236 Book Reviews

Kosovo’s FP, where Krasniqi remarks how lenging the methodology used by the “Kosovo’s path to full international sub- book’s contributors, while giving a pro- jectivity is inherently linked to the issue found overview of modern FP theory with of recognition and membership of inter- a special emphasis on foreign policy ana- national organisations. Therefore, in such lysis (FPA) and its role in contextualising cases, foreign policy gains a dual capaci- both ex-Yugoslav states’ FP/IR and the EU ty, serving both as a tool of state-building in general. Maybe it would have been be- and as a statehood prerogative” (217). The nefi cial for the overall content of the book same could be said for almost all of the ex- if the editors had decided to put such a Yugoslav republics: Slovenia and Croatia chapter at the very beginning of the book, were faced with similar challenges on the which can easily be circumvented by the eve of their 1991 independence, followed reader by reading it straight after the initial closely by Bosnia and Macedonia – as de- introduction by Keil and Stahl. Neverthe- scribed by all the contributors in detail. less, this edited volume is to be highly re- These types of similarities provoke the commended to all who have even a basic narrative laid down in the very introduc- interest in the complex realities of the FPs tion to the book by its editors, Keil and of the ex-Yugoslav states. Stahl, and especially by the welcome, but at the same time somewhat biased over- Amar Rešić view of the FP of Yugoslavia by Katrin University of Zagreb Boeckh. While Keil and Stahl remain scholarly neutral in their introduction, it is Boeckh who somewhat fails to neutrally Review and objectively present the reality of Yu- goslavia’s FP. Her overview may be factu- ally (or maybe even historically) accurate, Jardar Østbø but at the same time she falls into the trap The New Third Rome: Readings of Western-centric critique of the subject, of a Russian Nationalist Myth with highlighting only Tito and “Titoism” as being most responsible for the unique ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2015, 308 pp. success of Yugoslavia’s international rela- tions. However, as all contributors noted, it was the very heritage of Yugoslav FP that was the foundation of the buildup of FP/IR actions of all post-Yugoslav states. And, as While pursuing the slightest interest in it is often notable through all entries, it was international politics, a phrase one might the domestic actors of Yugoslavia’s FP that have heard attributed to Russia is “Third founded the initial FPs in the contempo- Rome”. Popping up occasionally in west- rary politics of today’s independent states. ern media, more often when Russia engag- In the closing chapter of the book, Ame- es in controversial international activity, it lia Hadfi eld provides the necessary theo- often comes in the form of news articles retical background on the subject, chal- pointing out some worrying strains over Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 236-241 237

Russia’s nationalist ideology, employing nitskaia of neo-Slavophilia/pan-slavism. “Third Rome” as an orienting concept. Østbø’s coverage of only four authors The treatment and analysis of the idea are, privileges depth over breadth. The work however, mostly superfi cial. A more illu- still manages to be representative, and minating, serious and impartial attempt at choosing these authors not only allows for analysis is Jardar Østbø’s book, detailing an in-depth analysis of the contemporary the vigorous life and importance of the uses of the Third Rome myth and its func- idea (or more precisely, multiple ideas) tions, but also for an insight into contem- in contemporary Russia’s nationalist dis- porary Russian nationalism. course. Østbø is a post-doctoral fellow at The second chapter, after the introduc- Oslo University, in the Department of Li- tion, starts with Østbø seeking to place terature, Area Studies and European Lan- his study within the relevant theoretical guages, and this is his fi rst book, an up- approaches on nationalism. Thus, juxta- dated version of his PhD thesis. The book posing the ‘modernist’ school of authors is accordingly written in a highly academic such as Hobsbawm, Gellner and Ander- style. son against the ethno-symbolist theory of The idea of a Third Rome is investigated Anthony D. Smith, Østbø seeks to defi ne here in the form of political myth – that is, and clarify concepts of nation, nationalism “a narrative about a political society, usu- and the practice of ‘inventing’ a nation. ally as an incitement to action” (from Kol- In all of these instances he leans towards stø’s foreword). The phrase was fi rst men- Smith’s theoretical framework. The ethno- tioned by Filofei, a 16th-century Orthodox symbolist emphasis on “shared memories, monk, and it was mostly used for a reli- symbols, myths, traditions and values” (p. gious/eschatological purpose. It has since 13) as constituent elements of a nation and resurfaced many times in many different ‘symbolic resources’ of nationalist ideolo- versions and for different purposes. Østbø gies serves as a basis for Østbø’s study, focuses on its occurrence in post-Soviet as he is interested in the ‘attainment and Russia’s writings of nationalist ‘intellec- maintenance of identity’ through the use tuals’, as an element in their narratives of myth in the (re)invention of the Russian whose aim is to construct and reconstruct nation by contemporary Russian nation- Russian national identity. For the purpose alist intellectuals. Clarifying the notion of the study, he chooses four prominent of ‘invention’, Østbø agrees with Smith, Russian nationalist writers, all four with against modernists, that it is impossible to a certain degree of support by the regime, “invent (fabricate) a nation from scratch”. namely: Vadim Tsymburskii, Aleksandr However, he distances himself a bit from Dugin, Nataliia Narochnitskaia and Egor Smith’s idea that “intellectuals can choose Kholmogorov. All four are representative only among specifi c myths that are already and infl uential within four of the most im- popular or at least have some ‘prior reso- portant currents of contemporary Russian nance’” (p. 15), leaving more room for the nationalism – Dugin of neo-Euroasianism, reinvention and rewriting of existing and Kholmogorov of Orthodox nationalism, popular myths, making them more viable Tsymburskii of isolationism and Naroch- in present contexts. This is exactly what 238 Book Reviews happens with the Third Rome myth – Øst- of the idea is sought through interpreta- bø deals with its wide array of transforma- tions by medievalist scholars, which, Øst- tions in contemporary Russia. bø concedes, is likely accurate in interpret- The rest of the chapter deals with pecu- ing Filofei’s intentions as religious, rather liarities of Russian nationalism, namely, than political in any way. Østbø concludes how the dichotomies of imperialism vs. that, as such, the original idea cannot itself nationalism and statist vs. cultural nation- be considered a myth, only its later inter- alism fall short in describing the nature of pretations. Examples thereof, standing op- Russian nationalism, where these opposed posite to medievalist scholarship, are at- characteristics come together almost dia- tempts at uncovering the meaning of Third lectically towards forms containing ele- Rome in ‘generalist’ history works. They ments of both. The seemingly opposed posit that Third Rome signifi es an ‘es- conceptions complement each other. Such sence’ of Russia, which determines its na- a state of affairs introduces a common ture, its behaviour and ultimately its fate, motive of Russian uniqueness and excep- whether this were a geographical entity, a tionalism, as can be seen amongst authors population, a transcendental principle, or analysed later in the book. The chapter some combination of these. Such essen- fi nishes with emphasising Orthodoxy as tialist accounts, which already somewhat a most crucial element of contemporary function as myths, either paint Russia in Russian identity, not to mention any sort a positive light, e.g., philosopher Nikolai of nationalist ideology. Fedorov and his universalist Russian mes- The third chapter deals with the theory sianism, or in a negative one,2 e.g., British of political myth and how it applies to the historian Arnold Toynbee’s conception of idea of the Third Rome. Starting with a Russia as a ‘distinct and different civilisa- review of a number of important theories tion’, ultimately hostile to the West, not concerning political myth, Østbø points only in the Cold War context, but through out key elements in each one – myth as history in general. an ideological narrative, as a story about What Østbø seeks is to distance himself a political society, as an incitement to ac- from this ‘purist’ paradigm. Both genera- tion, as constructing boundaries between list and medievalist approaches seek to social groups, as constructing identity, and fi nd the ‘true’ meaning of the Third Rome. as establishing a signifi cance and meaning While medievalist scholarship is useful in of political experiences, each of which he uncovering the roots of the idea, it does considers in further analysis.1 The chapter not do much for understanding later in- then considers the Third Rome myth in its terpretations, and labelling those as ‘mis- original form, a trifecta of epistles attribut- understandings’ or ‘misuses’ gets us no- ed to Starets Filofei. The original meaning where. The medieval manuscripts serve to

1 In accordance with the definition of political 2 Negative accounts of Third Rome show that myth which Pål Kolstø anticipates in the fore- political myth is not only aimed inwards for the word, and as mentioned in the introduction to purpose of forming identity, but also outwards, this review. forming identity in opposition to the other. Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 236-241 239

“... provide the basic narrative which is be- ence of the geographically-determined ‘is- ing constantly reappropriated in order to land mentality’ and infl uence of Byzantine generate signifi cance” (p. 55). Østbø con- culture. The Third Rome fi gures as a sort of cludes: “For the student of political myth, mental image of the ‘true Russia’ conven- there is in principle no correct or incorrect tion. Tsymburskii’s conclusion is the need use of a myth, since myths are not static, for an isolationist stance and a Russian but dynamic... the political myth of the ‘counter-reformation’, bringing it closer to Third Rome does not have any meaning its true nature constituted in pre-imperial outside its use and no use without a con- Rus’. text” (p. 54-55). He proposes a model of The second author is Aleksandr Dugin, three interrelated, rather than strictly de- who recently, once again, appeared in lineated, modes of expression of the myth Western media as a Russian boogeyman. – the original, the interpretations and the In an article published last December, the meta-interpretations, in constant interac- web portal BigThink called him “the most tion. dangerous philosopher in the world” and Chapters four through seven compose “Putin’s Rasputin” (Ratner, 2016). Dugin the main body of the work. They consist is likely the most eccentric and esoteric of of “Close readings, reconstruction and in- the four. His thought is fi rmly anti-ration- terpretation of the individual authors’ ver- alist and traditionalist with strong elements sions of the myth of the Third Rome” (p. of mysticism. Drawing from a seemingly 10). The examined authors’ entire body incompatible array of schools of thought, of work is considered, whether it be in such as classical geopolitics and Jungian academic publishing (where applicable) psychoanalysis, Dugin constructs a grand or internet blog posts. The fi rst is Vadim narrative of a historic Manichaean strug- Tymburskii (1957-2009), a university gle between good and evil, with Russia professor and an infl uential theorist of representing salvation and the West cor- Russian geopolitical thought. He can be ruption. As such, he gives Russia the mes- readily distinguished from the other three sianic, divinely warranted mission to “lead authors as being the only one who does other Eurasian peoples and free them from not argue for Russian expansion or at least Western (‘Atlantist’) hegemony” (p. 81). greater Russian infl uence in the post-So- The Third Rome represents this princi- viet space. He suggests for Russia to con- ple, while the West fi gures as an impostor centrate its attention within its present bor- ‘Fourth Rome’. ders, and presents the post-Soviet “huge The third author is Nataliia Narochnit- territorial loss as a return to the ‘normal’ skaia, a historian associated with the con- and ‘desired’ state of affairs” (p. 95). His servative Orthodox sector of Russian na- work is an attempt to reconsider Rus- tionalism. Her uniqueness amongst other sian history and make sense of Russia’s authors lays in offering a meta-interpre- new status after the end of the Cold War. tation of the myth. Her approach towards Using a Spenglerian civilisation approach, the history of ideas posits religion as its he argues that ‘Russia became Russia’ in essential foundation – for instance, every the 15th and 16th centuries, under the infl u- ideology or political doctrine, even the 240 Book Reviews most secular, can be explained by tracing Rome myth serves in the authors’ attempts its religious roots. Her main aim is to in- at ‘reinventing’ the Russian nation in the terpret Russian history in relation to the post-Soviet era. They are defi nitions of West. Østbø (noting the risk of oversim- who is Russian (and who is not), defi ning plifi cation) summarises her thesis as fol- the boundaries of Russia ‘as they should lows: the countries of the West throughout be’, a foundation myth, a factor of historic history remain heretical or godless. They continuity, moral prerogative, importance are hostile towards Russia and desire to of Orthodoxy and Russian ‘uniqueness’. destroy it. Russia fi gures as a protector of The fi nal chapter, dubbed an epilogue, is a the true faith, and its historic behaviour is short account of three of the authors’ (ex- more justifi able morally than that of the cluding Tsymburskii, who passed away) West. Dominant images of Russia in the reactions to the events in Ukraine between West are false stereotypes rooted in hereti- 2013 and 2015, as well as their most re- cal and inhumane thought. The myth of the cent uses of the Third Rome myth. Østbø Third Rome as replicated in the West that notes that in the context of these recent paints Russia as imperialist and anti-demo- events, the Third Rome myth has entered cratic (for instance, Toynbee) is an exam- the mainstream – in 2014 a conference de- ple of one such stereotype. voted entirely to the concept of the Third The fi nal author is Egor Kholmogorov, a Rome was organised in Moscow by no less freelance journalist and ideological merce- than the Moscow Patriarchy and the Min- nary, who seeks to win favour of both the istry of Culture. Dugin and Narochnitskaia regime and the country’s more radical ele- attended and gave speeches. ments. He is by far the most diffi cult to fol- Østbø manoeuvres several different are- low, as he has an ability to write at length as of theory to prime his study, successfully about a wide array of ideas, unexpectedly mobilising each one. Especially in the area jumping from one to the other, while stay- of political myth, which Østbø concedes ing as shallow as a puddle, not to mention is “relatively limited and far less known” often contradicting himself. Presenting his (p. 28), he manages to wrangle with diver- bizarre set of ideas, which mostly revolve gent sources to create a basis that fi ts well around Russian exceptionalism and wide- his object of study. The theoretical frames spread political mobilisation based on an are well connected with other scholar- Orthodox identity, would be diffi cult in ship on various subjects such as Russian such little space. Instead, I will quote Øst- nationalism, medieval scholarship and re- bø’s verdict: “Kholmogorov is no schol- ligious interpretation. The history of the ar, but a quintessential myth-maker. He Third Rome myth prior to the contempo- sees historical events, facts and processes rary era is well covered. The study of these as a reservoir to be exploited to achieve four authors must have been quite a feat, his political goal: Russia is to be world give that the whole breadth of their work leader, both politically and in religion” (p. was considered. Østbø manages to compe- 141). tently handle the wide array of eccentric The eighth chapter is a conclusion and ideas the authors employ. It also needs to a short review of the functions the Third be mentioned that, as Pål Kolstø mentions Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 236-241 241 in the foreword, Østbø does not fall into Source the trap of presenting ideas and systems as Ratner, Paul. 2016. The Most Danger- more coherent than warranted, and is not ous Philosopher in the World, afraid to point out contradictions and in- http://bigthink.com/paul-ratner/ congruities. The book will surely please the-dangerous-philosopher-behind- readers coming from a wide array of dif- putins-strategy-to-grow-russian- ferent interests, whether it is nationalism, power-at-americas-expense?utm_ Russian politics, religion, the history of content=buffer74e90 (accessed: 9. 1. ideas or many others. 2017).

Leon Cvrtila University of Zagreb