeau pour qui la volonté authentique du peuple est celle des hommes – dans l’atelier, dans les champs, dans les bureaux ou dans la rue – c’est là où elle doit être conquise puis imposée aux autorités publiques. Par conséquent, la démocratie au pouvoir est une démocratie en lutte. Aujourd’hui, nous avons des concepts et des principes plus modernes pour considérer un État comme « démocratique ». Giuseppe de Vergottini4, par exemple, évoque :
3 Dahl, R. A., Sobre a democracia, UNB, Brasilia, 2001, p. 18-24 : « Les gouvernements populaires ont disparu parmi les peuples établis depuis des milliers d’années. Cependant, ils ont été remplacés par des monarchies, des despotismes, des aristocraties ou des oligarchies, tous fondés sur une forme de catégorisation ou de hiérarchie [...]. Bien que la République romaine ait duré considérablement plus longtemps que la démocratie athénienne et plus longtemps que toute démocratie moderne à ce jour, vers 130 av. J.-C. elle a commencé à s’affaiblir par les troubles civils, la militarisation, la guerre, la corruption et par une diminution de l’esprit civique qui existait chez les citoyens. Ce qui restait des authentiques pratiques républicaines finit par périr sous la dictature de Jules César. Après son assassinat en 44 av. J.-C., une république autrefois gouvernée par ses citoyens est devenue un empire dirigé par des empereurs. » 4 De Vergottini, G., « Transitions Constitutionnelles et Consolidation de la Démocratie dans les Ordonnancements d’Europe centre-orientale », Mélanges en l’honneur de Slododan Milacic, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007.
187 Marcelo Figueiredo
a) des institutions stables garantissant la démocratie ; b) respect et protection des minorités ; c) économie de marché ; d) respect des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales ; e) égalité des droits et autodétermination des peuples ; f) Etat de droit ; g) sécurité juridique, etc. En Amérique latine5, par contre, nous travaillons avec le concept d’état de droit démocratique. Ceci ne peut être qualifié en tant que tel que si nous avons au moins quelques éléments : a) Principe de constitutionnalité, qui exprime en premier lieu que l’état de droit démocratique est fondé sur la légitimité d’une constitution rigide, émanant de la volonté populaire et qui, dotée de la suprématie, lie tous les pouvoirs et les actes qui en découlent aux garanties de libre exercice de la compétence constitutionnelle ; b) Principe démocratique qui, selon les termes de chaque Constitution, doit constituer une démocratie représentative, participative et pluraliste, qui constitue la garantie générale du respect des droits fondamentaux ; c) Système de droits fondamentaux individuels, collectifs, sociaux et culturels ; d) Principe de justice sociale, en tant que principe d’ordre économique et d’ordre social pour la réalisation de la démocratie sociale, culturelle et économique ; e) Principe d’égalité ; f) Principe de légalité ; g) Principe de sécurité juridique. Nous ne doutons pas que l’un des principaux problèmes du constitutionnalisme latino-américain réside précisément dans la consolidation de la démocratie6, 7. 5 Surtout au Brésil. 6 Par ailleurs, bien sûr, la lutte contre le chômage involontaire et une répartition plus équitable de la richesse et des revenus, la lutte contre la violence et l’exclusion sociale. 7 Pour que la démocratie ne s’affaiblisse et se développe, l’Amérique latine doit travailler sans relâche pour que les institutions démocratiques, des assemblées législatives aux autorités locales, soient transparentes, responsables de leurs actes et développent les compétences et les capacités nécessaires pour s’acquitter de leurs fonctions fondamentales. Cela signifie qu’il sera nécessaire de veiller à ce que le pouvoir à tous les niveaux de gouvernement soit structuré et réparti de manière à donner une voix réelle et une participation aux exclus. En outre, il doit prévoir des mécanismes permettant aux puissants, qu’ils soient dirigeants politiques, hommes d’affaires ou autres acteurs, de rendre compte de leurs actes. Il n’y a pas de raccourci dans cette voie : la consolidation de la démocratie est un processus et non un acte isolé. Cependant, amener les institutions publiques à fonctionner efficacement n’est qu’une partie du défi. En outre, il faut montrer aux citoyens que les gouvernements démocratiques s’attaquent aux problèmes qui concernent réellement les peuples, sont capables de répondre à ces questions et sont soumis à un contrôle effectif de la citoyenneté lorsqu’ils ne le font pas. En pratique, le défi implique également la mise en place d’institutions législatives et juridiques capables de protéger les droits de l’homme et de créer un espace pour un débat politique vigoureux et pacifique. Il comprend la mise en place d’une force de police capable de garantir la sécurité des rues et des frontières ; un pouvoir décentralisé, le prologue de l’administrateur du
188 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi8, constitutionnaliste argentin expérimenté, souligne : L’État de droit c’est l’État constitutionnel, qui n’est autre que le type d’État fondé sur la démocratie et le pluralisme, qui suppose : souveraineté populaire, création du droit par intervention ou représentation des gouvernés, prédominance du consensus sur la contrainte en matière de gestion des décisions politiques fondamentales, séparation et répartition des pouvoirs, limitation et contrôle du pouvoir, indépendance du contrôleur par rapport à la partie contrôlée, libertés individuelles et droits sociaux, pluralisme des partis et des idées et groupes d’intérêts, possibilité permanente d’alternance et d’accès à pouvoir, responsabilité des gouvernants, régime de garanties et relativisation des dogmes officiels. On parle beaucoup en Amérique latine de la démocratie sociale, ce qui implique nécessairement une meilleure qualité de vie pour le peuple, davantage de démocratie sociale, justice sociale et l’État providence9.
PNUD 15, afin que la population de chaque localité puisse se mobiliser pour que les écoles soient dotées d’enseignants bien formés et d’hôpitaux dotés du matériel et des médicaments appropriés, une société civile florissante et une presse libre. Le défi implique également que tous ces acteurs participent pleinement à la consolidation de la démocratie et qu’ils soient à l’avant-garde de la lutte contre la corruption et de la mauvaise gestion des gouvernements et des entreprises. Les objectifs de développement du millénaire (ODM) des Nations Unies – dont l’éventail inclut de réduire de la moitié l’extrême pauvreté et la faim jusqu’à ce que, d’ici 2015, toutes les filles et tous les garçons fréquentent l’école – fournissent un instrument pour remédier ces questions aux niveaux national et régional. Dans la réalité, les ODM constituent le premier manifeste mondial pour les femmes et les hommes, les filles et les garçons du monde entier : un ensemble de problèmes concrets, mesurables et synthétiques, afin que tout le monde puisse les comprendre et les honorer. Dans le cadre d’un pacte mondial entre des pays riches et des pays pauvres, compte tenu de l’engagement du monde développé à soutenir les pays en développement qui mènent à bien des réformes de bonne foi, les ODM offrent une réelle opportunité de canaliser l’aide extérieure en termes de l’accès au marché, l’allégement de la dette et l’augmentation de l’assistance dont de nombreux pays d’Amérique latine ont désespérément besoin pour intensifier leurs propres efforts. Si l’Amérique latine et le monde saisissent cette opportunité, il sera possible de créer un nouveau cercle vertueux grâce auquel une croissance économique renouvelée renforcera les ODM tout en aidant à construire et à maintenir des démocraties plus efficaces, capables d’accélérer un progrès social et économique équitable. Pour que cette vision devienne réalité, il faudra que les Latino-américains, et en particulier les dirigeants de tous les domaines, s’attaquent résolument aux problèmes critiques de la gouvernance démocratique, susceptibles de garantir que le développement et la démocratie continuent à être compris non comme des alternatives, mais comme les deux faces d’une même pièce. (PROGRAMA DAS NAÇÕES UNIDAS PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO. A democracia na América Latina. Rumo a uma democracia de cidadãos e cidadãs. Traduction de Monica Hirts. Disponible à l’adresse : https://docplayer.com.br/36429699-Rumo-a-uma-democracia-de-cidadas-e-cidadaos.html [consulté le 20 juillet 2019]. 8 Vanossi, J. R., El Estado de Derecho en el constitucionalismo social, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1987. 9 Sur le thème, voir : Figueiredo, M., « Balance y perspectivas del constitucionalismo social en Latino América ». In Astudillo, C., Carpizo, J., Constitucionalismo. Dos siglos de su nacimiento en América Latina, UNAM et Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Constitucional, Mexique, 2013, p. 393 ; Figueiredo, M., « O constitucionalismo contemporáneo : uma visão latino-americana. Homenagem ao Professor Héctor Fix-Zamúdio », Revista Interesse Público, v. 94, Belo Horizonte : Forum, 2015, p. 161.
189 Marcelo Figueiredo
L’idée de base est la suivante : la démocratie sociale stimule est une forme de développement humain. Celui-ci, selon le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD), est « l’augmentation des options pour que les gens puissent améliorer leur vie ». Selon Amartya Sem, le développement humain est un processus d’expansion des libertés réelles dont jouit un peuple. La plupart des constitutionnalistes latino-américains s’accordent pour dire que l’état de droit social et la démocratie sont des concepts indissociables. Tous deux exigent une participation politique concrète, une discussion publique des problèmes populaires et des politiques publiques, le respect de la Constitution et des droits fondamentaux de l’homme, une presse libre et d’investigation et une séparation effective des pouvoirs, chacun exerçant ses fonctions avec de façon indépendante et harmonique. Dans ce scénario, la juridiction constitutionnelle apparaît avec une importance remarquable. En fait, ce n’est pas un hasard le fait que les gouvernements autoritaires et non libéraux ne tolèrent pas l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire et tentent de l’affaiblir ou de le soumettre à leurs besoins totalitaires. Ce fut le cas à diverses époques de l’histoire de l’Amérique latine dans la plupart des pays de notre région, notamment de 1960 à 1980. Dans certains cas spécifiques, malheureusement, nous rencontrons encore ce phénomène aujourd’hui. Passons directement au thème de la judiciarisation en Amérique latine et du rôle réservé à la juridiction constitutionnelle. La judiciarisation des problèmes quotidiens en Amérique latine est une réalité indéniable, soit en raison de la structure même des constitutions (de compromis) de la région – analytiques10 et programmatiques – soit en raison de la crise de représentativité du pouvoir législatif dans les régimes présidentiels, ou de la grande ouverture d’espace pour que de nombreux problèmes puissent être soumis à la justice, soit en raison de la pression populaire et sociale pour que la justice résolve les problèmes de tous les jours. Le modèle triparti classique de séparation des pouvoirs a évolué à la recherche d’un équilibre souhaité entre les expressions traditionnelles du pouvoir politique. Traditionnellement, la division des pouvoirs attribuait des fonctions différentes à certains organes de l’État, puis, pour des raisons éminemment pratiques, une combinaison de deux pouvoirs était autorisée, mais toujours avec une prédominance d’un pouvoir sur l’autre.
10 Accusée depuis sa promulgation de contenir un très grand nombre d’articles, la constitution brésilienne n’est pas vaste par l’irresponsabilité de ses auteurs. Écrite après 20 ans de dictature militaire, il est compréhensible qu’elle ait été assez généreuse en matière de droits individuels et sociaux, dans la mesure où même un juge de la Cour suprême a déclaré que la Constitution « n’amène pas la personne bien aimée dans trois jours, à part ça, presque tout y est ».
190 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
De quelques décennies à ce jour, les organes du pouvoir qui remplissent les trois fonctions identifiées doivent donner des espaces de construction normative à d’autres organes. Quelques exemples peuvent clarifier notre pensée. La plupart des pays d’Amérique latine ont été influencés par le droit administratif français aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Par la suite, depuis les années 1980, nous avons incorporé le droit administratif américain et créé des organismes de réglementation. Ces agences ont généré un changement central dans la conception de la prise de décision et de l’autonomie politique. Le même phénomène a lieu avec les banques centrales, avec la réglementation de l’économie, de l’énergie, des télécommunications, etc. Il existe une nouvelle pluralité normative et un nouvel ensemble de forces qui transcende une conception classique de la séparation des pouvoirs. Cette situation se reflète dans la compétence de la juridiction constitutionnelle qui n’exerce plus seulement le rôle de « législateur négatif », mais aussi d’un organe de pouvoir qui crée également (constitue) le droit en quelque sorte, même sous le prétexte d’interpréter la Constitution, ses principes et ses valeurs. Aux côtés des instances dirigeantes et parlementaires traditionnelles, qui sont chargées d’exprimer les couches partisanes du peuple selon les critères de la majorité, s’est produite la nécessité d’institutionnaliser des organes « neutres » ou « arbitraux » au sein de l’État avec pour mission d’exprimer, de soigner, de promouvoir et défendre les valeurs fondatrices générales et permanentes du constitutionnalisme démocratique. Le premier modèle connu était la Cour suprême des États-Unis. De là, d’innombrables autres ont émergé avec des structures et des fonctions différentes11. Aujourd’hui, toutefois, outre le pouvoir judiciaire, de nouveaux organes constitutionnellement indépendants ont été investis de diverses fonctions « neutres », telles que conciergerie, supervision, promotion, défense et conseil, ainsi que d’autres fonctions spécifiques telles que les tribunaux ou la Cour des comptes, les procureurs, les médiateurs, les conseils des citoyens, avocats et défenseurs, banques centrales, conseils nationaux de la magistrature, etc. C’est peut-être pourquoi une partie de la doctrine constitutionnelle a affirmé que l’idée originale de Montesquieu s’était déjà perdue dans la poussière du temps. Le renommé professeur Bruce Ackerman12 affirme à juste titre qu’il existe aujourd’hui une « nouvelle séparation des pouvoirs ». Le progrès de l’activisme judiciaire n’est pas un phénomène exclusif en Amérique latine13. La Colombie, le Costa Rica, le Pérou et le Brésil sont de bons exemples de
11 Ramos, P. R. B., De Oliveira Júnior, J. F., « Características do ativismo judicial nos EUA e no Brasil », Revista de Informação Legislativa, Brasília, an 51, nº 204, oct.-déc. 2014. 12 Ackerman, B., « Adeus, Montesquieu », Revista de Direito Administrativo, nº 265, jan.-avr. FGV-RIO, Belo Horizonte : Fórum, 2014, p. 16. 13 Koerner, A., « Ativismo judicial como problema intelectual e político nos Estados Unidos : uma análise crítica », Revista Lua Nova, n° 99, p. 233.
191 Marcelo Figueiredo pays dans lesquels, de différentes manières, ils disposent de tribunaux plus ou moins activistes, comme c’est le cas en Afrique du Sud, en Inde et en Israël. La judiciarisation (au sens large) signifie que les questions d’un point de vue politique, moral ou social sont en dernière instance tranchées par le pouvoir judiciaire. Il y a maintenant indéniablement un transfert de pouvoir au pouvoir judiciaire et à ses tribunaux, au détriment des instances politiques traditionnelles, en particulier des pouvoirs exécutif et législatif14. D’autre part, l’activisme a de lourds adversaires. Ils apportent à juste titre des arguments importants contre cette pratique, notamment : a) l’activisme viole le principe démocratique et le gouvernement représentatif populaire ; b) le pouvoir judiciaire manque de capacité institutionnelle pour faire face à des problèmes techniques, politiques et sociaux complexes. Indépendamment de toute considération, en Amérique latine, le pouvoir exécutif est traditionnellement le plus puissant des pouvoirs, en particulier dans les pays qui adoptent le présidentialisme comme forme de gouvernement. D’autre part, le pouvoir législatif, dans le monde entier et, bien entendu, également en Amérique latine a diminué sa proéminence. Ce n’est pas généralement ce pouvoir qui trace les lignes de l’agenda politique, mais le pouvoir exécutif. Dans le même temps, les pouvoirs juridictionnels, notamment constitutionnels, ont été considérablement renforcés. Le contrôle juridictionnel a été renforcé en Amérique latine. Le pouvoir judiciaire peut être confronté non seulement à des actes inconstitutionnels émanant du pouvoir exécutif, mais également du pouvoir législatif, et même éventuellement du pouvoir judiciaire lui-même, par le biais d’un réexamen ou d’un recours. Les citoyens et diverses institutions, tels que les procureurs, les défenseurs et divers organes représentatifs de la société civile, tels que l’Ordre des avocats brésiliens (OAB), les associations nationales, les confédérations syndicales et les partis politiques peuvent déclencher le contrôle de constitutionnalité à large spectre15. Rappelons-nous également que, en tant qu’arène de débat politique, la Cour suprême fédérale était autorisée par la loi à admettre que des organisations de la société civile et d’autres groupes d’intérêts pouvaient faire intervenir des amici curiae16 dans des affaires mettant en cause des intérêts méta-individuels.
14 Crowe, J., Building the judiciary: law, courts and politics of institutional development, Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. 274. 15 Voir l’article 103 de la Constitution de la République fédérative du Brésil. 16 BRESIL. Loi nº 9.868/1999. Elle traite du processus et du jugement de l’action directe d’inconstitutionnalité et de l’action déclaratoire de constitutionnalité devant le Suprême tribunal fédéral. Voir le § 2 de l’art. 7, § 2 de la loi.
192 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
Nous mentionnons également une série d’actions et d’instruments procéduraux en faveur des citoyens, tels que l’action civile publique au Brésil, une sorte de recours collectif en défense de droits homogènes diffus, collectifs et individuels, l’action populaire et l’action de faute administrative. À son tour, l’exercice de ces actions et demandes finit par interférer avec les politiques publiques et sociales définies par l’exécutif17. Dans de nombreux cas, la décision finale de ces actions remet en question, annule ou nécessite le remplacement d’une politique publique déjà définie par le pouvoir exécutif par une politique différente de la précédente, en particulier lorsque les principes de cette même politique sont énoncés d’une manière ou d’une autre dans la Constitution fédérale. Au Brésil, cette position « activiste », ou si nous voulons, le respect de la Constitution se manifeste par des lignes de décision différentes. Parmi celles-ci figurent généralement : a) l’application directe de la Constitution dans des situations qui ne sont pas expressément prévues dans son texte ; b) la déclaration d’inconstitutionnalité d’actes normatifs émanant du législateur; c) l’imposition de comportements ou d’abstentions de la part du gouvernement, en cas d’inertie du législateur et en cas de politiques publiques inefficaces. Parmi les nombreux cas soumis au STF, nous soulignons les suivants : 1) dans l’action directe d’inconstitutionnalité (ADI) n° 4.048-1/2008, le STF a abstraitement contrôlé la constitutionnalité en ce qui concerne les lois budgétaires en les comprenant avec la force contraignante minimale pour imposer une obligation au pouvoir exécutif ; 2) Dans la demande d’extradition n° 1.085, le STF a annulé le refuge et a considéré qu’il s’agissait de crime commun et non pas de crime politique commis par le réfugié ; 3) dans le RMS 24.699/2004, le STF a obligé une municipalité de l’État de São Paulo à inscrire des enfants dans des crèches et des jardins d’enfants conformément aux dispositions de l’article 208, IV de la Constitution brésilienne ; 4) dans l’action directe d’inconstitutionnalité n° 4.650/2013 déposée par le Conseil fédéral de l’ordre des avocats brésilien (OAB), dans le but de déclarer l’inconstitutionnalité d’une partie de la loi électorale (loi n° 9.507/1997) et de la loi sur les partis politiques (loi n° 0996/1995), qui permettait le financement de campagnes politiques au moyen de ressources données par des personnes morales. Lors du procès, la Cour suprême a statué à la majorité et déclaré inconstitutionnelles les lois autorisant les contributions de personnes morales dans les campagnes électorales ;
17 Il est intéressant de noter que la constitution brésilienne, comme de nombreuses autres constitutions de la région, contient dans son texte 30,7 % de son total consacré aux politiques publiques. Ainsi, elle attire à elle la politique gouvernementale et la politique quotidienne, car ses dispositifs chevaucheront largement les questions qui font l’objet d’un différend politique entre les partis, entre le gouvernement et l’opposition et entre les divers groupes d’intérêts présents dans la société et dans l’état.
193 Marcelo Figueiredo
5) dans l’action de non-observation du précepte fondamental nº 45/2004 (ADPF), le juge rapporteur (ministre) a compris que l’intervention du pouvoir judiciaire dans les politiques publiques était légitime. Ce précédent est généralement invoqué dans des actions visant à fournir un traitement médical ou à garantir une éducation de base à la population ; 6) a été édité le précédent obligatoire nº 13/2008 interdisant l’embauche de membres de la famille, en ligne directe, collatérale ou par affinité, jusqu’au troisième degré, de l’autorité de nomination ; 7) Dans l’ADIN nº 3.999/2008, ont été déclarées constitutionnelles les décisions du Tribunal supérieur électoral régissant le processus et le jugement de perte de mandat parlementaire en cas de désaffiliation du parti ; 8) Dans la l’ADIN nº 4.277 et dans l’ADPF nº 132/2011, la Cour suprême a interprété conformément à l’article 1723 du Code civil et à l’article 226, paragraphe 3 de la Constitution, la reconnaissance de la même règle infra-constitutionnelle de l’union stable aux personnes de même sexe (mariage homosexuel) ; 9) Dans l’ADPF nº 54/2012 il a été autorisé l’interruption de grossesse chez le fœtus acéphale ; 10) Dans l’ADPF nº 442/2016, le STF a autorisé l’interruption volontaire au premier trimestre de la grossesse en donnant une interprétation conformément à la Constitution à la lumière des articles 124 à 126 du Code pénal brésilien qui caractérise le crime d’avortement. La Cour suprême a estimé que la criminalisation est incompatible avec les droits fondamentaux et les droits sexuels et reproductifs des femmes et que l’État ne peut pas les contraindre à maintenir une grossesse non désirée18 ;
18 L’autonomie des femmes, qui doivent conserver le droit de faire leurs choix existentiels ; l’intégrité physique et mentale de la femme enceinte qui souffre, dans son corps et dans son psychisme, les séquelles de la grossesse ; et l’égalité des femmes, puisque les hommes ne tombent pas enceints et que, par conséquent, la pleine égalisation des sexes dépend du respect de la volonté des femmes à cet égard. 5. A cela s’ajoute l’impact de la criminalisation sur les femmes pauvres. C’est parce que le traitement en tant que crime, prévu par le droit pénal brésilien, empêche ces femmes, qui n’ont pas accès à des médecins et des cliniques privées, d’utiliser le système de santé publique pour se soumettre aux procédures appropriées. En conséquence, le nombre d’automutilation, de blessures graves et de décès se multiplie. 6. La typification pénale enfreint également le principe de proportionnalité pour des raisons cumulatives : i) il s’agit d’une mesure d’adéquation douteuse visant à protéger le bien juridique qu’elle entend protéger (la vie de l’enfant à naître), car elle n’a pas d’incidence significative sur le nombre d’avortements dans le pays, seulement en empêchant de les en toute sécurité ; ii) il est possible pour l’État de prévenir l’avortement par des moyens plus efficaces et moins nocifs que la criminalisation, tels que l’éducation sexuelle, la distribution de contraceptifs et la protection des femmes qui souhaitent avoir leur enfant mais vivent dans des conditions défavorables ; iii) la mesure est disproportionnée au sens strict, car elle génère des coûts sociaux (problèmes de santé publique et décès) supérieurs à ses bénéfices. 7. Enfin, il convient de noter que pratiquement aucun pays développé et démocratique au monde ne traite de l’interruption de grossesse au cours du premier trimestre comme un crime, y compris
194 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
11) Dans l’ADI 3510/DF, la Cour suprême, statuant sur la constitutionnalité de la loi sur la bio-sécurité, a estimé que la recherche sur les cellules souches embryonnaires était constitutionnelle et qu’il n’y a pas de violation du droit à la vie19. L’accent mis sur le rôle délibératif des cours et tribunaux constitutionnels a donné lieu à d’importants débats en droit constitutionnel comparé. Au Brésil, ce n’est pas différent. La capacité de délibération de la Cour suprême a été continuellement critiquée par la doctrine brésilienne. Certains qualifient cet exercice de compétence constitutionnelle de « constitutionnalisme abusif »20.
les États-Unis, l’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, la France, l’Italie, l’Espagne, le Portugal, les Pays-Bas et l’Australie. 8. Octroi de l’ordonnance pour exclure l’arrestation préventive des patients, avec extension de la décision aux autres accusés. Décision après le vote du ministre Marco Aurélio, rapporteur, qui a rendu l’ordonnance d’habeas corpus, a demandé d’analyser le procès-verbal de l’affaire le président Luís Roberto Barroso, 1er panel, 09/08/2016. Décision : à la majorité des voix, le panel n’a pas pris acte de la pétition mais a donné l’ordre, d’office, conformément au vote du ministre Luís Roberto Barroso, président et rédacteur de l’arrêt, vaincu celui de Marco Aurélio, rapporteur, qui l’accordait (2016). 19 Les cas suivants sont également mentionnés : a) l’emprisonnement pour dettes (HC 87.585-TO), où la Cour suprême a révisé son ancienne jurisprudence sur la possibilité d’arrestation du dépositaire infidèle, autorisée par la loi brésilienne, mais interdite par le Pacte de San José du Costa Rica, dont le Brésil est également signataire, qui limite l’arrestation pour dette au non-respect inexcusable de la fourniture de la pension alimentaire. La thèse du statut supralégal mais infra-constitutionnel des traités a prévalu ; b) dans le RE 511.961-1-SP, il était jugé inutile de détenir un diplôme universitaire pour pouvoir exercer le journalisme ; c) dans l’arrêt de la démarcation de la terre autochtone Raposa Terra do Sol (PET 3388/2013), la Cour suprême a limité l’action du pouvoir exécutif en matière de démarcation des terres autochtones et a supplanté l’action de la législature qui ne pouvait approuver un nouveau point de repère des peuples indigènes au Brésil. 20 Dans ce sens, voir : Estorilio, R., Benvindo, J. Z., « O Supremo Tribunal Federal como agente do Constitucionalismo Abusivo », Cadernos Adenauer, XVIII, nº I, 2017. « Ces dernières années, avec la présence croissante de la Cour suprême dans la vie politique, il a été noté que la Cour, que ce soit dans ses décisions ou dans le discours de ses ministres, a renforcé sa position d’agent central du constitutionnalisme. Cette étape est importante pour que toute action de la juridiction constitutionnelle puisse disposer de l’autorité suffisante pour participer ultérieurement en tant qu’agent d’intérêt au processus de prise de décision ». À titre d’exemple, ils citent le MS (bref de mandamus) 32033-DF dans lequel le rapporteur, le ministre Gilmar Mendes, a déclaré inconstitutionnel le processus législatif traitant des règles des partis (PL 4470/2012), simplement parce que ce vote hâtif n’avait aucun sens. Pour lui, le fait que la Chambre des députés ait étrangement délibéré de façon rapide constituerait déjà une raison de suspendre le projet de loi. Dans la destitution de la présidente de l’époque, Dilma Rousseff, le STF avait adopté une attitude plus modérée, cherchant à se protéger contre le but de préserver le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs. Dans l’ADPF 402, le STF, dans une décision monocratique, avait accordé une injonction préliminaire fondée sur la prémisse qui ne pouvaient rester dans la ligne de succession de président de la République ceux accusés dans une procédure pénale devant la Cour elle-même. Les auteurs rappellent également le bref de mandamus 34.070/2016, qui avait prononcé une injonction afin d’empêcher l’investiture de l’ancien président de la République, Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (LULA), nommé pour occuper le poste de ministre de
195 Marcelo Figueiredo
En fait, depuis 30 ans21, en vertu de la Constitution de 1988, la Cour suprême a assumé un rôle très important et croissant dans son autorité. Il est difficile de trouver une question importante aux répercussions sociales considérables qui n’ait pas encore été portée à la connaissance de la Cour. Droits fondamentaux, représentation politique, délimitation des attributions des autres sphères de l’État, équilibre fédératif, questions fiscales, bref, tout au Brésil semble exiger un « dernier mot » de la Cour suprême. Oscar Vilhena Vieira22 note à juste titre que le STF est passé de législateur négatif à un pouvoir constituant réformateur. L’auteur soutient cette idée en fournissant des exemples concrets montrant que la Cour23 a fini par se considérer comme doué d’un pouvoir constituant réformateur, même si la modification de la Constitution n’a pas lieu par la modification explicite du texte de la Constitution. Il est difficile de juger si le phénomène signalé par Oscar Vilhena Vieira comme étant une suprémocratie est positif ou négatif. En fait, d’une part, l’État de droit démocratique et le constitutionnalisme lui-même se renforcent, de l’autre, c’est un symptôme de la fragilité du système représentatif face aux attentes qui lui sont imposées. Il semble également très difficile d’adopter simplement une théorie ou un courant comme solution à ce problème complexe. C’est le cas du « minimalisme » soutenu par Cass Robert Sustein24, A. Bickel, Lindquist et Cross, qui, à notre avis, sert de mise en garde doctrinale, mais ne peut pas être appliqué tout court en Amérique latine qui présente des défis différents de ceux de pays dotés de démocraties déjà établies.
la Maison Civile de Dilma Rousseff. Selon le rapporteur, l’affaire constituait un exemple typique d’abus de finalité administrative ayant entraîné la nullité de l’acte visant à obtenir le droit d’obtenir des prérogatives privilégiées de fonction lorsque l’ancien président avait été menacé par une enquête judiciaire. La décision, cependant, est entrée en conflit direct avec la jurisprudence consolidée de la Cour suprême fédérale. L’affaire n’a pas été portée à la délibération de la plénière de la Cour pour une délibération collégiale. La décision monocratique du ministre Gilmar Mendes, bien que provisoire, est devenue définitive sans le moindre consentement des autres ministres de la Cour, pour perte d’objet. (KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG. Disponible à : www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_ file?uuid=ff417ec1-eec2-f606-49 [Consulté le 20 juillet 2019]. 21 La constitution brésilienne de ces 30 dernières années contient déjà 105 amendements à son texte original. 22 Vieira, O. V., « Supremocracia », Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, juillet-décembre, 2008. 23 Il rappelle le cas de « loyauté envers un parti, MS 26.603/DF » et le cas de la plainte 4.335-5-Acre, concernant la constitutionnalité de la loi sur les crimes odieux. Dans le premier cas, la Cour suprême a approuvé la création d’une nouvelle catégorie de perte de mandats parlementaires, distincte des hypothèses énoncées à l’article 55 de la Constitution brésilienne. Dans le second cas, la Cour suprême a clairement indiqué que, dans le processus d’interprétation et d’application de la Constitution, son contenu, et éventuellement son libellé, pouvait changer. La Cour suprême a estimé qu’il y avait eu un « changement constitutionnel » en n’appliquant pas l’article 52, X de la Constitution brésilienne. Cette mutation a affecté, bien que de manière minime, la relation entre les pouvoirs, supprimant une compétence privée du Sénat fédéral et la transférant à la Cour suprême fédérale elle-même. 24 Sunstein, C., One case at a time: judicial minimalism on the Supreme Court, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
196 Le concept de démocratie tel que développé par la justice constitutionnelle
En conclusion de notre intervention, je rappelle que l’activisme au Brésil, et principalement en Amérique latine, représente ou peut également être identifié avec l’échec de l’État à répondre aux aspirations de sa population, tout en cherchant à atteindre les objectifs qui, au Brésil, ont été fixés par la Constitution de 1988. Peut-être pouvons-nous dire que l’activisme judiciaire positif serait caractérisé par les éléments suivants : a) Décision visant principalement à garantir les droits fondamentaux ; b) Décision orientée vers la garantie de la suprématie de la Constitution ; c) Décision prise à l’aide de techniques herméneutiques qui ne vont pas au-delà de la mens legis et ne dérogent pas la mens legislatoris de l’acte normatif en question. Il ne faut pas oublier pour autant qu’il est toujours possible de respecter la marge de liberté du législateur ou de maintenir une posture de retenue des tribunaux constitutionnels. Les minorités politiques ou les groupes vulnérables doivent également être protégés par la Cour, la Cour suprême ou un conseil constitutionnel. Enfin, il convient de rappeler une fois de plus que la plupart des pays d’Amérique latine connaissent une forte inégalité sociale et la marginalisation de larges couches de la population, par le manque de représentativité des partis politiques, par la violation systématique des droits de l’homme et par les risques évidents que de tels conflits peuvent – si non résolus – se transformer en plus de violence (caractéristique de la région). Nous pensons que, d’une manière générale, nous pouvons définir comme l’une des attributions du pouvoir judiciaire celle d’appliquer immédiatement les normes qui définissent les conditions pour le bon fonctionnement de la vie démocratique dans n’importe quel pays. Il n’est pas facile d’étalonner les performances des pouvoirs (judiciaire, exécutif et législatif). Mais il faut reconnaître que le droit comparé donne des exemples importants à ne pas négliger25.
25 David Landau enseigne : « En Colombie, par exemple, la décision de la cour en matière de mariage gay a donné au Congrès deux ans pour légiférer sur la question afin de résoudre le « déficit de protection » identifié par la cour. Si l’État n’agissait pas dans ce délai, les couples seraient automatiquement autorisés à faire appel à des notaires pour formaliser leur mariage. Des études menées en droit administratif américain ont montré que ce type d’incitation à une action administrative (généralement imposée par le Congrès et non par les tribunaux) est très efficace, en particulier si la règle par défaut est généralement indésirable. Cette approche est empiriquement beaucoup plus efficace que celle qui ordonne simplement à l’agence d’agir sur une question donnée dans un délai déterminé ; les délais sont systématiquement ignorés sauf s’ils sont associés à des règles par défaut. L’avantage de ces règles par défaut est que si elles sont bien exécutées, elles ne devraient pas exiger que les tribunaux aient le dernier mot dans l’élaboration des politiques. Les tribunaux peuvent définir une règle simple et brillante dans un domaine donné, tel que le Congrès ou que les agences administratives n’agissent pas sur les droits des patients cancéreux avant la date X. Tous les patients peuvent commencer à recevoir des prestations à cette date. Si la règle est acceptable, elle sera adoptée sans changement. Mais s’il est trop inclusif ou trop coûteux, le législateur ou l’organisme
197 Marcelo Figueiredo
Accepter l’inconstitutionnalité de la loi, donner au législateur un délai raisonnable pour réviser la norme, discuter du problème avec les différents segments de la société lors d’audiences publiques et impliquer davantage les acteurs sociaux semble être une réponse qui rapproche le pouvoir judiciaire de ceux qu’il devrait protéger sans offrir frictions indésirables à la conception moderne des checks and balances. Enfin, nous devons promouvoir une culture juridique guidée par le contrôle des conventions, en accordant la priorité et en reconnaissant l’importance des normes découlant du droit international des droits de l’homme dans l’ensemble de l’Amérique latine. En outre, le contrôle des conventions contribuera à la mise en œuvre dans le domaine national des normes, principes, la normativité et de la jurisprudence internationale dans le domaine des droits de l’homme, en renforçant la crédibilité des tribunaux et des cours suprêmes de la région.
peut la modifier en élaborant un nouveau plan. Par conséquent, les tribunaux qui appliquent ce type de recours devraient viser une application excessive plutôt qu’une application insuffisante. En effet, une solution claire et peu attrayante faite par un juge peut être le meilleur encouragement pour une action législative ». (Landau, D., « Improving remedies for social rights », Document préparé pour la Table ronde de Rio sur les droits sociaux, IACL-IACL-ABCD, avril 2013).
198 Selvete Gërxhaliu Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases
DEMOCRACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND ITS MAINSTREAMING IN COURT CASES
Selvete Gërxhaliu1 Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo Mr.Sc. PhD candidate, Institute of International Law and International Relations of Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
INTRODUCTION The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo (the Constitutional Court), since its establishment in 2009, has played a pivotal role in the development, safeguarding and consolidation of democratic values, which provide for the foundation of the constitutional order of the country. The Constitutional Court – as an independent organ in protecting the constitutionality and as the final interpreter of the Constitution – has given a justiciable character to the concept of democracy, as a socio-political value and core constitutional principle. In mainstreaming the concept of democracy through constitutional review, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court itself is of paramount relevance. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court includes the judicial review of the compatibility with the Constitution of the Government’s decisions; laws adopted by the Assembly; the constitutional review of decrees of the President and the Prime Minister, as well as the review of regulations of the Government.2 Advancing the established system for the protection of individual rights is a core value in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. In the context of the protection of individual rights, the number of cases referred by all community groups and their access to the Constitutional Court is of paramount importance.3 Generally, in constitutional democracies, constitutional courts are established in order to support the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes, being devised as a last resort mechanism to protect both human rights and the integrity of constitutions.4 Constitutional courts, through the jurisdiction entrusted to them, have had direct impact on the consolidation of newly established democracies around the world. The case of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo exemplifies this. The practice of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo so far has had direct impact upon the consolidation of democracy and other values.
1 The views expressed here are given from the personal academic point of view and not in the official judicial capacity. 2 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 113. 3 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter II and Chapter III. 4 Ginsburg, T., Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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Soon after its establishment, the Constitutional Court faced a period when it had to adjudicate and develop the constitutional identity of the Republic of Kosovo by ruling on important cases. The paper analyses the case law of the Constitutional Court that focuses on: analyses of the element of democracy enshrined as a value in the Constitution of Kosovo, in order to demonstrate the primary importance given to the principle of democracy by the Constitution of Kosovo, in the structural aspect of the state organisation and in respect of individual rights; second, the analyses will focus on establishing the constitutional justice concept in Kosovo, through explaining the role of the Constitutional Court in establishing a new constitutional order in the independent country, considering the overall transfer of competences from international to domestic authorities after the Declaration of Independence (2008); third, the analyses will turn to the discussion of the role of the constitutional justice as a tool for securing the separation of powers; and fourth, in a separate section, the practice developed by Constitutional Court in relation to ‘constitutional questions’ referrals, as well as the shifting of the constitutional practice in analysing the ‘constitutional questions’ due to the ‘maturity of the state institutions’, will be presented. The paper concludes with the findings on the proactive role that the Constitutional Court has played in enhancing democracy and constitutional values through its case law and the Court’ practice.
I. DEMOCRACY AS A VALUE OF THE KOSOVO CONSTITUTION The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo has enacted decisions that enable mainstreaming of democracy as a value through constitutional justice. In mainstreaming and safeguarding the value of democracy through constitutional justice, the text of the Constitution is the basic norm, which serves as a benchmark position for the Kosovo Constitutional Court’s interpretation. As such, in developing the constitutional justice concept, the text of the Constitution has a substantive role and is decisive for further constitutional interpretation.5 In the text of the Kosovo Constitution, the values of the constitutional order are embodied into basic provisions.6 Democracy as a value is a noble norm, explicitly enshrined within general principles, which underlines that: ‘the constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo is based on the principles of freedom, peace, democracy, equality, respect for human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, non-discrimination, the right to
5 Rainer, A., ‘The Evolution of the German Grundgesetz through Constitutional Jurisprudence – Some Aspects’, in Rainer, A., Rytel-Warzocha, A., and Szmyt, A. (eds.), Development of Constitutional Law through Constitutional Justice: Landmark Decisions and Their Impact on Constitutional Culture, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2019, p. 11. 6 See the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter I, Basic Provisions.
200 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases property, the protection of environment, social justice, pluralism, separation of state powers, and a market economy’.7 The constitutional provisions have a far-reaching hand affecting diverse areas. Therefore, the values of the Constitution – including the concept of democracy – and the role of the Court in furthering the mainstream of the concept of democracy as a value, through its case law, are crucial. The Court is an institutional authority to interpret the value of democracy, which enables the application of the concept of democracy through constitutional justice. The concept of democracy is not an abstract one. Through constitutional justice, such a concept as a value is interpreted and applied in conjunction with the operative part of the text of the Constitution.8 Furthermore, the norm that enshrines democracy as a value is embodied and coexists alongside other constitutional values such as the separation of powers, non-discrimination, the protection of the environment and respect for social justice. As added value in the text of the Constitution, it promotes respect for gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of society. The Court has to use its interpretation to enhance the equal opportunities for both women and men in participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and other areas of societal life, which is an advantage of democracy values, in which both men and women can help to increase the quality of democratic governance.9 As noted by Rosas and Armati, it is important to understand that the concept of democracy, as developed by constitutional justice, includes not only representative and participatory elements, but also substantive elements, such as respect for the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of minorities.10 The value of democracy as a concept developed by constitutional justice through case law has its impact on the proper functioning of the elected institutions, namely the legislative and executive, as well as the judicial branch. To develop further constitutional justice, constitutional courts must assess the value of democracy, which has to be considered in parallel with the value of the rule of law principles. It is in the hands of the elected authorities, mainly the legislative, to adopt laws, through which the concept of democracy can be affected in two ways, in furthering the quality of governance and the rule of law system or in a backsliding manner.11 However, it is in the competence of the Constitutional Court to set the constitutional parameters
7 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 7(1). 8 Bogdandy, A. von and Spieker, L. D., ‘Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges’, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 391–426. 9 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 7(2). 10 Rosas, A. and Armati, L., EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, p. 129. 11 For more, see the EU Rule of Law Framework, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final, Brussels, 11 March 2014.
201 Selvete Gërxhaliu by defining the role of the supremacy of constitutional norms, based on which the democratic and institutional system is founded and is functioning in our country, which finally has to be respected by the elected authorities. By setting constitutional parameters, the constitutional justice serves as a demarcation tool, which can remedy the situation against constitutional anarchy. Broadly conceived, democracy based on the concept of constitutional justice is a rule-based and institutionalist approach to the issue of political power.12 Constitutional justice is a tool, which can maintain the concept of democracy and contributes to refraining from constitutional populism.13 In mainstreaming the concept of democracy, the Court has to reaffirm the superiority of the constitutional norm, and, when a matter is prescribed by the Constitution, it cannot be amended, undermined or transformed through an act placed lower within the legal order’s hierarchy. Based on the supremacy of the constitutional norm, all other legal acts should be in compliance with it.14 Through judgments, constitutional courts have to be active constitutional justice actors to maintain and promote ‘a stable institutional structure that realises the liberty and equality of citizens through correct functioning of its institutions and mechanism’.15
I.1. THE VALUE OF DEMOCRACY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS In developing the concept of constitutional justice, establishing an effective system of the protection of individual rights is central to the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. In promoting individual rights, the application of the standards as developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)16 is of crucial importance. The values enshrined in the Constitution are not just a solemn proclamation; in reality, they are substantive rights, which have an impact on fundamental rights.17 The text of the values foreseen in Article 7(1) of the Kosovo Constitution is the same
12 Kinna, R., Prichard, A., and Swann, T., ‘Occupy and the Constitution of Anarchy’, Global Constitutionalism, Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2019, pp. 357–390. 13 Pech, L. and Kochenov, D., Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: Diagnoses, Recommendations, and What to Avoid, 2019, p. 1. ‘Rule of law backsliding’ means ‘the process through which elected public authorities deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party’. 14 The judgment of the Kosovo Constitutional Court in case No K043/19, 27 June 2019, para. 69. 15 Morlino, L., ‘What is a “Good” Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis’, p. 4. 16 The values stipulated in the Treaty are recognised in the preamble to the ChFR of the EU, thus forming part of the very foundations of the European Union’s legal order. For more, see the CJEU, the judgment of 10 December 2018, case C621/18, para. 62. Also see the CJEU, the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C402/05 P and C415/05 P, paras. 303 and 304. 17 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible next steps, COM (2019) 163 final, Brussels, 3 April 2019, p. 1.
202 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases text foreseen in Article 2 of the European Union Treaty.18 The Constitutional Court of Kosovo should refer to the practice developed by the CJEU and be able to follow this very important practice. In my view, our legal order is very much open to absorbing new principles and values as enshrined by the EU legal system and the practice established by the CJEU.19 It is in the interest of the Kosovo judicial order when the Court is using the practice developed by the CJEU, which enriches the interpretation of human rights and fundamental freedoms as democratic values. On the other hand, although Kosovo is not a member of the Council of Europe, based on the explicit norm of the Constitution,20 the Court must interpret human rights and fundamental freedoms consistently with the decisions of the ECtHR. In the context of the protection of individual rights, the access of all individuals to and the trust of community groups21 in the Constitutional Court are of paramount importance. In addressing individual rights through constitutional justice, special consideration has to be taken in providing equal treatment for all citizens regardless of their ethnic, gender or other status, such as belonging to the LGBT community. The role of constitutional justice in the protection of the individual is an outright duty and vividly, in a democratic system, the Constitutional Court has to be equally available to all citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religion. In this regard, the commitment of mainstreaming the concept of the democracy as a value has to be considered as the Courts’ institutional goal, regardless of the challenges that the Constitutional Courts themselves may face. From the social point of view, the democratic concept developed by the Courts helps to ensure that all individuals share benefits of the values of democracy based on market economy, the rule of law and participation in democratic processes.22 The concept of democracy has to be developed as an ideal of the Constitutional Courts.23 In order to ensure the functionality of the institutions and the protection of individual rights of the Republic of Kosovo in accordance with the Constitution, the Court, first, had to establish and maintain itself as an independent institution. By establishing and maintaining its independent position, the Court has ensured,
18 The European Union Treaty, Art. 2. Noteworthy, there is one exception: the separation of power as a value is not included in Article 2 of the TEU; in Article 7 of the Kosovo Constitution, the separation of power is included as a value. 19 Furthermore, the Republic of Kosovo signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, October 2015. 20 Art. 53 ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions’: ‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with the court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.’ 21 The statistics of the Constitutional Court of Republic of Kosovo – September 2019; cases brought by community groups make 11.5 per cent. 22 Tunheim, J., ‘Rule of Law and the Kosovo Constitution’, Minn. J. Int’l L., Vol. 18, 2009, p. 371. 23 Halmai, G., ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution’, Constellations, Vol. 19, No 2, 2012, p. 199.
203 Selvete Gërxhaliu by its decisions, the functionality of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo in accordance with the Constitution and has protected the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
II. ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE CONCEPT IN KOSOVO To explain the role of the Constitutional Court in Kosovo in establishing a new constitutional order in the independent country, it is important to elaborate on the transfer of powers from the UN Mission (UNMIK)24 to Kosovo institutions after the Declaration of Independence.25 The transfer of legal powers from UNMIK to Kosovo institutions was a period characterised by rapid changes in the legal framework. The process of transfer of legal powers from international administration to local ownership makes the process very exceptional, because of the limited time of validity of transitional rules.26 In Kosovo’s case, the Regulations adopted by the Head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), acting under UNSC Resolution 1244, were valid from June 1999. After the adoption of the Constitution, as to the hierarchy of norms, following the Declaration of Independence, it was determined in the Constitution that the provisional supremacy of the Ahtisaari Plan27 would prevail.28 The newly adopted Constitution entered into force on 15 June 2008. The Court became operational in September 2009. Initially, the Court operated under supervised independence.29 During the transition period, responsibilities in the rule of law area were transferred from one international mission (UNMIK) to another international mission, namely the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, known as EULEX. Operating under supervised independence, the Court had to interpret constitutional values, such as the rule of law and democracy, based on its obligation to uphold the supremacy of constitutional norms, as well as to introduce and enforce the implementation of laws adopted by the Kosovo Assembly by all actors, including 24 United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, established by UN Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999. 25 The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo of 17 February 2008. 26 Abat i Ninet, A., ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Egypt’s Failed Transition to Democracy’, in Scheinin, M., Krunke, H., et al. (eds.), Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, pp. 201–224. 27 Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 2 February 2007, http://www.kosovocompromise.com/2008/pdf/Ahtisaaris-Proposal-full-version.pdf. 28 Hasani, E., ‘Internationalised Constituent Power: The Case of the Special Court for Kosovo’, in Rainer, A., Rytel-Warzocha, A., and Szmyt, A. (eds.), Development of Constitutional Law through Constitutional Justice: Landmark Decisions and Their Impact on Constitutional Culture, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2019, pp. 181–213. 29 The mandate of the International Civilian Office (ICO) was to supervise conditional independence of the Republic of Kosovo. The ICO had a very important role in setting up new institutions, including the Constitutional Court.
204 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases the international mission on rule of law.30 At the outset, the Court, through its case law (KI25/10), managed to shape the constitutional order in two core respects. First, the Court employed the concept of democracy, reiterating the duties of the public authorities to apply laws adopted in a democratic and pluralistic process.31 The judgment laid down the important concept of constitutional justice in deciding which basic norm/law has to be applied in Kosovo, following the Declaration of Independence.32 The Court held that ‘the legislation applicable on the date of the entry into force of this Constitution includes UNMIK Regulations and Administrative Decisions issued by the SRSG before 15 June 2008. In accordance with Article 145, such Regulations and Administrative Instructions as well as other legislation will only continue to apply to the extent they are in conformity with the Constitution until repealed, superseded or amended in accordance with the Constitution.’33 The second component of the concept of constitutional justice employed in the judgment (KI25/10) of the Court set forth the obligations of the regular courts, including the obligation of the Supreme Court and its Special Chambers (in this case composed of EULEX judges),34 to ensure the uniform application of laws in the judicial system. The Court reiterated that ‘The Supreme Court shall ensure the uniform application of the law by deciding on appeals brought in accordance with the law …, therefore … the Special Chamber, as integral part of the Supreme Court, is obliged to abide by this provision.’35 It is noteworthy to mention that the EULEX mission in Kosovo was neutral regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence; in turn, it made EULEX judges and prosecutors36 hesitate to apply laws adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. By being neutral to the status of independence-Kosovo statehood,
30 The Kosovo Constitutional Court, the judgment in case No KI25/10, 31 March 2011. 31 This element employed by the Court is foreseen in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible next steps, COM (2019) 163 final, Brussels, 3 April 2019, p. 1. 32 The Court had to refer to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 22 July 2010, according to which the adoption of the Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) or the Constitutional Framework. See judgment KI25/10, para. 54. 33 The judgment in case KI25/10; it follows that UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, as amended, which was repealed by Article 31 ‘Applicable Law’ of Law No 03/L-067 on the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo of 21 May 2008, reading ‘UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, as amended, will cease to have legal effect on the date the present law enters into force’, is no longer applicable. Therefore, the relevant UNMIK Regulations and Administrative Instructions only continue to be applicable as long as they are in conformity with Law No 03/L-067, judgment KI25/10, paras. 58 and 59. 34 From 1999, the rule of law was under UN mission in Kosovo; from 2008, it was transferred to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. From 2018, the EULEX mission has a monitoring role. 35 Judgment KI25/10, para. 57. 36 For more, see Law No 03/L-053, adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo, on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, 13 March 2008.
205 Selvete Gërxhaliu the EULEX mission continued to apply UNMIK Regulations, ignoring laws adopted by the Kosovo Assembly based on the newly adopted Constitution. In shaping the legal order, the judgment (KI25/10) of the Court determined which laws are applicable in Kosovo and, consequently, the same laws have to be applied even by EULEX judges and prosecutors. The Court established a constitutional practice that reiterated who the legislative authority is. The legislative authority in the Republic of Kosovo is the Assembly – and it has full power to adopt laws. Laws adopted by the Assembly bind all public authorities, including representatives of the EULEX mission in Kosovo37 when they are exercising executive competencies within the Kosovo legal order. In developing the constitutional order, the judgment of the Court has played a crucial role and, to some extent, the judgment (KI25/10) can be considered of equal importance to UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, which had defined what laws were applicable in Kosovo after the deployment of the UN Mission in Kosovo in 1999.38 Worthy of mention, the judgment is important in the context of the constitutional justice, because, during the transition period, the Court had to remedy the situation when the basic principle of state sovereignty, such as the recognition and application of laws adopted by the democratically elected legislative, was called into question. In central paragraphs of the judgment (KI25/10), the Court underlined that, ‘In these circumstances, the Court can only draw the conclusion that the Appellate Panel of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo does not recognise and apply the laws lawfully adopted by the Assembly. In fact, the Special Chamber simply continues to ignore the existence of Kosovo as an independent State and its legislation emanating from its Assembly.’39 To sum up, in a very dynamic process of change in the legal order, the role of constitutional justice is to maintain and safeguard the mechanisms and institutions established in a democratic process and to safeguard the rule of law system as a value of democracy.40 The Court interpreted which basic norm should be applied in the Republic of Kosovo, namely the laws adopted in a democratic process and from a democratically elected institution – the Assembly of Kosovo. The Court did not tolerate situations of legal uncertainty, which affect the integrity, stability or the proper functioning of the institutions foreseen by law and the Constitution. In this respect, the decision of the Court requires the recognition of the identity of the 37 The EULEX judges continued to apply UNMIK regulations. The legal status of the EULEX judges in the Special Chamber is regulated by the law adopted by the Kosovo Assembly and effectively has to be applied by all judges and all courts; for more, see judgment KI25/10 of the Court, para. 62. 38 See UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, Section 1, para. 1.1: (a) the regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and (b) the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989. 39 For more, see judgment KI25/10, para. 53. 40 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final, Brussels, 11 March 2014.
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Kosovo constitutional order from all actors, including international actors present in Kosovo. The Court, through its case law, developed Kosovo’s constitutional identity,41 in the same line with the internationally recognised principles.42 For new independent states, the demarcation of the legal framework, when the independent state has full power to apply its own laws, adopted by a democratically elected legislative, is crucial. It is the duty of constitutional courts to mainstream the concept of democracy, even at an infant stage of the development of state institutions, such as Kosovo’s case.
III. THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AS DEVELOPED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
III.1. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AS A TOOL FOR SECURING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS It has to be noted that, during the UN administration in Kosovo, the separation of powers and checks and balances, in the classical sense of meaning, were almost non-existing. The UNMIK – as a UN-administration mission – controlled all three branches of governance. The SRSG was vested with unlimited powers to act as a final authority over all branches of governance. The Head of UNMIK adopted Regulations as primary laws.43 The judicial applicability of the concept of democracy in the Republic of Kosovo in the post-independence era is mostly expressed in the separation of powers and checks and balances between the classical pillars of governance. It was the duty of the Court to develop the concept of democracy alongside the separation of state powers and the form of governance as values of democracy. An additional challenge represented the fact that democracy as a value and constitutional justice were something relatively new in Kosovo. The separation of powers as a democratic concept is foreseen in the Constitution, within the general principles, as a norm – on the form of governance and the separation of powers.44 In addition, the principle of the separation of powers is included as a democratic element within the values of the Kosovo constitutional order.45 In this context, the Court pays special attention to the separation of powers as
41 For more on constitutional identity, see Treaty of European Union, Art. 4(2). Furthermore, see the judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009. 42 Cuyvers, A., ‘General Principles of EU Law’, DOI.101163/9789004322073_13, 2017, p. 1. 43 The SRSG is the Head of UNMIK, the executive authority in Kosovo. For more, see UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). 44 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 4. 45 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 7.
207 Selvete Gërxhaliu a governing principle and to the elements of constitutional values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which provide the ground for the value-oriented interpretation46 by the Court. In employing democracy through the constitutional justice concept, it is the constitutional obligation of the Court to clarify and maintain the constitutional position of all institutions, as established by the Constitution. The constitutional safeguards have to be respected regardless of whether such institutions are foreseen within the classical separation of powers (legislative, executive, judiciary), or as independent institutions based on the specific norm of the Constitution. As such, the institutions foreseen by the Constitution must exercise their function autonomously and independently, based on their constitutional mandate.47 The principle of safeguarding the constitutional position of independent institutions is relevant for democratic society. The role of independent institutions such as the Ombudsperson, the Central Election Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Central Bank of Kosovo and the Auditor-General are to upgrade the democratic culture within the constitutional order, as well as to enhance the quality of governance within Kosovo society. Overall, the Constitution defines Kosovo as a democratic Republic.48 The institutions foreseen within the conventional form of governance have to be involved in the interaction of the separation, control and balance of powers. The interaction between the institutions mainly (legislative, executive and judiciary) increases communication and dialog among institutions themselves. Apart from fulfilling operational duties as mandated by the Constitution, the open communication between institutions is a precondition for the development of an institutional democratic culture.49 Within institutional interaction, democracy as a value is placed as a basic provision of the Constitution and is a crosscutting element to be mainstreamed in the case law of the Court. Democracy as a constitutional value is assessed in conjunction with other articles of the Constitution, especially with the separation of powers, the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. 46 Bogdandy, A. von and Spieker, L. D., ‘Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges’, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2019, pp. 391–426. 47 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter XII. 48 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, see Art. 2 and Art. 4. The democratic representation stems from the people. The Assembly manifests the form of governance as representative democracy, which is entrusted to exercise the legislative power; the executive is responsible for implementation of laws and state policies and is subject to parliamentarian control; and judicial power is unique and independent and is exercised by courts. 49 See the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, adopted at the 108th Plenary Session, Venice, 14–15 October 2016; the Council Recommendation of 13 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Convergence Programme of Poland, COM 835 final 2017/0360, Brussels, 20 December 2017 (NLE), paras. 94–95.
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III.2. SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE FORM OF GOVERNANCE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS Apart from the three branches of government, within the separation of powers and form of governance norm, the position of the President of the Republic and the position of the Constitutional Court is very relevant.50 Normally, both institutions are situated outside of the three conventional branches of government (legislative, executive and judiciary). The President’s position represents the unity of the people and is the guarantor of the democratic functioning of the institutions.51 Moreover, the obligation of the President to guarantee the constitutional functioning of the institutions is foreseen under specific obligations of the President (Chapter V).52 However, the President is subject to constitutional control and she or he is unable to exercise the responsibilities if the Constitutional Court has determined that she or he has committed a serious violation of the Constitution.53 The Constitutional Court has its own position within Article 4 of the Constitution; the position of the Court must be respected by the governing authorities. The effectiveness of the Court’s rulings requires that the executive, legislative and ordinary judiciary acknowledge the value of the Court’s judgments.54 The Court is the only institution vested with power for the constitutional review of the compatibility with the Constitution of normative acts issued by the Government and laws adopted by the Assembly, of decrees of the President or the Prime Minister and of regulations of the Government.55 In addition, the Court is placed outside of the ordinary judiciary and is vested with the authority to review individual complaints for violations of human rights.56 As a rule, for all constitutional courts, the acknowledgement of their judgments by other authorities is very important. It has to be pointed out that, in Kosovo, there is no legal possibility to obstruct the publication of the decisions of the Court in the Official Gazette. The publication of the judgments of the Court in the Official Gazette does not depend on the actions of any other state agency. The decision is sent to each party ex officio and is published in the Official Gazette;57 the decisions of the Court are effective immediately.58 50 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 4(7). 51 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 4(3). 52 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 84(2). 53 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 91(1). 54 For more, see Bassok, O., ‘The Changing Understanding of Judicial Legitimacy’, in Scheinin, M., Krunke, H., and Aksenova, M., (eds.), Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p. 53. 55 For more, see the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 113. 56 For more, see the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapters II and III. 57 Decisions are published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Art. 20(4) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. 58 For more, see the judgment in case KO58/19 of 13 August 2019, point V.
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This component of the full power of the judgments of the Court obtains another dimension when considering what impact on enforcing constitutional justice, the obstruction of the executive can have when refusing to publish the judgments of the Constitutional Courts in the Official Gazette.59 The development of the concept of constitutional justice can serve as a tool in maintaining the position of the Court itself, within the institutional layer, in order to enable the enforcement of its decisions as the final authority to interpret the Constitution. In light of the ‘contemporary’ anarchy of constitutional values,60 the practice of some countries shows how constitutional justice and the independence of the judiciary can be affected when elected authorities are not respecting the separation of powers and the democracy value. The proper definition and functioning of the separation of powers as a democracy value, protects the constitutional order from backsliding of the rule of law and democracy in general.61 Furthermore, the concept of democracy as developed by constitutional justice has to fulfil the conditions of normative and societal legitimacy. From the normative and societal legitimacy components, the constitutional accountability and checks and balances of institutions come on the scene as democratic elements.62
III.3. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES IN THE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO
III.3.1. The mandate of constitutional institutions vis-à-vis bodies that may be established by law The Court has rendered decisions that annulled laws or parts of laws, as well as various decisions were declared unconstitutional, when adjudicating on the separation of powers and the value of democracy. In case KO43/19, the Court had to interpret the separation of powers, as a matter of general principles and as a value of democracy, in relation to the concrete competence of the executive and legislative vis-à-vis ‘the state delegation’ established by the contested Law. The challenged Law established the ‘state delegation’ and, in its scope, foresaw the institutional hierarchy and decision-making procedures in the process of dialogue with the Republic of
59 For more, see the Council Recommendation of 13 July 2017 on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Poland and delivering a Council opinion on the 2017 Convergence Programme of Poland, COM 835 final 2017/0360, Brussels, 20 December 2017 (NLE), paras. 94–95. 60 Kinna, R., Prichard, A., and Swann, T., footnote 12, p. 360. 61 ‘Poland: Free Courts, Free People, Judges Standing for Their Independence’, Amnesty International, 2019, p. 9. 62 Bassok, O., footnote 54.
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Serbia.63 Furthermore, the challenged Law governed the functioning of the ‘state delegation’ of the Republic of Kosovo for the dialogue with the Republic of Serbia, and it provided for the organisational structure, activities, competencies and responsibilities of the state delegation.64 Out of three main allegations of the applicants, two were related to the separation of powers and respect for the democracy value: ‘(i) determining and changing the institutional constitutional and decision-making hierarchy in the dialogue with Serbia; (ii) the legal competences of the state delegation directly interfere with the constitutional competences of the executive and legislative powers’. In relation to the first allegation raised by the applicants, namely that ‘the establishment of the state delegation is changing the institutional constitutional and decision-making hierarchy in the dialogue with Serbia’, the Court found that ‘the State Delegation, which was established by the challenged Law, is not foreseen by the Constitution, and is not foreseen within the form of government and separation of power. As such, the state delegation cannot be involved in the interaction of separation, control and balance of powers and cannot interfere in the form of governance, namely the structure of separation of power, as defined by Article 4 of the Constitution.’65 Furthermore, the transfer of competences to the state delegation as a ‘special mechanism’ represents interference in the form of governance and the separation of powers and is not in compliance with the democratic values and the rule of law, as set forth in Article 7 of the Constitution, because it vests in the state delegation the functions which do not comply with constitutional norms.66 In relation to the second allegation ‘that the legal competences of the state delegation directly interfere with the constitutional competences of the executive and legislative powers’, the Court, regarding the external representation of the Republic of Kosovo, emphasised the obligation of the institutions concerned to exercise their competences in foreign policy within their constitutional mandate. In essence, any negotiation or another action related to the conclusion of international agreements on behalf of the Republic of Kosovo must be within the constitutional obligations of the Assembly,67 the President and the Government.68 In addition, the Court found that the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo is obliged to oversee the foreign policy
63 The Constitutional Court, the judgment in case No KO43/19, constitutional review of Law No 06/L-145 on the Duties, Responsibilities and Competences of the State Delegation of the Republic of Kosovo in the Dialogue Process with Serbia, http://gjk-ks.org/en/decision/ vleresim-i-kushtetutshmerise-se-ligjit-nr-06-l-145-per-detyrat-pergjegjesite-dhe-kompetencat-e- delegacionit-shteteror-te-republikes-se-kosoves-ne-procesin-e-dialogut-me-serbine/. 64 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 57. 65 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 75. 66 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 80. 67 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 18(1). 68 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 93(1) and Art. 94(1) and (9); see the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 89.
211 Selvete Gërxhaliu within the constitutional competences foreseen under the Constitution. The ‘state delegation’ established by the contested Law could not be subject to parliamentary control and oversight as foreseen by the Constitution. The institutions competent in the sphere of foreign affairs, namely the Government/Prime Minister and the President, are obliged to act in inter-institutional consultation between them. However, this obligation of coordination/consultation does not extend to other bodies, which are not foreseen by the Constitution, such as the proposed ‘state delegation’.69 By adopting the contested Law, the Assembly acted ultra vires when it mandated a body that is not foreseen by the Constitution, namely a ‘state delegation’, to reach a final agreement with Serbia. Through the contested Law, the constitutional competencies of the executive and the legislative itself were ‘partly suspended’ and/or transferred to the ‘state delegation’. In the Constitution, the possibility is not foreseen for the constitutional competencies of the executive and legislative to be ‘subcontracted’ or delegated to whatever other body created by law. The mandate of the constitutional institutions cannot be transferred to the state delegation, through a lower legal act such as the challenged Law.70 In line with the concept of democracy, the Court found a combined violation of core elements of constitutional justice. Constitutional justice requires respect for the duties and responsibilities of institutions mandated within the form of government and the separation of powers, values and competencies of the Assembly, competencies of the Government and competencies of the Prime Minister.71 The Court found that essential articles of the challenged Law were not in compliance with the Constitution; consequently, the Law in its entirety is declared incompatible with the Constitution. In terms of constitutional justice, the democratically elected institutions should lead the negotiation process or any other action related to the conclusion of international agreements on behalf of the Republic of Kosovo.
III.3.2. Constitutional safeguards for independent institutions The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo provides the separate chapter on independent institutions. In relation to the constitutional safeguards, the Court has developed several important principles, which take into account the position of independent institutions and their role in the development of constitutional democracy. Through its case law, the Court has developed the practice on the constitutional position of the independent institutions enumerated in Chapter XII of the Constitution. The position of the Constitutional Court is defined in the separate Chapter VIII,72 which provides a clear independent position for the Court.
69 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 102. 70 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 88. 71 See the judgment in case KO43/19, para. 107. 72 For more, see the Kosovo Constitution, Chapter VIII.
212 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases
As such, the Court recognises the democracy concept promoted in constitutional comparative law forums, in relation to the principle of the separation of powers, checks and balances, which does not exclude the existence of several public institutions apart from the three conventional branches of governance power.73 The position of public institutions vested with a constitutional mandate is an added value for the democratic functioning of the state, as stipulated in Article 7 of the Kosovo Constitution. In line with a value-oriented interpretation, it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to preserve the constitutional position of independent institutions and the Constitutional Court itself from the interference of other branches of governance, mainly the executive. The institutional independence, as provided for by the Constitution, is called into question by the Ministry of Public Administration, by adopting an administrative act, the so-called Administrative Circular.74 The Administrative Circular affected the internal administration, budget and staff management of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsperson Institution, the Central Bank of Kosovo, the Central Election Commission, the Independent Media Commission and the Auditor General.75 Through the Administrative Circular, the Ministry requested the independent institutions and the Constitutional Court to submit their proposals for their internal job classification and placement to the Government for review and approval. The Constitutional Court established that the independent functioning of independent institutions, as enumerated in Chapter XII of the Constitution, as well as the functioning of the Constitutional Court, Chapter VIII, is safeguarded ‘by the Constitution, relevant laws and their operation and competence is regulated in detail. The independent constitutional institutions have their own budget, which is administered independently in accordance with the law.’76 The Court considers that independent institutions have different mandates and authority, as stipulated by the Constitution, and the specificity of their constitutional
73 Florczak-Wator, M., ‘The Constitutional Court as the Guarantor of the Separation of Powers’, in Development of Constitutional Law through Constitutional Justice: Landmark Decisions and Their Impact on Constitutional Culture, in Rainer, A., Rytel-Warzocha, A., and Szmyt, A. (eds.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2019, p. 128. 74 The judgment in case KO73/16, constitutional review of Administrative Circular No 01/2016, issued by the Ministry of Public Administration of the Republic of Kosovo on 21 January 2016. 75 In 2010, the Parliament adopted a new Law on Salaries of Civil Servants. In 2015, the Government enacted the Regulation on Classification of Jobs in the Civil Service based on the said law. In addition, the Government also adopted a catalogue of jobs in Civil Service with the aim of creating a system of uniform grades, positions and salaries in all public institutions that are financed by the Kosovo budget. In 2016, as a further implementing measure, the Government enacted an Administrative Circular requesting from the Ombudsperson and other independent institutions to classify and place its civil servants in positions and grades as approved by the Government. For more, see the Constitutional Court, Newsletter 2016. 76 The judgment in case KO73/16, para. 33.
213 Selvete Gërxhaliu status must be respected accordingly.77 The Constitution guarantees a special status to the Office of the Ombudsperson and to other independent institutions stipulated in Chapter XII of the Constitution. The Constitution also safeguards a special status to the Constitutional Court as the final guarantor and interpreter of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is the only authority established by the Constitution to resolve questions of conflict of constitutional competencies between the Assembly of Kosovo, the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the Government of Kosovo.78
III.3.2.1. Why does the position of independent institutions matter for constitutional justice?
The Ombudsperson, as one of the independent institutions enumerated in Chapter XII of the Constitution, has the primary role to promote and to defend rights and freedoms of individuals from unlawful or improper acts or failures to act of public authorities.79 The judgment of the Court is trying again to shed light on the importance of the Ombudsperson’s independence, which has a crucial role as a non-judicial mechanism to protect individual rights. In dealing with the relevance of the independent functioning of the Ombudsperson, the Court notes that the importance of the Ombudsperson as an institution that protects fundamental human rights is also highlighted in the well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights recognised that, in the circumstances of that case referenced below, a complaint by an applicant to the Ombudsman for alleged of ill-treatment by the police would have to be considered as an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, due to the authority of the Ombudsman of that country to refer complaints to the public prosecutor. The fact that the referral of the complaint by the Ombudsman to the Prosecutor did not lead to an investigation by the latter was held to be in violation of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.80 It is noteworthy to mention the relevance of the Ombudsperson, as an agent of the development of constitutional justice, in enhancing democracy through his active role in front of the Court. The Ombudsperson is an authorised party to bring referrals to the Constitutional Court and this is one of the reasons why the Ombudsperson has to maintain its independence and to refer very important matters to the Court, which contribute to furthering the concept of constitutional democracy. The Institution of the Ombudsperson, ex officio, can raise the question of the compatibility with
77 The judgment in case KO73/16, para. 62. 78 The judgment in case KO73/16, para. 64. 79 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 132(1). 80 The judgment in case KO73/16, para. 93.
214 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases the Constitution of laws, of decrees of the President or the Prime Minister and of regulations of the Government, and the compatibility with the Constitution of municipal statutes.81
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AND ‘CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS’ From the outset, the practice of the Court was partly developed based on specific questions raised by authorised parties, in a form of constitutional questions. In states in which constitutional justice is in an initial phase of development, it is logical that, in many situations of the functioning of state institutions, they raise different questions whereby competent institutions requested interpretation on how to apply the Constitution.82 In its case law developed as response to such constitutional questions, the Court acted as an agent of democracy. The Court had its limitations and the scope of its authority was dependent on how the questions were formulated and what arguments were offered by authorised parties. It is worth mentioning that, in the cases brought as constitutional questions, the Court was faced with burning issues of considerable constitutional and political importance.83 Of considerable constitutional and political importance is the development of the concept of constitutional justice and principles of democracy in post-electoral procedures. Following the parliamentary elections in 2014, the President of Kosovo submitted referral (KO103/14)84 to the Constitutional Court in order to clarify how to determine who should be proposed as a candidate for Prime Minister, ‘in consultation with the political party or coalition that has won the majority in the Assembly necessary to establish the Government’. The issue was that the political party that had emerged as the largest following the election did not have the support
81 Art. 113(2): one of the authorised parties to raise concerns different aspect of democracy values is institution of Ombudsperson. 82 Judgment KO97/10, the applicant, Jakup Krasniqi, Acting President of the Republic of Kosovo, concerning the holding of the office of the Acting President; KO29/12 and 48/12, proposed amendments submitted by the President of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo on 23 March 2012 and 4 May 2012, the judgment of 23 July 2012; KO98/11, the applicant, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, concerning the immunities of Deputies of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, the President of the Republic of Kosovo and Members of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, the judgment of 20 September 2011; KO103/14, the applicant, Atifete Jahjaga, President of the Republic of Kosovo, assessment of the compatibility of Article 84(14) (‘Competencies of the President’) with Article 95 (‘Election of the Government’). 83 On these problematics, for more, see Rosas, A., ‘The European Court of Justice: Do All Roads Lead to Luxembourg?’, CEPS Policy Insights, No 019/03, February 2019. 84 Judgment KO103/14, the applicant, Atifete Jahjaga, President of the Republic of Kosovo, assessment of the compatibility of Article 84(14) (‘Competencies of the President’) with Article 95 (‘Election of the Government’), 1 July 2014.
215 Selvete Gërxhaliu of the majority of Deputies in the Assembly. Following the elections, a coalition of rival parties was formed and it claimed the right to form a government. At a conceptual level, the Court’s benchmark position to assess who has the right to propose a candidate for Prime Minister is based on representative democracy and legitimacy. Referring to the principle of representative democracy, the Court noted that ‘Democracy, “vox populi” (voice of the people), requires the election of those who are going to represent the people’s voice in the legislative body of the state. In a parliamentary democracy this is the supreme governing entity vested with a variety of competencies, at the same time subordinate to the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. One of the main responsibilities of the parliament is to decide by voting whom to empower with executive functions. The government stems from the prevailing political power within the parliament and is rooted into the political force that wins the elections. This can be an absolute or relative win.’85 The Court interpreted Article 95 of the Constitution, which deals with the procedural steps that the President has to undertake to propose to the Assembly a candidate for Prime Minister. With respect to the consultation steps that have to be taken by the President and the political party or coalition that has won the majority in the Assembly, necessary to establish the Government, the Court distinguished four elements. The elements of Article 95(1) extracted by the Court are as follows: the President proposes to the Assembly a candidate for Prime Minister; in consultation with the political party or coalition; that won the majority in the Assembly; and the fourth element – the necessity to establish the Government.86 Apart from the extracted elements, the Court referred to the following: ‘the democratic rule and principles, as well as political fairness, foreseeability and transparency require the political party or coalition that won the highest number of seats as a result of the elections to be given the possibility to propose a candidate for Prime Minister to form the Government. The President of the Republic does not have the discretion to approve or disapprove the nomination of the candidate for Prime Minister by the party or coalition, but has to assure his/her appointment.’87 In the case the proposed candidate for Prime Minister does not receive the necessary votes in the Assembly, it is in the discretion of the President of the Republic, after consultations with the parties or coalitions, to decide which party or coalition will be given the mandate to propose another candidate for Prime Minister. The President of the Republic has to assess what is the highest probability for a political party or coalition to propose a candidate for Prime Minister who will obtain the necessary votes in the Assembly for the establishment of a new Government. Since, under the Constitution, the President of the Republic represents the State and the unity of the people, it is the President’s responsibility to preserve the stability of the 85 The judgment in case KO103/14, para. 49. 86 The judgment in case KO103/14, para. 81. 87 The judgment in case KO103/14, para. 88.
216 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases country and to find constitutional criteria for the formation of the new Government, in order for elections to be avoided.88 The constitutional justice concept in the post-electoral context has to go in line with the meaning of the basic norm of the Constitution and the principle of representative democracy, to build a coherent and consistent practice to respect the results of the election process. Another burning issue of considerable constitutional and political importance was the case (KO98/11) pertaining to the constitutional question on the immunity of the Deputies of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, the immunity of the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the immunity of Members of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo. The immunity of high public officials was referred by the Government of the Republic of Kosovo through constitutional question.89 In this case, the Court ruled ‘that these questions relating to immunity are of a constitutional nature’, because they raise important issues related to the abilities of the President, Assembly Deputies and Members of the Government to perform their constitutional functions independently. Concerning the prosecution of Members of the Assembly, the Court noted that ‘there is no such immunity against criminal prosecution for the deputies in the Constitution. The Court reiterates once again that immunity to prevent the criminal prosecution of deputies for acts taken outside the scope of their responsibility does not exist. No decision of the Assembly is necessary for such a prosecution.’90 Taking into consideration that even the deputies who are vested with ‘vox populi’ 91 legitimacy are not excluded from prosecution for actions taken outside of the scope of their responsibilities, it means that no one from high state officials is excluded from prosecution, and immunity cannot be used as a safe haven. The model of representative democracy and legitimacy of the Members of the Assembly, which derives directly from the will of the people, does not mean that it provides impunity for acts committed outside of their mandate as elected representatives and, subsequently, this standard applies to all high state officials.
IV.1. THE CURRENT PRACTICE IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT The President of the Republic of Kosovo submitted a referral (KO79/18) to the Court requesting an interpretation of the Constitution regarding the appointment of the members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) based on Article 139(4) of the Constitution. The President requested clarification to the question from which 88 The judgment in case KO103/14, para. 94. 89 The judgment in case KO98/11, the applicant, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, the judgment of 20 September 2011. 90 The judgment in case KO98/11, para. 70. 91 Based on the Kosovo Constitution, only a member of the Parliament elected directly from the people of Kosovo.
217 Selvete Gërxhaliu parliamentary groups the members of the CEC should be appointed: (a) from the parliamentary groups that have emerged from the political entities that won the elections for the Assembly of Kosovo or (b) from the parliamentary groups created after the constitution of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo?92 The Court recalled its previous case law in which it applied the broader understanding of the notion of ‘constitutional questions’ and had considered referrals that were not explicitly included within the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 113 of the Constitution. The Court considered that, in the concrete referral, the question raised by the applicant before the Court did not fall within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court as provided for by Article 113(3) and (4) of the Constitution.93 The Court reasoned its departure from its previous practice of answering constitutional questions on two grounds: (1) In the first decade of the Court’s establishment and the adoption of the new Constitution, referrals submitted under a broad meaning of the notion ‘constitutional questions’ should be understood in the spirit of the process of establishing the foundations of the constitutional judiciary and of the social need for the Court in its beginnings to be included in interpretations of specific articles of the Constitution, in particular when the questions raised were related to the exercise of the competencies of the President, as established by the Constitution; when the issues raised affected the separation of powers; in preserving the constitutional order; as well as when the issues raised had fundamental implications for the functioning of the constitutional system of the country.94 (2) The second reason why the Court departed from its previous practice is the new composition of the Court. In August 2018, five new judges were elected. The new composition of the Court considered that referrals should be ‘in full compliance with the explicit, exhaustive and restrictive language of Article 113 [Jurisdiction and the Authorised Parties] of the Constitution, all other references in the Constitution related to the referring of constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court stem from Article 113’.95 The Court has the right to review its practice and the interpretation of its jurisdiction. However, it is a question mark if the departure from the previous practice can be done through a resolution on inadmissibility. Based on the fact that the Constitution has restrictively defined the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, including the authorised parties to activate its jurisdiction, the possibility for the Court to take a consultative or advisory role is limited, and such a role would run counter to its fundamental role to decide on the cases brought before it.
92 The resolution on inadmissibility of 3 December 2018, KO79/18, para. 3. 93 The decision in case KO79/18, para. 60. 94 The decision in case KO79/18, para. 71. 95 The decision in case KO79/18, para. 72.
218 Democracy as a constitutional value and its mainstreaming in court cases
In a similar way, the Court rejected as inadmissible a referral (KO131/18) brought by the President of the Republic of Kosovo,96 based on the above-mentioned practice of ‘constitutional questions’. The President requested clarification on two questions in relation to the following: Exchange of letters between the President of the Republic of Kosovo (04.06.2018) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (08.06.2018) [Fourth Exchange of Letters], namely: – should it be ratified in the capacity of an International Agreement by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo by the two-thirds (2/3) vote of all deputies (in accordance with Article 18.1 of the Constitution); or, – should it be considered as ratified upon signature of the President (pursuant to Article 18.2 of the Constitution), due to the change of the role and mandate of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, as from now on it will have mainly an advisory and monitoring role.97 In claiming a conflict of constitutional competencies between the Office of the President and the Assembly of Kosovo regarding the ratification of an international agreement, the Court found that the President had presented his referral in the form of a question. The applicant did not clarify the nature of the alleged conflict of constitutional competencies with the Assembly of Kosovo. The President, as the authorised party, did not submit sufficient useful information about the ‘assumed’ or ‘alleged conflict’, nor did he ‘accurately specify what conflict exists among the constitutional competencies’ of the President and the Assembly. Therefore, the Court rejected the referral as being outside of its competence.
CONCLUSIONS Following its establishment in 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo has been called upon by the institutions of the state to interpret the provisions of the Constitution and to adjudicate in conflicts between the various organs of the state. In doing so, the Court has contributed to interpreting and clarifying the democratic functioning of Kosovo institutions in a new-born state, with respect to the identity of the constitutional order and the laws applicable in Kosovo. As such, in mainstreaming the democracy concept, the Court was in the front line during the period of supervised independence, which had an impact and for international actors deployed in Kosovo, the clarification of the constitutional mandate of constitutional institutions vis-à-vis other bodies, which may be established by law. The Court’s case law on the separation of powers as a component of constitutional justice is
96 The decision in case KO131/18, the request for assessment of the conflict among the constitutional competences of the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, as defined in Article 113(3)(1) of the Constitution. 97 The decision in case KO131/18, para. 4.
219 Selvete Gërxhaliu developed in two directions: the separation of powers and mainstreaming the value of democracy within the three branches of governance and the constitutional safeguards in relation to the position of other independent public institutions foreseen by the Constitution. The interpretation of post-electoral procedures was made for purposes of establishing a practice to respect the principle of representative democracy and other procedures necessary for the maintenance of a fully functioning democracy. The Constitutional Court is the final authority for the interpretation of the Constitution. Based on the recently changed practice, the Court does not have a role as an ‘advisory body’. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo can only adjudicate on issues where a real dispute or a conflict of constitutional competencies exists.
220 Constance Grewe Democracy in European constitutional law: A comparative perspective
DEMOCRACY IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Constance Grewe University of Strasbourg, France Former judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
INTRODUCTION Democracy is certainly the constitutional regime attended or intended in most countries, but also one of the vaguest notions, universal and relative at the same time. For constitutional lawyers, democracy refers to some principles, institutions, instruments and structures designing a situation as well as a process. Democracy appears, thus, either as a form of government and a certain quality of power, either as a constitutional objective. Historically, the process of democratisation has taken place due to, first, the development of sovereignty and representation and, then, the emergence of universal suffrage and political parties. The various meanings of the concept and the diversity of historical evolutions explain the impossibility to give a unique description of what is democracy in Europe today. Therefore, this very schematic contribution tries simply to give some indications about the polarities between which the European systems are oscillating. These polarities concern two fundamental questions the constitutional theory and practice have dealt with along the democratic history: what should be the substance of power in the State (I) and how this power should be structured or organised (II)?
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF POWER This question is closely linked to sovereignty. In all European constitutional systems, the state’s powers and, therefore, their legitimacy stem from the people, even when the state has adopted the form of monarchy.1 Thus, the right to vote, to be elected and to participate in public affairs are the minimal fundamental rights included in the notion of democracy. Beyond this basic understanding, we can find two sorts of polarities. The first one, which is quantitative, leads to distinguish a thin and a thick conception of democracy (I.1). The second one, qualitative, differentiates what we could call constitutional and political democracies (I.2).
1 See, for instance, Art. 1 of the Spanish Constitution, which mentions, at the same time, the national sovereignty belonging to the people and the parliamentary monarchy.
221 Constance Grewe
I.1. THE POLARITY BETWEEN ‘THIN’ AND ‘THICK’ DEMOCRACY Thin democracy is characterised by its narrow constitutional delimitation, by the few democratic items. We can find it principally in old constitutions,2 but also in some more recent texts.3 Judicial interpretation can make this conception thick. For instance, the constitutional case law underlines frequently the structuring function of some fundamental rights for democracy, such as freedom of opinion, freedom of association or trade unions. But this is not automatic, a reverse evolution being possible. Thick democracy means that some other concepts are added, compelling the interpreters to combine these concepts with the democratic principle, for example, pluralism, the rule of law or fundamental rights. Depending on these additional principles, the democracy concerned gets a more specific coloration.4 For instance, the Romanian state is qualified by its constitution as democratic and social, governed by the rule of law, in which human dignity, the citizen’s rights and freedoms, the free development of human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values.5
I.2. THE POLARITY BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY The European democracy could be characterised by the fact that, starting from opposed interpretations of the founding concepts, it evolves towards an increasing convergence. This convergence, operating since the end of WWII, among others, under the influence of the two European courts, consists of a sort of compromise between the two interpretations that are the law, on the one hand (British influence), and the power, on the other (French influence). When sovereignty is interpreted as the rule of law, this means that state powers should be limited and that the majority must respect minorities’ and fundamental rights. When sovereignty is interpreted as power, it means that the majority can change the rules and make the law. Constitutional democracy illustrates the prevalence of the rule of law.6 It occurs when sovereignty is incarnated, first of all, in the constitution. Not only is the constitution placed at the very top of the normative hierarchy, but also is protected by strong courts and intangible values.7 Thus, democracy refers not only to the
2 Such as Austria, Belgium or Norway. 3 Namely, Netherlands, France, Slovakia, Lithuania. 4 For instance, by provisions on political parties, federalism, territorial autonomies or social rights. 5 Art. 1(3). 6 As significatively illustrated by the case law of the Hungarian and Polish Constitutional Courts in the transition period. 7 This is namely the case in Germany, Portugal, Italy and Spain, as well as in the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech Republic.
222 Democracy in European constitutional law: A comparative perspective majoritarian principle, but also to a substantial conception where some values are excluded from any modification or are made very difficult to be amended. However, this does not prevent even profound modifications of the legal landscape by means of ordinary legislation, as it happened especially in Poland. Thus, constitutional democracy is not a guarantee against democratic backsliding. Political democracy underlines the sovereign power to create the law. The constitutional supremacy seems to be reduced, since the legislator can amend or change it completely without major procedural or substantial hurdles. Here, the majority principle is at the heart of the democratic idea.8 Furthermore, at least in France, the popular interventions by way of referendum are considered an expression of popular sovereignty and insofar impossible to review. The European Court of Human Rights sees in the democratic society the ultimate justification for restrictions on fundamental rights and the Court of Justice of the EU holds9 the fundamental rights as the nucleus of the European law and a standard of review. Likely, these courts prefer constitutional democracy.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF POWER The power’s structure refers principally to representation. The questions in this regard concern the proportions: the proportion, first, between direct and representative democracy (II.1) and the proportion, second, between the state/political and the social/public sphere (II.2).
II.1. THE POLARITY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY The debate on compatibility between these two forms of democracy was very hot during the 19th and part of the 20th century. Today their complementarity is largely admitted. However, no country has adopted a completely direct democracy. All we can find are limited elements of direct democracy, such as popular initiative, a referendum and popular abrogation. Such institutions are widespread in Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Austria, the Baltic States, Slovenia and Croatia. At the constitutional level, they are as well important in the
8 Most countries where the traditional system centred on the ordinary law has survived share this vision; so, the Benelux states, Northern Europe and most of Central and Eastern European countries. The possibility to change the whole constitution without any substantial restriction enabled the Hungarian majority, from 2010 up, to adopt a new Constitution. 9 The CJEU, the judgment of 3 September 2008 [GC], joint cases C-402/05 P & C-405/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission; see also Kadi II: the CJEU, the judgment of 18 July 2013 [GC], joint cases C-584/10P, C-593/10P and C-595/10P, Commission v Kadi.
223 Constance Grewe countries where a referendum is required for constitutional amendments.10 With regard to popular power, it is not indifferent to know who can initiate a referendum, what the admissible topics are and whether referenda can be controlled by the Courts. In addition, it is to be questioned how the political parties are acting in this field, especially, by financial contributions. The answers to these questions indicate to what extent institutions of direct democracy may remediate the so often criticised gap between the represented and representatives and, in doing so, limit the space for populism.
II.2. THE POLARITY BETWEEN UNITARY AND PLURALIST DEMOCRACY Unitary democracy states the unity of the represented, which means an exaltation of the political body’s unity. This is generally reflected in the state organisation by the equation between State, Nation, People and Republic and, sometimes, by special protections of the indivisibility, unity, independence or sovereignty of the state/nation/republic/territory. The French constitutional law provides a good example, since it does not recognise any minority, sub-nationalities or sub-people, like the Corsican one, and excludes any federalism.11 Pluralist democracy, on the contrary, presupposes, recognises and organises social diversity. Pluralism pervades state organisation so that there is no more substantive difference between the state/political sphere and the social/public one. This is one of the major difficulties for regulating the activities and status of political parties.12 Furthermore, the traditional equation between state/nation/republic/citizens and nationals becomes weak or even broken.13 Factors like federalism or the existence of minorities increase the possible evolution towards multi-national or multi-ethnic states. So, for instance, the Spanish constitution recognises the indivisibility of the Spanish nation before admitting the autonomy of different communities and nationalities in Spain. Several Central and Eastern European countries try, in a similar way, to reconcile the state unity with the plurality of nations or people. Particularly,
10 It is compulsory for all constitutional amendments: in Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark; only for certain amendments: in Austria, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. In addition, manifold constitutions provide for a simply facultative referendum. See the Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2005)034. 11 See also Romania (Constitution, Arts. 1 and 4) and Poland (Constitution, Preamble, Arts. 1, 4 and 35). However, most constitutional systems are located between these polarities so that there are few purely unitarian examples; yet, the notion ‘state people’ in Germany is, for instance, inspired by this doctrine. 12 The Italian Constitution (Art. 12) offers a significant example of this difficulty. It conceives the creation of political parties as a citizens’ right and, at the same time, defines the functions of the latter as to determining national policies, which is normally a governmental task. 13 See, for instance, the Preamble of the Croatian Constitution with its distinctions between the Croatian nation, the citizens of the Croatian state and, among the latter, manifold national minorities.
224 Democracy in European constitutional law: A comparative perspective the recognition of certain minorities or ethnic groups, like in Slovenia,14 Kosovo,15 Hungary16 or in Bosnia and Herzegovina,17 illustrates the incursion of pluralist structures in the state organisation.
CONCLUSIONS Although proclaimed by most European constitutions, democracy is not a uniform notion of European constitutional law. Issued from truly diverse historical legacy and from two very opposite models of sovereignty and representation, it can be apprehended through some significant polarisations. In respect of sovereignty, these polarisations are oscillating between thin and thick and between constitutional and political democracy. When it comes to representation, the polarisation takes place between representative and direct and between unitary and pluralist democracy. The constitutional case law shows, at the same time, a rather homogeneous evolution towards a thick and substantial conception of democracy and a still impressive diversity between the different national systems. This diversity is strengthened, and democracy threatened, by the increasing success of populist movements.
14 Arts. 64 and 80 of the Constitution with special representation for the autochthone minorities. 15 Pursuant to Art. 3 of the Constitution, Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities; these other Communities benefit from special rights (Arts. 57 to 62), a representation in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo (Arts. 64(2), 78 and 81) and in the government (Art. 96). 16 The national minorities are recognised as ‘constituent parts’ of the state: see the Constitution of Hungary, Preamble and Art. XXIX (Freedom), Arts. 2 and 30 (State). 17 According to the Preamble of the Constitution, Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are qualified as ‘constituent peoples’, whereas the so-called ‘Others’ (Jews, Roma and other minorities) do not participate equally in public governance.
225 Enver Hasani Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF DEMOCRACY: KEY DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOSOVO
Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani Faculty of Law of the University of Pristina ‘Hasan Prishtina’ Former President of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo
INTRODUCTION The aim of this paper is to show that constitutional courts, including the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo (CCRK or Constitutional Court), serve as state agents with delegated powers to enforce and implement certain policies. Implementation is done via judicial means based on constitutional commitments of a contractual nature and based on trust between the principal (state) and the actor (constitutional court). Under an organisational logic, constitutional courts as agents belong in the European/Kelsenian model of constitutional justice – the institutional design based on the precepts of Hans Kelsen – as opposed to the American and hybrid models. The second aim of the paper is to demonstrate that changes in parliamentary governance happen as a result of the constitutional review of the European/Kelsenian model. Under functional logic, the control of constitutionality is of utmost importance for the rule of law in transitional societies. This goal may be achieved through other models of constitutional justice, in addition to the European/Kelsenian one, hence our discussion covers all models. The paper sheds light on the organisational and functional logic of constitutional review using the Republic of Kosovo and its Constitutional Court as a case study. Kosovo does not differ substantially from the experience of other post-communist countries in terms of constitutional justice, its impact on governance and the role of the constitutional court. The paper has three sections, each divided into three to four subsections. The first section gives a comparative overview of the reason d’être of constitutional review and constitutional politics in general. The case law from the Kosovo Constitutional Court is used to illustrate institutional, jurisdictional and societal aspects.1 The second section deals with key elements of the delegation of power theory and how it relates to constitutional justice in general. This theory is further discussed in combination with the trust or fiduciary theory as developed by Alec Stone Sweet, whose work this paper heavily draws upon. Theories are presented how they played 1 The case law used for the production of this paper is available in English at the official website of the CCRK: https://gjk-ks.org/.
226 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo out in Kosovo. Three subsections delve on constitutional courts as controllers of the substance and form of legislative enactments, on judges controlling the rights and their constitutional limits, and on judges holding the monopoly on the interpretation of constitutional law. Three cases from the jurisprudence of the CCRK – concerning heads of state, constitutional amendments and restrictions on the right to work – are discussed in the fourth subsection. The third section, titled ‘Outcomes of constitutional politics’, describes constitutional courts as transformative actors of parliamentary behaviour. Kosovo further illustrates how constitutional adjudicators shape the behaviour of the regular judiciary and, as in any society in transition, in defining the constitutional identity of the country as a whole. The final section is reserved for some conclusions on the role of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo in governing society, always looked at from a comparative perspective. This is done in terms of organisational and functional logic.
I. THE RAISON D’ÊTRE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY: HOW IT APPLIES TO KOSOVO I.1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT – AN ORGANISATIONAL LOGIC WARRANTED BY TRADITION AND HISTORY Kosovo made a deliberate choice of institutional design: a separate, European/Kelsenian-model court conducts constitutional review to the exclusion of the regular judiciary. The choice is rooted in the tradition that began with the first constitutional court (First Court), formed in 1972, when the country was an autonomous province within communist Yugoslavia. But later developments – from the rise of Serbian nationalism and fall of communism in the late 1980s to the establishment of the current Constitutional Court in newly independent Kosovo in 2009 – were a much stronger impetus. Prior to the country’s independence, ethnic Albanian citizens of Kosovo lived under a violent apartheid system, which began in earnest in 1986, when Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević came to power. Three years later, on 23 March 1989, Milošević succeeded in tearing down Kosovo’s autonomy, guaranteed by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The autonomy included the First Court, established by amendment X to the 1969 Constitutional Law of Kosovo and reconfirmed by the 1974 Constitution of Kosovo.2
2 Salihu, K., Lindja, zhvillimi, pozita dhe aspektet e autonomitetit të Krahinës Socialiste Autonome të Kosovës në Jugosllavinë Socialiste (Enti i Teksteve dhe Mjeteve Mwsimore tw KSAK: Pristine, 1984) [Birth, Development, Position and Aspects of Autonomy of the Socialist Autonomous Province of
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The basic idea behind the First Court involved the classical delegation logic: the principal, as the representative of the sovereign, authorised an agency to carry state responsibilities on behalf and on account of the principal. Here, the principal retains effective mechanisms to control the exercise of delegated powers, as reflected in the court’s jurisdiction and the appointment and dismissal of judges. The arrangement suited the socialist system of government, which was based on the principle of delegation, with legitimacy obtained indirectly through delegates. The delegation principle made up the essence of Yugoslavia’s constitutional design, which applied to Kosovo: delegation or indirect representation rested on the unseparated powers of state and the leading constitutional role of the communist party, known as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The ultimate principal or delegator here was the LCY, which established assemblies as representative bodies at all levels of government – federative, republican and provincial. The assemblies were then recognised as the highest bodies of state authority, with the power to elect constitutional judges at federal, republican and provincial levels. The assemblies also had the power to overturn decisions of constitutional courts by a qualified majority. Court rulings were practically non-binding. But the organisational logic was in line with the indivisibility of power and the party’s role as a vanguard of the working people. The Yugoslav-era constitutional justice came to an end in March 1989. In 1990, ethnic Albanians set up a parallel state to resist the autocracy of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević. His repressive measures eventually led to the war between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian forces in 1998. The conflict ended with NATO’s intervention in support of ethnic Albanians and Kosovo’s liberation in 1999. Following Serbia’s withdrawal in June that year, the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 1244, placing Kosovo under an interim international administration. A UN mission, known as UNMIK, was deployed to implement the resolution. International administration ended de facto on 17 February 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence and was recognised as a sovereign state by most countries worldwide. The notion of constitutional justice did not apply during Kosovo’s international administration. UNMIK derived its authority from Resolution 1244, a political act of the UN Security Council, which retained the sole power to interpret or repeal it, in accordance with its rules of procedures. Any evaluation of the resolution’s legal effect by domestic bodies, including the UNMIK administration, would constitute an absurdity of its own kind. Furthermore, all state power in Kosovo – legislative, executive and judicial – was concentrated in the hands of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who held the absolute power to annul legal acts, to invest executive officers and to appoint or remove judges. No authority had the right
Kosovo], publication of the Pristina-based entity for production of books and other material during the Communist era, 1984, p. 141.
228 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo to review the legality of SRSG’s decisions. Their legality was presumed, because they were based on UNSC Resolution 1244. From the formal aspect, however, UNMIK fostered the principles of the separation and balancing of powers, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental liberties. Such postulates were embodied in all legal documents issued by the SRSG, who was, as noted, the country’s supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority.
I.2. NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM – EMPHASIS ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW New constitutionalism, as called in legal doctrine,3 refers to a model of government that recognises the separation of powers while also providing for a separate constitutional adjudicator charged with the constitutional review of acts, actions and omissions of public authorities. The adjudicator has broad and clear jurisdiction on matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms and is intended to secure the supremacy of the constitution, not the supremacy of mere legislation. The latter is the goal of old constitutionalism, where it constitutes – alongside the separation of powers – the will of the sovereign in its absolute entirety. Old constitutionalism, therefore, lent little room for an independent adjudicator with clear constitutional jurisdiction. The trend of embracing the Kelsenian model, with an adjudicator separated from the regular judiciary, was largely a novelty of former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Until them, most of Europe viewed constitutional control as incompatible with parliamentary democracy and the unitary state. This, of course, differs from Yugoslavia’s socialist system of government by assemblies, where delegates exercised unique, indivisible power. The European parliamentary system, defined by the supremacy of law and the will of the parliament, introduced a unique combination of representative democracy and the separation of powers. This understanding of the separation of powers viewed each power as equal to the other so that the judiciary could not exercise control over the will of the parliament. Constitutional review was limited to nonjudicial bodies and was known as the political control of constitutionality. This setup persisted for a long time in most western countries, except for the United States, which recognised the power of the courts to review acts of Congress in order to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. The supremacy of law in Europe, in the meantime, was viewed as contradictory to the separation of powers: neither the judiciary nor another body could exercise the control of constitutionality, for that would mean the usurpation of power. But this doctrine – espoused by early representative democracy, which sought the absolute separation of powers – did not convince former socialist countries to
3 Stone, A., ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics, Vol. 25, No 1, January 2002, pp. 77–100, at pp. 78–82.
229 Enver Hasani reject constitutional review. Given their experience with the subservient judiciary of the socialist system, they moved to create independent constitutional courts. This meant that the separation of powers, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental liberties would take on a new dimension with the adequate control of constitutionality. The constitutional adjudicator would not be part of the regular judiciary, which had been compromised by party rule, but an entirely separate, independent institution. An independent constitutional court, with clear constitutional jurisdiction, was indispensable to new constitutionalism. This new system was not based on the supremacy of law and the absolute separation of powers, but on the supremacy of the constitution and its strong normativity. Conceived by Hans Kelsen, the constitution’s normativity could be put into life by a mechanism that was entirely independent and specialised in constitutional cases and controversies. Normativity does not extend to mere majoritarian rule, i.e. the constitutional review of laws, but to the control of the constitutionality of any act, action or omission of public/state authorities in order to bring them in line with the national constitution. In this context, human rights and fundamental freedoms hold a special place in new constitutionalism. Kosovo is no exception to the latest expansion of the Kelsenian model: the Constitution of Kosovo, adopted on 15 April 2008 (2008 Constitution), sanctions the supremacy of the constitution and a powerful bill of rights with normative effect. Normativity is materialised through constitutional justice, set in motion by a complaint to the Constitutional Court. In other countries, constitutional normativity is achieved through procedures of the abstract control of norms (Austria and Italy), through derivative jurisdiction on constitutional complaints (Germany, Spain and other countries recognising full and partial complaints). Besides abstract control and constitutional complaints, most national constitutions also provide for the concrete control of constitutionality. This is the case in Czechia, Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Spain and most other European countries that cultivate constitutional justice through a separate adjudicator. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo is among the most powerful in the region, with Article 112 ‘Constitutional Court: General Principles’ and Article 113 ‘Jurisdiction and Authorised Parties’ of the Constitution providing for abstract control, concrete control, constitutional complaints and other aspects of the constitutional review of acts and actions of public authorities. In our discussion of the Constitutional Court’s case law, we have selected cases that reflect Kosovo’s new constitutionalism. We have not focused on human rights protected through the derivative mechanism of constitutional complaint, but on the constitutional control (preventive and repressive) of laws and other acts of the Assembly of Kosovo, whereby human rights and freedoms are protected through the abstract control of legal norms. This constitutional policy sanctioned by Articles 112 and 113 was part of the debate on Kosovo’s constitution-making, which took place within an internationally
230 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo imposed framework, known as the Ahtisaari Plan.4 In this sense, the 2008 Constitution could be considered an entirely internationalised constitution due to the decisive role and position of the international factor in its drafting.5 The reason behind the Kosovar tribunal’s expansive jurisdiction rests precisely in the role of the international community, which sought a special mechanism to implement the constitutional project. The text comprises constitutional principles and norms whose primary goal is to transform Kosovo into a society based on the rule of law, the separation and balancing of powers, human rights and fundamental liberties and the protection of minority communities. This constitutional policy could not be implemented but through a pervasive intervention of international experts, given that Kosovo’s history and legal education belong to a former socialist system – one with little tradition or cognisance of values and principles of modern constitutionalism. Seen from this prism, human and minority rights in the 2008 Constitution represent a great leap towards the social, political and cultural transformation of the country. Human rights and minority protections are enshrined in Chapters II and III not as natural rights, but as positive rights and freedoms that are implemented through an adequate judicial mechanism activated through the constitutional complaint. This does not mean that such constitutional guarantees attain their effect only through constitutional justice: the judiciary and all other public authorities in Kosovo are bound by the Constitution and obligated to foster a culture that respects human rights.
I.3. CASE LAW ILLUSTRATION: THE KOSOVO COURT AS A NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR In addressing human rights issues, the Kosovo Constitutional Court avoided natural-law argumentation, resorting instead to the classical review of constitutionality of the legislative action. Put differently, the Constitutional Court played the role of a ‘negative legislator’. The seminal cases here include the rulings on public-broadcaster fees, pension benefits for MPs and the law on the dialogue with Serbia.
4 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 2 February 2007, UN S/2007/168/Add. 1, Security Council Reports, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/ kosovo-s2007-168-add1.php [last accessed 30 January 2020]. 5 Referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and Cyprus, Bosnian scholar Edin Šarčević considers internationalised constitutions and their constitution-making process as ‘constitution out of necessity’. Šarčević, E., Ustav iz nužde: Konsolidacija ustavnog prava Bosne i Hercegovine (Rabic: Sarajevo, 2010) [Constitution Out of Necessity: Consolidation of the Constitutional Law of Bosnia-Herzegovina], published by Sarajevo-based publishing house Rabic, 2010, pp. 325–327. For more on internationalised constitutions and the notion of internationalised constitution-making power, including the current trends, see Hay, E., ‘International(ised) Constitutions and Peacebuilding’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, Issue 1, March 2014, pp. 141–168.
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I.3.1. Public broadcaster fees: the case of Radio and Television of Kosovo (RTK)6 There are several defining features for this case. To begin with, it was the first decision ever rendered by the Constitutional Court, on 16 October 2009. The decision’s form and content had an impact of RTK’s management in terms of funding for RTK as Kosovo’s public broadcaster. As we shall see, the Court did not issue a judgment, but a decision ordering interim measures at the request of an individual. The measure suspended the further collection of a 3.5-euro fee to fund RTK’s activities. The decision granted interim relief without ruling on the merits of the case. In fact, there was never a final judgment, as the matter was resolved in the meantime and became moot for the Court. But the decision, nonetheless, had an impact on how the issue was handled. The referral consisted of an individual complaint filed by Mr Tomë Krasniqi, a senior citizen who asked the Court to suspend the 3.5-euro subscription fee paid monthly to Radiotelevizioni i Kosovës (RTK), the nation’s public broadcaster.7 As initially provided by contract and later under Article 20(1) of the Law on RTK, the payment was collected by the sole electric company, Korporata Energjetike e Kosovës (KEK), which added the fee to every electric bill. The Court noted that KEK had suffered material loss from the fee collection.8 The Court stated that Krasniqi’s petition was not an actio popularis, as it may initially appear. It further argued that interim relief would mean a ban on the collection of fees until a final decision on the merits. The Court invoked the public interest of Kosovo citizens and the right to private property.9 In granting relief, the Court effectively suspended Article 20(1) of the Law on RTK, and urged the Assembly of Kosovo to review the provision by December 2009.10 The Assembly addressed the matter in 2010, such that the case became moot and was removed from the docket.11 The decision initiated the Court’s role as the guardian of human rights under Chapter II of the Constitution.
6 Case KI 11/09, Krasniqi v RTK, CCRK, Decision (Interim Measure), 26 October 2009. 7 Ibid., para. 5 of the Decision. 8 Ibid., para. 11 of the Decision. 9 Ibid., paras. 13 and 17 of the Decision. 10 Ibid., disposition (Item II) of the Decision. 11 Two judges submitted separate ‘dissenting opinions’ – unprecedented in the history of constitutional justice, for they opposed an order to adopt interim measures. Dissenting and concurring opinions are entered along a final judgment (which was never issued on this case). The dissenting opinions on this case, opposing interim relief, reveal the judges’ views on the merits. Under any court rules, the opinions would disqualify the judges from further consultation on the case. As the Court never reached a decision on the merits, however, it was not compelled to disqualify the two dissenting judges. Case KI 11/09, Krasniqi v RTK, CCRK, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Almiro Rodrigues and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gjylijeta Mushkolaj.
232 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo
I.3.2. Lifetime pensions for MPs: a question of the rule of law, equality and social justice12 The Kosovo ombudsman asked the Court to review provisions of a law on MP benefits, shortly after it was adopted in the Assembly.13 By passing the law, lawmakers granted themselves a lifetime ‘supplementary pension’ of at least 50 per cent of an MP’s base salary, depending on the number of terms served. But the ombudsman contended the pension infringed on constitutional principles. The Constitutional Court agreed. In a comparative analysis that drew from the case law of former communist countries, the Kosovo tribunal struck the MP pension provisions as unconstitutional, for they violated the right to equality and non-discrimination, the right to property and constitutional values that included social justice. Placing human rights and fundamental freedoms on a normative pedestal, the judgment recognises them as a constitutional barrier to dishonest legislation. Here, the Court explicitly acknowledges its role as a ‘negative legislator’ in that the Assembly is not deprived of its legislative powers. Legislation may, of course, accommodate legitimate and proportional demands of MPs, in line with constitutional norms and principles.14
I.3.3. The law on dialogue with Serbia: an ad hoc body could not negotiate treaties15 This case illustrates the Court’s negative legislator role in protecting the separation and balancing of powers. Here, the Assembly had passed a law to govern Kosovo’s representation in dialogue with Serbia. The dialogue is expected to produce a final agreement between the two countries that were at war with each other and are yet to recognise one another. The law hence provided for a state delegation – a unique body, a sort of parallel structure to existing institutions, to represent Kosovo in the process. Formally titled Law 06/L-145 on the Duties, Responsibilities and Competences of the State Delegation of the Republic of Kosovo in the Dialogue Process with Serbia, the
12 Case KO 119/10, Constitutional Review of Law No 03/L-111 on Rights and Responsibilities of the Deputy, CCRK, Judgment, 8 December 2011. 13 Law No 03/L-111 on Rights and Responsibilities of the Deputy, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No 74/2010, 20 July 2010. 14 ‘The Court’s decision does not prevent the Assembly from enacting pension legislation for members of the Assembly nor does it prevent the Assembly from enacting legislation compensating families of members of the Assembly from being compensated in an appropriate amount if the deputy dies or is injured while serving as long as the Assembly considers the requirements of the Constitution in enacting such legislation.’ Case 119/10, Judgment, para. 82. 15 Case KO 43/19, Application of Albulena Haxhiu et al., Constitutional Review of Law No 06/L-145 on Duties, Responsibilities and Competences of the State Delegation of the Republic of Kosovo in the Dialogue Process with Serbia, CCRK, Judgment, 27 June 2019.
233 Enver Hasani act was given the status of a lex specialis such that its provisions would prevail in the case of a conflict with other laws.16 But the parallel structure, which would serve in consultation with the constitutional bodies of the state, ran counter to the separation and balancing of powers ingrained in Kosovo’s parliamentary form of government. First, the unique organisation usurped the power of the executive to propose and implement the country’s foreign and domestic policy. Second, it created – by law – a different hierarchy of institutions from what is prescribed in the Constitution.17 The altered hierarchy infringed on the constitutional provisions on the separation of powers, state sovereignty and the authority to negotiate and enter into treaties that affect the sovereignty, territory, political alliances, peace, human rights and so on.18 By nullifying the state-delegation law, the Court established clear standards as to the foreign policy powers of state institutions.
II. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE DELEGATION OF POWER AND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP TO CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW The delegation theory on constitutional justice, set forth by Alec Stone Sweet, does not exclude contractual aspects. These aspects became particularly relevant in the constitution-making of post-communist countries: new constitutions entailed broad public debate and compromise on the responsibilities of a third, neutral, professional institution, tasked with giving effect to an original agreement or ‘original compact’. The original compact here is the constitution and the institution chosen to give effect to its terms was found in the European/Kelsenian model of constitutional justice. It proved the most adequate option to preserve the integrity of the original compact, which determined the physiognomy of state power, the means of exercising power and the role and position of the individual in society. The delegation of power by contract implies the parties’ trust on the modalities of safeguarding the original compact. Ensuring the supremacy of the constitution, as the original compact, is the main feature of the agreement to delegate responsibilities to a third, neutral and professional institution, i.e. the constitutional adjudicator. This goes beyond the logic of classical delegation, for it carries the element of trust vested in the constitutional court along with the processes and dynamics that ensure in and around this new institution. In this sense, the sovereign and its representatives are no longer the immediate and original commanders of the constitutional court,
16 Ibid., para. 45. 17 Ibid., paras. 55–109. 18 Under Art. 18(1) (‘Ratification of International Agreements’) of the Constitution, these treaties are ratified by the Assembly of Kosovo with the support of two thirds of deputies.
234 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo whether in the personal, organisational/functional or financial aspect. The court is, instead, commanded by the constitutional principles and norms and the rules on its internal organisation and finances. Therefore, the constitutional adjudicator has completely and in all aspects isolated itself from its original founder, which is the representative of the sovereign and the will of the majority. In fact, the very reason behind the constitutional court was to reign the excesses of the majority and to ensure the supremacy of constitutional democracy, whereby the will of the people is fulfilled within a predefined legal framework. Next, we turn to the elements of the contractual theory on the legitimacy of constitutional courts, which exercise the delegated trust within a predefined legal framework. This framework guarantees the personal, organisational/functional and financial autonomy of the constitutional adjudicator. We then illustrate the contractual theory with seminal rulings of the Kosovo Constitutional Court. The contractual framework, which provides for the court’s original autonomy, further allows them to build their legitimacy through reasoned decision making. Reasoning, provided in professional terms, is an ‘obligation’ the courts have assumed to justify the trust given by the representatives of the sovereign, who in turn commit to respect a court ruling because of their professionalism. As Alec Stone Sweet put it, the more courts manage to solve complex constitutional problems in reasoned terms, the more political and social actors will rely on the courts. This situation, as a result, increases the court’s legitimacy.19 This is made possible in new constitutionalism, because law is no longer a mere instrument of public order, but a means to transformational social justice. Constitutional courts play a special role in attaining this goal. Through their constitutional control of legal norms, courts bring legislation in line with the constitution, ensure the substantial terms of social justice and adapt the purpose of legal norms to social justice in wholly concrete situations. Independent constitutional courts of new constitutionalism, empowered by the contractual delegation of trust, came as the result of three systemic developments.20 The first factor was the emergence of constitutional democracy. Following the tragedy of World War II, many European nations set up democracies with the separation and balancing of powers, independent judiciary and the supremacy of the constitution (guaranteed by a separate constitutional adjudicator). Austria was the first to do so by restoring the federal constitution and the Constitutional Court of the pre-nationalist era, which ended with the global conflict. Germany and Italy established their own constitutional courts shortly after. Spain and Portugal also set up constitutional
19 See more in Stone, A., ‘Judicialisation and the Construction of Governance’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 32, Issue 2, April 1999, pp. 147–184. 20 Kagan, R., Kapiszewski, D., et al., ‘New Judicial Roles in Governance’, in Delany, E. and Dixon, R. (eds.), Comparative Judicial Review, Edward Elgar Publishing, USA and United Kingdom, 2018, pp. 142–163, at pp. 159–160.
235 Enver Hasani tribunals during their transition to democracy in the 1970s. As the Cold War came to an end, the model attained nearly universal presence, having been embraced by countries in former socialist Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. The second important factor was globalisation and liberal trends in the economy. This brought about the promotion of the free market as well as an increased regulatory role of the state, thereby empowering independent courts to interpret new market rules. In this sense, constitutional courts assumed a special role as guarantors of constitutional rights and freedoms that affect economic activity. The third and final factor is closely linked to the second. It has to do with the activist state. Here, the state responds to economic growth with efforts to transform society. This is particularly prevalent is developing nations, where rapid economic growth and social emancipation and integration require a more active role of the government and, consequently, assign constitutional courts another transformational role. These developments have substantially defined or redefined new constitutionalism, the Kelsenian-model constitutional court and the legal profession tied to it. Constitutional justice has now assumed a merited role in governance, orienting society towards constitutional values and principles that guarantee equality for all. This is particularly noted among societies in transition.
II.1. JUDGES CONTROLLING THE PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE LEGISLATION This is the first defining feature of new constitutionalism: not only do constitutional judges control the form in which the sovereign’s will is manifested; they control the content. The content often goes against constitutional norms and principles and the values of modern constitutionalism, which we have described above. Here, we speak not only of legislation, but also of constitutional norms and of any other norm whose adoption is provided by the national constitution. In fact, upholding constitutional principles is most challenging in reviewing proposed constitutional amendments. The constitutional control of legislation, on the other hand, is an ordinary procedure – the very essence of the Kelsenian model of constitutional justice. It is not so with the control of constitutional norms or amendments: these cases typically elicit questions about the legitimacy of constitutional justice and raise doubts about the authority of constitutional courts to control the sovereign’s exercise of its constitution-making power.
II.2. JUDGES CONTROLLING RIGHTS – VIRTUALLY OPEN-ENDED DELEGATION OF POLICY-MAKING AUTHORITY The role of judges in controlling rights emphasises another two features of the European/Kelsenian model. First, judges control constitutional rights and freedom by interpreting them when national norm-makers adopt new legislation
236 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo and constitutional norms. This is the case with countries allowing for the abstract control of legal norms (Italy, for instance) as well in jurisdictions of the concrete constitutional control of legal acts and omissions. Second, constitutional judges control rights and liberties also through special procedures of constitutional complaints. In such cases, judges enter into theoretical and philosophical reasoning that resembles the natural-law discourse of medieval, illuminist and modern-era jurists. This situation – one in which human rights and fundamental liberties form a parameter for the constitutional review of an act or omission of public authorities – was not originally envisaged by the European/Kelsenian model of constitutional justice. This added jurisdiction came at a later stage and has proved highly effective in constraining national norm-makers and increasing the role of constitutional judges in governance.
II.3. CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES’ MONOPOLY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, EFFECTIVELY BANNING JUDICIAL REVIEW BY ORDINARY JUDGES Another basic trait of Kelsenian constitutional justice, in fact, the very reason for its existence, was to build a monopoly on the final interpretation of constitutional law by constitutional adjudicators. As one may notice, the preceding sentence highlights two aspects. The first has to do with the genesis of constitutional justice and the structural reasons that led to its emergence a century ago; the second has to do with the fact that the monopoly on constitutional interpretation encompasses the nation’s entire body of constitutional law, not merely what is codified in the constitutional text. Constitutional justice, as we know it today, arose as a result of the structural defects in the European governments of post-World War I: while democracies across the Atlantic had already enhanced the separation and balancing of powers with the control of constitutionality by the judiciary, which they considered the least dangerous power, this advancement was impossible in Europe. The reasons were structural and tied to the collapse of government systems due to the heightened conservatism of European monarchies, where the judiciary merely granted legitimacy to the ineffective and inefficient government of European monarchs. Instead of serving as a check on the other two powers, the European judiciary sided with the repressive and corrupt regime of the day. In this situation, the solution was sought outside of the classical trichotomy, in a mechanism that is not one of the powers but a check on them. The early theoretical reasons for separate constitutional adjudicators first appeared in the historic debate between the two legal colossi of the time, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. The debate remains today an apology and a source of legitimacy for constitutional justice, but it is also a reference against it (Schmitt was against separate
237 Enver Hasani constitutional adjudicators, with clear constitutional jurisdiction and predefined authorised parties that could petition the court).21 There is no doubt that the primary monopoly of Kelsenian constitutional justice is anchored in the text of the national constitution. This is a widely accepted setup. Some states allow the regular judiciary to disregard legislation of dubious constitutionality, but this does not deprive constitutional adjudicators of their monopoly in constitutional interpretation. In theory, such states – they are mostly in Europe and Latin America – are said to have a hybrid system of constitutional justice. What is of import here is the scope of control, which encompasses the constitutional text and the entirety of constitutional law, which is sometimes scattered among domestic documents, international conventions and other obligations of a constitutional nature that a society has assumed as part of its constitutional system. The most prevalent example for Europe would be the adherence of nation states to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the norms of the European Union. Neither instances involve securing the supremacy of the national constitution, but defending the constitutional identity that is anchored in constitutional law, which consists of a wide gamut of legal texts adopted with the consent of the Members States of the Council of Europe or the EU.22 The three qualities we just described are well reflected in Kosovo’s constitutional jurisprudence. Next, we discuss three decisions of the Constitutional Court to illustrate the first two features: judges controlling the form and content of norm making and judges controlling constitutional rights and freedoms. The cases were selected almost randomly and for illustration purposes only, for the jurisprudence is quite extensive on these matters and it is nearly impractical to do a thorough survey. While none of the three decisions addresses the relationship between Kosovo’s domestic order and the EU and ECHR bodies of law, they nonetheless help explain the main features of the Kelsenian model of constitutional justice. Under the Constitution, the ECHR enjoys directly applicability in Kosovo, as do many other documents of guiding value to EU Member States.23
21 For a thorough overview of the debate, see Samardžić, S., Norma i odluka: Karl Šmit i njegovi kritičari (Filip Višnjić: Beograd, 2001) [Norm and Decision: Carl Schmitt and His Criticisers], published by Belgrade-based publishing house Filip Visnjic, 2001; Vinx, L., The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 22 On the relationship between the ECHR, EU law and domestic law, see Pollicino, O., ‘The New Relationship between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe: Towards a Unitary Theory of Jurisprudential Supranational Law?’, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 29, No 1, 2010, pp. 65–111; Martinico, G., ‘Is the European Convention Going to Be “Supreme”? A Comparative-Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts’, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No 2, May 2012, pp. 401–424. 23 Art. 22 ‘Direct Applicability of International Agreements and Instruments’ of the Constitution of Kosovo:
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II.4. CASE LAW ILLUSTRATION: THE KOSOVO COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR These cases show that the Kosovo Constitutional Court did not use rights-based argumentation, but resorted instead to a contemporary review of constitutionality. In other words, the Court played the role of a ‘positive legislator’.
II.4.1. Powers of acting president From September 2010 to March 2011, the Constitutional Court decided the fate of two presidents of Kosovo. The judgments had an enormous impact on the nation’s institutional life. In both cases, the Court led to the removal of the head of state because of constitutional violations: in the first case, the president himself had violated the Constitution by simultaneously holding the presidency and the chairmanship of a political party;24 in the second case, the Assembly of Kosovo had violated the procedures for the election of the president.25 After President Sejdiu resigned following the Court ruling in September 2010, the Assembly elected Behgjet Pacolli as his successor. But the election was held unconstitutional. In response, political parties resorted to a political agreement in April 2011 to elect Atifete Jahjaga as ‘interim’ president. Based on the agreement, the Assembly began procedures to amend the Constitution to provide for direct presidential elections and to further define the powers of the acting president. The proposal for direct elections is discussed later. Here, we focus on the rules on the acting president. When Sejdiu resigned in September 2010,26 the speaker of the Assembly, Jakup Krasniqi, stepped in as acting president. During this time, Dr. Krasniqi appointed judges and prosecutors, granted pardons and exercised other powers of the president, for which he was criticised by public opinion and other state officials.
‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following international agreements and instruments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions: (1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (2) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; (3) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols; (4) Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; (5) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; (6) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; (7) Convention on the Rights of the Child; (8) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.’ 24 Case KI 47/10, Rrustemi v President Sejdiu, CCRK, Judgment, 28 September 2010. 25 Case KO 29/11, Application of Hamiti et al., Concerning the Election of the President, CCRK, Judgment, 22 February 2011. 26 Case KO 47/10, Judgment, para. 68 and disposition, part II.
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This is why the proposed amendments also sought to curb the role of the acting president.27 The package included restrictions on the right to pardon, appoint judges and prosecutors and exercise other powers such as the declaration of a state of emergency, the appointment of ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions and the awarding of medals and decorations. In reviewing the proposed amendments, the Court held that only the very last of the presidential powers could be denied to the acting president, for they were ordinary matters that could wait. But other competencies, if denied to the acting president, would infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. A delay in the appointment of judges and prosecutors would threaten the administration of justice and jeopardise the right to a fair trial. Failure to declare a state of emergency (in coordination with the Government) when required to do so would also jeopardise human rights and liberties, and withholding due pardons would hurt those qualifying for forgiveness under the law.28 Here, as one may see, the Court acted as a negative legislator with references to Chapter II of the Constitution, which guarantees human rights and freedoms. Any limitation on human rights and freedoms constitutes a valid reason to annul proposed constitutional amendments that are presented to the Court for constitutional control.29
II.4.2. The case of President Jahjaga: the term of office could not be shortened President Atifete Jahjaga took the oath of office on 7 April 2011. Her election was the product of a political agreement for an interim presidency and a series of constitutional amendments that would allow Kosovars to directly elect their head of state, would reform the electoral system and would curtail the powers of the acting president among other changes. The draft amendment on direct election also sought to end Jahjaga’s term prematurely. It was further provided that Jahjaga would be removed six months before her successor was elected. The Constitutional Court declared this stipulation unconstitutional for it violated human rights, namely the active and passive electoral rights of Ms Jahjaga and of all citizens of Kosovo who had expected that a legitimate president’s term would last five years.30 Here, too, the Court relied on Chapter II rights as a material constitutional parameter providing a basis to invalidate the proposed amendments.
27 Cases KO 29/12 and KO 48/12, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, CCRK, Judgment, 20 July 2012, paras. 158–172. 28 Cases KO 29/12 and KO 48/12, paras. 162–171. 29 Art. 113(9) (‘Jurisdiction and Authorised Parties’) of the Constitution: ‘The President of the Assembly of Kosovo refers proposed Constitutional amendments before approval by the Assembly to confirm that the proposed amendment does not diminish the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Chapter II of the Constitution.’ 30 Cases KO 29/12 and KO 48/12, Judgment, paras. 244–286.
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II.4.3. The Law on Health restricting the right to work and exercise profession The ruling on the Law on Health is another case of the Court’s involvement in the legislative process.31 In fact, the case clearly illustrates the Court’s generally non-activist approach, which remains within the bounds of the Kelsenian negative legislator. We have chosen this case precisely because of its great systemic importance on labour relations: debates continue to this day about the right of certain professionals to work concurrently in the public and private sectors. In its ruling, the Court struck as incompatible with Article 49 ‘The Right to Work and Exercise Profession’ of the Constitution certain provision of the Law on Health, which restricted the exercise of profession outside of working hours for those employed in the public sector. This was done because such restrictions had not passed the proportionality test under Article 55 ‘Limitations on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’ of the Constitution.32
III. OUTCOMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY In the Kelsenian model of constitutional justice, the imperfect delegation and relationship between the principal and agent improves through trust. This means that entrusting constitutional adjudicators to interpret in order to implement the national constitution supersedes the parliamentary sovereignty of classical constitutionalism. From now on, parliaments and governments govern according to rules and procedures that are beyond their control as they are enshrined in national constitutions, whose interpretation (for purposes of their implementation) is entrusted to constitutional courts. In practice, the legislative and executive may influence the appointment of constitutional judges and the amendment on the national constitution, as means of influencing constitutional justice policy. However, by instituting the normative superiority of the national constitution, the constitutional court, as the body charged with the control of constitutionality, and the very specific procedures for constitutional amendment (including the preventive control of proposed amendments), the representative body and the national executive have considerably reduced their potential to influence the development of the national constitution. This prerogative belongs solely to one body – the constitutional court. For this reason, the relationship between this court and the executive and representative organ is a relationship based on rules and procedures predefined in the national constitution. As such, the rules and procedures are beyond the control of representative and executive bodies. The same could be said of the rapport between the constitutional adjudicator and the regular judiciary and, particularly, the highest regular court.
31 Case KO 131/12, Application of Muja et al., Constitutional Review of Law No 04/L-125 on Health, CCRK, Judgment, 15 April 2013. 32 Case KO 131/12, Judgment, paras. 127–175, disposition, paras. III–IV.
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In these relationships, it was constitutional courts that had the greater transformative influence, ensuring that the behaviour of the three powers no longer corresponded to the standards of classical constitutionalism and parliamentary sovereignty. The separation of powers here serves as the allocation of responsibilities, where the constitutional court has the most important duty, that of securing the supremacy of the national constitution and making sure that the rules of the game are observed strictly and in accordance with the predefined constitutional parameters.
III.1. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS A TRANSFORMATIVE MECHANISM OF PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOUR Kelsenian constitutional justice provides means to soften majoritarian rule, thereby protecting minorities and ensuring the supremacy of the constitution, which is rooted in ideals of political pluralism and the understanding that majorities and minorities do not remain unchanged. When ethnic minorities and other permanent minorities are concerned, national constitutions prescribe mechanisms to protect and cultivate diversity and ensure the participation of all groups in public life. This system is known as consociational democracy and the constitutional court is tasked with ensuring its implementation. In such democracies, national constitutions define not only the jurisdiction, but also the composition of the constitutional adjudicator. The court’s decision making hence serves only as a guide corroborating the commitment and orientation sanctioned by the constitution. The goal here is to transform the classical parliamentary system by limiting the expression of the will of the representative body. This role of constitutional courts, including the transformational effect on the representative body, is most evident in cases of prolonged socio-political and economic transition. Literature identifies three causes for such an active role of constitutional courts in transforming the parliamentary system.33 The causes have to do with: (1) structural factors; (2) current political dynamics; and (3) factors pertaining to the courts.
III.1.1. Structural factors The basic features of the political regime are at the top of structural factors. This includes an assessment of whether a state is democratic or autocratic. Among democracies, federations differ from unitary states in that power is fragmented among the federal units. Other questions include whether the state has a parliamentary form of government or one based on the separation and balancing of powers and whether the country is a new or consolidated, traditional democracy. In all these cases, the role of courts and constitutional justice differs. The role and position of constitutional
33 Kagan, R., Kapiszewski, D., et al., footnote 20, pp. 150–157.
242 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo justice in reigning parliamentary majority will be weaker in countries with a lesser tradition of democracy and with a unitary nature of the state. The next structural factor of importance is the legal status of the judiciary in general. This includes the tradition of independence from political interference, the tradition of constitutional review and the degree of support constitutional justice and the judiciary in general enjoy among lawyers, judges, prosecutors, scholars and others. The impact of supranational and international forces is also important as a structural factor. This points to the state’s international obligations, which inevitably place a reign on the majority’s will. Such is the case with Kosovo’s commitment to the Special Court, which was founded in 2015 as a result of the international obligation to prosecute and try war crimes and crimes against humanity and international law allegedly committed during and after the Kosovo war (1998–1999). In addition to contractual obligations, there are other restrictions derived from supranational structures, such as the European Union, the Council of Europe or other organisations whose norms significantly restrict the activity of national norm-makers, with constitutional courts obliged to ensure the constitutionality of such obligations. Many national constitutions provide for the so-called control of conventionality. In other words, they have authorised constitutional courts to control whether laws and other domestic acts are in line with obligations assumed under international agreements or other means that create international obligations (as is the case with erga omnes obligations). This jurisdiction also exists in Kosovo: the Constitutional Court may perform the conventionality control of constitutional amendments.34 Finally, structural factors also include the degree to which the country depends on external actors politically, culturally and economically. Such is the case with Latin American countries, whose constitutional courts are very similar in jurisdiction to the tribunals in Spain and Italy and much less to the courts in the United States or countries of greater geographic proximity. Former French colonies have also modelled their constitutional justice following its former colonial master (e.g. some of the countries of west Africa). In Kosovo’s case, this structural factor was present during the period of internationally supervised independence (2008–2012). At the time, the Constitutional Court was bound to uphold the supremacy of the Ahtisaari Plan rather than the 2008 Constitution. This solution was temporary, ending in September 2012, when the Constitutional Court cleared the proposed constitutional amendments that put an end to supervision.35 This is so because the 2008 Declaration of Independence itself was, in Hans Kelsen’s words, ‘the historically first constitution’, which makes up the grundnorm preceding all other legal acts adopted on the eve of the Declaration and its
34 Art. 113(3)(4) (‘Jurisdiction and Authorised Parties’) of the Constitution: ‘compatibility of a proposed constitutional amendment with binding international agreements ratified under this Constitution and the review of the constitutionality of the procedure followed’. 35 Case KO 38/12, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, CCRK, Judgment, 15 May 2012.
243 Enver Hasani aftermath. Kelsen compared the grundnorm with a deity whose existence we presume but do not contest. The Declaration is hence the founding instrument of the sovereign state of Kosovo, which represents the exercise of original constitution-making power and presents a break with the past: everything else derives from this act.36 The Declaration promised that Kosovo would implement the Ahtisaari Plan and adopt a constitution based on the Plan. The Constitution was adopted, as noted, on 15 April 2008 and came into effect on June 15 that year. The commitment made in the Declaration was a unilateral one with erga omnes effect, towards the international community in general. This means that the Declaration is a grundnorm, which is presumed, and forms the basis for the Ahtisaari Plan and the 2008 Constitution.37 As to the latter two, the Declaration sanctioned the temporary supremacy of the Plan (during the period of supervised independence).38 Ahtisaari was the reason for the 2008 Constitution, hence the Ahtisaari Plan came at the top of the constitutional norms, but with a transitional effect, for the duration of international supervision.39 This temporary hierarchy of norms is attributed to the role of the international community. With their participation in the exercise of constitution-making power during the declaration of independence, internationals left their substantial mark in the Declaration, as they did in key processes of many post-conflict societies.40 Under these circumstances, the 2008 Constitution should be seen as a process that serves multiple goals, not merely as a single act that serves for the creation of other legal norms. All these structural factors influence in their own way the capacity of the national judiciary and of constitutional courts to assume certain roles in the governance of the nation.
III.1.2. Political dynamics Political dynamics include situations of political pressure, which could generate demands for action by the constitutional court or, the other around, foster resistance to involving the constitutional court in expressing the national political will. The history of constitutional justice has shown that when a country is politically divided on a particular issue, constitutional courts are more likely that not to step and solve the issue. Such issues may include the use of religious symbols, discrimination and
36 See Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law, Lawbook Exchange Ltd., New Jersey, 2002, 2009, pp. 193–194 and 198–205. 37 See Doli, D. and Fisnik, K., ‘What about Kosovo’s Constitution: Is There Anything Special? Discussing the Grundnorm, the Sovereignty, and the Consociational Model of Democracy’, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, Vol. 5, No 1, March 2011, pp. 49–70, 54–55, 69. 38 Ibid., the authors contest the Plan’s supremacy. 39 Aucoin, L., ‘Views from the Field on Constitution Writing: The Case of Kosovo (Interview)’, Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Vol. XXIII, 2008, pp. 123–128, at p. 124. 40 Hay, E., ‘International(ised) Constitutions and Peacebuilding’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No 1, March 2014, pp. 141–168, at pp. 144–145.
244 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo other matters related to constitutional democracy, such as pluralism and diversity. Additionally, daily political dynamics may be such as to homogenise a political grouping to the extent that parliamentary majorities also change, leading to a complete defactorisation and marginalisation of constitutional courts. Such has been the case with the constitutional courts and regular judiciary of Hungary and Poland.41
III.1.3. Judicial factors Finally, the active role of constitutional justice stems from structural factors pertaining to constitutional courts. Of course, constitutional courts may include supreme courts or other high courts that carry the functions of constitutional justice, regardless of appellation. Structural factors tied to constitutional courts have to do with the intellectual profile of the chief judge, of the several judges and the motives, strategies, techniques and tactics they use in handling constitutional cases and controversies. The decisive role of the court’s president is illustrated by Israeli chief justice Ahron Barak. During his tenure as president of the Supreme Court, Barak spearheaded the so-called constitutional revolution, laying the doctrinal basis for the supremacy of Israel’s basic laws over ordinary legislation and, consequently, their effect as norms guiding the constitutional review of other acts. Similarly, chief justices of India and Pakistan challenged the authoritarian leaders of their respective countries.42 Another related factor is the constitutional court’s desire to strengthen and preserve its legitimacy. South Africa is mentioned as a typical example, for its Constitutional Court actively promoted human rights to prevent discrimination and inequality that once plagued the nation. Common law jurisdictions often use various techniques to stall judicial activism. These techniques include the ‘political issue doctrine’, which contends that certain matters are of such nature as to exclude judicial solution. The continental civil-law system is less welcoming to such restrictions, for constitutional courts have clearly defined jurisdiction, which is complemented and operationalised by the organic law that regulates their international organisation and procedures, such that any renunciation of responsibilities would constitute the abuse of power amounting to criminal offense and imprudent behaviour. Constitutional adjudicators have often devised rules and procedural instruments to expand their participation in governance and to assist in democratic processes.
41 For more on this matter, see the following articles discussing the return to authoritarianism and the destruction of constitutional justice in Hungary, Poland and other countries with a tradition of authentic constitutional democracy: Brown, N. and Waller, J., ‘Constitutional Courts and Political Uncertainty: Constitutional Ruptures and the Rule of Judges’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 14, No 4, October 2016, pp. 817–850; Halmai, G., ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?’, Constellations, Vol. 19, No 2, 2012, pp. 182–203. 42 See more in Kagan, R., Kapiszewski, D., et al., footnote 20, p. 155.
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Such was the case with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling to expand the habeas corpus right of arrestees and detainees, acknowledging their right to challenge local and state court decisions in the federal court. The Supreme Court of India, similarly, liberalised the criteria for active legitimacy (or standing) to hear petitions by persons arrested or detained indefinitely.43 There are also rulings where courts invent procedures to admit cases that affect their legitimacy. Following the Orange Revolution (November 2004–January 2005) in Ukraine, political opponents, embroiled in accusations of electoral fraud, turned to the Supreme Court for an answer. Instead of a standard three-court panel, the Court set a plenary hearing before the entire civil department and arranged for live broadcasting on national television to demonstrate its impartiality.44 Finally, judiciary-related structural factors include tactics of decision-making where a constitutional court may admit the unconstitutionality of an act or omission but, at the same time, deny the legal remedy sought by the party. In Marbury v Madison (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court established the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and the judiciary’s prerogative to exercise constitutional review of laws. But the Court declined to annul the act of appointment as sought by Marbury. In the Bank Hamizrachi case (1995), the Israeli Supreme Court assumed the power of the constitutional control of laws adopted by the Knesset, which had until then been a mission impossible. But the Court held the law impugned had instituted proportional measures limiting the right to property, which was at stake, and the claimant was denied relief.45
III.2. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS A TRANSFORMATIVE MECHANISM OF THE REGULAR JUDICIARY The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in Kosovo have interacted within constitutional parameters: cases of incidental control have been very rare, consisting of a negligible share of the docket, for the Supreme Court is reluctant to initiate cases. Supreme Court judges prefer the classical interpretation of laws, setting aside the Constitution and the case law of the Constitutional Court. Exceptions are made where the Constitutional Court has declared a ruling of the Supreme Court unconstitutional and remanded the case. The Constitutional Court then provides clear instructions on how to correct the decision, including an order to keep the Constitutional Court informed of further actions. The same holds true for other regular courts: the number of petitions for incidental control are extremely rare and for the same reasons. This shows that Kosovo needs to increase awareness about the benefits of incidental control and its effect in constitutionalising the legal order. This concept
43 Ibid., p. 156. 44 Ibid., pp. 156–157. 45 Ibid., p. 157.
246 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo implies three goals: first, removing from the legal order laws that are contaminated with unconstitutionality; second, increasing awareness about constitutional norms as a primary source of law that must be applied by parties and the judiciary in deciding concrete cases; and, third, in conceiving the logic of constitutional reasoning – in the letter and spirit of the Constitution – among regular-court judges when handling concrete cases and controversies. That is so not because the Constitutional Court may tacitly serve as another instance of the judiciary, but because its jurisprudence will ensure the unification of Kosovar constitutional law. Individual complaints under Article 113(7) of the Constitution – they make up 95 per cent of all cases – undoubtedly spurred the constitutionalisation of the Kosovar legal order. Kosovo’s condition differs from other countries that allow for full or partial constitutional complaints. Through this procedure, as in cases of incidental control, the Constitutional Court controls the final result of the judgments of the regular judiciary, thereby helping with the unification of Kosovar constitutional law and bridging the gap between the constitution and laws. Finally, abstract-control procedures, which make up the second largest number of cases, have contributed exceptionally to systematic constitutionalisation. The Court controlled the pace and results of lawmaking and helped consolidate Kosovo’s new constitutional identity – one based on the premises of consociational constitutional democracy, the rule of law, the separation and balancing of powers, human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect for the rights of non-majority communities. Having all three competences enabled the Kosovo Constitutional Court to achieve a level of enviable constitutionalism fairly quickly. This was not the case with constitutional adjudicators lacking concrete-control jurisdiction and full constitutional complaint mechanisms. For example, France allowed no incidental control until 2010 and Italy had no constitutional complaints or the abstract control of constitutionality.
III.3. CASE LAW ILLUSTRATION: THE COURT AS A GUIDE TO CONSOLIDATING KOSOVO’S CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY The following cases depict the Court’s indispensable role in strengthening the country’s constitutional identity – an identity based on parliamentary consociational democracy, the separation of powers, the rule of law and human and minority rights.
III.3.1. Prizren logo case: representing cultural diversity This case involves the cultural rights of non-majority communities in the municipality of Prizren.46 The subject of constitutional control was the statute of
46 Case KO 01/09, Application of Kurtiši, Prizren logo case, CCRK, Judgment, 18 March 2010.
247 Enver Hasani the municipality itself. The case reached the Constitutional Court by petition of the deputy chairman of the municipal assembly, who argued that the statute’s provision on the logo – with references to the history of the Albanian majority – undermined the equality of communities and the preservation of their ethnic, linguistic, religious and other identities of the communities living in Kosovo.47 The Constitutional Court agreed and the mayor of Prizren later informed the Court that the municipal statute had been amended so that the logo would reflect the unique identity of all communities.48
III.3.2. Agreements with Serbia: review of treaties and constitutional order Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 and its recognition by most sovereign states, the international community called on Kosovo and Serbia to begin dialogue that would resolve technical matters between the two countries. At the time, Kosovo readily answered the call, since the international community, particularly the United States and the EU, had been instrumental in creating the Kosovar state. The process eventually turned political. Several agreements were reached in the meantime with the most important being the ‘First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations’, signed on 19 April 2013. The instrument was ratified on 27 June 2013 by the Kosovo Assembly.49 We refer to it as ‘the First Agreement’. The First Agreement contains 15 paragraphs or sections, with the first 6 providing – in broad and concrete terms – for the establishment of an association of ethnic-Serb majority municipalities (hereinafter ‘the Serb Association’). The Association, according to the First Agreement, is established by a statute or charter and modelled after the existing structure of the current Association of Kosovo Municipalities. Next, to bring this international obligation to life, Kosovo and Serbia signed another instrument, the Second Agreement, which was concluded after the Frist Agreement had been ratified in the parliament. The Second Agreement, however, became the subject of a Constitutional Court’s judgment, which holds many of its provisions as unconstitutional.50 The judgment, however, states in its operative part that
47 Ibid., paras. 12, 15–17. 48 On 18 June 2010, the mayor of Prizren sent a letter to the Court asking for a 60-day extension to the three-month deadline set by the judgment in case KI 01/09. The Court approved the mayor’s request by the order of 21 June 2010. The municipality of Prizren finally complied with the Court’s judgment on 24 March 2011 when it changed the municipal logo. 49 Law No 04/L-199 on Ratification of the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, No 38/13, 17 September 2013. 50 Case KO 130/15, Application of President Jahjaga, Concerning Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities, CCRK, Judgment, 23 December 2015.
248 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo the Serb Association is a constitutional and international obligation for the Republic of Kosovo.51 It is so based on the First Agreement, signed and ratified in 2013. The First Agreement is an international treaty that, according to Article 18(1) (‘Ratification of International Agreements’) of the Constitution, must be ratified in the Assembly by two thirds of its members.52 Under Article 18(1), agreements are not subject to constitutional control by the Constitutional Court. If this were to be permitted, then constitutional adjudicators would interfere in the states’ international communication and consequently assume the role of an international tribunal. This is the position held by the Constitutional Court in its judgment concerning the First Agreement.53 The ruling makes it clear that countries permitting the constitutional control of treaties do so only for instruments prior to their ratification by the representative body (i.e. domestic ratification). Once they are ratified, constitutional review is not permitted for it would seriously hinder intergovernmental relations. The Second Agreement has a total of 22 paragraphs expounding on the provisions of the First Agreement. But it does so considering the Serb Association, an entity that protects and promotes the interests of local Serbs and enjoys an administrative-legal status on par with legal persons recognised under Kosovo public law. The agreement gives the Government the authority to decree the statute of the Association, while the Constitutional Court is granted ‘additional jurisdiction’ to control the constitutionality of the statute after its drafting by a managing commission and its approval by government decree. At first sight, the Second Agreement clearly deviates from the framework set under the First Agreement, because it provides for a legal entity with rights and obligations at central and local government levels, in a way could severely undermine the fundamental principles of the constitutional order. Through its 2013 and 2015 judgments on the two agreements with Serbia, the Court participated in governance supplying the executive with a roadmap on concluding international agreements, their legal nature and the role and position of the Assembly of Kosovo in making agreements part of the domestic legal order.
51 Ibid., Disposition, § II. 52 Art. 18 ‘Ratification of International Agreements’ of the Constitution: ‘1. International agreements relating to the following subjects are ratified by two thirds (2/3) vote of all deputies of the Assembly: (1) territory, peace, alliances, political and military issues; (2) fundamental rights and freedoms; (3) membership of the Republic of Kosovo in international organisations; (4) the undertaking of financial obligations by the Republic of Kosovo.’ 53 Case KO 95/13, Constitutional Review of Law No 04/L-199 on Ratification of the First International Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia and the Implementation Plan of this Agreement, CCRK, Judgment, 9 September 2013.
249 Enver Hasani
III.3.3. Raiffeisen Bank: protecting consumers from usury The Constitutional Court solved this case by a resolution that upheld a ruling of the Supreme Court.54 In the Constitutional Court’s practice, over 90 per cent of cases are decided by resolutions upholding the Supreme Court’s decision making as within the permitted constitutional parameters. The Raiffeisen Bank case is no exception. Declared ‘manifestly ill-founded and thus inadmissible’,55 the referral came from a commercial bank that had lost its civil-law contest in all stages of the Kosovar judiciary. Raiffeisen then asked the Constitutional Court to overturn the ruling of the Supreme Court, which held that penalty interest for failure to pay the principal could not be contracted for monetary payments. For such payments, penalty interest has long been determined by law, not by contract between the parties, which would constitute unjust enrichment, as held by all instances of the regular judiciary.56 The Raiffeisen case helped build a relationship based on mutual trust between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, for the ruling confirmed that – in constitutional terms – there is a clear and strict division of responsibilities between the two bodies. The Constitutional Court ensures the application of the norms and principles of the 2008 Constitution. Any time it reviews the decision making of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court hears a case or controversy while simultaneously enforcing the Constitution as the highest law of the land. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, ensures the uniform application of laws, whose constitutionality is presumed, for the whole territory of Kosovo. The Constitution specifies that courts ought to decide cases in accordance with the Constitution and laws. But this provision is not an authorisation to directly apply constitutional norms or, worse, to apply those norms to the exclusion of legislation. The Constitutional Court has a similar effect on the regular judiciary even when overturning its decision making. Judgments in such cases provide clear instructions on how the Supreme Court or other courts should act for purposes of addressing unconstitutionality as identified by the Constitutional Court. This means that the regular judiciary follows the instructions given in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, thereby satisfying the constitutional obligation to comply with the Constitution and laws. The legal effect of theRaiffeisen ruling was colossal for it simply upheld a thoroughly constitutional and lawful decision of the Supreme Court and other courts, which had disallowed the conversion of late-payment interest into a penalty interest – in other words, they had prevented legalising usury. Until then, Raiffeisen and other commercial banks had collected millions of euros from Kosovar citizens.
54 Case KI 118/14, Raiffeisen Bank Kosovo J.S.C., Constitutional Review of Judgment E. Rev. no 24/2013 of the Supreme Court of Kosovo of 5 February 2014, CCRK, Resolution on Inadmissibility, 9 March 2015. 55 Ibid., para. 89. 56 Ibid., paras. 55–84.
250 Constitutional review of democracy: Key decisions of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo
The decision instituted discipline and ethics among financial institutions, which had exploited the unfavourable position of their clients for unjust enrichment. While involving the abstract control of constitutionality, the Microfinance Law case, decided some time before Raiffeisen, is conceptually related.57 The ruling prevented the exploitation of the financial quandary of impoverished citizens, as permitted by the unconstitutional law on small loans. This state of legislative apathy came from a limited knowledge of financial regulation in a market economy. Human rights and fundamental freedoms were the reference point for both cases. It is noteworthy that attorneys representing the lenders in these cases were among those who had become inexplicably wealthy after the Kosovo War, mainly serving as brokers between the judiciary, prosecutors and their clients.
CONCLUSIONS This paper has shown that constitutional courts have immensely impacted the work of legislators. Kosovo is no exception in this regard. This is, in fact, the oldest aspect of constitutional justice and is generally known as the ‘negative legislator’ role of constitutional courts. Most of the time, constitutional courts remain within the confine of this classical duty. History shows, however, that out of necessity and as a matter of pragmatic policy, constitutional courts may overstep their competences acting not only as ‘positive legislators’, but also as creative policymakers involved in the governance of society. This is also observed in the Kosovo case law surveyed in this paper. The impact of legislators is part and parcel of constitutional justice when legislation and other acts are reviewed in abstract. Along with abstract control, constitutional courts enact constitutions and clarify the constitutional law of the country. This enactment and its corollary, the clarification of constitutional law, stretch beyond abstract control covering other competences of constitutional courts. The cases mentioned in this paper, including those relating to the jurisprudence in Kosovo, show this unequivocally. The constitutional court may influence lawmakers directly, as a ‘negative legislator’, or indirectly, by self-limitation or corrective revision. The latter transpires as legislators anticipate policy preferences of the court and act to prevent a finding of unconstitutionality. Lawmakers acting ahead of a final court judgment was seen in the Kosovar case of Krasniqi v RTK. Abstract-control cases cited in this paper showed that the Kosovo Constitutional Court generally remained within the confines of the negative legislator without much resort to substantial activism. The interpretation and clarification of national constitutional law goes beyond the review of legislation; it is part of a process known as the constitutionalisation
57 Case KO 97/12, Ombudsperson, Constitutional Review of Articles 90, 95(1.6), 110, 111 and 116 of the Law on Banks, Microfinance Institutions and Non-Bank Financial Institutions, No 04/L-093, of 12 April 2012, CCRK, Judgment, 12 April 2013.
251 Enver Hasani of the legal order. This term connotes as follows: the constitution is a direct source of law; constitutional courts serve as super-courts of appeal in constitutional matters; constitutional decision-making is a model for argumentation not only for the legislature, but for the regular judiciary and other branches of public power, in particular, when it comes to the argumentation of constitutional rights and liberties and their scope of application. Several Kosovo cases illustrate this process. Here, Kosovo’s constitutionalisation logic is simple, since Article 53 of the Constitution clearly recognises the case law of the European Court in Strasbourg as a standard for interpreting human rights and fundamental liberties. This reliance on Strasbourg jurisprudence explains why the Constitutional Court’s rulings in Kosovo are supposed to permeate the entire constitutional system. Additionally, constitutionalisation has found solid grounds in Kosovo owing to the Constitutional Court’s broad jurisdiction. Handling the abstract and concrete control of constitutionality and individual complaints, the Kosovo tribunal is much like its counterparts in Germany, Spain and some former socialist countries in Eastern Europe.
252 Cristina Hermida Del Llano Conscientious objection in democratic systems
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS
Prof. Dr. Cristina Hermida Del Llano Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain
INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTUAL APPROACH Whoever objects to the law for reasons of conscience, which may come from a moral code or freedom of conscience,1 seeks that the Law exempts him or her complying with a set of rules or obligations. The legal system should carve out exceptions to legal obligations in recognition of the importance of moral or conscientious reasons, tolerating non-compliance,2 because tolerating freedom of conscience has moral value.3 In fact, in most democratic systems characterised by reasonable pluralism, conscientious objection has been recognised ‘as an instance or remedy that realistically prevents anyone from being harmed when the laws do not contemplate their moral interests’.4 In fact, there is no lack of authors who insist that the most important novelty of the normative constitutions of our century is the configuration of fundamental rights that serve to protect minorities.5 According to Barranco, ‘as a requirement of respect for minorities – which is an essential characteristic of a pluralist regime – and, in short, to strengthen legitimacy by favouring criticism of the system, certain formulae of disobedience can be justified even in the context of a legitimate state’.6 It could be said that conscientious objection refers us to an elementary prerequisite for democratic debate: the public sphere should be the place where various moral proposals intersect. As Ollero has maintained, behind each such moral proposal, there is always an ideological or religious support, which should not be a source of enforcement, because it would be antidemocratic: ‘The public must be the
1 Already the Antigone of Sophocles highlighted the importance of conscientious objection, giving it a positive and valuable character, worthy of being protected. Recall that, in the work, represented for the first time in 442 BC, the protagonist objects to the decree of the King, Creon, to refuse to bury the body of his brother, Polinices, Antigone begs her sister Ismene to help her secure a burial, but only Antigone defies the law in favour of ‘divine law’. 2 Prieto, L., ‘La objeción de conciencia sanitaria’, in Gascón, M., et al. (coords.), Derecho sanitario y bioética. Cuestiones actuales, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2011, pp. 981–982. 3 Leiter, B., Why Tolerate Religion?, Princeton University Press, 2012. 4 Papayannis, D. M., ‘La objeción de conciencia en el marco de la razón pública’, Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Palermo, Año 9, No 1, julio 2008, p. 71. 5 Guillén López, E., ‘Sobre la Libertad Religiosa. Principios Constitucionales’, in WebIslam.com, 15 September 1997, p. 1. 6 Barranco Avilés, M. C., ‘La moral en el Derecho y el conflicto entre ley y conciencia’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, Mª Isabel Garrido Gómez and Mª Carmen Barranco Avilés (eds.), Dykinson, Madrid, 2011, p. 113.
253 Cristina Hermida Del Llano agora of the argued debate.’7 Let us bear in mind that the opposite position can lead us to a paternalistic model8 in which the Law is used to impose the performance of behaviours in order to protect them, ignoring the autonomy of the subjects. Just as one can reproach paternalism, from my point of view, the limitation of individual rights by public authorities requires justification.9 According to this, it could be said that conscientious objection falls within an interpretative line that is characteristic of the political philosophy of constitutionalism and limits to power, where the rights of individuals have a preferential position over power. The limitation of rights by public authorities carries with it, therefore, a burden of justification.10 We can draw on a rich tradition of legal and political philosophical thought that, since the humanist Renaissance, has insisted that the autonomy of the will be respected, based on the anthropocentric vision that man controls his own destiny and could, by virtue of his freedom, decide for himself his conduct. It is worth remembering here the illustrious figure of Thomas More, who resigned from his post as Chancellor of England in 1531 alleging, precisely, reasons of conscience. Thomas More would, thus, become a clear ‘conscientious objector’ and one of the first defenders of tolerance by opposing any persecution for reasons of convictions or beliefs, as exemplified in his work Utopia.11 This way of understanding conscientious objection is linked to the idea that the liberal and secular (non-secular) legal system grants freedom of conscience, a value of its own, by respecting each other’s convictions and renouncing any argument of authority over conscience, as long as there is no attempt against the needs of public safety, public order, health or public morality.12
I. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE We could say that objection is respected to the extent that the legal system is capable of supporting it, because, as Ollero points out, ‘if we recognised it
7 Ollero, A., El derecho a la verdad. Valores para una sociedad pluralista, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2005, p. 37. 8 As is well known, this issue leads us to also reflect on low budgets, which is justified for the Law to become an instrument to impose moral content. To this question authors have answered with forcefulness, from antagonistic positions, moralism and liberalism. Vid., e.g. the arguments facing Hart, H. L. A. and Devlin, Lord P., in Dworkin, R. M. (comp.), Filosofía del Derecho (translation by Sáinz, J.), Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1977. Also, vid. Laporta, F., Entre la moral y el derecho, Fontamara, México, 1993. 9 Vid. Prieto, L., El constitucionalismo de los derechos. Ensayos de filosofía jurídica, Trotta, Madrid, 2013, pp. 301–303. 10 Prieto, L., footnote 2, pp. 989–990. 11 Vid. More, T., Utopía (translation by García Estébanez, E.), Tecnos, Madrid, 1987; Utopía, Preliminary Study by Antonio Poch, Ed. Altaya, Barcelona, 1993. Also, Touchard, J., Historia de las ideas políticas, Tecnos, Madrid, 2006, pp. 210–213. 12 Papayannis, D. M., footnote 4, p. 76.
254 Conscientious objection in democratic systems unconditionally, we would be in full civil disobedience’. 13 Indeed, it is important not to confuse civil disobedience with conscientious objection. The question to be elucidated is the criterion that differentiates them and the assumptions that underlie them. We refer to conscientious objection to a confrontation between public ethics and private ethics; while, in the case of civil disobedience, two versions of public ethics face each other.14 Conscientious objection could be legally defined as disobedience that is connected to the fundamental rights of religious freedom, of beliefs, of conscience, with a strictly ethical content and not a political manifestation.15 Santamaría16 highlights how modern doctrine, through Bedau and Rawls, differentiates between civil disobedience and conscientious objection for the nature and political purpose that characterise the first and which, instead, do not concur in the second.17 Indeed, civil disobedience is aimed at modifying a legal norm and a political decision; conscientious objection, on the other hand, has a strictly ethical and/or religious nature and is aimed at breaching a legal norm to safeguard the moral integrity of the objector. The concordance between ethical principles (internal scope) and practical behaviour (external scope) would be broken by following what the norm prescribes. As Papayannis points out, ‘obedience to the right cannot demand from reasonable citizens the breach of their moral duties’.18 This should not be understood as a general right to disobedience.19 In relation to the Spanish Constitution, the Spanish Constitutional Court was blunt, clarifying this issue, in Judgment 161/87 of 27 October: ‘Conscientious objection in general, that is, the right to be exempted from compliance with Constitutional or legal duties if such compliance were contrary to the convictions, is not recognised nor can it be imagined that it is recognised in our Law or in any Law, as it would mean the very denial of the idea of the State. Such objection can be permissible only as an exception and regarding a specific duty.’ In my view, precisely because conscientious objection is not intended to convey a political ideology but has a private and individual character, it should be legally respected and protected. Not so civil disobedience, which constitutes a violation of
13 Ollero, A., El derecho en Teoría, Aranzadi, Navarra, 2007, p. 202. 14 Barranco Avilés, M. C., footnote 6, p. 114. 15 Pérez de Ayala, J. L., ‘Objeciones de Conciencia y Derecho Tributario’, Estudios de la Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, 2010, Dykinson, Madrid, 2011, p. 326. Thesis previously defended by Santamaría Íbeas, J. J., ‘Estado de Derecho, objeción de conciencia y desobediencia civil’, in AA.VV., Estudios en homenaje al profesor Peces-Barba, Madrid, 2008, Vol. III, p. 1167 y ss. 16 Santamaría Íbeas, J. J., footnote 15, p. 1167 y ss. 17 Barranco Avilés, M. C., footnote 6, pp. 113–114. 18 Papayannis, D. M., footnote 4, p. 76. 19 Gascón Abellán, M., ‘Notas sobre la existencia de un posible derecho general a la desobediencia’, XII Jornadas de Filosofía Jurídica y Social: Obligatoriedad y derecho, Universidad de Oviedo, Oviedo, 1991, pp. 281–292.
255 Cristina Hermida Del Llano the legal system with a political purpose, as occurs in cases of the so-called ‘fiscal objection’,20 since this is not an imperative of conscience, but a manifestation of the objector’s ethical or political preferences (Arrieta, Dalmau).21 The question of obligation was treated already by Hugo Grotius, who differentiated between political (legal) and personal freedom; by means of the latter, one can disobey – the author says – a mandate from the sovereign that is in conflict with the natural law. For the Dutch jurist, society identified with the State, so that when the members of the community felt that the public authority was not working in accordance with the community, the contract could be terminated and the right to resistance was justified.22
II. NORMATIVISM VS DECISIONISM The current debate on conscientious objection in democratic systems inevitably leads us to take sides in the dispute between normativism and decisionism, rules and principles, positivism and constitutionalism, etc. In other words, we need to enter fully into the debate between supporters of the rule of law (such as Forsthoff, Raz, Hart, Laporta) and supporters of the so-called ‘constitutionalist paradigm’ (such as Nino, Alexy, Dworkin, Ferrajoli, Atienza, Ruiz Manero would be placed).23 The criticism of legal positivism made by neo-constitutionalism is an internal criticism. Its supporters believe that it is fidelity to the spirit of legalistic positivism that leads to its burial. Let us not forget that legal positivism defends an attitude of reverence towards legislated law, because anything above the law, such as ethical criteria, would be
20 On the issue of tax objection, I refer to the work of Pérez de Ayala, J. L., footnote 15, pp. 323–345. 21 Pérez de Ayala, J. L., footnote 15, pp. 343–344. In this same sense, also vid. Navarro-Valls, R., ‘Las objeciones de conciencia. La objeción de conciencia fiscal’, in AA.VV.,Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado Español, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1993, pp. 504–508. 22 Vid. Grocio, H., Del derecho de la guerra y de la paz (1625) (translation by Torrubiano, J.), Reus, S. A. (ed.), Madrid, 1925. 23 About this doctrinal controversy, vid. Atienza, M., Laporta, F., ‘Imperio de la ley y constitucionalismo’, El Cronista del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, Núm. 0, octubre 2008, pp. 46–55; vid. also Peña, L., ‘Fundamentos metafísicos del Derecho Natural’, Una filosofía del derecho en acción, coordinated by Cristina Hermida and José Antonio Santos, Congreso de los Diputados, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, 2015, pp. 411–442. Among all those who defend different types of neo-constitutionalism, vid. García Figueroa, A., Criaturas de la moralidad: Una aproximación neoconstitucionalista al derecho a través de los derechos, Madrid, Trotta, 2009. Also, I recommend Atienza and Ruiz Manero, ‘Dejemos atrás el positivismo jurídico’, Isonomía, No 27, October 2007, pp. 7–28. About the inclusive legal positivism, vid. El caballo de Troya del positivismo jurídico: Estudios críticos sobre el Inclusive Legal Positivism, Etcheverry, J. B. and Serna, P. (eds.), Granada, Comares, 2010; vid. also Bayón, J. C., ‘El contenido mínimo del positivismo jurídico’, in Zapatero, V., (comp.), Horizontes de la filosofía del derecho, Publ. Universidad de Alcalá, Madrid, 2002, pp. 33–54.
256 Conscientious objection in democratic systems suspect, as these would be the subject of each one within his or her internal jurisdiction, in line of philosophers of law such as Thomasius24 or Kant,25 among others. Emphasising legalist positivism against the constitutionalist implies, in my view, a setback in the search for social justice. Here I will try to explain why, by referring, in particular, to conscientious objection. For this, I will use Robert Alexy’s principalist theory,26 from which a fundamental rights theory is established. Let us bear in mind that his conception falls within a range of theories under the hegemony of strict legal positivism, such as Dworkin’s, for example, who uses the principles to give normative foundation to individual rights. The structural theory of fundamental rights that Alexy presents constitutes a continuation of the analytical tradition of conceptual jurisprudence, although, as he himself tried to clarify, rather than claiming to create a ‘mathematics of law’, in the words of Ihering, what he wanted to do was to take from the ‘framework of logic’ what is therein correct and indispensable for jurisprudence.27 As we said before, when one approaches the issue of conscientious objection, one is faced with the dilemma posed by conflicts between public ethics and private ethics that place the individual before the need to choose between the fulfilment of their moral obligations and obedience to the Law.28 Let us keep in mind the observation that Alexy made in 1989 when he detects and highlights the claim of authority as a defining feature of the Law, the pretension to dictate norms and require obedience to its subjects, which is referred to as a ‘claim of correction’. Which indicates that a Constitution could not, without pragmatic contradiction, defend that its provisions are unfair since by nature it would have to go in search of justice to try to obligate its citizens. In other words: the Constitution is built with the aim of achieving social legitimacy, that is, the rational social adherence to norms by citizens and this will be more easily achieved if it has a good measure of legitimacy. What seems unquestionable is that ‘it does not seem reasonable to maintain, in legal terms, the existence of a right to object to the law’.29 It would seem paradoxical 24 Thomasius, Ch., Fundamentos de Derecho natural y de gentes (1705) (translation by Rus Rufino, S., and Sánchez Manzano, A.), Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, Preliminary Study by Cremades, J. J. G.; Rodríguez Paniagua, J. M., ‘Las doctrinas sobre la tolerancia religiosa de fines del siglo XVII y la distinción entre moral y derecho a principios del XVIII’, Anuario de Derechos Humanos, 4, 1986/1987, p. 374 y ss. 25 Kant, I., La metafísica de las costumbres, Colección Grandes Obras del Pensamiento, Altaya, Barcelona, 1994, p. 374. 26 For Alexy, a model based on principles can help fill the gaps, because ‘from the principles, from the collision law, valid legal consequences can be deduced understood as requirements or mandates of the legal system itself and not external to it’. Vid. Suárez-Rodríguez, J. J., ‘El argumento de los principios en la teoría contemporánea del derecho: un alegato antipositivista’, Civilizar, 12(22), enero-junio 2012, p. 72. 27 Alexy, R., Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1993, p. 46. 28 Barranco Avilés, M. C., ‘La moral en el Derecho y el conflicto entre ley y conciencia’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, op. cit., p. 107. 29 Ollero, A., footnote 13, p. 205.
257 Cristina Hermida Del Llano that the legal system included a general right to disobedience, as Alexy himself emphasises in defending the claim of authority and the requirement of obedience on the part of citizens. Conscientious objection raises the question of whether it is possible and justifiable and, if so, in which cases, that the Law supports the citizen who feels morally obliged to avoid complying with a specific rule that goes strongly against one’s conscience. Put another way, what we are asking here is (1) if there is an exception to this overarching claim that the Law is correct; (2) if yes, which body is responsible for creating it: the legislator or the judge? Let us analyse the first question. Obviously, it is based on the premise that conscience exists and also constitutes an element worthy of being valued in positive terms. In philosophical terms, it has been understood that with the enlightened age one begins to conceive of the subject as the holder of an individual identity, which is particularly his, that one discovers in oneself and which also implies that one must be true to oneself and one’s unique way of being.30 According to Pelayo, conscience could be conceived as ‘the set of intimate convictions related to value judgments that shape the personality of the subject, to which the individual adapts his way of life, and which are an essential part of his personality. So violating them creates “a problem of conscience”, which somehow questions or even torments one’s personality. In conscientious objection the existence of an intimate conviction is so strong that the presence of a legal obligation is not sufficient to counterbalance it, and the subject is determined to oppose and resist the norm so as not to deny himself.’31 From the viewpoint of legalistic positivism or normativism, the case that a legal obligation was a sufficient reason to transgress a conviction in a strong sense could not be justified, because the legal norm belongs to the universe of the decisions taken by the majority and supported by social consensus, decisions that, to put it another way, are legitimated and have no connection to the moral order. To resolve this difficulty, the following has been proposed: it could be stated that conscientious objection requires the prior existence of a legal obligation and that of a norm, conceived in a broad sense, that allows one not to fulfil that obligation, that is, the presence of legal support for their disobedience.32 I believe that understanding the particular kind of norm sheds light as to how a legal obligation can be compatible with conscientious objection thanks to the principalist theory of Robert Alexy, largely inherited from classical Roman law.33 One of the first questions that strike us is what criteria will require a rule that authorises the non-adherence to a legal obligation. A reasonable proposal I think is
30 Taylor, C., El multiculturalismo y la política del reconocimiento, translation by Utrilla, M., Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1993, p. 47. 31 Pelayo González-Torre, Á., ‘La objeción de conciencia sanitaria’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, op. cit., pp. 120–121. 32 De Asís, R., ‘Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, ibid., p. 39. 33 Suárez-Rodríguez, J. J., footnote 26, pp. 58–59.
258 Conscientious objection in democratic systems the one that Falcón34 provides when he states that conscientious objection requires compliance with certain requirements: (1) it must be ‘justified’ in the plane of values, which requires that the objector’s conviction come from a sufficiently structured, coherent and sincere system of thought, as Navarro-Valls has stressed.35 In relation to the sincerity of the convictions, it is obligatory to refer to the thesis defended by the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment of 25 February 1982, delivered in the case of Campell and Consans (paragraph 36), where it asserts occasional ideas do not rise to the level that sustain conscientious objection, but only those that reach a ‘certain degree of strength, seriousness, coherence and importance’. Otherwise, as Pelayo points out, ‘we could find a border issue that concerns conscientious objection and a very different legal sense, which is none other than the issue of defrauding or abusing the law, when what it is intended to simply avoid a legal duty by claiming non-existent moral convictions’;36 (2) it has to be ‘explained’ at the level of the facts. That is, the behaviour that the objected law imposes on the objector is a behaviour incompatible with that value system. In accordance with this criterion, it is not enough to emphasise that the medical professionals who object to the voluntary termination of pregnancy must make known their objection in time so that the right to such a procedure can be guaranteed through another doctor who provides such a public service: ‘The guarantee of the provision of the service is undoubtedly an essential requirement for conscientious objection to be granted, given the priority that should be given to the general interests embodied by the law over particular interests’;37 (3) it must be ‘excusable’ in the context of the intended breach of the legal norm. When the two previous premises are met, the objector can claim the right to conscientious objection and the absence of ‘legal reproach’ for his breach of the objected legal obligation. While it is possible to meet all these conditions to have conscientious objection be recognised, so as not to be harmed by a law that did not contemplate one’s moral interests, and not just one’s own personal interests,38 a second question remains to be answered: should conscientious objection be developed within a legislative framework or should rather such cases be left to the judges, who through the weighting of the different rights at stake must resolve the conflict that appears when religious freedom or conscience clash with various legal duties.39 In such a case, in view of the objector’s 34 Falcón Tella, M. J., ‘Derechos humanos y desobediencia a la ley’, Revista de la Inquisición, No 11, 2009, p. 295. 35 Paper presented in November 2009 to the Catholic and Public Life Congress (Congreso Católicos y Vida Pública). 36 Pelayo González-Torre, Á., footnote 31, pp. 122–123. 37 Ibid., p. 140. 38 Papayannis, D. M., footnote 4, p. 71. 39 Crucial in dealing with this matter, I refer to Spain’s STC 15/1982, FJ 6º. According to this judgment, conscientious objection seems to require for its realisation, apart from the effective declaration in each case, the delimitation of its content and the existence of a procedure regulated by the legislator,
259 Cristina Hermida Del Llano claim, the judge is obliged to weigh between the application of the right to freedom of conscience, religious or conscience and the objected norm. In case it could serve as a reference, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany established an ‘essentiality criterion’, according to which a development law is necessary when it comes to relations between the State and subjects of private law, while, on the contrary, decisions can be jurisprudential if relations arise between subjects of private law. For its part, the Spanish Supreme Court proclaimed in its judgment of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of 11 May 2009, without any shame, that we are facing ‘a right to conscientious objection of purely legislative – non-constitutional rank – and, consequently, derived from the freedom of configuration of the system available to the democratic legislator, which could create it, modify it or delete it as it deems appropriate’. If we are consistent with the commitment to decisionism, I believe that there would be no defence of the doctrine that advocates conscientious objections to be collected as a numerus clausus, legally regulating the so-called ‘options of conscience’. Rather, on the contrary, we should defend a numerus opening in the line defended, among others, by Prieto, who on the subject of this matter points out: ‘therefore, of conscientious objection, and not because socially or historically result in unlimited power, but because as long as the conflict with another right or constitutional right does not arise, it is indifferent to ascribe the conduct to one or the other right, or even to the somewhat diffuse sphere of agere licere’. 40 Let us not forget, as Montesquieu already mentioned, that laws are an expression of the degree of freedom of a people. And, as this author points out in the eleventh book of The Spirit of Laws: ‘In a State, that is, in a society that has laws, freedom cannot consist of anything other than being able to do what one should want and not being forced to do what you should not want.’ In other words, suggested by other authors,41 freedom should be understood as a rule of closure of the system of freedoms.
in the terms prescribed by art. 30(2) CE, with due guarantees, since only if such regulation exists can the declaration be made that the right to conscientious objection finds its fullness. In support of this argument, it should be remembered the Judgment of the Superior Court of Justice of the Valencian Community of 29 May 1989, which identifies fiscal objection with conscientious objection, as far as personal ethics are concerned, but it does not recognise it as the object and content of a subjective right, insofar as it is not typified nor regulated by law, in accordance with the constitutional provisions. Thus, in the Fundamentals of Law of the Judgment (Second), the following is specified: ‘The interpositio legislatoris is inescapable, without which it is not possible to recognise the right of the appellant by means of interpretation of the constitutional precepts, which does not imply, due to the above, abandonment of the promotion of the conditions so that the full freedom, equality and participation of citizens are real and effective (art. 9.2 of the Constitution).’ Much more restrictive, and a sample of the fluctuations of the Court itself, was STC 160/1987, FJ 3º, which dealt with even specifying the nature of the law. 40 Prieto, L., ‘Desobediencia civil y objeción de conciencia’, Objeción de conciencia y Función pública, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Madrid, 2007, p. 34. 41 Prieto, L., ‘La delimitación de los derechos fundamentales y la norma de clausura del sistema de libertades’, Derechos y Libertades, No 8, 2000, pp. 429–468. As explained Barranco Avilés, M. C., ‘La
260 Conscientious objection in democratic systems
The situation of confrontation between public ethics and private ethics that occurs in conscientious objection can be seen as a conflict or collision between principles, which is not a problem that is resolved by having one principle invalidate another,42 but by pondering what principle should be given a greater specific weight. Alexy points out that, under some circumstances, one principle precedes another, what he calls the collision law.43 The conscientious objection is thus presented not so much as a fundamental right but as ‘a conflict situation for whose resolution different legal assets have to be weighted according to the case, weighing the relation of the reason for the objection to the freedom of conscience by one side and with the rights of third parties and the fulfilment of the purpose pursued by law by another’.44 Obviously, with conscientious objection, as with the rest of the rights, it is a justified claim that has limits, which excludes that it be conceived as an absolute right.45 According to De Asís, ‘in general, limitations on conscientious objection may derive from both the content of the obligations and the right holders’,46 as provided in Article 20(4) CE, there are no unlimited rights. Now, just as rights are not unlimited, neither should their restrictions. In any case, the affirmation that ‘there are no unlimited rights’ introduces us to the field of justice; by assuming that it is possible to have a right to object as a result of a weighting between the right to freedom of conscience and the legal rights or obligations that the objected norm seeks to guarantee.47 This is because the principles that govern the field of fundamental rights are not exempt from some tension. Consider the case of our Spanish Constitution on the right to religious freedom, equality, neutrality of the State and cooperation. For this reason,
moral en el Derecho y el conflicto entre ley y conciencia’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, op. cit.: ‘Accepting the closing rule assumes, in the opinion of L. Prieto, that any situation in which freedom is restricted can be considered as a violation of rights in relation to which a weighting operation is required. In general terms, for the limits to be justified they must be based on other constitutional rights or values and there must be an adaptation between the need to protect those other rights and values and the sacrifice of the fundamental right’; p. 112. 42 This is what would happen, according to Alexy, if there were a conflict between rules because in that case there would be two ways to solve it. One would be to introduce in one of the rules an exception clause that eliminates the conflict. The other would be to declare at least one of the rules invalid, through rules such as lex posterior derogat legi priori or lex specialis derogat legi generali, although it is also possible to proceed with the importance of the rules in conflict. In any case, the decision taken to resolve a conflict of rules is a decision about the validity of any of them. Vid. Alexy, R., footnote 27, p. 88. 43 Vid. ibid., p. 89. 44 Pelayo González-Torre, Á., footnote 31, p. 128. 45 In this context, vid. Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo. Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo. Sección octava, de 11.05.2009. Recurso Núm.: 69/2007. Acuerdo del Pleno del Consejo General de Poder Judicial de 22 de noviembre de 2006. Desestimación del recurso de alzada nº 109/06. Objeción de conciencia del juez encargado del Registro Civil respecto de los expedientes matrimoniales de personas del mismo sexo. 46 De Asís, R., footnote 32, p. 41. 47 Ollero, A., footnote 13, p. 203.
261 Cristina Hermida Del Llano it is of enormous importance to elucidate how the issue of tension or conflict between constitutional principles is resolved, where the Constitutional Court, as the maximum interpreter, plays a central role.48 We thus arrive at the controversial subject of the role that the judge must occupy within the legal system, knowing that the judicial role is increasing in our continental system in a line increasingly closer to the North American system,49 which has been defended initially by neo-constitutionalists. In any case, conscientious objection should lead to the need for a weighting that defines the right as such. It is about weighing the relationship between the motive of conscientious objection and freedom of conscience on the one hand and with the rights of third parties and the fulfilment of the purpose pursued by law on the other.50 According to Alexy, I believe that this form of judicial reasoning ‘allows for the proper consideration of all points of view, which is one of the fundamental postulates of rationality … Justice as a weighting also has an additional advantage. It expresses the idea of the right measure, which is a classic idea for justice. It excludes, therefore, any form of fanaticism. The postulate of the willingness to ponder is an essential postulate of the rational discourse of justice. It expresses respect for the principles of justice of others and, with it, is a corollary of the recognition of others as interlocutors of the speech on equal rights and members of a society of free and equal.’51 In short, I think that Alexy allows us to defend and better understand conscientious objection, a tenet – and I finish – essential in the plural, free and democratic societies of our day.
48 Vid. Requena López, T., Sobre la función, los medios y los límites de la interpretación de la Constitución, Comares, Granada, 2001. 49 As Pelayo González-Torre, Á., explains in ‘La objeción de conciencia sanitaria’, Libertad ideológica y objeción de conciencia. Pluralismo y valores en Derecho y Educación, op. cit.: ‘Precisely in the United States the solution of the assumptions we are talking about is normally jurisprudential, and essentially casuistic and practical, putting the legal interests faced in balance and trying to make the compliance with the norm compatible with respect for freedom of conscience. With a very flexible conception of law, one runs away from essentialist considerations about the value of the law or about the specific cataloguing of rights, demonstrating anti-formalism and escaping the canons of conceptualisation. With practicality, the protection of freedom of conscience on the one hand and interest in the application of the norm on the other will be weighed, so that the State is obliged to seek an adaptation (accommodation) of the norm to the duties of conscience of the citizen, unless this involves excessive taxation (undue Hardship) … It is important to emphasise that American jurisprudence refers to freedom of conscience rather than conscientious objection, which already takes a clear position in the sense that the demands of individual conscience must be seen as a manifestation of the personal freedom of the subject.’ (p. 130) 50 Vid. ibid., p. 128. 51 Alexy, R., La institucionalización de la justicia, op. cit., pp. 66–67.
262 Nikola Ivanovski Constitutional court protection of the principle of the rule of law as a fundamental value of the democratic order
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT PROTECTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW AS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORDER
Nikola Ivanovski President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of North Macedonia Almost without exception, theoretical views on democracy consider the rule of law as one of the principles essential for its implementation. Back in ancient times, Aristotle believed that democracies can be assessed on how they comply with the general rules (the law), otherwise they assume another form. This principle applies to the way in which society is governed, with the standard applying equally to all, including the state, where human freedoms and rights are of primary importance and are protected by independent and autonomous institutions. In this way, the law is an instrument to restrict the state, and not an instrument of the state, where the laws as general compulsory rules are openly published; their provisions are clear and precise; respect the vested rights and protect freedoms and rights; and apply equally. The absence of the rule of law or its disregard in a democracy turns it into an expression of the self-will of the majority. The fact that the notion ‘democracy’ means rule of the people should not be a reason not to abide by this principle and under the pretext that it is the people’s will, because each government should be limited by law, even that of the people. Accordingly, the rule of law and democracy are complementary. Moreover, the rule of law is a way to correct some of its ‘flaws’, such as the protection of the minority from the will of the majority.1 The first step towards establishing the rule of law in a democracy is to lay it down in the highest legal act – the constitution, where, in addition to its proclamation as the supreme value of the legal system, it is being worked out through the other constitutional norms relating to human rights, the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary and the protection of constitutionality and legality. Our Constitution contains the provision that proclaims the rule of law as a fundamental value of the constitutional order (Line 3 of Art. 8(1) of the Constitution), which, being a basic provision, is a starting point in the interpretation of the other constitutional norms. In addition, the Constitution contains provisions relating to the specific aspects of this fundamental value. For instance, the protection of the rights and freedoms by the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts as their guarantee (Art. 50(1)); laws must be consistent with the Constitution and all other
1 Stanovcic, V., ‘Demokratija i vladavina prava’, Anali Pravnog fakulteta, broj 2, 2005.
263 Nikola Ivanovski regulations with the Constitution and laws and everyone is obliged to respect the Constitution and laws (Art. 51(1) and (2)); the mandatory publication of the laws and other regulations before they come into force and the prohibition of retroactivity of laws (Art. 52(1) and (4)); freedoms and rights of the individual and citizen may be restricted only in the cases defined by the Constitution (Art. 54(1)), etc.2 However, the constitutional definition of the rule of law as a fundamental value and its further stipulation with the other constitutional norms is not sufficient in itself. It is necessary to have an institutional framework that will safeguard human freedoms and rights and ensure that the makers of lower general legal acts respect the Constitution and laws, the key feature of the bodies that are part of this framework being their independence guaranteed with the constitutional norm. Such a task is assigned to the Constitutional Court under Article 108 of the Constitution, which defines it as a body of the Republic protecting constitutionality and legality. Article 110 of the Constitution stipulates its competencies, inter alia, envisaging that it shall decide on the conformity of laws with the Constitution and the conformity of lower regulations with the Constitution and laws, protect the laid down freedoms and rights, decide on issues of conflict of competences between the holders of the three branches of government and local self-government that certainly refer to the exercise of the principle of the rule of law. By systematising the provisions relating to the Constitutional Court in a separate section, and not together with those governing the organisation of the bodies of state powers, the Constitution has underlined the independent status of the Court, which is not organically connected to the system of state powers, which in the case should be emphasised. This status of an independent institution is manifested in three dimensions: managerial, budgetary and administrative independence. At the same time, it must be noted that the used term ‘body of the Republic’ for the definition of the Constitutional Court differs qualitatively from the term ‘state body’, which is narrower and refers to a body acting only within the state apparatus, unlike the first one, which is broader and refers to the interests of the whole society, including the citizens. In addition to the legal guarantees for the independence of the institution, the exercise of the role of the protector of the rule of law requires certain safeguards for those who, in the name of the institution, take the decisions – the constitutional judges. Such are the constitutional provisions on the length of tenure of the judges at the Constitutional Court, the restrictive conditions for the termination of office and dismissal, the incompatibility of the office and the immunity enjoyed by judges. However, when speaking of the foregoing, which certainly guarantees independence and impartiality in the performance of the office, the subjective aspects must be
2 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, nos 52/91, 1/92, 31/98, 91/01, 84/03, 107/05 and 6/19.
264 Constitutional court protection of the principle of the rule of law as a fundamental value of the democratic order mentioned that certainly have their impact and importance: the moral character of the judge, his or her awareness of the social significance of the office of a constitutional judge and the conscientiousness in the performance of the duties. The protection of the principle of the rule of law by constitutional courts needs to follow prior known rules that will be available and known to everyone. In fact, these are the rules under which the Constitutional Court acts and decides on the matters for which it is competent. In this sense, Article 113 of the Constitution stipulates that the manner of work and procedure before the Constitutional Court be regulated by an act of the Court. This act (Rules of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia) was adopted in 1992 and published in the Official Gazette.3 It regulates the procedures through which the powers of the Court are exercised, the way of decision making, the rights and duties of the President of the Court and the judges, the types of acts adopted by the Court, the legal effect of the decisions of the Court, the transparency in its work, the cooperation with constitutional courts of other countries, the internal organisation and the expert service. It should be mentioned that, in the protection of constitutionality and legality, the Rules provide a possibility for everyone to address the Court through a formal application for appraising the constitutionality and legality, which is a democratic solution enabling the citizens to play an active role in protecting the rule of law. In addition, the Rules empower the Constitutional Court itself to institute proceedings for appraising the constitutionality and legality upon its finding. Furthermore, the principle of the rule of law also applies to the decisions of the Constitutional Court. They must be clear, understandable, with legal arguments and proper interpretation of the constitutional and legal norms, publicly announced and predictable in the sense that they should be consistent with the previous case law of the Court, which is a separate issue dealt with below. Respect for and the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decisions are explicitly stated in Article 112(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, which states that the decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and enforceable, which, in practice, means that they are not subject to appeal. Although not explicitly stated, it is understood that, through the power of such judicial activism that acts on normative acts, decisions are also generally binding. According to the same article of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court will repeal or annul a law if it finds that it is not in accordance with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court will also repeal or annul any other regulation or general act, collective agreement, statute or programme of a political party or association if it finds that they are inconsistent with the Constitution and/or law (Art. 112(2)).
3 The Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia were adopted on the basis of Article 113 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia by the Constitutional Court on the meeting held on 7 October 1992.
265 Nikola Ivanovski
As for the interpretation, in the appraisal of the constitutionality, the Court applies the Constitution and its norms. In terms of the principle of the rule of law, this interpretation should be objective or, as the German Professor Theodor Maunz says, ‘the will of the constitution should be interpreted, and not the will of the constitution maker’. That is correct because behind the will of the constitution maker there is always a political background that should not be part of the process of interpretation. Thereby, the purpose of the interpretation should not be creating a new constitutional norm, supplementing or changing the existing one, but clarifying its content in order to be applied to a particular case.4 This approach allows a constitutional norm to be adapted to new social circumstances that were not valid at the time when it was taken or, re-quoting Professor Maunz, ‘the will of the constitution is not totally fixed’, and it changes depending on the circumstances and, if changed, ‘a new interpretation comes to its aid’.5 The possibility for constitutional norms to be interpreted evolutionary results in a change of the previous constitutional jurisprudence, where the question that arises is whether its change is in accordance with the rule of law. In principle, the constitutional court is sovereign in terms of the decision it will take, but, in terms of the rule of law, it is necessary that there be certain predictability and consistency in the way it is decided on the same issues at different times. That is of particular importance, because the national authorities adopting the legal acts that are appraised by the constitutional court will be familiar in advance with its position and will have to adopt and act in line with the stance of the court regarding their constitutionality and legality. Otherwise, they would be declared unconstitutional and illegal. On the other hand, the rule of law, in principle, does not mean inability to change the previous case law, especially if we consider the above-mentioned regarding the interpretation of constitutional norms. In such cases, constitutional courts are obliged to provide reasoning as to the legal arguments for changing the previous case law. At the same time, once the case law has been changed, they should continue to apply the changed one in future cases and not to reverse to the previous case law. Finally, it is certain that the implementation of the decisions of constitutional courts is also an important element for the rule of law, since a decision finding a violation of constitutionality and legality and freedoms and rights that is not implemented is the same as if it was not taken. According to Article 80 of the Rules of Procedure, the execution of legality enforced individual acts passed on the basis of a law, regulation or other common act, which by a decision of the Court is revoked, cannot be allowed, nor implemented, and, if the execution is being started, it will be cancelled. Therefore, the binding
4 Shkarikj, S., ‘Scholarly Interpretation – Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia’, Kultura, 2014. 5 Ibid.
266 Constitutional court protection of the principle of the rule of law as a fundamental value of the democratic order nature of the decisions of the Court depends on what issues the decisions are about and what their character is. According to Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, the decisions of the Constitutional Court are executed by the entity that passes the law, other regulation or common act that by a decision of the Court is being annulled or repealed. The decisions by which the Court decides for the protection of freedoms and rights regulated by the Constitution are executed by the organ or organisation that has adopted the individual act that, by a decision of the Court, is annulled, where the said organ or organisation is the one that has undertaken the activity forbidden by a decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia does not have its own mechanism or instruments to enforce its decisions, nor can oblige any other state body to enforce its decision. However, the Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 87 of its Rules of Procedure, follows the execution of its decisions and, if necessary, will ask from the Government of the Republic of Macedonia to ensure their execution. The immediate monitoring of the execution of the decisions of the Constitutional Court is within the obligations and duties of the Secretary General of the Constitutional Court, who, if it is found that a certain decision of the Court is not being implemented in practice, shall inform the Court thereof. The Court primarily addresses the relevant Ministry with a request to be notified whether the decision is being implemented and, in parallel, the Court addresses the Government of the Republic of Macedonia with a request to ensure the enforcement of the Court’s decision. But the Court can also act on correspondence and notices from citizens informing it of the non-enforcement of its decisions whether it is general non-enforcement or absence of enforcement in a particular case. The examples that follow illustrate the way the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia has applied various aspects of the importance of the rule of law in its decision making. An interesting case of an older date is Decision U.br.121/2015, which repeals Line 6 of Article 98(5) of the Law on Administrative Officials.6 In the reasoning of this Decision, the Court, among other constitutional provisions such as equality,7 the right to work and free choice of employment,8 also invokes the rule of law.9 Judicial intervention is accomplished by analogy of Decision U.br.114/2014 of 29 June 2016, when the Court abrogated (repealed) Article 104(2) in the part: ‘(men) and up to 65 years of age (women)’ and Article 104(4) in the part: ‘(men) and up to 65 years of
6 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, nos 27/2014, 199/2014, 48/2015, 154/2015 and 5/2016. 7 Art. 9 of the Constitution. 8 Art. 32 of the Constitution. 9 Line 3 of Art. 8(1) of the Constitution.
267 Nikola Ivanovski age (women)’ of the Law on Labour Relations.10 The position of the Court expressed in this Decision is that another issue is the right of the insured woman to acquire an old-age pension earlier than the insured man, if she herself so chooses, given that this right is justified by the principle of affirmative action, that is, the principle of the positive discrimination of women. However, that right of women in the sphere of pension and disability insurance cannot automatically be applied in other areas, especially if it leads to the restriction of rights on grounds of gender. Specifically, the Court held that the extension of the employment contract actually means the continuation of the employment that is the exercise of the right to work, which differs from the exercise of the right to an old-age pension. In this case, the abrogated Line 6 of Article 98(5) of the Law on Administrative Officials relating to the termination of employment provided that the administrative official’s employment terminated by force of law upon turning 62, 63, 64 or 65 years of age (for woman), that is, 64, 65, 66 or 67 years of age (for men). Reaffirming the view expressed in its previous Decision, the Court emphasises that the constitutional obligation of the legislator, when regulating issues related to the exercise of the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the employee and employer under the employment and establishment and termination of employment, to put citizens in equal legal position on these grounds. But also this imperatively set legal provision is essentially vague and imprecise, thus being inapplicable, for reasons that the specified different number of years of age as a condition for the termination of employment for both men (64, 65, 66 and 67) and women (62, 63, 64 and 65) by force of law questions the rule of law. In addition, the repealed provision leads to legal uncertainty among citizens, since the regulation of the right of the termination of employment, which is governed by the Law on Labour Relations, in its provision refers to the application of a special law (in this case, the Law on Administrative Officials), and that Law, again in the regulation of the termination of employment, invokes and refers to the application of the Law on Labour Relations. Because of this very cyclic legal inconsistency another violation of the rule of law is noted. The declarative aspect of the principle of the rule of law does not always mean that the states and government during its operation continuously take care and respect this rule. This principle can be neglected or abandoned in the creation of legal rules, which is why one of the tasks, that is, responsibilities of constitutional courts, is precisely to take account of the strict adherence to this principle by providing the mutual harmonisation of normative acts, seeing to respect the principle of the separation of powers, the protection of constitutionally proclaimed rights of citizens from their derogation or damage, etc.
10 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, nos 62/2005, 106/2008, 161/2008, 114/2009, 130/2009, 149/2009, 50/2010, 52/2010, 124/2010, 47/2011, 11/2012, 39/2012, 13/2013, 170/2013, 187/2013, 113/2014, 20/2015, 33/2015, 72/2015 and 129/2015.
268 Manana Kobakhidze The role of the Constitutional Court of Georgia in protecting democratic values and fundamental rights
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GEORGIA IN PROTECTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Justice Manana Kobakhidze Secretary to the Constitutional Court of Georgia It should be underscored that a well-built system of constitutionalism presents a crucial prerequisite for the development of democratic institutions of a modern state. In general, the constitution as a supreme law presents a value-forming document, which includes constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, the separation of powers, pluralism, social solidarity, human dignity, etc. Each branch of government should ensure the protection of these principles and of the democratic values of society. On the one hand, the legislative branch should adopt rational and constitutional legislation and the executive branch, on the other, should implement the laws and actualise democracy in all its actions. As for the judiciary, particularly, the constitutional court, it has to give effect to the aforesaid values by administering justice. These values have consistently been considered as one of the essential aspects of the constitutional legal order by the Constitutional Court of Georgia. In 2007, in the case1 of Georgian Young Lawyers Association and citizen Eka Lomtatidze v Parliament of Georgia, the applicants were claiming that certain norms of operative-investigatory activity were vague and violated, among others, the principle of the foreseeability of the norm. In this case, the Constitutional Court of Georgia held that: ‘The fundamental constitutional principles assist in identifying contents of the Constitution and, at the same time, define the main direction of the state development. The principles of democracy and the rule of law are the most important ones among the constitutional principles. They are the foundation of every other constitutional norm as well as other constitutional principles. The constitutional order is founded on these principles. Fundamental constitutional principles are guarantees for protection of human dignity. Therefore, disproportional interference within these rights violates human dignity also.’ This presents one of the landmark judgments of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, because, while examining the constitutionality of the norm, it referred and applied constitutional principles. Indeed, the central element of democratic values is the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms and, without them, there would
1 Judgment of the Constitutional Court, N1/3/407, chap. II, paras. 1, 2, 3 (26 December 2007), http://constcourt.ge/en/legal-acts/judgments/georgian-young-lawyers-association-and-citizen-of- georgia-eka-lomtatidze-v-the-parliament-of-georgia-518.page.
269 Manana Kobakhidze not be any democracy. If the human rights dimension is not applied while judging upon democratic principles, the entire constitutional order becomes fictitious. In view of the constant development of human rights, the role of constitutional courts is extremely important. Social changes sometimes lead to becoming those laws unconstitutional that were adopted in certain reality and were suitable for material time. Moreover, the fact that constitutional provisions tend to be open-ended and abstract, they leave more room for judicial interpretation than most of the other statutes. Therefore, the constitutional court presents an ultimate arbiter in this interpretation process. The judges of the constitutional court should use a clear and comprehensible interpretative methodology, which would make the litigating parties aware of the manner and sequence of arguments that may be brought before the court, as well as the path through which the constitutional judges are going to substantiate their reasoning. It should be underscored that, in a modern society, constitutional courts go beyond their traditional role of the negative legislator by challenging the democratic institutions to review the policies while addressing important social issues and by urging the parliament to pass on systemic changes in legislation; constitutional courts indirectly sketch out new political directions of a state in line with constitutional values. To illustrate how the court deals with these kinds of challenges, I would like to refer to the recent case law of the Constitutional Court of Georgia concerning punishment for drug-related offences. The Georgian legislation provided for rather severe punishment for the purchasing and possessing of drugs for personal use. In particular, the complainant disputed the constitutionality of the normative content of the certain paragraph of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which provided for imprisonment from 7 to 14 years for purchasing and owning up to 70 grams of dried leaves of cannabis for personal use. In order to determine the proportionality of the punishment, the Court discussed the nature of the act itself and the risks associated with the action in question. The legitimate aim of criminalising the act of purchasing and storing cannabis was to prevent the distribution of cannabis and, in this way, to ensure that public order safety and the health of the humans were protected.2 ‘In this case, restricting liberty of a person only serves the general prevention purpose, so that others do not commit the same acts and do not harm their own health.’ Therefore, based on the legitimate aim of protecting the health of an individual, imposing punishment in the form of restricting liberty for the act of purchasing and storing the respective amount of cannabis (up to 70 grams) was
2 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N1/5/592, 24 October 2015, http://constcourt.ge/ en/legal-acts/judgments/citizen-of-georgia-beka-tsikarishvili-v-the-parliament-of-georgia.page.
270 The role of the Constitutional Court of Georgia in protecting democratic values and fundamental rights declared disproportional as it infringed human honour and dignity. In other cases,3 the Constitutional Court of Georgia emphasised that the use of marijuana is protected by the constitutional right to free development of one’s personality as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Constitution of Georgia and declared unconstitutional the administrative as well as criminal responsibility for the personal use of marijuana in private residences. In the following years, the Constitutional Court of Georgia adopted several judgments and annulled punishment for various drug related offences, forcing the Parliament of Georgia to review the drug policy at the national scale. It should be pointed out that, since 2015, the Constitutional Court of Georgia has played a crucial role in ensuring the state policy and, as of today, the legislation in the field of drug control is being amended in line with constitutional standards by the Parliament. In 2014, the Constitutional Court of Georgia came across with another critical issue and delivered a precedential judgment,4 when it assessed the system of the legal capacity of an individual in Georgia. The provisions of Georgian law challenged by the complainant concerned the issues such as finding natural persons incapable, the impossibility by persons declared incapable to express their intention under civil law and the notion of guardianship. The complainants disputed that the existing model contradicted the requirements of the rights of free development and equality. According to the Civil Code of Georgia, the notion of legal capacity means the ability of natural persons to acquire and exercise their civil rights in full by their free will and action. Depriving a person of their legal capacity meant their ‘civil death’. A person with no legal capacity would be rendered unable to make transactions, since their expression of will was considered void under the Civil Code. The situation was worsened by the fact that a person found incapable would retain this status for an indefinite period. The legal norms in force at that time were not taking into account the psychosocial needs of individual persons in relation to specific rights and the affected person was losing all of his or her rights at once. The Court declared unconstitutional provisions as disproportional restriction, as they failed to recognise varying degrees of the quality of individual mental capacities of persons recognised incapable, and, with blanket ban, stripped them of their rights. ‘The disputed norms, however, were applied to each and every person with the status of recognised as mentally incapable, and took away from them the possibility to realise those capacities, which they did still have in their possession.’
3 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N1/13/732, 30 November 2017, http://www. constcourt.ge/ge/legal-acts/judgments/1-13-732-saqartvelos-moqalaqe-givi-shanidze-saqartvelos- parlamentis-winaagmdeg2.page; Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N1282, 30 July 2018, http://www.constcourt.ge/ge/legal-acts/judgments/1-3-1282-saqartvelos-moqalaqeebi- zurab-djafaridze-da-vaxtang-megrelishvili-saqartvelos-parlamentis-winaagmdeg.page. 4 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N2/4/532,533, 8 October 2014, http://constcourt. ge/en/legal-acts/judgments/citizens-of-georgia-irakli-kemoklidze-and-david-kharadze-versus-the- parliament-of-georgia.page.
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It has to be mentioned that, following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, the Parliament amended the existing legislation and introduced inherently a new system of legal capacity, where a person’s mental capacity is assessed individually. And, finally, as I have mentioned above, the protection of human rights and freedoms is the cornerstone of democratic values. The constitutional court presents an ultimate guardian of the rights of citizens in our system of governance, which contributes to gradually further developing constitutional rights not only by promoting them, but as well as by setting workable legal criteria and standards for their application in practice, which serves to safeguard democratic values in Georgian society.
272 Moments from the XXII International Congress
273 274 Moments from the XXII International Congress
275 276 Moments from the XXII International Congress
277 278 Moments from the XXII International Congress
279 280 Moments from the XXII International Congress
281 282 César Landa Challenges of judicial appointment in Peru
CHALLENGES OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN PERU
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. César Landa Pontifical Catholic University of Peru Former President of the Constitutional Court of Peru
I. EXPLANATORY CONTEXT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE AND POLITICS In Latin America, there is a common refrain when it comes to the appointment of judges and their independence: ‘Tell me who appointed you, and I can tell you just how you’ll rule.’ Such criticisms of the judge’s role tend to become even more intense during periods when the region is going through rapid and profound economic, political, social, cultural and technological changes. This is due, on the one hand, to the incongruities that can often be identified between court rulings and the real social context of the respective countries and, on the other, to the courts’ obsequiousness toward political changes implemented by the government. All of this tends to result in courts that act as defenders of the status quo or that defer to the political agenda of those currently in power when issuing their rulings. However, the Peruvian judicial experience also shows that the power of judicial review has ended up debilitated when courts attempt to confront governmental power head on, sometimes by insisting on a literal interpretation of the Constitution. In other cases, the courts’ power has been undermined by overstepping their bounds when interpreting constitutional norms. In some circumstances, nevertheless, Peruvian judges have succeeded in adapting a jurisprudential criterion on political matters, exercising the legal disposition and temperance required to reign in government power.1 In the present-day democratic process, the practice of judicial review has exhibited a jurisprudential need for a model for ruling on cases. In essence, such a model would help guide the evaluation of difficult cases or borderline judicial decisions, while maintaining equilibrium and unity between the law and politics. To date, the interpretive line set forth by the administrators of justice between legal review and political control has not been sufficiently clear, with the resultant risk that the supreme interpreters of the law may find themselves involved in a political, rather than legal, debate. As noted above, however, radical voices have often emerged in times of crisis and social change, arguing for the judicial voluntarism of many judges, rooted in a discretional criterion of justice, which can be identified directly with politics; while
1 Landa, C., Poder Judicial y Tribunal Constitucional: independencia y control de poderes, Lima, PNUD – Perú, 2010, pp. 329–349.
283 César Landa others promote judicial positivism that tends to fossilise law, distancing it from reality and closing doors to sensible solutions to social conflicts.2 As an alternative to these two judicial stances – which may be based on opposite fundaments but tend to coincide in their instrumentalisation of the Constitution and the law – we must propose a model of judicial review that seeks to progressively move closer to the truth, from least to most truthful. This approach is what ancient thinkers referred to as prudence, and what we now call reasonability.3 This model is essential given the normative shortcomings of the Constitution and the law in allowing the courts to uphold their responsibility to control the acts of public and private powers, some of which take on more subtle forms, while others are more evident. For such purpose, we must consider not just the normative nature of the Constitution, but also the value system that gives it force. This leads us to establish constitutional parameters for interpretation based on the construction of an evaluative framework as a foundation for the Constitution, thus enabling judges to reasonably apply it. This interpretation may evolve over time, given the courts’ task of settling political conflicts. The duty of maintaining the peace can only be achieved, of course, when judges’ rulings are respected by the legislative branch and public opinion supports its decisions. This is doable provided that both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court use a juridical method of constitutional and legal interpretation that is reasonable, predictable and reviewable. Note should be made here of the need to set aside the old thesis of justiciable and non-justiciable acts, given that there is a continuum of possibilities of judicial action between the two points. It is precisely these possibilities that instil real meaning in the position of the Supreme Court and, especially, the Constitutional Court, in their duty to control public and private powers. Given the judiciary’s perpetual reluctance to provide clear analyses and rulings on political matters, the Constitutional Court has established itself as the final instance for the review of excesses committed by public powers – i.e. the legislative, judicial and executive branches – and private powers. Thus, the Constitutional Court is the body competent to limit political power and safeguard fundamental rights, with the scope of its review powers leaving no area untouched.4 This has only become possible following the transition from a State under the rule of law to a constitutional State, which has basically entailed the recognition of the normative force of the Constitution, with the aid of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. In other words, the Constitution is recognised as legally binding on all public powers, thus resulting in the invalidity of all acts or norms that run
2 Böckenförde, E., Escritos osbre Derechos Fundamentales, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 15–19. 3 Hesse, K., Escritos de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid, CEC, 1983, pp. 43–57. 4 Landa, C., Tribunal Constitucional y Estado Democrático, Lima, Palestra, 2007, pp. 791–814.
284 Challenges of judicial appointment in Peru contrary to it, based on the principle of the legal supremacy of the Constitution and, progressively, the Convention. Nevertheless, this transition has not been a smooth one, often taking two steps forward only to take one step back. Thus, the Constitution, as the supreme legal norm, prevails over the country’s entire body of laws and requires all public powers to act in accordance with it, as per Sections 51 and 43 of the Constitution. Consequently: (a) no constitutional provision may be interpreted on an isolated basis. Rather, they must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of the unity of the Constitution, so as to guarantee the logical principle of non-contradiction between provisions of higher and lower hierarchy; and (b) all conflicts between constitutional provisions shall be resolved by ‘optimising’ their interpretation, i.e. without ‘sacrificing’ any of the values, rights or principles concerned. This mandate arises from the constitutional interpretive principle of practical concordance and interpretation of the law in accordance with the Constitution. Constitutional justice thus stands as one of the most vigorous possibilities for legitimately articulating a defence of general interests and, thus, fostering a sense of ethico-political revitalisation.5 Nevertheless, this approach also faces its share of problems, such as the creeping feeling that we are merely replacing a government by the people with a government by judges.6 This is especially problematic given the lack of democratic accountability mechanisms applicable to judges, who are not held responsible by any public power for their votes or opinions. However, the careful selection of judges, the establishment of the institutional guarantees provided to them under the Constitution and respect for the limits of constitutional interpretation, in political cases, can minimise the possibility of out-of-control practices on the part of ordinary and specialised judges. This is why it is so important to examine the systems used to select judges for the judiciary and the Constitutional Court.
5 De Cabo Martín, C., Contra el consenso, estudios sobre el Estado constitucional y el constitucionalismo del Estado social y el constitucionalismo del Estado social, México, UNAM, 1997, p. 317. 6 Lambert, E., Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux État-Unis. L’experiénce américane du contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité des lois, Paris, Giard & C., 1921, pp. 220–236.
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II. SELECTION MECHANISMS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL POWER When it comes to the judge selection process, there are two mechanisms in force in Peru for such purpose, depending on whether the judges will administer ordinary justice as part of the judiciary or specialised justice as part of the Constitutional Court (CC). These processes were conducted by the former National Judicial Council (CNM) and the Congress of the Republic, respectively.
II.1. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE JUDGES OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE In regard to the selection and appointment of judges and district attorneys, the current constitutional model and its respective legal development have established a regulated procedure consisting of stages, which essentially involve the assessment of abilities, skills and knowledge, in the form of a written test; the evaluation of the applicant’s professional development, in the form of his or her curriculum vitae; a psychological evaluation via the application of a test; and a personal evaluation in the form of an interview. Just on 9 January 2019, according to Sections 150 and 154(1) of the Peruvian Constitution, the selection and appointment of judges and district attorneys for administration of ordinary justice was handled by the former National Judicial Council (CNM). This differs from the previous model, under which appointments were made by the Congress of the Republic. This change has formally depoliticised the selection and appointment duties and appointed a body other than the judiciary or the Government Attorney General’s Office to conduct the process.7 However, high levels of corruption were revealed in 2018 by Fiscal Supremo8 Pablo Sánchez in the constitutional complaint he presented before the Congress of the Republic against Supreme Court Justice César Hinostroza and four former councilmembers of the National Judicial Council – Orlando Velásquez, Guido Aguila, Julio Gutiérrez Pebe and Iván Noguera – for the alleged commission of crimes ranging from criminal conspiracy to influence peddling, illegal representation, acceptance or solicitation of bribes for violation of official duties, and offering or payment of bribes.9
7 Miranda Canales, M., Sistema de nombramiento de magistrados en el Perú, Lima, Ediciones jurídicas, 2004, p. 111 ss. 8 Translator’s note: this position in Peru is roughly equivalent to that of Chief State Prosecutor (or Chief Federal Prosecutor in the United States). 9 See https://idl-reporteros.pe/tag/cnm/.
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The complaint brought by thefiscal supremo is based on documentary evidence, wiretaps, statements rendered by witnesses as part of a plea bargain, and anonymous government witnesses. This evidence allegedly shows that Supreme Court Justice Hinostroza and the aforementioned former councilmembers played a significant role in illegal dealings intended to benefit themselves personally by manipulating judgments in judicial cases involving organised crime; trading favours in exchange for the appointment and confirmation of judges and district attorneys; and their links to business people and politicians with ties to the APRA and Fujimorista parties headed by former presidents Alan García and Alberto Fujimori, respectively. According to the information revealed, the influence of these networks of corruption was so vast that they even played a part in appointing district attorney Pedro Chavarri, first, asfiscal supremo and, later, as Fiscal de la Nación.10 Additionally, Supreme Court Justice Hinostroza was making preparations for his own election as president of the judiciary.11 As a result of the corruption scandal that rocked the CNM, Peru’s President, Martín Vizcarra, called an extraordinary plenary session of Congress so that, in accordance with their powers, the members of this government body could remove the councilmembers in the light of their serious offences. This decision was adopted unanimously on 20 July 2018. One day prior to this, the president of the judiciary, Duberlí Rodríguez, resigned from his position after audio recordings revealing his involvement in the judicial corruption ring were shared widely on social media. The foregoing proves that, although the procedure for the selection and appointment of judges has distanced itself from the political model and has made progress in terms of specialisation and the establishment of objective parameters, there are still serious problems of corruption in the very same autonomous body that is responsible for appointing these judges. Such problems appear to be rooted not in shortcomings in institutional design – although there are some aspects that bear improving – but to illicit political influence or networks of corruption within the CNM and the questionable actions of both councilmembers and judges. In response to this, President Vizcarra issued a call during his annual speech to the nation on 28 July 2018, given in the chambers of Congress, for a constitutional reform regarding judicial and political matters. To achieve this, he proposed to submit four laws on constitutional reform to a public referendum, with the goal of reorganising the CNM, returning to a bicameral system, prohibiting the immediate re-election of members of Congress and strengthening control over the irregular financing of political parties.
10 Translator’s note: this position in Peru is essentially equivalent to that of State Attorney General. 11 See: https://idl-reporteros.pe/ratificacioncon-trampa/.
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The judicial reform bill changes the name of the National Judicial Council to the National Board of Justice (Junta Nacional de Justicia), made up of seven members who are elected by a public contest of merits, with the following responsibilities:12 Section 154: The National Board of Justice shall have the following duties: 1. Appoint, following a public contest of merits and personal assessment, judges and district attorneys of all levels. Said appointments shall require the public and well-reasoned favourable vote of at least two thirds of the legal number of the Board’s members. 2. Reconfirm judges and district attorneys of all levels every seven (7) years, with a public and well-reasoned vote; and conduct an interim performance assessment of judges and district attorneys of all levels every three (3) years, jointly with the Judges’ Academy (Academia de la Magistratura). Those judges and district attorneys who are not reconfirmed or who are removed from office may not be reincorporated into the judiciary or the Government Attorney General’s Office. 3. Enforce the removal from office of Supreme Court justices or chief federal prosecutors; as well as judges and district attorneys of all levels, whether ex officio or Junta de Fiscales Supremos,13 respectively. In the case of Supreme Court justices and chief federal prosecutors, the National Board of Justice may also issue warnings or suspensions of up to one hundred twenty (120) calendar days, based on criteria of reasonability and proportionality. The final decision shall be well-founded, and based on a prior hearing in which the interested party is allowed to present his or her defence arguments. This decision is not subject to appeal. 4. Keep and maintain updated Disciplinary Sanction Records on Judges and District Attorneys, publishing them as applicable. 5. Bestow the applicable official title on judges and district attorneys. 6. Submit an annual report to the Plenary Session of Congress. In regard to this matter, it is not only necessary to introduce improvements to institutional design that reshape the constitutional body in charge of appointing and sanctioning judges, however. It is essential that the people appointed to this constitutional entity demonstrate an outstanding ethical, professional and democratic background, that they represent our country’s sound moral fabric and that they are capable of carrying out duties as important as those entrusted to them by the constitutional reform of 1993. It should be noted that this proposed constitutional reform would give the National Board of Justice a period of no more than eighteen (18) months to review all appointments, confirmations, assessments and disciplinary proceedings carried out by the councilmembers who were removed by the Congress of the Republic, in
12 Congreso de la República. Ley de Reforma Constitucional sobre la Conformación y Funciones de la Junta Nacional de Justicia, del 18 de setiembre de 2018. 13 In Peru, this board is made up of five Fiscales Supremos, or Chief State Prosecutors, one of whom is the State Attorney General, who presides over the board.
288 Challenges of judicial appointment in Peru accordance with Congressional Legislative Resolution 0126-2017-2018-CR, in cases where there are indications of serious irregularities. Finally, this project of constitutional reform of the judicial and political systems, approved with 85 per cent votes on 9 December 2018, was promulgated by the President of the Republic on 10 January 2019;14 actually, the chiefs of Ombudsman, Judicial Power, Constitutional Court, General Attorney and Comptroller General are implementing the selection of the new National Board of Justice in Peru. Undoubtedly, the people expressed their desire to dismantle this system of political and judicial corruption; but the problems faced by Peru’s judges and courts do not end there, however, given that the selection and appointment of Constitutional Court judges is conducted and decided by the Congress of the Republic. This is significant, since these judges have the final say in the interpretation of legal norms under the Constitution.
II.2. THE APPOINTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGES In regard to the selection process for the administration of specialised justice, Section 201 of the Constitution establishes that the Congress of the Republic is responsible for appointing the seven judges of the Constitutional Court, with a majority of two thirds of the unicameral Congress, which consists of a total of one hundred thirty representatives. It should be no surprise that when it comes to appointing the Constitutional Court judges, the political parties with parliamentary representation have an interest in influencing the nomination and appointment of these figures. Indeed, this is almost inevitable given the close ties between the Constitution and the country’s politics.15 This political process requires a two-thirds consensus among the members of Congress, however. At a minimum, this establishes the obligation to engage in dialogue, negotiations and concertation among the parliamentary majorities and minorities, which is intended, in turn, to act as a control mechanism exercised by the minorities to prevent the majority from overstepping its bounds. In practice, however, the selection of Constitutional Court judges has laid bare two shortcomings in the democratic system of constitutional control. Due to a lack of consensus among the members of Congress, this process has led to the deterioration of the selection process and the consequent mistreatment of candidates; while conversely bolstering the partisan system of quotas and negotiations that ultimately enables the parliamentary majority and minorities to treat candidates’ nominations 14 Ley Nº 30904. Ley de Reforma Constitucional sobre la conformación y funciones de la Junta Nacional de Justicia, https://static.legis.pe/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Ley-de-reforma-constitucional- sobre-la-conformacion-y-funciones-de-la-JNJ-Legis.pe_.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3fUg61QhYjkD ni007fhX5b 3Kw4TNWSUQoxjr_8IDpr2T_nuuEzOxly4pg-. 15 Landa, C., ‘Estatuto del Juez Constitucional en el Perú’, https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx /www/ bjv/libros/7/3166/58.pdf.
289 César Landa as business transactions or exchanges. This was observed in 2007, for instance, when the Constitutional Court was left at the mercy of political favours and the interests of the day in Congress, which was controlled at that time by the ruling APRA party and its allies in the Fujimorista party. Specifically, in 2007, Luis Alarcón, Vladimir Paz de la Barra, Gerardo Eto and Javier Ríos Castillo were appointed as new judges to the Constitutional Court. It was Ríos Castillo who caused an outcry over the selection process after the media published a photo of the judge meeting with a high-ranking APRA official and several military members accused of misdeeds under the Fujimori administration.16 In response to this backlash, the Plenary of Congress decided to suddenly annul the selection of the four judges due to the embarrassing picture of the recently appointed Constitutional Court justice Javier Castillo. Nevertheless, this did not stop the Congress from appointing four new judges to the Constitutional Court (Eto Cruz, Calle Hayén, Álvarez Miranda and Beaumont Callirgos) based on the very same political alliances. The APRA members on the Court (Mesía Ramírez) proceeded to work together with conservatives (Vergara Gotelli) and the most of new judges, promoting a discourse that had little to do with the fight waged by the Court against corruption and human rights violators after Peru first began its transition to democracy. This led to contradictions of varying degrees in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the fight against corruption and even a passive tolerance of drug trafficking and impunity for human rights violations. These recent circumstances have resulted in a decline in the Constitutional Court’s prestige in the eyes of the public and the opinion of experts, in turn aggravating citizens’ mistrust toward Congress.17 After former president and APRA member Alan García left office, the new administration headed by President Ollanta Humala (2011–2016) proceeded to appoint new judges in a process that was sullied by the influence of political interests. After two judges’ terms in office ended in 2011, followed by another four in 2012, a selection process was carried out in 2013. Despite the expectation that the incumbent judges would be reappointed to their positions and their jurisprudence would continue to be applied, this new process resulted in the change of all six judges, thanks to the political power wielded by the congressional majority. That year, the new justices appointed to the CC included the jurists Francisco Eguiguren, José Luis Sardón and Ernesto Blume. Also named were Cayo Galindo and Víctor Mayorga, two controversial former congressmen from President Ollanta Humala’s Partido Nacionalista party; and Rolando Sousa, a former
16 Caretas, ‘La tremenda corte de Ríos Castillo’, http://www2.caretas.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&S= &id=12&idE=867&idSTo=0&idA=45113#.W8CtkhNKh0s. 17 Palestra, ‘Juez Constitucional y compromisos éticos. La relevancia de los valores en la actuación de la magistratura constitucional’. Entrevista realizada por Pedro Grandez a César Landa, ex Presidente del Tribunal Constitucional, Lima, 2010, p. 12.
290 Challenges of judicial appointment in Peru congressman with the Fujimorista party and defence attorney for ex-president Alberto Fujimori, who was found guilty of crimes against humanity. These appointments sparked protests several days on streets by citizens and institutions committed to defending human rights, leading to demonstrations that served as a clear expression of civil society’s dissatisfaction with the threats being posed to democracy. Above all, it was the way the judges were appointed in exact proportion to the majority political parties in Congress at that time – i.e. the Partido Nacionalista Peruano and the Partido Fujimorista – which inspired the collective condemnation of what popularly came to be known as ‘la repartija’, or ‘the divvy-up’.18 The appointment of members with direct ties to the political parties that controlled the Congress exemplified the political powers’ clear intent to ‘politicise’ an institution as important as the CC, which must instead remain autonomous, independent and impartial. These figures’ proximity to and affinity with government and opposition groups showed a clear lack of objectivity in their appointment, consequently tarnishing the reputation of the members of Peru’s Congress and their commitment to justice and democracy. Faced with massive civil protests precipitated by the population’s discontent with the partisan control of independent government bodies, the Congress was forced to back down in 2013 – just as it had in 2007 – from the appointment of all of the members nominated for the Constitutional Court, as well as annulling the appointment of the public ombudsman and three directors of the Central Reserve Bank, who had been selected by the Congress at the same time. These judge selection processes inevitably led to the deterioration of not only the Constitutional Court – given the lack of the independence of the majority of its justices in exercising control over governmental actions – but to the consensus-based model of democracy, deepening the public’s mistrust of the Congress. The Congress’s lack of transparency in the selection processes laid bare the obvious desire to control the Court, first through the selection of its judges and then by subjecting them to public and private power through ad hoc proceedings and judgments. In response to the aforementioned civil protests and media outcry, the Congress appointed the six new judges to the CC19 in 2014 based on a multiparty agreement that included, on the one hand, a consensus regarding candidates whose professional background and commitment to democracy was, at least in principle, indisputable; 18 This term was used on social media in calls for mass demonstrations against the selection of the members of the Constitutional Court, the Government Ombudsman’s Office and the Central Reserve Bank. See http://elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/minuto-minuto-congreso-elije-integrantes-tc- bcr-defensor-pueblo-noticia-1605038. 19 Ernesto Blume Fortini, Eloy Espinoza-Saldaña, Marianela Ledesma Narváez, Manuel Miranda Canales, Carlos Ramos Núñez and José Luis Sardón became the new members of the CC. The Congress of the Republic carried out this selection after overcoming differences among the political parties, which were accused at one point of engaging in negotiations with respect to the candidacies.
291 César Landa while, on the other, also taking into account public demands. Later, in 2017, a vacancy on the Court was filled by the attorney Eduardo Ferrero C., with the ardent support of the Fujimorista party, which holds a majority in the current Unicameral Congress (2016–2021). In 2019, finished the term of five years of the six judges, in a period of strong tension between the opposition between the Congress and the Executive Power, due the fight of President of Republic Vizcarra against the corrupts in the political and judicial system and the protection of the majority of Congress of them. In this scenario, on 30 September 2019, the parliamentary majority bloc called a vote for on the appointment of six new judges to the Constitutional Court (TC) of Peru. Candidates were selected from a list of eleven attorneys that the Special Commission of Unicameral Congress had invited to participate, based on its partisan interests. Despite the fact that just days before, the Prime Minister had asked Congress for a vote of confidence on the urgent need to modify the system for the election of Constitutional Court candidates. The proposed modifications were made in accordance with Section 134 of the Constitution and the democratic principles of a public merit-based selection process and transparency in the evaluation of their judges’ job profiles and, with citizen oversight, the parliamentary majority bloc attempted to elect the judges despite, and while ignoring, the motion for a vote of confidence. According to the Constitution and the Procedures of Congress, a motion for a vote of confidence is an urgent matter that must be given priority in addressing it. Nevertheless, the majority bloc in Congress attempted to prevent Premier del Solar from acting in accordance with these legal provisions, even preventing him from physically entering the Plenary Session of Congress to set forth his arguments for the vote of confidence. Despite this, the Premier was able to enforce his right as Prime Minister to join the debate in the Plenary Session of Congress (Section 129 of the Constitution), using the opportunity to file the motion for a vote of confidence. The Congress held a vote on whether or not to debate the motion and, ultimately, refused. This refusal to deliberate on and hold the vote of confidence proposed by Premier del Solar is the parliamentary legal act by virtue of which Congress, in practice, denied the vote of confidence, despite the fact that they had deferred the election of the Constitutional Court judges until after the debate on the vote of confidence. Following this, the lawyer Ortiz de Zevallos – the cousin of the President of Congress – obtained the necessary 87 votes to be elected as a judge, unlike the second candidate for the Constitutional Court – Sanchez Palacios – failed to obtain the necessary votes, bringing a halt to the failed election of the new judges. However, the votes received violated the constitutional and legal mandate establishing that a motion for a vote of confidence shall take priority, a priority that the parliamentary majority bloc was attempting to circumvent.
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Following these events, the same day in the afternoon, the President of the Republic ordered the dissolution of Congress, in accordance with Section 134 of the Constitution, after having been denied a vote of confidence on two ministerial cabinets (the first being the Zavala cabinet in 2017). The majority bloc in Congress then reacted by trying to remove the President of the Republic from office, but it was unable to achieve the 87 votes required (two thirds of all members of Congress). In view of this situation, they proposed the suspension of the President of Republic by for one year, violating the parliamentary due process. Given that this measure is not regulated by law, the opposition decided that it required only a majority vote to push the suspension through, it obtained the necessary 86 votes in favour. Congress then proceeded to appoint Vice President Mercedes Aráoz as acting president. She was sworn in but then resigned the next day. As the President issued a public statement in a Message to the Nation, in which he announced the dissolution of Congress in accordance with Section 134 of the Constitution, the dissolution was officially enacted the afternoon of 30 September 2019, with the publication of the Executive Order (Decreto Supremo Nº 165-2019-PCM). The order dissolving Congress and called for parliamentary elections in four months from then (Sunday, 26 January 2020). Based on this order, the National Electoral Council (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones) immediately published the electoral calendar. The Peruvian Armed Forces and National Police Force, for their part, have both issued public statements recognising Martín Vizcarra as the Constitutional President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the former President of Congress, Pedro Olaechea, sent an official letter to the Palace of Government ordering the suspension of the President from office. Acceptance of this letter was refused, even when sent via a notary public. After Olaechea sent a letter to the secretary general of the Organisation of American States (OAS) denouncing the dissolution of Congress as a coup d’état, Secretary General Daniel Almagro responded with a communiqué in which he praised the decision to call popular elections and recommended that the matter be raised escalated to the Constitutional Court for the settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation of the Peruvian Constitution. Following the dissolution of Congress, the people took to the streets and squares that same Monday, 30 September, celebrating the closure of the parliament. Out of all government institutions, Congress had the lowest rate of public approval due to its constant shielding of corruption among members of Congress and other high-ranking authorities officials and persons under investigation by state prosecutors, as well as those who had already been tried and convicted by the Judiciary (in particular the now-deceased former president Alan García and the opposition leader Keiko Fujimori).
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After the dissolution of Congress was implemented, effective immediately, at least two members of Congress – Viera and García Belaunde – left the country. They left the next morning following the announcement that, in two days’ time, a representative of the Brazilian company Odebrecht would be revealing the names of Peruvian congress members who had received bribes from this firm. Not only has the response among citizens, to the closure of Congress, been highly positive, the stock exchange and the price of the dollar have not reflected any sort of volatility or panic in the markets. This latter possibility had been cited by the parliamentary majority bloc, consisting of the Fujimorista party and its lackeys, when President Vizcarra proposed calling general elections for 2020 in order to resolve the impasse between the government and the opposition. The elections were to include a constitutional reform put up for a public referendum. This proposal was cunningly rejected by the parliamentary opposition bloc after calling on the Venice Commission to hear its opinion – an unexpected move given the bloc’s hurry to appoint six judges to the Constitutional Court and, thus, consolidate its control of the country’s highest authority on the interpretation of the Constitution. Looking to the future, it is worth noting that six of the CC’s justices finished their terms in 2019, at which point the different political groups in the new Congress that will be elected on 26 January 2020, once again will have to reach a two-thirds majority (87 votes out of 130 members of Congress) to renew the Constitutional Court’s makeup. With this in mind, it is necessary to propose a basic profile to be met by any candidate seeking to occupy a spot not just on the Constitutional Court but, indeed, any spot in the Peruvian judicial branch as a whole.
II.3. PROFILE OF THE IDEAL JUDGE A judge’s profile is essentially based on the so-called requirement of legitimacy, or compliance with law. This means that the person selected must be a jurist or legal scholar, first and foremost, who has exhibited a mastery of the juridical sciences and their human aspects, thus enabling him or her to contribute knowledge of the law and experience when hearing cases. A judge must also demonstrate an ability to maintain neutrality, incorruptibility and clarity in his or her opinions. In effect, the independent vocation and qualities required of a jurist provide apt parameters for the profile or legitimacy of a judge.20 The judge must also exhibit values of justice, effectiveness, wisdom, courage, moderation and intellectual humility. Only with these principles and values can one correctly address complicated affairs that often take the form of opposing interests, where one must remain open and willing to incorporate differing opinions and points of view.
20 Frowein, J. A., Meyer, H., et al., Bundesverfassungsgericht im dritten Jahrzehnt, Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1973, p. 73 ff; see also Kirchheimer, O., Politische Justiz, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Germany, 1981, p. 37 ff.
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Judges must remain independent when making judicial decisions involving political and private powers. Indeed, determining the degree of independence to be exhibited by future magistrates is critical when appointing these judges. One guarantee of such independence can be gained by evaluating their professional history, their public actions in defence of democracy and human rights, and the extent to which they have demonstrated the awareness of and involvement in Peru’s current reality, rather than their ties to political powers or private interest groups. It is important to make sure that there is no hidden political or economic force lurking behind a judge’s candidacy. Otherwise, the judges’ future votes or opinions will eventually reveal a debt not to the Peruvian Constitution, but to de jure or de facto powers. It is, therefore, necessary to determine the commitments of candidates seeking appointment as judges to the primary expressions and different forms of thought in our society. This will ultimately provide a sense of trust among the different majority and minority forces in society, as well as both the party currently in power and its opposition parties, making them feel that they are represented in our judiciary and on the Constitutional Court by judges who are committed to defending the Constitution and the law, free from undue influence by political parties or interest groups.
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES The current state of our justice system reveals the need for a democratic strengthening of the mechanisms used to appoint judges, along with the functional reorganisation of their judicial tasks, given the crisis of legitimacy currently afflicting judges’ jurisdictional decisions and their connection to society as a whole. The Constitutional Court’s legitimacy is bolstered or weakened not only based on the source of the appointment of its justices, but also the procedural legitimacy and results of the Court’s constitutional review of normative acts carried in by public powers and its protection of fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court’s actions in recent years – which have ranged from moderate, at times, to a normativist stance, at others – have been accompanied by convincing new legal arguments. While its work may be open for debate, its rulings have been faithfully obeyed by authorities,21 thus enabling it to achieve constitutional legitimacy thanks to its flexible handling of power and the support or criticism of the Court voiced by public opinion. The judiciary’s lack of legitimacy, on the other hand, is one of the most long-lasting effects of the crisis facing the justice system in Peru, partially reflecting the country’s crisis as a state under the rule of law. This branch of government has sporadically
21 De Vega, P., ‘Jurisdicción constitucional y crisis de la constitución’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, No 7, Madrid, 1979, p. 417.
295 César Landa exhibited a lack of independence from political powers and economic groups, as well as a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This lack of legitimacy can be explained, to some extent, by serious shortcomings or the absence of a minimum standard in the professional education and background of most judges, rather than a simple lack of judicial independence. It might be said that Peru’s justice system is predominantly immersed in a positivist/normativist conception of the law, which holds that judges are simply the mouthpiece designed to pronounce the words uttered by the authors of the law, dissociating such norms from the everyday reality of the country’s citizens, among other issues. It is thus necessary to implement a system for the selection, appointment and promotion of judges who are able to act as administrators of justice, with a proven democratic vocation. This means that they must do their job with independence from political and private powers when making judicial decisions, imbuing the law with content based on Peruvian reality, in accordance with international law and the jurisprudential standards necessary to concretely enforce the rights at stake in each specific case.
296 Gabriella Mangione Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration
SOME COMMENTS CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF A BALANCED BUDGET AND THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN RELATION TO MIGRATION
Prof. Dr. Gabriella Mangione Insubria University, Como, Italy INTRODUCTION Migration is a highly topical issue in Europe and, in particular, in Italy. There has been a steady flow of migrants towards European shores over the last few years and thousands of people have lost their lives when attempting the crossing. The numbers are terrifying: 18 651 migrants died or went missing in the Mediterranean Sea between 2014 and the end of 2019.1 As is known, Italy is characterised by its geographical location as a platform projected into the Mediterranean and it is one of the countries most acutely affected by migration. Hardly a day passes without reports of some new landing along the beaches of southern Italy or reports concerning crime or declarations by politicians that highlight the problem of migration. The issue of immigration has been at the heart of public discussion in Italy over these last few years. More than half of the Italians who cast their ballots in the last parliamentary election held on 4 March 2018 voted for populist parties (which have no realistic goals and seem to be united only on the issue of immigration), continuing the European trend of declining loyalty towards traditional mainstream parties, especially on the centre-left. Politics in Italy, as in much of the EU, are being reshaped by migration. And, indeed, one thing is certain: migratory phenomena have laid bare the weaknesses of Europe. However, this paper will not focus directly on the important issue of migration. Whilst this issue will remain in the background, the wider context will provide an opportunity to offer some reflections concerning an issue that is highly topical for Italian law. This is the constitutional principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court. The principle of a balanced budget is probably presented in more prominent terms, almost as the normative paradigm representing the Government’s political responsibility towards the Parliament. The Constitutional Court is thus increasingly required to consider how a balance is to be struck between budgetary constraints and guaranteeing rights, including the rights of migrants. In other words, it is necessary
1 See the Report of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/ mediterranean [accessed 23 December 2019].
297 Gabriella Mangione to examine how that delicate balance is struck between public spending requirements and the satisfaction of the rights in question. This issue is, moreover, thrown into sharper relief by spending cuts that have also impinged upon inviolable rights, including specifically social rights. These issues have been debated in Italy for decades. However, they came to the fore of a particularly lively institutional debate following the 2012 constitutional amendment2 of the original Article 81 of the 1948 Constitution, along with the constitutional decisions concerning access to certain social services by foreigners without long-term resident status. These are judgments that, as will be illustrated below, have given rise to new spending. Before entering into the merits of this paper, it is necessary to make two clarifications. As regards the constitutional amendment, it should be pointed out that it introduced the concept of cyclical budgetary equilibrium into the Italian Constitution. (In this way, ‘a new concept – that of the economic cycle – with which lawyers are not particularly familiar was introduced directly into the Constitution’.3) However, it must be stressed from the outset that, according to one view within the literature, Article 81 as originally adopted already contained a rule requiring balanced budgets. It is argued that it was simply asserted within the Constitution in a more explicit manner in order to respond to pressure under Community law.4
2 See Art. 81 of the Constitution (text introduced by Constitutional Law no 1 of 20 April 2012, ‘Introduction into the Constitution of the Principle of a Balanced Budget’): ‘The state shall ensure equilibrium between revenue and expenditure within its own budget, taking account of both adverse and favourable phases of the economic cycle. Recourse to deficits shall only be permitted with the aim of taking account of the effects of the economic cycle and, subject to authorisation by the Houses of Parliament adopted by an absolute majority of the respective members, upon the occurrence of exceptional events. Any law involving new or increased expenditure shall provide for the resources to cover such expenditure. Every year, Parliament shall approve by law the budget and the closing financial statements presented by the Government. Interim budget authority may not be granted save by law and for no longer than four months. The content of budgetary laws, fundamental norms and the criteria intended to establish an equilibrium between revenue and expenditure within budgets and the sustainability of the debt of the public administrations as a whole shall be specified by law approved by an absolute majority of the members of each House, in accordance with the principles laid down by constitutional law.’ 3 Silvestri, G., President of the Constitutional Court, the presentation given to the workshop on ‘Il principio dell’equilibrio di bilancio secondo la riforma costituzionale del 2012’ [‘The Principle of Cyclical Budgetary Equilibrium under the 2012 Constitutional Reform’], organised at the Constitutional Court, Rome, on 22 November 2013, http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/ convegni_seminari/AperturaBilancioSilvestri2.pdf [accessed 23 December 2019]. 4 The economic and financial crisis started in the USA between 2007 and 2008, following which it also hit the economies of EU countries hard from 2009 onwards, including in particular those of the Eurozone. In fact, it induced the European Union to implement broad reforms to its own governance processes with the aim of reinforcing the instruments and procedures for implementing a more
298 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration
Similarly, as regards the role of the Court, it should be pointed out that, leaving aside the recent judgments that have expanded the rights of foreigners, the so-called ‘spending judgments’ (i.e. judgments resulting in an increase in public spending) in reality represent a sore point, which has caused controversy within the literature for a long time. The constitutional amendment that reaffirmed the principle of balanced budgets and the constitutional decisions concerning the rights of foreigners have thus simply brought to the fore and re-evoked older questions concerning the role of the Constitutional Court and the justiciability by the Constitutional Court of rules concerning budgets and the public accounts. In other words, it is a vexata quaestio fuelled by broad and long-standing debate within the literature.5
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY PROCEEDINGS AND THE THORNY ISSUE OF ‘SPENDING JUDGMENTS’ The issue of relations between constitutional proceedings and the principle of financial coverage has been much debated above all with reference to the cases in which the Court itself has issued judgments that resulted in an increase in public spending or otherwise a deterioration in the equilibrium of the public finances. These are known as ‘spending judgments’: there have been innumerable cases in which the judgments of the Court have had more or less traumatic ramifications on the public finances.6 It must, first and foremost, be considered that, in the Italian constitutional system, any Constitutional Court judgment that invalidates a law has retroactive effects. For example, the striking down as unconstitutional of a revenue-raising law will thus
rigorous budgetary policy and guaranteeing Europe’s financial solidity, thereby reinvigorating its prospects for growth. 5 See Onida, V., Le leggi di spesa [Budgetary Legislation], Giuffrè, Milan, 1969, p. 151 et seq.; Giannini, M. S. Il pubblico potere [Public Power], Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, p. 69 et seq.; Bognetti, G., Costituzione e bilancio dello stato. Il problema delle spese in deficit [The Constitution and Government Budgets. The Problem of Deficit Spending], in Nomos, 3/2008, https://www. associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/old_sites/sito_AIC_2003-2010/dottrina/teoria_generale/ Bognetti02.pdf [accessed 23 December 2019]; Bognetti, G., La Costituzione economica italiana [The Economic Constitution of Italy], Giuffrè, Milan, 1995, p. 111 et seq.; Bartole, S., Articolo 81, Commentario alla Costituzione [Commentary on Article 81 of the Constitution], in Branca, G. (ed.), Vol. II, Zanichelli, Bologna–Rome, 1979; Di Gaspare, G., L’art. 81 della Costituzione, abdicazione della sovranità finanziaria dello Stato? [Art. 81 of the Constitution, Abdication of Financial Sovereignty by the State?], online review ‘Amministrazione in cammino’, December 2014, http:// www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/DiGaspare_art81cost-e- sovranit%C3%A0-finanziaria-Stato.pdf. 6 The literature is extremely broad on this point. See, in this regard, the workshop on ‘Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale e l’art. 81 u.c. della Costituzione’ [‘The Judgments of the Constitutional Court and Article 81 Fourth Paragraph of the Constitution’]. Atti del seminario svoltosi in Roma, Palazzo della Consulta nei giorni 8 e 9 novembre 1991, Giuffrè, Milan, 1993; Zagrebelski, G., La Giustizia Costituzionale [Constitutional Justice], Il Mulino, Bologna, 1988.
299 Gabriella Mangione result in a lack of financial coverage for the laws for which those revenues are intended to provide spending coverage, thereby violating the principle of the requirement of financial coverage. In these cases, it is the repealing effect brought about by the Court’s acceptance of the doubt as to the constitutionality of legislation that acts as the immediate cause of the breach. The unconstitutionality of a revenue-raising law propels the Court into the delicate realm of relations between the Government and the Parliament with regard to the allocation of financial resources. In fact, since a declaration of unconstitutionality takes effect immediately, it forces governmental bodies to take action promptly according to new arrangements in order to deal with the financial burden that is now devoid of any cover. But, above all, in the most complex cases, through its efforts to establish and broaden the principles of the welfare state, the Constitutional Court is increasingly often required to engage with questions concerning the constitutionality of laws granting individuals or social groups rights to benefits financed out of public funds. At times, it has been asked to extend welfare and pension benefits. On other occasions, it has been called upon to sanction the insufficiently general award of particular benefits to specific classes of public servant. Finally, in other cases, legislative measures providing for the transfer of public resources only to particular categories of individual, undertaking or association, to the exclusion of others, have been referred to it for review. More specifically, as will be seen below, in one group of cases involving legislation that granted public benefits only to a certain category of foreign nationals – long-term foreign residents in Italy – in breach of the principle of equality, the Constitutional Court’s judgment extended those benefits to a broader class of foreign nationals, thus triggering expenditure without any financial coverage. In all of these cases involving laws providing for spending, the Constitutional Court is confronted with a difficult task. Specifically, whilst it is able to extend the scope of the law, it is unable to indicate the new financial means that are necessary in order to deal with the increased spending. The Court thus appears to subject the public administration to financial burdens greater than those ordinarily provided for by law, thereby violating the requirement of coverage. A problem thus arises concerning the violation of Article 81(4) of the Constitution by the Constitutional Court itself when, acting in the name of equality, it resolves a defect by extending the scope of a law. In particular, it is precisely with regard to questions involving the principle of equality that the risk that judgments by the Constitutional Court ruling legislation unconstitutional may result in financial imbalances is particularly high. Moreover, this risk is even higher where the principle of equality is applied in the area of social rights, which inevitably entail a range of discretionary political choices on a greater scale than in other areas of the law.
300 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration
The problem is extremely complex, as it involves highly disparate aspects: the techniques used in constitutionality proceedings and rulings that legislation is unconstitutional; the limits on legislative discretion; the uses to which the Court has, and may, put this discretion; the limits and arrangements applicable to proceedings in which principles such as equality or reasonableness are applied; relations between the Court and the Parliament, and whether or not it is possible to rely on subsequent action by the Parliament in the wake of judgments in which the Court strikes down legislation; finally, the relationship between the rulings of the Court and the individual rights or expectations of citizens, who may or may not draw benefit from the laws. Each of these aspects has been considered in greater detail in a lively debate within the literature. The said complexity and openness of the context within which the Court has asserted its spending power result specifically in friction and objections and have been a sore point creating division within the literature for decades.7 The power to order spending, which the Court has more or less implicitly recognised within its case law when confronted with the ongoing fiscal crisis of the state, has appeared as an increasing threat, exposing the Court’s decisions to the most questionable of arguments: ‘there is no more money’.8 In fact, there has been a long-standing debate within the literature concerning the legitimacy of case law that grants redress for the violation of certain constitutional provisions, whilst at the same time giving rise to situations that are unconstitutional.9 It is a paradoxical result of the activity of constitutional review that the Court should issue a judgment, legibus soluta, which, rather than applying Article 81 as a parameter applicable to proceedings before it, by contrast disregards it entirely, thereby potentially giving rise to new expenditure requirements without indicating the resources necessary to cover them. The recent decisions of the Constitutional Court concerning foreigners have played out within this framework.
7 Donati, F., ‘Sentenze della Corte costituzionale e vincolo di copertura finanziaria ex art 81 Cost.’ [‘Constitutional Court Judgments and the Requirement of Financial Coverage under Article 81 of the Constitution’], Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, bimonthly, Vol. II, Giuffrè, Milan, 1989, p. 1508 et seq.; Grosso, E., Sentenze costituzionali di spesa che ‘non costino’ [Constitutional Spending Judgments that ‘Don’t Cost Anything’], Giappichelli, Turin, 1991, p. 34; Romboli, R., Aggiornamenti in tema di processo costituzionale (2014–2016) [Constitutional Case Law Update (2014–2016)], Giappichelli, Turin, 2018. 8 Zagrebelski, G., ‘Problemi in ordine ai costi delle sentenze costituzionali’ [‘Problems on the Costs Associated with Constitutional Judgments’], in Le sentenze della Corte Costituzionale e l’art. 81 u.c. della Costituzione, cit., Giuffrè, Milan, 1993 p. 103. 9 See below § 3.
301 Gabriella Mangione
II. THE RECENT ‘SPENDING JUDGMENTS’ OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CONCERNING FOREIGNERS The principle of solidarity pervades the structure of the Italian republican legal order, which contemplates innumerable forms of expression of the principle of solidarity. There is no doubt that Article 2 of the Italian Constitution10 gives rise – at least within the intention of the Constituent Assembly – to a conception of associated life as ‘life in which all persons express solidarity with the destinies of all others’.11 However, do fundamental rights and, specifically, social rights and the non-derogative duties of solidarity apply only to Italian nationals or also to foreigners?12 Article 3 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of equality and promotes action by the state with the aim of removing obstacles of an economic and social nature that prevent the full development of the individual, refers only to citizens.13 Similarly, also the fundamental principles guaranteed in Part One of the Constitution appear to apply to Italian nationals only. In reality, the literature14 considers that the interpretation of these provisions must not be limited solely to their literal wording. Conversely, an expansive reading
10 See Art. 2 of the Constitution: ‘The Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity shall be fulfilled.’ 11 Dossetti, G., Assemblea costituente [Constituent Assembly], Session of 9 September 1946, in La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparatori dell’Assemblea Costituente [The Republican Constitution within the Preparatory Works of the Constituent Assembly], Vol. I, Camera dei Deputati, Rome. 12 It should be pointed out that Italy was a country of emigrants at the time the Constitution was adopted. One needs only consider that the Republican Constitution of 1948 expressly recognised freedom of emigration and enshrined protection for Italian workers abroad (Art. 35(4)). See Onida, V., Lo statuto costituzionale del non Cittadino [The Constitutional Status of Foreign Nationals], Lo statuto costituzionale del non cittadino, Atti del Convegno di Cagliari [Conference Proceedings], 16 ottobre 2009, Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, Naples, 2010, p. 3; Sciortino, A., Anche voi foste stranieri L’immigrazione, la Chiesa e la società italiana [You Were Foreigners too. Immigration, the Church and Italian Society], Laterza, Bari, 2010. 13 See Art. 3 of the Constitution: ‘All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions. It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature that constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country.’ 14 Lavagna, C., ‘Basi per uno studio delle figure giuridiche soggettive contenute nella Costituzione italiana’ [‘Basic Principles for a Study of the Individual Legal Rights Contained in the Italian Constitution’], in Id., Studi economico-giuridici [Economic and Legal Studies], Cedam, Padua, 1953, p. 14; Paladin, L., Il principio costituzionale di uguaglianza [The Constitutional Principle of Equality], Giuffrè, Milan, 1965, p. 205; Pizzorusso, A., Che cos’è l’eguaglianza? [What Is Equality?], Editori riuniti,
302 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration of Article 3 is widely endorsed amongst scholars, according to which the principle of equality is applicable also to those who are not Italian nationals. Also, the decisions of the Constitutional Court have for some time preferred an expansive reading of fundamental rights. Since the 1970s, the Constitutional Court has adopted a clear position in asserting that, ‘whilst it is the case that Article 3 of the Constitution refers expressly to citizens only, it is also the case that the principle of equality also applies to foreign nationals as far as respect for fundamental rights is concerned’.15 Over subsequent years, the extension of fundamental rights to foreign nationals became consolidated within the case law of the Constitutional Court both through the use of Article 2 of the Constitution as well as the principle of solidarity where fundamental rights are at issue and through Article 10(2) of the Constitution on the treatment of foreign nationals.16 In general, when the benefit stipulated by law for Italian nationals is a remedy intended to permit ‘the specific satisfaction of “primary needs” inherent within the sphere of protection of the individual, which it is the task of the Republic to promote and safeguard’, the immigrant must be treated in fully equivalent terms with Italian nationals.17 Accordingly, all of the provisions that subject the payment of allowances and social security benefits of various types to the prerequisite of possession of a residence card are unconstitutional. A residence card may only be issued after a period of residence in Italy not shorter than five years: thus, the wait required ‘could significantly compromise the need for care and assistance of individuals which the legal system
Rome, 1983, p. 69; Grosso, E., entry for Straniero [Foreigner], Digesto discipline pubblicistiche, Vol. XV, Utet, Turin, 2000, pp. 162–170; Pezzini, B., ‘Una questione che interroga l’uguaglianza: i diritti sociali del non-cittadino’ [‘A Question of Equality: The Social Rights of Foreign Nationals’], in various authors, Lo statuto costituzionale del non cittadino, cit., p. 163 et seq.; Corsi, C., ‘Stranieri, diritti sociali e principio di eguaglianza nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale’ [‘Foreign Nationals, Social Rights and the Principle of Equality within the Case Law of the Court’], in www.federalismi.it, Focus Human Rights, no 7/2014, https://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo- documento.cfm?artid=27711 [accessed 23 December 2019]. 15 See the Constitutional Court, judgment no 120 of 15–23 November 1967, specifically Section 2 of the judgment; see also the Constitutional Court, judgment no 104 of 19–26 June 1969; the Constitutional Court, judgment no 244 of 10–23 July 1974. 16 According to Art. 10(2) of the Italian Constitution, ‘the legal status of foreign nationals shall be regulated by law in accordance with international law and treaties’. See D’Orazio, G., Lo straniero nella Costituzione italiana (asilo-condizione giuridica-estradizione) [Foreign Nationals under the Italian Constitution (Asylum, Legal Status and Extradition)], Cedam, Padua, 1992; Corsi, C., Lo Stato e lo straniero [The State and the Foreigner], Cedam, Padua, 2001; Nascimbene, B., (ed.), Diritto degli stranieri [The Law on Foreign Nationals], Cedam, Padua, 2004; Pitino, A., Gli stranieri nel diritto pubblico italiano: Profili attuali della parità di trattamento con i cittadini tra Stato, autonomie e Unione europea [Foreign Nationals within Italian Public Law: Current Aspects of Equal Treatment with Italian Nationals at State, Local Government and European Union Level], Giappichelli, Turin, 2018. 17 The Constitutional Court, judgment no 187 of 2010.
303 Gabriella Mangione should by contrast protect, if not even thwarting them entirely’.18 For example, the provision of financial assistance to underage persons who are physically disabled or to civilian invalids who encounter persistent difficulties doing their schoolwork and the activities typical for their age or who require rehabilitative treatment or therapy following their injury cannot be conditional upon the holding of a residence card.19 The Constitutional Court has recently extended fundamental rights to non-Italian nationals – even where these do not relate to primary requirements – applying the principle of reasonableness. Whilst recognising the ‘non-essential’ and ‘constitutionally unnecessary nature’ of particular services – with particular reference to the so-called benefits of a socio-welfare nature – it has increasingly consolidated an inclusive approach over the years. In a series of judgments, the Constitutional Court has stated its position regarding various provisions contained in laws enacted by the regions or autonomous provinces that provide for different treatment for foreign nationals on the basis of their right to residence or the duration of their residence in a particular place. These included provisions granting free public transport to those who are fully disabled (judgment no 432 of 2005), or creating beneficial arrangements for the right to study (judgment no 2 of 2013) or access to regional financing for persons who are not self-sufficient (judgment no 4 of 2013), or the grant of the carer’s allowance (judgment no 40 of 2013) or a regional allowance to the immediate family (judgment no 133 of 2013) or regional initiatives to combat poverty and social exclusion (judgment no 222 of 2013). The framework of efforts to deal with the right to housing for foreigners and the right to nursery schools for their children include two recent decisions by the Constitutional Court delivered within the space of just two days. By judgment no 106 of 2018, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional20 a Regional Law enacted by Liguria, providing for a longer residence requirement for access to public housing by foreign residents than that applicable at national level. Judgment no 107 of 2018, on the other hand, dealt with the social and educational function of nursery schools. The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a Regional Law enacted by Veneto,21 which introduced a criterion of preference in admission to nursery schools for the children of parents who had resided in Veneto for at least fifteen years. In all these decisions, the different levels of protection were rigorously objected to by the Constitutional Court. In identifying a ‘logic of social solidarity’ at the root 18 The Constitutional Court, judgment no 329 of 2011. 19 The Constitutional Court, judgment no 329 of 2011, cit.; see also the Constitutional Court, judgments no 22 of 2015 and no 230 of 2015. 20 See Art. 4(1) of Liguria Regional Law no 13 of 2017. 21 See Art. 1(1) of Veneto Regional Law no 6 of 2017. See Statistical Report, Veneto: A Story to Tell, Like No Other, Veneto Region Regional Council Presidency, 2017, especially § 7.1 ‘A Matter of Justice’, p. 44 et seq.; currently available as a PDF from the Regional Statistical System on the Veneto Region website http://statistica.regione.veneto.it/ENG/Pubblicazioni/RapportoStatistico2017/Statistical_ Report_2017.pdf [accessed 23 December 2019].
304 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration of financial benefits, the Court has constantly asserted that ‘the prerequisites of citizenship and extended periods of residence as criteria for selecting the recipients of payments appear to be entirely immaterial, and hence arbitrary, with regard to the rationale of those rights’.22 The lack of any connection between citizenship or the holding of a certain type of residence permit and ‘need’, thus, constitutes an intolerable element of unreasonableness. The real basis for the eligibility for benefits of the individual (whether a national or a ‘non-national’) is thus need. It is beyond question that a foreign national – whether irregular or undocumented – must be vested with fundamental constitutional rights, according to the many lines of argument deployed in this area for some time both within the literature23 and by the Constitutional Court, which agree on this issue. Clear confirmation on this point is provided by the applicable legislation on immigration. Article 2 of the Consolidated Law on Immigration states that ‘any foreign national present on any grounds at the border or within the territory of the state shall be guaranteed the fundamental human rights provided for under internal law, international conventions in force and the generally recognised principles of international law’.24 It is evident that the rationale for the applicability and application of fundamental rights also to foreign nationals who do not hold a residence permit lies in the simple fact that they are persons within Italy, irrespective of their status.
III. THE DEBATE WITHIN THE LITERATURE CONCERNING SPENDING JUDGMENTS It is now clearly apparent that the general requirement to state the sources of funding within legislation has been violated. The violation of the principle that the
22 The Constitutional Court, judgment no 222 of 2013 and no 432 of 2015, cit. 23 Cerrone, F., ‘Identità civica e diritti degli stranieri’ [‘Civic Identity and Rights of Foreigners’], Politica del diritto, 1995, three-monthly, Il Mulino, Bologna, p. 441; Luciani, M., ‘Cittadini e stranieri come titolari dei diritti fondamentali. L’esperienza italiana’ [‘Citizens and Foreigners as Holders of Fundamental Rights. The Italian Experience’], Rivista critica del diritto privato, three-monthly, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992, p. 203; Sicardi, S., ‘L’immigrato e la Costituzione. Note sulla dottrina e sulla giurisprudenza costituzionale’ [‘The Immigrant and the Constitution. Notes on Doctrine and Constitutional Jurisprudence’], Giurisprudenza italiana, monthly, Utet, Turin, 1996, Vol. IV, p. 313; Acosta, D., The Right to Migrate as a Fundamental Right? The Construction of the Foreigner through Equal Treatment, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 148–172. 24 The Consolidated Law on Immigration (Law no 286) was enacted on 25 July 1998. It is available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/98286dl.htmhttps://www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo- documento.cfm?artid=27711 [accessed 23 December 2019]. The Consolidated Law on Immigration has been amended on various occasions and submitted to the Constitutional Court for review in relation to various aspects. For example, in judgments nos 222 and 223 of 2004, the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional, at least with reference to certain aspects of the legislation in question, rulings that were incompatible with the constitutional law on personal freedom.
305 Gabriella Mangione sources of the funding that is to be used to finance specific public spending (pursuant to Art. 81(4)) must be stated becomes particularly serious in all of the cases involving migrants and the so-called ‘judgments providing for expanded provision’, in which the Court declares that the legislature has not sufficiently guaranteed the principle of equality and also specifies the other classes to which certain benefits are to be extended. The following questions have been raised within the literature concerning this issue: what is the relationship between budgetary policies and constitutional review? What role does the constitutionalisation of the ‘balanced budget rule’ have within constitutional justice? How must the requirement of financial coverage laid down in the last paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitution be construed? Does this requirement apply only to the legislature or also to the Constitutional Court? According to a significant and authoritative current of opinion within the literature, just like the legislature – at which the requirement laid down in Article 81(4) of the Constitution is more directly aimed – the Court cannot be exempt from the constitutional obligation to make provision for the increased expenditure envisaged by raising new revenue. Consequently, any judgment that mandates new expenditure without indicating how financial cover is to be provided must be inadmissible.25 These authors take the view that Article 81 expresses a constitutional value of general primary importance. The requirement that the public finances must not have destabilising effects on general economic equilibria is a value that must be taken into account when interpreting any other constitutional rule. In this regard, it is evident, inter alia, that the Court’s approach to the application of the principle of equality must also be conditioned by it. However, an opposing school of thought, which is decidedly predominant within the literature, asserts by contrast that Article 81(4) of the Constitution is not directed at the Court.26 According to this view, it cannot be required to shoulder
25 Bognetti, G., La Costituzione economica italiana, cit., p. 111 et seq.; Caianiello, V., ‘Corte costituzionale e finanza pubblica’ [‘Constitutional Court and Public Finance’], Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, bimonthly, Vol. IV, Giuffrè, Milan, 1984, p. 284; Cerri, A., ‘Appunti sul sindacato di costituzionalità relativo al principio di eguaglianza’ [‘Notes on the Principle of Equality within Constitutional Review’], Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, bimonthly, Giuffrè, Milan, 1973, p. 860; Zorzi Giustiniani, A. G., ‘Una nuova sentenza “additiva di prestazione”’ [‘A New Judgment Providing for “Expanded Provision”’], Giurisprudenza italiana, monthly, Utet, Turin, 1988, Vol. I, p. 23; Mainetti, M., ‘Abuso del potere interpretativo da parte del giudice e del legislatore: un’occasione mancata per un conflitto di attribuzione’ [‘Abuse of Interpretative Power by the Courts and the Legislature: A Lost Opportunity for a Jurisdictional Dispute between Branches of State’], Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, bimonthly, Vol. IV, Giuffrè, Milan, 1984, p. 2326. 26 Colapietro, C., ‘Le pronunce “erogatorie” della Corte costituzionale ed il vincolo costituzionale della copertura finanziaria: le “additive di prestazione” sono per loro natura esenti dai vincoli e limiti dell’art. 81 Cost.’ [‘The Judgments of the Constitutional Court Providing for the Payment of Allowances and the Requirement of Constitutional Coverage: So-Called “Judgments Providing for Expanded Provision” Are, by Their Nature, Exempt from the Constraints and Limits Provided for in Article 81 of the Constitution’], Giurisprudenza italiana, monthly, Utet, Turin, 1989,
306 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration responsibility for the state of the public finances, but rather solely the rigorous application of constitutional law (including, in particular, the principle of equality). Insofar as it requires the Parliament to state the resources required in order to cover new spending, the constitutional provision cannot be considered to be applicable also to the judgments of the Court, even where they give rise to the same result. In other words, according to this position within the literature, the Court is able to act in a manner that is not open to the Parliament under Article 81. This is claimed to result directly from the inherently different nature of judgments compared to legislative provisions, as well as the content and scope of the principle of constitutional law. The essence of that principle, according to this view, is that spending decisions, i.e. decisions concerning the use and allocation of public financial resources, must be taken by the Parliament within the context of overall financial equilibrium. Were the Constitutional Court to conclude that it was obliged not to adopt ‘costly’ judgments, considering such matters to be reserved to the political authorities, it would be forced to acknowledge a deficit in terms of its own ability to act, thus essentially committing institutional suicide.27 In actual fact in some cases, albeit quite rarely, the Court has deferred the effects of its judgments.28
CONCLUSIONS The issues constituting the backdrop for this clash between the Constitutional Court and the Parliament are socially sensitive and arouse interest amongst the pp. 1249–1260; Pizzorusso, A., ‘Tutela dei diritti costituzionali e copertura finanziaria delle leggi’ [‘Protection of Constitutional Rights and the Principle of Financial Coverage of Laws’], in Giudizio ‘a quo’e promovimento del processo costituzionale [Rulings by Referring Courts and the Initiation of Constitutional Proceedings], Atti del seminario [Conference Proceedings] held in Rome, Palazzo della Consulta on 13 and 14 November 1989, Giuffrè, Milano 1990, pp. 271–288. 27 Luciani, M., ‘L’equilibrio di bilancio e i principi fondamentali: la prospettiva del controllo di costituzionalità’ [‘The Balanced Budget and Fundamental Principles: The Constitutional Review Perspective’], the presentation at the workshop on ‘Il principio dell’equilibrio di bilancio secondo la riforma costituzionale del 2012’ [‘The Principle of Cyclical Budgetary Equilibrium under the 2012 Constitutional Reform’], the Constitutional Court, 22 November 2013, cit., p. 33, currently available as a PDF at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/Seminario2013_ Luciani.pdf [accessed 23 December 2019]; Id, ‘Art. 81 della Costituzione e decisioni della Corte costituzionale’ [‘Art. 81 of the Constitution and Decisions of the Constitutional Court’], in various authors, Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale e l’art. 81, u.c., della Costituzione, cit., p. 53 et seq. 28 See decision no 10 of 2015 of the Constitutional Court filed on 11 February 2015 concerning the so-called ‘Robin Hood Tax’, i.e. the surcharge tax imposed on the profits of oil and energy companies. In its decision, the Constitutional Court held that the increase in the tax applicable to the oil and energy sectors, as configured under the contested legislation, violated Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution concerning respectively the principle of equality and the criterion of the progressive nature of the tax system. The importance of the judgment lies in the Constitutional Court’s decision to regulate the temporal effects of its decision by providing that it was to apply solely pro futuro. The judgment is currently available on the Constitutional Court’s website at http:// www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2015&numero=10.
307 Gabriella Mangione public at large. As noted above, the state’s treatment of migrants is an issue to which Italy is extremely sensitive.29 In particular, it has a highly emotive impact, a high rate of subjectivity and has often been used and abused by political parties.30 It is evident that the real challenge facing societies today is not represented by foreigners in Italy with a valid residence document or, indeed, by foreigners who are lawfully resident in Italy: the real challenge comes from migrants, i.e. those present in the country who cross the border, in whatever way, without being a national of the country.31 Similarly, it is evident that the range of people vested with fundamental rights, including specifically social rights, is extremely broad. It is also evident that, when confronted with a biblical exodus of migrants converging on the coasts of southern Italy, the matter becomes extremely delicate due to its interplay with the objective problem of the economic crisis and the marked imbalance between the available resources and the needs that have to be satisfied. There is no doubt that social rights are the most tangible instruments available for liberation and human promotion. However, they are evidently ‘rights that have a cost’ and it is natural that the requirements manifested in this area by citizens and foreign nationals, with or without a residence permit, translate into financial commitments.32 Inevitably what makes the difference – at least in terms of the perception that citizens have of the phenomenon of migration – is precisely the ‘cost’ of social rights combined with the limited resources. This forces both lawmakers (often the regional
29 Since 2014, Italy has experienced the highest number of incoming non-EU citizens seeking international protection and economic opportunities in its history. This problem is particularly acute above all for Italians who live in the south of the country in Lampedusa, in Sicily, in Calabria and in the vicinity of the Italian coastal areas where hundreds of people arrive sometimes on a daily basis. At the end of May 2016, for instance, 13 000 migrants reached the shores of Lampedusa in just four days. More than 7 000 foreign minors reached the shores of Italy over the first five months of 2016. See the Report by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), cit., https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ region/mediterranean [accessed 23 December 2019]. 30 See, e.g. the debate concerning Legislative Decree no 94 of 2009 (the so-called security package), which introduced the offence of illegal immigration into Italian law. 31 Biondi Dal Monte, F., Regioni, immigrazione e diritti fondamentali [Regions, Immigration and Fundamental Rights], http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/images/stories/pdf/ documenti_forum/giurisprudenza/2010/0047_nota_269_299_2010_biondi.pdf; Randazzo, A., La salute degli stranieri irregolari: un diritto fondamentale ‘dimezzato’? [The Health of Irregular Foreigners: A ‘Halved’ Fundamental Right?], http://www.giurcost.org/studi/randazzo3.pdf; Corsi, C., ‘Stranieri, diritti sociali e principio di eguaglianza nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale’ [‘Foreign Nationals, Social Rights and the Principle of Equality within the Case Law of the Court’], 10/2014, http://www.federalismi.it/document/22102014151431.pdf [accessed 23 December 2019]. 32 On various occasions, the Constitutional Court has found that the need to ensure the universal and comprehensive nature of the social security system in Italy has conflicted and still conflicts with the limited availability of financial resources available for allocation to the healthcare sector each year, within the ambit of the general planning of social assistance and welfare spending. See, e.g. judgments no 111 of 2005 and no 162 of 2007.
308 Some comments concerning the principle of a balanced budget and the role of the Constitutional Court in relation to migration lawmakers) and the government to reduce the scope available for social benefits and entails a serious risk of unleashing a ‘war’ between the weakest segments of the population, the results of which are unforeseeable. As noted above, immigration often lies at the heart of election campaigns and is frequently exploited by politicians who seek to distinguish between how foreigners – especially those not lawfully resident – and nationals of the state are treated. This dynamic ends up privileging the latter and ‘sacrificing’ the former, in line with the financial health of the state coffers. Be that as it may, returning to spending judgments, it is not always easy to provide redress for the interests infringed, both because this may entail high costs (notwithstanding the Article 81 requirement) and also because it is liable to encroach upon legislative discretion. The courts should, therefore, take care not to overstep the dividing line between the judicial and political realms, which, precisely for this reason, limits their scope for action in relation to any matter that might result in the redistribution of resources. Nevertheless, the delicate balance that constitutional courts must always strike between politics and justice is felt particularly keenly in the area of social rights, an area which is by definition contested and which has become even more so in the wake of increased migration.
309 Viktor Muraviov and Nataliia Mushak The EU Court of Justice as a guardian of supranational and national democracies
THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE AS A GUARDIAN OF SUPRANATIONAL AND NATIONAL DEMOCRACIES
Acad. Prof. Dr. Hab. Viktor Muraviov Institute of International Relations of Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University
Prof. Dr. Hab. Nataliia Mushak Department of International and Comparative Law at the Faculty of International Relations of the National Aviation University, Ukraine INTRODUCTION The European Union is a constitutional entity based on principles and determined values that constitute a legal basis for the EU legal order. The EU principles and values, including the principle of democracy, are enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, as well as specified in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, and have internal and external dimensions.1 The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, as many other EU international agreements, contains EU principles and values.2 By means of the conclusion of the association agreements, EU law extends its effect on the internal legislation of the associated countries. Thus, the EU principles and values become an integral part of the national legislation of third states. In this connection, the study of the peculiarities of the Association of Ukraine with the EU becomes topical for Ukrainian science of European law. Unfortunately, the legal problem of influence of EU law on the nature and content of the association agreements, which creates preconditions for the expansion of the Union acquis in the internal legal order of third countries, has not attracted sufficient attention in the Ukrainian and foreign literature on European law. The study of these issues is the actual problem of modern science of international and European law and its solution will be of considerable practical importance for Ukraine.
1 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European Union, 2007/C 306/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT [accessed 11 December 2019]. 2 The Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one Part, and Ukraine, of the other Part, 29 May 2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A22014A0529%2801%29 [accessed 11 December 2019].
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I. THE ROLE OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF TWO LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION After the Second World War, the establishment of democratic values and, along with it, the development of civil society, its institutions in the states of Western Europe gained special weight. Similar constitutional foundations for democratic values and human rights and freedoms have been and continue to be characteristic of the European states of developed democracy. While speaking about democracy in the EU and its Member States, one should bear in mind that, in both cases, the content of it is different. So that it is not correct to compare the European democracy to a national democracy, even though the EU democracy draws inspiration from national democracies in the Member States. The EU is not a state nor is it a traditional international organisation. It is a sui generis entity, which differs from a state and from an international institution. At the same time, the EU has many features of a state but for sovereignty. It allows us to conclude that democracy as a phenomenon can be attributed to the EU. We can call it ‘supranational democracy’.3 The same applies mutatis mutandis to other EU common values. National and supranational democracies are interconnected and dependent on each other. For instance, it is impossible for non-democratic states to form a democratic union. On the other hand, supranational democracy is not all sufficient. It supplements national democracies and, at the same time, in some clearly designated cases, can even intervene and make corrections to its functioning in the EU Member States. The Member States have endowed the EU with limited powers for this. Beyond this sui generis political power, the European Union also has a singular institutional scheme, which is, despite similarities to national-level counterparts, different from a typical national-level system. For instance, it is impossible to compare the Commission to a government, since the executive power is shared with the European Council and the Council of the EU. The same applies to the Council. The European Parliament has much limited legislative powers than national parliaments etc.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CJEU PRACTICE The CJEU has understood the principle of democracy in a way that is respectful of the two sources of democratic legitimacy at the EU level, namely the Member States
3 Arnold, R., ‘Anthropocentric Constitutionalism in the European Union: Some Reflections’, in The European Union – What Is Next? A Legal Analysis and the Political Visions on the Future of the Union (monograph), Wolters Kluwer, 2018, pp. 117–118.
311 Viktor Muraviov and Nataliia Mushak and the peoples of Europe. The CJEU strives to place national and supranational democracies in a mutually reinforcing relationship. At the very beginning of its functioning, the EU suffered from the so-called ‘democratic deficit’, since almost all powers were concentrated in the executive institutions – the Commission and the Council. At that time, the present European Parliament was called the Assembly, which had only consulting powers in the legislative process. What is more, the provisions of the founding treaties did not contain any references to democracy and the rule of law. However, step by step, the situation with the democratic deficit in the EU radically changed. In the preamble to the Single European Act, the Member States expressed their determination to work together to promote democracy on the basis of fundamental rights.4 In Article F(2) of the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States made commitments to respecting fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Human Rights Convention and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.5 The aim of consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law is included in Article 21(2) of the Treaty on European Union among the key objectives that define the Union’s common policies and actions.6 The most important for our topic is Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. It states: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’ The EU Court of Justice was the mastermind of those changes. The crucial role was played by the CJEU, as an institution of the EU that is not bound by the political constraints that limit the action of the European Commission. The decisions of the CJEU cover the whole spectrum of democracy on the supranational and national levels. The effect of the case Van Gend en Loos was to give the Community law to the people taking it out of the hands of politicians and bureaucrats.7 Of all the Court’s democratising achievements, none can rank so highly in practical terms. Moreover, the Court recognised in Van Gend en Loos that the two aspects of democratic
4 The Single European Act, 29 June 1987, Official Journal of the European Communities, https://eur- lex.europa.eu/resource.html [accessed 11 December 2019]. 5 The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, 29 July 1992, Official Journal of the European Communities, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT [accessed 11 December 2019]. 6 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European Union, 2007/C 306/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT [accessed 11 December 2019]. 7 The CJEU, the judgment of 5 February 1963, Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 26–62, para. 12.
312 The EU Court of Justice as a guardian of supranational and national democracies legitimacy – namely, the right of the people to participate in the law-making function through representative bodies and the ability of individuals to vindicate their rights in judicial proceedings – are intimately linked: one of the reasons given for upholding direct effect was that ‘the nationals of the States brought together in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee’. In the area of human rights, the EU Court of Justice relies on the definition of a catalogue of fundamental rights by reference to which the Court reviews the legality of the Community’s legislative and administrative acts. That achievement, which was initiated in 1969 and 1970 with the judgments in Stauder8 and Internationale Handelsgesellschaf 9 and has continued systematically to the present day, is one of the greatest contributions that the Court has made to democratic legitimacy in the Community. In the case Roquette Frere, the EU Court of Justice came to the conclusion that the consultation provided for in the Treaty is the means that allows the Parliament to play a part in the legislative process of the Community.10 Such power represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects, at the Community level, the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly. Due consultation of the Parliament, therefore, constitutes an essential procedural requirement disregard of which means that the measure concerned is void. In the Chernobyl case, the Court held that, in order to maintain the institutional equilibrium created by the Treaty as amended by the Single European Act, the Parliament should be able to safeguard its newly won prerogatives and, therefore, have standing to commence proceedings against acts of the Council and Commission.11 In the judgment delivered in the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Conta, the CJEU affirmed that judicial independence (i.e. judges’ responsibility to deliver justice independently, making impartial decisions based solely on fact and law) is a fundamental principle that has to be safeguarded all over the Union.12 The case concerned the potential infringement of the judicial independence of Portuguese judges through the enactment of Law No 75/2014, by which the Portuguese legislature temporarily reduced the remuneration of a series of employees of the public sector. 8 The CJEU, the judgment of 12 November 1969,Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, 29–69, para. 8. 9 The CJEU, the judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 11–70, para. 4. 10 The CJEU, the judgment of 29 October 1980, SA Roquette Frères v Council of the European Communities, 138/79, para. 3. 11 The CJEU, the judgment of 16 July 1992, Parliament v Council, C-70/88, para. 5. 12 The CJEU, the judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, C-64/16, para. 4.
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In order to reach such a judgment, the CJEU confirmed that the principle of judicial independence is enshrined in both Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 47 of the Charter. It then affirmed Article 2 of the Treaty, to the effect that the European Union is founded on values, such as the rule of law, which are common to the Member States in a society in which justice prevails; and national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfil a duty entrusted to them jointly. In other words, from the CJEU perspective, the various national judicial authorities are part of a common European judicial network, whose integrity is essential for the correct functioning of the European Union. Although the CJEU concluded that the salary-reduction measures at issue did not impair the independence of the Portuguese judges, its decision is potentially revolutionary in that it considers any attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary of a Member State as an attack on the entire Union. As a result, the CJEU is conferring upon itself the right to intervene against such attempts carried out at the national level. With this judgment, the CJEU has prepared the ground to rule on the independence of national judiciaries in any other member states. The obvious candidate is Poland, where the nationalist Law and Justice government has reduced the public broadcaster to a propaganda organ, packed civil service with loyalists purging the public administration, and undermined the independence of the judiciary by stacking the Constitutional Tribunal with its cronies and enacting pieces of legislation to put under its control judicial appointments. In July 2018, the head of the Polish Supreme Court was even forced to step down from her job through a retirement law passed by the ruling party. The senior judge described the law as ‘a purge of the supreme court, conducted under the guise of retirement reform’. In its judgment in joint cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 Commission v Poland, the CJEU ruled that the Polish judicial reforms aimed at lowering the retirement age of ordinary court judges violated EU law.13 The Court said the reforms introduced political influence over the judiciary by giving the justice minister the ability to retain certain judges beyond their retirement age. ‘Independence requires that the court concerned exercise its functions wholly autonomously and in an impartial manner,’ the Court said. Judges in Luxembourg also ruled that the change of the age of retirement for women to 60 and for men to 65, down from the current 67 – bringing in different retirement ages for men and women – equated to gender discrimination. The CJEU also decided that there is a reason to question the independence of the new disciplinary authority at the Supreme Court of Poland, which exercises monitoring and administers the potential punishment of judges.
13 The CJEU, the judgment of 19 November 2019, Commission v Poland, C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18, para. 7.
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Poland has the choice either to roll back its judiciary reforms and comply with the CJEU ruling or risk further action from the European Commission, which could involve financial penalties.
CONCLUSIONS As the Council of Europe has highlighted in the 2017 report on the state of democracy in Europe, nationalist and xenophobic parties have made gains in a growing number of countries, challenging elites and exploiting public anxieties over migration. In this situation, the European Union institutions may serve as a bastion of democracy and the rule of law, when national institutions drift towards authoritarianism and national governments prove to be incapable of defending the very fundamental values on which our free societies are based.
315 Joakim Nergelius The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE – A MATTER OF GROWING IMPORTANCE IN TIMES OF A ‘RULE OF LAW BATTLE’
Prof. Joakim Nergelius University of Örebro, Sweden The purpose of this article is to discuss the increasingly important relationship between national constitutional – or supreme – courts and the two European courts in general, with a special focus on the European Court of Justice (CJEU). This issue is rapidly becoming a constitutional matter of great importance within the EU, not least in relation to the recent Rule of Law crisis particularly in Poland and Hungary. First, a general background to the current situation is given, followed by updates on the situation concerning the EU Commission’s legal actions towards Hungary and Poland, as well as the development of the so-called Rule of Law Framework (RoL) within the EU. Finally, some interesting cases from the CJEU that do also involve national courts are analysed.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND – A HISTORICAL VIEW ON THE RULE OF LAW WITHIN THE EU It was not until 1993 that the rule of law entered into the EU treaty, at the change of the three European Communities into one European Union. At the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, on 1 May 1999, the former Article F was expanded into two new articles (Arts. 6 and 7 TEU) and the rule of law was turned into a principle upon which the Union was founded.1 The rule of law was, above all, instrumental in the context of enlargement, since it was a keystone of the Copenhagen criteria, adopted in 1993 as the basic criteria for states wanting to become EU members. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the founding principles have been moved from Article 6 TEU to Article 2 TEU. Article 7 TEU is the procedure envisaged for the protection of the values in Article 2 TEU, which means that the two articles together form the EU’s main mechanism for the protection of the rule of law in the Member States. It may be added that a widespread discussion on the application of Article 7 TEU (that was by then Art. 6) took place already in 2000, when a majority
1 On the history of the Article 7 mechanism, see Sadurski, W., ‘Adding Bite to the Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’, Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 16, 2009/2010, p. 385 s.
316 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ of the Member States appeared to be willing to introduce some very mild and, in reality, informal sanctions against Austria, due to the fact that the right-wing populist party FPÖ had joined the Austrian government. For a number of reasons though (the most important of which being that Austria had in fact not violated any of the said values), the rather bizarre measures thus initiated, such as refusals from other Member State governments to shake the hands of Austrian ministers or let them join common photo sessions, quickly ended.2 Still, for some time, all the other Member States refused to cooperate with the Austrian government, since it included members of FPÖ, though Austria had not (yet) violated either of the principles in Article 6(1) TEU. This lack of legal clarity was addressed in the following treaty revision in 2000 (Nice Treaty), when Article 7 TEU was changed to include the possibility of determining the existence of both a breach and a clear risk of a serious breach. The current rule of law crisis within the EU started as early as 2010, with the huge electoral victory for the Fidesz party in Hungary, which won a majority of two thirds of the members in the Parliament and immediately began to use that majority in order to appoint new judges and chief executives for various public bodies. Such moves were followed by a new media law, as well as a new Constitution in 2011, and then also a decision to force all the judges at the age of 62 years or older into retiring. The media law strengthened the government’s control over all state media and the new Constitution has a remarkably nationalistic language and approach, while also curtailing the independence of the judicial system and huge parts of the public administration.3 In many respects, that is where the right-wing populist movement that has since then shocked the western world with such force must be said to have started. These and other assaults on the rule of law and other crucial values stated in Article 2 TEU did, of course, cause a number of reactions from the EU. Among the actions initiated by the EU, it may be noted that the EU Commission brought a case against Hungary concerning the forced retirement of judges older than 62 years to the CJEU, who found in 2012 that this amounted to unlawful discrimination on grounds of age.4 Here, however, it seems that the Commission did deliberately choose that quite technical approach, with claims of an alleged treaty violation according to Article 258 TFEU, rather than claiming that the basic, fundamental principle of the rule of law was actually violated. Now, anyhow, some recent developments, which 2 This was partly also due to a report from three so-called ‘wise men’, former Finnish President Ahtisaari, former Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja and German law professor Jochen Frowein, published in September 2000. 3 For an overview, see Nergelius, J., ‘The Hungarian Constitution of 2012 and Its Protection of Fundamental Rights’, Sieps (Epa) 2012:3, Stockholm, 2012. A more general perspective on the development, from 2010 until 2014, in Hungary and Romania, is provided in Bogdandy, A. von and Sonnavend, P., Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area – Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, Oxford/Portland, 2015. 4 C-286/12.
317 Joakim Nergelius are dealt with below, have to some extent changed this legal situation. Thus, the need to initiate procedures in the area of the rule of law itself can no longer be avoided, though it may not be necessary to invoke Article 2 TEU. However, in the discussions that have occurred since 2010, concerning the situation in Hungary but, at times, also in, for example, Romania and, since early 2016, not least in relation to Poland, governments have expressed profound doubts concerning the very validity of key European values such as the rule of law and human rights.5 It is thus no wonder that, since 2010, Hungary has been in the focus of this whole conflict, which has been escalating ever since 2011, at least from a political point of view.6 From the legal point of view, anyhow, it seems very clear that Hungary has not complied with the key values of European integration (cfr. Art. 2 TEU). Ever since 2011, it has been discussed when the threshold, in this respect, will be passed in relation to Hungary or rather when Article 7 must be activated if it is to have any real significance at all. Since 2015, also the resistance from Hungary and a few other Member States to the existing or proposed EU policy on refugees has added fuel to the fire, while the development in Poland, with its new conservative government, seems to be almost a copy of what happened in Hungary a few years before. And, for various reasons, the EU Commission has clearly been more active in relation to Poland, as shown below. A decision of the EU eventually to react against a Member State that is allegedly failing in this respect would, according to Article 7 TEU, have to be carried out in two steps. First, the Council must establish, with a majority of four fifths of the other Member States, that a clear risk exists that a Member State does really violate the basic values that are stated in Article 2 TEU. After that, the Council may unanimously (the failing state in question again not participating) declare that the state thus identified does in fact, in a serious and persistent manner, ignore these values. In hindsight, the EU certainly took its time before reacting sharply to what happened in Hungary. Concerning Poland, on the other hand, the Commission initiated a dialogue with the then new Polish government already in January 2016. Since March 2014, the EU Commission has at its disposal a new instrument for this and other current dialogues of the same kind with the Member States, namely
5 The most well-known statement with such a significance was probably the one made by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, who, in 2014, advocated an ‘illiberal democracy’ that would, in his view, respond to contemporary challenges such as migration and terrorism in a better way than the traditional, liberal and pluralist democracy. The full text of the speech, held at Tusnafürdö on 26 July 2014, is available at https://budapestbeacon.com. 6 At the same time, there has been an intense legal discussion on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly after the Opinion of the CJEU in December 2014 stating that such an accession would not be legally possible (Opinion 2/13). Still, the question when the majority of the EU Member States may wish to react against one or a few Member States who do, in fact, violate fundamental rights is, in fact, wider and more dramatic and, probably, also more urgent.
318 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ the so-called Rule of Law Framework.7 The main purpose of this instrument seems to be to make it possible for the EU Commission to involve in a dialogue with a Member State, based on critical observations of the development of the country in question, without having immediately to resort to the controversial and politically difficult procedure envisaged in Article 7 TEU. (In fact, the actual use of the procedure in Article 7(2) and (3) whereby a Member State might lose its vote in the Council does now seem more remote than ever, since Hungary has promised to use its veto in case of a vote on Poland and Poland has made a similar declaration concerning Hungary.) The background to the Commission’s action against Poland is this. On 25 October 2015, parliamentary elections were held in Poland. PiS won a majority in the Sejm and started an ambitious reform project. The first step included changes to the law on the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the nomination of five new judges to the said court and the annulment of the five nominations of the outgoing Sejm. The Polish president went on to appoint the five new judges nominated, even though there were cases concerning the legality of the nominations pending before the Constitutional Tribunal. 8 On 13 January 2016, the Commission decided to invoke the EU Framework for strengthening the Rule of Law (the RoL Framework).9 The surveillance mechanism envisaged in this Framework states that the Commission shall assess the situation in a Member State where problems in relation to the rule of law have been observed, a move that shall be followed by recommendations for change and then also a follow-up or an evaluation of the measures taken by the state in question. After that, if no change has occurred, Article 7 may be applied. Graphically, the procedure looks like as presented in the scheme ‘Commission’s infringement proceedings’.10 What this sketch also tries to show is that traditional infringement proceedings against a Member State before the CJEU under Article 258 TFEU is one thing, while the procedure when possible threats to the rule of law are observed in a Member State is quite different. Here, the Commission and maybe also the EU Parliament will engage in a dialogue with the Member State in question, which may lead to assessments, opinions and recommendations from the Commission, which is exactly what has now happened in the case of Poland. During this time, the conflict may hopefully be successfully resolved, but, if not, Article 7 may have to be launched. This may happen either in the mild form prescribed in Article 7(1), or in the sharper version, with possible sanctions, in Article 7(2) and (3). Formally, that
7 COM (2014) 158. 8 Shortly thereafter, on 3 December and 9 December, the Constitutional Tribunal issued two judgments, to the effect that the outgoing Sejm had had no mandate to nominate five judges (but instead only three) and that the newly elected Sejm had not been mandated to cancel the five nominations. 9 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, 19 March 2014. 10 This model is presented by the EU Commission, ibid.
319 Joakim Nergelius harder, sanctioning line may also be applied directly, without first passing the threshold of establishing that there is a risk of breaches of the rule of law in a certain Member State, though politically it may be easier and more logical to start with the milder, preventive form of criticism.
Commission’s infringement proceedings As we shall see below, the original RoL Framework has now been completed and the legal picture is for many reasons more complicated. Nevertheless, the background is important to understand. The original RoL Framework was thus adopted by the Commission on 19 March 2014. It was designed to complement the existing EU mechanisms for the protection of the rule of law in the EU Member States, i.e. the infringement procedure in Article 258 TFEU, as well as Article 7 TEU, and especially adopted to address situations where the existing Member State mechanisms fall short of safeguarding the rule of law, though the threshold for activating Article 7 TEU has not been reached. Furthermore, the Commission took the view that the infringement procedure in Article 258 TFEU may only be used in response to specific breaches
320 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ of explicit obligations under EU law, which does not include Article 2 TEU.11 The Commission’s (former?) view is shared by, among others, the Council’s Legal Service.12 However, the CJEU is the only institution able to give an authoritative interpretation on the provisions of the treaties (cfr. Art. 19 TEU) and it would be interesting to see what the Court would do in a case clearly based on a failure to fulfil the obligation in Article 2 TEU.13 The RoL Framework contains a three-step process: the assessment and recommendation of the Commission and the follow-up to that recommendation. In the first step, the Commission compiles and analyses information indicating a systemic threat to the rule of law. If this initial assessment confirms that the rule of law is threatened, the Commission initiates a dialogue with the Member State in question, expressing its ‘opinion on the rule of law’ and proposing measures to be taken. If the parties fail to agree on how to handle the issues or, should the authorities of the Member State in question refrain from taking appropriate action, the Commission sends a published ‘rule of law recommendation’ to that Member State. The recommendation lays out the reasons why the Commission views the situation as a systemic threat to the rule of law, setting a deadline for the Member State to take action and report to the Commission. In the third step, the Commission monitors that the Member State follows the recommendation. If not, the Commission may activate one of the mechanisms in Article 7. This Framework was thus applied for the first time in January 2016, when the Commission decided to react to the recent changes in Polish law on the Constitutional Tribunal and the appointment of judges.14 For the following two years, the Commission maintained a dialogue with the Polish government. On 1 June 2016, the Commission sent a Rule of Law Opinion to Poland and, when the Polish response did not satisfy Commissioner Timmermans, this was followed by the first ever Rule of Law Recommendation on 27 July. Two more recommendations were issued (21 December 2016 and 26 July 2017) and, finally, the Commission issued a fourth
11 Later case law may have changed the Commission’s firm belief regarding the link between Article 51 CFR and Article 258 TFEU, as the Court has held that the scope of Article 51 CFR does not prevent Article 19(1) TEU from being applicable in a dispute outside the remit of the scope as construed in Article 51 CFR. C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 (Portuguese Judges case), para. 29. 12 The Council of the European Union, the Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council on the Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 10296/14, 27 May 2014. 13 Furthermore, case law handed down in 2018 established a connection between Article 19(1) and Article 2 TEU, stating that the former gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law in Article 2 TEU. See C-64/16, the Portuguese Judges case, para. 32. 14 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland, OJ L 217/53, 12-08-2016.
321 Joakim Nergelius recommendation in combination with the reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU on 20 December 2017.15 The points raised by the Commission, as threats to the rule of law, were basically the same throughout the entire dialogue, focusing on ‘the lack of an independent and legitimate constitutional review’ and ‘the threats to the independence of the ordinary judiciary’. The first category concerns the workings of the Constitutional Tribunal, for example, the situation regarding the three judges nominated by the previous Sejm, who, in December 2017, had yet not been allowed to take up their positions. The appointment of the Tribunal’s president was also a matter of grave concern. As the Commission highlights, the combined effect of these measures is that the constitutionality of Polish laws can no longer be guaranteed. Concerning the threats to the independence of the ordinary judiciary, the main concern of the Commission was the amendment of the law on the Supreme Court, which lowered the retirement age from 70 to 65, with immediate effect also on judges already in office. The changes were also applicable to the Supreme Administrative Court but, in the Supreme Court, the effect was that 31 of its 83 judges would have to retire. The changes to the law on the Supreme Court also gave the President of the Republic far reaching powers to grant individual judges permission not to retire, upon their own request. Basically, this means that the President holds power, at his own discretion, to decide which judges who may stay on and which judges that must retire. Furthermore, the new law also establishes a new disciplinary regime for Supreme Court judges, whereby the President of the Republic can appoint ad hoc ‘extraordinary disciplinary officers’ whose task is to decide on the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges.16
15 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, COM(2017) 835 final, Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, 20 December 2017. On the same day, the Commission also referred an infringement case against Poland to the CJEU, C-192/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland (still pending), where the Commission contends that Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the treaties on two accounts. It thus claims that Poland has breached its obligations under Article 157 TFEU and Articles 5(a) and 9(1)(f) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 relative to the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women in matters of employment and work, by introducing a retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men for judges of the ordinary courts, public prosecutors and judges of the Supreme Court, and, secondly, that Poland had ‘failed to fulfil its obligations under the combined provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by lowering, in Article 13(1) of the Amending Law of July 2017, the retirement age of judges of the ordinary courts, while at the same time vesting the Minister of Justice with a discretion to prolong the period of active service of individual ordinary court judges under Article 1(26)(b) and (c) of the same law’. 16 Within this category, the Commission also brought up the changes made to the law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation, the law on the National Council for the Judiciary and the law on the National
322 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’
It is hard to say whether the rather imminent use of this mechanism in relation to Poland, as opposed to the quite passive attitude initially shown towards Hungary, is due to the simple fact that this framework did not exist in 2011, or if the Commission in fact thought that the Polish government would be more inclined towards constructive dialogue than the Hungarian one.17 Needless to say, it would have been useful for the EU had this mechanism existed already in 2011, when the Hungarian problems started, but this is not the place for remorse. Now, in view not least of mistakes made, the EU needs to look to the future. A survey of the current situation is here needed. Concerning Poland, where its activity has thus been much higher, the Commission decided to leave a reasoned proposal, advising the Council to take action based on Article 7 TEU against Poland, on 20 December 2017, following almost two years of negotiations and discussions, assessments, opinions and recommendations regarding the Polish rule of law framework. As mentioned above, the proposal was a result of Polish judicial reforms that have placed the country’s judiciary system in the hands of the ruling parliamentary majority, as explained above. In total, the Polish parliament (Sejm) in 2016–2017 adopted more than thirteen legal changes affecting the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, ordinary courts, the National Council for the Judiciary, the prosecution service and the National School of Judiciary, leading to a significantly weakened rule of law since the executive and legislative branches have been systematically enabled to politically interfere in the composition, powers, administration and the functioning of the judicial branch.18 Among these decisions, a new President of the Constitutional Tribunal, supposed to be loyal with the governing PiS party was appointed in 2016 (Ms Przyłębska), who then almost immediately seated allegedly unconstitutionally elected PiS judges, thus assuring that the Tribunal would be loyal to PiS. This took place while the EU Commission was warning the Polish government against authorising the appointment of a new president for the Tribunal. The government also refused to implement two judgments of the Tribunal from December 2015 on the legal status of judges elected by the old and new governments, as well as the judgment of 9 March 2016, in which part of the new law regulating the Constitutional Tribunal itself was considered to be unconstitutional. In general, it should also be noted that the Polish government has refused to provide the Commission with sufficient answers and full information. During this
School of Judiciary, claiming that the combined effect of these legislative changes raises ‘serious concerns as regards judicial independence, the separation of powers and legal certainty’. 17 There may, of course, also be other explanations, such as the fact that Hungary adopted a new constitution in 2011, after which Hungary did not violate its own, national rules as evidently as Poland has done since 2016. Nevertheless, the difference in the (strength of) reaction from the EU against the two countries is striking. 18 The European Commission, the press release of 20 December 2017, MEMO/17/5368. For a description of the current legal and constitutional situation in Poland, see Wojciech Sadurski (2018).
323 Joakim Nergelius whole time, Poland has treated the Commission quite arrogantly, stating that it acts in accordance with its own Constitution (or rather the government’s own interpretation thereof) and sometimes even responding to the Commission in Polish. In fact, when the Commission decided finally to present a reasoned proposal to the Council, it was partly due to the failure of the Polish authorities to engage ‘in a constructive dialogue in the context of the Rule of Law Framework’.19 As mentioned, the EU until very recently refrained from invoking Article 7 TEU, according to which a Member State that does not respect the rule of law and/or other key values of the European integration mentioned above may temporarily lose some of its rights as a member, including the right to vote in the EU Council, against Hungary or Poland.20 This somewhat arrogant attitude from the Polish government may actually also have made the Commission more eager to bring cases against Poland before the CJEU. Thus, the Commission, on 20 December 2017, referred Poland to the CJEU for breaches of EU law through the Polish law on the Ordinary Courts Organisation. The development in this case and others will be described below but, first, a few words more should be said about the actions taken towards Hungary.
II. A BRIEF COMMENT ON HUNGARY Concerning Hungary, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in the country, calling for the Commission to strictly monitor Hungary and potential breaches of the Rule of Law occurring there, on 17 May 2017. The resolution is based on how Hungarian authorities have treated immigrants and asylum seekers in Hungary, including situations where immigrants in Hungary have been charged with committing acts of terror and sentenced to prison in unlawful judicial processes. In the other resolution, related situations are mentioned, such as the use of ‘stop Brussels’ as a consulting and advertising campaign for the government on immigration and terrorism, which has raised further concern on whether Hungarian authorities do really act in compliance with EU primary and secondary law. The resolution was adopted in the Parliament by 393 votes to 221 with 64 abstentions on 17 May 2017.21 19 See the European Commission, the press release ‘Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland’, 2017, IP-17-5367. 20 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180222STO98434/rule-of-law- concerns-in-poland-how-the-article-7-procedure-would-work. Before the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of a Rule of Law breach, the Parliament needs to give its consent, which it decided to do on 1 March 2018 through a resolution that called for the Council to take ‘swift action’ towards Poland. At the European Council meeting on 27 February 2018, the Commission presented its reasoned proposal to the Council. The Council will revert to the issue in ‘due course’ and has not yet taken any other action regarding the triggering of Article 7(1), since it awaits potential development in the area regarding a possible dialogue between the EU and Poland. The Council has also not yet responded to the Parliament’s resolution calling for the Council to take ‘swift action’. 21 The European Parliament resolution of 17 May 2017 on the situation in Hungary (2017/2656(RSP)). This resolution also calls for the Hungarian government to engage in a dialogue with the Commission
324 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’
The Parliament then also, in September 2018, voted on a report on Hungary from MEP Judith Sargentini, which was adopted by an absolute majority of MEPs (with 448 votes in favour and 197 against).22 This quite intense recent activity of the Parliament must be viewed in the light of the earlier, rather strange lack of activity from the Commission; but, on 7 December 2017, the Commission referred Hungary to the CJEU over Hungary’s adopted NGO law, since the Commission finds that the new law indirectly discriminates and disproportionately restricts donations from abroad to civil society organisations and that Hungary violates the freedom of association enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The referral followed previously reasoned opinions and letters of notice from the Commission that had been unanswered from Hungary.23 The result of these proceedings remains to be seen. We may note that they concern rather principled issues and do not have quite the same technical character as the cases brought against Hungary by the Commission in 2011 and 2012. Still, the CJEU seems to be slower in reacting in these cases than in similar Polish ones discussed below. It is at the moment hard to foresee how relations between Hungary and the EU may be improved.24 Once again, one cannot help thinking that the situation might have been slightly different, had the Commission reacted more quickly in November 2010. This can, of course, also be seen as yet another gap in the constitutional model of the EU; in a well-functioning federal system, the executive or supervisory body would not have hesitated so much before reacting against serious legal flaws in one of the Member States.
regarding the issues stated in the resolution and includes the decision to vote on whether or not to encourage the Council to take action in accordance with Article 7(1) against Hungary, concerning breaches of Article 2 TEU (i.e. in relation to values such as respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of people belonging to minorities). 22 LIBE, Committee meeting, 12-04-2018; Judith Sargentini, LIBE rapporteur, 10:07 / 10:30, 12-04-2018. After this, Hungary brought a case against the Parliament to the CJEU (C-650/18, pending). 23 C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, pending. See the press release of the European Commission ‘Infringements – European Commission refers Hungary to the Court of Justice for its NGO Law’, 2017. In December 2017, the Commission also referred Hungary to the CJEU concerning the new Hungarian higher education law, since it is possible that it disproportionally restricts EU and non-EU universities in their operations and, therefore, needs to be brought back in line with EU law (C-66/18, pending). The new Hungarian law added new requirements as regards the name of foreign higher education institutions and additional requirements for the registration and authorisation of higher education services in Hungary. 24 For a theoretical overview of the matter, see Jakab, A., ‘Institutional Alcoholism in Post-Socialist Countries and the Cultural Elements of the Rule of Law – The Example of Hungary’, in Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, A. and Groussot, X., The Future of Europe – Political and Legal Integration Beyond Brexit, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol. XIII, Oxford, 2019, pp. 209–245.
325 Joakim Nergelius
III. CASES AGAINST POLAND BEFORE THE CJEU As we know, the EU has gradually developed its own legal system, which over the years has turned into a legal system that clearly deviates from its origins in international law. The development may be described as a gradual move from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism. In an intergovernmental system, unanimity may not be required for decisions that create binding obligations, but the states will hold veto power against any obligations that they do not wish to be bound by. Furthermore, intergovernmentalism is characterised by consensus-oriented dialogue, whereas the logic of supranationalism leans towards majoritarian rule. Typically, it may also be said that majority rule and transparency work well within supranationalism, while secrecy and compromise are key elements of intergovernmentalism. In recent years, supporters of the Commission’s actions against Hungary and Poland have expressed frustration over the apparent inefficiency of Article 7 TEU.25 Proceedings before the CJEU seem to be more effective, as shown below by the Polish case. This is logical given that Article 7 TEU offers political decision making by negotiation and consensus, in contrast to the legal procedure laid down in Article 258 TFEU. For instance, it is interesting that, when interim measures in a new case concerning the law on the Polish Supreme Court were decided in October 2018,26 Poland was quick to follow the sentence from the CJEU, ordering Poland to immediately suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges. The Commission’s main legal concern with the contested law is the discrimination on the basis of gender given the introduction of a different retirement age for female judges (60 years) and male judges (65 years), which seems to be contrary to Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 on gender equality in employment. In its referral to the CJEU, the Commission also raised concern on whether the independence of Polish courts will be undermined by the fact that the Minister of Justice has been given the discretionary power to prolong the mandate of judges who have reached retirement age, as mentioned above (see Article 19(1) TEU in combination with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).27 Here, it is very interesting that the Commission invoked Article 19(1), which obliges the Member States to secure an effective protection of rights emanating from EU law within their national legal systems. This is a new line of reasoning, with support in recent case law as explained 25 See, e.g. Kochenov, D. and Pech, L., ‘Better Late Than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and Its First Activation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 54, No 5, 2016; Kochenov, D. and Pech, L., ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 11, No 3, 2015, pp. 512–540; Müller, J., ‘Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?’, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No 2, 2015. 26 C-619/18. 27 The Commission’s Fourth Rule of Law Recommendation, C (2017) 950 final.
326 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ below, the result of which needs to be closely followed and analysed.28 The CJEU in October 2018 thus ordered Poland to suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation related to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges and to take all necessary measures to ensure that the Supreme Court judges concerned by the law may continue to perform their tasks, with the same status and the same rights that they had before the law entered into force, without any new judges being appointed as their replacements. On 7 March 2018, the Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister had presented a White Paper to the European Commission, the Parliament and all the Member States, arguing against the Commission. Here, Poland argues that the changes made in the judiciary system are necessary in order to solve the issues and problems that have existed within the Polish judiciary system for almost a decade. Furthermore, the White Paper presents comparisons with judicial systems in other EU states, in an attempt to prove that the changes made within the Polish judiciary are not as dramatic as the Commission claims.29 On 24 June 2019, the CJEU handed down its final judgment in the case.30 The Court found that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR or the Charter). The case is interesting from many points of view. From the perspective of the Polish government, the measures that the Court found to have amounted to a failure to fulfil the obligation to ‘ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’ as stated in Article 19(1) TEU were thus part of a necessary process aiming at ridding the Polish judiciary of the judges appointed to serve previous (communist) governments. From the point of view of the Commission, which was shared by most Member States and several NGO’s, the fundamental reform of the Polish judiciary was seen as a series of flagrant violations of the rule of law, conducted by the executive in order to take control of the judicial branch of the Polish governing powers. The full legal and political background was that, on 2 July 2018, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the Polish government, asking it to reply to the Commission’s concerns about the Polish law on the Supreme Court entering into effect on 3 July, forcing 27 out of 72 Supreme Court judges to retire. When the responses of the Polish government failed to satisfy the Commission, it thus referred Poland 28 See, in this respect, also C-216/18, PPU v Minister for Justice and Equality, where the Irish High Court was in doubt on whether an alleged criminal could be extradited to Poland according to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), given the risk that he would not enjoy a fair trial within the Polish legal system. The CJEU basically stated that such decisions by courts in other Member States will need to be based on the circumstances in the individual case; in other words, the general, unconditional obligation for national authorities to obey the EAW seems to have been suspended in relation to Poland. 29 The White Paper on the Reform of Polish Judiciary, Warsaw, 7 March 2018. 30 C-619/18, Commission v Poland, 24 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
327 Joakim Nergelius to the CJEU on 24 September 2018 under Article 258 TFEU.31 The Commission had applied for interim measures, requesting that the CJEU should order Poland to suspend the implementation of the law lowering the retirement age of the Supreme Court judges. As mentioned above, the CJEU upheld the measures proposed by the Commission on 19 October32 and the Polish government quickly confirmed that it intended to comply with the Court’s decision. Hungary then intervened on the side of Poland, but, at the oral hearing, Poland submitted that the national provisions challenged by the Commission had all been repealed by subsequent legislation, which entered into force on 1 January 2019. AG Tanchev delivered his opinion in this case on 11 April 2019,33 concluding that the procedures under Article 7 TEU and Article 258 TFEU are separate and may be invoked at the same time. The CJEU agreed and found that the disputed national law could be reviewed under Article 19(1) TEU, which requires the Member States to provide sufficient remedies to ensure effective legal protection.34 The CJEU accepted that the lowering of the retirement age as such could be legal,35 but held that the objective for the measure was, in fact, an unacceptable attempt of ‘side-lining a certain group of judges’.36 The Commission’s second complaint concerned the fact that the new law grants the President of the Republic the discretion to prolong a judge’s term of office beyond the current and even previous retirement age. Also, this violated the rule of law according to the CJEU.37 It is interesting to note that the final judgment in case C-192/18 was delivered on 5 December 2019.38 Also, here Poland was found to have violated Article 19(1) TEU, on similar grounds as in the previous case. The jurisprudence of the CJEU is thus consistent in relation to Poland, but, for some reason, the Court seems to be more hesitant towards Hungary.39 And needless to say, actions suggested against Hungary
31 Here, it would seem as if the Commission may have been encouraged by the Court’s acceptance of the use of Article 19(1) TEU in combination with Articles 4(3) and 47 CFR in the Portuguese Judges case described below (C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117; C-216/18 PPU, LM, 25 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586). However, the Commission already in C-192/18 of 20 December 2017 – two months before the judgment in the Portuguese Judges case – argued that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 19(1) and Article 47 CFR. 32 The order of the Vice-President of the Court in case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland, 19 October 2018. 33 The Opinion of AG Tanchev in case C-619/18, paras. 52–60. 34 C-619/18, paras. 42–59, especially paras. 50, 54 and 58. 35 Ibid., para. 79. 36 Ibid., para. 82. 37 Ibid., para. 118. 38 ECLI:EU:C:2019:924. 39 There are, of course, also a number of cases concerning Hungary before the European Court of Human Rights and also some sentences against the country. See, e.g. Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag v Hungary, 18030/11, the judgment of 8 November 2016.
328 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ before the European Council have so far been without any result, for similar reasons as the ones regarding Poland. A further illustration of the difference between the two approaches (i.e. legal before the CJEU and political in the Council) is that, according to the CJEU, Article 19 TEU ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU’,40 which means that there is no real material difference between a failure to fulfil Article 19 TEU compared to a failure to fulfil Article 2 TEU. At the CJEU, we may also point to the Opinion of AG Sharpston from October 2019, criticising Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic for refusing to comply with the provisional mechanism for mandatory relocation of asylum seekers,41 while, at same time, concerning Poland, the Council has not yet decided on the issue that was referred to it on 20 December 2017, which illustrates the difficulties in launching the intergovernmental approach for such a decision that requires unanimity or at least a four fifths majority (Art. 7 TEU).42 This fact has now also been noted by the EU Parliament, where a resolution was adopted on 16 January 2020 with 446 votes against 71, urging the Member States to take actions against Hungary and Poland, considering that previous attempts have not led to any progress in the field of the rule of law.43
IV. RULE OF LAW PROTECTION WITHIN THE EU – FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS On 3 April 2019, also a new Communication was sent from the Commission to the EU Parliament, the European Council and the Council on how to further strengthen the rule of law within the EU.44 Concerning Article 7 TEU, the Council’s use of the article is severely criticised. The Commission is equally critical of the results of its own rule of law dialogue, conducted under the RoL Framework. Hardly surprising, the Commission is more positive towards the infringement proceedings and describes them as ‘an avenue for EU action which has increasingly gained traction through recent rulings of the European Court of Justice’.45 Interestingly, the Commission also takes the opportunity to include a tool in the box, which does not
40 C-619/18, para. 47. 41 The Opinion of 31 October 2019, cases C-715/17, 718/17 and 719/17. 42 Here, we may also note the low number of cases where the Member States have actually brought other Member States before the CJEU; cf. Butler, G., ‘The Court of Justice as an Inter-State Court’, Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 36, 2017, pp. 179–208. 43 Resolution 2020/2513 (RSP). 44 The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and possible steps, COM(2019) 163, 3 April 2019. 45 Ibid., p. 4.
329 Joakim Nergelius yet exist; the proposed mechanism to suspend payments from the EU budget in cases of ‘generalised deficiencies regarding the rule of law’.46 Here, concerning the rule of law and the value crises, the idea is to create a link between EU funding and respect for the rule of law. The Commission argues that respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition also for sound financial management and effective EU funding and, therefore, proposes ‘a new mechanism to protect the EU budget from financial risks linked to generalised deficiencies as regards the Rule of Law’. Should such deficiencies impair or threaten to impair sound financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the Union, EU funding may be stopped. Such a decision is to be proposed by the Commission and then adopted by the Council through the so-called reversed Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), meaning that the Commission’s proposal is deemed to be adopted by the Council unless the Council decides by qualified majority to reject it. This new procedure is, of course, quite radical as such but, at the same time, less than before is said about ‘conditionality’ in relation to EU funding, or the possibilities to stop support to a Member State due to violations of human rights or the rule of law as such, for their own sake, so to speak. Instead, the possible negative economic effects of rule of law violations – which are perhaps sometimes harder to prove – are stressed. It remains to be seen what the Member States will say about this in the tough budget negotiations that have now started. In order to curb further rule of law violations, it might perhaps be a good idea to reintroduce the concept of conditionality and bring it into those negotiations. Furthermore, already in July 2019, the Commission followed up its previous April communication with the publishing of its new ‘Blueprint for Action’.47 The Commission here states that the responsibility to ensure respect for the rule of law is primarily an obligation of the Member States. It also stresses the duty of the Member States to refrain from measures that could jeopardise the Union’s objectives,48 which is logical in the light of the principle of loyalty and solidarity in Article 4(3) TEU. In the following section, three categories of actions are suggested, namely ‘promotion’, ‘prevention’ and ‘response’.49 As regards ‘promotion’, the Commission claims that the fostering of a common rule of law culture is ‘the best guarantee for the respect of our common values’.50 It identifies the need for civil society, media, academia and the education systems to play a part alongside with European networks 46 The Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, COM(2018) 324, 2 May 2018. 47 Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union. A Blueprint for Action, COM(2019) 343, 17 July 2019. 48 Art. 4(3) TEU; with direct references to case C-619/18, the Commission mentions the ‘core obligation of Member States … to guarantee to citizens the exercise of their rights, notably through access to justice and fair trial’, COM(2019) 343, p. 4. 49 Ibid., pp. 9–13. 50 Ibid., p. 5.
330 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ of, for example, judges and courts. The Commission also promises to make its own work more transparent.51 In the category ‘prevention’, the Commission has a focus on itself, though the proposed Rule of Law Review Cycle acknowledges the need for better coordination amongst the EU institutions (one of the components is, in fact, called ‘inter-institutional dialogues on the rule of law’).52 Still, the Commission states that, in the supervision of the Rule of Law in the Member States, it regards itself as the main responsible actor, due to its role as the guardian of the treaties.53 Finally, as regards ‘response’, the aim is that the need for it shall be significantly reduced, as a result of the implementation of the initiatives in the ‘promotion’ and ‘prevention’ categories. However, the Commission mentions the quite recent development where the CJEU has stepped up as a guardian of certain core principles of the rule of law, in particular judicial independence.54 This does not mean that the Commission is ready to abandon Article 7 TEU. On the contrary, while calling for more collaboration between the institutions, the Commission proposes several improvements to the procedure. However, since clear procedural rules for the decision-making process and more transparency, as here suggested, are very atypical elements in the intergovernmental decision-making process and would, above all, require a treaty change, it is highly unlikely that we will see these changes to Article 7 TEU materialise. It is also hard to see that the Council would agree with this analysis on how to improve Article 7 TEU.55 When the Commission brought the case against Poland under Article 7 in December 2017, the Council put the rule of law in Poland on the agenda for the meetings of the General Affairs Council. The item remained on the agenda all through 2018, but when the Romanian presidency took over in January 2019, it was taken off the agenda for the January meeting. This caused some reactions and it was then reintroduced on the agenda for the February meeting. Instead, the incoming Finnish presidency started off its first meeting by having the Commission present its recently published communication, by adding the item of the rule of law in Poland to
51 ‘In order to make the rule of law more visible, the Commission intends to develop a dedicated communication strategy on the rule of law, including to make related information accessible in all official languages and to clearly explain its significance for the Union as a whole and for individual citizens and businesses’; ibid., p. 6. 52 Ibid., p. 11. 53 Ibid., p. 12 (cfr. Art. 17 TEU). 54 Ibid., p. 13. 55 The Council’s Legal Service has previously held that the institutions lacked the competence to adopt procedural rules for Article 7 TEU, in its opinion on the Commission’s EU Framework for the Rule of Law, back in 2014. Opinion of the Council’s Legal Service 10296/14, 27 May 2014.
331 Joakim Nergelius the agenda and then announcing the decision to approve new ‘standard modalities’ for the hearings referred to in Article 7(1) TEU.56 Who will be in charge of upholding the Rule of Law in the EU in the future, then – the Commission, the CJEU or the highest courts of the Member States? It seems clear that the Article 7 mechanism leads to poor results. Meanwhile, the CJEU has declared that Article 19(1) TEU and Article 2 TEU are closely connected, which means that it will be possible to have cases concerning infringements of vital components of the rule of law tried there. For the future, this is highly important, not least since this kind of legal procedure may be really effective. In C-692/18, for instance, even before the case was settled, Poland withdrew its plans to retire a large number of judges in the highest courts. Further, concerning efficiency, the highly interesting proposal on suspension of payments linked to rule of law performance57 is still in the pipeline, waiting for the budgetary discussions to come to an end. There is, however, no doubt that this may prove to be an effective measure, should it be realised.
V. IMPORTANT CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL COURTS However, there is also a further aspect of the case law and the different measures now discussed to be dealt with here, namely the ‘ever closer’ relationship between the CJEU and the highest courts (be they supreme or constitutional) in some of the Member States, notably through the use of the procedure for preliminary rulings in Article 267 TFEU. When analysing the recent development of case law from the CJEU dealing with human rights issues and including national constitutional and/or supreme courts, it is logical to see the cases Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, delivered on 26 February 2014, as a point of departure. The judgment inMelloni raises some fundamental issues that are likely to cause more confusion in the field of EU constitutional law, for many reasons and perhaps for a long time to come. This is true not least in the field of fundamental rights, where
56 As a reply to the European Council’s new strategic agenda 2019–2024, as well as to the Commission’s ‘Blueprint’, the Finnish presidency of the Council issued a discussion paper to the delegations of the Member States. The discussion paper recalls the Council’s task of re-evaluating the Council’s own rule of law dialogue by the end of 2019. During the following meeting, several Member States expressed ‘support for developing a preventive mechanism for monitoring the rule of law situation in all the EU Member States’. Council Doc. 12044/19 on enhancing respect for the rule of law in the Union: presidency discussion paper, 10 September 2019. 57 The legislative resolution of the European Parliament of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018)0324 – C8-0178/2018 – 2018/0136(COD)), P8_TA-PROV(2019)0349.
332 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ it may even be said that it collides with the important Åkerberg Fransson case, which will also be discussed further below. In the case, Mr Melloni had been sentenced in Italy to ten years of prison for fraud related to a bankruptcy. This was established in a trial in which he had not himself been present. The sentence was finally laid down in 2004 and the Italian authorities then wanted him extradited from Spain where he resided, invoking the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). In fact, Melloni had then been in Spain for a long time and Italian authorities wanted him extradited already in 1993. In 1996, Spain accepted this request, but Melloni disappeared and was not caught until 2008. After he had been arrested, a lower Spanish court, Audiencia Nacional, decided that he should be extradited, but Melloni then appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court, Tribunal Constitucional, arguing that the Spanish Constitution (Art. 24(2)) strongly protects the right to a fair trial, which includes the right not to be sentenced to prison – at least not for long – in your absence. After long proceedings, the Constitutional Court decided in June 2011 to ask three crucial questions to the CJEU. Those three questions all concerned the relationship between three central rules in EU law, namely the EAW (secondary law), the Charter of Fundamental Rights (primary law) and the Spanish Constitution, though they were phrased in different terms. One of the reasons for the somewhat – in my view – odd outcome of the case and one of the main difficulties for the CJEU seems to have been the interpretation of the Arrest Warrant, which in its original 2002 version prescribed that all Member States are to execute extraditions from other Member States according to the well-known principle of mutual recognition. At the same time, however, Article 5 of the text of the Framework Decision contained certain guarantees, clarifying that, if someone was requested for extradition having been sentenced in his absence, there should be a possibility to have the sentence and judgment reviewed. Still, the new framework decision of 2009, which should have been implemented in the Member States by March 2011 or at the very latest 1 January 2014, states that these guarantees do not apply when the person requested for extradition had been represented by a lawyer and when he had known about the procedure against him and the fact that he might be sentenced in his absence. Despite the fact that there may be reasons for these harsh rules – such as the interest in making EAW work smoothly and, as far as Italy is concerned, the combatting of organised crime – the situation here was complicated, even more so since the CJEU actually neglected to inform the readers of its judgment on the knowledge of such facts that Mr Melloni might have had during the lengthy procedures. Furthermore, the possibilities for extradition were increased in 2009, as explained above, while the Spanish Constitutional Court ought to base its judgment on the situation in 2008 (cfr. Art. 7 ECHR and Art. 49(1) CFR)).
333 Joakim Nergelius
Anyway, against this background, the Spanish Constitutional Court, Tribunal Constitucional, asked three questions to the CJEU, which were formulated in the following way: 1. Must Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, as inserted by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, be interpreted as precluding national judicial authorities, in the circumstances specified in that provision, from making the execution of a European arrest warrant conditional upon the conviction in question being open to review, in order to guarantee the rights of defence of the person requested under the warrant? 2. In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, is Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with the requirements deriving from the right to an effective judicial remedy and to a fair trial, provided for in Article 47 of the Charter … and from the rights of defence guaranteed under Article 48(2) of the Charter? 3. In the event of the second question being answered in the affirmative, does Article 53 of the Charter, interpreted schematically in conjunction with the rights recognised under Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, allow a Member State to make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being open to review in the requesting State, thus affording those rights a greater level of protection than that deriving from European Union law, in order to avoid an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects a fundamental right recognised by the constitution of the first-mentioned Member State? Thus, though all three questions raise very important issues concerning the status of the Arrest Warrant, the third and last question is in a sense wider, since it adds the huge constitutional issue, of general interest for the EU as whole, of the relationship between the arrest warrant (secondary EU law), the Charter (primary EU law, cfr. Art. 6 of the EU Treaty) and a national constitution. Having this very interesting background in mind, the judgment as such is regrettably short. The CJEU applied the arrest warrant in its new version; the fact that this in reality made the penalty or, at least, the application of the relevant penal rules harder was seen as a mere procedural issue and thus obviously unproblematical, which is somewhat surprising. Concerning the first question, the CJEU referred to the principle of mutual recognition and stated that extradition must take place in a case such as this, at least when the convicted person was aware of the trial against him and had the possibility to be represented by a lawyer (or was aware of the fact that a judgment against him may be given in his absence). Once again, it is not quite clear from the judgment what Melloni really knew, though the judgment is obviously based on the presupposition that he was fully aware of all these facts. In relation to question 2, then, the CJEU argued, invoking its own previous jurisprudence as well as case law from the Strasbourg court, that the right to be
334 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ present at a trial may be limited, thus arriving, in a not very convincing or persuasive line of reasoning, at the conclusion that the arrest warrant (in particular Art. 4a(1)) does not violate Articles 47–48 CFR. This argumentation is not convincing and may definitely be criticised, but the answer to the third question is, nevertheless, the most crucial part of the judgment, in my view. As is well known, Article 53 CFR states that none of its rules may limit or infringe upon the fundamental rights that are acknowledged by EU law, international law, international conventions to which the Member States are parties or the Constitutions of the Member States. The possibility for national courts to maintain a higher standard for single persons in this respect than the one provided by the arrest warrant (as interpreted by the CJEU) was, however, simply dismissed by the Court, since that would ‘undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would allow a Member State to disapply the legal rules which are fully in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s constitution’. But is not that exactly what national courts ought to do, when taking Article 53 CFR seriously? This particular line of reasoning of the CJEU is not new. On the contrary, it is well known from classical cases such as Costa v Enel58 and Simmenthal.59 It basically means that any kind of EU law, primary as well as secondary, is superior to any kind of national law of the Member States, including the national constitution. This latter part of this constitutional jurisprudence is not accepted by very many Member States or their highest courts, as is also well known. However, in this case, the CJEU first, before maintaining its jurisprudence on this last point, on dubious grounds managed to find that the secondary EU law in question was compatible with the applicable primary EU law, which in itself, in Article 53 CFR, states that it is inferior in relation to any more far-reaching protection of human rights that may be found in a national constitution. Thus, the CJEU has managed a double operation, both steps of which are most doubtful, in order to ‘save the life’ of the European arrest warrant, which has obviously been seen as very crucial. But while saving this patient, was not the ‘life’ or, at least, the legal status of the considerably more important Charter, which is primary EU law as follows from Article 6(1) TEU, sacrificed instead, given that its Article 53 has so clearly been applied and interpreted e contrario, thus in reality losing its significance? At least that is what follows from a close reading of the judgment. Arguably, the Court’s interpretation of Article 53 CFR, stating that Member States may not apply the standard of human rights protection guaranteed by its constitution when it is higher than that deriving from the CFR (despite the clear wording of Article 53), applies only in areas where EU law has been completely harmonised. Thus, if this view is
58 6/64, ECR, 1964, p. 1141. 59 106/77, ECR, 1978, p. 629.
335 Joakim Nergelius accepted, allowing a Member State to invoke Article 53 CFR in order to disregard the Framework Decision on the EAW would undermine the principle of supremacy, as well as the mutual trust between the Member States. But the consequences of such a line of reasoning are of course far reaching. Basically, it means that human rights will not apply, or will in reality not matter when being in conflict with material EU law, in its harmonised areas – i.e. in very great fields of EU law. This is, unfortunately, the only possible conclusion, concerning the general implications of Melloni for human rights within EU law. The CJEU there states that the possibility for a national court to refuse extradition in a case such as this would spread doubt on ‘the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework decision’, which would, consequently, undermine the principle of mutual recognition and, ultimately, the confidence between the legal systems of the Member States. In other words, uniformity and mutual trust is superior to human rights protection. But, if this line of reasoning is to be followed, prison sentences for as long as ten years rendered in the absence of the accused are generally to be accepted in the EU of today, which is slightly surprising, to put it mildly. As mentioned above, the Spanish Constitutional Court, Tribunal Constitucional, had asked for a preliminary ruling. Once that ruling arrived, the Constitutional Court complied with it, to some surprise, in a plenary judgment of 13 February 2014.60 Here, the protection offered by Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution was openly lowered, which was formally justified by invoking Article 10(2) of that same constitutional text, stating that the norms concerning fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with other international agreements ratified by Spain. Thus, EU law and the CFR were here seen as just another kind of international law, in order to justify the severe limitation of human rights protection that had just occurred. At the same time, the Spanish Constitutional Court, invoking the preamble of the Constitution, seemed to reserve for itself the right to give priority to the national constitution in future similar cases61 (in line with previous, well-known Solange cases and other case law from Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), the German Constitutional Court62). In Germany, the Constitutional Court has for a long time – ever since the 1970’s – been fighting a kind of battle with the CJEU concerning supremacy in the relation between EU law and the national constitution (and also on the question whether national courts may set aside EU acts that are considered unconstitutional as being ultra vires, i.e. outside the competence of the EU to enact). The BVerfG is an extremely powerful court in the financially and politically most important of all Member States, so if any court anywhere in Europe would be in a position to challenge the views of the CJEU, this is definitely the most likely candidate. Without going into details of this 60 STC 26/2014. 61 Cfr. Besselink, op. cit. p. 550 s. 62 See BVerfGE 37, 271 and 73, 339, as well as 89, 155.
336 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ long battle between two powerful judicial bodies in Karlsruhe and Luxemburg, suffice it here to say that the German attitude has inspired constitutional and high courts in many other EU Member States, such as Cyprus, Denmark, Italy and Poland.63 At the same time, however, the BVerfG has in recent years also shown signs of cooperation and loyalty towards the CJEU, being, after all, a national court in a Member State and thus bound by the principle of loyalty in Article 4(3) TEU. For instance, in the so-called Canissa decision of July 2011, it made clear that foreign legal persons may invoke certain rights of the German Constitution that would according to the text appear to apply only to Germans.64 And, in January 2014, the BVerfG, for the first time ever, asked for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, in a case concerning the so-called stability funds within the euro zone.65 Regardless of the legal context, the fact that this happened at all has symbolic weight. It may also be noted that, in particular, Articles 23 and 59 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), as well as its Preamble, do actually require it to be interpreted in a manner that is open and friendly towards Europe and to international law in general.66 Both Germany and Spain can thus, to a certain extent, be said to have anticipated, through their constitutional courts, the outcome of Opinion 2/13, with the partly unclear legal situation that it has created. Both countries have also been much affected by what we may call a gradually intensified battle between powerful European courts, i.e. the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and national constitutional courts. To a certain extent, this tendency has been visible also in Sweden, although Sweden lacks a constitutional court. Here, some decisions of the Supreme Court have merited particular attention. The most well-known of these are undoubtedly the cases concerning ne bis in idem, the prohibition against double sanctions in tax affairs. This has come to be known also at European level, due to the Åkerberg Fransson case already mentioned above (which never as such went to the Supreme Court). There are, however, also other important cases here, both before and after the Åkerberg Fransson judgment of 26 February 2013.
63 See here, in alphabetical order of the countries, the judgments from the Constitutional Court of Cyprus of 7 November 2005 in case 294/2005; Höjesteret in Denmark, U 1998.800 H; Corte Costituzionale in Italy, Frontini, 183/1973, 1974 Giur.Cost. 330; and, in Poland, a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 17 April 2005 in case P I/05. Concerning the initial development in some of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004, see Miasik, D., ‘Application of General Principles of EC Law by Polish Courts – Is the European Court of Justice Receiving a Positive Feedback?’, in Bernitz, U., Nergelius, J., and Cardner, C. (eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008, pp. 357–392. It may also be noted that the Solange cases and the Maastricht case from October 1993 (BVerfGE 89, 155) have to a large extent inspired the Swedish regulation of the constitutional conditions and requirements for EU membership, as follows from Chap. 10, Art. 6, in the Swedish Constitution. 64 19 July 2011, BVerfGE, 129, 78. 65 The decision of 14 January 2014, 2BvR 2728/13 u.a. 66 See, e.g. Ludwigs, M., ‘Kooperativer Grundrechtsschutz zwischen EuGH, BVerfG und EGMR’, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, 2014, p. 279.
337 Joakim Nergelius
Concerning the Åkerberg Fransson case, a few words may be said about its background (also with a view to the previous discussion). Mr Åkerberg Fransson was a self-employed fisherman with only one fishing boat. He ran his financial activities as a sole trader and was, therefore, personally responsible for paying income tax and VAT. He fished vendace in the north of Sweden, at the mouth of the Kalix River. Vendace is full of valuable roe, Kalix löjrom, which is an expensive and delicious speciality that enjoys a protected designation of origin in the EU. Mr Åkerberg Fransson sold Kalix löjrom to buyers in Sweden, primarily first-class restaurants, but he had also sold a smaller amount of vendace as mink food in Finland. The Swedish Tax Agency scrutinised the tax returns and the book keeping of Mr Åkerberg Fransson, assessing that there were errors in the book keeping for the sale of roe and deciding to increase Mr Åkerberg Fransson’s declared income and VAT for 2004 and 2005 with approximately SEK 500 000 and approximately SEK 150 000 (ca € 16 000). The Tax Agency also decided to charge a tax surcharge as the tax returns were found unsatisfactory. For the income part, the surcharge was 40 per cent and, for the VAT part, 15 per cent. Mr Åkerberg Fransson did not appeal the Tax Agency’s decision. Despite the fact that Mr Åkerberg Fransson had been ordered to pay a tax surcharge, he was summoned to appear before the Haparanda District Court in 2009 on charges of serious tax offences. Given the circumstances, he risked a prison sentence of 6–8 months. His defence counsel pleaded that the case should be rejected, invoking the ne bis in idem principle. In December 2010, the District Court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ, asking whether the Swedish policy of double procedures and sanctions could be regarded as being compatible with the prohibition against ne bis in idem in Article 50 of the Charter. In its request to the CJEU, the District Court stressed that the tax surcharge partly concerned VAT.67 The issue whether it was legally possible under the ECHR to apply separate legal proceedings for tax surcharge and tax offences based on the same information in a tax return had been debated in Sweden for a long time. In 2002, the ECtHR had concluded in two cases that the Swedish system with tax surcharges was of a criminal kind.68 However, the decisions by the ECtHR did not change the Swedish legislation. Neither did the courts change their practice. However, the sharpened definition of what constitutes ne bis in idem in the Zolotukhin judgment in 2009 made the problem urgent. The Supreme Court ruled on the matter in two new decisions in 2010 and 2011, respectively. In the 2010 judgment, which focused on the ECHR,
67 The decision by the Supreme Court majority not to refer a similar case to the ECJ, NJA, 2011, p. 444, was handled down approximately six months later. For some reason, the referral of the Åkerberg Fransson case that was already being considered by the ECJ, was not mentioned in the Supreme Court ruling. 68 Janosevic v Sweden, App. No 34619/97, and Västberga Taxi and Vulk v Sweden, App. No 36985/97.
338 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ the majority of the justices (3–2) took the view that the Zolotukhin judgment did not give ‘clear support’ to the need to change Swedish practice.69 In the 2011 case,70 the defendant in particular invoked the ne bis in idem principle in Article 50 of the Charter. The case dealt partly with tax surcharges for undeclared VAT. A Supreme Court majority of three justices concluded that the Swedish legal provisions on tax offences and tax surcharges lay outside the scope of the Charter and that thus a preliminary ruling was not required. Two dissenting justices took a different view and concluded that the legal position was not clear as regards the possible applicability of the Charter and that a preliminary ruling should thus be requested. In reality, the Supreme Court voted on whether a preliminary ruling should be requested by the ECJ or not. As is well known, according to Article 267(3) TFEU, the highest instance is obliged to request a preliminary ruling if a case pertains to EU law, unless the legal position is clear (acte clair, as follows from the well-known CILFIT case). Obviously, the Supreme Court in its decision did not observe that obligation, which was even sharper as the CJEU at that time had not clarified its position on the scope of the Charter. In its Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the CJEU found it necessary to include a reminder – obviously addressed to the Supreme Court – about the duty to observe Article 267 TFEU as interpreted in the CILFIT case.71 In Sweden, judgments and decisions from the Supreme Court are not formally binding on judges in lower courts but, nevertheless, hitherto always observed and followed. However, in this case, some judges in lower courts found the position of the Supreme Court clearly wrong and refused to follow it. This much observed ‘revolt’ among Swedish judges is an important part of the background to the Åkerberg Fransson case, in which a district court judge in a small town thus decided to call in question the established Swedish system by asking the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. In the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, then, the CJEU, as we know, emphasised the importance of the CFR and underlined the need for national courts to apply it whenever possible, i.e. when the case is within the scope of EU law. After the Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the Swedish Supreme Court, in two other rulings in June and July 2013, based on the ne bis in idem principle totally reversed the practice to impose a tax surcharge on a person and then also prosecuting the same person for a tax offence in different
69 NJA, 2010, p. 168. 70 NJA, 2011, p. 444. 71 Case 283/81, Cilfit and Others, 1982, ECR 3415, para. 47 in the Åkerberg Fransson judgment.
339 Joakim Nergelius legal proceedings.72 In the first ruling, a unanimous plenary ruling in June 2013,73 the Supreme Court found that the established Swedish double sanction system (tax surcharge and criminal sentence), applying two different legal procedures for providing false information in a tax return, was not compatible with the ne bis in idem principle. It is obvious that this important change in the Swedish legal position was brought about by the decision of the CJEU in the Åkerberg Fransson case. Later, in July 2013,74 the Supreme Court established that a result of this change in the law is that everyone has the right to a new trial if he or she has paid a tax surcharge and in addition been sentenced in a criminal procedure for tax offence. The Supreme Court set the ‘birth’ for the use of this extraordinary legal remedy to 10 February 2009, the date of the ECtHR judgment in the Zolotukhin case.75 In the following months, a substantial number of persons serving sentences for tax offences were thus released from prison and many ongoing tax offence prosecutions were terminated in cases where the accused persons had had to pay a tax surcharge. Thus, it is clear that theÅkerberg Fransson judgment had very important repercussions in Swedish constitutional law, strengthening both human rights and judicial review. The Supreme Court has, also in other cases, been eager to stress the increased importance of the ECHR and the fact that Swedish laws will normally not be upheld should they violate or be in conflict with the Convention.76 In 2014, the Supreme Court even launched its own ‘equivalent’ of the Bosphorus doctrine, stating, in the so-called Billerud case,77 that Swedish courts must follow the interpretation of EU acts made by the CJEU unless the application of the specific act would amount to a clear, obvious violation of the ECHR. The court stressed that this means that the possibilities for Swedish courts to deviate from the jurisprudence of the CJEU are extremely limited, given that EU law must be supposed to meet the standard(s) of the ECHR. However, in recent years there have also been other interesting cases related to constitutional or supreme courts in some Member States. Here we must mention C-216/18, PPU v Minister for Justice and Equality, where the Irish High Court was in doubt on whether an alleged criminal could be extradited to Poland according to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), given the risk that he would not enjoy a fair
72 The literature on this subject is now large. See in English Sarmiento, D., ‘Who’s afraid of the Charter?’, CML Rev, 2013, p. 1267 ff; Kargopoulos, I., ‘Ne Bis in Idem in Criminal Proceedings’, Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol. 5, Oxford, 2014, p. 85 ff; Zetterquist, O., ‘Ne Bis in Idem and the European Legal Tsunami of 2013: A Vision from the Bench’ and Gulliksson, M., ‘Effective Sanctions as the One-Dimensional Limit to the Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU Law’, both in Nergelius, J. and Kristoffersson, E. (eds.), Human Rights in Contemporary European Law – Swedish Studies in European Law, Vol. 6, Oxford, 2014, pp. 131–140 and 141–189, respectively. 73 NJA, 2013, p. 502. 74 NJA, 2013, p. 746. 75 App. No 14939/03, Zolotukhin v Russia, judgment of 10 February 2009. 76 From recent years, see, e.g. NJA, 2012, pp. 211 and 1028. 77 NJA, 2014, p. 79.
340 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the EU Court of Justice – A matter of growing importance in times of a ‘rule of law battle’ trial within the Polish legal system. The CJEU, basically, stated that such decisions by courts in other Member States will need to be based on the circumstances in the individual case; in other words, the general, unconditional obligation for national authorities to obey the EAW seems to have been suspended in relation to Poland. Furthermore, the Court’s acceptance of the use of Article 19(1) TEU in combination with Articles 4(3) and 47 CFR in the so-called Portuguese Judges case in February 2018 (based on a request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Administrative Court in Portugal, did most likely inspire the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court on Article 19(1) (which was here applied together with Art. 47 CFR).78 Finally, the case Junqueras from December 2019 should be mentioned.79 Here, the CJEU found, on request of the Spanish Supreme Court, that the Spanish MEP Oriol Junqueras should have been entitled to parliamentary immunity and, therefore, not prosecuted and sent to prison in Spain, as a result of his political activities in favour of Catalan independence. This recent judgment has, needless to say, already caused quite a lot of stir throughout Europe and, in particular, in Spain. However, its future consequences are still unclear.
CONCLUSIONS Given the rather complex material described above, it seems to be possible to draw two main conclusions. Concerning rule of law protection within the EU in general, one may wish that the Council and Commission will consider the principle of sincere cooperation, Article 4(3) TEU, and make sure that the EU actions are coordinated instead of competing. However, this article and its principle of loyalty and solidarity is after all primarily an obligation for the Member States in relation to the EU. Thus, above all, the Member States within the EU have an obligation to respect and promote the rule of law and fundamental rights – an obligation that will not go away. Beside of that, the very clear tendency that important European constitutional issues are being decided after a dialogue between the CJEU and national courts must be underlined. This development is not necessarily linked to the discussion on the so-called ‘constitutional identity’ of the Member States (Art. 4(2) TEU), but may perhaps be seen as a continuation of the debate on ‘constitutional pluralism’, which was very influential in EU law doctrine circa 2010.80 It may be good or bad (which will not be discussed here), but it is most likely here to stay.
78 Cf. C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117; C-216/18 PPU, LM, 25 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. 79 C-502/19, 19 December 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:958. 80 For an overview of and introduction to this (once) vast topic, see Walker, N., ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, Modern Law Review, 2002, pp. 317–359.
341 Sandrine Perera Démocratie, droits fondamentaux et justice constitutionnelle en France
DÉMOCRATIE, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX ET JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE EN FRANCE
Dr. Sandrine Perera Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, France
INTRODUCTION Le sujet du Congrès conduit à interroger le rôle de la justice constitutionnelle et de la démocratie en France, et observer comment l’un influence l’autre et vice versa. L’expression de la « justice constitutionnelle » est importée dans la doctrine française dans les années 20, par la thèse d’Eisenmann et de l’article de Kelsen publié dans la revue de droit public1. La justice constitutionnelle peut être entendue comme le contrôle du respect de la Constitution, mais au regard de cette définition, il existe des difficultés à identifier l’organe auquel doit être attribué la qualité de juge constitutionnel2. La doctrine entretient différentes thèses : certains ne reconnaissant cette qualité qu’au juge constitutionnel en raison de sa mission essentielle de contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi3 ; d’autres auteurs au contraire reconnaissent cette qualité à tous les juges, parce qu’ils participent tous à l’application et ou la défense de la Constitution, et que leur existence est consacrée par la Constitution4 ; d’autres encore ne reconnaissent cette qualité qu’à certains juges dont la liste varie (qui comprend souvent le Conseil constitutionnel, le Conseil d’Etat, la Cour de cassation, et parfois la Cour de justice de la République et la Haute Cour5, ou encore le Tribunal des conflits6). Ces différences de qualification se justifient par des divergences de définition. Il nous apparait que la qualification de justice constitutionnelle peut être accordée (selon des degrés différents) à tous les juges ayant en charge le contrôle de la constitutionnalité de la loi. Dans ce cadre, le Conseil d’Etat et la Cour de cassation peuvent bénéficier de la qualification, et selon le degré le plus important, le Conseil constitutionnel est
1 Kelsen, H., « La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution », RDP, 1928, p. 197. 2 Sur le sujet : Heushling, L., « Justice constitutionnelle et justice ordinaire. Épistémologie d’une distinction théorique », in Grewe, C., Jouanjan, O., Maulin, E., Wachsmann, P. (dir.), La notion de « justice constitutionnelle », Dalloz, Coll. Thèmes et commentaires, Paris, 2005, pp. 87-89. 3 Ces auteurs refusent donc de reconnaitre cette qualité aux juges de Conseil d’Etat par exemple : Favoreu, L., « Le juge administratif a-t-il un statut constitutionnel ? » in Mélanges Auby, Dalloz, Paris,1992, p. 121 et s. 4 Waline, M., « Éléments d’une théorie de la juridiction constitutionnelle en droit positif français », RDP, 1928, p. 441 et s. 5 Terré, F., Introduction générale au droit, Dalloz, Coll. Précis, Paris, 2015, p. 94. 6 Waline, M., « Eléments…art.cit., p. 442.
342 Démocratie, droits fondamentaux et justice constitutionnelle en France le juge constitutionnel par excellence. Nous concentrerons notre propos sur le juge constitutionnel, et donc sur la juridiction du Conseil constitutionnel. Le concept de démocratie connait aussi quelques difficultés de définition. Il est souvent défini par sa racine grecque demos et kratos, c’est-à-dire le pouvoir du peuple, mais cette définition est en partie insatisfaisante et le sens même de la démocratie a évolué dans le temps, c’est ce que nous nous attacherons à démontrer, mais à l’étape de l’introduction, nous pouvons surtout mettre en avant l’existence d’une définition formelle et d’une définition substantielle. Il est intéressant de voir que le juge constitutionnel n’a pas toujours adopté et choisi la même définition, même si les textes n’ont pas changé. L’évolution du sens de la démocratie est particulièrement révélatrice des évolutions du droit, de ces mouvements contemporains, suivants les mouvements de la société, de ses valeurs et désirs. La justice constitutionnelle donne une réalité, une portée à ces évolutions de la démocratie, lequel est bien un concept, construit par les acteurs mais aussi les récepteurs du droit, dans une certaine mesure. Pour comprendre la manière dont se construit le concept constitutionnel de démocratie, il convient d’en observer l’ambivalence (I), puis d’étudier la façon dont ce concept de démocratie est saisi par la justice constitutionnelle aujourd’hui, autour ou sur la base des droits fondamentaux (II).
I. LA POLYSÉMIE DU CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE La démocratie n’a pas une existence en soi, elle est un concept7 crée par les hommes et le droit au service d’une certaine finalité. Cette construction a un sens mais sa traduction concrète ou pratique a pu varier dans le temps et l’espace, ce qui conduit certains auteurs à soutenir – parfois avec certaines contradictions – qu’il n’y a pas d’essence de la démocratie8. En s’intéressant aux différentes théories et conceptions, on distingue deux sens de la démocratie, qui ne sont pas opposées et qui sont même solidaires, mais la définition choisie par les auteurs en fonction du temps et de l’espace, peut insister plus sur un sens ou sur l’autre avec des conséquences diverses. Il existe ainsi une conception formelle et une conception substantielle.
7 Aujourd’hui, le concept est de plus en plus prisé, avec des adjectifs divers accolés ainsi : « L’on trouve ainsi invoquée la démocratie sociale, culturelle, sanitaire, administrative, participative, ethnique, sexuelle, environnementale et l’on parle même aussi de démocratie contentieuse, de démocratie des droits ou encore de démocratie continue selon l’expression chère à Dominique Rousseau sans oublier la fameuse e-démocratie.[…] il y aurait démocratie partout où, d’une manière ou d’une autre, formalisée ou pas, des citoyens seraient amenés à discuter de la chose publique, Le Pourhiet, A-M., « Définir la démocratie », Revue française de droit constitutionnel, Vol. 87, n° 3, 2011, pp. 453-464. 8 Troper, M., « La démocratie et les droits de l’Homme dans les révolutions d’Amérique et de France », in Champeil-Desplats, V., Denquin, J-M. (dir.), Démocratie et constitutionnalisme. Retours critiques, Mare et Martin, 2019, p. 75 ; Rousseau, D., « Constitutionnalisme et démocratie », La vie des idées, 19 septembre 2008 et voir la critique de Denquin, J-M., « Que veut-on dire par « démocratie » ? L’essence, la démocratie et la justice constitutionnelle », Juspoliticum, n° 2 (en ligne).
343 Sandrine Perera
La conception formelle vise à mettre l’accent sur la forme, sur la procédure, autrement dit sur le régime. Elle reprend le sens étymologique en s’intéressant à sa réalisation, la réalité effective. L’intérêt est porté aux modalités formelles d’exercice de la souveraineté, par exemple savoir si la démocratie s’exerce de façon directe, indirecte, semi-directe. La démocratie au sens formel consiste donc à savoir comment le peuple exerce sa souveraineté. Ce sens de la démocratie plus formel correspond au sens antique, certains auteurs contemporains l’ont aussi appelé « démocratie électorale »9. L’idée étant de trouver le meilleur régime possible, pour assurer la meilleure représentativité du peuple, de la volonté générale. Dans ce sens formel, on s’intéresse non au fond de la démocratie mais aux procédures, au régime pour la réaliser en pratique. Ce sens formel est présent dans la constitution française à l’article 3 de la Constitution. La concentration sur la seule définition formelle autour des modalités de la représentativité ne saurait suffire et retirerait le sens et l’intérêt du concept de démocratie, c’est pourquoi il faut articuler cette conception formelle à une conception substantielle. Jean-Marie Denquin distinguait deux formes de la démocratie qui correspondent aux deux conceptions que nous proposons. Il suggère d’étudier la démocratie considérée comme un régime, mais avant cela, il présente la conception de la démocratie considérée comme un projet, ainsi il écrit à propos de cette dernière : « elle se définie d’abord par un principe général. Celui-ci pose des valeurs et des finalités au service d’un idéal. Les institutions lui sont subordonnées comme des moyens à une fin. On ne saurait donc réduire la démocratie en ce sens à une construction juridique, même parfaitement agencée et fonctionnant à la satisfaction générale. Un tel système peut être considéré comme un bon gouvernement, mais il ne sera pas une démocratie s’il n’actualise pas le principe qui définit le concept »10. Cette conception de la démocratie tend à insister sur les valeurs et la finalité de la démocratie, elle n’insiste plus sur la forme mais sur le fond. Le plus souvent, selon cette définition substantielle, la démocratie est conçue autour de valeurs prédominantes que sont l’égalité et ou la liberté11, étant comprises
9 Rousseau, D., « Constitutionnalisme…art.cit., il écrit à propos de la démocratie électorale : « la notion de démocratie électorale présentée, implicitement ou explicitement, comme la notion légitime et naturelle de la démocratie qui est d’être « le gouvernement du peuple ». 10 Denquin, J-M., « Que veut-on dire par « démocratie »… art.cit. p. 9. 11 Kelsen, H., La Démocratie, sa nature, sa valeur, Dalloz, Coll. Bibliothèque Dalloz, 2004, p. 20-25. Mais l’idée est aussi globalement soutenue par la doctrine française, ainsi E. Dockès écrit à propos de la liberté et l’égalité comme valeur de la démocratie : « Toutes deux issues d’un certain humanisme, elles expriment la valeur de l’être humain. La liberté valorise l’individu, unique, irremplaçable et sa volonté propre. L’égalité est le premier principe concernant le rapport à l’autre. Valeur relationnelle, sociale, elle commande d’accorder une égale valeur à tout être humain. Ces deux valeurs s’opposent parfois. Elles s’affaiblissent alors l’une l’autre. D’autres fois, en revanche, elles s’associent pour œuvre
344 Démocratie, droits fondamentaux et justice constitutionnelle en France comme inhérentes aux Hommes constituants le peuple. Le sens de ces deux notions est souvent variable dans le temps et l’espace, néanmoins en France aujourd’hui, la liberté est comprise comme puissance d’autodétermination relative (article 4 de la Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen : « La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui »). L’égalité est le plus souvent compris comme une égalité des droits12. La variation de ces sens va avoir évidemment un impact sur la façon même de concevoir la démocratie, c’est pourquoi il y a un grand intérêt à étudier ces notions abstraites a priori et leurs évolutions qui ont bien des conséquences. Dès à présent, on peut voir l’association de la démocratie avec la notion de valeur, laquelle est particulièrement importante dans notre société actuelle. Même si le concept de démocratie peut fluctuer dans le temps et en pratique (il peut s’incarner selon différentes modalités, différents régimes de représentativité), il ne désigne pas tout et n’importe quoi. Il y a une idée, un concept et un sens de la démocratie qui s’articule autour de deux logiques solidaires et non pas séparés, comme l’écrit Jean Marie Denquin : On voit aussi que ces deux points de vue [démocratie considéré comme projet et démocratie considéré comme régime] sont en quelque sorte solidaire : le projet doit s’incarner pour ne pas demeurer un rêve. Et le régime serait autre que ce qu’il est s’il n’était pas d’abord la tentative de réaliser un certain projet. La démocratie est donc l’un et l’autre, mais aussi les deux : elle existe comme tension entre ces deux polarités13. Cependant, le juge comme les auteurs peuvent choisir d’insister sur un sens en particulier. Ce choix est souvent révélateur d’une certaine conception du droit, il est donc intéressant d’observer la conception choisie par le juge constitutionnel français et le sens de ce choix.
II. LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE SAISI PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE FRANÇAISE Dans cette partie, il s’agit d’étudier la façon dont la démocratie est saisie et transformée par la justice constitutionnelle. La démocratie était auparavant (avant 1791 environ) essentiellement envisagée selon une conception formelle mais la modification du rôle du Conseil constitutionnel par la décision du 16 juillet 197114 (laquelle donne officiellement valeur constitutionnelle à la Déclaration des droits
dans une même direction. Et c’est alors sans doute, que l’on touche à l’essentiel », Dockès, E., Valeurs de la démocratie, Dalloz, Coll. Méthodes du droit, 2005, p. 2. 12 Cependant cette conception abstraite de l’égalité a laissé la place à une multiplication d’exception visant à prendre en compte de plus en plus les différences. 13 Denquin, J-M., « Que veut on dire…art.cit, p. 10. 14 CC, 16 juillet 1971, déc. n° 71-44 DC, Loi complétant les dispositions des articles 5 et 7 de la loi du 1 er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association.
345 Sandrine Perera de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, notamment) et la révision de 2008 insérant la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité15, a entrainé un changement de conception de la constitution et de la démocratie. Comme l’a mis en avant D. Rousseau, la Constitution était auparavant conçue autour de l’aspect organisation/séparation des pouvoirs, mais depuis les changements précités, la Constitution est conçue et définie également et surtout autour de la garantie des droits. Par cette transformation du sens de la constitution ou l’insistance sur un sens plus substantiel de celle-ci, le Conseil constitutionnel en vient à souligner une conception plus substantielle de la démocratie autour de la garantie des droits fondamentaux, il va donc rendre compte d’un nouveau contenu dans de multiples décisions16 ; certains auteurs parlent à cet égard de « démocratie constitutionnelle »17. Peu à peu s’opère une équivalence voire une assimilation entre droits fondamentaux et démocratie, et la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux équivaut à une protection de la démocratie. Autrement dit, la garantie du principe de démocratie conduit à une protection des droits fondamentaux. Néanmoins cette association, qui concorde à l’évolution historique ne correspond pas nécessairement au sens initial de la démocratie et peut comporter certains dangers. Bien évidemment, les droits de l’Homme sont nécessaires à la démocratie (participants égaux, liberté d’expression des opinions, participation à la formation de la loi, contrôle de l’exécution18) ; mais la démocratie ne peut être assimilée à la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux. Selon l’étymologie, la démocratie est le respect de la volonté du Peuple s’exprimant par la voie majoritaire et elle n’implique pas nécessairement le respect de l’intégralité des droits fondamentaux. Dans certains
15 La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité est un mécanisme permettant à une partie à un procès ou une instance de soutenir qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la constitution garantie. 16 Le Conseil semble défendre une démocratie « constitutionnelle » autour de la garantie des droits comme en atteste les décisions suivantes : dans l’exercice de sa compétence, le législateur ne saurait dispenser le législateur, dans l’exercice de sa compétence, « du respect des principes et des règles de valeur constitutionnelle qui s’imposent à tous les organes de l’État » (Décision n° 81-132 DC du 16 janvier 1982) ; « la loi votée n’exprime la volonté’ générale que dans le respect de la Constitution » (Décision n° 85-197 DC du 23 aout 1985) ; « l’exigence du pluralisme de courants d’idées et d’opinion constitue le fondement de la démocratie » (Décision n° 89-271 DC du 11 Janvier 1990). 17 Rousseau, D., « Constitutionnalisme et démocratie », La vie des idées, 19 septembre 2008 : le contrôle juridictionnel et notamment celui de constitutionnalité des lois est désormais également présenté comme une composante indispensable de la démocratie contemporaine. Cette conception de la démocratie est critiquée par plusieurs auteurs : Brunet, P., « La démocratie, entre essence et expérience – Réponse à Dominique Rousseau », La vie des idées, 9 octobre 2008 ; Denquin, J-M., « Que veut-on dire par démocratie ? L’essence, la démocratie, la justice constitutionnelle », Jus Politicum, n° 2, 2009 ; François B., « Justice constitutionnelle et “démocratie constitutionnelle” ». Critique du discours constitutionnaliste contemporain », in Chevallier, J., (dir.), Droit et politique, PUF, 1993. 18 Exemple donné dans l’article de Troper, M., « La démocratie et les droits de l’Homme dans les révolutions…art.précité.
346 Démocratie, droits fondamentaux et justice constitutionnelle en France cas, les droits fondamentaux peuvent être une limite à la démocratie, et s’imposer au pouvoir souverain. Inversement, dans le cas d’une démocratie non libérale (si le concept existe) le pouvoir du peuple peut justement limiter les droits et libertés. Il y a donc une connexion entre les deux mais aussi une indépendance relative de ces concepts qu’il convient de ne pas confondre, même s’il ne peut exister de démocratie sans l’exercice de certaines libertés, comme la liberté d’expression. Aujourd’hui la démocratie est moins conçue comme la voie du peuple que l’attachement à certaines valeurs. Cette assimilation peut d’autant plus conduire à certains dangers. L’insistance sur les droits fondamentaux peut conduire à une transformation étymologique de la démocratie qui ne serait plus construite autour de la souveraineté du peuple mais plutôt d’une souveraineté des droits de l’Homme. Cette souveraineté des droits fondamentaux est même potentiellement dangereuse pour la démocratie. En effet, le développement d’une conception individualiste (et parfois moraliste) des droits fondamentaux met à mal ou du moins peut affaiblir la démocratie, vue comme la voie du peuple. De plus, les droits fondamentaux par leur caractère généraux et abstraits donnent un plus grand pouvoir au juge comme l’écrit S. Hennette Vauchez, il y a une « (re)définition de la démocratie largement réorientées autour de la figure du juge »19, mais cela n’est pas sans risque et peut potentiellement conduire à une négation ou une ignorance de la volonté du sujet et mener à moins de démocratie au nom d’une nouvelle conception de celle-ci, un grand pouvoir est donné au juge dans l’interprétation de ces droits fondamentaux. En résumé, droits fondamentaux et démocratie tendent à être assimiler par le juge constitutionnel mais il conviendrait à notre sens de les distinguer. Néanmoins, il faut tout de même s’interroger sur les raisons de cette nouvelle conception de la démocratie. Ce choix peut se justifier par deux raisons majeures. D’une part, cette évolution s’explique par la prééminence des valeurs dans le discours juridique contemporain, dans la jurisprudence des différentes juridictions. Les valeurs ne sont plus taboues ou tenues hors du droit, elles sont plus que jamais dans le droit. La démocratie suit ce mouvement, elle devient liée une valeur du bon et du bien. Elle devient d’ailleurs elle-même une valeur. Le juge constitutionnel ne fait là que suivre le mouvement général d’une conception plus axiologique du droit. D’autre part, cette conception de la démocratie est une manière de légitimer le juge et ses décisions20. Il peut y avoir de
19 Hennette-Vauchez S., « L’Europe comme laboratoire du « droit global » : l’occasion de renouveler l’interrogatoire théorique sur les tensions entre droits de l’Homme et démocratie », in Champeil Desplats, V., Denquin, J.-M (dir.), Démocratie et constitutionnalisme…op.cit., p. 337. 20 Cette légitimité du Conseil constitutionnel, particulièrement au regard de la démocratie a beaucoup été questionnée, au regard notamment du fonctionnement secret de l’institution, de la composition du Conseil, sur le rôle même du Conseil, voir la critique de Thibaud, P., « Le Conseil constitutionnel et la démocratie », le Débat, vol. 43, n° 1, 1987, pp. 69-80.
347 Sandrine Perera la part du Conseil constitutionnel un enjeu stratégique21 à définir la démocratie autour des droits fondamentaux fortement valorisés dans la société actuelle.
CONCLUSION En somme, ce choix d’une définition plus substantielle assure plus d’assise et une plus grande légitimité du pouvoir du Conseil constitutionnel, suivant le mouvement général de promotion des droits fondamentaux par la démocratie ou/et de la démocratie par les droits fondamentaux, avec tous les dangers que cela présente. Il semblerait plus utile de distinguer les deux et établir ou continuer la réflexion sur les droits fondamentaux et revenir à l’étymologie de la démocratie, dont de nombreux auteurs soulignent l’état de crise, en raison d’une perte de confiance en ce modèle, résultat d’une crise de légitimité et d’efficience22.
21 Meunier, J., Le pouvoir du Conseil constitutionnel. Essai d’analyse stratégique, LGDJ, Coll. La pensée juridique moderne, 1994. 22 Mathieu, B., Le droit contre la démocratie ? LGDJ, Coll. Forum, 2017, 304 p.
348 Sophie Perez La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes
LA PRATIQUE DES RÉFÉRENDUMS SUR LES QUESTIONS EUROPÉENNES
Prof. associée Sophie Perez Maître de conférences habilité à diriger des recherches, Université de Toulon S’interroger sur la pratique des référendums européens oblige non seulement à s’interroger sur la question de la constitutionnalisation de l’appartenance à l’Union européenne mais aussi sur la pratique référendaire qui pour l’instant demeure nationale. Il existe en effet trois types de référendums, qui tous sont utilisés, peuvent l’être ou l’ont été dans les constitutions ou les pratiques nationales rapportés à des questions européennes. L’exemple de la France est sans doute le plus complet en termes de procédures référendaires. Il existe en effet le référendum législatif (tel qu’il est prévu par exemple à l’article 11 de la Constitution Française : Le président de la République, sur proposition du Gouvernement ou proposition conjointe des deux assemblées peut soumettre au peuple un projet de loi qui peut porter sur différents sujets (l’organisation des pouvoirs publics, l’autorisation de ratifier un traité international, et, depuis la révision constitutionnelle du 4 août 1995, les réformes affectant la politique économique, sociale ou environnementale de la Nation et les services publics y concourant)1. Ensuite, le référendum constituant, prévu lui aussi dans la constitution française (l’article 89 de la Constitution prévoit une initiative possible du président de la République ou des assemblées pour une révision de la Constitution)2. Enfin, celui prévu par l’article 88-5 de la constitution française qui permet le recours au référendum pour les adhésions aux traités européens, sauf dérogation possible par un vote parlementaire avec le vote d’une motion adoptée en termes identiques par chaque assemblée, puis l’adoption du projet de loi par le Congrès à la majorité des trois cinquièmes des suffrages exprimés selon la procédure prévue au troisième alinéa de l’article 893. 1 Depuis la révision constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008, complétée par les lois organique et ordinaire du 6 décembre 2013 relatives à l’application de l’article 11 de la Constitution, un référendum d’initiative partagé peut être organisé à l’initiative de 1/5e des parlementaires soutenue par 1/10e des électeurs inscrits. Ce référendum peut porter sur des réformes économiques, sociales et environnementales, ainsi que la ratification d’un traité « qui, sans être contraire à la Constitution, aurait des incidences sur le fonctionnement des institutions ». Ce dispositif est entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 2015, mais est resté depuis inusité. Le texte soumis au référendum prend alors la forme d’une proposition de loi et ne peut abroger une disposition législative promulguée depuis moins d’un an. Le texte doit en avoir été approuvé par le Conseil constitutionnel. Si le résultat du référendum est négatif, un délai de deux ans suivant la date du scrutin est nécessaire avant l’adoption d’une nouvelle proposition portant sur le même sujet. En revanche, dans les deux cas (projet ou proposition de loi), si la réponse est positive, la loi est adoptée. 2 Le référendum intervient alors après le vote, dans les mêmes termes, par les deux assemblées, du texte de révision proposé. Si la réponse est positive, la révision est adoptée. 3 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724, du 23 juillet 2008, JORF du 24 juillet 2008, p. 24.
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Il existe cependant d’autres types de référendums, qualifiés de référendums « d’en bas » ou d’initiative populaire qui n’existent pas en France mais qui ont été mis en œuvre dans plusieurs États membres, en Italie, en Autriche ou encore au Pays-Bas. Ils sont caractérisés par le fait que l’initiative appartient au peuple, qu’ils peuvent porter sur différents domaines (législatif ou constituant), et qu’ils peuvent être obligatoires ou facultatifs. Les procédures varient, mais on peut dégager des étapes générales : les initiateurs d’un projet doivent réunir un nombre préétabli de signatures soutenant le texte envisagé (pétition) et si ce nombre est atteint, les pouvoirs publics sont tenus d’organiser un référendum. En cas de réponse favorable au texte, le Parlement doit alors discuter d’une adoption ou d’une modification de la loi ou de la constitution dans le sens indiqué par le référendum. Cela rapproche ce type de référendum de la procédure initiée par le traité de Lisbonne qui permet à un million de citoyens issus d’un nombre significatif d’États de l’Union européenne à inviter la Commission à soumettre une proposition de texte européen sur une question qu’ils estiment nécessaire. Il ne s’agit bien cependant de l’introduction dans le système décisionnel de l’Union d’un mécanisme de démocratie semi-directe mais qui ne va pas aussi loin que le référendum. Enfin, aux côtés de ces trois types de référendum, il faut évoquer l’existence dans certains États du référendum décisionnel local, qui ne concernent pas en général les problématiques européennes mais qui existent en Allemagne, en Italie ou encore en France4. Les référendums sur les questions européennes entrent, dans la plupart des États membres de l’Union, dans les deux premières catégories, et peuvent être organisés de façon différentes selon la forme constitutionnelle de l’État. Or ces dernières années les approfondissements des Traités européens ainsi que les nombreux élargissements ont incités les États, nouveaux entrant et originaires à des révisions constitutionnelles assez fréquentes, qui ont soulignés l’importance de la dimension politique et constitutionnelle de l’intégration européenne, et qui ont suscité des votations populaires sous forme de référendums5. Les évolutions de la construction européenne ont sans doute aussi été à l’origine de l’évolution cette pratique : la création de l’Union européenne par le Traité de Maastricht au début des années quatre-vingt-dix représente sans aucun doute une étape importante, puisqu’à partir de cette date, les procédures d’adhésion feront de plus en plus systématiquement appel à l’intervention des peuples soit pour approuver l’adhésion, soit pour entériner la révision constitutionnelle nécessaire à cette dernière. Ainsi, tous les États devenus membres depuis cette
4 Loi constitutionnelle n° 2003-276 du 28 mars 2003 « relative à l’organisation décentralisée de la République », JORF n° 75 du 29 mars 2003 p. 5568. Cette loi reconnait à toutes les collectivités territoriales la possibilité de soumettre à leurs électeurs tout projet de texte (acte ou délibération) relevant de sa compétence (art. 72-1). La loi organique du 1er août 2003 a précisé les modalités d’organisation de ces référendums, JORF n° 177 du 2 août 2003 p.13218. 5 Voir sur ces questions Rideau, J., « Les référendums nationaux dans le contexte de l’intégration européenne », in Auer, A., Flauss, J.-F., Le référendum européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1997, p. 81-113.
350 La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes
époque ont procédé à des révisions constitutionnelles en vue ou à l’occasion de leur adhésion6. Dès le quatrième élargissement conduisant à l’adhésion de l’Autriche, de la Finlande et de la Suède en 1995, cette révision a été accompagné d’un référendum. Cette tendance s’est confirmée lors des élargissements suivants : lors du cinquième élargissement en 2004 (adhésion de dix États), Chypre, Malte, les trois États baltes, la Hongrie, la Pologne, la République tchèque, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie, tous les États à l’exception de Chypre ont choisis le référendum comme mode d’acceptation de l’adhésion. Même si la nature de la procédure constitutionnelle différait dans ces États, l’importance de l’adhésion populaire est, quant à elle, indiscutable tant elle se posera comme un refus, insurmontable, en cas de réponse négative. La pratique du référendum peut aussi avoir un redoutable effet cliquet : pour plusieurs États le référendum négatif a éloigné de façon pérenne l’adhésion à l’Union européenne ou à l’ensemble européen plus large qui aurait pu être analysé comme une « antichambre » de l’adhésion. Le Conseil fédéral suisse a en effet abandonné l’objectif d’une adhésion à l’Union en 1992 suite à une votation populaire par laquelle les citoyens suisses ont refusé à 50,3 % des suffrages, la participation de leur pays à l’Espace économique européen (EEE) et la Norvège a par deux fois refusé l’adhésion aux Communautés par le vote des 24 et 25 septembre 1972 et à l’Union européenne le 28 novembre 1994 (avec une participation massive de 89,04 % et un vote pour le non à 52,2 %). Le 9 avril 1995 c’est aussi par référendum que le Liechtenstein ratifie par son adhésion à l’Espace économique européen. En outre, si la construction européenne a été longtemps conçue comme inséparable d’un projet d’approfondissement (fédéralisme fonctionnel) et d’élargissement, sans autre limite que la contingence géographique (art. 1 TUE), l’introduction dans le Traité de clauses régressives voulues par certains États membres (le Royaume-Uni en particulier) a abouti à la possibilité inscrite dans les traités d’une diminution des compétences de l’Union (art. 48, § 2 TUE) ainsi que de la désormais célèbre clause de retrait de l’article 50 TUE. Ainsi, la première utilisation de cette clause par le Royaume-Uni a été scellée par le référendum. Ni l’interprétation de la Cour de justice indiquant que l’État membre qui avait notifié son intention de se retirer pouvait revenir sur son intention et « révoquer unilatéralement, de manière univoque et inconditionnelle », « conformément à ses règles constitutionnelles » 7, ni les recours formés devant la High Court, n’ont pu éviter le Brexit, qui est bel et bien devenu irrévocable dès lors qu’il a été approuvé par le référendum du 23 juin 2016. La pratique du référendum s’inscrit bien depuis toujours comme un processus susceptible de transcender les dispositions du Traité ou les dispositions constitutionnelles de l’État concernant les procédures d’adhésion ou de retrait (1).
6 Grewe, C., « Constitutions nationales et droit de l’Union européenne », Répertoire communautaire, Dalloz, janvier 2009, p. 5. 7 CJUE, arrêt de la Cour (assemblée plénière) du 10 décembre 2018, Andy Wightman e.a. contre Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, affaire C-621/18, ECLI :EU :C :2018 :999, pt 49.
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Mais la place prise par la pratique des référendums ne se limite pas aux élargissements ou au départ de l’Union européenne : elle influence et parfois durablement les évolutions de la construction européenne lorsque les États organisent ces derniers pour acter des révisions des traités. Ce type de révision posent des problèmes particuliers parce qu’elles peuvent être perçues, surtout depuis le traité de Maastricht, comme des atteintes constitutionnelles à la souveraineté de l’État. Les évolutions de la construction européenne ont donc souvent coïncidé avec des révisions constitutionnelles dans les États membres parfois approuvées par référendum, selon les formes constitutionnelles des États concernés. Depuis quelques années aussi, ces procédures référendaires ne cessent de mettre en évidence une crise qui voit grandir le fossé entre élites politiques et citoyens, les premiers étant parfois obligés de recourir à deux opérations référendaires pour faire accepter les révisions des Traités (l’Irlande ou le Danemark par exemple) qui ont été dans un premier temps rejeté. Parfois, comme pour le Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe, le rejet sera tel qu’il équivaudra à un renoncement définitif. Le contrôle populaire sur la construction européenne se transforme alors en une censure, d’autant plus violente qu’elle est démocratique, du système de gouvernance de l’Union et des options prises pour son avenir (2).
I. LA PRATIQUE DU RÉFÉRENDUM LIÉE À L’ADHÉSION (OU AU RETRAIT) DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE : UN PASSAGE QUASI OBLIGÉ Lorsque, comme cela est souvent le cas, la caution démocratique accompagne une adhésion (ou un retrait) celle-ci devient incontournable, même si elle n’est pas totalement en adéquation avec les dispositions constitutionnelles de l’État, ce qui est susceptible de produire des situations inédites. En ce qui concerne les adhésions, non seulement tous les États devenus membres depuis les années soixante- dix ont fini par procéder à des révisions constitutionnelles en vue ou à l’occasion de leur adhésion mais aussi, progressivement par des référendums. Ainsi, le quatrième élargissement conduisant à l’adhésion de l’Autriche, de la Finlande et de la Suède en 1995 a été accompagné pour les trois États, d’un référendum. Cet assentiment populaire a été demandé par la suite par pratiquement à l’occasion des élargissements successifs, que la procédure ait été prévue ou non par leur constitution.
I.1. LA PRATIQUE RÉFÉRENDAIRE ET LA RECHERCHE D’UN ASSENTIMENT POPULAIRE À L’ADHÉSION Certaines constitutions ne prévoient donc pas, pour des raisons différentes, d’organiser des référendums. Pourtant, même lorsque c’est le cas, le référendum n’est
352 La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes jamais une impossibilité absolue. Un référendum peut toujours être décidé, en termes politiques, par des élections, l’acceptation du résultat des élections législatives sera toujours dans ce cas-là, comme un verdict définitif du peuple sur l’Union vis-à-vis de l’adhésion. Lors du premier élargissement, les trois États concernés ont organisé un référendum. En ce qui concerne l’Irlande, le référendum du 10 mai 1972 portait sur une révision de la Constitution, établie par un acte du Parlement de 1971 qui a ajouté à l’article 29, section 4, de la Constitution une sous-section 3 autorisant l’État à devenir membre des Communautés européennes. En ce qui concerne le Danemark la ratification du traité d’adhésion aux Communautés européennes a également fait l’objet d’une autorisation référendaire autorisée par un référendum organisé en 1972, puis le Parlement a voté en 1972 une loi sur l’adhésion aux Communautés européennes précisant notamment les conditions d’application du droit communautaire dans cet État. Quant au Royaume-Uni, cet État, a, dès son adhésion offert une situation inédite : le référendum sur l’adhésion se tiendra en effet en 1975 soit deux ans après l’adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne à la Communauté économique européenne et qui portera sur « le maintien de la qualité de membre et le référendum de 2016 pour quitter l’Union ». Ainsi, il s’agissait d’un référendum destiné à évaluer le soutien populaire en faveur du maintien de l’adhésion et qui était conforme à la proposition britannique durant les négociations d’une période d’ « initiation», d’une année après l’adhésion, à la façon d’une clause de « stand still », proposition impossible à réaliser au regard de la structure de l’acte d’adhésion8. Par la suite, et qu’elles aient été les situations constitutionnelles nationales, le référendum s’est naturellement imposé dans le cadre des adhésions aux Communautés puis à l’Union européenne. Par exemple, lors de l’élargissement de 1995, le référendum était obligatoire en Autriche parce qu’il était opéré en même temps qu’une révision totale de la Constitution, qui impose le recours obligatoire à un référendum en cas de modification totale ou fondamentale de la Constitution (art. 44, § 3). Il était facultatif et simplement consultatif en Finlande et en Suède où il a porté uniquement sur l’adhésion. Puis, lors du cinquième élargissement en 2004, les dix États concernés ont organisé des référendums (à l’exception de celui de Chypre où le Parlement s’est prononcé à l’unanimité en faveur de l’adhésion). Le caractère obligatoire ou facultatif de l’adhésion n’a pas, là encore, eu réellement d’incidence sur les choix opérés. En effet, le référendum n’était pas prévu dans la constitution comme Malte et, obligatoire en Lituanie et dans les autres États9. Pour la Lituanie par exemple, l’article 4 de la loi sur les référendums prévoyait un référendum obligatoire concernant la participation de la
8 Puissochet, J-P., « L’adhésion du Royaume-Uni, du Danemark, de l’Irlande et de la Norvège aux Communautés européennes », Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1971, vol. 17, p. 943. 9 Voir, Rideau, J., Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés européennes, LGDJ, 5e éd., 2010, pp. 1140 et s.
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République de Lituanie aux organisations internationales, lorsque cette participation était liée à des transferts de compétence des organismes gouvernementaux à des institutions d’organisations internationales. La nature du référendum a été également diverse selon les états : la votation a porté sur l’adhésion proprement dite à Malte, en Lituanie, en Hongrie, en République tchèque et en Slovénie (dont le référendum venait aussi entériner aussi l’adhésion à l’OTAN). La République tchèque a organisé un référendum sur la base d’un accord constitutionnel spécial, qui a abouti à la promulgation d’une loi à cette fin. En ce qui concerne la Lituanie, c’est le Parlement qui a adopté le 18 décembre 2002, une résolution sur l’organisation d’un référendum sur l’adhésion à l’Union et sur la modification de la Constitution. Cette procédure était obligatoire en Lituanie. Le référendum a eu lieu les 10 et 11 mai 2003 au cours duquel une simple déclaration « Je suis pour l’adhésion de la Lituanie à l’Union européenne » était soumise au vote. En Pologne où il était facultatif (article 90 de la constitution), le référendum fut également organisé. En Estonie, le référendum a également eu pour objet d’approuver la révision constitutionnelle alors que dans la mesure où cette dernière ne modifiait pas le noyau constitutionnel, il demeurait facultatif (art. 163). En revanche, en Slovaquie, cette procédure était obligatoire et venait entériner tant l’adhésion que la ratification et la révision constitutionnelle (art. 7, 93-1 et 98 de la constitution). Pour l’État Maltais, le fait que le recours au référendum ne soit pas prévu par la constitution, ne signifiait pas qu’il ne pouvait pas avoir lieu. Ainsi, lorsque l’idée d’un référendum relatif à l’adhésion fut lancée de façon informelle par le groupe de travail d’un parti politique, le Parti nationaliste (conservateur) du gouvernement pris la décision de sonder le peuple sur l’adhésion. Le référendum n’était pas obligatoire en vertu de la Constitution et par conséquent non contraignant sur le plan juridique. Le résultat du vote fut majoritairement en faveur de l’adhésion. La même situation a pu être observée en Finlande où les votes parlementaires sur l’adhésion ont été précédés par un référendum de consultation qui a eu lieu le 16 octobre 1994 et qui fut largement positif. Le sixième élargissement, permettant l’adhésion de la Bulgarie et de la Roumanie à partir de 2007, a été accompli par la voie parlementaire en Bulgarie et si la Roumanie a également ratifié le Traité d’adhésion par la voie parlementaire, un référendum obligatoire d’approbation de la révision constitutionnelle a néanmoins eu lieu. Souvent il s’agissait aussi pour les États du quatrième élargissement du seul à l’échelle de l’État qui n’ait jamais eu lieu, comme pour la République tchèque ou encore la République Slovaque. En outre, dans ces États, aucun autre référendum n’a été organisé depuis lors sur des questions purement européennes.
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I.2. LA PRATIQUE RÉFÉRENDAIRE ET LE CARACTÈRE IRRÉVERSIBLE DU RÉFÉRENDUM DE REJET À L’ADHÉSION OU DU RÉFÉRENDUM FAVORABLE AU RETRAIT La pratique du référendum en matière d’adhésion a été l’occasion pour certains États de renoncer, de façon pérenne à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne. Il a pu être également, avant le Brexit, l’instrument du retrait de certains territoires, soit par un référendum directement négatif, soit par l’abandon du référendum au regard d’une expression populaire déjà exprimée.
I.2.1. Les référendums de rejet à l’adhésion Le référendum peut être également un obstacle diriment à l’adhésion. En effet, par deux fois, lors des deux référendums de 1972 et 1994, une faible majorité de Norvégiens a refusé l’adhésion de la Norvège à l’Union européenne. Les 27 et 28 novembre 1994, les citoyens norvégiens qui ont refusé pour la deuxième fois l’adhésion de leur pays à l’Union européenne ont sans doute mis un terme pour longtemps à de nouvelles négociations. La procédure d’adhésion de la Suisse au sein de l’Union est, avec la Norvège et l’Islande, l’une des seules qui n’a pas abouti. Le refus du peuple Suisse, par référendum le 6 décembre 1992, de ratifier l’accord sur l’Espace Économique Européen (EEE) a mis fin à cette procédure mais aussi à toute perspective d’adhésion à l’Union10. De même, c’est sans doute la perspective d’un référendum négatif qui mit fin aux négociations d’adhésion avec l’Islande qui avait présenté sa candidature pour intégrer l’Union européenne le 16 juillet 2009. Cette demande avait été officialisée par le Conseil européen le 27 juillet 2009 et transmise pour analyse à la Commission. La Commission ayant soutenue l’ouverture des négociations, le 17 juin 2010, l’Union avait accordé le statut de candidat à l’Islande en approuvant formellement l’ouverture des négociations d’adhésion qui débutèrent le 27 juillet 201011. Le gouvernement islandais avait pour objectif d’adhérer en 2013, et l’adhésion aurait été l’objet d’un référendum d’approbation. Cependant, les élections législatives islandaises de 2013, portant au pouvoir un gouvernement ouvertement hostile à l’adhésion, mirent un terme à ce calendrier rapide. Le 13 juin 2013, la candidature islandaise est ainsi gelée par le gouvernement.
10 Auer, A., Le référendum constitutionnel. Les origines de la démocratie directe en Suisse. Actes du colloque organise les 27-29 avril 1995 par la Faculté de droit de Genève et le C2D. Bâle et Francfort- sur-le-Main : Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1996, pp. 80–82. 11 Voir Conclusion du Conseil européen du 17 juin 2010, Bruxelles, le 13 juillet 2010 (14.07) EUCO 13/1/10 REV 1.
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I.2.2. Les référendums favorables au retrait Avant même le Brexit, l’exemple du Groenland, qui avait intégré la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) lors du premier élargissement en 1973, en tant que comté d’outre-mer du Royaume du Danemark, même s’il est atypique, démontre la force de cet instrument appliqué à l’adhésion comme au retrait de l’Union. En effet en 1979, la loi sur l’autonomie du Groenland a en effet transféré aux autorités autonomes du territoire presque toutes les responsabilités jusqu’alors exercées par les autorités danoises. Dès ce statut obtenu, un référendum consultatif sur le retrait de la Communauté économique européenne fut organisé et le 23 février 1982, le retrait de la Communauté fut acté et le Groenland ne fait plus partie de l’Union européenne depuis 198512. Le premier référendum organisé au Royaume-Uni sur la construction européenne avait porté sur la participation à la construction communautaire en 1975, celui organisé le 23 juin 2016 sur le maintien ou la sortie de l’Union européenne aura été le second, et par conséquent le dernier. Il s’agissait également d’une obligation quasi constitutionnelle dans la mesure où depuis son introduction dans l’ordre juridique du Royaume-Uni, la loi sur les Communautés européennes de 1972 (European Communities Act) était devenue une sorte de « loi constitutionnelle », confirmée par l’approche de la Chambre des Lords dans l’affaire « Factortame »13. De même, le traité sur l’Union européenne devait également donner lieu à l’intervention du Parlement appelé à adopter un amendement à l’European Communities Act (EUA), qui prévoyait aussi que certaines décisions ne pouvaient pas être adoptée sans loi du Parlement, soit de sa propre initiative, soit en plus d’un référendum. C’est la raison pour laquelle le référendum sur le Brexit, a eu lieu, après le vote de la loi sur le référendum de 2015 (European Union Referendum Act, adoptée le 17 décembre 2015). Si le résultat fut sans appel (le 23 juin 2016 les britanniques ont choisi de quitter l’Union européenne à une large majorité14), si l’on en croit les trois décisions rendues par les juges britanniques, et notamment celui de la Cour Suprême dans la décision Miller du 24 janvier 2017, semblant indiquer que le référendum de 2016 ne signifiait pas que, légalement, le Parlement est lié dans la mesure où la loi prévoyant la tenue de ce référendum est muette sur les conclusions procédurales à en tirer15 :
12 Voir Commission européenne « Proposition de décision du Conseil sur les relations entre l’Union européenne, d’une part, et le Groenland et le Royaume de Danemark, d’autre part », COM(2011) 846 final du 07/12/2011. 13 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport ( n° 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 14 Le camp du « Leave », favorable à la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne, l’a emporté avec 51,9 %, contre 48,1 % pour le « Remain », pro-européen. 15 Voir Guilluy, T., « Les juges britanniques face au Brexit : Une revanche posthume du droit de l’Union européenne ? », Jus Politicum, n° 18.
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Le référendum de 2016 n’a pas modifié le droit de telle sorte qu’il permette aux ministres de retirer le Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne sans intervention législative. Mais cela ne signifie en aucune façon qu’il soit dépourvu d’effet. Cela signifie que, à moins que et jusqu’à ce qu’il soit mis en œuvre par le Parlement, sa force est politique plutôt que juridique. Et il s’est déjà avéré doté d’une grande portée politique16. La force politique du référendum ne s’est en effet pas démentie : aucune Cour, ni aucun argument juridique ne pourra arrêter le Brexit, qui est devenu une réalité, tout au moins officielle, le 31 janvier 2020. Cette force politique s’appliquera aussi aux référendums destinés à accepter ou refuser les évolutions de la construction européenne où les traités de révisions. À ce titre, les référendums participeront aussi à leur manière à l’instauration progressive de la fameuse Europe à plusieurs vitesses : cet instrument montrera souvent que les opinions publiques des États membres se montreront attaché à une Europe respectueuse des spécificités nationales qui n’accepte pas sans réserve les évolutions de la construction européenne. Pour autant, force est de constater que ces référendums, s’ils sont tous porteurs d’enseignements sur les situations de crises qu’ils ont parfois engendrés n’ont pas toujours eu un impact positif sur la construction européenne.
II. LA PRATIQUE DU RÉFÉRENDUM LIÉE AUX ÉVOLUTIONS DE LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE : UN INSTRUMENT DE CONTRÔLE À GÉOMETRIE VARIABLE Contrairement aux Référendums d’adhésion, ceux qui ont été organisés par les États membre pour valider les traités de révisions ou les évolutions de l’Union européenne ne constituent ni une pratique fréquente, ni une pratique uniforme. L’utilisation des référendums sera en effet extrêmement variable selon les États : elle dépendra à la fois des traditions constitutionnelles des États, mais également d’aspects conjoncturels et politiques. Pour certains États en effet, le recours au référendum pour autoriser les ratifications des traités de révision ou les nouveaux Traités européen semble ou semblait exclu, en raison d’une méfiance « constitutionnelle » pour ce procédé. C’est le cas par exemple de la plupart des États qui ont adhéré à partir du milieu des années deux-mille ou de certains États membres originaires comme la Belgique. Pour autant, comme cela a été souligné pour les adhésions, rien n’interdit jamais totalement l’utilisation de
16 R. Miller & others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, § 124.
357 Sophie Perez ce processus dont l’utilisation n’est proscrite par aucune constitution et qui peut, en outre, être une procédure obligatoire ou facultative17.
II.1. L’UTILISATION DU RÉFÉRENDUM LIÉE AUX ÉVOLUTIONS DE LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE : UNE SIMPLE POTENTIALITÉ DANS UNE MAJORITÉ D’ÉTATS MEMBRES Pour des raisons diverses, tenant parfois à l’absence de disposition dans la constitution mais aussi à d’autres raisons, les référendums comme instruments de contrôle n’ont jamais été utilisé par certains États. De nombreux États en particulier les derniers entrants, ont introduit dans leurs constitutions des dispositions prévoyant la possibilité de référendums lorsque certaines questions internationales aboutissent à des changements constitutionnels par exemple, mais aucun de ces États n’en a organisé sur des questions européennes. Ce fut le cas en Slovénie ou en Pologne par exemple. Dans cet État, la constitution prévoit pourtant trois types de référendum national qui pourraient s’appliquer aux questions européennes : la possibilité de décider sur des questions revêtant une importance particulière pour l’État (art. 125) ; pour la ratification d’un accord international opérant des transferts de compétence (art. 90), ou engendrant une modification de la Constitution (art. 235). Même dans des États comme la République Tchèque, dont la constitution semblait a priori hostile à la pratique du référendum, il fut finalement intégré, à la suite d’un compromis, une possibilité de promulguer une loi constitutionnelle sur les référendums sous réserve qu’elle obtienne une majorité qualifiée requise dans les deux chambres du Parlement. Aucun texte n’a jamais été promulguée pour l’instant car aucun accord n’a jamais pu être trouvé sur un mode de fonctionnement approprié de cette procédure. Cependant dans la mesure où cette possibilité existe, il y a eu des débats concernant les référendums sur certains traités de révision, notamment sur le Traité de Lisbonne. De même, le système constitutionnel belge ne prévoit pas expressément l’organisation de référendum mais n’interdit pas explicitement, leurs recours, qui peut être déduit de l’art. 33, qui fait référence à la « nation » comme étant la source tous les pouvoirs. Si la ratification des traités et de leurs modifications n’a jamais soulevé de difficultés particulières en Belgique, il a cependant été question de soumettre la ratification du Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe au référendum, même si cette option fut finalement abandonnée18. En ce qui concerne la Constitution du Luxembourg, aucune interdiction constitutionnelle ne s’applique aux référendums concernant les traités internationaux. Une situation identique peut être relevée en Suède : dans cet État, l’idée d’organiser un référendum sur l’Union économique et
17 Anneli, A., Bardutzky, S., (editors) National Constitutions in European and Global Governance : Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law, National Reports, Asser Press, Springer Open, 2019. 18 Rideau, J., Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés européennes, LGDJ, 5e éd., 2010, pp. 1174.
358 La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes monétaire (UEM) a été évoquée, pour autant celui-ci n’a jamais été organisé, sans doute parce qu’il était clair, d’un point de vue juridique, que la Suède avait depuis 1997 pris la décision de ne pas participer à la troisième étape de la monnaie unique. De même en Grèce, les référendums constitutionnels n’étant pas prévus, ils n’ont pas été employés et le contrôle démocratique par rapport à la construction européenne a toujours été exercée par le Parlement. Toutefois, il convient de noter qu’au milieu de la crise financière qui a frappé le pays, en 2010, l’idée d’organiser un référendum avait été avancée par l’Assemblée et le Premier ministre George Papandreou. En 2011, sous la pression exercée par les dirigeants français et allemands, et son propre parti (un vote de confiance était en attente au Parlement), ainsi que par les partis de l’opposition, Papandreou a finalement annulé le mandat de l’Assemblée pour organiser le référendum. De même, au Portugal, depuis l’adhésion, l’idée d’organiser un référendum sur l’intégration européenne a été discuté mais ne s’est jamais concrétisé. La Constitution ne prévoyait jusqu’en 1989 que des référendums locaux et les modifications introduites après cette date ont permis des référendums nationaux, sans que cela n’ait un effet sur le plan de la pratique référendaire. En ce qui concerne le Royaume-Uni, bien que le référendum n’ait été utilisé que pour l’entrée et la sortie de l’Union, l’European Union Act de 2008, modifié en 2011, prévoyait que certaines décisions ne pouvaient pas être adoptées sans loi du Parlement, soit de sa propre initiative, soit en plus d’un référendum. Cela signifiait que le choix était laissé à l’appréciation de ce dernier. En particulier, une loi du Parlement et un référendum étaient nécessaires avant qu’un ministre ne puisse adopter des décisions sur la défense commune de l’Union ou prendre des décisions en vertu de l’article 4 du Protocole 21 sur la liberté, la sécurité et la justice (art. 6). Ce contrôle pouvait donc passer par un référendum mais ce fut toujours le Parlement qui validera, parfois non sans mal, les différentes évolutions des Traités, malgré des recours devant la Hight court, comme lors de la ratification du traité de Maastricht19. De la même façon, en Allemagne, il est possible d’organiser un référendum supposant une révision constitutionnelle, ce qui aurait pu être l’occasion de passer par une approbation référendaire lors de la modification de certains Traité. Cependant, ces derniers furent toujours approuvés par les votes du Bundestag et du Bundesrat. Même pour la ratification du Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe, le référendum a été écarté, et c’est le Bundestag et le Bundesrat qui ont autorisé la ratification du traité en 2005. La même situation constitutionnelle en Autriche a abouti au même résultat : après un référendum sur l’adhésion en 1994, le recours au référendum fut écarté, les deux chambres du Parlement autrichien ont donc voté en faveur du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe en mai 2005.
19 Regina/Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte : Lord Rees-Mogg, CML Rep. 1993, p. 101.
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En Italie, la ratification des traités européens n’a pas donné lieu à l’organisation d’un référendum. La pratique référendaire est utilisée soit pour abroger (conformément à l’art. 75 de la Constitution) soit pour confirmer une loi parlementaire (conformément à l’art. 75 de la Constitution). Cependant, il a été organisé dans cet État un référendum consultatif relatif à la transformation de l’Union européenne. Il s’agissait d’approuver, à l’occasion des élections du Parlement européen de juin 1989, une loi constitutionnelle relative à l’attribution d’un pouvoir constituant à ce dernier20. La constitution espagnole prévoit de soumettre à référendum les « décisions politiques d’une importance particulière », sur proposition émanant du premier ministre après accord du Congrès des députés à la majorité absolue. Après un référendum consultatif en février 2005 en faveur de l’adoption du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, le Parlement espagnol a émis un vote favorable à la ratification en avril et mai 2005. Cependant en ce qui concerne le traité de Lisbonne, ce dernier est intervenu au Congrès des Députés le 26 juin 2008 et le 15 juillet 2008 au Sénat. Cette situation est comparable à celle de l’Estonie, l’article 105 de la constitution permet qu’un référendum puisse porter sur l’adoption d’un texte de loi ou sur toute « autre question d’intérêt national »21. En oppositions avec ces exemples, Certains États comme la France, le Danemark, l’Irlande ou encore les Pays Bas ont développé une réelle culture du référendum européen sur les questions européennes. Là encore, cet usage relève autant des dispositions constitutionnelles que d’une tradition issue de l’histoire européenne et de l’impact de cette dernière avec les États concernés, peu importe là encore que la procédure soit obligatoire ou non. En effet, l’exemple Danois montre que même consultatif, un référendum négatif a une incidence sur les évolutions des Traités : c’est sans doute la raison pour laquelle cette possibilité fut tous simplement supprimée par les Pays bas en 2018.
II.2. L’UTILISATION DU RÉFÉRENDUM SUR LES ÉVOLUTIONS DE LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE DANS CERTAINS ÉTATS MEMBRES : STOP OU ENCORE ? Ainsi les grandes étapes de cette construction, telles que le Traité de Maastricht, l’entrée dans la monnaie unique devront ou encore le Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe offriront autant d’occasion aux populations des États membres de contrôler les évolutions de la construction européenne. Par l’intermédiaire des procédures référendaires, ces États se sont souvent montrés attaché à une Europe respectueuse des spécificités nationales et ont parfois accepté mais surtout refusé, certaines évolutions majeures de la construction européenne.
20 Rideau, J., Droit institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés européennes, LGDJ, 5e éd., 2010, pp. 1311. 21 Laffranque, R., « L’objet du référendum en Estonie », Juridica International, 2006 (11), pp. 175–183.
360 La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes
Les exemples Danois et Irlandais sont assez emblématiques de ce type de contrôle. En ce qui concerne le Danemark dont le recours au référendum va commencer dès la ratification de l’Acte unique européen, les référendums pourtant consultatifs, ont toujours déterminé la conduite de l’État par rapport à la construction européenne. Ainsi en 1986, le Folketing ayant demandé une renégociation de l’Acte unique européen et cette demande n’ayant pas été satisfaite, il se prononcera contre la signature du Traité, tout en acceptant que le Gouvernement organise un référendum consultatif. Comme ce dernier fut positif, le Parlement Danois adoptera finalement le texte. Au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, la ratification du traité sur l’Union européenne va susciter une situation totalement inversée. Cette fois le traité fut approuvé par le Folketing mais il fut suivi par un vote négatif. Les autres États membres se déclarèrent immédiatement opposés à une renégociation des traités mais ils consentirent à l’adoption d’un compromis sur la base d’exemption de cet État (sur la citoyenneté, la monnaie unique, la défense ainsi que sur la justice et des affaires intérieures). Sur ces bases, le Parlement votera trois projets de loi en vue de la tenue d’un second référendum et le 18 mai 1993 les électeurs danois se prononcèrent en faveur de la ratification du traité. La ratification du Traité d’Amsterdam fit également l’objet d’un référendum positif. En ce qui concerne le Traité de Nice, il fut seulement ratifié par le Parlement tout comme le traité de Lisbonne. En ce qui concerne le Traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe, un référendum était prévu mais il n’aura pas lieu compte tenu de la suspension des processus de ratification après les « non » français puis néerlandais. Les référendums de ces deux États membres originaires des Communautés européennes seront en effet à l’origine de l’abandon du projet. En ce qui concerne l’Irlande, après de multiples problèmes d’ordre constitutionnels c’est finalement un référendum qui permit la ratification de l’Acte unique européen au prix d’une modification de la constitution, en insérant dans l’article 29 de la Constitution une disposition selon laquelle « l’État est autorisé à ratifier l’Acte unique européen signé par les États membres de la Communauté ». La longueur de cette procédure constitutionnelle eut pour effet un retard de six mois par rapport au calendrier prévu pour la ratification et l’entrée en vigueur du Traité. La même procédure fut suivie pour le traité sur l’Union européenne, puis pour le Traité d’Amsterdam. Les révisions firent l’objet de deux référendums positifs organisés le 18 juin1992 et le 22 mai 1998 qui furent tous les deux positifs. Cependant, La ratification du traité de Nice fut bloquée par le référendum négatif de 2001 qui nécessita une nouvelle consultation qui eut lieu en octobre 2002 et qui réunit finalement une majorité favorable. Il fut suivi par un vote parlementaire. Le référendum envisagé pour autoriser la ratification du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe qu’aurait suivi un vote parlementaire, n’a pas eu lieu. En revanche, la ratification du traité de Lisbonne fut de nouveau soumise au référendum qui fut négatif en 2008 puis à un nouveau référendum qui a abouti à un résultat positif (67, 1 % pour, 32, 9 % contre) le 2 octobre 2009 après que des
361 Sophie Perez aménagements aient été adoptés par le Conseil européen22. La dernière révision date du 27 juin 2012 et concerne le pacte budgétaire européen (TSCG). Un référendum avait eu lieu le 31 mai 2012 pour rendre possible la ratification du Traité en insérant cette autorisation dans l’article 29 de la constitution et écartant de fait toute remise en cause qui pourrait être fondée sur la Constitution du traité ou sur les actes nationaux d’application. L’exemple donné par le Pays Bas est lui aussi emblématique du peu d’importance du caractère obligatoire ou non, ou non des dispositions de la constitution à partir du moment où le référendum a lieu. C’est en effet un référendum consultatif relatif a l’approbation par les Pays-Bas du traite établissant une constitution pour l’Europe qui a eu lieu le 1er juin 2005 qui mis un terme définitif au processus de ratification de ce texte. Comme dans beaucoup d’États membres, le traité sur l’Union européenne ou le traité d’Amsterdam, de Nice ou de Lisbonne, ou portant sur des questions européennes comme le Traité instituant le mécanisme européen de stabilité (traité MES), ont été approuvés par un acte ordinaire du Parlement. Cependant, depuis une loi sur le référendum consultatif adoptée en 2015, des initiatives privées pouvaient aboutir la tenue d’un référendum sur des questions semblant relever de la compétence ou de transfert de compétence des Pays Bas. Lorsqu’une pétition récoltait plus de 300 000 signatures, le gouvernement se voyait contraint d’organiser un scrutin. C’est ainsi qu’en 2016, les néerlandais se sont prononcés, par la négative, sur la ratification de l’accord d’association créant une zone de libre-échange entre l’Union européenne et l’Ukraine ce qui a obligé le gouvernement lors d’un Conseil européen à négocier un texte « interprétatif »23. En 2018, devant la multiplication des demandes, les députés néerlandais ont finalement choisi de supprimer purement et simplement le référendum consultatif. Enfin en France, depuis l’adoption de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, neuf référendums ont été organisés et trois d’entre eux se sont distingués par leur thématique européenne. Aux termes de l’article 52 de la Constitution, c’est en effet le président de la République qui négocie et ratifie les traités. L’article 53 impose une autorisation parlementaire pour certaines catégories de traités, dont ceux relatifs aux organisations internationales Les traités peuvent être soumis au Conseil constitutionnel en vertu de l’article 54 et les lois d’autorisation de ratification des traités ou d’approbation des accords peuvent également être contrôlées dans le cadre de l’article 61, alinéa 2. En cas de constatation d’une contrariété de l’engagement international avec la Constitution, la loi d’autorisation de ratification ne pourra être votée, dans le cadre de la procédure de l’article 54, ou promulguée, dans le cadre de la procédure de l’article 61, alinéa 2, sans une renégociation aboutissant à sa modification ou sans que la Constitution ne soit révisée. Enfin, en vertu de l’article 11 de la constitution, l’autorisation 22 Conseil européen, Conclusions de la Présidence du 18 et 19 juin 2009, Bruxelles, le 19 juin 2009. 23 Conseil européen, Conclusions sur les migrations, la sécurité, le développement économique et social, la jeunesse et les relations extérieures du 15 décembre 2016.
362 La pratique des référendums sur les questions européennes référendaire peut être substituée à l’autorisation parlementaire pour les traités qui, sans être contraires à la Constitution, ont des incidences sur le fonctionnement des institutions. Avant 1992, cette procédure n’avait été utilisée qu’une fois en 1972 pour la ratification du traité relatif à l’adhésion du Royaume-Uni, du Danemark et de l’Irlande et s’expliquait, non tant sur le plan juridique (les incidence du traité sur les institutions étaient en effet inexistantes) mais plutôt au regard des relations conflictuelles qui régnaient à l’époque entre la France et l’Union européenne depuis que la première tentative d’adhésion du Royaume-Uni ait été refusée par le général De Gaulle en 1961. Le Président Georges Pompidou était favorable à cet élargissement et le référendum fut lui aussi massivement positif. En 1992, la France fut l’un des rares États membres à avoir opté pour un référendum pour la ratification du traité sur l’Union européenne. Ce deuxième référendum eut aussi pour origine une décision présidentielle. Après le « non » danois, le président de la République décida en effet de soumettre au référendum l’autorisation de ratification du traité sur la base de l’article 11, après avis du Conseil d’État et du Conseil constitutionnel24. Mais ce fut à une courte majorité que le peuple français autorisa cette fois, le 20 septembre 1992, le président de la République à ratifier le traité25. En 2005, la France a de nouveau été l’un des États membres qui a exigé un référendum pour la ratification du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe et cette demande s’est soldée par le vote négatif du 29 mai 2005. L’absence de consensus en faveur du oui ou du non au sein même des partis politiques et la calamiteuse campagne en faveur des tenants du « oui » peuvent en partie expliquer ce résultat. Cet évènement diplomatiquement peu glorieux pour la France qui était à l’origine du traité a démontré surtout que l’utilisation politique du référendum devenait dangereuse. Pour la classe politique française, comme pour la classe politique britannique et comme pour les classes politiques européennes en général, le référendum a pu être considéré comme un moyen de « restaurer la confiance entre les citoyens et ceux qui incarnent les institutions ». Or depuis quelques années, la pratique du référendum sur les affaires européennes démontre clairement le contraire. Il s’agirait plutôt d’une illustration de plus en plus claire de la défiance d’une majorité de citoyens face à leurs dirigeants en général et au système de gouvernance européen en particulier, qu’ils ne comprennent de moins en moins et qui leur semble de plus en plus éloigné de leurs préoccupations. Dans les années à venir, il est probable que la méfiance de la classe politique européenne soit désormais de mise vis-à-vis de cet instrument de démocratie semi-directe.
24 Décret du 1er juillet 1992, JORF du 2 juillet 1992. 25 Loi n° 92-1017, JORF du 25 septembre 1992, p. 13294.
363 Étienne Picard Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit
LES PRÉSENTATIONS OFFICIELLES DU PROJET DE LOI DE RÉVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE « POUR UN RENOUVEAU DE LA VIE DÉMOCRATIQUE »1 : OU COMMENT LE NON-DROIT PRODUIT DU DROIT
Prof. ém. Étienne Picard Cette contribution n’a pas elle-même pour objet de présenter ce projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle, en dépit de l’intérêt qu’il suscite, spécialement pour son apport au concept de démocratie, puisque tel est son titre et que la démocratie est précisément le sujet de notre Congrès : elle a pour objet d’analyser les présentations qu’en ont fait divers documents officiels sous l’angle de la question du mode de production du droit, que l’on peut appeler la jurisgénésie : comment le droit s’engendre-t-il ? comment le droit naît-il ? Comment s’élabore-t-il, comment se constitue-t-il à partir de l’idée que l’on en a jusqu’à son écriture ou sa formalisation et son application ? Pour déterminer le contenu des règles de droit, on ne se pose guère ces questions tant que ce contenu est clair et intelligible, comme il le doit en vertu d’un principe de droit fondamental, qui n’a pas besoin d’être écrit pour s’imposer, mais que le juge français a consacré en tant que principe constitutionnel non écrit. Mais si, sans être nécessairement obscur et inintelligible, le texte se prête à plusieurs interprétations possibles et laisse donc des interrogations ouvertes, alors il faut recourir aux apports de l’herméneutique et en particulier se poser diverses questions relatives à la « fabrication » de ce texte, au sein même du processus de la production normative en général. Peut aider, à cet égard, l’analyse des documents de présentation officielle de ce projet de révision constitutionnelle, même si ces documents ne sont certainement pas des textes normatifs au sens où l’entend la conception du droit qui domine en France actuellement, assez largement positiviste. Or celle-ci qui sépare systématiquement le devoir-être de l’Être, oppose aussi le discours normatif ou prescriptif, qui est celui des sources de droit positif, aux discours descriptifs de ces normes, qui selon cette conception ne présentent aucune portée normative. On pourrait dire que, selon cette conception du droit, ils ne font pas partie du droit et que ce ne sont pas des objets juridiques, le juridique étant ici confondu avec le normatif (et le normatif avec la triade de l’interdiction, de l’autorisation et de la prescription, qui n’est toutefois nullement exhaustive). Or, ce qui est tout à fait remarquable est que, à rebours de ce que cette conception du droit persiste à maintenir, ces textes non normatifs contribuent à engendrer du 1 Enregistré à l’Assemblée nationale française le 29 aout 2019.
364 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit droit, participant ainsi de cette jurisgénésie qui condamne toutes les dichotomies que le juspositivisme entretient coûte que coûte, alors que les faits les condamnent. Mais ces doctrines du droit ne veulent précisément pas considérer les faits, puisque selon leurs présupposés il ne s’agit pas de droit. A ce stade, il nous faut rapidement décrire ces documents de présentation du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle, avant de préciser le cadre théorique dans lequel se pose ce problème juridique : le fait, c’est à dire le non-droit selon cette façon de séparer les deux ordres de l’Être et du devoir-être, peut-il engendrer du droit ? (I), question qui précédera sa réponse selon laquelle le fait peut effectivement contribuer à la formation du droit, aussi contraire aux dogmes en cours que cela puisse être (II). Commençons donc par rappeler sommairement la procédure au terme de laquelle les deux assemblées et le Parlement en Congrès ou le peuple par référendum selon le cas, décideront d’adopter cette révision constitutionnelle – aujourd’hui en panne pour des raisons politiques, ce qui atteste déjà le rôle du fait dans la confection du droit. En simplifiant à l’extrême, nous pouvons retenir trois types de documents officiels contribuant à la présentation du « projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique », puisque tel est son titre. Ce sont, dans un ordre plus chronologique que logique, l’avis du Conseil d’Etat (en date du 20 juin 2019), puis le compte-rendu de la séance du Conseil des ministres à la délibération duquel le texte a été soumis (dans sa séance du 28 août 2019) et enfin l’exposé des motifs du projet de loi présenté à l’Assemblée nationale (le 29 août 2019). Les deux rapports des parlementaires chargés d’introduire les discussions devant l’Assemblée nationale puis devant le Sénat seront ici omis des documents de présentation du texte que nous considérerons, car ils s’insèrent beaucoup plus que les documents précités dans le processus même d’adoption positive de la révision. Ces documents visent chacun des fins particulières, mais ils présentent un point commun : ils tendent tous à décrire plus ou moins sommairement le contenu du projet, voire à le transcrire, c’est-à-dire à le traduire en un langage autre que celui du texte en question, afin de le rendre plus « lisible » (c’est le cas, de façon très complète et objective, de l’avis du Conseil d’Etat, et c’est aussi ce à quoi s’attache l’exposé des motifs, de la façon la plus pédagogique possible, mais évidemment très impliquée dans le soutien du texte ; et c’est également ce à quoi se livre, pour un public plus large et moins averti, le compte-rendu de la séance du conseil des ministres, de façon très sommaire et cette fois tout à fait orientée. A partir de là, leurs fonctions particulières peuvent diverger davantage : décrire ou transcrire, correspond à un travail de pur fait ; c’est à cela que se livrent surtout l’avis du Conseil d’Etat de façon relativement neutre mais néanmoins possiblement critique, et encore l’exposé des motifs, mais de façon plus commune et plus partisane. Ce travail de pur fait conduit à procéder à des jugements de réalité ou à des énoncés purement factuels consistant à se demander et à expliquer ce que le texte veut dire
365 Étienne Picard et entend réaliser. Mais ces documents de présentation peuvent aussi vouloir vanter ou apprécier de façon plus ou moins engagée le texte du projet. Ceux-là prononcent ainsi des jugements de valeur, soit sur le plan de la forme du texte, spécialement de sa rédaction (cette tâche revient tout spécialement au Conseil d’Etat), soit sur celui de son fond (ce que fait aussi l’avis du Conseil d’Etat, mais de façon bien plus objective que les deux autres documents, l’exposé des motifs et le très sommaire compte-rendu de la séance du Conseil des ministres) ; et ce jugement peut être de pure opportunité, plus ou moins objective (comme il faut s’y attendre dans l’exposé des motifs) ; il peut aussi s’agir d’un jugement de valeur relatif à la correction juridique du texte (fonction dévolue au Conseil d’Etat), voire à sa conformité au droit, du moins si ce texte s’inscrit dans une hiérarchie normative, comme le fait une loi ordinaire, au lieu de pouvoir se parer de la souveraineté inconditionnelle car primaire. Mais ici il s’agit d’un projet de loi constitutionnelle qui est en principe soumis, dès lors qu’il s’agit bien d’une révision constitutionnelle et non d’une nouvelle constitution, aux seules dispositions de la Constitution applicables en cas de révision (spécialement celles de l’article 89, qui interdit notamment que « la forme républicaine du gouvernement » puisse faire l’objet d’une révision), puisque le constituant secondaire (ou dérivé) n’a pas les mêmes pouvoirs que le constituant primaire (ou originaire). Toutefois, dans l’un et l’autre cas, les normes supranationales qui lient la République française s’imposent aussi à la constitution, comme l’exige d’une façon très générale l’alinéa 14 du Préambule de la Constitution de 1946 notamment, toujours en vigueur. Aucun des organes que nous avons mentionnés ici ne dispose d’un pouvoir positivement normatif dans ce genre de fonctions. Le Conseil d’Etat n’intervient pas ici comme juge, mais comme conseil ; et son pouvoir consiste seulement – mais il est très important – à se prononcer en légalité ou plus exactement en constitutionnalité, en opportunité ou en pertinence sur tous les éléments du texte qui suscitent sa réaction. Le compte-rendu de la séance du Conseil des ministres se veut le plus simple et le plus synthétique possible dans l’ordre de la défense a priori du texte, voire de sa promotion politique et médiatique. Or, dans tous ces cas, la question se pose de savoir si ces interventions, sans être normatives, ne sont pas juridiques au point de contribuer à la formation du droit, en lui indiquant ou même en lui fournissant ses fondements, en l’assistant dans la rédaction donc dans la production de ses normes ou dans la formalisation de ses concepts quant à leur fond. Ainsi, il s’agit de se demander, sur un plan théorique, si le fait ne se mêle pas déjà au droit, d’une façon générale et indépendante du cas plus particulier de ce projet de révision constitutionnelle, au point de contribuer vigoureusement à son élaboration véritable. Nous y répondrons ensuite positivement, de manière empirique, pour ce qui concerne ce projet.
366 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit I. LE FAIT PEUT-IL CONTRIBUER À LA FORMATION DU DROIT ? Une certaine doctrine du droit qui se présente comme une théorie du droit empreinte de positivisme, spécialement kelsénien, et qui s’est installée dans les esprits de la doctrine française dominante comme une forme de vulgate caricaturée et rarement remise en question, considère qu’il existerait, non pas seulement une distinction, mais une dichotomie au sein du monde du droit en général : – entre la prescription normative et la description du droit, comme entre la forme et le fond, entre la légalité et le bien-fondé concret, et plus généralement entre le droit et le fait. La forme relèverait du droit pur, saisissable par la science du droit, car toujours objectivement identique à elle-même d’un ordre juridique à l’autre en tant qu’élément d’une structure universelle de conformité normative, tandis que le fond ou le contenu du droit serait le lieu des faits, des circonstances, des aléas, de toutes sortes de matérialités, de conjonctures, de valeurs subjectives, de dogmatiques diverses, radicalement insusceptibles d’une appréhension scientifique : le fait ne se mêlerait donc pas au droit, le droit n’interférerait pas dans les faits, alors qu’il apparaît déjà, à la pensée ordinaire, qu’il tend à s’imposer à eux et qu’il en dépend ne serait que pour établir la légalité de ses actes. Malgré cela, selon cette doctrine dominante, la science du droit ne s’abimerait pas à considérer les faits. Cette attitude donne à penser que c’est là l’effet de d’une science imparfaite que celle qui réduit son objet à ce dont elle peut rendre compte, mais qui nie que puisse en faire partie un de ses aspects au motif qu’il n’entre pas dans ce qu’elle peut expliquer. C’est l’effet du désir de « pureté » en droit. C’est pour les mêmes raisons que le droit serait l’objet de deux sortes de discours, étrangers l’un à l’autre : il y aurait d’abord le discours du droit lui-même, soit le discours juridique proprement dit, celui de la Constitution, des codes, des lois et des règlements, qui seul énoncerait du droit ou de la normativité, et d’autre part le discours sur le droit, soit les gloses juridiques qui ne seraient pas du droit, et seraient donc dépourvus de tout effet normatif. Le premier discours, intervenantdans le droit, serait constitutif du droit, tandis que le second, intervenant à propos du droit ou sur le droit, serait purement descriptif de ce que ce dernier prescrit, interdit ou autorise. Et, évidemment, ces textes de présentation du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle seraient du discours sur le droit et même du discours sur du non-droit puisque, par hypothèse même, le projet de loi constitutionnelle n’est qu’un projet, donc un fait, et non déjà une norme, tant qu’il n’est pas adopté et promulgué. Si le devoir-être dont relève le droit est étranger à l’Être, ces discours de présentation n’auraient donc guère d’intérêt pour cette science du droit, puisque ce sont-là de purs faits coupés du droit. Et donc, surtout, ils ne pourraient produire du droit. Car, selon la théorie en cause, seul du droit peut produire du droit, pour cette raison fondamentale que le droit en tant que devoir-être est postulé comme
367 Étienne Picard
étant coupé de l’Être, c’est-à-dire notamment coupé du monde des faits où, toujours selon cette théorie, il ne trouve pas sa source, tout juste son champ d’application. On va montrer tout à l’heure qu’il n’en est rien et que tous ces discours, qui ne sont certainement pas seulement descriptifs, mais aussi imaginatifs et critiques, sont comme les marais juridiques où se fécondent leurs progénitures – ou, si l’on préfère selon un langage plus mélioratif, où se tiennent les « zones humides » du droit, là où germent les cellules originaires du droit et bientôt sa chair. Pour l’instant, dans un premier temps, il convient d’appréhender la question des rapports du droit et du fait sous le seul angle théorique, avant d’observer empiriquement, dans un second temps, leur étroite intrication. La question générale des rapports entre le droit et le fait doit, comme on vient de le laisser entendre, s’appréhender à deux égards, épistémologique et ontologique.
I.1. L’APPROCHE ÉPISTÉMOLOGIQUE Dans le mot « épistémologique », la racine « épistémè » sera prise ici au sens de savoir, de connaissance, de science, en sorte que son suffixe « logos » est entendu comme discours rationnel sur cette science ou ce savoir. « L’épistémologie » peut donc désigner dans notre propre discours « la science des sciences ». On pourrait aussi parler à son propos de « méta-science », cette science qui montre selon quelles conditions il peut y avoir une science de quelque chose. Ainsi, l’épistémologie juridique tend à établir les conditions de possibilité d’une science du droit qui se sont dégagées au fil des siècles et dont on peut tirer une généalogie des objets du droit, cette jurisgenesis qui s’attache à décrire les modalités de l’engendrement ou de la gestation du droit. On peut encore entendre épistémè au sens que lui donnait M. Foucauld. Il y voyait l’ensemble des conditions de possibilité des sciences en général et donc de la science du droit en particulier – et donc du droit lui-même comme on le verra plus loin. Ces conditions étant selon lui de toutes sortes, religieuses, morales, philosophiques, économiques…., mais matériellement différentes selon l’époque. Surtout, selon ce qu’elles sont, elles entraînent l’essor ou le déclin des sciences. Il distinguait à cet égard trois épistémè, celle de la Renaissance, celle du Classicisme, et celle de la Modernité, lesquelles éclairent tout aussi bien l’histoire du droit. Or l’épistémologie du droit révèle de façon tout à fait remarquable la spécificité du droit parmi toutes les sciences et parmi tous les objets possibles des sciences en général. Cette spécificité touche le plus souvent la question des rapports entre le droit et les faits. Ainsi, tout d’abord, il n’y a pas d’ordre juridique possible sans effectivité « globale », comme l’admet déjà Kelsen lui-même. Or, cette effectivité est nécessairement factuelle : elle dépend des comportements pratiques des destinataires des normes juridiques, qui peuvent ou non y obéir. Et cette donnée implique donc qu’il n’y a de droit que selon les circonstances, les faits, l’histoire : la condition de la juridicité se trouve donc
368 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit dans sa factualité, ce qui ne cadre pas du tout avec cette séparation dichotomique qui existerait par postulation de principe entre le droit et le fait. Ce qui vaut pour l’ordre juridique global vaut aussi pour la norme la plus importante de l’ordre juridique, la constitution souveraine : il n’y a de norme constitutionnelle souveraine que si celle qui prétend à cette qualité est elle-même obéie, « au moins en gros » – facteur d’incertitude lui-même subordonné à des données de pur fait. En tout cas, pour être du droit, elle doit être obéie factuellement, même si ce n’est qu’« en gros ». Sinon, elle serait ridicule et n’y survivrait pas : l’obéissance effective étant elle-même une question de fait, la souveraineté constitutionnelle, là où gît désormais le cœur du droit positif, dépend elle aussi de données purement factuelles. On perçoit la situation contradictoire dans laquelle le droit s’enferme alors : pour être du droit il doit être obéi, mais pour devoir être obéit, il doit être du droit, c’est à dire obéi… En second lieu, et en-deçà de la donnée précédemment relevée, des constitutions n’ont pu apparaître que parce que les acteurs de la jurislogie, ce discours du droit sur lui-même et qu’il élabore conceptuellement et axiologiquement, ont imaginé la notion de souveraineté et se sont représenté la constitution pour ce qu’elle est devenue en fait et en droit. Il en va de même, évidemment, du principe de légalité ou du principe de séparation des pouvoirs ou de tout autre principe ou norme. Aucune entité juridique n’aurait pu naître sans une pensée du droit à son propos, pensée qui est bien du fait, selon la dichotomie du droit pur et des faits impurs, mais qui confectionnent déjà le droit, substantiellement ! Ainsi, le droit n’a pas d’existence en dehors de sa connaissance réflexive, de sa science qui est invention et construction, tout en restant critique ; c’est la connaissance que l’on a du droit qui forme le droit lui-même, et assure factuellement son existence réelle. La disputatio suivant les quaestiones, chaînons essentiels de la jurislogie, s’affirme comme la tribune du droit occupée à sa gestation : elle est comme l’intelligence imaginative et prolifique mais mesurée qu’elle a de lui-même. Toutes les sortes d’épistémè, entendues en ce sens et qui ne sont que des états de la pensée face aux faits, montrent en outre qu’elles sont déterminantes quant au contenu du droit, lequel varie selon son histoire et sa géographie : le droit de la Renaissance n’est pas le même que le droit du Classicisme ou de celui de la Modernité : les faits et la façon pratique dont ils sont reçus ou accomplis ici ou là font le droit dans son contenu, qui est sa dimension la plus déterminante, car c’est le fond qui commande la forme, l’esprit qui dicte la lettre. Le droit nait donc de la pensée qu’il suscite tandis que celle-ci le construit en retour dans une dialectique qui forme l’essence même de sa production : l’échange, le dialogue, la négociation, le débat, la discussion, le contradictoire, le délibéré, l’appel, à nouveau le contradictoire et le délibéré…. Il n’y a pas d’objet juridique qui ne procède de cette pensée réflexive, que le droit exerce de lui-même et sur lui-même, et qui discute en son sein propre. C’est le discours sur le droit qui l’élabore substantiellement
369 Étienne Picard pendant que le formalisent diverses procédures (elles-mêmes imaginées par le savoir pratique du droit). Le droit est d’abord discours sur lui-même car c’est la science du droit qui constitue son objet, le droit, au sens le plus positif. Les sources formelles, avant d’être formelles, ont été imaginées par l’activité de la connaissance du droit par lui-même. Et plus l’histoire s’est rapprochée de l’époque moderne, plus ce discours sur le droit a revendiqué le monopole de l’élaboration et de la production du droit par la pensée que l’on en a. Or, à l’époque moderne, ce discours a travaillé autant qu’il a pu à évacuer les facteurs de production du droit encore rémanents, qui seraient extérieurs à la Volonté, lorsque celle-ci a voulu se poser comme l’instrument de la Liberté. Et la Volonté s’est vouée à éliminer des sources de droit tous les facteurs possibles qui n’étaient pas l’expression de cette Volonté, comme l’histoire, la religion, la coutume, la morale… Et cette volonté est d’abord factuelle, avant d’être « juridicisée » en Volonté du souverain ou Volonté générale. L’idée d’une certaine démocratie, l’idée moderne de démocratie et ses discours innombrables ont produit un droit autre que le droit de l’époque classique, pétri de cette synthèse entre une forme de naturalisme et une autre de rationalisme, c’est-à-dire d’instances elles aussi extérieures à la Volonté, laquelle a finalement voulu ne connaître qu’elle-même comme Source du droit par excellence. Mais, pour nous ici, le plus important ne réside pas tant dans la question des modalités diverses de production du droit et d’élaboration de ses produits, mais dans le fait que le droit n’accède pas à l’existence sans le discours que l’on tient sur lui, sans la pensée qui en traite, sans les opinions qui l’inspirent, le critiquent, l’affinent, de manière purement factuelle selon la dichotomie critiquée, pleinement juridique selon la conception ici défendue… Et c’est à cette œuvre que contribuent les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle de 2019, soit du non-droit voué à œuvrer en droit… ! Ce fait que le droit naisse d’une réflexion sur lui-même constitue une extraordinaire spécificité du droit, curieusement négligée, alors qu’elle est au cœur de ce qu’il est : – les sciences de la nature ne créent pas leurs objets, mais se contentent de les repérer, de les décrire, de les analyser, de les expliquer ou même de les comprendre : les lois de la gravitation existeraient même si les Galilée, Kepler ou autres Newton ne les avaient pas découvertes ; les lois de la thermodynamique existeraient sans leur révélation par les Joule, Watt et autres Carnot. L’objet de ces sciences-là jouit d’une autonomie par rapport à ces dernières. Or il en va tout différemment pour le droit, comme science ou comme normes : l’objet n’accède à l’existence que par l’acte de sa connaissance, qui ne peut être, dans ces conditions, qu’un acte de construction de cet objet, puisque l’objet n’a de réalité que dans cet acte de connaissance-élaboration : la réalité de la constitution n’existerait pas sans l’idée que la jurislogie en a eue et continue d’en avoir, sans les pensées qui l’ont, à proprement parler, inventées soutenues et faite évoluer. Il en va de même de toutes les entités juridiques : pas de séparation des pouvoirs, pas de démocratie, pas de loi, pas de juge, pas de République, pas d’Etat de droit sans
370 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit leur représentation a priori par la pensée du droit, sans leur élaboration quasi ex nihilo par la très factuelle pensée conceptuelle et axiologique de la science du droit : l’objet de cette science-ci, le droit, ne jouit d’aucune autonomie par rapport à cette dernière, la science, le savoir, qui n’est pas nécessairement un savoir scientifique, pétri de neutralité et d’indifférence, mais un savoir impliqué et responsable. Cependant, cette science est tout de même liée, comme le sont les autres sciences, par des données objectives, qui sont normatives pour le droit également : par exemple, un énoncé juridique, pour accéder à vraie juridicité, doit pouvoir prétendre au moins à la réception de ses normes par ses destinataires et au mieux à l’obéissance de ces derniers, assurant leur effectivité. Ou encore, un énoncé juridique, pour prétendre à la juridicité, ne peut pas comporter une contradiction insurmontable sans se nuire à lui-même et au droit d’une façon générale : le droit, s’il veut prospérer dans l’Être, doit respecter le droit : il s’oblige lui-même objectivement, par ses propres normes. Tu patere legem… n’est pas un adage de simple bonne conduite s’imposant aux autorités normatives, mais une condition essentielle, ontologique donc, du droit. Ces données s’appliquent différemment aux sciences sociales autres que le droit, qui est donc spécifique par rapport à ces sciences. Ces sciences sociales autres que le droit visent à restituer les réalités qu’elles observent ; au contraire le droit tend essentiellement à construire une certaine réalité en transformant le réel social ou pratique en un monde à lui lorsque ce réel social ne voudrait pas changer ou à l’inverse en le sauvegardant lorsqu’il irait à la dérive (cf. le maintien de l’ordre). Ainsi, la science économique n’a créé ni la richesse ni la pauvreté, ni le capital ni le taux d’intérêt, ni le commerce ni la concurrence. Mais, en les analysant, en les conceptualisant, en les formalisant, elle s’est donné les moyens de les expliquer, de les comprendre et, le cas échéant, d’agir sur elles ; la science politique n’a pas inventé le pouvoir ni la tyrannie, ni l’autorité, ni la légitimité ; la sociologie n’a pas constitué la société, ni les communautés, ni dressé la violence des uns contre celle des autres, etc. Toutes ces sciences sociales ont non pas élaboré mais trouvé des données factuelles qu’elles ont identifiées, analysées, conceptualisées et formalisées, puis jugées en se forgeant finalement, le cas échéant, les outils propres à agir sur ces données. Au contraire, le droit en pensée et en action a créé tous ses objets, qui n’ont aucune existence en dehors de cette pensée et de cette action qui les ont fait naître à partir de rien en cela que ce ne sont que des artefacts, des inventions pratiques pures et simples sorties de la pensée et de l’art des juristes de la jurislogie. Le recours pour excès de pouvoir n’a pas d’existence dans la nature, pas plus que le principe de séparation des autorités judiciaires et administratives ou l’action de in rem verso, pas plus que l’idée de constitution, de souveraineté, de droits de la défense, etc. Ce qui est vrai est que le droit, comme toutes les sciences, rencontre des réalités qu’il ne peut nier ni contourner. Mais, au lieu de n’en retirer que des contraintes entravant son office, il les reconstitue juridiquement en vue de l’accomplir. Ainsi, il recompose avec ses
371 Étienne Picard concepts la réalité sociale soit pour la sauvegarder, soit pour la changer, en inventant une multitude d’entités qui n’ont de réalité existentielle que dans le monde du droit ; par exemple, à la place « des hommes » qu’il trouve dans un certain mode de réalité naturelle, dont chaque science peut se saisir pour en rendre compte, il construit les notions d’ « Homme et de Citoyen » qui ont chacun deux sortes de droits, les droits subjectifs et les droits ou fonctions civiques, celles d’« individus » qui n’ont ni naissance privilégiée, ni sexe, ni âge, ni conditions sociales , ni profession ni famille, ni spécificités d’aucune sorte afin d’assurer leur égalité devant et par la loi, celle de « contribuables » qui ne jouissent ici d’égalité que dans la proportion de leur « facultés contributives », celle de « propriétaires », celle de « créanciers » ou de « débiteurs ». Ainsi, toute la réalité sociale est reprise en main par le droit pour reconstituer au sens propre un « état de droit », une situation dans laquelle le droit peut régir ce monde ainsi reconstruit. Pour rendre compte de cet état de fait, on dit souvent que le droit serait « fictif ». En réalité, il n’est nullement « fictif », dans la mesure où ces catégories d’entités juridiques qu’il a constituées (les usagers, les justiciables, les héritiers …) existent vraiment en réalité – on veut dire dans la réalité juridique qu’il a lui-même créée et qui se traduit par des sanctions nullement fictives, mais bien réelles. Le fait que les artefacts soient créés de la main de l’homme ne leur retire aucune part de réalité, pas plus que le fait qu’ils soient nés de l’esprit humain. On pourrait cependant soutenir que le droit est bien davantage « fictionnel » en cela que les entités qu’il a créées et qu’il ne cesse de recréer, ne sont pas des entités existantes dans les autres ordres de réalité, comme ceux de la sociologie, de la science politique, etc. Mais ce serait juger du droit en faisant des autres ordres de réalité le paradigme de La Réalité ou son critère : or « les ménages » de la science économique n’ont pas plus de réalité que le « consommateur » ou de « l’acheteur » du droit des contrats de vente ; pour être plus facile d’accès intellectuel et pratique, le « travailleur » de la sociologie ou de la science politique n’a pas plus de réalité que « l’employé » du contrat de travail selon le droit… Et souvent, le droit construit des catégories en reprenant leur matière à la réalité sociologique, mais sans être lié par elle : les « personnes » en droit ne sont pas que des personnes physiques ; le « patrimoine » en droit n’a que peu à voir avec le patrimoine de la science économique, ce qui explique que l’indigent puisse détenir un patrimoine au sens juridique même s’il est en fait criblé de dettes ; « les époux » du droit civil n’étaient pas les époux d’une sociologie contemporaine, mais celle-ci a pu conduire le droit à réviser sa notion d’époux ; il en va de même de la « filiation » qui présente un certain sens en droit sans refléter nécessairement ce que la science s’avère capable de réaliser. D’autres entités juridiques n’ont pas d’équivalent en dehors du droit. Par exemple « l’obligation » n’a pas d’existence en dehors du droit ou de la morale, le non-droit ou l’amoralité ne connaissant ici que la force, la contrainte ou la ruse, en encore la violence ou la pression, mais aussi
372 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit tout de même l’honnêteté, l’obligation naturelle ou le don gracieux, lesquels jouissent d’une existence certaine en morale, même si celle-ci ne présente pas nécessairement le même contenu selon le droit… Il en va de même pour « le consentement », lequel répond à certaines conditions en droit, qui n’assurent pas nécessairement le consentement de fond selon la psychologie. Et tous ces objets juridiques n’ont d’existence réelle que par l’effet de la pensée qu’en développe la jurislogie, la connaissance réfléchie et critique, par la science du droit, de ses propres objets. Or la science du droit est bien du fait qui produit ses propres objets, concepts ou normes juridiques, lesquelles jouissent bien d’une réalité factuelle. Cependant, la culture contemporaine, sans doute sous l’effet d’un certain sociologisme ambiant et dominant, peine à saisir l’existence effectivement juridique des objets de la langue et de la réalité du droit. Elle est même portée, quelquefois, à la défigurer complètement, faute de la comprendre. On l’observe quotidiennement, par exemple, à propos du principe de la présomption d’innocence, qui conduit nombre de commentateurs, dès le lendemain d’un crime, à parler du « présumé assassin » de la vieille dame, alors qu’au contraire chacun doit être pénalement présumé innocent de ce crime, tant que le juge n’a pas condamné. De la même façon, sans doute moins gravement, mais plus généralement, la saisie pertinente de la réalité juridique n’est pas toujours accessible au commun qui, par exemple, ne voit pas que, en droit, le ministre n’est pas considéré en tant que personne humaine exerçant certaines fonctions, mais en tant qu’organe du droit qui n’a et ne peut avoir aucun sexe. Mais, en parlant de « la ministre » de quelque chose, on ne s’étonne plus du fait qu’elle puisse s’entourer de « hautes fonctionnaires », de « maîtresses de conférences » ou de « maîtresses des requêtes ». Il y a bien pourtant des « maitresses d’école », mais elles sont alors envisagées comme personnes, car on ne songerait pas à les présenter comme des « agentes publiques ». La situation est pire encore lorsque l’on relève une certaine désaffection pour le droit, si ce n’est une forme de répulsion, quand il s’agit d’appréhender des faits sociaux, lesquelles transparaissent dans la façon dont les présentations du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle sont conçues et rédigées : surtout ne pas parler en droit pour présenter l’objet du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle ! La question épistémologique en appelle ainsi, en amont, à l’approche ontologique qui fait ressortir que le droit, loin de se cantonner dans une sphère extérieure à l’Être, en fait nécessairement partie intégrante, parce que c’est proprement inconcevable qu’il n’en soit pas ainsi.
I.2. L’APPROCHE ONTOLOGIQUE L’approche ontologique tend ici à établir pourquoi le fait n’est non seulement pas étranger au droit dans la mesure où celui-ci dépend de celui-là, comme on vient de le
373 Étienne Picard montrer, mais encore que le droit lui-même, en tant que devoir-être, relève du monde des faits, c’est à dire de l’Être, sous réserve de sa spécificité au sein de l’Être. D’ailleurs, comment le devoir-être pourrait-il ne pas se tenir dans l’Être puisque l’Être comprend exhaustivement tout ce qui est, et que, en dehors de lui, il n’y a de place concevable que pour le Néant, dont on ne peut rien dire, à peine le nommer. Ainsi, d’un point de vue ontologique il n’est pas possible que le droit, qui existe, soit étranger au monde des faits c’est-à-dire à l’Être. Il doit donc en subir toutes les lois, mais aussi en tirer profit, sous réserve de sa spécificité au sein de l’Être qui lui permet aussi d’agir sur ce qui est. C’est la raison pour laquelle les faits eux-mêmes peuvent, par leur objectivité même, être normatifs pour le droit, comme l’a montré l’approche épistémologique et plus particulièrement cette notion d’ « objectivités normatives » qui s’imposent au droit : par exemple, le droit implique nécessairement une communication qui soit matériellement assurée entre l’émetteur de la norme et son récepteur ; et le droit ne peut pas prétendre à l’existence si cette communication n’est pas globalement efficiente car, sinon, l’obligation n’aura aucune possibilité d’être obéie. Mais le devoir-être du droit présente, comme tous les éléments constitutifs de l’Être, une spécificité au sein de l’Être : il y a ainsi l’être ici et l’être là, l’être présent et l’être lointain ; il y a l’être du passé comme l’être du futur, qui existe chacun sous l’une de leurs modalités d’être spécifiques, qui sont innombrables ; de même, et pour cette raison, il y a l’être projeté et l’être désiré, comme il y a l’être imaginé et même l’être rêvé ; et il y a encore l’être actuel et l’être virtuel et l’être à effectuer. Et puis il y a l’être qui doit être en vertu de l’obligation et que l’on doit désigner comme l’être déontique, qui est celui du droit et de la morale, et qui doivent être chacun selon une certaine modalité de devoir, car le devoir-être du droit n’est pas le devoir-être de la morale, ni le devoir-être des probabilités, ni le devoir-être des nécessités comme celui des phénomènes naturels… Ainsi, peuvent se lever nombre de contradictions ou d’impossibilités déjà rencontrées. Au sein de tout ce qui relève du droit, on peut distinguer divers éléments qui n’ont pas exactement le même statut ontologique. Certains éléments sont ontologiquement nécessaires au droit, tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas et permettent des variations : il est nécessaire, par exemple, qu’il y ait une communication entre les émetteurs des normes et leurs destinataires, et il est nécessaire que le droit comporte des obligations. Mais il n’est pas nécessaire, en ce sens, qu’il y ait un code civil ou une constitution en la forme, puisque certains ordres juridiques peuvent s’en passer, spécialement ceux qui pratiquent surtout le common law. Et puis, au sein des éléments en la forme non nécessaires, s’ils existent, il peut se trouver parmi eux des éléments plus particuliers qui, autrement identifiés, s’avèrent nécessaires. Ainsi, tel article d’une loi qui institue une taxe n’est pas nécessaire au sens ontologique, car le législateur aurait pu adopter
374 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit un autre dispositif ; mais cette loi, pour s’imposer comme norme juridique, doit comporter ce qui est radicalement spécifique au droit (et à la morale), l’obligation, laquelle comporte elle aussi une multitude de figures, bien plus diversifiées que ne le laisse penser la classique trilogie « interdire, permettre, prescrire ». Et puis le Code civil ou la Constitution se présentent comme des totalités partielles dont les divers éléments constitutifs n’ont pas tous ce même statut : l’article qui pose la règle selon laquelle l’auteur fautif d’un dommage est tenu de le réparer jouit intégralement, en tant qu’énoncé et tel qu’il est en sa forme, de la plénitude de l’être réel, factuel et présent, dans l’ordre du droit. Mais au sein de cette règle, il y a un élément d’être spécifique qui tient au fait que l’obligation énoncée, qui existe déjà factuellement, tend à imposer un résultat qui n’est pas encore actuel ni présent, car rien n’assure effectivement, au moment où est prononcée, qu’elle sera obéie. Cependant l’obligation est réelle et actuelle, mais son objectif n’est pas effectivement réalisé, selon les modalités que la règle a prévues : il doit être. C’est la toute la spécificité de cette modalité d’être, propre au droit et à la morale, que l’on peut appeler la modalité d’être déontique. De telles constatations permettent de rattacher à l’Être les divers éléments constitutifs du droit (la norme, l’acte qui applique la norme, son effet escompté, qui n’est pas actuel mais qui doit le devenir, alors que l’attente est actuelle), en sorte que chacun jouisse d’un statut d’être différencié. Elles expliquent également que le noyau dur de l’énoncé juridique soumis à une réduction éïdétique, réside dans l’obligation. Mais l’obligation elle-même doit subir cette analyse qui distingue entre d’une part, l’énoncé de l’obligation, qui est réel, actuel et effectif, et d’autre part le résultat escompté de l’obligation, dont l’effectuation reste hypothétique même si elle est probable. On touche ici à ce qui constitue ultimement le droit en tant qu’il est spécifique par rapport aux autres éléments et modalités de l’être : l’obligation existe bien en droit et en fait ; mais à proprement parler, si elle oblige à quelque chose, le résultat escompté n’est pas actuel tant que l’obligation n’est pas exécutée et que l’élément d’être qu’elle escomptait réaliser ne l’est pas encore. Cette approche épistémologique et cette analyse ontologique permettent de mieux comprendre la question croisée plus haut : comment concevoir que le droit puisse devoir se référer au fait, s’imprégner de fait et le cas échéant s’y soumettre pour rendre compte de ce qu’il est essentiellement : spécialement, comment les documents de présentation du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle œuvrent ils en droit ?
II. LE FAIT CONTRIBUE NÉCESSAIREMENT À LA FORMATION DU DROIT C’est une conviction généralement partagée selon laquelle les documents de présentation peuvent exercer une certaine influence – voire une influence
375 Étienne Picard certaine – sur le droit décidé par les autorités compétentes, bien qu’ils soient postérieurs à la rédaction même des projets de loi, qui vont les inspirer. Mais une telle reconnaissance, surtout assortie de cette conviction, ne cadre pas du tout avec la posture théorique et à la fois dogmatique, assez largement partagée malgré cela, selon laquelle le droit est étanche au fait. La chose est donc admise, sans explication, un peu comme une sorte d’exception de pur fait à la vérité fondamentale selon laquelle le fait n’interfère pas avec le droit. Or, selon nous, il ne s’agit pas d’une exception à cette vérité : il s’agit d’une manifestation de cette donnée fondamentale selon laquelle le droit ne se détermine pas sans égard aux faits et ne le doit pas, en aucun cas. Rien n’est inconditionnel en droit, même la norme suprême dont la validité – c’est-à-dire, en ce sens spécial, sa prétention à se poser comme une norme – exige qu’elle soit rattachable à un ordre juridique généralement obéi. Les faits, comme ceux qui sont invoqués par ces documents de présentation du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle, jouent un rôle essentiel et nécessaire pour la détermination du droit. Celui-ci ne peut pas les tenir comme des données indifférentes dans la mesure où ils contribuent fortement, même dans un système de droit qui se veut fondé sur l’exclusive Volonté d’un organe, à déterminer le sens de ce droit et de ses normes. Cela s’observe d’abord à propos de la détermination des fondements et des buts d’une telle révision constitutionnelle, et ensuite relativement à ses objets et ses procédés.
II.1. LE RÔLE DES FAITS DANS LA DÉTERMINATION DES FONDEMENTS OU DES BUTS DU PROJET DE LOI DE RÉVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE On aurait pu penser que les documents étudiés, opérant sous l’empire de cette dichotomie postulée entre le fait et le droit, s’attacheraient à rendre compte en droit de ce projet de révision constitutionnelle présentée au Parlement. Dans l’esprit imposé par cette dichotomie, les documents auraient pu et auraient dû n’invoquer que le seul fondement juridique possible en l’espèce, eu égard à la nature de la norme projetée, qui n’était autre que la souveraineté du constituant (secondaire ou dérivé). Or, en fait, ils ne l’ont pas fait, alors que le droit pouvait ou aurait dû, s’ils s’en étaient tenus à la stricte séparation postulée entre le fait et le droit, les conduire à ne retenir que des arguments de droit. Le droit, parce qu’ici souverain, avait atteint ses limites quant à la détermination de ses fondements : il ne pouvait plus trouver des fondements juridiques en dehors de lui-même. Ainsi, pour démontrer l’intérêt et la valeur de ce projet constitutionnel, les auteurs des documents, et spécialement le Conseil d’Etat dans son avis sur le projet, n’ont avancé que des arguments de pur fait.
376 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit Ils ont donc fait appel, pour jus-tifier le projet, à « la légitimité » de la réforme, dont cependant la vérification n’est pas assurée objectivement ; ils en ont même affirmé, de façon encore plus factuelle, son « opportunité », jugement de valeur entièrement dérivé des faits et des circonstances ; ils ont invoqué « les aspirations des citoyens, » et même le « ressenti des Français », n’hésitant pas à faire état de leurs « sensibilités diverses », pour justifier « la dose de proportionnalité » que le projet entend introduire en matière électorale. Les « valeurs », que naguère chaque juriste se gardait bien d’invoquer dans tous débats de droit ont même été sollicitées pour présenter et fonder le projet, alors qu’elles pouvaient n’être tenues que pour des données quasi-sentimentales et donc subjectives, en tout cas a-juridiques, selon le droit conçu traditionnellement par l’opinion juridique dominante. Certes, les valeurs mises en avant pour justifier le projet ont été la « démocratie » et la « justice », ce qui rapproche du droit les fondements de cette future norme constitutionnelle. Mais on aura observé que la démocratie, notion si malmenée dans la langue ordinaire ou dans celles plus savantes du droit ou de la science politique, n’est pas autrement définie par les documents en cause, ni même considérée comme une notion juridique, alors qu’elle pourrait l’être. Pas plus que la notion de « justice » qui n’était même jamais appréhendée comme telle, directement et sans médiation, depuis que la loi a été chargée, à titre exclusif, de la servir ou de la dicter selon ce qu’elle en pense. Il faut ici montrer quels sont les effets sur le droit qu’emportent ces façons de raisonner et de procéder. Dans la conception classique du droit telle que le corpus doctrinal du droit public l’a soutenue pendant un siècle ou deux, le service des valeurs pouvait trouver sa place en droit, mais simplement et silencieusement dans le cadre des textes, comme objectif possible et discret des normes de droit positif : ces valeurs dépendaient donc entièrement des règles de droit positif ; elles ne présentaient pas de consistance ni de portée autonomes pour s’imposer au droit ou en droit : elles n’entraient dans le droit que sous le couvert de la loi, voire du règlement. Et, évidemment, leur respect n’était pas un critère de validité ou de rectitude normative des normes en cause. Ces valeurs n’avaient que la valeur de la loi qui les portait le cas échéant, sans qu’il fût nécessaire qu’elle s’y référât expressément : elles devaient découler du droit positif mais non d’instances extérieures au droit auquel elles se seraient imposées. Or, voilà que suivant l’exemple du juge administratif qui le cas échéant les invoque entre autres normes sociales (comme le « vivre-ensemble »), pour justifier telles décisions de police, il est admis que ces valeurs puissent provenir d’instances assez insaisissables, généralement extérieures au monde organique du droit. Or ici, dans les textes de présentation du projet, les valeurs sont placées au fondement de la norme constitutionnelle projetée, puisqu’elles sont invoquées pour justifier sa révision, en sorte que l’inversion des facteurs est totale : au lieu d’être traitées comme un objectif visé par des règles de droit qui s’y référerait, elles sont postulées comme étant non seulement autonomes, par rapport au droit positif, mais
377 Étienne Picard comme le fondement même des règles constitutionnelles. Cela implique qu’elles ne peuvent être soumises à aucun contrôle, puisqu’elles se tiennent à l’origine de l’origine constitutionnelle elle-même. A moins que le contrôle ne soit que factuel, opéré par exemple par les médias. Cela implique aussi, par conséquent, que les normes constitutionnelles peuvent être soumises à une appréciation au regard de ces valeurs désormais autonomes. La révolution s’avère considérable. Toutefois, ce fait ne serait pas trop sujet à inquiétudes et pourrait même être approuvé si le mode de détermination de ces valeurs était lui-même soumis au droit, ce qui n’est pas le cas actuellement où un foisonnement de valeurs désordonnées envahit tous les champs, les confondant d’ailleurs, pour leur imposer des normativités que personne ne domine si ce n’est peut-être ceux qui les proclament, sans chercher à les fonder autrement, spécialement sur un corpus que l’on pourrait désigner comme le droit fondamental, ce droit des règles du droit qui ordonne ontologiquement au droit. Plus encore, tout l’esprit du discours de ces présentations tend à imposer cette idée que ce n’est pas seulement le contenu de la norme à venir qui doit s’inspirer à ces valeurs, mais que ce sont ces valeurs postulées comme étant au fondement de la norme projetée qui contribuent à assurer la normativité même de cette norme, celle-ci portant en elle, pour le reste de son existence et par son exemplarité à l’égard de toutes autres normes, cette conviction que ce sont ces valeurs qui directement font le droit et sa normativité. Tout cela est vrai mais ne serait juste que si ces valeurs étaient vérifiées d’une manière quelque peu formalisée. Ce phénomène est en cours d’amplification depuis l’émergence de ces droits fondamentaux, dont la fondamentalité même, affirmée aussitôt qu’est reconnu le droit en cause, sans autre forme de procès, suffit à impliquer leur nécessaire normativité, sans que celle-ci soit soumise à l’appréciation du constituant, le juge se portant garant de la caution que ne manquera pas de lui apporter, à l’occasion mais après coup, l’organe compétent. Cet état de chose revient à rappeler que, dans l’esprit public, ces normes ou ces droits ne sont pas fondamentaux parce que constitutionnels, mais constitutionnels parce que fondamentaux. Ainsi, un droit ou une norme n’est pas constitutionnel parce qu’inscrit dans la Constitution, mais parce qu’il ou elle mériterait de l’être, le critère de ce mérite restant assez insaisissable en l’état. Cela constitue une inversion radicale des facteurs de production du droit tels que le corpus doctrinal d’antan les concevait et qui mériterait une autre conception du droit que celle qui coupe le fait du droit pour tenir celui-ci dans sa fantasmatique et pure tour d’ivoire. Naturellement, les tenants de l’ordre classique se lèvent vent debout contre une telle évolution. Ils n’ont pas tort de protester pour maintenir l’ordre classique. Mais leur discours, non normatif selon leurs propres critères, s’efforce de contribuer à la confortation d’un ordre juridique et d’une conception du droit qui se trouve en réalité en déroute. Car, à la vérité, quoi de plus normal que ce soit le fond des choses qui gouverne in fine leur forme, quoi de plus normal que ce soit la
378 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit normalité objective de quelque chose, c’est à dire sa normativité substantielle, qui détermine sa normativité formelle. Mais il faudrait le reconnaître et le construire juridiquement, théoriquement et pratiquement. Les différents documents s’attachent ensuite à recenser les buts et à expliquer les intentions prêtées à un constituant qui, par hypothèse, ne s’est pas encore prononcé sur le projet. En fait, il s’agit des buts et des intentions des autorités exécutives qui ont déposé le projet sur le bureau de l’Assemblée nationale. La fiction endogène, c’est-à-dire interne au droit, est ici certaine. Là encore, la détermination de ces buts et de ces intentions se fait hors du droit, de manière essentiellement factuelle, car les concepts en cause ne sont pas juridiques selon la conception en cause, et d’ailleurs restent souvent très flous ou savamment incertains. Mais ils se voient assigner cette fonction consistant à justifier de plus fort le projet constitutionnel, comme si un projet, et non ses auteurs, pouvait avoir lui-même une intention. Quoi qu’il en soit, les documents analysés se réfèrent à une assez vaste pluralité de finalités. Il s’agit pour commencer d’assurer « le renouveau de la démocratie », formule qui constitue le titre même du projet de loi. Et cette thématique se décline en plusieurs autres finalités, comme « la revitalisation de la démocratie », « la démocratie citoyenne », ou « la démocratie participative », « la proximité », « la décentralisation », « l’indépendance de la justice, qui se surajoute plus qu’elle ne s’insère dans ce projet de renouvellement de la démocratie. Il est facile d’observer que si la démocratie n’est ici toujours pas caractérisée ni définie (mais simplement qualifiée par tel ou tel adjectif), son « renouveau » ou sa « revitalisation » le sont encore moins, parce qu’elles ne sont pas des notions juridiques et ne présentent pas de contenu définissable a priori, sauf à postuler que constitue un renouveau ou une revitalisation tout ce que le projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle entend poser de nouveau par rapport au droit existant, ce qui serait une manière de faire barrage à toute appréciation critique, puisque ces notions seraient alors purement positives : tout ce que le droit positif tiendrait pour un « renouveau » serait tenu pour un renouveau… ! Mais alors on s’aperçoit combien la présentation du projet, qui entend pourtant se placer sur le terrain des faits, comporte néanmoins une dimension fortement juridique, voire normative, car sans que cela soit toujours imputable à ce futur texte constitutionnel, elle altère d’ores et déjà la réalité actuelle des institutions en cause. En effet, se faire fort de tendre à « la revitalisation » de la démocratie qui constitue le but majeur de la réforme implique nécessairement que la forme représentative qu’elle revêt aujourd’hui est sinon moribonde du moins dépassée – ce que ne dit pas exactement le projet lui-même qui se contente d’ajouter du nouveau à l’existant, sans porter ouvertement un jugement de valeur sur l’un ou l’autre, même si les mots en cause sont par eux-mêmes mélioratifs. Au demeurant le texte du projet constitutionnel a bien du mal à se dégager lui-même des cadres intellectuels dans lesquels se situent les notions en cause. Car, pour définir « la
379 Étienne Picard démocratie participative » et plus spécialement le nouveau « Conseil de la participation citoyenne », le texte ne peut pas s’empêcher d’énoncer que ce conseil « représente » les citoyens, ce qui atteste la difficulté de se défaire des concepts anciens, lesquels jouissent d’une extraordinaire rémanence en dépit des intentions, car ce sont bien des faits, linguistiques et conceptuels, qui l’imposent. De même, rattacher à la décentralisation les « aspirations » nouvelles à « la proximité » n’est possible qu’en affectant le sens de cette notion de décentralisation, ce que fait le projet mais ce que les auteurs des documents de présentation de ce projet ne soulignent pas, mais ratifient implicitement. En effet, la décentralisation, notion pleinement juridique, ne laisse place à la « participation » ou à « la proximité » que si l’on change le sens qu’elle présentait traditionnellement depuis des décennies : la décentralisation était essentiellement destinée à éloigner du centre les lieux administratifs de décision ou de gestion ; tandis qu’invoquée sous l’égide de la proximité elle devrait tendre à rapprocher ces centres des lieux périphériques où vivent les sujets de droit concernés, désignés ici, pour les besoins de la cause, comme « citoyens ». Mais l’usage constant et exclusif de ce vocable de « citoyen », dans ce texte comme dans d’autres, quel que soit son « impact » avantageux en termes de « communication », est de nature à emporter certaines confusions conceptuelles, à propos de ce mot notamment. A moins, tout au contraire, que l’usage de ces mots entendent emporter des novations conceptuelles et constitutionnelles. Dans les deux cas, on voit combien le fait des présentations du projet constitutionnel opère dans le droit et l’affecte. En effet, le « citoyen » ou mieux les citoyens (car la citoyenneté est toujours une co-citoyenneté) se caractérisent juridiquement, en tant que tels, par certains droits qui leur sont spécifiques, les droits civiques, qui les investissent plutôt, fondamentalement, d’une fonction de co-souveraineté. Mais ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a vote et élection que toute procédure de cet ordre relève de la citoyenneté. Celle-ci s’exerce essentiellement au plan de la souveraineté au sein de l’Etat. Et ce n’est que par l’effet malheureux d’une inflation de l’usage du mot que l’on pourrait concevoir que la souveraineté s’exercerait au sein des collectivités territoriales décentralisées. Au sens classique strict, il ne peut y avoir exercice de la souveraineté au sein de collectivités qui ne sont pas souveraines. La « participation » et la « démocratie participative » ne s’exercent ici qu’au sein de collectivités locales, qui ne sont donc pas souveraines. La citoyenneté invoquée s’analyse ainsi comme une simple participation à des pouvoirs administratifs de gestion locale. Mais l’insistance avec laquelle le mot citoyenneté est utilisé tend peut-être à faire émerger l’idée que ces pouvoirs pourraient toucher à la souveraineté, ce qui ne serait toutefois pas très prudent tant une propension centrifuge domine ces questions. Et puis la démocratie participative des citoyens n’est pas le seul but de cette politique de « proximité » : il s’agit aussi de faciliter l’exercice d’un grand nombre de droits qui ne le permettent pas lorsque le lieu de leur exercice se trouve par trop
380 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit éloigné du lieu de vie ou de travail des intéressés, pris cette fois en tant que sujets de droits. Or ces sujets de droits se caractérisent quant à eux par l’exercice de droits subjectifs. Et les droits civiques dont la reconnaissance ou l’attribution identifie le citoyen ne permettent certainement pas par eux-mêmes l’exercice de ces droits subjectifs. On ne peut donc assimiler ces différents types de droits en une même catégorie. On ne peux pas davantage fondre leurs titulaires en une même et unique catégorie. Et ces catégories ne peuvent pas non plus accueillir d’autres droits dont les titulaires sont les ayants-droits à des prestations fournies par les services publics, dont ils sont usagers. Toutes ces catégories ne sont certainement pas substituables les unes aux autres, même si elles peuvent se recouper, comme c’est le cas le plus fréquent, au profit des personnes qui possèdent les trois qualités. Dans l’ordre juridique français, les citoyens ne constituent donc qu’une catégorie des titulaires de droits ; et tous les titulaires de droits ne sont pas nécessairement citoyens, dont la qualité est réservée à telles catégories de personnes identifiées en droit ; l’utilisation quasi-exclusive de ce mot, appliqué à tous au lieu de la plupart seulement et cette propension à regrouper tous ces droits en une seule catégorie brouille toutes les notions et n’est certainement pas neutre juridiquement. Elle renoue avec les travers du « droit-de-l’hommisme » qui en les instituant partout lui-même, nuit à ces droits plus qu’il ne leur profite, et entretient des confusions sur ces notions essentielles. Mais cette propension qui se veut flatteuse n’est nullement récente. Le législateur lui-même affectionne abusivement ce terme, spécialement avec cette loi du 12 avril 2000 sur « les droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avec les administrations » qui précise, dès ses premiers articles, qu’elle ne s’applique pas qu’aux citoyens mais à « toute personne » se trouvant en relation avec ces administrations. Mais il se pourrait, sur certaines bases renouvelées, que les frontières entre ces catégories soient adéquatement remises en cause. Et cette possible novation serait alors initiée par l’effet de simples pratiques langagières qui trouveraient ensuite leurs raisons d’être. Ainsi, par le choix des mots, les documents de présentation des textes, comme les textes eux-mêmes peuvent affecter la substance des concepts que ces mots désignent. Ils peuvent donc entraîner, selon le cas, des erreurs ou des novations juridiques, ici de portée constitutionnelle. Là encore, on voit combien le fait d’un simple jugement de valeur non normatif peut exercer un effet indéniable sur le droit positif en conférant un sens nouveau ou renouvelé aux concepts qu’il véhicule ; mais l’absence de critique, par le Conseil d’Etat et a fortiori des autres documents, de l’usage de ce mot peut aussi contribuer à aggraver les confusions ou à faire admettre des évolutions conséquentes. Des effets analogues se produisent concernant les objets et les procédés normatifs évoqués par le projet analysé par ces documents de présentation.
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II.2. LE RÔLE DES FAITS POUR LA DÉTERMINATION DES OBJETS ET DES PROCÉDÉS NORMATIFS EN CAUSE DANS LE PROJET DE LOI DE RÉVISION CONSTITUTIONNELLE Le projet de loi de révision de la Constitution confère à celle-ci des objets et des moyens relativement nouveaux mais dont la juridicité est cependant mal assurée, quelque fois. Or, ce qui intéresse notre propos réside dans la façon dont les textes de présentation traitent ces objets et ces moyens pour les faire advenir comme objets juridiques, en leur donnant du corps et de la portée. Le projet apporte des révisions significatives quant à ces objets, mais les documents de présentation du projet jouent un rôle nécessaire, soit en ratifiant certaines novations apportées par le projet, soit en préconisant de les modifier. Cela se produit de façon très nette, mais pas toujours, à propos de certains mots ou notions auxquels le projet se réfère, comme celles de « pouvoirs publics territoriaux », de « questions de société », de « société civile », de « différenciation territoriale ». Pour ne prendre que quelques exemples, le mot de « territoires », qui a commencé à perdre son sens lors des dernières réformes de l’organisation territoriale (qui prétendaient au contraire lui en conférer !), se trouve un peu plus affecté par le projet et, de fait, par l’absence de critique de la part du Conseil d’Etat dans l’avis qu’il a rendu sur ce point. Le mot « territoires », surtout au pluriel, tend à désigner, dans la langue juridique, non pas tant des territoires au sens matériel ou physique du terme, mais des territoires au sens d’objet et source de compétences des « collectivités territoriales », dont le nom paraît avoir cessé de plaire. Mais cet adjectif, attaché à celui de collectivité, conserve ou devrait conserver tout son sens et sa portée dès lors que cette qualité « territoriale » confère aux collectivités ainsi qualifiées d’une part le pouvoir de lever des impôts, ce à quoi ne sont pas habilités par eux-mêmes les territoires, ni les entités non territoriales, et d’autre part leur reconnaît une clause de compétence générale sur toutes les affaires considérées comme locales, dont ne jouissent pas les autres organes administratifs qui ne disposent le cas échéant que d’un pouvoir normatif spécialisé, comme les établissements publics. Les collectivités territoriales ne sont donc nullement réductibles à des territoires, qui ne constituent que le cadre géographique et l’objet même de leurs compétences. Et la notion de « territoires » n’est pas davantage extensible à celle de collectivités territoriales. Par ailleurs, ces dernières n’ont pas qu’un territoire, mais aussi et surtout une population, qui se trouve étonnamment gommée par cette nouvelle désignation réductrice, déjà très installée dans les esprits. Surtout, lorsqu’il s’agit d’instaurer une « démocratie participative », ce ne sont pas à l’évidence les territoires qui l’exerceront, ce qui n’aurait aucun sens, mais bien les personnes humaines relevant de ces collectivités. Il est regrettable que l’avis du Conseil d’Etat n’ait pas profité de cette occasion pour redresser un travers linguistique et donc conceptuel qui contamine désormais le plan constitutionnel. Et puis ces collectivités territoriales ne sont pas constituées que de
382 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit leur territoire et de leur population, mais aussi d’une administration compétente pour servir cette population et gérer les affaires locales. Or, ne pas réagir contre ces dérives verbales tend à obscurcir dans l’esprit public ce que peuvent bien être un territoire ou une collectivité territoriale, d’autant qu’il se produit un enchaînement des obscurités et des confusions qui, à ne pas être dénoncées au moment de la préparation du projet, s’enkysteront au niveau constitutionnel. Les désordres conceptuels se propagent donc à d’autres notions. Ainsi, l’article 11 de la Constitution, dans sa nouvelle rédaction projetée et bien accueillie par l’avis du Conseil d’Etat, dispose que « le Président de la République peut soumettre à référendum tout projet de loi portant sur l’organisation des pouvoirs publics nationaux ou territoriaux ». Cette rédaction, qui différencie le national et le territorial, implique nécessairement que ces « pouvoirs publics territoriaux » ne pourraient être que locaux. Or, dans notre tradition constitutionnelle, les « pouvoirs publics » n’ont jamais été « territoriaux » au sens local du terme : les pouvoirs publics ont toujours été seulement étatiques (plus que « nationaux »), l’Etat constituant bien, lui aussi, une collectivité territoriale (puisqu’il a également un territoire, une population et des organes gouvernementaux). Instituer au sein d’un Etat unitaire cette notion de « pouvoirs publics territoriaux » au sens de pouvoirs publics locaux confine à la création d’un monstre juridique lorsque l’on se rappelle que l’une de ces collectivités locales s’est précisément, en 1871 et pour deux mois, auto-proclamée, de façon insurrectionnelle, en Commune libre, ce qui voulait dire, selon elle, souveraine… Elle était alors, à elle toute seule, une sorte de « pouvoir public ». Dans l’hypothèse inverse d’une dissolution illégale de l’Assemblée nationale, la loi Tréveneuc du 15 février 1872, toujours en vigueur, prévoit que les conseils départementaux s’assemblent immédiatement pour assurer le maintien de l’ordre public, tandis que leurs délégués, à raison de deux par département, constituent une « assemblée des délégués » compétente pour édicter toute mesure nécessaire au rétablissement de l’Assemblée nationale et de ses pouvoirs, et pour pourvoir provisoirement à l’administration générale du pays. Et, là encore, mais cette fois légalement, les collectivités territoriales, départementales en l’espèce, peuvent jouer un rôle relevant des compétences des pouvoirs publics proprement dits, mais par l’effet d’une exceptionnelle substitution légale. Ces deux hypothèses attestent bien, l’une en violation du droit, l’autre conformément à la loi, que les pouvoirs publics ne sont normalement pas « territoriaux » au sens des collectivités territoriales locales, et que ce n’est que par une très hypothétique exception, assez strictement encadrée, que les collectivités départementales peuvent suppléer à l’incapacité des pouvoirs publics étatiques de rétablir eux-mêmes l’ordre républicain. On peut regretter que le Conseil d’Etat n’ait pas saisi cette occasion pour rappeler aux « pouvoirs publics » (et à ceux qui n’ont pas cette qualité), dans un énoncé certes consultatif mais tout de même appelé à une vocation constitutionnelle, qu’ils ont
383 Étienne Picard le monopole de l’organisation politique de la République et de ses institutions, sauf situation tout à fait exceptionnelle prévue par la loi tendant elle-même au rétablissement de l’ordre républicain et de ses pouvoirs publics. Et, s’il s’agissait de reconnaître que les collectivités territoriales participent bien de la République, il suffirait de souligner qu’elles exercent bien une part de la puissance publique de la République, autant dans l’ordre normatif que dans l’ordre coercitif, sans que cette « puissance publique » (dont personne ne songe à rappeler que les collectivités territoriales locales peuvent l’exercer) servent les mêmes compétences que celle de ces « pouvoirs publics ». Une autre manifestation de ce pouvoir dont jouissent les textes de présentation du projet constitutionnel s’observe à propos de cette notion de « questions de société ». La formule, dont l’origine est simplement politique et médiatique, apparaît dans les modifications projetées de l’article 11 de la Constitution, et, par référence à ce denier article, dans celles de l’article 69 qui tendent à étendre à ces « questions de société » le champ d’application des sortes de référendums prévus par ces deux articles. L’avis du Conseil d’Etat observe immédiatement que cette notion ne correspond pas à une catégorie juridique établie, mais que, comportant cet effet de détermination du champ d’application de ces référendums, il est nécessaire d’en identifier la teneur et les limites, pour en faire une catégorie ou au moins une notion juridique. L’avis se garde bien, toutefois, de poser lui-même cette définition, estimant que le Conseil constitutionnel, dans son rôle de juge de la régularité des opérations de référendum, sera certainement conduit à apprécier la constitutionnalité des décrets convoquant les électeurs à prendre part à un référendum portant ou prétendant porter sur de telles questions. Mais l’avis du Conseil d’Etat procède néanmoins à un début d’éclaircissement général de cette notion, mais de pur fait, puisqu’aucune autorité normative qui aurait reçu compétence à cet effet ne l’a exercée. L’avis ne procède pas à une caractérisation générale et abstraite de la notion, mais à des illustrations ponctuelles de ce à quoi elle pourrait correspondre. Il ne nous appartient pas ici de discuter de la valeur de cette démarche plus illustrative qu’essentialiste, ni de son résultat, mais d’observer que le Conseil d’Etat n’objecte rien à l’utilisation de cette notion par le projet de texte constitutionnel, alors qu’elle est vraiment très incertaine dans son principe même, comme dans ses possibles applications, et sera certainement source de contentieux. Il estime ainsi que la défectuosité de ce concept ne constitue pas un obstacle insurmontable à son insertion dans un texte constitutionnel dont la netteté et la certitude devraient cependant représenter ses nécessaires qualités, alors qu’ailleurs il ne manque pas de recommander la suppression, dans les textes qu’il est chargé d’examiner, des vocables trop indéterminés. On doit surtout relever que cet avis, qui ne fait que recueillir une possible convergence d’opinions sur cette question, purement factuelles, commence à donner
384 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit du corps à cette notion en orientant son inspiration, en l’illustrant concrètement, en favorisant la perspective de sa détermination : il participe ainsi très activement à cette jurislogie dont la fonction est précisément de produire substantiellement des concepts et des normes juridiques. Et, dans cette jurislogie, on ne peut ici que reconnaître la part essentielle qu’y joue le Conseil d’Etat eu égard à son magistère intellectuel et juridique. Les développements de son avis sur cette notion n’ont pas par eux-mêmes de portée immédiatement normative, mais ils en balisent les limites et dessinent des axes de fond propres à contribuer peu à peu sa détermination. En tout cas, on voit jusqu’à quel point c’est le fait qui ici détermine le droit ou même admet sa relative indétermination en cherchant à la préciser. On pourrait procéder à des constats similaires en considérant ces autres notions mentionnées par le texte du projet ou évoquées par son commentaire, et aussi plus ou moins incertaines comme celle de « société civile » (comment la société pourrait-elle ne pas être « civile » ?) ou celle plus charpentée, de « différenciation territoriale ». Cette dernière notion, que ratifie et analyse l’avis du Conseil d’Etat, n’est finalement qu’une implication substantiellement nécessaire du principe d’égalité et donc de ses exceptions ou limites jouant à l’intérieur même des catégories. Jusqu’alors, la Constitution faisait de ces catégories des blocs dont tous les éléments devaient rester identiques, de manière intouchable, d’une collectivité à une autre. Au contraire, cette « différentiation territoriale », initialement admise en 2003 pour les collectivités d’outre-mer puis proposée par un groupe de travail de l’Assemblée nationale pour s’appliquer aux autres collectivités, autoriserait, en vertu de l’article 72 de la Constitution révisée, que les mêmes catégories de collectivités territoriales puissent, sous certaines réserves, jouir de compétences différenciées. Cette différenciation leur permettrait même de déroger aux normes législatives et réglementaires délimitant ces compétences, éventuellement transférables d’une collectivité à une autre. Commentant ces idées ou ces projets de novation constitutionnelle, comme il l’avait déjà fait dans un important avis du 7 décembre 2017, rendu à la demande du Premier ministre, et auquel il se réfère en 2019 pour consolider sa doctrine, le Conseil d’Etat en est venu à proposer toute une construction convoquant et articulant entre eux les divers grands principes qui gouvernent la matière. Et faisant œuvre tout autant doctrinale que substantiellement normative, il consacre formellement un « principe de cohérence » devant assortir le principe de libre administration des collectivités territoriales, « le principe de subsidiarité », « le principe d’égalité entre les personnes », l’exigence d’une « démocratie locale », son « efficacité », « les besoins de la population et de l’économie ». On a ici une illustration très typique de ce que peut être cette jurislogie qui construit le droit à partir d’une pensée sur les faits, libres ou nécessaires et sur les réflexions que cette pensée suscite.
385 Étienne Picard
On retiendra encore ici deux objets de la révision constitutionnelle et plus spécialement deux procédés normatifs originaux, qui sont en l’espère assez liés : le fait de « favoriser » et l’admission d’une hiérarchie intra-constitutionnelle. Le premier, qui trouve sa manifestation dans le projet d’article 1er de la Constitution, concerne donc le verbe « favoriser » : « La République favorise la préservation de l’environnement, la diversité biologique et l’action contre les changements climatiques », tout comme depuis la loi constitutionnelle du 28 juillet 2008, elle « favorise l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux, ainsi qu’aux responsabilités professionnelles et sociales ». Rappelons que ce verbe avait été choisi, à la place d’autres mots plus précis, afin d’obtenir plus facilement le consentement d’une partie de la majorité, assez divisée sur ce sujet et prête à sacrifier la clarté intellectuelle au profit de la facilité politique. Ce verbe « favoriser » n’appartient pas au vocabulaire juridique classique, si ce n’est pour exprimer la condamnation, au nom du principe d’égalité, de tout « favoritisme ». Or c’est le Conseil d’Etat qui, dans son avis, a demandé que le mot « favorise » soit substitué à celui « d’agir », demande qui a été acceptée par l’exécutif qui est en droit l’auteur du projet de révision constitutionnelle, mais non bien sûr de la révision. Cette substitution est extrêmement importante au regard de la doctrine classique des procédés normatifs. On ne concevrait pas qu’un jury reçoive l’ordre de favoriser telle catégorie de candidats, encore que la discrimination positive, qui procède autrement, revient pratiquement à cela. On ne concevrait pas non plus qu’un conseil municipal soit habilité à favoriser, par ses subventions, tel courant d’expression politique, religieux, social, ou philosophique. Certes, le mot « agit », qui figurait initialement dans le projet, eût été plus conforme à l’esprit dans lequel le titulaire d’une compétence doit en toute neutralité l’exercer, bien que ce mot soit un peu plat ou lisse et n’emporte pas très explicitement quelque encouragement d’aller dans tel ou tel sens qui serait adressé à telle autorité normative. Le mot « favorise » et l’objet de cette faveur, comportent une certaine invitation, sinon une injonction, qui renforce la portée de la proclamation de certains principes, tirés de la Charte de l’environnement et dont l’objet est analogue à ceux de cet article 1er. Or il y a là une autre novation, introduite par un organe consultatif qui dans le cadre de ses fonctions exerce une sorte de pouvoir normatif factuel consistant à instaurer en substance une obligation à la charge de la République, là où la Constitution institue au profit des autorités publiques des prérogatives plutôt que des obligations. Cependant, on notera que cette injonction atténue considérablement sa force dès lors qu’elle n’est pas adressée à telle autorité normative, mais simplement, si l’on peut dire, à « la République », qui n’est pas une autorité normative, bien qu’elle en comporte en son sein un grand nombre. Il reste par ailleurs que favoriser quelque chose au détriment d’autre chose postule qu’il existe une hiérarchie au profit de l’une de ces choses. Or, comme l’une
386 Les présentations officielles du projet de loi de révision constitutionnelle « Pour un renouveau de la vie démocratique » : ou comment le non-droit produit du droit et l’autre de ces choses constituent des principes constitutionnels, cela implique nécessairement qu’il existe, au sein même de la Constitution une hiérarchie des normes. Naturellement, cette hiérarchie intra-constitutionnelle n’est pas proclamée comme telle et continue d’être niée farouchement par les tenants de l’ordre positif que l’on est bien obligé de qualifier d’ancien. Il est surtout absolument remarquable que le constituant n’aura pas, expressis verbis, posé le principe d’une telle hiérarchie (contrairement à la doctrine du droit public classique qui ne l’admet pas), mais que celle-ci se sera imposé d’elle-même, à partir de la préconisation de certains mots plutôt que d’autres et de la construction à laquelle leur choix a conduit. Les faits, et parmi eux le discours que l’on tient sur ces faits autant que sur le droit positif, travaillent ainsi à l’élaboration de leur objet, et à sa réécriture constante, que les autorités normatives formelles consentent de plus en plus à ratifier. Cette tendance montre qu’il se produit comme un déplacement des sources fondamentales du droit, que le discours perpétuel de la jurislogie, désormais plus audible mais qui pourrait l’être bien davantage encore, cesse d’imputer à une mythique Volonté, sans réelle volonté et sans parole crédible : ces sources passent des autorités formellement compétentes pour se retrouver du côté de eux qui, en parlant du droit, le conçoivent et le façonnent et le déterminent : ce n’est plus tant la forme normative qui arrête souverainement des contenus ; ce sont bien davantage des substances nécessaires qui portent par elles-mêmes et en elles-mêmes leur force normative en cela qu’elles reposent sur des objectivités normatives autrement plus impératives que des formes légales et même constitutionnelles. Ce peut être là un véritable avenir pour la démocratie de fond, celle qui transcende la démocratie représentative et la démocratie participative, tout en les inspirant.
387 Joêl Rideau Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
LE PRINCIPE DÉMOCRATIQUE DANS LES TRAITÉS DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE
Prof. ém. Dr. Joêl Rideau Université de la Côte d’Azur (Nice France) Membre honoraire de l’Institut universitaire de France INTRODUCTION Les inscriptions de la démocratie comme l’un des fondements de l’Union européenne dans le traité sur l’Union européenne, modifié par le traité d’Amsterdam, (art. 6 TUE), puis par le traité de Lisbonne dans le traité sur l’Union européenne, également comme valeur (art. 2 TUE) ont tendu à renforcer l’image de l’Union en la légitimant1. Elle apparaît comme l’une des réponses aux critiques de ce qui a été appelé le déficit démocratique de la construction européenne. Ces critiques ont nourri les résistances apparues dans différents États membres, parfois relayées par les positions adoptées par certains constituants nationaux et certaines cours constitutionnelles, en particulier par la Cour constitutionnelle allemande dont la jurisprudence a parfois influencé – de manière croissante mais à des degrés divers – d’autres États membres2. Dans son arrêt sur le traité de Maastricht, du 12 octobre 19933, la Cour constitutionnelle allemande, en analysant le principe démocratique, a constaté l’absence des conditions nécessaires à l’existence d’une démocratie à l’échelon européen, relevé l’inexistence d’un peuple européen et reconnu au Parlement européen une simple fonction d’appui dans le processus de légitimation démocratique. Elle a considéré que seule comptait vraiment la démocratie sur le plan interne, principalement incarnée par le Bundestag, qui, avec le Gouvernement qu’il contrôle, doit garder le contrôle des affaires externes sans que ses compétences puissent être vidées de leur substance. L’arrêt rendu par la Cour constitutionnelle allemande sur le traité de Lisbonne a sans aucun doute prolongé l’arrêt sur le traité de Maastricht en accentuant cependant les éléments de fermeture que l’on avait pu relever à l’époque du premier4.
1 Castor, C., Le principe démocratique dans le droit de l’Union européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011. 2 Rideau, J., The case-law of the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts on National Identity and the German Model, dans Alejandro, S. A., Llivina, C. A., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2013, p. 243-261. 3 Cour const., 12 octobre 1993, BVerfGE 89, p. 155. 4 Cour const., arrêt du 30 juin 2009, Traité de Lisbonne, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 30 juin 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 et 2 BvR 182/09 : ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009 : publié sur le site internet de la Cour constitutionnelle www.bverfg.de/ entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html. Cité par Reflets 2/2009 : https://curia.europa.eu/ jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-07/fr_2009_reflets2.pdf [Dernier accès 8 janvier 2020].
388 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
Pour la Cour, le principe démocratique est équivalent à un droit fondamental dont la violation peut être mise en cause par un recours constitutionnel (art. 38, § 1, phrase 1 LF Loi Fondamentale, en liaison avec l’article 93, § 1, 4a, LF prévoyant la possibilité de recours constitutionnels). Le droit de vote, qui est la manifestation par excellence du principe démocratique, englobe le droit à l’autodétermination démocratique, le droit à une libre et égale participation à l’autorité de l’État exercée en Allemagne et le droit au respect du principe démocratique incluant le respect du pouvoir constituant du peuple. On aurait pu penser que l’évolution générale de l’Union européenne vers un renforcement démocratique et, en particulier, les apports importants du traité de Lisbonne (extension de la codécision, introduction de la démocratie directe, rôle des parlements nationaux notamment) auraient, sinon supprimé, du moins réduit, les arguments tirés par la Cour du prétendu déficit démocratique de la construction européenne. La Cour a quasiment rejeté la possibilité de l’existence d’une vie démocratique en dehors de l’État. La Cour a affirmé qu’en dépit de l’extension de ses compétences, le Parlement européen n’était pas en mesure, à cause d’un déficit de démocratie structurel existant dans une telle communauté d’États souverains, de combler la lacune de légitimité entre l’étendue des pouvoirs législatifs existants au niveau européen, d’une part, et les droits démocratiques des citoyens des États membres, d’autre part. Selon la Cour, son élection, comparée aux exigences liées à la démocratie dans les États, ne prend pas convenablement en compte l’égalité et son autorité n’est pas en mesure de compenser le déficit d’autorité publique européenne. Le Parlement européen peut simplement accroître le niveau de légitimation de l’Union. En l’absence d’un peuple européen exprimant sa volonté politique dans un État fédéral, les peuples des États membres demeurent, selon la Cour, les détenteurs de l’autorité publique, y compris celle de l’Union. Cette analyse l’a conduite à examiner les pouvoirs du Bundestag au regard de diverses dispositions du traité de Lisbonne. La Cour s’est demandé si ces pouvoirs répondaient aux exigences constitutionnelles résultant de l’article 23, paragraphe 1, LF, jouant non seulement pour les modifications des traités soumises à ratification mais, plus largement, pour tous les types de modifications susceptibles d’intervenir. À la suite de cet examen, elle a déclaré inconstitutionnel l’Acte étendant et renforçant les droits du Bundestag et du Bundesrat dans l’Union européenne comme constituant une violation de l’article 38, paragraphe 1, LF en conjonction avec l’article 23, paragraphe 1, LF dans la mesure où les droits de participation des deux chambres, qu’il prévoyait, ne répondaient pas suffisamment aux exigences constitutionnelles. Elle a donc rendu nécessaire l’adoption le 25 septembre 2009 de la Loi sur la mise en œuvre de la responsabilité du Bundestag et du Bundesrat en matière d’intégration
389 Joêl Rideau dans le cadre de l’Union européenne5. L’accord de l’Allemagne aux actes de l’Union dépend, dans les cas énumérés dans cette loi, de l’approbation du parlement allemand. Certaines décisions ultérieures témoignent de la continuité de la Cour constitutionnelle allemande dans ses réserves à l’égard de la construction européenne. Cette continuité se retrouve dans les limites qu’elle entend faire respecter à l’engagement de l’Allemagne dans cette construction, notamment en se déclarant prête à réagir contre les dépassements de compétences de l’Union européenne (ultra vires) en défendant les pouvoirs du Bundestag et de manière plus large l’identité constitutionnelle allemande. La Cour constitutionnelle s’est prononcée le 6 juillet 20106 sur l’arrêt de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes (CJCE) dans l’affaire Mangold concernant la discrimination fondée sur l’âge. Parfois présentée comme un assouplissement de la position de la Cour constitutionnelle par rapport à son arrêt Lisbonne, la décision reste toutefois dans la ligne de la jurisprudence antérieure en apportant des précisions sur le contrôle des dépassements des compétences par les institutions de l’Union. La Cour a affirmé son droit et son devoir de procéder à ce contrôle. Elle a toutefois souligné la nécessité de coordonner son exercice avec la mission confiée à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) chargée d’assurer l’interprétation et l’application des traités. Le contrôle doit être exercé uniquement dans l’hypothèse où les organes et institutions européens dépassent les limites de leurs compétences de façon suffisamment caractérisée, en cas de modification structurelle notable de l’équilibre des compétences entre l’Union et les États membres au détriment de ces derniers. Le contrôle de l’ultra vires doit être exercé uniquement dans un esprit d’ouverture au droit européen. La Cour de justice de l’Union doit se prononcer sur les questions relevant du droit de l’Union, avant que la Cour constitutionnelle puisse constater l’inapplicabilité du droit de l’Union. Dans une décision de 2012 la Cour constitutionnelle a constaté une violation des droits à l’information du Bundestag en relation avec le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) et le Pacte Euro Plus en témoignant ainsi une nouvelle fois de son souci de protéger les droits du Bundestag7.
5 Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, Bundesgesetzblatt I Nr. 60, Seite 3022), www.bundesgesetzblatt.de. Cité par Reflets 1/2010 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-02/ fr_2010_reflets1.pdf [Dernier accès 8 janvier 2020]. 6 Cour const., ord. du 6 juillet 2010, 2 BvR, Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 Senat), ordonnance du 6 juillet 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Mangold-Urteil EuGH, Honeywell, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. Cité par Reflets 3/10 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-12/fr_2010_ reflets3.pdf [Dernier accès 8 janvier 2020]. 7 Cour const., 19 juin 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, communiqué de presse n° 42/2012 du 19 juin 2012, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg12-042en.html.
390 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
Dans une décision de 20138, la Cour constitutionnelle a très nettement mis en cause une interprétation du champ d’application des droits fondamentaux inscrits dans la Charte (art. 51, § 1), prêtée à la Cour de justice dans l’affaire Åklagaren/Åkerberg Fransson9, en donnant sa propre interprétation restrictive de l’arrêt de la Cour sans vouloir procéder à un renvoi préjudiciel et en évoquant, par un véritable chantage juridique, la menace du contrôle de l’ultra vires et de la mise en œuvre de la défense de l’identité constitutionnelle si son interprétation de l’arrêt n’était pas retenue. La question du dépassement de compétences est à l’origine et au centre du premier renvoi préjudiciel de la Cour constitutionnelle allemande à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne10. La Cour devait se prononcer sur la légalité de la décision prise par le Conseil des gouverneurs de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) d’intervenir massivement sur le marché secondaire de la dette publique afin d’aider les États attaqués par les marchés (programme OMT, opérations monétaires sur titre). La Cour, après avoir nettement pris position dans le sens de l’illégalité de cette décision considérée comme un dépassement de compétences potentiel, a, conformément à sa jurisprudence Honeywell, opéré un renvoi préjudiciel à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. C’est donc après la réponse de la Cour de justice que la Cour constitutionnelle devait statuer et éventuellement se prononcer sur le dépassement de compétences qu’elle semblait décidée à confirmer sous réserve d’une interprétation restrictive par la Cour de justice de la décision de la BCE allant dans le sens de la Cour constitutionnelle. La Cour constitutionnelle a, par la suite, rejeté les recours dirigés contre le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES), le traité budgétaire et les actes nationaux s’y rapportant11. La question avait été séparée de celle de l’OMT par une décision de la Cour du 17 décembre 2013. Elle avait déjà rejeté dans une procédure d’urgence des recours demandant de suspendre la ratification du MES le 12 septembre 2012 sous réserve du respect de certaines conditions12. Elle a constaté en 2014 l’absence de transferts aux institutions de l’Union européenne de pouvoirs mettant en cause
8 Cour const., 24 avril 2013, Data-base Terrorism, 1 BvR 1215/07, communiqué de presse n° 31/2013 du 24 avril 2013, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg13-031en.html. Cité par Reflets, n° 2/2013 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-07/fr_2013_ reflets2.pdf [Dernier accès 8 janvier 2020]. 9 CJUE, Grande chambre, 26 février 2013, Åklagaren contre Hans Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10 REC, EU:C:2013:105, points 27-30. 10 Cour const., 14 janvier 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13, communiqué de presse du 7 février 2014, www.bverfg. de/en/press/bvg14-009en.html, www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1613. 11 Cour const., 18 mars 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12 2 BvR 1824/12, 2 BvE 6/12, communiqué de presse n° 23/2014 du 18 mars 2014, www.bverfg.de/en/press/bvg14-023en.html. 12 Communiqué de presse n° 67/2012 du 12 septembre 2012, www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/ press/bvg12-067en.html.
391 Joêl Rideau la responsabilité budgétaire globale du Bundestag et d’un engagement permanent et irréversible de l’Allemagne concernant sa politique économique. Après l’arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l’affaire Gauweiler e.a.13, la Cour constitutionnelle a rejeté plusieurs recours contre la décision de la BCE relative à un programme d’opérations monétaires sur titres, permettant au Système européen de banques centrales (SEBC) d’acquérir des obligations négociables, plus particulièrement des obligations souveraines d’États membres (programme OMT)14. La Cour a suivi l’interprétation donnée par la CJUE en estimant que le programme OMT, tel qu’encadré par cette dernière, n’excédait pas les attributions de la BCE relatives à la politique monétaire et ne violait pas l’interdiction du financement monétaire des États membres. Elle a néanmoins établi un certain nombre de conditions auxquelles la BCE devrait se conformer dans l’hypothèse de sa participation à la mise en œuvre du programme OMT. Le Bundesverfassungsgericht a rappelé qu’un transfert de droits souverains vers l’Union ne pouvait s’opérer que dans les limites posées par la Constitution allemande, l’étendue de ce transfert étant soumis à son contrôle juridictionnel au regard du droit de vote. Concernant les conséquences d’un acte ultra vires, la Cour constitutionnelle a souligné notamment que les organes constitutionnels allemands étaient tenus de s’opposer activement à de tels actes, en vertu de leur responsabilité en matière d’intégration, afin de garantir que la mise en œuvre du processus de l’intégration européenne ne porte pas atteinte outre mesure au « droit à la démocratie » des citoyens allemands. Dès l’origine il était exclu qu’un État non démocratique puisse devenir membre des Communautés européennes, comme en témoignent, dans des contextes différents, les relations antérieures avec la Grèce, l’Espagne et le Portugal à l’époque des régimes dictatoriaux installés dans ces États. La mention dans les traités de l’objectif d’une élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct devant succéder à la désignation de ses membres par les parlements nationaux, puis la réalisation de cet objectif en 1976, de même que la responsabilité de la Commission devant le Parlement, constituaient également des signes forts. De nombreuses déclarations ou prises de position politiques des institutions ont rappelé en diverses circonstances la prégnance du principe dans la construction européenne. Les révisions successives des traités communautaires, le traité sur l’Union européenne et ses modifications ultérieures par les traités d’Amsterdam et de Nice ont été inspirées de façon croissante par la volonté de réduire les déficits démocratiques du système par l’augmentation des pouvoirs du Parlement européen, notamment par l’introduction du partage avec le Conseil de la décision budgétaire, puis de la codécision législative, par l’accroissement des pouvoirs du Parlement pour
13 CJUE, Gde ch., 16 juillet 2015, Gauweiler e. a., C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400. 14 Bundesverfassungsgericht, arrêt du 21 juin 2016, 2 BvE 13/13 e.a., www.bundesverfassungsgericht. de, cité par Reflets 2/2016, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-11/ reflets-2_2016.pdf [Dernier accès 8 janvier 2020].
392 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne la désignation du président et des membres de la Commission. Les révisions ont en même temps suscité des réflexions relatives au respect des volontés populaires relatives en particulier aux conditions dans lesquelles elles ont été opérées, souvent sans recours à l’organisation de votes référendaires. On a, par ailleurs, mis en cause les conditions dans lesquelles, après l’échec en 2005 du traité établissant une constitution pour l’Europe, a pu être élaboré le traité de Lisbonne reprenant largement les éléments qui figuraient dans le traité rejeté par les référendums français et hollandais de 2005. Cette recherche de la valorisation des éléments démocratiques a aussi concerné les parlements nationaux et a fait l’objet de préoccupations croissantes des auteurs des révisions : d’abord avec les déclarations n° 14 et n° 15 adoptées par la conférence intergouvernementale qui a élaboré le traité de Maastricht, puis avec le protocole sur le rôle des parlements nationaux faisant suite au traité d’Amsterdam repris et développé dans la suite de l’évolution. L’importance croissante des droits fondamentaux et, en particulier, de certains d’entre eux, liés de façon étroite au principe démocratique, comme le principe de transparence15, ainsi que le rôle attribué aux partis politiques (art. 191 TCE) ne peuvent être méconnus dans une appréciation des perspectives démocratiques dans lesquelles s’inscrit l’Union européenne. L’étude de l’évolution des textes, sous la forme de révisions successives concernant notamment le principe démocratique, doit précéder l’examen de la justiciabilité du principe qui a émergé progressivement.
I. LE PRINCIPE DANS L’ÉVOLUTION DES TRAITÉS La référence faite par le traité sur l’Union européenne depuis le traité d’Amsterdam à des fondements a été préparée par de nombreux textes antérieurs et aussi par la jurisprudence. Le Prof. Joël Molinier et ses coauteurs ont énuméré ces étapes préalables à l’occasion desquelles ont été mentionnés les principes qui seront ultérieurement retenus comme principes fondateurs16. Ils dressent la liste d’une première vague de références textuelles : déclaration de la conférence au sommet de Paris du 21 octobre 197217 ; déclaration de la conférence au sommet de Copenhague du 14 décembre 197318 ; rapport de la Commission du 25 juin 1975 sur l’Union européenne19 ; résolution du Parlement du 10 juillet 1975 sur l’Union européenne20. Cette vague a été suivie d’une autre : la déclaration solennelle sur l’Union européenne
15 Voir le lien établi par le Tribunal entre le principe démocratique et la transparence dans TPICE, 7 février 2002, Kuijer/Cons, aff. T-211/00, EU: T:2002:30, § 52. 16 Molinier, J. (éd.), Les principes fondateurs de l’Union européenne, PUF, Paris, 2005 p. 36 et s. 17 Bull. CE octobre 1972, p. 15. 18 Bull. CE décembre 1973, p. 126. 19 Bull. CE 1975, supplément 5/75. 20 JOCE n° C 179, 6 août 1975, p. 28.
393 Joêl Rideau des chefs d’État et de gouvernement de Stuttgart du 19 juin 198321 ; la résolution du Parlement du 14 septembre 1983 relative au projet de traité sur l’Union européenne22 ; le projet de traité du Parlement du 14 février 1984, dit projet Spinelli23. Ces différents textes ne débouchèrent pas dans l’immédiat sur des dispositions de droit positif, même si de nombreuses dispositions des traités ainsi que des positions jurisprudentielles étaient à l’évidence corrélées avec les futurs fondements de l’Union européenne et témoignaient de leur présence immanente avant la lettre. Le préambule du traité CEE du 25 mars 1957 et le préambule de l’Acte unique européen du 28 février 1986 ont fait référence à certains de ces principes. Le principe démocratique a pris de l’ampleur au fil des révisions opérées par les traités successifs.
I.1. TRAITÉ SUR L’UNION EUROPÉENNE Il a fallu attendre l’adoption du traité sur l’Union européenne en 1992 pour que les fondements soient évoqués dans les textes mêmes des traités de base. Dans le préambule du traité, les États membres déclaraient « leur attachement aux principes de la liberté, de la démocratie et du respect des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales et de l’État de droit ». L’article 6, paragraphe 1er, du traité UE évoquait les systèmes de gouvernement des États membres fondés sur les principes démocratiques. L’article 6, paragraphe 2, faisait référence à la protection des droits de l’homme24.
I.2. TRAITÉ D’AMSTERDAM Le traité d’Amsterdam a inscrit les principes en 1997 dans l’article 6, paragraphe 1er, en tant que principes fondateurs de l’Union s’imposant tant aux institutions qu’aux États membres soumis à leur respect, notamment par le jeu d’un contrôle particulier de nature politique pouvant conduire, en cas de violation, à la suspension de leurs droits : « L’Union est fondée sur les principes de la liberté, de la démocratie, du respect des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales ainsi que de l’État de droit, principes qui sont communs aux États membres »25. Les principes s’imposaient aussi aux États candidats, qui devaient les respecter (art. 49, al. 1, TUE), et même aux États tiers enserrés dans l’obligation de les respecter
21 Bull. CE 1983, p. 26. 22 JOCE n° C 277, 17 octobre 1983, p. 95. 23 Parlement européen, rés., 14 février 1984 relative au projet de traité sur l’Union européenne, JOCE n° C 77, 19 mars 1984, p. 53. 24 Rideau, J., « Le rôle de l’Union européenne dans la protection des droits de l’homme », RCADI, 1997, t. 265, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1999, p. 356 ; Molinier, J., « D’un traité à l’autre : les principes fondateurs de l’Union européenne, de Maastricht à Amsterdam », dans Mélanges Mourgeon, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998, p. 439 ; Molinier, J. (éd.), Les principes fondateurs de l’Union européenne, note 16. 25 Simon, D., « The Sanction of Member States’ Serious Violations of Community Law », dans Liber amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Kluwer Law International, La Haye, 2000, p. 275.
394 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne par des clauses de conditionnalité politique figurant dans les accords internationaux ou dans des actes unilatéraux leur attribuant des avantages conditionnés par le respect des principes de l’Union.
I.3. TRAITÉ ÉTABLISSANT UNE CONSTITUTION POUR L’EUROPE Le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe tendait à confirmer l’accession du principe démocratique au rang de principe fondateur dans l’article I-2 énonçant les valeurs de l’Union. L’extension prévue de la juridictionnalisation (sous réserve de la PESC) tendait évidemment à développer l’impact juridique du principe. Le traité maintenait les références au respect de ces valeurs dans l’examen des candidatures à l’adhésion (art. I-58, Traité const.) et la référence à leur respect par les États membres, les violations de ces valeurs pouvant conduire à la suspension de leurs droits (art. I-59, Traité const.). Le traité mentionnait aussi le principe dans le titre VI sur la vie démocratique de l’Union, en évoquant d’abord dans l’article I-45 le principe d’égalité démocratique26. Le texte confirmait dans l’article I-46 le principe de la démocratie représentative déjà présent dans la construction européenne en le solennisant27 « 1. Le fonctionnement de l’Union est fondé sur la démocratie représentative » et en l’amplifiant par la référence non seulement au Parlement européen mais aussi par la mention de la représentation des États membres au Conseil européen par les chefs d’État ou de gouvernement et au Conseil par les gouvernements eux-mêmes, démocratiquement responsables, soit devant leurs parlements nationaux, soit devant leurs citoyens. L’article I-46 affirmait en outre que « 3. Tout citoyen a le droit de participer à la vie démocratique de l’Union. Les décisions sont prises aussi ouvertement et aussi près que possible des citoyens. 4. Les partis politiques au niveau européen contribuent à la formation de la conscience politique européenne et à l’expression de la volonté des citoyens de l’Union »28. La nouveauté était aussi l’introduction par l’article I-47 d’un volet de démocratie participative29. Différentes dispositions relatives aux partenaires sociaux et au dialogue social autonome (art. I-48), au Médiateur (art. I-49), à la transparence des travaux des institutions (art. I-50) comprenant le droit d’accès aux documents et la publicité des débats législatifs au Parlement et au Conseil, au droit à la protection des données
26 Levrat, N., « Article I-45, Principe de l’égalité démocratique », dans Burgorgue-Larsen, L., Levade, A., Picod, F. (éd.), Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, Commentaire article par article, Partie I et IV « Architecture constitutionnelle », Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, t. 1, p. 597. 27 Gaudin, H., « Article I-46, Principe de la démocratie représentative », dans Burgorgue-Larsen, L., et a., note 26. 28 Voir également pour les partis l’article III-331, relatif à leur statut et à leurs règles de financement. 29 Grewe, C., « Article I-45, Principe de la démocratie participative », dans Burgorgue-Larsen, L., et a., note 26, p. 78, spéc. p. 81 s.
395 Joêl Rideau personnelles (art. I-51), au statut des églises et des organisations non confessionnelles (art. I-52) plaçaient la démocratie dans la perspective élargie de la bonne gouvernance. La codécision était appelée à devenir la procédure législative ordinaire et le projet renforçait les pouvoirs du Parlement en matière budgétaire et pour la nomination de la Commission. Le rôle des parlements nationaux était consacré par un nouveau protocole. Des références à la promotion de la démocratie à l’extérieur de l’Union figuraient aussi dans l’article III-292, reprenant d’ailleurs et amplifiant des dispositions antérieures des traités UE (art. 11, § 1, TUE) et CE (art. 177 TCE). On peut considérer que la reconnaissance aux États membres par l’article 50 TUE du droit de retrait de l’Union se rattachait – au moins indirectement – au principe démocratique dans la mesure où elle permettait aux peuples ou à leurs représentants de sortir de l’Union s’ils en exprimaient le désir selon les règles constitutionnelles en principe démocratiques30. À ces textes s›ajoutaient évidemment les dispositions de la Charte des droits fondamentaux constituant la II° partie du traité.
I.4. CHARTE DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX Le préambule de la Charte des droits fondamentaux à laquelle le traité de Lisbonne a reconnu la valeur de droit primaire de l’Union européenne confirme l’importance attachée aux valeurs de l’Union. La Charte repose d’ailleurs sur les principes de démocratie et d’État de droit (devenu Union de droit dans la construction européenne). Les articles 39 et 40 de la Charte proclament le droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux élections du Parlement européen et aux élections municipales des citoyens de l’Union dans l’État membre où ils résident, dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants de cet État, droit reconnu par le traité CE31.
I.5. TRAITÉ DE LISBONNE La coexistence dans les textes européens de base de diverses expressions dont on distingue mal les relations respectives (telles que principes fondateurs, valeurs
30 Les difficultés rencontrées lors du Brexit ont toutefois montré les complications pouvant surgir dans de telles occasions, mises en lumière par l’intervention de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni pour mettre fin à la suspension de la Chambre des communes mettant en cause le respect de la démocratie, 24 septembre 2019, R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent), Neutral citation number UKSC 2019/0192, Case ID UKSC 2019/0192. 31 Mehdi, R., « Article I-99, Droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux élections au Parlement européen », dans Burgorgue-Larsen, L., Levade, A., Picod, F. (éd.), Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe. Commentaire article par article, Partie II, « La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union », Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, t. 2, p. 505 ; Verpeaux, M., « Article II-100, Droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux élections municipales », dans Burgorgue-Larsen L. et a. (éd.), Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, op. cit., t. 2, p. 525.
396 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne communes, droits fondamentaux, principes généraux du droit) était porteuse d’ambiguïtés mises en lumière par le Prof. Joël Molinier32. Les auteurs de ce dernier ouvrage ont montré, en particulier, que si le traité sur l’Union européenne évoquait des principes (art. 6, § 1), la Charte des droits fondamentaux (préambule) – devenue deuxième partie de la Constitution – faisait référence à des valeurs et à des principes, le reste de la Constitution mentionnant dans la première partie des valeurs (art. I-2) mais désignant comme principes dans la IIIe partie (art. III-292) les valeurs mentionnées dans la première partie. Ils avaient également mis en lumière les interrelations complexes entre ce qu’ils ont appelé les principes fondateurs et les autres notions mentionnées, sans pouvoir toutefois en surmonter entièrement la complexité. La reconnaissance ou la consécration par le traité d’Amsterdam de ces fondements, souvent reconnus préalablement pour certains d’entre eux, globalement ou partiellement, comme des droits fondamentaux sous la forme de principes généraux du droit, leur avait donné une dimension nouvelle de nature constitutionnelle. Certains d’entre eux tout au moins avaient même parfois atteint cette dimension avant leur reconnaissance explicite par le traité sur l’Union européenne à partir du traité d’Amsterdam. Leur élévation en tant que fondements par le traité d’Amsterdam était le fruit d’une volonté des auteurs du traité de procéder à une consolidation de l’Union européenne, également présente dans le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, par la fondation ou la refondation de l’Union européenne sur des références identiques ou équivalentes à celles qui forment la base des ordres juridiques étatiques. Ces principes devaient être incontestablement une source d’inspiration tant pour la production de normes de droit primaire de l’Union européenne, à l’occasion de la révision des traités, que pour l’adoption du droit dérivé. Ils étaient également des références pour le juge appelé à interpréter et à appliquer le droit positif de l’Union européenne. Le traité de Lisbonne, reprend en le modifiant, dans l’article 2 TUE consacré aux Valeurs de l’Union, le texte qui figurait dans le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe33 : L’Union est fondée sur les valeurs de respect de la dignité humaine, de liberté, de démocratie, d’égalité, de l’État de droit, ainsi que de respect des droits de l’homme, y compris des droits des personnes appartenant à des minorités. Ces valeurs sont communes aux États membres dans une société caractérisée par le pluralisme, la non-discrimination, la tolérance, la justice, la solidarité et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. L’énumération antérieure des principes – devenus désormais valeurs (liberté, démocratie, État de droit, respect des droits de l’homme) – est complétée par la mention de la dignité et l’égalité et par une référence aux droits des personnes
32 Molinier, J. (éd.), Les principes fondateurs de l’Union européenne¸ note 16, p. 15 et s. 33 Voir Rideau, J., « Les valeurs de l’Union européenne », Revue des affaires européennes, 2012, n° 2, p. 329.
397 Joêl Rideau appartenant à des minorités, ajoutée au respect des droits de l’homme pour tenir compte notamment des préoccupations hongroises. D’autres valeurs – telles que la solidarité – pourraient-elles également être retenues ? Les violations de ces valeurs par les États membres relèvent en particulier du contrôle politique prévu par l’article 7 du traité UE et pouvant aboutir à la suspension des droits (art. 7, § 3, TUE et art. 354 TFUE)34. Elles pourraient également donner lieu à des constatations de manquements par la Cour de justice ou être prises en compte dans des recours en annulation, dans la mesure où elles sont considérées comme justiciables, ou donner lieu à des renvois préjudiciels aux fins d’interprétation. Les États candidats doivent les respecter et s’engager à les promouvoir pour que leurs candidatures soient admises (art. 49 TUE). Leur respect par ces États est donc examiné au cours de la négociation devant aboutir à la conclusion des traités d’adhésion. Les objectifs fixés par l’article 3 correspondent largement à ceux établis par le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe et incluent des références aux valeurs35 : Elle combat l’exclusion sociale et les discriminations, et promeut la justice et la protection sociales, l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes, la solidarité entre les générations et la protection des droits de l’enfant [...] Dans ses relations avec le reste du monde, l’Union affirme et promeut ses valeurs et ses intérêts et contribue à la protection de ses citoyens. Elle contribue à la paix, à la sécurité, au développement durable de la planète, à la solidarité et au respect mutuel entre les peuples, au commerce libre et équitable, à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à la protection des droits de l’homme, en particulier ceux de l’enfant, ainsi qu’au strict respect et au développement du droit international, notamment au respect des principes de la Charte des Nations Unies.
La compétence de la Cour de justice s’étend, comme c’était le cas pour le traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, à l’ensemble du droit primaire (TUE et TFUE notamment), à l’exception de la PESC, en développant ainsi la juridictionnalisation de l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne. À la différence du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, qui intégrait la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans sa deuxième partie, le traité de Lisbonne la transforme en droit primaire de l’Union européenne par un article du traité sur l’Union européenne (art. 6, § 1, TUE). La défense des valeurs de l’Union européenne se trouvait, en outre, potentiellement renforcée par les perspectives de l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention 34 Voir Rideau, J., « Les crises liées aux violations par un État membre des valeurs, de l’Union européenne » dans L’Union européenne et les crises, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2010, Collection droit de l’Union européenne – colloques, n° 11, p. 25. 35 Voir également art. 21 TUE L’Union a pour but de promouvoir la paix, ses valeurs et le bien-être de ses peuples […].
398 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne européenne des droits de l’homme, ouvertes par l’article 6, paragraphe 2 TUE. Le processus d’adhésion a été bloqué pour l’instant par l’avis 2/13 de la Cour de justice déclarant l’adhésion incompatible dans les conditions prévues par l’accord d’adhésion qui lui était soumis36. Les nominations du président de la Commission et de ses membres constituent un élément-clé dans l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre du principe démocratique dans la gouvernance de l’Union européenne qui ne joue que de manière limitée ou est inexistante pour les autres institutions, à l’exception bien sûr du Parlement européen. D’après les règles établies par les traités, et notamment par le traité de Lisbonne, entré en vigueur le 1er décembre 2009, le président de la Commission européenne est élu tous les cinq ans par le Parlement européen, sur proposition du Conseil européen. Les chefs d’État et de gouvernement sont appelés à sélectionner un candidat à la majorité qualifiée renforcée (72 %) des États représentant 65 % de la population), avec la seule obligation de «tenir compte » du résultat des dernières élections européennes, que prévoit l’article 17 du traité sur l’Union européenne. Lors du renouvellement du Parlement en 2014, les eurodéputés avaient imposé à ce poste le chef de file du groupe parlementaire européen sorti vainqueur des urnes selon la procédure dite du « Spitzenkandidat » (candidats principaux des différentes forces politiques). La situation qui a prévalu en 2019 a été différente puisque les chefs d’État et de gouvernement n’ont pas respecté dans leur choix le système des « Spitzenkandidaten » en marquant ainsi un recul dans la mise en œuvre du principe démocratique par rapport au Parlement précédent. Les dirigeants du Conseil européen gardent par ailleurs le pouvoir de désignation des autres commissaires européens à la majorité qualifiée renforcée, et notamment du haut représentant de l’Union pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité, la liste étant soumise au vote d’approbation du Parlement européen. Chaque État membre présente d’abord son candidat. Le président de la Commission répartit ensuite les différents portefeuilles (Concurrence, Affaires étrangères, Économie, Energie, Transports, etc.). La nouvelle équipe doit alors être approuvée par le Conseil à la majorité qualifiée renforcée puis par le Parlement européen, après l’audition des candidats par les commissions compétentes. Le traité généralise la codécision, devenue procédure législative ordinaire (art. 289 et 294 TFUE). Il donne au Parlement et au Conseil des pouvoirs égaux dans la procédure budgétaire. L’article 10 TUE rattache l’Union à la démocratie représentative donnant ainsi une portée juridique et un contenu au principe démocratique proclamé par l’article 2
36 CJUE, Ass. plén., avis 2/13, Adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH, du 18 décembre 2014, EU:C:2014:2454. Voir Rideau, J., « L’incompatibilité du projet d’adhésion de l’UE à la CEDH au regard du contrôle de la PESC : Les sages se rebiffent », Revue des Affaires européennes/Law European & Affairs, 2015, p. 29.
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TUE et, par ailleurs, consacré par la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Les différents volets mentionnés sont développés par d’autres dispositions des traités : – Représentation directe des citoyens, au niveau de l’Union, au Parlement européen ; – Représentation des États membres au Conseil européen par leur chef d’État ou de gouvernement et au Conseil par leurs gouvernements, eux-mêmes démocratiquement responsables, soit devant leurs parlements nationaux soit devant leurs citoyens ; – Droit de tout citoyen de participer à la vie démocratique de l’Union ; – Prise des décisions aussi ouvertement et aussi près que possible des citoyens ; – Contribution des partis politiques au niveau européen à la formation de la conscience politique européenne et à l’expression de la volonté des citoyens de l’Union37.
L’article 11 TUE reconnaît l’importance de la possibilité pour les citoyens de faire connaître leurs opinions et du rôle des associations et de la société civile avec lesquelles les institutions doivent dialoguer. Il prévoit la consultation des parties concernées pour assurer la cohérence et la transparence des actions de l’Union. Il innove également en ouvrant la possibilité d’une initiative citoyenne (au moins un million de citoyens européens d’un nombre minimum d’États membres, fixé à 7 par la suite) et en invitant la Commission à soumettre une proposition d’acte juridique aux fins de l’application des traités selon des modalités à préciser(art. 24, al. 1, TFUE38). Cette disposition introduit une amorce de démocratie semi-directe dans un système dominé par la démocratie représentative. L’article 12 TUE donne une nouvelle dimension aux parlements nationaux qui ne faisaient l’objet que d’un protocole depuis le traité d’Amsterdam jusqu’au traité de Lisbonne. L’article énumère les différents aspects de la contribution active des parlements nationaux au bon fonctionnement de l’Union. Ces aspects sont précisés par d’autres dispositions des traités mais aussi par le nouveau protocole n° 1 sur le rôle des parlements nationaux et par le nouveau protocole n° 2 sur l’application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité qui leur donne les moyens (notamment juridictionnels) de participer au contrôle du respect du principe de subsidiarité. Le nouveau protocole n° 1 vise à mieux associer les parlements nationaux aux activités de l’Union. Il rappelle que « la manière dont les parlements nationaux exercent leur contrôle sur leur gouvernement pour ce qui touche aux activités de l’Union européenne relève de l’organisation et de la pratique constitutionnelles propres à chaque État membre ». Sa finalité est d’« encourager une participation accrue des parlements nationaux aux activités de l’Union européenne et (à) renforcer leur capacité à exprimer leur point
37 Règlement (UE, Euratom) 2018/673 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 3 mai 2018 modifiant le règlement (UE, Euratom) n° 1141/2014 relatif au statut et au financement des partis politiques européens et des fondations politiques européenne, JOUE n° L 114I, du 4 mai 2018, p. 1. 38 Ce texte a pris la forme du règlement (UE) n° 211/2011 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 févr. 2011 relatif à l’initiative citoyenne, JOUE n° L 65, 11 mars 2011, p. 1. Dernière version consolidée : 1er janvier 2020.
400 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne de vue sur les projets d’actes législatifs de l’Union européenne ainsi que sur d’autres questions qui peuvent présenter pour eux un intérêt particulier ». L’article 21, paragraphe 1, alinéa 1, paragraphe 2, b), TUE fait référence à la promotion, à la consolidation et au soutien de la démocratie dans les relations extérieures.
II. LA JUSTICIABILITÉ DU PRINCIPE Peut-on, compte tenu de la reconnaissance croissante du principe démocratique par les textes, considérer que cet incontestable principe politique de l’Union européenne est devenu en tant que tel un paramètre de constitutionnalité ou de légalité et qu’un recours en annulation contre un acte d’une institution puisse être fondé sur ce principe ou qu’un recours en manquement introduit par la Commission ou par les États membres mette en cause sa violation par un État membre ? On peut également s’interroger sur la place que pourrait occuper ce principe dans la mise en œuvre de la procédure préjudicielle par les juridictions nationales dans une perspective de contrôle des institutions ou de contrôle des États membres. La référence au principe, au moins indirecte, est présente dans divers contentieux relatifs aux procédures d’adoption des actes juridiques39. Le principe a progressivement émergé dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. Le rôle réduit du Parlement dans la PESC et la juridictionnalisation limitée de ce domaine réduit évidemment les hypothèses dans lesquelles peut se produire une intervention du juge. La Cour a rappelé l’obligation de reconsultation du Parlement en cas de modification substantielle de la proposition de la Commission par le Conseil, en indiquant que cette solution s’imposait en vertu non seulement du principe d’équilibre institutionnel mais aussi parce que la compétence consultative du Parlement « constitue l’expression d’un principe démocratique fondamental selon lequel les peuples participent à l’exercice du pouvoir par l’intermédiaire d’une assemblée représentative »40. La Cour a fait référence au principe démocratique fondamental selon lequel les peuples participent à l’exercice du pouvoir par l’intermédiaire d’une assemblée représentative dans une affaire concernant la procédure de coopération qui renforçait le rôle du Parlement dans la procédure législative41. La Cour s’est, ultérieurement, prononcée sur les conditions d’intervention du comité de conciliation dans la procédure de codécision, avancée démocratique incontestable, en statuant sur un recours mettant en cause la modification apportée par celui-ci à un article d’un projet de règlement n’ayant fait l’objet d’aucun amendement
39 CJCE, 16 juillet 1992, Parlement/Cons., C-65/90, EU:C:1993:410, point 14. 40 CJCE, 29 octobre 1980, Roquette frères/Cons., 138/79, EU:C:1980:249 ; CJCE, 29 octobre 1980, Maïzena Gmbh/Conseil, aff. 139/79, EU:C:1980:250. Voir également CJCE, 5 juillet 1995, Parlement/ Conseil, aff. C-21/94, point 17, EU:C:1995:220. 41 CJCE, 11 juin 1991, Comm./Belgique, aff. C-290/89, EU:C:1991:243.
401 Joêl Rideau du Parlement en deuxième lecture42, sans admettre qu’il aurait été porté atteinte aux principes de la démocratie représentative (§ 61). Dans une autre affaire43, elle a jugé que si, la participation du Parlement au processus législatif était le reflet, au niveau de l’Union, d’un principe démocratique fondamental selon lequel les peuples participent à l’exercice du pouvoir par l’intermédiaire d’une assemblée représentative, la différence entre les articles 75 TFUE et 215 TFUE quant à l’implication du Parlement résultait d’un choix opéré par les auteurs du traité de Lisbonne de conférer un rôle plus limité au Parlement à l’égard de l’action de l’Union dans le cadre de la PESC. S’agissant de l’argument du Parlement selon lequel il serait contraire au droit de l’Union que puissent être adoptées des mesures ayant une incidence directe sur les droits fondamentaux des particuliers et des groupes au moyen d’une procédure excluant la participation du Parlement, elle a relevé que l’obligation de respecter les droits fondamentaux s’adresse, conformément à l’article 51, paragraphe 1, de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, à toutes les institutions, à tous les organes et organismes de l’Union. En outre, tant aux termes de l’article 75 TFUE qu’à ceux de l’article 215, paragraphe 3, TFUE, les actes visés par ces deux articles contiennent les dispositions nécessaires en matière de garanties juridiques. Elle a ajouté que : Par conséquent, un acte, tel que le règlement attaqué, comprenant des garanties quant au respect des droits fondamentaux des personnes figurant sur la liste peut être adopté sur la base de l’article 215, paragraphe 2, TFUE. La thèse inverse selon laquelle un tel acte ne pourrait être adopté que sur la base de l’article 75 TFUE reviendrait, du reste, à priver l’article 215 TFUE d’une grande partie de son effet utile, alors que l’obligation de conformité aux droits fondamentaux pèse également sur les actes de l’Union mettant en œuvre des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Dans ces conditions, et eu égard à l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent, il y a lieu de conclure que c’est à bon droit que le règlement attaqué est fondé sur l’article 215, paragraphe 2, TFUE. Le traité a aussi prévu dans l’article 218, § 10 TUE que le Parlement « est immédiatement et pleinement informé à toutes les étapes de la procédure » de négociation et de conclusion des accords internationaux prévue à cet article. La Cour a été saisie d’un recours, fondé notamment sur cette disposition, contre la décision 2011/640/PESC du Conseil, du 12 juillet 2011, concernant la signature et la conclusion de l’accord entre l’Union européenne et la République de Maurice, relatif aux conditions de transfert, de la force navale placée sous la direction de l’Union européenne à la République de Maurice, des personnes suspectées d’actes de piraterie et des biens associés saisis, et aux conditions des personnes suspectées d’actes de piraterie après leur transfert. La Cour s’est fondée sur cette disposition en considérant
42 CJCE, 10 janv. 2006, IATA et a., aff. C-344/04, EU:C:2006:10, points 49 s. 43 CJUE, Grande chambre, 19 juillet 2012, Parlement/Conseil, aff. 130/10, EU:C:2012:472, points 81 à 84.
402 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
« que cette règle est l’expression des principes démocratiques sur lesquels l’Union se fonde. En particulier, la Cour a déjà précisé que l’implication du Parlement dans le processus décisionnel est le reflet, au niveau de l’Union, d’un principe démocratique fondamental selon lequel les peuples participent à l’exercice du pouvoir par l’intermédiaire d’une assemblée représentative » (§ 81). Elle a jugé que « La méconnaissance de cette exigence d’information porte, dans ces conditions, atteinte aux conditions d’exercice, par le Parlement, de ses fonctions dans le domaine de la PESC et constitue en conséquence une violation d’une forme substantielle » (§ 86). La Cour a annulé la décision tout en maintenant ses effets, comme elle le fait souvent en cas d’annulation d’un acte de conclusion d’un accord international44. On retrouve le principe démocratique dans certains contentieux du choix des bases juridiques prenant en compte la sauvegarde des prérogatives du Parlement45. En statuant sur un recours du Parlement contre le Conseil, elle a rappelé l’importance du rôle du Parlement dans le processus législatif de la Communauté. Selon elle, la participation du Parlement à ce processus est le reflet, au niveau de la Communauté, d’un principe démocratique fondamental, selon lequel les peuples participent à l’exercice du pouvoir par l’intermédiaire d’une assemblée représentative. Elle a toutefois jugé, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, que le recours à une double base juridique consistant en les articles 179 CE et 181 A CE ne serait pas de nature à porter atteinte aux droits du Parlement puisque le recours à l’article 179 CE impliquerait une participation plus importante du Parlement dans la mesure où il prévoit l’adoption de l’acte selon la procédure dite de « codécision ». Du reste, il n’a pas été soutenu devant la Cour qu’une telle double base juridique ne serait pas possible du point de vue de la technique législative46. Il faut sans doute aussi reconnaître au principe démocratique une place implicite à côté de la référence explicite au principe de la Communauté de droit (désormais de l’Union de droit), dans la reconnaissance sans texte de la légitimation active du Parlement européen47. Dans des affaires relatives au pouvoir d’auto-organisation du Parlement européen, la Cour ou le Tribunal ont fait référence au principe démocratique comme élément fondateur48. La Cour s’est référée au respect des droits fondamentaux inclus dans la conception européenne de la société démocratique49.
44 CJUE, Gde ch., 24 juin 2014, Parlement/Conseil, C-658/11, EU:C:2014:2025. 45 Voir, par exemple, CJCE, 11 juin 1991, Commission/Conseil, C-300/89, EU:C:1991:244, point 20. 46 CJCE, 6 novembre 2008, Parlement/Conseil et Commission, aff. C-155/07, EU:C:2008:605. 47 CJCE, 23 avril 1986, Les Verts/Parlement, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, § 23. 48 Voir CJCE, ord., 11 novembre 2003, Martinez/Parlement, C-488/01 P-R, EU:C:2003:608, § 30. TPICE, 2 octobre 2001, Martinez et a./Parlement, T-222/99, T-327/99 et T-329/99, EU:T:1999:299, § 200. 49 CJCE, 12 juin 2003, Schmidberger, aff. C-112/00 EU:C:2003:333.
403 Joêl Rideau
La Cour a également mentionné la notion de société démocratique dans l’appréciation des limites pouvant être apportées aux droits et libertés garantis, dans la même ligne que la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme50. Le développement jurisprudentiel – désormais inscrit dans le traité – du droit à l’accès aux documents est incontestablement relié au principe démocratique51. Un lien a d’ailleurs été établi par le Tribunal entre le principe démocratique et la transparence52. Le Tribunal de première instance s’était fondé sur le respect d’un principe démocratique fondamental entendu de manière extensive, pour statuer sur la recevabilité d’un recours en annulation d’organisations professionnelles contre une directive, à propos de la participation de partenaires sociaux au processus de décision conçue comme une alternative à la participation du Parlement européen53. Les règles démocratiques ont été mentionnées par la Cour dans un arrêt relatif à l’élection du comité du personnel du Parlement européen54. Le principe démocratique a été évoqué par l’avocat général Tizzano dans ses conclusions présentées le 6 avril 2006, sous deux arrêts de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes rendues dans des affaires dans lesquelles était évoqué le droit de vote aux élections du Parlement européen55. Dans la première affaire, où était en cause la législation britannique accordant à des personnes non citoyennes de l’Union européenne résidant à Gibraltar le droit de vote pour les élections du Parlement européen, l’avocat général a estimé que : L’extension des droits énumérés aux articles 18 à 21 à des personnes n’ayant pas le statut de citoyens de l’Union n’est donc pas – comme le prétend le gouvernement espagnol – un phénomène exceptionnel qui “ morcelle ” le caractère unitaire de la notion de citoyenneté. Au contraire, le fait que certains de ces droits, considérés comme des attributs du statut juridique des citoyens de l’Union, soient étendus par le droit communautaire lui-même en dehors de ce cercle, confirme que les droits en question ne constituent pas nécessairement une prérogative exclusive des citoyens. On peut également conclure que, si pour certains de ces droits c’est le droit communautaire qui procède à ladite extension, on ne peut exclure en principe que pour d’autres (tels que le droit de vote précisément) un État membre puisse prendre une telle décision de manière autonome [...] Et ce d’autant plus que cette extension semble en accord avec le principe démocratique du suffrage universel, sur lequel l’Union européenne est également fondée. Ce principe milite en effet... en faveur de la reconnaissance du droit de vote “ au plus grand nombre ” et, par
50 CJCE, 27 avril 2006, Commission/Allemagne, C-441/02, EU:C:2006:253, point 109. 51 CJCE, 30 avril 1996, Pays-Bas/Conseil, C-58/94, EU:C:1996:171. 52 TPICE, 7 février 2002, Kuijer/Conseil, T-211/00, EU:T:2002 :30, point 52. 53 TPICE, 16 juin 1998, UEAPME/Conseil, T-135/96, EU:T:1998:128, § 89. 54 CJCE, 29 décembre 1976, Dapper/Parlement, 54/75, EU:C:1975:95, att. 25. 55 CJCE, Grande chambre, 12 septembre 2006, Espagne/Royaume-Uni, C-145/04, EU:T:2005:462 ; CJCE, Grande chambre, 12 septembre 2006, Eman et Sevinger, C-300/04, EU:C:2006:545.
404 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
conséquent, éventuellement aussi aux étrangers établis dans un État membre donné qui, tout comme les citoyens, sont effectivement assujettis aux actes approuvés par les organes législatifs nationaux et communautaires (pts 92 et 93). Il contestait pourtant cette extension sur une autre motivation fondée sur les textes liant le Royaume-Uni. La Cour n’a pas mentionné le principe démocratique mais a admis l’extension par le Royaume-Uni du droit de vote à des personnes n’ayant pas la qualité de citoyens européens : Pour des raisons liées à sa tradition constitutionnelle, le Royaume-Uni a fait le choix d’octroyer le droit de vote et d’éligibilité aux QCC remplissant des conditions exprimant un lien spécifique avec le territoire au titre duquel les élections sont organisées. En l’absence, dans les traités communautaires, de dispositions indiquant de manière explicite et précise quels sont les bénéficiaires du droit de vote et d’éligibilité au Parlement européen, il n’apparaît pas que le choix du Royaume-Uni de transposer aux élections à ce Parlement organisées à Gibraltar les conditions de vote et d’éligibilité prévues par sa législation nationale tant pour les élections nationales au Royaume-Uni que pour les élections à la Chambre législative de Gibraltar soit contraire au droit communautaire (pt 69). Dans la seconde affaire, il s’agissait de la privation du droit de vote pour l’élection au Parlement européen de citoyens néerlandais résidant dans un territoire faisant partie des PTOM. Le principe n’a pas été évoqué alors qu’il aurait pu légitimement l’être puisque des citoyens européens se trouvaient privés de leur droit de vote. Il ressort de ce survol que le principe a été à diverses reprises utilisé par le juge pour dégager des solutions en s’y référant dans les affaires qui lui ont été soumises. Son utilisation reste toutefois globalement limitée. Le principe doit malgré tout être pour l’instant considéré de manière générale plutôt comme une source d’inspiration de la jurisprudence que comme un paramètre direct utilisé par le juge. Le juge peut s’y appuyer en se référant à des textes ou à des principes généraux du droit et le relier aux autres valeurs, telles que la liberté, le respect des droits de l’homme et les principes de l’État de droit qui en sont le corollaire. Le nouveau paragraphe 1 de l’article 6 du traité sur l’Union européenne, introduit par le traité d’Amsterdam, a consacré le principe démocratique comme fondement de l’Union européenne, en l’accompagnant d’une procédure de contrôle du respect de ces fondements par les États membres (art. 7 TUE) et de leur insertion dans les critères d’éligibilité des États candidats à l’adhésion (art. 49 TUE). En outre, la publicité des débats législatifs du Conseil, introduite dans l’article 207 du traité CE dans sa version postérieure au traité d’Amsterdam, visait certainement à renforcer la base démocratique du processus législatif dans l’Union européenne. Cette évolution pourrait être de nature à développer le recours au principe démocratique comme paramètre couramment utilisable par le juge.
405 Joêl Rideau
CONCLUSIONS Le survol de la jurisprudence permet de conclure que le principe démocratique doit être pour l’instant considéré principalement plutôt comme une source d’inspiration de la jurisprudence que comme un paramètre direct utilisé fréquemment par le juge. Le juge peut s’y appuyer en se référant à des textes ou à des principes généraux du droit et le relier aux autres valeurs, telles que la liberté, le respect des droits de l’homme et les principes de l’État de droit qui en sont le corollaire et qui ont été transposés dans l’Union de droit. La reconnaissance de la démocratie par le traité de Lisbonne comme valeur de l’Union dans le nouvel article 2 TUE ainsi que l’inscription dans les traités d’un certain nombre d’éléments nouveaux devraient favoriser l’évolution en développant le caractère opérationnel du principe et accroitre l’utilisation du principe démocratique par les juges de l’Union européenne ainsi d’ailleurs que par les juges nationaux agissant en leur qualité de juges de droit commun de l’Union européenne et également par la Cour européenne de droits de l’homme en l’absence même d’une adhésion de l’Union européenne à la CEDH. Cette évolution est d’autant plus souhaitable que la procédure de contrôle politico-juridictionnelle du respect par les États membres des valeurs de l’Union européenne, prévue par l’article 7 TUE56, est bloquée par les conditions de sa mise en œuvre qui exigent l’unanimité des États membres autres que l’État mis en cause alors que les violations par les États de leurs obligations se sont développées (Pologne et
56 « 1. Sur proposition motivée d’un tiers des États membres, du Parlement européen ou de la Commission européenne, le Conseil, statuant à la majorité des quatre cinquièmes de ses membres après approbation du Parlement européen, peut constater qu’il existe un risque clair de violation grave par un État membre des valeurs visées à l’article 2. Avant de procéder à cette constatation, le Conseil entend l’État membre en question et peut lui adresser des recommandations, en statuant selon la même procédure. Le Conseil vérifie régulièrement si les motifs qui ont conduit à une telle constatation restent valables. 2. Le Conseil européen, statuant à l’unanimité sur proposition d’un tiers des États membres ou de la Commission européenne et après approbation du Parlement européen, peut constater l’existence d’une violation grave et persistante par un État membre des valeurs visées à l’article 2, après avoir invité cet État membre à présenter toute observation en la matière. 3. Lorsque la constatation visée au paragraphe 2 a été faite, le Conseil, statuant à la majorité qualifiée, peut décider de suspendre certains des droits découlant de l’application des traités à l’État membre en question, y compris les droits de vote du représentant du gouvernement de cet État membre au sein du Conseil. Ce faisant, le Conseil tient compte des conséquences éventuelles d’une telle suspension sur les droits et obligations des personnes physiques et morales. Les obligations qui incombent à l’État membre en question au titre des traités restent en tout état de cause contraignantes pour cet État. 4. Le Conseil, statuant à la majorité qualifiée, peut décider par la suite de modifier les mesures qu’il a prises au titre du paragraphe 3 ou d’y mettre fin pour répondre à des changements de la situation qui l’a conduit à imposer ces mesures. 5. Les modalités de vote qui, aux fins du présent article, s’appliquent au Parlement européen, au Conseil européen et au Conseil sont fixées à l’article 354 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne ».
406 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne
Hongrie notamment) et que s’établissent des solidarités entre les États violateurs qui réduisent les possibilités de contrôles effectifs sous réserve d’une mise en œuvre plus affirmée des contrôles juridictionnels qui sont moins soumis aux aléas politiques. L’examen récent par les juridictions de l’Union européenne de la situation de certains membres du Parlement européen élus en Catalogne illustre l’importance que peuvent revêtir les procédures juridictionnelles européennes pour la protection du principe démocratique57. La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, saisie d’un renvoi préjudiciel par la Cour suprême espagnole, a précisé, dans un arrêt du 19 décembre 201958, la portée personnelle, temporelle et matérielle des immunités accordées aux membres du Parlement européen59. La Cour avait été saisie de plusieurs questions préjudicielles relatives à l’interprétation de l’article 9 du protocole. Ces questions avaient été formulées dans le cadre d’un recours introduit par un homme politique catalan élu au Parlement européen lors des élections du 26 mai 2019, contre une ordonnance portant refus de lui accorder une autorisation extraordinaire de sortie de prison. La Cour a jugé, en premier lieu, qu’une personne élue au Parlement européen acquiert la qualité de membre du Parlement du fait et au moment de la proclamation des résultats électoraux et bénéficie donc des immunités garanties par l’article 9 du protocole (prévues à l’article 343 TFUE et à l’article 9 du protocole sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne). Selon la Cour, si la procédure électorale et la proclamation des résultats sont en principe régis par la législation des États membres, conformément aux articles 8 et 12 de l’acte électoral de 19762, l’élection des membres du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct, libre et secret60, constituait l’expression du principe constitutionnel de démocratie représentative, dont la portée est définie par le droit de l’Union lui-même (art.14, § 3, TUE61). Selon la Cour, il découle des traités et de l’acte électoral de 1976 que la qualité de membre du Parlement européen résulte de la seule élection de l’intéressé et lui est acquise du fait de la proclamation officielle des résultats effectuée par les États membres. En outre, il résulte de l’article 343 TFUE
57 Van Elsuwege, P., « A Matter of Representative Democracy in the European Union. The Catalan Question before the Court of Justice » : https://verfassungsblog.de/a-matter-of-representative- democracy-in-the-european-union [Dernier accès 11 janvier 2020]. 58 CJUE, Grande chambre, 19 décembre 2019, Junqueras Vies, C-502/19, EU:C:2019:1115. Avec les conclusions de l’avocat général Szpuznar présentées le 12 novembre 2019. 59 Immunités prévues à l’article 343 TFUE et à l’article 9 du protocole n° 7 sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne, JOUE 2012 n° C 326, p. 266. 60 Prévue par l’Acte portant élection des membres du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct, annexé à la décision76/787/CECA, CEE, Euratom du Conseil, du 20 septembre 1976, JOCE 1976, n° L 278, p.1, modifié, en dernier lieu, par la décision 2002/772/CE, Euratom du Conseil, du 25 juin et du 23 septembre 2002, JOUE 2002, n° L 283, p.1. 61 « 3. Les membres du Parlement européen sont élus au suffrage universel direct, libre et secret, pour un mandat de cinq ans ».
407 Joêl Rideau que l’Union, et donc ses institutions ainsi que leurs membres, doivent bénéficier des immunités nécessaires à leurs missions. En deuxième lieu, la Cour a jugé que les personnes, comme M. Junqueras Vies, élues membres du Parlement européen, bénéficiaient, dès la proclamation des résultats, de l’immunité de trajet attachée à leur qualité de membre et prévue à l’article 9, deuxième alinéa, du protocole, qui a pour objet de leur permettre, notamment, de se rendre et de prendre part à la session constitutive de la nouvelle législature du Parlement européen. En effet, à la différence de l’immunité de session prévue au premier alinéa, qui ne leur bénéficie qu’à compter de l’ouverture de cette session constitutive et pendant toute la durée des sessions du Parlement européen, l’immunité de trajet couvre les déplacements des membres à destination du lieu de réunion du Parlement européen, en incluant sa première réunion. Pour la Cour les objectifs poursuivis par les immunités prévues consistent à assurer la protection du bon fonctionnement et de l’indépendance des institutions. L’immunité de trajet visée à l’article 9, deuxième alinéa, de ce protocole donne effet au droit d’éligibilité garanti par l’article 39, paragraphe 2, de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, en permettant à tout membre proclamé élu, indépendamment du point de savoir s’il a ou non accompli d’éventuelles formalités prévues par le droit interne, de participer à la session constitutive du Parlement européen sans pouvoir être entravé dans son déplacement. La Cour a jugé, en troisième et dernier lieu, que le bénéfice de l’immunité de trajet garantie à tout membre du Parlement européen implique de lever toute mesure de placement en détention provisoire imposée antérieurement à la proclamation de son élection, afin de lui permettre de se rendre et de prendre part à la session constitutive du Parlement européen. En conséquence, si la juridiction nationale compétente jugeait nécessaire de maintenir une telle mesure, il lui incomberait de demander dans les plus brefs délais la levée de cette immunité au Parlement européen, sur le fondement de l’article 9, troisième alinéa, du protocole. Par ailleurs, la Cour de justice a été saisie par MM. Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó et Antoni Comín i Oliveres d’un pourvoi demandant l’annulation de l’ordonnance du président du Tribunal de l’Union européenne du 1er juillet 201962, par laquelle celui-ci a rejeté leur demande tendant, d’une part, au sursis à l’exécution, premièrement, de la décision du Parlement européen de ne pas prendre acte des résultats officiellement déclarés par le Royaume d’Espagne des élections au Parlement du 26 mai 2019 et de la décision subséquente de prendre acte d’une liste différente et incomplète de membres élus, notifiée le 17 juin 2019 par les autorités espagnoles, deuxièmement, de la décision du Parlement de regarder la communication de la Junta Electoral Central (Commission électorale centrale, Espagne) du 20 juin 2019 comme privant
62 Trib., prés., 1er juillet 2019, Puigdemont i Casamajó et Comín i Oliveres/Parlement, T-388/19 R, non publiée, EU:T:2019:467.
408 Le principe démocratique dans les traités de l’Union européenne d’effet la proclamation des requérants en tant que membres élus du Parlement et, troisièmement, de la décision du Parlement portant refus de garantir, conformément à l’article 3, paragraphe 2, du règlement intérieur du Parlement européen, le droit des requérants de siéger au Parlement et dans ses organes en pleine jouissance de leurs droits à partir de la première séance et jusqu’à ce qu’il ait été statué sur les contestations portées devant le Parlement et les autorités judiciaires espagnoles, ainsi que, d’autre part, d’enjoindre au Parlement de prendre toutes mesures nécessaires, y compris la confirmation des privilèges et immunités que les requérants tirent de l’article 9 du protocole (n° 7) sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Union européenne annexé aux traités UE, FUE et CEEA pour leur permettre de siéger au Parlement dès l’ouverture de la première session qui suit les élections. La Cour a jugé qu’en l’espèce le président du Tribunal avait conclu à tort à l’inexistence d’un fumus boni juris, sans avoir examiné la condition relative à l’urgence, ni effectué la mise en balance des intérêts en présence63. Par ailleurs, l’ordonnance attaquée ayant été rendue, ainsi qu’il a été relevé au point 16 de la présente ordonnance, sans que le Parlement ait été entendu au préalable, la Cour ne dispose pas des éléments nécessaires pour vérifier si ladite condition était satisfaite et procéder, éventuellement, à la mise en balance de ces intérêts. Dans ses observations devant la Cour, le Parlement avait conclu au rejet de la demande de mesures provisoires pour deux motifs, à titre principal, l’absence d’intérêt à agir des requérants, à titre subsidiaire, le caractère manifestement irrecevable des moyens soulevés dans le recours formé dans l’affaire principale. Or, ces questions soulevées pour la première fois devant la Cour n’ont pas été débattues entre les parties. La Cour a donc jugé que la demande de mesures provisoires n’était pas en état d’être jugée et qu’il y avait lieu, dès lors, de renvoyer l’affaire devant le Tribunal. Nul ne doute que les politiciens et les juges espagnols éprouveront des difficultés redoutables pour sortir d’un imbroglio juridique qu’ils ont contribué à construire mais c’est sans doute le prix à payer pour garantir la démocratie.
63 CJUE, vice-prés., 20 décembre 2019, Puigdemont i Casamajó et Comín i Oliveres/Parlement, C-646/19 P(R) EU:C:2019:1149.
409 Anna Rytel-Warzocha A priori constitutional review – Pros and cons in the light of doctrinal opinions and practical experience
A PRIORI CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW – PROS AND CONS IN THE LIGHT OF DOCTRINAL OPINIONS AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
Prof. Dr. Hab. Anna Rytel-Warzocha Department of Constitutional Law and Political Institutions, University of Gdansk, Poland
INTRODUCTION The review of the constitutionality of law is now a well-established institution in the political systems of European countries. Constitutional review in the European model, whose introduction to constitutional practice was preceded by the development of its theoretical assumptions. However, it should be noted that, in the light of the concepts developed by Hans Kelsen, the constitutional review of law restricted only to ex post review concerning legal norms already in force, so it had a follow-up nature. The possibility of conducting the constitutional review of norms prior to their entering into force appeared later on. Nevertheless, only in France, this form of review for a long time played a central role and, moreover, until 2010, it was the only form of constitutional review. The basic criterion that distinguishes the preventive review of the constitutionality of law from repressive review is the moment of its implementation. Unlike the follow-up review, a priori review always takes place before the formal end of the legislative process, which usually culminates in an act of law promulgation by the head of state. However, it is more difficult to determine the initial moment at which such control can be carried out. Depending on the solutions adopted in individual countries, preventive judicial may take place at the stage of parliamentary work even before the adoption of a legal act or after the adoption of a legal act by the parliament but before other activities conditioning its entry into force, such as approval or promulgation by the head of state or its proper announcement. It should be noted that, apart from constitutional courts, the preventive constitutional review of law already at the early stages of legislative proceedings is also carried out by the parliament, whose competence in this respect has a special dimension in countries with a strongly outlined principle of parliament’s sovereignty and supremacy. The analysis of applicable legal solutions leads to the conclusion that, in the vast majority of European countries, preventive review is, in principle, subsidiary
410 A priori constitutional review – Pros and cons in the light of doctrinal opinions and practical experience and optional. Due to its nature, preventive control will always be abstract in nature concerning various types of normative acts, including ordinary and constitutional laws as well as international agreements, which are reviewed from the aspect of their compliance with the Constitution. The concept of preliminary constitutional review that provides constitutional courts with a possibility for the constitutional court to perform the preventive review of the constitutionality of legal norms, as well as the concept of the parliamentary review of the constitutionality of law, have been differently assessed by representatives of legal doctrine, who present both its advantages and disadvantages, pointing out both its potential as threats.
I. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A PRIORI CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW In general, basic arguments for introducing preventive constitutionality review into the constitutional system are the same as the arguments in favour of repressive constitutional review. These include the protection of such values as a coherent and stable system of applicable law, the protection of the rights and freedoms of an individual, the protection of minorities and the whole community, as well as the protection of principles and values of a democratic state based on the rule of law. Constitutional review has been also justified by the principle of the supremacy of the constitution. It is pointed out that, in countries where this principle is respected, the review of the compliance of parliamentary acts with the Constitution is its natural consequence. Supporters of a priori constitutional review emphasise its preventive nature. Successful a priori review allows eliminating faulty legal norms from the applicable system even before they enter into force and, thus, before they are applied. This allows to avoid problems related to the consequences of the derogation of the already existing norms, such as the issue of ‘healing’ (revising) individual decisions issued on the basis of norms that were later on recognised by the constitutional court as unconstitutional.1 The preventive model of the constitutional review of law gives the legal system greater stability. This effect can be achieved above all in a situation where preventive review is exclusive and, thus, a normative act once announced cannot be challenged
1 Garlicki, L., ‘Prewencyjna kontrola umów międzynarodowych’, in Dębowska-Romanowska, T. and Jankiewicz, A., Konstytucja, ustrój, system finansowy państwa. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesor Natalii Gail, Warszawa, 1999, p. 268; Florczak-Wątor, M., ‘Prewencyjna kontrola konstytucyjności ustaw’, in Konstytucja i sądowe gwarancje jej ochrony. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Pawła Sarneckiego, Kraków, 2004, p. 66.
411 Anna Rytel-Warzocha in the future. Where the possibility of ex ante review occurs alongside ex post review, this stability is no longer so certain.2 The undoubted advantage of a priori review is the avoidance of legal uncertainty also in the context of subjective rights. A priori constitutional review raises the level of legal security. Discussion regarding the compliance of the act with the constitution takes place before its entry into force, which is particularly important from the point of view of the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms. The elimination of unconstitutional legal norms before they enter into the system of applicable law allows avoiding a situation in which the constitutional rights and freedoms of an individual could be violated in the process of applying the law.3 Legal certainty (in a formal sense) as the main advantage of the preventive constitutional review of law has often been emphasised in the doctrine.4 In addition, it has also been pointed out that the mechanism of preventive constitutional review, in particular, when such review is obligatory, can cause a kind of a ‘freezing effect’. As Krzysztof Łokucijewski notices, ‘many peculiar legislative ideas have never changed into the applicable law because the authors of these proposals were aware that they had no chance of passing the constitutional test’.5 Last but not least argument that can be added to the above list is that the preventive constitutional review of an act amending the already existing regulations not only prevents the entry into force of unconstitutional solutions, but also prevents the repeal of existing provisions, which retain binding force and continue to be applied and, thus, ‘protect the prestige of the legislator’.6
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PRIORI CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW On the other hand, the main argument presented by representatives of the doctrine sceptical about the preventive review of the constitutionality of law is that it violates the principle of the separation of powers, constituting the excessive interference of the judiciary in the basic competences of the legislative authority. Opponents point out that preventing the introduction into the legal system of legal
2 Sadurski, W., Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe, Springer Netherlands, 2016, p. 105. 3 François, B., ‘Sądownictwo konstytucyjne we Francji’, Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 1995, year LVII, Vol. 2, p. 153. 4 Buerstedde, L., ‘Kontrolle der rechtsetzenden Gewalt durch Conseil constitutionnel und Conseil d’Etat nach der französische Verfassung vom 4 Oktober 1958’, in Leibholz, G., Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart. Neue Folge, Tübingen, 1963, p. 169. 5 Łokucijewski, K., ‘Kontrola konstytucyjności prawa. Standard w państwach demokratycznych’, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, 2016, No 2, p. 12. 6 See the judgment of the Constitutional Court of Hungary of 20 April 1991, case 16/1991.
412 A priori constitutional review – Pros and cons in the light of doctrinal opinions and practical experience norms that are the ‘final’ product of parliamentary legislative activities results in weakening the constitutional position of the legislative authority.7 In particular, preventive review is considered controversial because of the accusation of the ‘power of judges’ over the parliament. It is also pointed out that, by carrying out the a priori review of the constitutionality of law, the constitutional court assumes the role of a ‘mediator’ between the parliamentary majority and minority and, thus, becomes involved in a political dispute.8 The second argument against preventive constitutional review concerns the fact that legal norms are inspected before they enter into force and, therefore, the review is based only on the pure text of the legal provision without obvious reference to the content that could be given to it in the process of its application.9 This type of review concerns norms before their practical application and, therefore, has a purely theoretical dimension. As Lech Garlicki points out, ‘the actual content of the legal provision is revealed only in practice and only then can all its legal consequences be found’, which is possible only in the case of follow-up constitutional review. Therefore, it may happen that the constitutional court will consider as constitutional norms that may become unconstitutional in the process of their application, or the other way around, that the norm found unconstitutional, in the process of its application, could become constitutional, for example, due to the appropriate interpretation.10 By questioning the desirability of ‘resolving the legal dilemma before anyone is injured’, it is pointed out that the a priori review of the constitutionality of law requires the constitutional court to take a hypothetical, premature and abstract decision regarding a problem that is not yet fully specified and that later would not require the intervention of the constitutional court at all. All this, as well as the obvious lack of facts concerning the application of the examined law, its costs and social benefits also increases the risk of making a mistake by the constitutional court.11 Nevertheless, we should remember that also the subsequent abstract constitutional review may relate to legal norms that have never been applied in practice. However, the most serious objection to preventive constitutional review is the danger of politicising the constitutional court, which acts as the third chamber of the parliament and can be used by the head of state or parliamentary opposition as part of a political struggle to implement legal solutions that have failed to go through the parliament. 7 Florczak-Wątor, M., footnote 1, p. 66. 8 Sokolewicz, W., ‘Sąd konstytucyjny w Rumunii’, in Trzciński, J., Sądy konstytucyjne w Europie. Bułgaria, Czechy, Rumunia, Słowacja, Węgry, Part 2, Warszawa, 1997, p. 161. 9 Balicki, R., Udział Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w postępowaniu ustawodawczym, Wrocław, 2001, p. 110. 10 Garlicki, L., footnote 1, p. 268; Diemer-Benedict, T., ‘Prewencyjna kontrola konstytucyjności w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej’, Przegląd Sejmowy, 1997, No 2, p. 47. 11 Posner, R. A. and Landes, W. M., ‘The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication’, Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, 1993, No 18, p. 4.
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Challenging the law in a preventive manner can also become a form of political ‘retaliation’. In principle, preventive review can be initiated by a narrow group of entities, usually including the head of state, a group of parliamentarians or the government, which are guided by political premises.12 The process of the preventive review of laws by the constitutional court may thus lead to a violation of the principle of the separation of powers.13 In the doctrine, preventive review is sometimes explicitly treated as a purely political ex ante abstract review, citing as an example the scrutiny carried out by the French Constitutional Council, often at the request of 60 members of the Parliament who previously voted against the contested law ultimately adopted by the majority of votes.14 In addition, it is also pointed out that preventive review, which is ‘unwise, unfair, dangerous, destructive, burdensome, disastrous’, is intended as a counterweight to majoritarianism. Therefore, Jon Elster put forward the thesis that this review should be seen as an extension of the veto right of the executive body and its extension by including representatives of the judiciary in this process, rather than a separate form of reviewing the constitutionality of law.15 Another argument to the disadvantage of a priori review is the allegation that courts are less cautious about the examination of acts in the form of preventive review than in regard to already binding acts. The Spanish doctrine has also pointed out that, in the case of the examination of acts before the end of the political process of their adoption, the courts show a greater tendency to decide on the unconstitutionality of the act than in the case of the review of acts already in force. Thus, it was suggested that the Constitutional Court assumes the role of the third chamber of the parliament.16 Preventive review, which, by definition, is abstract in nature and is conducted by the constitutional court always in isolation from the process of applying the law, may weaken its authority. What is more, the preventive review of law is primarily focused on protecting the quality of the legal system, serving the interest of the state, which may lead to deficits in the legal protection of citizens.17
12 Czeszejko-Sochacki, Z., Garlicki, L., et al., Komentarz do ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym, Warszawa, 1999, p. 21. 13 Elster, J., ‘Limiting Majority Rule, Alternatives to Judicial Review in the Revolutionary Epoch’, in Sólyom, L. and Brunner, G., Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court, University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 154. 14 Rosenfeld, M., ‘The United States of America. A Comparativist Critique of US Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights Cases: Exceptionalism, Paradoxes and Contradictions’, in Bell, J. and Paris, M.-L., Rights-Based Constitutional Review. Constitutional Courts in a Changing Landscape, Cheltenham–Northampton, 2016, p. 34. 15 Smith, E. (ed.), Constitutional Justice under Old Constitutions, the Hague–London–Boston, 1995, p. 10. 16 Barreiro, B., ‘Judicial Review and Political Empowerment: Abortion in Spain’, in Heywood, P., Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain: No Longer Different?, Londyn–Portland, 1999, p. 151. 17 See Garlicki, L., Sądownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie Zachodniej, Warszawa, 1987, p. 234.
414 A priori constitutional review – Pros and cons in the light of doctrinal opinions and practical experience
In regard to a priori constitutional review there are also allegations addressed generally against the exercise of constitutional review by judicial authorities external to the parliament. Jeremy Waldron, presenting his critical opinion in this regard, raises two main arguments. First of all, he indicates that there are no grounds to assume that the mechanism of the judicial review of the constitutionality of parliamentary acts is a better guarantee of the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual than the legislator enjoying democratic legitimacy. Secondly, he emphasises that judgments of constitutional courts in the area of the constitutional review of law are deprived of democratic legitimacy.18 Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Waldron not so much criticised the preventive form of reviewing the constitutionality of law, but he questioned the review of the constitutionality of law in general. The doctrine also indicates that the system of the preventive constitutional review of law may constitute an incentive for the opposition to use this institution unseriously or obstructively (which was the main reason for abandoning this form of constitutional review in 1985 in Spain, when the notorious referral of laws before their entry into force to the Constitutional Court caused delays in the implementation of reforms proposed by the government in 1983–1985).
CONCLUSIONS The above-mentioned features of preventive constitutional review cause that, in the doctrine, this form of review is differently assessed, having its supporters and opponents. Among the arguments in favour of preventive control, it is primarily pointed out that it contributes to the protection of a coherent and stable system of applicable law, thus ensuring the protection of individual rights, constitutional principles and values of a democratic state ruled by law and increasing the level of legal security. On the other hand, among the arguments against preventive constitutional review, there is most often the allegation of the excessive interference of the judiciary in the sphere reserved for the legislature, the inability to assess the practical dimension of the challenged provisions, as well as the danger of politicising the constitutional court.19
18 Waldron, J., ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’, The Yale Law Journal, 2006, No 115, p. 1346 and next. The arguments presented by Waldron were argued by, among others, Wojciech Ciszewski, see Ciszewski, W., ‘Demokratyczny status sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa’, Filozofia i Edukacja Demokratyczna, 2016, Vol. V, No 1, p. 170 and next. 19 The above presented review of argument for and against a priori constitutional review, as well as other aspects of a priori constitutional review in Poland and other European countries, have been previously presented in Rytel-Warzocha, A., Prewencyjna kontrola konstytucyjności prawa w Polsce na tle państw europejskich. Studium z prawa konstytucyjnego, Gdańsk, 2019.
415 Siniša Rodin Judicial neutrality
JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY1
Prof. Dr. Siniša Rodin Judge of the Court of Justice of the European Union
I. Democracy and the rule of law are foundational principles of the European Union. The Treaty on European Union refers to them in the Preamble, as well as in Articles 2, 10 and 21. They are invoked in the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. They also make part of political criteria for membership of EU, as defined by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993.2 However, despite of the fact that democracy and the rule of law are always mentioned together, one should conclude that there is no tension between the two. While democracy entails political participation and representation based on free and fair elections, the rule of law is concerned with boundaries and restraints. A recently proposed Regulation3 specifies that: ‘The rule of law requires that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial courts. It requires, in particular, that the principles of legality, legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers, separation of powers, and effective judicial protection by independent courts are respected.’ Together, democracy and the rule of law constitute a backbone of liberal democratic order. Fareed Zacharia nicely explained the tension between democracy and legal restraints by making a distinction between constitutional liberalism and democracy and arguing that the two do not always go hand in hand.4 Namely, constitutional liberalism does not automatically make a political system democratic. In his view, Habsburg monarchy was a liberal autocracy,5 whereas certain contemporary
1 This text reflects personal opinions of the author. 2 The Conclusions refer to stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1. 3 The Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, Brussels, 2 May 2018, COM(2018) 324 final 2018/0136(COD). 4 Zacharia, F., ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 1997, 76, 6, p. 22. 5 Ibid. at p. 29. At another place, Zacharia explained how emperor Franz Joseph I refused to approve the election of racist Vienna mayor elect: ‘That March Vienna had elected an ultranationalist, Karl Lueger, as mayor. Lueger’s politics were ugly. He regularly likened Jews to locusts, demanding that they be crushed into the ground like fertiliser or packed onto ships and drowned at sea. The Habsburg emperor, Franz Joseph I, decided that Lueger’s election was a threat to the city’s civic liberties and, in an unprecedented move, refused to honour it. He was supported in this decision by Austria’s other ancient and authoritarian institution, the Catholic Church. Vienna’s intellectuals,
416 Judicial neutrality political systems can be characterised as democracies without liberal constitutional component. In that sense, democracies can be illiberal and constitutional liberalism can be non-democratic. For Zacharia, constitutional liberalism ‘is not about the procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals. It refers to the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source – state, church, or society.’6 Admittedly, in liberal democracy, constitutional liberalism with its counter-majoritarian mechanisms, such as federal structure and judicial review, will always restrain democracy, which is intrinsically majoritarian. Since democracy entails the majoritarian articulation of precepts about good life, such precepts, in the absence of counter-majoritarian checks, incline to become universally binding. Therefore, liberal neutrality is possible only in the presence of entrenched counter-majoritarian safeguards. Where such safeguards are established, institutional arrangements are not neutral but in function of safeguarding liberal order. In other words, while liberal neutrality guarantees individual liberty to pursue good life, the absence of neutrality in the social contract makes that choice possible by preventing particular preferences from becoming universal rule of conduct. Thus, choosing liberal democracy instead of another form of governance is not a neutral choice. However, it may appear neutral for participants of liberal tradition who, speaking from within the tradition, take its constitutive elements for granted.7 For those, speaking from outside the tradition, the same elements may not look objective but biased.8 What are the elements of the tradition that the European Union is immersed into? At minimum, it is characterised by its supranational and quasi-federal structure, its horizontal and vertical separation of powers, independent judicial review, all that being subject to the Founding Treaties, a set of rules of a constitutional order and, not the least, its fundamental rights, liberties and values, make the EU a liberal democratic constitutional project. It also combines political ends and values with liberal economic governance. As I have argued elsewhere,9 the specific ontology of the EU and its ‘[r]ules on free movement, competition, the area of freedom, security and justice are not mere ends in themselves, but vehicles of the process of integration’. They serve, as the CJEU has stated, ‘to the implementation of the process of integration
traditionally opposed to the monarchy and the church, found themselves in the awkward position of siding with the king, against the people.’ (Zakaria, F., The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (revised edition), W. W. Norton & Company, Kindle edition, at p. 748) 6 Zakaria, F., ibid., at pp. 25, 26. 7 See Feyerabend, P., footnote 25. 8 See footnote 5. 9 Rodin, S., ‘Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions’, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 64, Issue 4, 2016, p. 815.
417 Siniša Rodin that is the raison d’être of the EU itself’.10 The above-mentioned constitutional choices of the EU also apply to the Member States.
II. Judicial independence, impartiality and neutrality are essential elements of constitutional liberalism. However, it is important to recognise that, while independence and impartiality are not tradition-sensitive and can operate across traditions, judicial neutrality is tradition-specific.11 Another difference between the three concepts is that independence and impartiality primarily refer to the question ‘how courts operate’, while neutrality primarily refers to the question ‘why’ or ‘to what end’. And, within the liberal tradition, the answer to that ‘why’ is to allow the citizens to pursue their individual ideas of good. Since that is possible only where a certain idea of good is not determined by majoritarian means and made the universal code of conduct, liberal neutrality is possible only once liberal order is secured on the constitutional level. Indeed, outside the tradition of constitutional liberalism, it would be possible to imagine courts that would be independent and impartial while not neutral. Conversely, in order to be neutral in liberal sense, courts cannot be neutral in constitutional sense. For example, to uphold equal treatment for men and women in a particular case, the principle of equal treatment needs to be secured on the constitutional level. The constitution needs to be biased towards equality and, what is more, courts have to act as agents of that principle. While that agency requires fidelity to laws that become neutral to participants of the liberal tradition, liberal neutrality may also necessitate tilting a balance between different rights in each individual case in order to protect a weaker party.12 At this point, it is important to distinguish judicial independence, impartiality and neutrality. The CJEU laid down the narrative of judicial independence in the Portuguese Judges case.13 The reference for a preliminary ruling from the Portuguese
10 Opinion 2/13 on accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, at para. 172. 11 This means that judicial neutrality is, on the one hand, specific for the tradition of constitutional liberalism and, on the other hand, that it is not necessarily exclusive for that tradition. In either case, it is always specific for the tradition within which it operates. 12 See, e.g. joined cases C-70/17 and C-179/17, Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA v Alberto Garcia Salamanca Santos and Bankia SA v Alfonso Antonio Lau Mendoza, Verônica Yuliana Rodriguez Ramirez, ECLI:EU:C:2019:250, at para. 57: ‘In that regard, the Court has held that such a substitution is fully justified in the light of the purpose of Directive 93/13. It is consistent with the objective of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, since that provision is intended to substitute for the formal balance established by the contract between the rights and obligations of the parties real balance re-establishing equality between them, not to annul all contracts containing unfair terms.’ 13 Case C-64/16 Associaçâo Sindical dos Juizes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
418 Judicial neutrality
Supreme Administrative Court inquired whether Article 19(1) TEU14 precludes general salary-reduction measures to be applied to national judges, in the concrete case members of the Court of Auditors. After having asserted the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU on which the EU is based, the Court continued to explain that the principle of mutual trust assumes ‘that Member States share a set of common values on which the European Union is founded’.15 The Court continued by stating that the EU is based on the rule of law, which is postulated in Article 2 TEU and given concrete expression by Article 19 TEU.16 More importantly, giving effect to the rule of law is to be achieved in collaboration of the CJEU and national courts, under the principle of sincere cooperation.17 The substance of the rule of law that the CJEU defined in this case is focused on the role of courts and legal remedies that ensure effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of EU law.18 It stems from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and is enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court concluded, in paragraphs 36 and 37, that ‘[t]he very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law’, which is incumbent on the Member States to ensure. Moreover, in order to be able to provide effective judicial protection, courts have to be independent and the guarantee of independence is inherent in adjudication19 and necessary for European judicial cooperation under Article 267 TFEU. In this way, the CJEU has expressed a normative claim of an absolute nature that national courts should follow the same set of values and the same standards as those defined by the CJEU. A tacit but possible consequence of non-compliance with this condition would be inadmissibility of preliminary references referred to the CJEU by national courts that are not independent within the meaning of well-established case law. As articulated by the CJEU, independence supposes: ‘that the body concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint
14 Art. 19(1) TEU reads: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.’ 15 Para. 30 of the judgment: ‘According to Article 2 TEU, the European Union is founded on values, such as the rule of law, which are common to the Member States in a society in which, inter alia, justice prevails. In that regard, it should be noted that mutual trust between the Member States and, in particular, their courts and tribunals is based on the fundamental premise that the Member States share a set of common values on which the European Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168)’. 16 Paras. 31 and 32. 17 Paras. 33 and 34. 18 Paras. 34 and 35. 19 Paras. 41 and 42.
419 Siniša Rodin or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions.’20 It also includes ‘protection against removal from office’ and ‘remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions’.21 As far as judicial impartiality is concerned, the CJEU, relying on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, identified two aspects. First, ‘the members of the tribunal themselves must be subjectively impartial, that is, none of its members must show bias or personal prejudice, there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary’. Second, ‘the tribunal must be objectively impartial, that is to say, it must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect’.22 Once requirements of judicial independence and impartiality are met and judges are bound only by law, the problem of neutrality still remains, the main problem being that participants to the tradition within which adjudication takes place may see some judicial decisions as neutral, while observers of that tradition may see it as biased. The reason why that is so, I will suggest, is that neutrality is tradition-specific. In not so frequent occasions where the Court of Justice overtly refers to neutrality, it does not always clearly distinguish it from independence and impartiality. Apparently, while independence and impartiality are defined objectively, neutrality seems to refer to appearance, that is, to how a court becomes to the observers.23 However, those objective characteristics seem to be a condition for creating an appearance of neutrality. Only a court that possesses such objective characteristics is capable of creating an appearance of neutrality in the eyes of observers. In the words of the CJEU, in order to be neutral, a court has to ‘dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it’.24 If courts are supposed to create an appearance of neutrality, what kind of judicial outcomes should they deliver and against what criteria should such outcomes be 20 Para. 44. 21 Para. 45. 22 Joined cases C-341/06 P and C 342/06 P, Chronopost, at point 54, ECLI:EU:C:2008:375. 23 See case C-216/18 PPU, LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, at para. 66: ‘Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it. In order to consider the condition regarding the independence of the body concerned as met, the case-law requires, inter alia, that dismissals of its members should be determined by express legislative provisions (judgment of 9 October 2014, TDC, C-222/13, EU:C:2014:2265, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).’ 24 See the Opinion of AG Tanchev in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551, at para. 116.
420 Judicial neutrality measured? Paul Feyerabend assumes that traditions are unaware of their historical grounding. For him, traditions are neither good nor bad, they just are. They assume desirable or undesirable properties only when compared with another tradition.25 However, as nothing stands in absolute isolation, there has to be at least some awareness, within the tradition, of the world-outside-tradition, a notional hors-tradition, or an imaginable absence of one’s own tradition. In that way, a tradition (re-)constitutes itself in opposition to notional hors-tradition, without having to be aware of particulars of any other specific tradition. In such circumstances, the criterion for determining desirable and undesirable outcomes is the tradition itself and only those outcomes that perpetuate the tradition are desirable. That is why the judiciary belonging to the tradition of constitutional liberalism defends and perpetuates that tradition when it delivers outcomes viewed as neutral from the liberal point of view. And the absence of such outcomes is perceived as a threat to the liberal tradition itself.
25 See Feyerabend, P., Against Method (third edition), London, 1993, p. 226: ‘A tradition assumes desirable or undesirable properties only when compared with some tradition, i.e. only when viewed by participants who see the world in terms of its values.’
421 Ihor Slidenko The concept of democracy in the context of new horizons of the Ukrainian Constitution. The philosophical and conceptual basis of the new Constitution
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW HORIZONS OF THE UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION
Ihor Slidenko J.S.D., Justice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine Trends in the development and improvement of modern constitutional regulation are manifested through the corresponding values that are typical of the western type of society, state, western civilisation in general. Given the historical retrospective and the stages of the formation of the rule of law and civil society, such values can be conventionally classified into modern and classical ones. The emergence of classical values has become a consequence of the long-term development and improvement of civil society and the state, but they still form the basis of western civilisation. They are the structural basis for the section about human rights of the new Constitution. The synergistic effect of the interaction of classical values leads to the emergence of new values that permeate all sections of the new Constitution. Among other things, their appearance is connected with the extraordinary dynamics of society, science, technology, the effects of globalisation, their influence on the state over the past half century. For both varieties of values, there are tendencies of development and dynamics of functioning, and they differ for each of the groups. For classical values, the main trend is the dynamics of their understanding, influence on social relations and realisation of public power and positioning of a person in the system of foundations of the state and society. Modern values, given the reasons of their appearance and tendencies, manifest themselves in the adaptation of the person to the existing parameters of the state and society. It should be noted, however, that the operation of the modern values is characterised by mutual influence: on the one hand, they adapt to existing realities, on the other hand, they cause modernisation influence on the above-mentioned elements. Both classical and modern values operate in a complex. Only the cumulative effect of these values makes the state itself European, that is, one that belongs to western civilisation. On the European continent, in particular, it gives it the ability to integrate into the European Union and, globally, to structures such as NATO, because these characteristics are crucial for joining such organisations. Given the certain conditionality of the division of these categories and their complex effects, they should be analysed in general, with emphasis, if necessary, on their origin. Some of the following values are of a purely legal nature, some of them
422 The concept of democracy in the context of new horizons of the Ukrainian Constitution. The philosophical and conceptual basis of the new Constitution are based on ethics, some of them have a mixed nature, but they all have a forming influence on the state and society and directly or indirectly find their expression in legal norms. These are the rules of supreme legal force, that is, constitutional ones. Thus, the new Constitution acts not so much as a system of norms, but as a system of values. (1) Multicultural pluralism, the maintenance of the diversity of identities, the denial of any form of nationalism. The basis of European civilisation as a multiplicity of different kinds of entities, operating within a single civilisation and legal space. Nationalism as a theory and practice contradicts the communitarian method, which is the basis of European integration. In the new Constitution, this approach is reflected, in particular, in the rules that establish a multiparty system, the prohibition of racial and any other discrimination in the legal field. (2) Openness and integration ability. This quality is crucial for the normal coexistence of the state on the international scene. It also makes the state a potential member of existing integrational entities. In the new Constitution, this approach is reflected, among other things, through the recognition of fundamental international principles. (3) Culture of peace (conflict resolution culture) and pacifism are the denial of violence as a way of solving internal and external state problems. It is one of the characteristics of the completeness of the legal system from the point of view of regulating social relations. It is a complex quality, which includes both legal components (ways of regulating social relations, legal culture) and ethical ones (civilisational and cultural features). (4) Ethics of capitalism (pragmatism, economy, free competition, value of labour). The basis of the liberal economy. The law is implemented directly through a declaration in the form of appropriate principles (free competition) or subjective rights (right to work). In the new Constitution, the approach is reflected by providing norms such as the establishment of the right to private property of means of production and land, antitrust law, some subjective rights (freedom to conduct business etc.). This aspect of the new Constitution is also revealed through the doctrine of the ‘constitutional economics’. The main idea is to determine the general influence of legal and economic factors on making decisions in the field of economic and social rights in the context of the relationship between the problems of the application of the Constitution and the structure, functioning of the economy. The constitutional economics reflects the approach according to which the solution of problems of state regulation of the economy must be found based not only on economic expediency, but also on the realities of the constitutional structure of the state. (5) Sustainable economic development for future generations. The purpose and tasks of the functioning of a liberal economy. However, sustainable economic development is not needed in itself, but for the development of human civilisation. A fundamentally new direction for the development of constitutional regulation. Its
423 Ihor Slidenko roots can be found in one of the main values of western civilisation, according to which the state must adhere to sustainable development in order to ensure future generations. The main idea is the synergy of the use of natural resources, scientific and technological revolution, human development and institutional improvement. The concept is manifested both at the national level and at local levels of government. At the national level, ‘sustainable development’ is manifested in the practical field, namely in forecasting, planning and extrapolation. The concept of ‘sustainable development of territories’ implies providing for the implementation of city-planning activities of security and favourable conditions for human life, limiting the negative impact of economic and other activities on the environment and ensuring the protection and rational use of natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations. The new Constitution implements these ideas as strategic principles and basis of the functioning of tax, customs, social policies, etc. (6) Rechtsstaat. The basic principle that defines law as a public value and subordinates all socially important relations to regulation by law. It defines the essence of the ‘state of law’. It is maybe declared in the new Constitution in the form of ‘state of law’. (7) Guarantees of property and the inviolability of private property. The basis of civil society, western mode of production and liberal economy. (8) Democracy. The basis of public authority and the way of its implementation. One of the defining characteristics of the modern state. It is implemented in the new Constitution through political rights. (9) Laicism (secular state). The separation of powers; public powers are divided into secular and spiritual. In the new Constitution, it is implemented by establishing the relationship between the state and the church, freedom of religion, etc. (10) Tolerance. The basis of civil society, the principle that solves the problem of relative conflict-free functioning within a multicultural pluralism. (11) Guarantees of minority rights. The defining feature of democracy, without which democracy loses its internal meaning and becomes a dictatorship. It is realised primarily in electoral law. (12) Guarantees of self-expression and approval as a unique member of society. The main principle of civil society, which forms the basic unit thereof – the type of the citizen. (13) Human rights guarantees. The basis of the relationship between the state and civil society. Subjective rights are crucial for the functioning of civil society, and guarantees are crucial for the ‘state of law’. (14) Social orientation and the responsibility of the state (protection of social outsiders). Definitive characteristic of the state, which establishes the responsibility of the state to individuals and civil society.
424 The concept of democracy in the context of new horizons of the Ukrainian Constitution. The philosophical and conceptual basis of the new Constitution (15) Social partnership and solidarity. The basis of the functioning of civil society, the essence of which is the ability to group together in order to jointly solve problems and implement plans. (16) Ecological safety. It determines the directions of the state’s activity in order to find balance between the development of the economy and the safe conditions of human existence in the natural environment. (17) Decentralisation and regionalism. The definitive characteristic of the territorial organisation of public power and organisation of the economy. Subsidiarity as a way of forming relations between central and local authorities. (18) Social choice. The basic idea is manifested through the methods of using the institutions of power by people to meet their own needs. The social choice is based on three main preconditions. The first one is individualism: people act in the political sphere, pursuing their personal interests. The second one is the concept of an ‘economic person’. The behaviour of the individual is rational. The rationality of the individual has universal significance in this theory. This means that all people – from voters to the president – are guided in their activities by an economic principle: ‘comparing marginal benefits and marginal costs’. The third one is the treatment of politics as an exchange process. In politics, people pay taxes in exchange for public goods. This exchange is not very rational. The state is an arena of competition for influence on decision making. However, the state is a special kind of market. Its members have unusual property rights: voters can choose representatives to higher state bodies, deputies can make laws, and officials can monitor their implementation. Voters and politicians are treated as individuals exchanging votes and election promises. Proponents of the theory of social choice have shown that one cannot rely on the results of voting, because they are largely dependent on the specific rules of decision making. Therefore, the new Constitution proposes a number of new approaches (mass collaboration etc.).
425 Gheorghe Stan The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION AND BALANCE OF STATE POWERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, REFLECTED IN THE RECENT CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Gheorghe Stan Judge of the Constitutional Court of Romania
INTRODUCTION The 1991 Constitution of Romania did not expressly provide for the principle of the separation of state powers, but it organised the authorities according to its requirements. As a result, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Romania also reflected this concept, ruling on the separation of state powers as an implicit constitutional principle. Following the revision of the Romanian Constitution in 2003, this principle was enshrined expressis verbis in Article 1(4), as follows: ‘The State shall be organised based on the principle of the separation and balance of powers – legislative, executive and judicial – within the framework of constitutional democracy.’ It is found that, by taking into account the difficulties identified in the operation of a pure model, i.e. of the rigid separation of powers, the Romanian framers supplemented the classical principle by adding the ‘balance’ component with regard to State powers. In its case law after 2003, the Constitutional Court of Romania interpreted and applied the constitutional text of reference by taking into consideration its current, modern configuration and its features, which turn it into an integrator of the other constitutional norms and provisions in the national legal order. In time, the centre of gravity of the classical theory of the separation of powers has shifted towards the idea of balance and collaboration between state powers, collaboration that must be governed by mutual respect and constitutional loyalty. Thus, the Court developed, through its case law, an implicit constitutional sub-principle, i.e. of constitutional loyalty, subsumed within the rule of law, governed by the separation and balance of powers. Most often, constitutional loyalty was invoked while settling legal conflicts of a constitutional nature, the power of the Court also introduced through the revision of the Constitution.1
1 According to Article 146(e) of the Romanian Constitution, the Constitutional Court ‘decides on legal disputes of a constitutional nature between public authorities, at the request of the President of Romania, the President of either of the Chambers, the Prime Minister, or the President of the Superior Council of Magistracy’.
426 The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court Given the breadth and complexity of the issues related to the topic subject to analysis, as well as the fact that it can imply numerous distinctions, in this study, we shall refer to a segment of legal relationships between authorities belonging to the executive, legislative and judicial powers, namely the one circumscribed to the law-making process in a broad sense, while also highlighting, in specific contexts, the developments of the sub-principle of constitutional loyalty. We shall thus analyse, from the perspective of the above-mentioned principle, who is competent to legislate according to the Romanian Constitution and what are the limits of this competence. It seems simple, but the cases settled by the Constitutional Court of Romania show that the Constitutional Court had to intervene in order to impose delineations, from this perspective, between the Parliament, the Government and the courts of law, and to state the importance of their loyal constitutional conduct. We shall, therefore, refer distinctly to the relationships between the Parliament and the Government, between the Parliament and the courts of law, as well as to the principle of constitutional loyalty, in relation to the topic of lawmaking.
I. THE PARLIAMENT’S COMPETENCE VERSUS THE GOVERNMENT’S COMPETENCE IN TERMS OF LAWMAKING According to Article 61(1) of the Romanian Constitution, the Parliament is the supreme representative body and the sole legislative authority of the country. As a result, the Parliament represents legislative power, and the concept ‘legislator’ implies first and foremost the Parliament. In exercising executive power, the Government does not have the right of primary regulation of social relations, but only to adopt secondary legislation. However, the Constitution of Romania establishes, by Article 108(3) and Article 115(1) to (3), the competence of the Government to issue ordinances, therefore, a regulatory competence derived from an enabling law, adopted by the Parliament, and, by the provisions contained in Article 115(4) to (6), the competence of the Government to issue emergency ordinances, by which it adopts norms with the power of laws, under the conditions expressly provided for by the constitutional norm itself. Therefore, according to the Romanian Basic Law, the role of a legislator is also, exceptionally, entrusted to the Government, which is, however, a delegated legislator, which can act only in the situations and conditions expressly provided for by Article 115 of the Constitution, which regulates legislative delegation. Over time, both the Parliament and the Government have ‘exceeded’ the scope of their powers in the sense that the Parliament tried to ‘legislate’ by adopting individual acts, in breach of the jurisdiction of the Government/administrative authorities, or the Government tried to replace the Parliament, in violation of the limits of legislative delegation. By the decisions delivered, the Constitutional Court of
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Romania sanctioned these behaviours, finding the unconstitutionality of the adopted acts, in relation to the principle of the separation and balance of state powers. Thus, regarding the first hypothesis, i.e. of exceeding the limits of competence of the Parliament, we note situations in which, for example, attempts were made to regulate, by law, the legal situation of a series of assets that belonged to the former sovereign of Romania, Michael I,2 to grant a house to a general,3 to establish a high school4 or a publishing house.5 The Court found the unconstitutionality of the laws thus adopted, noting, in essence, that the law, as a legal act of the Parliament, regulates general social relationships, being, through its constitutional essence and purpose, an act with general applicability. By definition, the law, as a legal act of power, is unilateral in nature, expressing solely the will of the legislator, while its content and form are determined by the need to regulate a certain field of social relationships and by the specificity thereof. However, insofar as the scope of the regulation is determined concretely, given the intuitu personae reason of the regulation, it is individual in nature, being intended not to be applied to an unlimited number of concrete cases, depending on their compatibility with the hypothesis of the norm, but, de plano, to a single case, preset without any ambiguity.6 The Parliament, by appropriating to itself the competence to legislate, under the conditions, in the field and with the purpose pursued, violated the principle of the separation and balance of state powers, enshrined in Article 1(4) of the Constitution, flaw that affects the law as a whole. The Court also held that the fact of accepting the idea that the Parliament may exercise its legislative authority in a discretionary manner, at any time and under any conditions, adopting laws in fields that belong exclusively to acts of a non-statutory, administrative nature, would amount to a deviation from the constitutional prerogatives of this authority, enshrined in Article 61(1) of the Constitution, and to its transformation into an executive public authority.
2 Decision No 600 of 9 November 2005, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 1060 of 26 November 2005. 3 Decision No 970 of 31 October 2007, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 796 of 22 November 2007. 4 Decision No 118 of 19 March 2018, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 367 of 27 April 2018. 5 In this case, we are talking about a law approving an emergency ordinance with this subject, see Decision No 249 of 19 April 2018, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 456 of 31 May 2018. 6 Decision No 600 of 9 November 2005, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 1060 of 26 November 2005; Decision No 970 of 31 October 2007, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 796 of 22 November 2007; Decision No 494 of 21 November 2013, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 819 of 21 December 2013; Decision No 574 of 16 October 2014, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 889 of 8 December 2014, para. 21; Decision No 68 of 27 February 2017, para. 78; or Decision No 777 of 28 November 2017, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 1011 of 20 December 2018, para. 24.
428 The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court As regards the second hypothesis, namely the overcoming of the limits of competence of the Government, we would point out that the issue of legislative delegation, to which we referred and which allows the Government, in the cases provided for by the constitutional text, to intervene in the sphere of competence of the Parliament,7 is quite sensitive. Over time and with reference to various successive Governments, an attempt to substitute the Parliament in the legislative field making was criticised, through the frequency of adopting simple or emergency ordinances. Dealing with emergency ordinances thus adopted, the Constitutional Court of Romania found that, as expressly provided for in Article 115 of the Constitution, the regulation by way of ordinances and emergency ordinances is a power exercised by the Government on the basis of legislative delegation, and the overcoming of the limits of that delegation, laid down by the text of the Constitution itself, represents an interference that is not permitted in the Parliament’s legislative competence, in other words, an infringement of the principle of the separation of powers.8 It also led the Constitutional Court of Romania to develop, by way of case law, an implicit limit in the field of the adoption of emergency ordinances, holding that it is unconstitutional to ‘adopt emergency ordinances only in order to counteract legislative policy measures’, therefore, a law adopted by the Parliament. The Court found both the infringement of the principle of the separation of powers and of the Parliament’s role, as enshrined in Article 61(1) of the Constitution, and of the conditions for the adoption of emergency ordinances, provided for by Article 115(4) of the Constitution.9 In our opinion, the assessment of the extent to which the Government proceeds to such ‘counteraction’ of the legislative authority requires a complex analysis, covered by the assessment of the emergency and of the extraordinary situation in which the Government has the constitutional authorisation to intervene, including in view of amending a law adopted by the Parliament, postponing its effects or even repealing it. In any case, legislative delegation continues to give rise to controversy, a proof being the most recent referendum initiated by the President of Romania, as well as a recent initiative to revise the Constitution of parliamentary roots, both of which aiming to limit the areas of lawmaking through emergency ordinance, by excluding offences and penalties.10 The Constitutional Court of Romania found the constitutionality of the revision initiative, recalling also the similar legislative proposal to revise the Constitution, initiated in 2014, when it was found that such a regulatory solution would not breach the limits of the revision of the Basic Law. Similarly, the recommendations of the Venice Commission, since 2012, are in the
7 As long as, from the material point of view, of the substantive legal content, simple or emergency Government ordinances have force of law, being considered as primary regulatory acts. 8 Decision No 544 of 28 June 2006, Official Gazette No 568 of 30 July 2006. 9 Decision No 842/2009, Official Gazette No 464 of 6 July 2009. 10 See Judgment No 2/2019, unpublished, www.ccr.ro, and Decision No 464/2019, Official Gazette No 646 of 5 August 2019.
429 Gheorghe Stan direction of resolving this problem, being also noticed the fact that one of the reasons for the excessive use of such ordinances appears to be reflected in the cumbersome legislative procedures within the Parliament.11 As a result, both authorities, the Parliament and the Government, need to work together and act in a spirit of constitutional loyalty, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the constitutional texts that transcend the limits of their respective legislative powers.
II. THE PARLIAMENT’S LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE VERSUS THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF LAW COURTS According to the principle of the separation of powers, law courts exercise judicial power and they cannot exercise any powers within the sphere of legislative power, i.e. of the Parliament, nor of executive power, to wit, in the case of Romania, of the Government and the President. However, there have been situations where law courts have burnt their prerogatives within the sphere of legislative power, which resulted in finding legal conflicts of a constitutional nature, triggered by the violation of the principle of the separation of powers. Thus, for instance, in a case resolved in 201812 concerning a legal conflict of a constitutional nature between the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the Parliament, the Court admitted the referral brought by the Prime Minister of the Government of Romania and found ‘the existence of a legal conflict of a constitutional nature between the Parliament, on the one hand, and the High Court of Cassation and Justice, on the other hand, generated by the decisions of the Governing College of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, starting with Judgment No 3/2014, according to which only 4 of the 5 members of the 5 Judge Panels were appointed by drawing lots, contrary to what is laid down in Article 32 of Law No 304/2004 regarding judicial organisation, as amended and supplemented by Law No 255/2013’. The High Court of Cassation and Justice did so on the basis of its own previously mentioned judgments, in disregard of the express provisions of the law. Thus, although a statutory provision entered into force on 1 February 2014,13 according to which ‘Judges forming part of
11 CDL-AD(2012)026-rom. The Opinion on the compatibility with constitutional principles and the Rule of Law of actions taken by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in respect of other state institutions and on the Government emergency ordinance on amendment to Law No 47/1992 regarding the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court and on the Government emergency ordinance on amending and completing Law No 3/2000 regarding the organisation of a referendum of Romania, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 93rd Plenary Session (Venice, 14–15 December 2012), para. 79. 12 Decision No 685 of 7 November 2018, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 1021 of 29 November 2018. 13 Law No 255/2013, which, by Article 72(9), amended Article 32(1), (4) and (5) of Law No 304/2004.
430 The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court these panels [5 Judge Panels – our emphasis] are appointed by drawing lots, at the public hearing, by the President or, in his absence, by the Vice-President of the High Court of Cassation and Justice’, by Decision No 3/2014 of the Governing College of the High Court of Cassation and Justice being established a practice maintained until the case was referred to the Constitutional Court of Romania, by which one of the members of the 5 Judge Panels was a person among the heads of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (President, Vice-President, Division President). Thus, there has been created and maintained an obvious optical difference between the intention of the legislator, expressed by law, and the interpretation given to that will, expressed by an administrative act. While the law established that all judges belonging to the panel are drawn by lots, the administrative act has limited/limits the scope of the law for almost 5 years. With regard to this conduct, the Constitutional Court of Romania held, in essence, that ‘the very atypical positioning of the supreme court towards the Parliament, from 1 February 2014 to the present, denotes a disregard both of the obligation to comply with the laws, laid down in Article 1(5) of the Constitution and of the rule of law requirements, more exactly of constitutional loyalty – intrinsic element of this one – which the supreme court must demonstrate … The High Court of Cassation and Justice, by Judgments No 3/2014 and No 89/2018 of the Governing College, has amended, by way of an administrative act, a law adopted by the Parliament, which means that there is an opposition/counteraction of the legislative policy.’ The Court also held that ‘the way in which the members of the 5 Judge Panels are appointed, to wit, by a mechanism circumventing the law, establishing “lawful members” – who does not exist in the law – in conjunction with the refusal to apply the new law shows that the court is not currently composed according to the law and calls into question the independence and objective impartiality of these panels’. By resolving the conflict, the Court established the conduct to be followed as follows: ‘The High Court of Cassation and Justice shall immediately proceed to the appointment by drawing lots of all members of the 5 Judge Panels, in compliance with Article 32 of Law No 304/2004 regarding judicial organisation, as amended and completed by Law No 207/2018.’ That case led the Constitutional Court of Romania to recall that the principle of the separation of powers requires a certain constitutional order, grafted on the activity giving rise to primary rules of the Parliament, the other branches of the public power having the competence to implement those rules; only the Constitutional Court is allowed to establish their unconstitutionality and thus to remove them from the active substance of the primary legislation. By contrast, the other public authorities cannot supplement, amend or repeal the Parliament’s legislative acts (except for the Government, when it acts as delegated legislator), neither by administrative acts nor by judicial decisions. Each of the public authorities must set themselves within the limits of their own competence and not give rise to legislative powers. Constitutional order, as enshrined in the
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Basic Law, cannot be disregarded by the public authorities themselves which are vested to defend it; in such a situation, namely when an authority, through concrete action, opposes the Parliament’s legislative policy, its institutional positioning is generated outside of constitutional order and its re-establishment can be achieved both through law courts and through the Constitutional Court. A similar conduct of the High Court of Cassation and Justice was penalised by the Court also in another case, settled in 2009,14 when it responded to the request of the President of Romania to rule on the existence of a legal dispute of a constitutional nature between, on the one hand, the judicial authority, represented in that case by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, and the Parliament of Romania and the Government of Romania, on the other hand, dispute created by the way in which the courts decided to exercise their constitutional prerogatives in the resolution of certain disputes concerning the grant of salary rights, by creating legal rules, which is the prerogative of the Parliament and, in certain situations, strictly circumscribed by the Constitution, of the Government. In that case, ruling on appeals in the interest of the law based on the non-unified practice of courts with regard to the granting of certain salary rights of judges, prosecutors, other magistrates, financial judges, financial prosecutors, financial controllers or specialised auxiliary staff of the courts and prosecution offices, the High Court of Cassation and Justice did not confine itself to the clarification of the meaning of legal rules or of their field of application. The Supreme Court, citing legislative technique irregularities – failure to comply with the provisions of Law No 24/2000 – or unconstitutional irregularities – breach of the legislative delegation rules – reinstated rules that had ceased to apply, as they had been repealed by normative acts of the legislative authority. However, such a legal operation can only be carried out by the legislative authority (the Parliament or the Government, as the case may be), the only authority empowered to establish the necessary solutions in this matter. The Constitutional Court ascertained ‘the existence of a legal dispute of a constitutional nature between the judicial authority, on the one hand, and the Parliament of Romania and the Government of Romania, on the other’. At the same time, the Court held that, in exercising the powers laid down in Article 126(3) of the Constitution, the High Court of Cassation and Justice had the duty to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the law by all courts, in accordance with the fundamental principle of the separation and balance of powers enshrined in Article 1(4) of the Constitution of Romania. The High Court of Cassation and Justice had no constitutional jurisdiction to establish, amend or repeal laws or regulations or to review their constitutionality.
14 Decision No 838 of 27 May 2009 on the case brought by Mr Traian Băsescu, the President of Romania, on the existence of a legal dispute of a constitutional nature between the judicial authority, represented by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, and the Parliament of Romania and the Government of Romania, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 461 of 3 July 2009.
432 The principle of the separation and balance of state powers within the framework of constitutional democracy, reflected in the recent case law of the Constitutional Court In other cases, in the exercise of its power to resolve exceptions of unconstitutionality, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional certain legal provisions likely to result in the courts’ jurisdiction being exceeded to the detriment of the legislative authority. We refer to Decision No 818 of 3 July 2008, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 537 of 16 July 2008, whereby the Court declared unconstitutional, inter alia, the provisions of Article 27(1) of Government Ordinance No 137/2000 on preventing and sanctioning all forms of discrimination, republished in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 99 of 8 February 2007, in so far as they were understood as meaning that the courts had jurisdiction to annul or refuse the application of legislative acts that have the force of law, on the grounds that they were discriminatory, and to replace them with rules created by means of jurisdiction or by provisions contained in other normative acts. The Court held that such a meaning given to these legal provisions, whereby the courts would be given jurisdiction to abolish legal rules laid down by law and to create instead other rules or to substitute them with rules contained in other normative acts, was manifestly unconstitutional, since it infringed the principle of the separation of powers enshrined in Article 1(4) of the Constitution and the provisions of Article 61(1), according to which the Parliament is the sole legislative authority of the country. By virtue of those constitutional texts, the Parliament and, through legislative delegation, under Article 115 of the Constitution, the Government have the power to establish, amend and repeal legal rules of general application. The courts do not have such a power, since their constitutional mission is to achieve justice – Article 126(1) of the Basic Law – i.e. to settle, under the law, disputes between subjects of law relating to the existence, scope and exercise of their individual rights.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY, AN IMPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE The above-mentioned cases have given rise to reliance upon and the characterisation by the Constitutional Court of Romania of the principle of constitutional loyalty. The Court held, in essence, that this principle involved, on the part of the public authorities, constitutional behaviours and practices, which have a background in the constitutional order, viewed as a set of principles underpinning the social, political and legal relations of society. In other words, this constitutional normative order has a broader meaning than the positive rules laid down by the legislator, constituting the constitutional culture specific to a national community. Therefore,loyal cooperation means, beyond respect for the law, the mutual respect of the authorities/institutions of the State, as an expression of certain assimilated, undertaken and promoted constitutional values, with a view to ensuring balance between the powers of the State.
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Constitutional loyalty can, therefore, be characterised as an intrinsic value-principle of the Basic Law, while loyal cooperation between state authorities/institutions plays a defining role in the implementation of the Constitution.15 As we have pointed out, constitutional loyalty appears to be an implicit constitutional principle, developed in case law, and, in the light of its importance for the rule of law, it seems to us that it would be necessary to have it even explicitly enshrined, in the context of a future revision of the Constitution of Romania.
CONCLUSIONS In this contribution, examples have been selected that have been assessed as being most relevant for the analysed segment of legal relationships. Of course, this subject is much broader. However, these examples, together with all the case law developed in the interpretation and application of the principle of the separation of powers, show that, regardless of how clear the rules of a Constitution are and regardless how deeply rooted in the democratic culture are the principles underlying the Constitution, situations may arise in which the authorities exceed the limits of their constitutional jurisdiction, situations of the misuse of power. This reveals, on the one hand, the usefulness of enshrining the principle of the separation of powers in the State amongst the constitutional principles, with all due nuances and developments, and, on the other hand, the important role played by constitutional courts, called, in their capacity of guarantors of the supremacy of the constitution, to restore constitutional harmony by defining the limits of competence of public authorities. This is all the more so since no constitution can contain explicit solutions for all situations that may arise in practice in the evolution of society, and it is absolutely necessary to have a formal, authoritative interpretation of its provisions during such dynamic evolution. As noted in legal literature, ‘the Constitution inevitably uses some concepts or principles which, through their content, constitute in reality a genuine legislative delegation to the interpreter. There are concepts that allow for the expansion of the constitutional provisions, the content of which, undefined by the constitutional legislator, varies depending on developments in the social environment.’16 The binding nature of Constitutional Court’s decisions serves, from this point of view, to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, while respect for the Constitution by all public authorities is vital for the existence of the rule of law.
15 Decision No 611/2017, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 877 of 7 November 2017, para. 107. 16 Vida, I. ‘Obligativitatea deciziilor Curţii Constituţionale pentru instanţele judecătoreşti – factor de stabilitate a Constituţiei şi a practicii judiciare’, Pandectele române, No 3/2004, p. 202.
434 Andrzej Szmyt Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland
IMPACT OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE SHAPE OF PARLIAMENTARY LAW IN POLAND
Prof. Dr. Hab. Andrzej Szmyt Department of Constitutional Law and Political Institutions at the University of Gdansk, Poland
I. In accordance with Article 173 of the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997,1 courts and tribunals are separate and independent from other authorities. The decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal are universally binding and final (Art. 190(1)). In accordance with Article 188 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal shall adjudicate, among others, regarding the following matters: (1) the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the Constitution; (2) the conformity of statutes to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by the statute; (3) the conformity of legal provisions issued by central state organs to the Constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland in Article 10 determines that the system of government of the Republic of Poland is based on the division and balance between legislative, executive and judiciary powers, with ‘legislative power vested in the Sejm and the Senate’. The issues concerning legislative power are primarily governed by Chapter IV of the Constitution (‘The Sejm and the Senate’), including the organisation and operation of the parliament (Art. 109 to Art. 124), in particular, Article 112, according to which ‘The internal organisation and conduct of work of the Sejm and the procedure for appointment and operation of its organs as well as the manner of performance of obligations, both constitutional and statutory, by State organs in relation to the Sejm, shall be specified in the rules of procedure adopted by the Sejm.’ In addition, the Constitution stipulates that the citizen’s right to obtain information on the activities of the Sejm and the Senate is implemented in the manner specified by their rules of procedure (Art. 61(4)). The Constitution also provides that the National Assembly (the Sejm and the Senate sitting in joint sessions in cases specified in the Constitution) adopts its own rules of procedure (Art. 114) and that the provisions of Articles 110, 112, 113 and 120 of the Constitution shall be applied in regard to the Senate, respectively.
1 The Official Journal of Laws Dziennik Ustaw, No 78, Item 483, with later amendments.
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The provisions of the Constitution thus outline the foundations of parliamentary law, although one can note doctrinal differences in its making.2
II. For the purposes of this contribution, it is sufficient to indicate that, in a narrow sense, parliamentary law is understood as the internal law of the parliament regulating its nature, significance and content of the chambers’ Standing Orders, so mainly matters concerning the parliament’s internal structure, organisation and mode of operation. In a broader sense, parliamentary law may also include, in particular, issues concerning electoral law, the legal status of a deputy and a senator, or even the legislative process in the phase preceding the submission of a bill to the Sejm, but functionally related to the parliamentary phase. It should be emphasised that the constitutional provisions have priority in the discussed matters. Additionally, irrespective of parliamentary regulations, the statutes inseparably related to parliamentary law in the narrow sense are of significant importance. The examples of such statutes are the Act of 9 May 1996 on the exercise of the mandate of a deputy and a senator,3 the Act of 24 June 1999 on the exercise of legislative initiative by citizens4 or the Act of 21 January 1999 on the investigative committee.5 For the purposes of this contribution, it is irrelevant whether parliamentary law is only part of constitutional law or a separate branch of law. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the role of the so-called judicial lawmaking (‘Richter-Recht’). In Polish constitutional practice, it is primarily the case law of the Constitutional Tribunal. It seems that it is not accurate to reduce the role of the Tribunal to the so-called negative legislator. This matter, due to its significance, has already been the subject to the current doctrinal reflection.6 Having in mind the addressees of this contribution as well as the permissible volume of the text, the following comments will be only sketchy but pointing to significant examples of importance – in Polish constitutional practice – of the Constitutional Tribunal’s jurisprudence in regard to parliamentary law. In many cases, the Constitutional Tribunal has clarified quite general provisions of the Constitution.7 Numerous
2 Among rich literature on the issue, see, in particular, Czeszejko-Sochacki, Z., Prawo parlamentarne w Polsce, Warszawa, 1997; Szymanek J. (ed.), Wielki słownik parlamentarny, Warszawa, 2018. 3 The Official Journal of Laws Dziennik Ustaw, 2011, No 7, Item 29, with later amendments. 4 The Official Journal of Laws Dziennik Ustaw, No 62, Item 688, with later amendments. 5 The Official Journal of Laws Dziennik Ustaw, 2016, Item 1024, with later amendments. 6 As particularly important, the following should be mentioned: Zubik, M., ‘Prawo parlamentarne i postępowanie ustawodawcze w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’, in Zubik, M., Księga XX-lecia orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, Warszawa, 2006; Karp, J. and Szymanek, J., ‘Wpływ orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego na kształtowanie się prawa parlamentarnego’, Przegląd Sejmowy, No 4, 2009. 7 Zubik, M., footnote 6, p. 718.
436 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland examples of ‘parliamentary’ judgments can be found in regard to virtually all areas of parliamentary law including parliamentary autonomy, mutual relations between the two chambers – the Sejm and the Senate, the functions of the parliament and methods of their implementation, the intra-chamber rules of procedure and the sources of parliamentary law.8 A comprehensive presentation and analysis of these issues would require an extensive monograph. For the sake of accuracy, it should be emphasised that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal in matters of parliamentary law has its origins in the period before the political transformation and the adoption of the Polish Constitution of 1997.
III. There has never been any doubt that the parliamentary Standing Orders – in principle – contain legal norms, so they are subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal (today Art. 188(3) of the Constitution). However, problems could ad hoc arise in regard to other resolutions of the Sejm. As an example, the Sejm’s resolution of 1 July 1994 on the mode of work on the act on the ratification of the Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland9 can be mentioned, where the Constitutional Tribunal discontinued the proceedings because of the assessment that this resolution was not of a normative but individual and procedural nature.10 On the other hand, in the case of parliamentary resolutions establishing investigative committees, the Constitutional Tribunal recognised its cognition and its jurisprudence became an extremely important factor contributing to the model of establishing and functioning of such committees. The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 September 2006 (case U 4/06)11 was of fundamental importance for parliamentary law and further political practice. The Constitutional Tribunal noticed 8 A number of these issues may appear as part of the broader issue of law-making rules in a democratic state ruled by law and have more general literature, see Chojnacka, I. (ed.), Proces prawotwórczy w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Wypowiedzi Trybunału Konstytucyjnego dotyczące zagadnień związanych z procesem legislacyjnym, XIV ed., Warszawa, 2015, p. 310; Czeszejko-Sochacki, Z., ‘O niektórych problemach konstytucyjnej procedury legislacyjnej’, in Garlicki, L., Konstytucja, wybory, parlament, Warszawa, 2000; Sokolewicz, W., ‘Niektóre zagadnienia procedur parlamentarnych w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’, in Trybunał Konstytucyjny. Księga XV-lecia, series Studia i Materiały, Vol. XV, Warszawa, 2001; Szymanek, J., ‘Senat a Trybunał Konstytucyjny. Współzależność w kształtowaniu systemu prawnego państwa’, Przegląd Legislacyjny, No 4, 2004. 9 The Official Journal of Laws Monitor Polski, No 39, Item 326. 10 For more, see Zubik, M., footnote 6, pp. 696–697; case U 5/94 and the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 December 1994, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 1994, Part II, Item 41. 11 The judgment was published in the Official Journal of Laws Monitor Polski, No 66, Item 680; the judgment with the explanatory note was published in Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, series A, 2006, No 8, Item 109; for more, see Szmyt, A., ‘Komisja śledcza. Komentarz (do wyroku z dnia 22 września 2006 r., U 4/06)’, in Garlicki, L., Derlatka, M., et al. (ed.), Na straży państwa prawa. Trzydzieści lat orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, Warszawa, 2016, pp. 590–609.
437 Andrzej Szmyt that the above-mentioned resolution provides ‘supplementary’ provisions in relation to ‘general and incomplete’ Article 7(1) of the Act on the Sejm Investigative Committee. By the way of understanding the ‘normativity’ of such resolutions, the Constitutional Tribunal has modelled its cognition towards the Sejm’s resolutions on the appointment of investigative committees. In addition to resolving the problem of its cognition in relation to the Sejm’s resolutions, the Constitutional Tribunal significantly referred in its judgment to such fundamental issues of parliamentary law as relations between the Standing Orders and statutes or the understanding of the control function of the Sejm.
I V. In many of its rulings, the Constitutional Tribunal has referred to the issue of parliamentary autonomy. Article 112 of the current Constitution expressis verbis formulates the principle of the regulatory autonomy of each chamber; however, it is worth pointing out that the Constitutional Tribunal referred to it even before the adoption of the Constitution in 1997. Particular significance can be attributed to the decision of 26 January 1993 in case U 10/92.12 The Constitutional Tribunal assumed that the principle of the parliament’s autonomy in the sphere of its internal relations is nowadays one of the basic, unquestioned principles determining the position of the parliament in the system of state organs. Its existence in democratic countries is independent of the adopted model of government. It is of fundamental importance for ensuring the parliament an independent position in systems based on the principle of the separation of powers. It emphasised that the autonomy of the parliament consists above all of its right to adopt the Standing Orders independently, specifying the internal organisation and functioning of the parliament. The parliament should adopt these regulations in the form of a resolution, which excludes the influence of external factors (the executive – the government and head of state, but also the second chamber of the legislature) on their content. This allows to maintain balance in relations between the legislature and other authorities. In the above-mentioned judgment, the Constitutional Tribunal emphasised that the provisions of the Constitution, constituting the basis of the parliament’s autonomy, oblige the Sejm and the Senate to regulate the indicated matters in their Standing Orders. At the same time, it determines the exclusive form of a resolution to regulate these matters, which precludes their regulation in the form of a statute. In this case, the principle of the parliament’s autonomy justifies the introduction of an exception to the principle of the unlimited scope of a statute. The Constitution – in the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal – does not prohibit the regulation of non-listed matters (Art. 61(4), Art. 112 and Art. 123(2)) in the Standing Orders; however, the regulations
12 Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 1993, Part I, Item 25. On the side lines of statutory autonomy, it should be added that parliamentary autonomy also means personal, budgetary and territorial autonomy, see Karp, J. and Szymanek, J., footnote 6, p. 147; Zubik, M., footnote 6, p. 698.
438 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland may not, in turn, encroach on matters reserved for statutes, in particular, regarding the rights and obligations of an individual. Additionally, it cannot confer authority on the Sejm and its organs or impose new obligations on other public authorities. The Constitutional Tribunal has pointed out that the Constitution leaves a wide margin of discretion to the Sejm as to how to regulate the premises and mode of action within the chamber, e.g. in regard to the dismissal of its organs or the forms of the organisation of deputies in the Sejm (rules for creating clubs, circles and teams and conducting their activities and their representation in parliamentary bodies). However, by adopting the Standing Orders, the Sejm becomes bound by its provisions. Thus, deputies and senators must follow them as long as it is binding. However, they can change them partially or completely at any time. The principle of legality in the legislative activity of the parliament cannot be limited only to stating a general legitimacy to exercise legislative power (or to observe only constitutional rules of lawmaking). It is associated with the need to comply with all applicable ‘game rules’. The understanding of the nature of the parliamentary Standing Orders prompted the Constitutional Tribunal – in its judgment in case U 10/92 – to determine certain limits of its jurisdiction in regard to these acts. According to the Constitutional Tribunal, the review of the compliance of the entire content of the Standing Orders with the Constitution cannot raise any doubts, because the rule of law requires that all laws must be in accordance with the Constitution. However, the nature of parliamentary autonomy requires the Constitutional Tribunal to maintain ‘special restraint’ in reviewing norms established in matters of this autonomy. It should be assumed that, while establishing certain provisions regarding its own organisation and mode of operation, the parliament has a wide margin of discretion. Therefore, in these areas, the Constitutional Tribunal should take into account the particularly strong presumption that the regulations are in conformity with the Constitution. On the other hand, if constitutional provisions leave certain interpretative gaps, the Constitutional Tribunal should give priority to the interpretation adopted in practice of bodies applying the Constitution.13 Another dimension – which will be discussed below – is the issue of the ‘non-compliance’ of the Standing Orders with statutes. On another occasion, however, the Constitutional Tribunal pointed out14 that the principle of regulatory autonomy does not mean that the Sejm and the Senate have the right to provide the legal interpretation of the constitutional concepts of parliamentary law. The final and binding interpretation of constitutional provisions – also in these matters – belongs to the Constitutional Tribunal. Regulatory autonomy cannot create a risk of excessive, uncontrolled independence of the parliament, which goes beyond the constitutional framework of the freedom to shape the provisions of the Standing Orders.
13 See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 February 1999, case K 25/98, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 1999, No 2, Item 23. 14 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 March 2004, case K 37/03, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 3/A/2004, Item 21.
439 Andrzej Szmyt
The Constitutional Tribunal accepted the admissibility of the entry into force of resolutions amending the Standing Orders upon their adoption so before their announcement in the Official Journal of Laws Monitor Polski. This is justified by the fact that the provisions of the Standing Orders usually refer to the behaviour of deputies in the Sejm and its organs and thus may be directly known or communicated to them. The adopted formula is to express this feature of the Standing Orders, which is called the ‘necessary flexibility’. In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ‘immediate’ entry into force of the norms of the parliamentary Standing Orders is not prevented by axiomatic considerations and the social effectiveness of the adopted legal norms, which, with regard to the ‘universally’ binding provisions, make the validity of legal norms subject to their prior publication, and from the appropriate vacatio legis.
V. When analysing aspects of the parliamentary regulatory autonomy, the Constitutional Tribunal noticed a very complex problem of the relations between the Standing Orders and statutes. In the ruling in case U 10/92, the Tribunal emphasised that a statute may not encroach on matters passed by the Constitution to be regulated by the Standing Orders of the Sejm. This would be a clear violation of the Constitution. In other words, the constitutional provisions in force introduce an exception from the rule that matters of creation, competences and mode of operation of state organs shall be regulated in a statute by providing for the autonomous, non-statutory legislative activity of the Sejm. This exclusivity of the Sejm to regulate a certain range of matters, as well as freedom in regard to the manner of doing it, constitutes the content of the principle of the autonomy of the Sejm’s Standing Orders. In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Standing Orders of the Sejm is not an executive act in relation to a statute. It is an independent act, issued directly on the basis of the Constitution and, in this sense, it can also be treated as an executive act to the Constitution. In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, the relationship between the Sejm’s Standing Orders and statutes cannot generally be considered as the relation of one type of the Sejm’s normative act (statute) to another (resolution). The relationship between a statute and the Standing Orders is a relation of a general act to a specific individual act of a clearly limited subject matter, which includes the organisation and mode of operation of the Sejm. The ‘statute–Standing Orders’ relationship is not the relation of the Standing Orders to any statute, but only to statutes whose content is relevant to the parliament. If a statute regulates the same matters and there is a contradiction between the provisions of the statute and the provisions of the Standing Orders, the first question to consider should be whether the provisions contained in the statute fall within the constitutional scope of the Standing Orders. If the answer to this question is positive, and there is a real contradiction between the Standing Orders and the statute, there may be a problem of the conformity of the Standing Orders with
440 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland the statute, but the statute with the Constitution. The non-compliance of the Standing Orders with the statute can only be considered in regard to provisions that exceed the scope of the regulation provided for in the Constitution and enter into the matters reserved for the statute. The basic problem is, therefore, the precise determination of the limits of regulation in the Standing Orders. The Constitutional Tribunal has made several statements on the understanding of constitutional provisions relating to matters of internal organisation and the mode of operation of the Sejm, which explicitly indicate a statute as an act competent to regulate these matters. It concerns the provisions of Article 105(6) (detailed rules and procedure for prosecution of MPs), Article 111(2) (mode of operation of investigative committees) and Article 227(7) (detailed rules for appointing and dismissing the organs of the National Bank of Poland).15 On this background, the Constitutional Tribunal distinguished: (1) the sphere of exclusivity of the statute, which the parliamentary Standing Orders cannot enter; (2) the sphere of exclusivity of the Standing Orders of the Sejm and the Senate, which a statute cannot enter; and (3) the sphere of matters that may be regulated by a statute and – in more detail – in the parliamentary Standing Orders. This last sphere includes – pursuant to Article 112 of the Constitution – detailed matters related to the manner of performing the constitutional and statutory obligations of state organs towards the Sejm. It should be added that the provisions of the parliamentary Standing Orders regarding these issues must comply not only with the Constitution but also with statutes.16 In the context of the hierarchical relations between the Standing Orders and statutes, it must be remembered that the provisions of the Standing Orders may constitute a criterion for reviewing the constitutionality of the statute from the point of view of the procedure – ‘required by law’ – of its coming into effect.17
VI. The constitutional provisions regulating political parties ensure freedom for their creation (the principle of political pluralism) and define their purpose of influencing the formulation of the policy of the state by democratic means (Art. 4 of the provisions upheld by Art. 77 of the Small Constitution of 1992). However, there is no constitutional regulation on parliamentary clubs.
15 About the judgment of 8 November 2004 concerning Art. 6, case K 38/03, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 2004, series A, No 10, Item 104, see the approving commentary: Szmyt, A., Przegląd Sejmowy, 2005, No 2, pp. 139–142. 16 See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 14 April 1999, case K 8/99, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 1999, No 3, Item 41. 17 See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 July 2002 in the already mentioned case K 1/02. On the breach of statutory requirements as a premise for the unconstitutionality of the procedure of coming into effect by the act, see Szmyt, A., ‘Nowe elementy konstytucyjne i regulaminowe postępowania ustawodawczego’, Przegląd Sejmowy, 1998, No 3, p. 28.
441 Andrzej Szmyt
In its ruling of 26 January 1993 (case U 10/92), the Constitutional Tribunal stated that the political system of modern democratic states assumes the exercise of power by political parties through parliamentary mechanisms. ‘In practice, party parliamentary clubs have become the basic link between the political party and this mechanism.’ In connection with the above, the Tribunal stated that, pursuant to Article 4 of the above-mentioned constitutional provisions, there is an obligation to regulate the organisation and functioning of the parliament in a way that allows political parties to fulfil their functions. The Constitutional Tribunal also stated that ‘the freedom to create parliamentary groups is part of the general freedom to create a political party and as such should be given constitutional status’. At the same time, however, it concluded that it should not mean the inadmissibility of introducing certain restrictions as long as they do not violate the essence of a certain right and can be explained by another constitutional principle. Such a principle – in the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal – results from the need to provide the parliament with the legal conditions for performing its constitutional tasks. It is not formulated expressis verbis in constitutional provisions but has been derived by the Constitutional Tribunal from the concept of a democratic state ruled by law, the principle of a free mandate and the general powers and tasks of the parliament. Therefore, the provisions of the Standing Orders that specify deputies’ rights are in accordance with the Constitution as long as they are based on the issue of the parliament’s capacity to fulfil its constitutional tasks. The issues of deputies’ clubs and circles are explicitly regulated in the Sejm’s Standing Orders and a statute. The formerly binding Act of 31 July 1985 on the duties and rights of deputies and senators provided in Article 14 that deputies could create clubs, circles and teams in the Sejm and the authorities of these groups were to inform the Presidium of the Sejm of their personal compositions and internal statutes. The content of these regulations should be conducive to the implementation of the constitutional and statutory rights and obligations of deputies (Art. 14(1) and (2)). At the same time, Article 9 of the Sejm’s Standing Orders of 30 July 1992 provided (and still provides) that ‘deputies may create clubs or circles based on the political principle in the Sejm’ (Art. 9(1)). There is still the requirement that authorities ‘shall inform the Presidium of the Sejm about their personal composition and internal statutes’. The relevant provision is also included in Article 17 of the Act of 9 May 1996 on the exercise of the mandate of a deputy and a senator, which provides that, pursuant to the principles set out in the Sejm’s Standing Orders, deputies may create parliamentary clubs, circles or teams (Art. 17(1)). In the above-mentioned judgment, the Constitutional Tribunal clearly stated that the essence of the principle of freedom of political parties and their right to act in the Sejm shall be understood taking into account the principle of a free parliamentary mandate referred to in Article 6 of the Small Constitution of 1992, as well as – on the margins of the possible rights of the authorities of parliamentary clubs and circles to
442 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland decide solely on their composition and number – the Tribunal pointed out that the size of a parliamentary group is primarily determined by the results of parliamentary elections, and their current personal composition, often variable as practice shows, depends on the will of individual deputies. The organisation of deputies in clubs and parliamentary circles is – as practice shows – quite closely related to the election result. Deputies usually identify them with the name of the political option represented by them in the elections. They also recall the name of the political party or the coalition in the name of their clubs or circles. However, also this bond is not an unconditional rule as parliamentary practice shows. A deputy may be a member of a particular party and not belong to the club established by that party. These comments are intended to emphasise the importance of the readability of political structures within the Sejm, but also to signal that these structures cannot be understood as dependent in everything on political parties. In the above-mentioned ruling, the Constitutional Tribunal generally stated that the freedom of parliamentary groups can be ‘moderated’ by balancing other constitutional values. The Constitutional Tribunal’s remarks expressed in the resolution of 24 April 1996 (case W 14/95) on establishing a generally applicable interpretation of Article 4(2) and (5) of the Act on political parties are also very important. The Tribunal referred to the opinion of the First President of the Supreme Court that the recording of all applications, without reviewing them would change the records of political parties into a set of declarations made by political activists. In its resolution, the Tribunal approved the idea of understanding the records of political parties as a document containing reliable information that remains under basic control. Although the statutory wording (Art. 4(1)) explicitly constitutes the basis for the thesis on the notification nature of the act of ‘application’, a broader assessment allowed the Constitutional Tribunal to depart from this thesis. The system is not just a ‘notification’, since there are certain obligations resulting from the ‘application’, which means that some kind of review is assumed. The freedom of establishing political parties and the willingness to take advantage of the legal effects of the fact of entering into the registers of political parties may also support the admissibility of increased requirements. The rationale for this reasoning may also apply accordingly in regard to the interpretation of Article 9(7) of the Sejm’s Standing Orders. Thus, the Presidium of the Sejm may – according to the Standing Orders – refuse to ‘acknowledge’ the composition and the statute of the club (circle) presented by its authorities. Article 9 of the Sejm’s Standing Orders does not provide expressis verbis for the institution of the ‘refusal to acknowledge’. However, the interpretation assuming its admissibility has both historical and legal support. The Act of 1996 on the performance of the mandate of a deputy and a senator provides for the ‘protection of rights arising from the exercise of the mandate’ (Art. 4) by imposing the obligation to assist deputies in the performance of their mandate on the Presidium of the Sejm (Art. 46(1)). A specific
443 Andrzej Szmyt task in this regard is the ‘acknowledgment’ by the Presidium of the Sejm referred to in Article 9(7) of the Sejm’s Standing Orders. If the club’s status affected the rights of other deputies, such protection would be constituted by refusing to accept it.
VII. The Constitutional Tribunal many times interpreted the provisions on legislative proceedings in the parliament. It emphasised the primary obligation of the Sejm to consider a bill submitted to the parliament. This obligation is a correlate of the constitutional right of specified entities to legislative initiative. The Constitution does not set any dates for the Sejm (Art. 118 in conjunction with Art. 119); however, it cannot be interpreted that the Sejm may consider a bill or leave it without consideration. The constitutional formula (‘considers a bill’) means that the Sejm should respond to any properly submitted bill.18 This also includes the disapproval of the situation, in which the Sejm does not reject a bill but, at the same time, sets an unreasonable, distant deadline for submitting the report by the committee working on the bill, which, in fact, prevents its adoption.19 However, the speed of the proceedings cannot in itself constitute an objection of unconstitutionality. However, it can be assessed in the context of respecting the pluralistic nature of the chamber when the course of work deprives a particular parliamentary group of the opportunity to present their position. However, not every violation of the Standing Orders may be considered a violation of the Constitution. Such a violation can only be considered when the deficiencies of the Standing Orders lead to the violation of the constitutional elements of the legislative process, or when they occur to such an extent that they prevent deputies from expressing – in the course of work in the committee and at plenary sessions – their position on individual provisions and the entire act.20 The Constitutional Tribunal also emphasised the purpose of the ‘three readings’ of a bill, that is the most thorough consideration of a bill, eliminating the risk of randomness and underdevelopment. This also means the necessity of examining the same bill three times in a substantive and not only technical sense. Counteracting the ‘short cuts’ in the legislative procedure must be treated not only as respect for the competences of individual participants in the legislative process and applicable procedures as such, but also and above all as an important guarantee of lawmaking with special care, with
18 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 March 2004, case K 37/03, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 2004, series A, No 3, Item 21. 19 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 December 1994, case U 5/94,Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 1994, Part II, Item 41. 20 See the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 26 March 2006, case K 4/06, and of 4 October 2006, case K 31/06, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 2006, series A, No 9, Item 135.
444 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland the existence and observance of the institutional conditions for the comprehensive consideration of legislative proposals before they become applicable law.21
VIII. The Constitutional Tribunal devoted a very extensive analysis to highlighting differences between the institution of legislative initiative and the institution of amendments, as well as the material and temporal scope of amendments. As stated in case K 37/03, the separation in the Constitution of the right to submit a bill to the Sejm (Art. 118) and the right to amend a bill (Art. 119(2)) must lead to the conclusion that these rights have a different content and various subject areas. The legislative initiative is a holistic, programmatic institution for a specific legislative process. On the other hand, amendments introduced to a bill – in the course of parliamentary work – are assumed to be ‘points’ in nature and assume that those parts of the bill that they do not apply to remain unchanged. Technically, the amendments are not independent and are assumed to be fragmentary. Proposing an amendment deleting the content of all existing provisions, so that it would, in fact, be an entirely new bill should be considered as a violation of the provisions of the Constitution. The distinction between the two institutions is based on two criteria – entities authorised to use them and the stage of the parliamentary procedure. The existence of these procedures should not lead to blurring the boundaries between them (case K 3/98). The content proposed in the legislative initiative must undergo a full parliamentary procedure before it can be adopted. The content proposed in the amendment is not subject to the full consideration procedure. In case K 25/98, the Constitutional Tribunal noticed the following: (1) there is an obligation to recognise and emphasise the separateness between the ‘amendment’ and ‘legislative initiative’ and (2) there is the content distinctiveness of both institutions: the legislative initiative is an independent legislative proposal and its subject framework depends, in principle, on the recognition by its authors; the amendment is a secondary legislative proposal referring to the text to which it is proposed, which means that it must remain within this text. As the Constitutional Tribunal emphasised, the admissibility and scope of amendments depend – to a large extent – on the stage of parliamentary work at which they are submitted. In the Sejm proceedings, a particularly broad possibility of modifying a bill occurs at the stage of committee works, between the first and second reading of the bill. In principle, apart from exceptions, there are no obstacles to propose a new version of the bill in the committee report, which is far from the content of the legislative initiative. The modification stage is so early in that case that there is still time for reflection. The right to submit amendments is more limited in
21 See cases K 18/95 and K 11/02.
445 Andrzej Szmyt the second reading and in further stages of the Sejm proceedings.22 Due to the subject of the amendment – when the content and scope of the proposed changes leads to the transformation of the amendment into a new legislative initiative, it can be considered whether this does not constitute a breach of Article 118(1) of the Constitution. The permissible limit is exceeded when an amendment constitutes a draft of a new legal regulation and its content has no direct relation to the originally defined purpose and subject of the bill (case K 3/98).
IX. The Constitutional Tribunal devoted very important analyses to the participation of the Senate (the second chamber of the Polish parliament) in the implementation of its legislative function, mainly to the scope of the Senate’s amendments to an act adopted by the Sejm.23 The starting point is generally the statement that, although both chambers of the parliament together constitute legislative power, the Sejm has a leading and dominant role in the legislative process. Prima facie, there is a visible imbalance between the powers of both chambers in the law-making process. The identity of the legislative function is combined with a clear division of competences, so that the chambers are not equal. Each of the chambers performs a different role in the process of exercising legislative power and participates in it to a different degree. The Senate’s right to adopt amendments to an act adopted by the Sejm is the most important competence in the field of legislation that the Constitution confers on the Senate. The Constitutional Tribunal has even developed a kind of the ‘theory of amendment’, expressing the already established standards. In addition to separating the institution of the amendment from the institution of the legislative initiative, a special attention should be payed to the permissible scope of the content of amendments. In particular, the Constitutional Tribunal has emphasised that the amendments of the second chamber may only concern matters subject to the act passed to the Senate. Therefore, the Senate is not entitled to replace the content of the law with completely new one as this can only be the subject of a new legislative initiative. In addition, a distinction should be made between the ‘depth’ and the ‘width’ of the amendment. The ‘depth’ of the amendment concerns the content of the act adopted by the Sejm, while the ‘width’ of the amendment allows to determine the boundaries of the regulated matter. The Senate’s amendments within the matter covered by the act may provide for
22 The judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 21 December 2005, case K 45/05, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 2005, series A, No 11, Item 140; the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 12 December 2002, case K 9/02, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, No 7, 2002, series A, Item 94; see also case K 37/03. 23 In this respect, see the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 23 February 1993 (case K 5/93), of 22 September 1997 (case K 25/97), of 23 February 1999 (case K 25/98), of 19 June 2002 (case K 11/02), of 24 June 2001 (case K 14/02) and, in particular, of 20 July 2006 (case K 40/05) and of 19 September 2008 (case K 5/07).
446 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland alternative solutions, but they must refer only to the text of the act that was passed to the Senate. Including other issues in the amendment would mean circumventing the constitutional provisions. If it is found that the Senate ‘has exceeded’ the acceptable scope of amendments, even the failure to reject them by the Sejm does not result in the correction of the shortcomings. However, the determination of whether we are dealing with an amendment or a proposal for a new regulation is possible – according to the Constitutional Tribunal – only in concreto when examining the content of a specific amendment to a specific act.24
X. The Constitutional Tribunal made a significant departure from the bicameral model of ‘unequal’ chambers on the basis of the so-called ‘European judgment’ of 12 January 2005.25 The constitutional review concerned the provisions of the Act of 11 March 2004 on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters related to Poland’s membership in the European Union.26 The Constitutional Tribunal pointed out that the development of the European Union in many cases forces a new approach to legal issues and institutions that have been shaped in many years of tradition, enriched by jurisprudence and doctrine and have finally taken root in consciousness. It considered that the need to redefine certain – seemingly inviolable – institutions and concepts is due to the fact that, in the new legal situation resulting from European integration, there may sometimes be a conflict between the common understanding of some constitutional provisions and the newly emerging needs of effective and, at the same time, constitutional impact on the forum of the European Union. The Constitutional Tribunal presented the opinion that it is necessary to interpret constitutional norms in such a way that will enable the incorporation of the influence of the Polish state organs (including the parliament) on EU law into the existing political system of the Republic of Poland. This approach allows the Constitution to be read in a manner adequate to the new situation and fully complies with the principle of favour towards Community law. Thus – according to the Constitutional Tribunal – the notion of legislation should not be limited only to establishing internal law (issuing statutes), but it should also include the participation of the parliament in making legislative decisions at the EU level. This is important as, with accession to the European Union, the Polish parliament has largely lost its influence on the shape of universally binding law. Both chambers of the parliament have the ‘status’ of legislative power, both are representative and equally express the idea of nation sovereignty. Since there are
24 About the way of checking by the Sejm the essence of the Senate’s proposal, see Zubik, M., footnote 6, pp. 716–717. 25 Case K 24/04, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, ZU, 2005, series A, No 1, Item 3. 26 The Official Journal of Laws Dziennik Ustaw, No 52, Item 515.
447 Andrzej Szmyt two chambers of the parliament at the will of the constitution makers, both should equally participate in the work on shaping the Polish position in the field of creating EU law. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal considered that – especially, in view of the ‘silence’ of constitutional provisions as to the mechanisms adapting state organs to actions in EU conditions – it is necessary to give priority to such interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution that will express the fundamental principle of bicameralism. In the EU dimension, the interpretation of the Constitution deviates from the ‘unequal’ bicameralism that is characteristic of the internal dimension in relations between the chambers of the parliament.27 Consequently, the Constitutional Tribunal – while analysing the ‘cooperative act’ – decided that the unequal position of both chambers of the parliament violates the constitutional obligation of both chambers (legislative authority) to perform the legislative function.
XI. The above-mentioned ‘European’ ruling under the ‘cooperative’ act is of great importance – from the point of view of parliamentary law – not only in the context of the principle of the bicameral parliament, but also for understanding the functions of the parliament. In a quite controversial way, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that ‘opinion-giving’ instruments – in the hands of the parliament – towards government actions related to acts from the EU sphere do not have the character of a controlling function and they should be considered as part of the legislative function. Assuming that the assessed ‘opinions’ are not a means of control over the government in the framework of the control function of the Sejm, the Constitutional Tribunal has decided that they are not reserved exclusively for the Sejm. By explicitly strengthening the Senate’s position in this area in the context of the principle of the bicameral parliament, the Constitutional Tribunal implicitly ‘strengthened’ the reservation of the control function solely for the Sejm. At the same time, the concept of the legislative function was expanded, because it went beyond the imperative acts of establishing statutes in the domestic order and included other forms of ‘influence’ on the legal order. Reinterpretations of classical constitutional concepts were far reaching. The Constitutional Tribunal also significantly strengthened the way of understanding the control function of the Sejm in the above-mentioned judgments in cases concerning resolutions on the appointment of investigative committees. The Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly emphasised28 that the activities of investigative committees must comply with the constitutional norms and principles that set the limits of parliamentary control. The matter subject to examination by an investigative
27 For more, see Karp, J. and Szymanek, J., footnote 6, pp. 160–164 and pp. 171–174, as well as the literature referred to there. 28 In particular, see the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 September 2006, case U 4/06, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjngo, 2006, series A, No 8, Item 109.
448 Impact of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal on the shape of parliamentary law in Poland committee must fall within the subjective and objective scope of parliamentary control specified in the Constitution and statutes. An investigative committee can, therefore, examine only the activities of public bodies and institutions, and private individuals only to the extent to which they carry out public administration tasks or benefit from state aid. It is unacceptable to set up investigative committees to investigate issues that public authorities are not entitled to control at all. Constitutional organs equipped with the attribute of independence from other authorities, in full or in part, remain outside the scope of an investigative committee. The Constitutional Tribunal defined an investigative committee as an instrument of the Sejm’s control function, taking into account, in particular, the relations between parliamentary control and the principle of the separation of powers affecting the limits of Sejm control. It referred to Article 95(2) of the Constitution in a comprehensive manner, noticing doctrinal disputes and clearly determining many specific issues.29
XII. It is certain that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal has a significant impact on the shape of Polish parliamentary law, contributing to the political picture of the parliamentarism of the Third Polish Republic. The Constitutional Tribunal defines the way of understanding the norms and principles of the Constitution in this area. Sometimes this was happening in stages, through subsequent interpretative additions, even with a modification of the previous position. While filling the general provisions of the Constitution with more specific content, the Constitutional Tribunal took into account doctrinal discussions and current parliamentary practice. Its judgments clarified the conceptual grid and established the rules of fundamental and operational interpretation. This referred not only to the provisions of the Constitution, but also to statutes and the Standing Orders. The aim was to find optimal solutions from the point of view of an acceptable way of interpreting the content of legal provisions and establishing binding standards. It was both about the foundations of parliamentary law in connection with the constitutional principles of the entire system and practical issues, sometimes even utilitarian ones. Thus, the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgments not only set out perspectives, but also settled current political disputes with the legal background. However, most judgments constituted clear case law, stabilising and systemically harmonising the individual fragments of parliamentary life. There is no doubt that it is also thanks to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal that parliamentary law has such a clear and high legal status.30
29 For more, see Szmyt, A., footnote 11, pp. 602–609. 30 Such assessment was presented in Zubik, M., footnote 6, p. 718, as well as in Karp, J. and Szymanek, J., footnote 6, p. 146 and pp. 174–175.
449 Arta Vorpsi (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion
(UN)CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON PARLIAMENTARY DISCRETION
Prof. Dr. Arta Vorpsi Faculty of Law, University of Tirana Constitutional Court of Albania
INTRODUCTION One of the most appealing questions involving comparative public law today is: can a constitutional amendment be declared unconstitutional? If so, by what criteria and by whom?1 In some countries, the supreme or constitutional courts have developed a basic doctrine that they can invalidate a constitutional amendment, based on substantive grounds, despite the fact that all procedural requirements for the formal amendment of constitutional provisions have been complied with.2 There are countries where constitutional control extends to both substantive and formal aspects, just as there are countries that have preferred only control over the formal aspects of adopting constitutional amendments.3 The second model was also chosen by the Albanian legislator during the 2016 constitutional reform.4 Elsewhere (e.g. in France), the culture of exercising popular sovereignty prevails, which validates all amendments made to the Constitution formally and, therefore, does not recognise the possibility of a court declaring a constitutional amendment unconstitutional.5 The question raised above, though it contains three elements (if, by what criteria and by whom) for constitutional law scholars in our case, focuses mostly on the last two elements, since the first one is essentially a genuine political decision. The question of the criteria and the body that should evaluate the constitutionality of constitutional amendments seems to run counter to the doctrine of the legitimacy
1 Albert, R., ‘The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution’, Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression, Boston College Law School, 2015, pp. 13–40; Dixon, R. and Landau, D., ‘Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 13, 2015, p. 606; Roznai, Y., ‘The Theory and Practice of “Supraconstitutional” Limits on Constitutional Amendments’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 62, 2013, p. 557. 2 See the decisions of the Supreme Court of India: Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of India, 1980 AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206, SCC (2) 591; Sripadagalvaru v Kerala, 1973 SCC (4) 225; Golaknath v State of Punjab, 1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762. 3 Art. 147(1) of the Turkish Constitution. 4 Art. 131(2) of the Albanian Constitution. 5 Decision No 92-312 DC, 2 September 1992 of the French Constitutional Council.
450 (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion of the legislature, which denies the possibility of unconstitutional declaration of democratic will. In essence, these questions concern the possibility of maintaining or not constitutional democracy, in some respects.6 The purpose of this contribution is to present some reflections on the possibilities and mechanisms that exist for controlling constitutional amendments after their approval by the sovereign and its effect on democracy, especially on parliamentary discretion. Following the 2016 constitutional amendments presented in Albania, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to control the constitutionality of constitutional amendments; there is already some limited discussion (mostly in law journals) regarding the scope of such scrutiny.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS Why is the judicial control of constitutional amendments necessary? How could a constitutional amendment be unconstitutional if it was adopted under the rules expressly and clearly set out in the constitutional text by the sovereign? From the point of view of a constitutional loyalist, the constitution is all in harmony as the highest norm and, as such, it can never be unconstitutional. The idea that constitutional norms conflict with one another is, in principle, unacceptable. According to the positivists, the constitutionality of a constitutional norm is presumed in any case, because all other laws derive from it; without it, there can be no authorising law and, as such, no source of law, which is impossible. In fact, none of these arguments, taken individually or collectively, is sufficiently satisfying in order to answer the question of whether or not a constitutional amendment may be unconstitutional. Reality has shown that it could happen. The outcome of a decision-making process is only acceptable if it goes through a constitutional process. This applies both to decisions of a purely political nature and to those of a purely legal nature. The adoption of a constitutional amendment actually has the qualities of both, so there can be no formal legal process without first going through a political one (formal or informal one). For this reason, the proper judicial review of the validity of a constitutional amendment, from a procedural or substantive point of view, is necessary. The question that arises in this case is: can the highest legal norm undergo judicial control? As in many legal issues, there are at least two answers on this question. The first one categorically prohibits judicial review, considering it impossible to review the political will already expressed and entered into force, which has the
6 Vorpsi, A., ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism – Still a Tense Relationship in New Democracies’, Transformation of Law System in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe in 1989–2015, Gdansk University Press, 2016, p. 538.
451 Arta Vorpsi same legal effect as the highest legal norm, whose validity is presumed.7 The second one relates to the fact that even a legal act that amends the constitution is a formal law and, as such, has no need to exclude its constitutional control.8 For this reason, many constitutional courts have followed this position if there was no explicit prohibitive provision for such control. So unless it is expressly prohibited, there is no legitimate reason to not exercise this control.9 This is the argument used by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which, in its interpretation, considered the act amending the Basic Law as ‘federal law’, not excluding it from its control, although this competence is not expressly recognised by the Basic Law or the organic law of Bundesverfassungsgericht.10 The question that arises after this is: does the judiciary have the legitimacy to assess the will of the legislator? The evaluation of a constitutional amendment by any other organ different from the sovereign will remain an extraordinary competence. However, today this situation is increasingly turning into a constitutional reality. Unconstitutionality is a concept closely linked with constitutional formality, constitutional values, constitutional democracy and constitutional legitimacy. For this reason, when talking about a constitutional amendment, we should not only focus on the procedure of adoption, but also on the principle of democracy and constitutional legitimacy. The fact that a given society is defined by its constitution makes the process of its change quite significant. The power to amend the constitution is not a formal or purely technical issue, but it should be understood as a set of norms that contain important details that influence or define the underlying political processes. This is why most democratic constitutions explicitly provide for the rules relating to more difficult procedures for revising constitutional norms, such as: (i) formal provisions; (ii) material boundaries; (iii) different rules that are rooted in certain historical developments.11 In view of the above, it is now imperative that, along with the constitutional legislator’s ability to exercise its political will, the protection of the constitution (Verfassungsschutz) during this process must also be guaranteed. According to Carl Schmitt, the term protection of the constitution is broad, it refers to any action, ordinary or extraordinary, against an attack on the constitution. It extends not only to the ‘damaged’ part of the constitution, but also to the entire political, economic, legal and social system.12
7 Waldron, J., ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 115, 2006, p. 1346. 8 Gozler, K., Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments. A Comparative Study, 2008, p. 20. 9 Art. 93 of Grundgesetz; Art. 140(1) of the Austrian Constitution; Art. 147 of the Turkish Constitution. 10 See Decision 1 BvR 2378/98 of Bundesverfassungsgericht of 3 March 2004. 11 Art. 146 of the German Grundgesetz foresees that this law will be out of force on the day the German people will adopt a new constitution based on their free will. 12 Schmitt, C., ‘Der Hüter der Verfassung, Tübingen’, Die Justiz, Vol. 11–12, 1930–1931, pp. 576–628.
452 (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion
Whereas, according to Hans Kelsen, constitutional courts, through their interpretation of constitutional principles and values, not only ensure the protection of the constitution a priori, but provide the state organs with the standards of their behaviour. In this way, the constitutional court plays not only a protective function towards the constitution, but it also has a creative role in regard with the elements of the rule of law. The dual protective and creative role is only possible because constitutional courts are judicial bodies. Their judicial character implies, inter alia, that they cannot act on their own initiative, but only on requests/petitions and in cases provided for by the constitution. They should follow only the criteria set by the constitution and less or not at all the political opportunity or necessity. Regardless of the fact they are included in the judicial pyramid of the justice system, the jurisdiction of constitutional courts cannot preserve them by making decisions with irrefutable political implications. This factor cannot diminish the fact that constitutional courts not only resolve the conflict, but much more often than ordinary courts create precedents that are incorporated into the respective legal system.13
II. SUBSTANTIAL OR FORMAL CONTROL? As is well known, the Constitution provides itself with the formal rules for adopting constitutional amendments as a set of guaranties. The details it provides, like specifying the subjects entitled to initiate or propose constitutional amendments, time periods and quorums necessary for the proposals and, subsequently, following strict procedures until their final approval, underline the difference between an ordinary legal amendment and a constitutional one, which in itself could be considered a constitutional value and, as such, should be respected in order to preserve the rule of law.14 Formal rules for amending the constitution are particularly necessary to channel the popular will into an institutional dialogue and then to transform it further into constitutional changes. By their very nature, the formal rules for amending the Constitution simultaneously reflect both trust and distrust in political actors: on the one hand, they authorise political actors to improve the constitution, while, on the other, they limit the manner, procedure and timing of their action to that end. Given the essential functions embodied in the formal rules for adopting constitutional amendments, it is to be expected that the constitution itself will provide for them in the most exhaustive manner and, in fact, most of them follow this line.15 Some of them even go further, providing for the mechanism that will exercise control over whether
13 Kelsen, H., ‘Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit’, Veroeffentlichung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, No 5, 1929, pp. 30–88. 14 Albert, R., ‘The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules’, McGill Law Review, 2013, pp. 225–236. 15 Rasch, B. E. and Congleton, R. D., ‘Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability’, Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, 2006, pp. 319–325.
453 Arta Vorpsi these functions are respected at their core, otherwise a constitutional amendment is invalid. This is precisely the mission of the constitutional court when it reviews the procedure for the approval of a constitutional amendment by the parliament. However, this review cannot remain within some formal procedural boundaries. A constitutional amendment can bring substantial effects to the constitution even when made in accordance with the procedural rules to that effect. It can affect the existing legal order and its basic principles by replacing them with new ones, thereby changing the constitutional identity of a country, in full compliance with the procedural rules. The procedural mechanism for the constitutional review of a constitutional amendment by constitutional courts, although not universally widespread, nevertheless applies in many countries with new democracies, even before it is approved by the parliament.16 The a priori control of a constitutional amendment should not be confused with the a posteriori control, which is the most widespread and during which it is assessed whether the procedure for adopting a constitutional amendment has been followed. In some constitutional systems, the constitutional court may also exercise a posteriori constitutional control in order to assess whether an adopted amendment conflicts with the intangible provisions of the constitution.17 There is no internationally accepted standard of what is the best or most effective model. In some countries the idea of a posteriori constitutional control has been rejected based on the fact that courts, despite their jurisdiction, are also state bodies and, as such, cannot be over the constitutional legislator or act as being constitutional power.18 This discussion also took place during the process of drafting and adopting the constitutional amendments in 2016 in Albania. Initially, the draft submitted to the Venice Commission foresaw explicitly the ban of the constitutional review of constitutional amendments by the Constitutional Court. But the Venice Commission’s position in the Interim Opinion of 21 December 2015 saw as necessary at least the possibility of constitutional review focused on the procedural aspects of their adoption, as one of the most widespread models in Europe. According to the Venice Commission: ‘it would be possible to give the Constitutional Court at least the power to verify the procedure in which the constitutional amendments are adopted (as opposed to the substance of the amendments). After all, the Draft Amendments do not touch upon the power of the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of a referendum (see Art. 131(ë) of the current Constitution), 16 Art. 153 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan; Art. 98 of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan; Art. 141(2) of the Constitution of Moldova; Art. 159 of the Constitution of Ukraine. 17 According to Art. 79(3) of Grundgesetz, amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation in principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Arts. 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible. See also the French Constitution (Art. 89), the Italian Constitution (Art. 138), the Greek Constitution (Part IV, Chapter II) and the Romanian Constitution (Art. 18). 18 See the Final Opinion of the Venice Commission on draft constitutional amendments proposed by the Assembly of Albania on Judicial Reform, CDL-AD (2016)009, 11 March 2016.
454 (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion including the referendum on changing the Constitution. In any event, when the Constitution is so detailed and encompasses issues which should normally be regulated at the legislative level, the role of the Constitutional Court is already quite limited.’19 Regardless of the model and scope chosen by the constitution, one thing does not change: the constitutional provisions that give constitutional courts the jurisdiction to control the constitutionality of constitutional amendments are of an exceptional nature and should, therefore, be interpreted in accordance with the principle exception est strictissimae interpretationis. Albania is not one of those countries whose constitutions have provided for the clear unamendability of some constitutional provisions (eternity clause or Ewigkeitsklausel). However, if we interpret Article 3 of the Albanian Constitution, which provides for the highest values of the Albanian state, such as independence and territorial integrity, human dignity, human rights and freedoms, social justice, constitutional order, pluralism, national identity and national heritage, religious coexistence, as well as coexistence and understanding of Albanian nationals with national minorities, one could say that it could be interpreted in favour of the inviolability of these principles by any possible constitutional amendments. So, if the pillars of the democratic state are affected, then its constitution could not stand further, as long as law constitutes the basis and the boundaries of the activity of the state (Art. 4), giving also the possibility of the direct application of the Constitution, unless it prohibits it itself. In this sense, it can be argued that the constitution has taken care to establish safeguards, which do not necessarily have an explicitly prohibitive nature, but it could still be effective in preventing the violation of the rule of law. Amending the Albanian Constitution is neither impossible nor easy. Article 177 provides for the submission of an amendment in three ways: first, an amendment must be approved by not less than two thirds of all members of the Assembly (Para. 3); second, the Assembly may decide, with two thirds of its members, that draft constitutional amendments be voted in a referendum (Para. 4); third, an approved constitutional amendment is put to a referendum when this is required by one fifth of the members of the Assembly (Para. 5). From these provisions, it can be concluded that the Constitution has created space for a minority of members of the Assembly, consisting of one fifth of its members, in the event of a disagreement with a two-thirds majority of a constitutional amendment, to request that the constitutional amendment be put to a referendum. However, the Constitution clearly does not intend to hold a referendum on amendments to the Constitution in any case, but only in cases where there is a lack of political consensus. This was also stated by the Constitutional Court when it considered a petition for a referendum on some constitutional amendments approved by the Assembly. According to the Court, the Albanian Constitution allows 19 See also the Interim Opinion of the Venice Commission on draft constitutional amendments proposed by the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Commission on Judicial Reform, CDL-AD (2016)009, 21 December 2015, pp. 19–21.
455 Arta Vorpsi for a referendum on constitutional amendments only within the limits provided for in Article 177. The right of 50 000 citizens to vote for the abrogation of a law under Article 150 does not extend to laws on revision of the Constitution.20 Formally, any provision of the Albanian Constitution can be amended, as we have no express prohibitions as in the case of the German Basic Law.21 But referring to the position expressed above regarding the safeguards that the constitution provides for, it can be said that the comprehensive review of the constitution is, in principle, not prohibited, as long as the foundations of a democratic state and the rule of law foreseen by Article 3 are not affected. However, the viability of the constitution largely depends on the willingness of the political parties represented in the parliament and their agreement to interfere with the constitution. There are times when the situation can become dangerous if intervention is for purely political purposes, no matter what the consequences may be. The viability of the constitution should not be used as an argument or excuse for political viability, as it often tries to justify itself. When an initiative to amend the constitution coincides with the considerable loss of confidence and faith in political parties, then the issue becomes more serious.22 In order to prevent or control as much as possible the undesirable consequences of such a situation, interference by means of a mechanism of control by the Constitutional Court is envisaged.23
III. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT? Turning to the model chosen by the Albanian legislator, who provided for the a posteriori control of a constitutional amendment only in respect of procedural aspects, it is logical to state that, theoretically, the Albanian Constitutional Court does not have the jurisdiction to assess the compliance of constitutional amendments with the fundamental principles of the Constitution from a substantive point of view. However, this fact does not undermine the value of this new competence, which should be considered a further guarantee of constitutional protection. As the theory of law teaches us, form is determinative of content. In fact, this formally new competence has essentially been exercised by this Court over the years. Even in one case, the Court declared unconstitutional a constitutional
20 Decision No 25/2009 of the Albanian Constitutional Court. 21 Vorpsi, A., Recent Developments in Albanian Constitutional Law, Monograph, Universitatsverlag Regensburg, 2012, pp. 23–24. 22 Vorpsi, A., ‘Rishikimi i Kushtetutës’ [‘The Revision of the Constitution’], Legal Studies Review, Faculty of Law of the University of Tirana, No 1/2012. 23 See Komentarin mbi Reformën Kushtetuese në Sistemin e Drejtësisë 2016, Ed. Open Society Foundation and Institute for Public and Legal Studies, 2019, p. 103.
456 (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion amendment24 that obliged the Court to go through its renewal/rotation, which the Court did not accept, because it infringed its independence. Given the fact that this decision dates in 1997, few years after its creation and also the political conflict between the new democratic parliament and the new founded Constitutional Court and its sometime questionable case law at that time, it is difficult to say whether the intention was to safeguard the constitutionality of the constitution or a political reaction of the Court to the political strikes of the parliament at the time, which, by that constitutional amendment, aimed at forcing the Constitutional Court to rotate its composition by one third within 30 days. This detached case cannot be regarded as the Court’s practice or as a proactive approach to exercising such control whenever the need arises.25 However, the Court has consistently and coherently interpreted specific provisions of the Constitution, not detaching them from other constitutional norms, but even repeating the idea that the provisions of the Constitution should not be understood as separate, because it is a whole document, including its preamble, which expresses a set of core values.26 For this reason, I think that its new competence to review constitutional amendments on formal and procedural aspects is an essential and important instrument for safeguarding the constitution, if used properly. The Court has had the opportunity to be involved in the constitutional review process of the issues raised in a petition for a constitutional referendum. It emphasised that the stability of the Constitution is a constitutional value, which is guaranteed by a difficult and complex procedure of amendments. According to the Court, this viability can be impaired if a constitutional amendment, adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and for which no referendum was required by the subjects provided for in Article 177 of the Constitution, could be abrogated in a referendum demanded by 50 000 voters. The sovereignty is a wide principle, which becomes enforceable through the specific provisions of the Constitution. The Court held that Articles 150–152 and 177 of the Constitution are in harmony with the principle of popular sovereignty, as provided by its Article 2. These articles, according to the Court, do not contradict this principle, but concretise it by indicating the extent to which sovereignty is exercised by representatives, directly by the people or in a combined or mixed manner. Based on the above analysis, in a nutshell, it can be said that, in this decision, the Constitutional Court distinguished between the principle of representative democracy and popular sovereignty, concluding that the Constitution, in the case of adopting constitutional amendments, has preferred to give priority to the first one. In these circumstances, although arguments concerning the form and procedure for
24 Decision No 57 of the Albanian Constitutional Court of 5 December 1997. 25 Sadushi, S., Drejtësia kushtetuese në zhvillim, Toena Publishing House, 2012, p. 221. 26 Decisions Nos 6/2002, 28/2002, 75/2002, 2/2005, 25/2009, 15/2010 of the Albanian Constitutional Court.
457 Arta Vorpsi adopting constitutional amendments are found in the reasoning of this decision, this did not prevent the Court from assessing matters relating to constitutional principles and values. Regardless of the subject matter of the request, as well as the arguments used in this decision, what matters is the (non)ability of voters to hold a referendum on amending the Constitution. According to the current constitutional regulation and the current case law of the Court, it turns out that this opportunity is quite small and depends entirely on the will of the legislator to allow it or not. This solution, according to internationally recognised practices, does not appear to be contrary to the principle of democracy, but relies mostly on a system of representative democracy, typical of parliamentary systems. It must be acknowledged, however, that this constitutional solution significantly limits the right of voters to express their will directly on such a sensitive issue as amending the Constitution. Referring to the nature of the Constitution as a social contract between the people and the power holders, it turns out that, if the first could not receive the permission of the latter, it cannot exercise its right as the sovereign to approve or reject constitutional amendments, which could strongly affect its life. At the end, the only way to preserve the Constitution remains the control of the Constitutional Court, which, through its interpretation, within the limits set by its organic law and its jurisprudence, could guarantee the constitutional stability and harmony, as an indispensable precondition of the rule of law. Based on that approach, it is to be expected that the Constitutional Court will exercise its control, based on the fact that the constitutional text is a whole and, as such, imposes the interpretation of constitutional amendments in the light of general constitutional principles in force. Is not this the essence of constitutional interpretation, after all?
CONCLUSIONS Both when the constitutions provide for a ban of amendments of some provisions and when they do not, it is undemocratic to ban any kind of constitutional amendments. Otherwise, it would run counter to the idea of the pouvior constitutional of the sovereign. But it is necessary to foresee effective mechanisms to ensure that the constitutional amendments undertaken are in accordance with the rest of the constitutional text in force. The contrary implies a violation of the principle of constitutionality and, consequently, a violation of the rule of law. Whether or not this mechanism is a court, or another form of control, depends on the model chosen by the legislator. However, if the Constitution provides for a court to control and safeguard constitutionality, there is no reason not to extend its control even to provisions of the same hierarchy. The question of how far the review of the constitutional court on constitutional amendments could go, whether it will be limited to procedural or substantial aspects, again, is for the legislator to decide. Hereafter, it remains a question of the judge’s view,
458 (Un)Constitutionality of the constitutional amendment and its effect on parliamentary discretion background, courage or self-restraint. No one can force a judge to focus solely on strict formal rules of procedure for adopting a law and to turn a blind eye or ignore potential content with serious constitutional implications. This would be contrary to the mission of constitutional review, which was created and exists to preserve and guarantee the Constitution in its entirety and at all times. The political reality, especially in countries with unconsolidated democracy, has shown us time and again that, if we are to presume that preserving the essence of the constitution is only a matter of conscience and responsibility of politics and that no other body can correct or improve it, then we risk too much.27 It is necessary to have an effective decision-making body outside the constituent power to guarantee the separation of powers and to increase the level of guaranties of constitutional order in cases where constitutional amendments are undertaken mostly based on purely political interests.28
27 Baranger, D., ‘The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in France (or the Absence Thereof)’, Israel Law Review, Vol. 44, No 3, 2011, pp. 389–428. 28 Pfersmann, O., ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Normativist Approach’, Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, Vol. 67, No 1, 2012, p. 43.
459 Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec Standards of ‘indecent legislation’ in Poland
STANDARDS OF ‘INDECENT LEGISLATION’ IN POLAND
Prof. Dr. Hab. Zbigniew Witkowski Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland
Dr. Hab. Maciej Serowaniec, Prof. UMK Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland
INTRODUCTION In accordance with the provisions of Article 10(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland,1 the basic function of the Polish Parliament is the legislative function. However, for years in the field of lawmaking, there have been a number of irregularities related, among others, with too frequent changes in the legal status, the adverse treatment of public consultations, and with undue haste in lawmaking, which all translate into its low quality. During the last parliamentary term, the state of affairs in this field has not improved and, in many respects, the existing problems have intensified. In consequence, the standards of the Polish law-making process have deteriorated. The Parliament has become a ‘manufacture’ of law in which everything can be ‘produced’.
I. THE EROSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN POLAND The pace of the proceedings on many draft laws in the Sejm of the 8th office term not only does not favour a high-quality legislative level but also detracts from the dignity of the Parliament. Legislative proceedings are often carried out under time pressure or late at night with no chance for MPs or any potential recipients of the new law to get to know the draft laws in depth. For instance, in the first year of the 8th office term of the Sejm, the legislative process in the Sejm lasted an average of 38 days, including 17 days2 in the first quarter of the first year. In the second year of work of the current Sejm, the average working time was 65 days and then 80 days in the third year.3 The average duration of proceedings in the Senate is currently 14 days. 1 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (JL of 1997, No 78, Item 483, as amended). 2 ‘The 9th Statement of the Citizens’ Legislation Forum on the Quality of the Legislative Process Based on Observations in the Period from 11 September to 10 December 2016’ (The Stefan Batory Foundation), p. 7, http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/przeciw_korupcji/ przejrzystosc_w_procesie_stanowienia_prawa_1/obserwacje_rzadowego_procesu_tworzenia_ prawa [accessed 15 December 2019]. 3 ‘The 7th Statement of the Citizens’ Legislation Forum on the Quality of the Legislative Process Based on Observations in the Period from 16 May to 15 November 2018, Summarising the Legislative
460 Standards of ‘indecent legislation’ in Poland
In the first year of the 9th office term of the Senate, the working time was 11 days and, in the first quarter of the first year, it was three days. However, if one takes into consideration the fact that there were parliamentary holidays during the period in question and that the meetings of the Sejm and Senate usually do not coincide, it turns out that the actual time of work for senators concerning the laws being adopted in the Sejm lasted two or three days at most. For instance, only one day was enough for senators to state the relevant considerations about the Act Amending the Act – the Law on the Structure of Common Law Courts and Certain Other Acts. The majority of the Senate, meeting at night, rejected all of the opposition’s amendments.4 In this regard, one should be rightly alarmed by the very rapid handling of some important draft laws, which are often complex and of high public concern. During the last four years, it has happened in the cases of amendments to the Act on the Supreme Court or deputies’ amendments to the provisions introducing the Act of 30 November 2016 on the Organisation of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Mode of Proceedings Before the Constitutional Tribunal and the Act of 30 November 2016 on the Status of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the Law on the Organisation of Common Law Courts. It is significant that these important constitutional laws were amended by deputies’ bills and presidential bills, that is, without consultation, opinions, or an impact assessment of these draft laws. The time taken to proceed from the first publication of a draft law to the moment of signing it by the President was often shorter than a month. The work on the amendment of the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance has become the instrumentalisation symbol of the role of the Parliament, which is, in fact, subordinate to and at the disposal of an external political centre. The amendment was made, including the signature of the Head of the State, who was paying a visit abroad at that time, within only a few hours. That draft law was submitted to the Sejm at 8:00 a.m. on 27 June 2018. After an hour and a half, the first reading began. The members of the Parliament were allowed to have only one minute of time for their comments. Then, without any further discussion, the second and third reading took place. After two hours, at 11:29 a.m., the act was adopted. The work of the Senate lasted less than five hours. The opposing senators left the meeting room protesting against the limitation of the senators’ speech time to only five minutes during the plenary. The legislative process was completed at about 6:00 p.m. when the President of the Republic of Poland, paying a visit in Latvia at that time, placed an electronic signature on it.5
Activity of the Government and the Parliament in the Third Year of Their Ruling’ (The Stefan Batory Foundation), p. 13, http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/przeciw_korupcji/ przejrzystosc_w_procesie_stanowienia_prawa_1/obserwacje_rzadowego_procesu_tworzenia_ prawa [accessed 15 December 2019]. 4 Ibid., p. 16. 5 Cf. Makowski, G., ‘The Amendments to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance and the Seven Deadly Sins of the PiS State’ (The Stefan Batory Foundation), www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20 operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/Grzechy_PiS_nowelizacje_IPN.pdf [accessed 1 December 2019].
461 Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec
In turn, nine days passed from the submission to the Sejm of the Deputies’ Draft Bill to Amend the Act – the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and Certain Other Acts to be adopted by the Parliament’s lower house, but, in reality, the Sejm worked on that draft law one and a half days. It was a very comprehensive amendment to several different acts, the amendment that eventually was given the title: the Act Amending the Act – the Law on the Organisation of Common Law Courts and Certain Other Acts. The majority of the Sejm ignored the very critical opinion of the Ombudsman, in which it was written that, among others: The analysis of the entire draft law leads to the conclusion that the need to prepare it is not a response to the existing problems of justice, but is a response to the current situation that has arisen as a result of the adoption of acts on the judiciary, which were recognised as not complying with the international standards in the opinion of many international institutions and organisations such as the Venice Commission, the European Commission, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the UN Special Rapporteur, the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). Introducing significant changes in acts through draft laws submitted by deputies, which allows bypassing social arrangements and consultations, must be assessed negatively. The mode of work on the draft bill is extremely hasty.6 Undoubtedly, the excessively fast pace of introducing changes affects legal certainty negatively and visibly limits the possibility of submitting comments for draft laws in proceedings, both in the cases of minor legislative defects and in the matters of fundamental importance for the State. It often happens especially in the cases of extensive, complex draft laws that regulate the matter with a high degree of complexity. It should be emphasised that the accelerated pace of work cannot be used to deliberately deprive all of the parliamentary minorities of the opportunity to refer to the draft law and propose alternative solutions. Furthermore, it also cannot be used to deprive other state institutions and non-governmental organisations of the opportunity to become familiar with the draft law and to caution against any faulty solutions. Consultation procedures, even if they are perceived by the general parliamentary majority as burdensome or time-consuming, build up a certain early warning mechanism, making it possible to detect and remove any draft law defects at the appropriate stage of the legislative process when these defects are not yet able to cause irreparable damage. Unfortunately, the course of proceedings on numerous draft laws in the current parliamentary term suggests that the opposition’s inability to get acquainted with the content of a draft law and to provide alternative solutions is not merely a side effect but the rule and the intended purpose of this law-making method. This dangerous tendency also includes entrusting the Presidium of the Sejm with the competence to 6 The Opinion of the Ombudsman Regarding the Draft Act Amending the Act – the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and Certain Other Acts, Sejm Paper No 2731, www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/ files/Opinia%20RPO%20dotycz%C4%85ca%20projektu%20nowelizacji%20ustaw%20o%20 prokuraturze%2C%20SN%2C%20KRS%20.pdf [accessed 10 December 2019].
462 Standards of ‘indecent legislation’ in Poland determine the number of questions raised during the first reading of draft laws and resolutions, a provision that was introduced by the amendment to the Regulations of the Sejm on 28 February 2018. We also note that the opinion of legislators is accepted when it concerns a matter of legislative technique. Substantive comments are often omitted. One of the consequences of such an attitude is the adoption of defective legal acts, which must be amended quickly and frequently. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the Presidential Bill of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court was amended seven times in 2018. The committee work on that presidential draft law of the Supreme Court continued in a very nervous atmosphere. The meetings of the Justice and Human Rights Commission on 28–30 November and 6 December 2017 were attended by representatives of the National Council of the Judiciary, the Ombudsman, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the Polish Judges’ Association IUSTITIA, and the National Social Rescue Network. On the whole, they all formulated critical opinions about that draft law, claiming it was contrary to the fundamental principles of the Polish political system. However, this had no impact on the content of the draft law or on the conduct of the Commission proceedings. The above-mentioned opinions were ignored and they were even subjected to verbal attacks from deputies representing the parliamentary majority. During the fourth meeting of the Sejm on 6 December 2017, a representative of the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) was denied the opportunity to speak a number of times.7 In that case, the Sejm experts did not have the opportunity to join the legal dispute and to give substantive comments. Their participation was marginal and limited only to amending the technical kind of aspects. A significant change also concerns the number of acts that have been adopted on the basis of draft laws submitted to the Sejm by the members of the ruling coalition. In the last parliamentary term, there are twice as many acts as in previous terms. More importantly, however, deputies’ draft bills often relate to the areas that up to now have used to be regulated by the government. So far deputies’ draft bills have been used to amend, among others, the regulations of the civil service, the Prosecutor’s Office, the radio and television management, the Penal Code, the national educational system and even the amount of severance payment in state-owned companies. During the course of the legislative process, however, numerous symptoms appeared indicating that these draft laws proposed as the deputies’ draft bills have been, in fact, prepared by the government. In the course of such legislative proceedings, the representatives of the Council of Ministers often came as the real authors of those draft laws. For instance, while working in the joint Education, Science and Youth Committee and the Local Self-Government and Regional Policy Committee on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the Education System and Certain Other Acts, a representative of the Ministry of National Education accepted or rejected all the amendments submitted
7 The transcripts from the meeting of the Justice and Human Rights Committee, www.sejm.gov.pl/ SQL2.nsf/poskomprocall?OpenAgent&8&2003 [accessed 10 December 2019].
463 Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej Serowaniec by deputies. In addition, the Minister, who was present at the first reading in the Sejm, emphasised that there were ‘dozens of conversations during the last few weeks when we met in the Ministry of Education not only with trade unions, but with any organisation that listened to our assumptions and willingly discussed these solutions’.8 This statement clearly indicates that the bill was prepared by the government, not by a group of deputies. The confirmation of this statement to be valid follows from the lack of the applicants or deputies participating in the work on these draft laws. For example, during the Senate work on the Bill to Amend the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, at the meeting of the joint Legislative Committee and Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Petitions Committee, the chairman stated that he had sent the invitation, but the representative of the draft law authors did not come to attend. Because of the request of a group of senators not to proceed without the representative of the authors, the chairman finally ordered to conduct the vote and, by 7 to 5 votes, it was decided that, despite the absence of the MP, the meeting would be continued. In the absence of the draft law authors, the representatives of the Ministry of Justice assumed the role of the authors. What is more, some of deputies’ draft bills were previously included on the list of legislative and programming works of the Council of Ministers. There one may find, among others, the Draft Act Amending the Act on the Police and Certain Other Acts. This draft bill was withdrawn by the decision of the Council of Ministers of 5 January 2016.9 MPs taking over government draft bills shorten the working time over them, which is sometimes justified in emergency situations. Nevertheless, it is connected with a significant limitation of the debate on the solutions proposed and the omission of conducting public consultations. Stakeholders, that is individuals and members of civic organisations, cannot in practice refer to the changes suggested. The observation of the legislative actions of the government shows also many examples of the deliberate limitation of the role of consultations. The average time spent on public consultations is only 13 days. In such a short period of time, most stakeholders who are not representatives of large institutions do not have adequate resources to read draft laws, consult and prepare well-formulated, substantive comments and opinions. In the legislative practice, it is also very rare to use pre-consultation, which enables the interested parties to have a consultation with expert groups at an early, conceptual stage of the legislative work. In the case of deputies’ bills that are not subject to public consultation, as well as controversial or insufficiently consulted government draft bills, stakeholders try to present their arguments at the meetings of the parliamentary committees. Unfortunately,
8 The 6th Statement of the Citizens’ Legislation Forum on the Quality of the Legislative Process Based on Observations in the Period from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016 (The Stefan Batory Foundation), p. 3, http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/przeciw_korupcji/ przejrzystosc_w_procesie_stanowienia_prawa_1/obserwacje_rzadowego_procesu_tworzenia_ prawa [accessed 15 December 2019]. 9 Ibid., p. 4.
464 Standards of ‘indecent legislation’ in Poland the opinions they voice are ignored very often, especially if representatives of the government present a dissenting opinion. We also note that the opinion of legislators is accepted when it concerns a matter of legislative technique. Substantive comments are often omitted. One of the consequences of such an attitude is the adoption of defective legal acts, which must be amended quickly and frequently. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the Presidential Bill of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court was amended seven times in 2018. The committee work on that presidential draft law on the Supreme Court continued in a very nervous atmosphere. The meetings of the Justice and Human Rights Commission on 28–30 November and 6 December 2017 were attended by representatives of the National Council of the Judiciary, the Ombudsman, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, the Polish Judges’ Association IUSTITIA, and the National Social Rescue Network. On the whole, they all formulated critical opinions about that draft law, claiming it was contrary to the fundamental principles of the Polish political system. However, it had no impact on the content of the draft law or on the conduct of the Commission proceedings. The above-mentioned opinions were ignored and they were even subjected to verbal attacks from deputies representing the parliamentary majority. During the fourth meeting of the Sejm on 6 December 2017, a representative of the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) was denied the opportunity of speaking a number of times.10 In that case, the Sejm experts did not have the opportunity to join the legal dispute so as to give substantive comments. Their participation was marginal and limited only to amending the technical kind of aspects.
CONCLUSIONS The parliamentary legislative apparatus ‘spits out’ the laws made to order by politicians and then the executive apparatus uses the laws produced in accordance with this political order without taking into account any established principles and universally accepted legislative standards in the democratic world. To put it differently, in the words of the ancient Romans, ‘law does not arise from injustice’ (ex iniuria ius non oritur). In this way, a certain ‘benchmark of indecent legislation’ is being created.11
10 The transcripts from the meeting of the Justice and Human Rights Committee are available online at www.sejm.gov.pl/SQL2.nsf/poskomprocall?OpenAgent&8&2003 [accessed 13 December 2019]. 11 Cf. Wyrzykowski, M., ‘The Defense of the Polish Constitution’, Kwartalnik o prawach człowieka [Human Rights Quarterly], No 3–4/2017, p. 9.
465 Jiří Zemánek The contribution of the Czech Constitutional Court to the development of democracy
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY
Jiří Zemánek Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic In the globalising world, we are witnessing a certain breakdown of national democracies, when parliaments are marginalised by de facto powers of the executive branch of the government and by non-state actors, occupying public discourse. On the other hand, democratic majorities sometimes incline to abuse their law-making powers to the detriment of the rule of law and fundamental rights of individuals. In both situations, constitutional review may be called up to resolve a clash between the acts of public power ‘of the day’, incorporated in statutes, and the ‘timeless’ values codified in the constitutions. The constitutional review of the acts that reflect – at the national level – democratic legitimacy deficits existing at the supranational – European Union-based – level cannot be avoided, too. The Czech Constitutional Court have had some – not so many, but important – cases to deal with and to decide such matters.
I. THE NATIONAL DIMENSION The Czech Republic is defined as a democratic state respecting the rule of law.1 This definition represents a certain general and introducing principle, implying a number of sub-principles, some of which are codified expressly in the Constitution, while some other are inferred by the case law of the Constitutional Court. Democratic principles are subtly mixed with the requirements of constitutionalism, which has its main source in liberal political thought of modern times. No regime other than a democratic one may be considered as legitimate2 and it is necessary to take into consideration the priority of a citizen over the state, hence also the priority of fundamental civil and human rights and freedoms.3 It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the principle of democracy in a substantial way.4 Supra-positive values of dignity, freedom and equality form the basis of the entire order of fundamental rights in a constitutional democracy. Their protection by the Constitutional Court as a judicial guardian of constitutionality5 can demonstrate
1 Art. 1(1) of the Constitution. 2 Judgment no Pl. ÚS 19/93 (all decisions may be found under http://nalus.usoud.cz). 3 Judgment no Pl. ÚS 43/93. 4 Judgment no Pl. ÚS 29/11. 5 Art. 83 of the Constitution.
466 The contribution of the Czech Constitutional Court to the development of democracy the delicate balance between the claims of democratic legitimacy and the rule of law in practice. Citizen-based resistance against lowering electoral rights may exemplify the approach of the Constitutional Court to the principle of democracy. The Parliament, in reaction to a governmental crisis, adopted by the qualified three-fifths majority the Constitutional Act on Shortening the Fifth Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies.6 The Act was intended to apply on this specific situation only and called forth the premature election, even when two ordinary constitutional ways how to raise a new election existed. The group of MPs, who lost the voting in the Chamber of Deputies on the legislative motion, submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court, attempting to annul this Act. The petitioners argued that the Act could be called ‘constitutional’ only in terms of the form and procedure of its adoption, but not in its substance, as it affected not a generally defined circle of addressees and situations, but a specifically designed subject (Chamber of Deputies elected in 2006) and a specific moment (closing its term of office on a specific date), both not meeting the requirements of legislature, violating the principle of the generality of laws. They complained, too, that the citizens’ constituency would be deprived of its right to vote (to enjoy the outcome of its choice) for the remaining time of the fifth term of office. The contra-argument was that this forfeiture would be compensated by a new opportunity for the citizens’ constituency to choose its representatives. The Constitutional Court, in spite of its commitment – in making its decisions – to constitutional acts,7 stated8 that the constitutional conformity of an act, regardless of its denomination, adopted inconsistently with the defined scope of competence of the Parliament, could be established only hand-in-hand with the protection of the substantive (material) core values of the Constitution, providing that ‘Any changes in the essential requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule of law are impermissible’.9 Just violating the principle of the generality of laws falls within the realm of impermissible interference with a law-based state, which could be accepted only in absolutely exceptional circumstances like a state of war or a natural catastrophe and meet the requirements that satisfy the principle of proportionality. Therefore, the Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional and annulled it with the judicial reasoning that it was inconsistent with the constitutional imperative of regular election periods as a substantive guarantee of exercising democratic voting rights. The Act was affecting a specific, not a normative, situation. The Court referred to the absence of the due constitutional authorisation to do so, to issue a constitutional act ad hoc and considered such circumvention of fundamental constitutional values to
6 Act no 195/2009 Coll. 7 Art. 88(2) of the Constitution. 8 Judgment no Pl. ÚS 2/09, called Melčák. 9 Art. 9(2) of the Constitution.
467 Jiří Zemánek be incompatible with the principle of the prohibition of retroactivity, the protection of justified confidence (legitimate expectation) by the citizens in the right to vote freely, with the knowledge of the conditions for creating democratic public representative authorities by elections, including their term of office. This encroachment on the Parliament’s prerogative as a lawmaker was justified by the protection of the essential requirements for a democratic state governed by the rule of law, which are non-changeable under any circumstance. Both principles had been placed on the same level. The judgment raised enormous public debate. Some of its opponents spoke about ‘a victory of the rule of law over democracy’. Since that time, the Constitutional Court has not been faced with such a mission. It has remained as a principled case in textbooks for universities.10
II. THE EU DIMENSION In the recent time, the European Union is living in ‘troubled waters’. The national parliaments of some Member States have felt themselves as ultima ratio bodies, when implementing EU laws into domestic legal orders, questioning the equality of democratic legitimacy of EU institutions and promoting the model of their ‘decisive responsibility’ for European integration.11 The Czech Constitutional Court, prudent vis-à-vis the status of EU law within the domestic legal order, has found, however, a modus vivendi about European democracy, based on the idea of complementarity, not of rivalry or ‘last word’ resentment.12 Its position towards the European electoral rights of citizens may be shown in the case on the European Parliament Elections,13 where equal voting power – a conflict between the principle of the proportionality of citizens’ representation and a threat of the fragmentation of this EU law – (co)making body – was under scrutiny. There has been five per cent threshold clause in the Act on Elections to the European Parliament,14 asked – as leading to inequalities of voting rights – to be removed by the petitioner, the Supreme Administrative Court. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that democratic processes at the EU and national levels mutually complement and condition each other. The EU pillar of democracy, constituted by the European Parliament, is not less important, even if it is complementarily supplemented by national parliaments. In its view, the modification of the principle of proportional representation, resulting from the continuing application of the minimum threshold in the Act on European Parliament 10 A couple of cases focused on the protection of the MPs’ freedom of speech for the effective exercise of a democratic mandate (the scope of parliamentary indemnity), on participatory democracy, etc. 11 See the doctrine of Integrationsverantwortung of the German Parliament (Bundestag), defined by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 12 Decisions no Pl. ÚS 19/08 Lisbon Treaty I and no Pl. ÚS 29/09 Lisbon Treaty II. 13 Decision no Pl. 14/14. 14 Act no 62/2003 Coll.
468 The contribution of the Czech Constitutional Court to the development of democracy
Elections, strengthened the line of argument taken by the Constitutional Court and supported by the European Court of Human Rights:15 it is definitely ‘a legislative assembly’, representing the principal form of democratic political accountability in the Community system and deriving legitimation from the direct election by universal suffrage, which best reflects concerns as to effective political democracy. It remained at stake, whether the Czech law, if it did not contain a five per cent threshold, could – in view of 21 Czech MEPs – endanger or significantly weaken functions that make the European Parliament a true representative institution and, therefore, it is necessary – in terms of the constitutional guarantee of the proper exercise of powers transferred to the supranational level – to preserve this limitation as it is, in order to consider the proper balance between integrating and differentiating effects of the respective election rules. The Member States have a multilateral commitment to and erga omnes responsibility (of a different quality than the pacta sunt servanda principle under international law) for the ability of the European Parliament to act, regardless of the size of national contingents of MEPs. Accordingly, the constitutional rule claiming that ‘The Czech Republic shall observe its obligations resulting from international law’16 is to be applied. In that regard, the Constitutional Court’s view of the petition was guided by restraint in relation to the legislature, which should be able to review the European aspects of its legislation. The de facto non-existence of European political parties makes the mutual understanding of the national and European legislative portfolios (agendas) more demanding, in particular, when the personal overlap between the two corps has been since 2004 no more possible.17 The limiting effect of a minimum threshold prevents the occurrence of formally classifiable individual players, marginal terms of real political influence, which would not correspond to the constitutional principle of an ‘effective political democracy’, as defended by the European Court of Human Rights, too.18 A reasonably small number of competing political parties capable of reaching functional compromises based on the will of the majority appears to be the aim of the threshold clause. The Constitutional Court followed that free competition, which is the foundation of every democratic constitutional system, does not depend on maximising the number of actors, who take part in it. The need and the degree of such a potential limitation is primarily up to the legislature, not a matter of the constitutional judiciary. In addition to the fixed five per cent ‘artificial’ minimum clause, also a ‘natural’ threshold capable of strengthening the integrative function of the electoral system exists, showing the smallest possible percentage of votes that a party has to obtain in
15 The judgment in the case Matthews v United Kingdom, no 24833/94. 16 Art. 1(2) of the Constitution. 17 Art. 7(2) of Decision no 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom on the Act on Direct Elections to the European Assembly (Decision no 2002/772/EC, consolidated version). 18 See, a. o., Judgment no 62289/01, § 41 – Py.
469 Jiří Zemánek an electoral district in order to gain at least one seat.19 However, it is not known in advance for an ordinary voter, in contrast to the statutory clause, the psychological effect of which works, increasing pressure on voter behaviour according to political preferences: only a voter acting in accordance with his or her internal conviction is the true basis of a democratically organised society. The Constitutional Court referred to its decision denying a petition to annul the minimum threshold in the Act on Elections to the Parliament of the Czech Republic:20 ‘The functioning of electoral systems on the national level cannot be evaluated on its own. It is gradually becoming an integral component of the functioning of the principle of representative democracy in the multi-level union of the European Union and its Member States, the functioning of which as a whole is also a condition for the proper conduct of democratic processes at the national level.’ The importance of the stability of election results for public confidence in a system of representative democracy is fundamental, both at the national level and the supra-national level. Forming a reliable majority in the European Parliament is an important prerequisite for the good functioning of the EU executive and also for citizens’ confidence that their participation in EP elections is meaningful. The limitation of equal access to elective office, guaranteed by the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,21 is proportional, respecting the requirement of minimising interference in the fundamental right to participate in the administration of public affairs through the free election of their representatives.22 The approach of the Czech Constitutional Court to the development of democracy in both dimensions seems to be balanced.
19 In the 2014 EP elections, it lied below four per cent. 20 Decision no Pl. ÚS 2/14. 21 Constitutional Act no 2/1993 Coll., Art. 21(4). 22 Ibid., Art. 21(1) to (3).
470
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS DEVELOPED BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
XXII International Congress on European and Comparative Constitutional Law Vilnius, 4–5 October 2019
LE CONCEPT DE DÉMOCRATIE DÉVELOPPÉ PAR LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE
XXIIe Congrès international de droit constitutionnel européen et comparé Vilnius, les 4–5 octobre 2019
01.09.2020 Printing 150 copies
Photos by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and Žygimantas Gedvila Technical editing by Renata Kupčiūnienė and Monika Rudokaitė-Marcinkevičienė Typesetting and page layout by Neringa Sviščiauskaitė and Valdonė Zubkienė Published by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Gedimino pr. 36, LT-01104 Vilnius Printed by the publishing office Baltijos kopija UAB