64

ACTIVE MEASURES Russia’s key export

Jolanta Darczewska, Piotr Żochowski 64 NUMBER 64 WARSAW june 2017

ACTIVE MEASURES Russia’s key export

Jolanta Darczewska, Piotr Żochowski © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Editor Anna Łabuszewska

Co-operation Halina Kowalczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

Translation Jim Todd

Graphic design PARA-BUCH

DTP GroupMedia

Photograph on cover Eugene Ivanov, Allegory of the Autocracy, Shutterstock.com

Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl

ISBN 978-83-65827-03-6 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION /5

THESES /8

I. Active measures’: an attempt to clarify the concept /12

1. Characteristics of the concept and its terms /12 2. The institutional frameworks /16 3. The special forces’ role in the proxy Cold War /19

II. Changes in the application of ‘active measures’ after the Cold War /28

1. Old methods in new realities /28 2. The ‘Primakov doctrine’: a repackaged technology of geopolitical confrontation /32 3. The rule of Vladimir Putin: the return of the state and ideology /37 4. The old fundaments of organisation and innovation /46

III. The Russian ‘active’ threat: today’s challenges /55

1. The role of the special services and their support operations in the Russian doctrine /55 2. The special services’ place in the armed forces: the Russian situ- ation /60 3. Areas affected by Russian actions /64

Summary the inheritance and the present /70 1 Volkoff Vladimir journalist and writer French the by piled com was practitioners and theorists these by texts of anthology excellent An War. Cold the during conducted as warfare psycho logical Union’s Soviet the of analysts Western by research of ince Thequestion indicated inthe title wasuntilrecently the sole prov century. of this beginning the since implemented been has which ‘Putinism’ the of and 1990s, the in formulated doctrine’ ‘Primakov of the heart layat framework the civilisational the in embedded world a of image geopolitical This policy. security and foreign of doctrine official an of rank the to raised was concept this War,Cold the during as and, worldview’ ‘geopolitical scientific a by replaced quickly very worldview’was scientific Marxist ‘the that shows analysis thorough more A rect. incor is Communism of fall the of kind with together this action long-term in engage to capacity its lost Russia that belief The ofa long-term psychological-ideological combat. strategy to subjugated was which Communism, of expansion the of policy aggressive the justified term This measures’. ‘active of name tic euphemis collective, the acquired operations These opponents. political of liquidation physical the even and sabotage, and tion decep propaganda, methods: of variety a used they end this To eign policy (i.e. by the conditionscreating for its implementation). for its of implementation the to contributing by also but world, outside the with of communication channels blocking it and with disagreed which views all fighting by only not of state, interests totalitarian a the served Union Soviet the of services special The INTRODUCTION

research in this area, also contained his work on misinformation. his contained also area, this in research of years many his (1999), summarised he internet] which the in to horse jan Od Konia Trojańskiego do internetu as Poland in published – a weapon of war], Komorów 1999. disinformation ciotechnology, books His Vladimir Volkoff, Vladimir Psychosocjotechnika, dezinformacja – wojny oręż [Psycho-so dezinformacja Psychosocjotechnika, Montaż [Montage] (2006) and [A treaty on disinformation. From the Tro the From disinformation. on treaty [A Traktat o dezinformacji. o dezinformacji. Traktat 1 , who , ------

5 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 6 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 third parties’ third from propaganda hostile countering at aimed communication gic strate EU’s the ‘On entitled it to annexed report the and Affairs, Foreign of Commission Parliament’s European the by 2016Oc tober 10 on adopted resolution the was this of manifestation One Russia. from threats identify to mechanisms warning develop to EU the and NATO of states member the led has This USA. the and Germany Syria, Ukraine, in witness can we effects whose crises creating in role their to linked be should observing currently are inthe The study renaissance of active Russian whichmeasures we services. special at aimed self-definition thethe forms ofof Russian myth-making, disguised less or more nature their by are subject the on cations the public opinion and policy of foreign countries. Russian publi at influencing aimed operations Soviet of the means and methods goals, the describing accurately commentary own his appended 2 has inspired), Russia is conducting a long-term a conducting is Russia inspired), has it which parties, political including groups, social by associa and tions, and foundations media, social (agencies, organisation spective per spective may help to and covert their identify analyse mechanisms. historical A contributed. have technologies communication and information new which oldproblems, to versionthe of hanced en with an attime same are aggressive the actions services’ Russian the connected problems current The schematics. on War-era degree Cold considerable a to based are measures’ ‘active of forms contemporary because treatment special deserves also topic This its up build in Europe. of sphere influence own to Russia of right EU the justify between to and states, conflicts member stoke to cooperation, Euro-Atlantic and values of system European the undermine to intended bilisation

1010IPR46530&language=PL&format=pdf www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=2016 MEPs, http:// affairs foreign warn Be ofand ISIS aware propaganda, Russian 2 . This report shows that, by using various kinds of kinds various using by that, shows report This .

process of desta of process ------policy goals of the Russian Federation, and a list of the areas at areas risk).greatest the of list a and Federation, Russian the of goals foreign policy the doctrines, Russian examining (by them identifying third, we highlight the contemporarythe challengesin and Cold War; the and theafter implemented ways innovations ofsational organi the and basis conceptual their on focuses part second the actions; sabotage and informational offensive conducted which KGB the within structures institutional those examine and cept con the define to attempt we first, the In parts. three of consists text This operations. ofthe nature secret the is process analytical ure effectiveness:their in factor the addition,inthelimiting main meas to tools and research of not only lack a is There operations. these of result end the on effect their determine and define to cult diffi it sometimes is used, are ures’.where they operations the In ‘activemeas as to referred activities the of multi-dimensionality and complexity the show paper this in presented comments The - - - - -

7 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 8 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 • • THESES • ideological strategy became ‘the force of progress’, ‘the ‘the progress’, of force ‘the became strategy ideological its in repression of apparatus the strategy, totalitarian state’s Soviet the in services: special USSR’s the of nition self-defi socio-technical the served also activities  These supervi sion control. its and under worked services secret the Kremlin, events from desirable pointinspiring the as of view of the the in well as there, oppositions crises social Westand creating political and internal the activating documents, false creating By etc. organisations, international media, influential politically in positions intelligence policy; used they Kremlin’s the supporting actions financing and influencing for agencies of network a up build to channels their used services The functions. inspirational and con trol, security, had also services secret the features, tive execu and organisational the to contractors’.addition In ‘sub the chose and plans these implemented operations, for plans prepared affected, countries the situation in the analysed they element: key the were services special The USSR. the of expansion ideological broader the for plans with associated was which process, coordinated single a into action of means various the combine to to attempt testified an measures active of institutionalisation  The Kremlin. of the eign policy for the supporting and Union Soviet the of environment international the at influencing operations aimed in used desired by Moscow. The termcombines various techniques ion, whose aim was to force its enemy to act in the manner Un Soviet the of policy foreign the of priorities and tions assump the from sabotage, arising espionage, and deception, destabilisation disinformation, at aimed takings under offensive covers measures’ ‘active of concept  The ------• • • Active measures were not discontinued after the collapse collapse the after discontinued not were measures Active which surrounded the political police. political the surrounded which statesecrecy ofregime Party’s policy.thestrict aided by was This Communist the of effectiveness the in belief the in it strengthening and society Soviet mobilising by and opinion, public foreign on pressure of kind a putting by both Kremlin, the of interests the to conformed services special the of potential unlimited and possibilities the of mythologisation This services’. intelligence of war the in winner ‘the war’,and revolutionary the in army Chekist activities which cover a variety of areas: political, econom political, coherence Their areas: of informational. and variety social a military, cover ic, which activities multi-level into translates This services. special Russia’s for opportunities the expanded has  Post-ColdWarreality erations of them. gen new of training the as well as fronts, various the on ‘soldiers’ its of mobilisation and concepts the of renewal constant the requires which and duration,long a over ed war, calculat permanent a is This means. surrogate tary) (non-mili by conduct proxy-entities enemy, which leged al the against war proxy conduct ideological-psychological an the of is culture this of manifestation constant  A community. international approach to the tational an ideologised image of the world, and thinking creatingimposing a confron and realism; ideological political of terms in and thinking over psychological of primacy the syndrome; siege’ under ‘fortress the forces; special the and external enemies; mythologising its to own power, society the army Russian within tensions internal by transferring regime the of legitimation the include culture this of bases permanent The culture. strategic and political sian ment to proven methods is a fundamental element of Rus KGB. of Attach the dissolution the Union and Soviet of the  ------

9 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 10 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 • • able content, the imposition of their own interpretation), own their impositionof content, ablethe objectionof world,removal reduplication, itsout the the through dissemination (its content specially-prepared of dissemination rapid the for possibilities created has It targets. their of penetration rapid the effect to services special to the for easier it making time, access real in information provides it communication; and information to barriers old the abolished has internet The action. for opportunities services’ special the expanded have which communication, of means new of use the on rely mainly actions, paramilitary actions, etc.). protest The provocation, latest (subversion, innovations deed and propaganda) and (disinformationword both of means implementedby are War.Cold the techniques during These used that from little differs measures’ ‘active modern of repertoire  The enemy.sions, the i.e. to weaken divi and controversies emphasise to it allow that ratives ready present in political discourse, and by choosing nar of others. It does by this contentmanipulating which is al values the destroying fact in is but values, assumed own its imposing not is Today,Russia creative. not structive, de- is which potential a exploit enemy.They the of image the on based are which concepts, negative are These etc. enemy’sposition, the weaken West, the with integration preventand countries Westernisation of surrounding the the neutralise regime, Putin the legitimise which tools – tools of toolbox a provide to intended are concepts  These others. and neo-Stalinism Chekism, Orthodox neo-Byzantism, world,’ conservatism, ‘Russian the Eurasianism, concepts: geopolitical and trends of ety vari a combines which matrix spacious a is This power. of and space of factors the of importance the emphasising matrix geopolitical a in formatted are constructs logical been by served new the has ideologisation of Ideo Russia. ------• manent, long-termmanent, state. the offensiveof strategy these actions have been tosubordinated the systemic, per foreign policy forcesof and military demonstrates measures, that Federation’s Russian the for support of arsenal the in inclusion the as well as conflicts, external by cohesion internal of construction The West. ‘aggressive’ the resist in to forced is interests, vital civilisations, its defending in Russia, of which rivalry the of context the in located are measures active services’ special Russian the  Today, versions old of ones. the enhanced merely are policy foreign aggressive Russia’s with lems audience the without any to Thisintermediaries. meansthat today’s access prob and anonymity providing while - - 11 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 12 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 ures’ (Ru. ures’ by the KGB’s Higher Felix Dzerzhinsky School in 1972, ‘active meas enemy, allowing his unwanted steps to be anticipated, to lead the the lead to anticipated, be to steps unwanted his enemy,allowing the of intentions the penetrate to possible it making intelligence o vros ehius msnomto, pca propaganda special (misinformation, techniques various for West,USSR’s the the a collective as term against battle ideological of waveintensification the of the 1960s, on in appeared first term at the inspiration and under the control of the services. special The concealed. have Theseout actors, different carried bybeen mostly are community international the influencing of methods various Like many Russian terms, this one also is a façade, behindterm. which imprecise somewhat now historical, a is ‘Activemeasures’ 1. I. 4 3 KGB documents. In the ‘Dictionary of counterintelligence’ of ‘Dictionary the In documents. KGB available publicly in found be can measures active of Definitions defensive. as them by presenting activities such of nature offensive the conceals term the addition, In notations. con negative have acceptance common in which etc.),sabotage,

Characteristics of concept the its and terms Characteristics ably in this text. this in ably interchange used are ‘propaganda’ and ‘disinformation’ terms the this reason, For sabotage. informational and ideological combine also techniques these of both information; manipulated of use the on for depending techniques influence, as treated are they text, this In 2/2015. no. Law] stitutional security], state to threats państwa bezpieczeństwa Kacała, Tomasz e.g. see Fortopic, ofon ranges this meaning. more assigned detail have cepts strictly con as separate and propaganda misinformation literature, In scientific the 2FfAlGUq9IcULWRmqEoOAPcEXoJ1HxKPkixIzbR4mngdg%3D&arc. see https://docviewer.yandex.com/?url=ya-disk-public%3A%2F% document, %D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5). For a scan of the entire 0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%8F+%D0%B0%D0%BA com/search/?searchid=1913655&text=%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D словарь Контрразведывательный A to c cti aktyvnye meropriyatiya) aktyvnye l v ari e m conce the fy easures Dezinformacja i propaganda w kontekście zagrożeń dla [Disinformation and propaganda in the context of context the in propaganda and [Disinformation [ReviewKonstytucyjnego Prawa ofPrzegląd Con ’: atte an , Moscow 1972, pp. 161-2(http://enc-dic. pp. 1972, Moscow , are defined as “acts of counter of “acts as defined are p t mp t 4

issued issued 3 ------, 5 disinfor- at aimed undertakings offensive covers ‘active measures’ of concept the that follows it definitions, these From progress.” social and peace ensure to Union; Soviet and of foreign policy mentationthe of the imple plans successful the for conditions favourable aggressive create to order in its torpedoing capitalism; of positions logical ideo and economic military, political, the undermining ments; move liberation national and Communism global countries, ist social other and Union Soviet the of interests the in out carried activities, those of object the are that countries political the of domestic situations and policy foreign the on influence exerting at aimed activities, as “espionage-operational defined were these intelligence Soviet In dimension. ideological and military nomic, Vasili eco political, their archivist to attention and particular drew who officer Mitrokhin, intelligence KGB former the by en giv was measures active of definition services’ intelligence The etc.”. information, intelligence obtaining value, tional opera ofUSSR ofthe of onto persons territory special the transfer the demoralisation, and compromise athim, directed information enemy, the dis with games operational conducting surroundings, its and enemy the of camp the in spies of position the up building at aimed projects include security state of organs counterintelligence the by activities in practised as measures active practice, In services. counterintelligence the by desired ways in con adverse and in ditions act to him forcing him, on act to will the posing im himself, expose to opponent the forcing stages, early their in activities hostile ofprevention and detection the in allowing nature, offensive are secrets, military and state of protection the and of secrecy regime of a maintenance the concerning e.g. those ures, meas defensive to contrast in measures, Active sabotage. of tions ac his to thwart him, from initiative enemy the into error, to take

London 2002, p. 13. 2002, London Handbook, Officer’s Intelligence Soviet The Lexicon: KGB Mitrokhin, Vasili 5 ------

13 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 14 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 porting the policy of the Kremlin. Kremlin. the of policy the porting sup and Union Soviet the of environment international the influencing at aimed operations in used techniques various combines term The Moscow. by desired ways in act to nents oppo its force to was aim whose Union, Soviet the foreign of policy the of priorities and assumptions the from arising espionage, and destabilisation sabotage, deception, mation, 6 niques: disinformation and fakes produced in order to discredit discredit to order in produced fakes and disinformation niques: ofuse the applied emphasise majority the tech Nevertheless, ers. oth and Maskhadov Akhmad Litvinenko, Aleksandr of murders and 1979, recent in more the in continuation others),their perceive many and Amin Hafizullah 1959, in Bandera Stepan 1940, in Trotsky Lev 1938, in Yevhen Konovalets of those as (such abroad out carried assassinations or sabotage as such actions, physical include Some KGB. the into researchers different among measures’ ‘active varies of concept the by covered terms of range The not always. although operations, secret include often activities These organisa media. the of front manipulation the and falsification, tions, and disinformation appearances: of game a was measures active of essence the Department, State reaction.” specific a obtain to order in opinion public or governments of perceptions and opinions the influence to is measures such of objective The activities. diplomatic informational and traditional from as well as espionage counterintelligence, both and from distinguished be should measures Active policy. foreign Soviet of support in out carried operations decoy informationpropagandaand campaigns mis anti-American on 1986 from report Department State US A successfully to implement objectivesthe of foreignthe policy conditions of Soviet the Union. favourable the create to influencing order definitions: in enemy both in identically treated is ures

formation and Propaganda Campaigns, August 1986, Washington, p. 1. 1986, Washington, August Campaigns, Propaganda and formation Disin Anti-U.S. of Process and Substance the on Report A Measures: Active The essence of active meas active of essence The 6 defines it as “secret or “secret as it defines According to the the to According ------used with the adjective ‘ideological’ (Ru. ‘ideological’ adjective the often with most used sabotage, measures’, ‘active of element key Another country. own their to harm causing enemy, thus of the and interests the in operating were they that aware were espionage,whoof methods by recruited persons from distinguished were them, on exerted being influence ofthe unaware described), were i.e.persons they 7 1986-7’ years the in USA the in ‘Activemeasures entitled 1987 from FBI the by report a in listed also were mechanisms un Similar connections. persons such of i.e. aware idiots’, ‘useful by as well as KGB, the with nections con their conceal whospies out by carried provocations political uninvolved; politically are which structures non-government as presented organisations fictional i.e. organisations, front of tion crea the organisations; and governments politicians, individual of Babrak Karmal and the intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. in Afghanistan in intervention the and Karmal of Babrak installation the and 1968, in Prague in ‘Danube’ 1956, in in Hungary ‘Whirlwind’ Operation as such interventions, armed lutions) revo anti-Communist of case the (in also and activists), political and social of liquidation the (i.e. assassinations groups), sistance out(who by militias KGB-trained presentedare as re spontaneous carried sabotage and terrorism of acts include turn, in subversion, of forms agitation-propaganda, Direct actions. corruption and informational, blackmail psychological, diplomatic, and country, given the within organisations public and secret both of activities the directing and creating inspiring, include methods indirect Its concerned. state the of policy foreign and domestic the in to changes then, and crisis; a about bring to intended manner a in forces armed the and society of morale the lower to and authorities cal politi the destabilise to intended projects includes general it the definition, with accordance In measures’. ‘active with equated ya

), has both a wider and narrower range of meanings. It is often often is It meanings. of range narrower and wider a both has ), mashkov/activities/activities.htmlhttp://okpz.freeservers.com/ see document, the of version Russian the For 7 , in which unwitting ‘agents’ (‘fakes’, as as ‘agents’(‘fakes’, unwitting which in , ideologicheskaya diversi ideologicheskaya ------15 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 16 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 organisations drawn up by the French researcher Thierry Wolton Thierry researcher French the by up drawn organisations of list impressive the by others, among demonstrated, been has scale Their science. and culture systems, ethical economics, tics, ideology,poli dominant the religion, as such activity, social and state of spheres various to subject been has activity of kind This 8 them intended Kremlin the being: into came state that time the TheSoviet Union’sspecial services employed active measuresfrom 2. viet Union and as the illegal practices of ‘agents practices of illegal imperialism’. the Union as viet and So the of affairs internal the in interference as interpreted were sabotage informational this oppose to West’sattempts the while of aspects the free flow of contacts, andinformation interpersonal legitimate fully as presented were example, for misinformation, and propaganda Soviet street: one-way a resembled game cow’s Mos of rules the result, a As Union. Soviet the of citizens the on influence any exerting West avoidthe to taken were precautions above,extraordinary outlined offensive actions ofthe Regardless bloc. socialist so-called the Unionand Soviet the from came 1990s, funding of 90%its the in revealed as favour: Moscow’senjoyedspecial Peace of Council World The it. by supported financially were and Moscow of ests inter the in acted groups These others. (33), and Science of tion (64), Lawyers World the FederaDemocratic of Association tional (86),FederationPeace Interna Womenthe of(129), Christian the Federation Democratic (114),International the Associa Journalists of tion International the (118), Students of Union International (210), the Youth Democratic of Federation World (91), the Africa and Asia Peoplesofof Solidarity of (90),Unions Organisation the in (which Peace World of Trade organisations),Federationthe of national 135 cludes Council World the as such groups cluding in KGB, the of extensions as considered has Kremlin the which

The institutional frameworks institutional The Thierry Wolton, Le KGB en France, Paris 1986. Paris France, Le en KGB Wolton, Thierry ------8

rectorate (for special propaganda) until 1991 until propaganda) (for rectorate special (successor to the CheKa) the to (successor OGPU the of framework the within Unszlicht Józef by 1923 in up (Ru. propaganda special and tion misinforma sabotage, of bureau so-called first The Union. Soviet the of Party Communist the of Committee Central the of visions closely of di under the direction the ideological and international working bodies, civilian including They structures, capitalism. different applied over Communism of victory the accelerate to 11 10 9 partment D (the letter standing for standing letter (the D partment De structure, separate another, of 1959 January in creation The by No. Bureau MPS). with 2of dealt the was Union Soviet of the territory on the subversion doplatov (internal Su Pavel was head whose 1, No. Bureau separate the by with dealt abroad were sabotage (terror)sabotage soft ideological and treme the structures of the Main Political Directorate contained a 7 contained Directorate Political ofMain the structures the intelligence tary (the GRU); as is apparent from the disclosed facts, mili within created also was structure a similar that be assumed telligence), signified a new approachkindto this of work. Itshould a resident agent in France and Iran a resident agent and France in as worked who employee intelligence outstanding an as website him on its characterises its head. The IntelligenceService Foreign of appointedwho Agayants, Ivan was initiative at created the was structure new The intelligence. military and civilian both from of the Foreignthe Soviet Union,Ministry which employed officers at Committee Information disbanded the of basis the on created sian operational jargon), operational of1 sian the part as

дезинформация, http://ricolor.org/history/rsv/good/2/ дезинформация, стратегическая – sta Фактор-стабильности Горбунов, strategic of Евгений factor See a bility. as service intelligence the glorifying in authorities’ Soviet acumen the of context the in initiative this sets he services; spe cial Russian the of historian a Gorbunov,Yevgeny in subject this on More http://old.redstar.ru/2011/06/29_06/5_01.html to Moscow. During World War II he developed a spy ring against the Nazis Nazis the against ring spy a developed he II War World During Moscow. to José and Diaz Ibárruri Dolores activists Party Communist Spanish the bring to operation the including sabotage, in specialised war, Agayants the Before 9 . In the Ministry of Public Security, ex Security, Public of Ministry the In . dezinfobiuro / dezbiuro / dezinfobiuro 11 . deza st , disinformation, in Rus in disinformation, , Main Directory (KGB in Directory Main 10 . Department D was was D Department . ) was set was ) th Di ------17 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 18 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 year, as John Barron wrote Barron John as year, one of course the During actions. similar taking into population local the provoke to and organisations, Jewish by run offices and stores synagogues, on slogans anti-Semitic paint and tombstones Jewish desecrate to RepublicofGermany Federal the to sent were agents German neo-Nazism’. of East country ‘a as Germany of lic Repub Federal the discredit to was task first Department’s The conducted who in and verbally active both operations. campaigns officers, disinformation 50 around had initially D Department 13 12 for for The success of the department meant that in 1963 it was trans was A formedof1 into the Service it 1963 in that meant department the of success The eyesage public. of the the in country’s that nation stage on im and tarnished international the condem with greeted was which fact a acts, anti-Semitic 833 ed negotiation of the final act of the CSCE theCSCE of (1974),act negotiation final of the events. and other (1970), Helsinki in the talks reduction arms the atdelegation viet of the KGB the of for elite reserved the conclusion itshence leadership was the that career, brilliant his of achievement crowning the was A Service Republic. Socialist Soviet Ukrainian the ofKGB the in for telligence of head became then and Oslo, in residency the of charge in was leader last (1991).Its Makarov Leonid (1975-90), and Ivanov 1967), Sergei (1967-?),Kondrashev Kosov Nikolai (?-1975), Vladimir which have proved difficult toreports were: confirm, Ivan to Agayants according (1963- heads, Its functions. planning and rational

intelligence). Psychosocjotechnika…, op. cit. op. Volkoff, Psychosocjotechnika…, in Quoted mentioned Information Committee and a lecturer at the 101 the at lecturer a and Committee Information above mentioned the of employee an residency 1946) (from the time to same the sent at and Society, Friend again ship Soviet-French was the he of co-founder war the things other among After was Paris, in actions. conducted and counter-propaganda propaganda Fascist of mechanisms the researched Iran, in http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/A.htm aktivka 13 , i.e. active measures), and was entrusted with inspi with entrusted was and measures), active i.e. , . The names of the heads of Service A appear in the So the in appear A Service of heads the of names The . 12 , the West German authorities report authorities German West the , st Directorate of the KGB (A standing KGB standing (A the of Directorate , p. 130. st School (for KGB KGB (for School ------contractors. their nominated and plans, operational prepared attack, ser intelligence under countries the the in situation the analysed which vices, by organised were ventures These to. resorted were ‘force’ of arguments ineffective, proved persuasion ideological of methods When actions. military andmovements,paramilitaryresistance opposition and andgroups for support conflicts, of provocation wreck the and ing, sabotage of actions other, the on and media; opinion-forming in the influence operations, of bridgeheads financial of build-up secret influence, of agents of running and recruitment the required this hand, one the On USSR. the of expansion ideological broad the for plans with associated was which process, coordinated single a into influence of methods various the link to attempt an institutionalisationThe activeofmeasures demonstrated A. fromService by officers were reinforced they as KGB.exception,an and Theresidencies were inBonn Washington on 6 May 1968 to the Secretary-General of the Communist Party Party Communist the of Secretary-General the to 1968 May 6 on and sent Andropov Yuri which reports in report a In KGB. the from documents reflected were activities above-mentioned The 3. the 1 of departments the ficers geographical of of by conducted were kind this of operations practice, in dencies: resi foreign its in officers intelligence for instructions executive and guidelines prepared KGBheadquarters the CIA’. in the A Cell by controlled Zionists and imperialists the of machinations ous insidi ‘the about theories conspiracy on based was it assessment their in and abroad, experience operational lacked officers the of for promotion, with which abroad.Many identified athey posting the Kalugin, Oleg rank-and-filelittle hope officers saw apositionas it offered which to according leadership: service’s the of tive however, preroga activities, the were coordinate to Foreigntrips The special forces’The special role proxy the Cold in War st Directorate of the of the Directorate ------19 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 20 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 Leonid Brezhnev Leonid 15 14 connection with the 50 the in with connection prepared being sabotage ideological of acts thwart and State, Soviet the of enemies dangerous most the and administration US the compromise politically states, imperialist of plans aggressive the expose to intended actions of series a out carried intelligence KGB policy, foreign USSR’s the of support in operations of work colleagues trusted espionageand agents with working for Regulations the in tion-psychological operations was the sole focus of the research research the of focus sole the was operations tion-psychological disinforma and sabotage ideological of issue the recently, Until etc.)”. clericals, nationalists, (exiles, Zionists, organisations anti-Soviet foreign of authorities and leaders as well as experts, and scientists cryptographers), (especially authorities counterintelligence and intelligence the of officers staffs, general and departments military of heads policy, foreign governments’ their of course the influence to able officials government Union, Soviet the regarding plans their and government their of policies foreign and domestic the on organisations information documentary international have who of staff “the include these appears; agents’ valuable ‘particularly of category the document same the may influence sabotageofthe enemy”. the ideological under by which arise In community, exile the among as processes negative undertakings, as well other and anti-social preventing ganisations, or foreign and centres anti-Soviet of subversion ideological the combating enemy, the “misinforming find we tasks these among to the be tasks implemented the with help of the agency. Moreover, my” are found at ofthe start the section of the document describing ene the of activities sabotage and intelligence the combat to ures meas “activeChebrikov, Victor KGB the of head the by approved

mruni.eu/.../agenturinio-aparato-nuo. mruni.eu/.../agenturinio-aparato-nuo. www.aurmonas.home. blogger website see ‘Приказ...’ ofthe Lithuanian the famhist/andropov/000394f1.htm famhist/andropov/000394f1.htm http://www.famhist.ru/ 1967;see year the in KGB’s activities the on Report 15 (Ru. (Ru. doverennoye litso doverennoye 14 , we read for example that “within the frame the “within that example for read we , th anniversary of Soviet power” ( , a trusted contact) of 4 July 1983,July 4 of contact) trusted a , sic ). Also, Also, ). - - - - - – – – disinformation of techniques the on book his In 3. 2. 1. followingaspects: on the focused intelligence viet objectives. to According Gordievsky,its strategic for example, So and intelligence Soviet of techniques operating the revealed who others), and Golitsyn Gordievsky,Anatoly Oleg Mitrokhin, Vasili Oleg Kalugin, Tomas DavidSchuman; as US menov,the in known Bez (Yuri KGB and me the from deserters famous reports on by commentaries dia based were These West. the in out carried 16 by Baltic the states disclosed documents by supplemented were these Union, Soviet dis closed by deserters from those services; materials theafter dissolution ofthe archive KGB from mainly drawn were War Cold in the services special the of participation the confirming facts The Red Brigades. Italian United the States support to a whole decade; even in the 1980s, it forserved as an argument the for used was – A Service by 1970 in prepared and – groups rorist ter Staff leftist by attacks General of of provocation the Chief USA),concerning the and of Vietnam in forces (commander-in- American the of Westmoreland chief William General by order the example, For duration. long of were operations measures Active the original sources, came from the so-called Mitrokhin archive, archive, Mitrokhin so-called the from came sources, original the Golitsyn revealed the strategic objectives of this policy: objectives of this strategic the revealed Golitsyn

– – –

See for example www.kgbdocuments.eu/ www.kgbdocuments.eu/ for example See in the West. the in protest for potential the and movements pacifist supporting EU, NATOin and the and allies between conflicts incite to groups documents, campaign organising false including at compromising US policy, above all materials, aimed of preparation the to conceal the Soviet Union’s Soviet the conceal to etc. expansion, own and America, South and West the push to out Africa of Asia, US out the of push to Europe, 16 . A real goldmine of knowledge, straight from offrom knowledge, goldmine real straight A . New lies for old for lies New - - - - - , 21 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 22 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 of effort to persuading local dignitaries to send the Soviet authori 60 Soviet of the occasion the the on letters send to congratulatory ties dignitaries local persuading to effort of deal great a devotedagents 1977, resident in activity: intelligence of foreign a part became Politburo to also the Pandering thorities. au Soviet the of policy the for butKGB, the for propaganda only not success, of certificate of kind a be to intended were reports annual head’s Its KGB. the of effectiveness the about evidence ed fabricat and information manipulated workcontains the of part ing that the authors themselves have pointed not out that a significant worth is it However, II’. Archive Mitrokhin ‘The and Ar chive’ Mitrokhin ‘The of titles the under known Mitrokhin, and Vasili Andrew Christopher by books the in gathered discussed are documents therein the of Some University. Cambridge at tre Cen Churchill 2014 the by February in available made was which 18 17 vice A vice Vsevolod officeran Radchenko, by ofand D, Department later the of KGB’smemoir Ser the is this of achieve example striking their One and ments. services the with mythologised books background this Many services. counterintelligence and telligence in the of veterans by memoirs i.e. literature, ‘Chekist’ so-called in discussed was question this KGB, the of dissolution the After of the October Revolution October of the by a deserter from the GRU who was arrested and sentenced to to sentenced and arrested was who GRU the from deserter a by written Papers’, ‘Penkovsky Western-published the discrediting operations: counter-propaganda of examples three cites author The Service”. Intelligence British the and CIA the instance, first the in services, intelligence Western of activities anti-Soviet the expose to “operations was work this of aspect key a that he stresses however, clause”; top-secret the by covered still are them of majority great “the that admits he measures, active to dedicated

Poznań 2006, p. 2006, 52. Poznań świat i KGB II. as Polish Mitrochina in published Mitrokhin, Vasili Andrew, Christopher book/39527/glavnaya-professiya-razvedka/ http://litbook.net/ разведка, – профессия Главная Радченко, Всеволод 18 . In chapter 5 of his book [The Mitrokhin Archive II. The KGB and the world], world], the and KGB The II. Archive Mitrokhin [The 17 . Main profession – Intelligence agent th anniversary Archiwum Archiwum ------, international airspace law. The role of the special services, in this this in services, law. airspace special rolethe The of international violating of and policy duplicitous a of USA the accused he chev: Khrush Nikita of supervision personal the under out carried and Party, Communist Soviet the of Committee Central the in pared by NASA). player main the Prosecutor Rudenko was in a preplan disappearance plane’s the about informed was House White the and discredit the narrative (inAmerican the official communiqué, light compromising a in USA the show to intended was trial The Park). Gorky in mounted been had which remains plane’s the of exhibition an way,shown bythe invited; were also were they ists to which Powers’s family and a large number of Western journal Kremlin, the to close Unions,ofHouse the of Columns of Hall the placein took (theUSSRtrial ofthe prosecutor-general the denko, Ru Roman of idea the notes, author the as was, Moscow in trial policy the of supporting in Soviet the government. Powers’s show were services special the by). helpful how emphasises author The Soviets’, Phil of the ‘great Kim of Land the of the helper care time life the as (such aspects positive its indicates and world, the in stability and peace for collaboration this of results beneficial emphasises the Radchenko services, Russian the with cooperate to Penkovsky); yet on by agents other hand, the motivating potential (like anyonenotrepresent anything or did and themselves mised with suspect reputations, and even schizophrenics, who compro people traitors, renegades, of services paid the of advantage took services intelligence Western the how exposes author the hand, the one on didactic: as social enemy,ofspecific a as well main as the West the on thought Russian of durability the evoke on 2011, reflections in published book, Radchenko’s in confessions The Union. Soviet overmission the espionage an on plane spy U-2 American an flying while 1960s the in Sverdlovsk over down shot pilot the a Powers, to G. Francis backdrop of propaganda trial the of organisation the and in 1963;to Moscow escaped who officer intelligence British a Philby, of West the in publication the connected with A Service by interventions the 1962; March in death My secret war secret My , a book by Kim Kim by book a , ------23 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 24 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 KGB the to 850 and – Ministry per Interior the employeesof 1500 military sonnel, 300 officials, and workers were thousand five awards to given Kremlin, the at ceremony a during 1980, August 14 of Politburo the resolution by a to According field. the in merits cial spe for awarded medals the of statistics significant the authorin up bythe summed security,was counterintelligence their as well as Olympics, Summer 1980 the of boycott the of effects potential the neutralise to operations combined the of one of description and Party the KGB by Communist the Soviet dissident Soviet Bukovsky.Vladimir A the detailed of Committee Central the from als materi ofarchive analysis excellent an by demonstrated is Party the Communist to relative services special the of subsidiarity The not could forgive which humiliation. its revenge CIA, the of the Powers’s author, was the to accident: according this acar in death of interpretation Radchenko’s is West, the about thinking atorial conspir services’ Soviet the of the continuity of certificate a time plificationabroad. and finishing thetouch, ofThetrial the same at am media the stay, and their during security the invited, nalists case, undoubtedly came down to the selection of the Western jour 19 against us were”. On a side note, it should be noted that sport was was were”. sport us notedsidethat note, a be it against should On made propaganda bourgeois of allegations the all untrue and ful to reality,see howhad to the opportunity attitude socialist deceit of the Olympics, who had come to the Soviet Union with a negative guests and participants the of majority vast “the that stated buro Polit the by resolution arisen separate A has Games.” Olympic which the around blockade information the break and attacks anti-Olympic and anti-Soviet the off fend to (...) managed we have backfired completely boycott the of idea “the that said however, Moscow.in games the attend Kremlin’s Themachine, propaganda to refused countries 63 1979; in Afghanistan of army Soviet the by

himself available on his website http://bukovsky-archives.net/ http://bukovsky-archives.net/ website on his available himself proces as Polish in Moscow, in published Judgment Bukovsky, Vladimir 19 . The boycott of the Olympics was a reaction to the invasion the to reaction a was Olympics the of boycott The . , Warsaw 1998, p. 476. The author has made the archives scanned by scanned archives the made has author The 476. p. 1998, Warsaw , Moskiewski Moskiewski ------which had, for example, been displayed by the protests against against protests the by displayed been example, for had, which momentum previous the lost KGB by organised protests ‘peace’ the however, etc.; space”, of demilitarisation “the “cease-fires”, coexistence”, Union’s viet for peaceful a years over many struggle So “the of result the as propaganda in presented were cussions dis These tests. weapons nuclear on information as exchanging on well as weapons, chemical and weapons nuclear strategic of reduction the and disarmament on initiated were tive),talks and initia an such forward put to first the been had Andropov (Yuri revived was CIA KGB the the and idea of between cooperation the his of announcement the and power to rise Gorbachev’s Mikhail after halted not was ures meas active of West).use The the disturbed that problems other and trade drugs the the terrorism, weapons, nuclear against of proliferation fight the in cooperation for proposals conferences; disarmament and peace for marches of organisation (the actions agitation/propaganda to transferred was operations active the in ofperiods ‘thaws’,During fortrieve organs transplants. stress the re to order in murder their and third-worldcountries from dren ofchil Americans by kidnapping children’, i.e.the ‘spare-part in trade the or African-Americans; eliminate to order in ostensibly (incans the course of on research weapons)bacteriological of HIV, Ameri the by invention supposed the with associated campaign the or States; United the discredit to intended actions prominent extremely and dynamic Af involved in which 1980s, the in intervention ghanistan Soviet the of criticism Western to response the and aggressive extremely took on considerable examples, we as dimensions: might mention were these relations, tense of times In West. the with relations Moscow’sof temperature the on ing evolved War depend Cold the during influence of operations The today. prevalent of remains doping, pathology which the is national teams the of matches propaganda the and sport of treatment political the The of legacy of capitalism. over that system socialist ing victories were intended to demonstrate the superiority ofsport thepropaganda: oftool a and ideologyof element an as treated perestroika n ‘e tikn’ when thinking’, ‘new and ------25 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 26 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 the Kremlin, they worked under its supervision and control. and worked its supervision they under Kremlin, the by as well as causing events which were desirable there, from pointthe of view of crises social and political creating and West the in opposition internal the activating by documents, false generating By etc. organisations, international media, opinion-making the in positions in placed wereagents plans, tions in support of the Kremlin’s ac policies.financed To implementand these influence exerted who agents of network a build to channels con their used They also inspirational. and ceptual and monitoring, security-related, organisational, functions which were informative (analysisout of the situation),carried services special the measures, active as to - re ferred activities the of resources executive the of part key a As Afghanistan. and Syria Iraq, in dictatorships to support political and military for providing responsible was he bigwigs, party the of expert an and Relations) International and Economy Global of Institute Primakov the (today IMEMO at sor Profes a As East. Middle the in al-Fatah of terrorists Palestinian the and militias Kurdish Soviet intelligence, the between link the Pravda for correspondent full-time a was Primakov Intelligence when opinion, common Foreignto YevgenyAccording Primakov. Service the of head subsequent the or Dresden: in Friendship of House German-Soviet the of director the was ion Un Soviet the of existence the of end the at who Putin, Vladimir officer intelligence KGB the as such individuals of roles dual the to mention suffices It influence. of exertion the of part covert the out carried service intelligence the of employees The strument. in key a butnevertheless state’sinstruments, policy of the many one werejust services secret Tothe up, that sum it stated be must economy planned of model. the haustion ex the and ideology Communist of erosion progressive change the this was of condition important An stage. international the on squads’) (1965-73) death (‘American war militarism American Vietnam stigmatising the in involvement military American , he was also also was he , ------the the effectiveness theofpolicy theof Party.Soviet Communist as a way to mobilise Soviet society and its strengthen belief in of it pressure could put on foreign public opinion, served and kind a as Kremlin the of suc interests the their with accorded as cesses, well as potential, unlimited and possibilities services’ special the of ligenceservices’. The mythologisation intel the of war the in winner ‘the war,’and revolutionary the in army Chekist ‘the progress’, of force ‘the became fare war ideological of strategy its in state Soviet the of strategy totalitarian the in repression of apparatus self-definition the USSR: the socio-technical of the served activities These - - - 27 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 28 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 Andrei Soldatov Andrei and Borogan Irina to according a sidenote it added be should that, ism), are interpreted as ‘unacceptable attempts to interfere in in interfere to attempts ‘unacceptable as interpreted are ism), described in the context of the fightterror international against for example question the of Chechen brutal the (which wars are Federation, Russian the of government the criticise to attempts Any ‘hawks’. and ‘doves’ between battles factional in West, the in popular belief, the to made also are references and forming, War, it and Russia re is is that democratising ceaselessly argued Cold the during 1990s:as the from familiar slogans propaganda theand arguments of and use the framework by demonstrated is institutional methods ‘active’ the both of continuity The head. first its became Contacts, forCentre Social former the head of FSB’s the Zdanovich, Aleksandr and grammes, Pro Support for Directorate the of name the received It1999. in Rus. Rus. (FIS: Service Intelligence Foreign separate a of creation the and KGB the of dissolution the USSR, the of collapse the after either, 1990s the in cease not did measures active employing Activities 1. II. 21 20 anyway) requested had been Americans had the unit (which the liquidated that reported FBS the officially assistance); (Ru.unit MS the in 2002; into according to account,A his transformed was Service ligencecolonel Tretiakov,who Sergei Americans went over the to

Old new in realities methods Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, KGB/FSB. Władcy Rosji [KGB/FSB. The rulers rulers The [KGB/FSB. Rosji Władcy KGB/FSB. 2015, Warsaw of Russia], p. 137. Borogan, Irina Soldatov, Andrei jemnice szefa rosyjskiej siatki szpiegowskiej w Stanach Zjednoczonych po zimnej wojnie zimnej po Zjednoczonych Stanach w szpiegowskiej siatki rosyjskiej szefa jemnice as in Polish Cold (2008),the War of End published the After Pete Earley, J: Comrade The of UntoldRussia’s Secrets SpyinAmerica Master m C Sluzhba vneshney razvedki vneshney Sluzhba han easures , Poznań 2008, pp. 184-5. , Poznań g a the in es 21 meropriyatiya sodeystviya meropriyatiya , a parallel structure had been created , in structure a the FSB parallel ’ a f C the ter ppl ). This was confirmed by the intel the by confirmed was This ). ication o o l d W , means for, means facilitation/ ar f ‘ acti Towarzysz J. TaJ. Towarzysz v e 20 . As As . - - - - - f omns, n ltr atcptd n h tasomto of transformation the in participated later and Communism, of defence in stood previously had who Chekists, the years: four only Dzher 1991.in ideologyFeliks took Its after Chekist ofzhinsky Therenewal place of statue the of removal the by example, for cated, indi was which of failure the ideology, Communist from isolated became Chekism way this In Day’).‘Chekist’s of name the quired ac immediately it space public the in thus CheKa’s creation; the of day the December,20 on fell holidayEmployees (this Services’ rity Secu the of Day national a of1995 in Yeltsin’s Boris establishment 23 22 ‘ confusion), of chaos, (i.e. ‘Yeltsin-suffering’ the of years the as presented were transformation ofprocess years the the privatisation, of of result a as suffering was which society a of moods the exploiting By order. and strength of offer own their with time the of chaos the and state the of weakness the contrasting means, tested super-power and tried applying a by so did for They leader. strong a need and state society’s Russian up building by ment, govern fight of pillar to a as position former activity their to their return their for of ing some dedicated services security The trade’. arms the US from the for income in rise unprecedented an shown have Maghreb, statistics the of countries the in revolutions colour the ‘since and pharmaceutics’, American profits for of source unfailing an ‘cul that argue have transformations led tural to a rise in cases of Russians AIDS, which is the example, for today, to up Right War. Cold the of practices the to return a and affairs’ internal Russia’s tura Chekist ideology Chekist the of renewal the in expression found also this level, symbolic a

tion 2012).tion publica 2011 (Russian Routledge Putin, to Lenin from tradition Chekist The security: state of cult the and Russia Fedor, Julie see topic this on more For dynacon.ru/content/articles/1468/ http://www. клубу), Изборскому (доклад 2.0 революций механизмы и Кобякова, содержание А.Б. ред. мировоззренческое год»: 1968 «Новый война. Анонимная Восканян, Маринэ Черемных, Константин See ’ (democracy+dictatorship) and ‘ (democracy+dictatorship)and ’ 23 . The beginning of this process was indicated by by indicated was process this of beginning The . 22 dermokratia ’ (‘crapocracy’).At ’ demokra ------29 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 30 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 Federal Security Service in the same year same the in Service Security Federal transformation of thethe Federal did as policy, Counterintelligence Russia’ssecurity in priorities traditional to Service re turn a into theindicated organs, security federal on law the like activities, operational-investigative on law the particularly 1995, in adopted legislation The rhetoric. official in security state’s the and terests Russia’sof in geopolitical guarantors the all above became Russia, 25 24 increase in the political importance of the the of importance political the in increase the was services security Russian the by activity this of effect One The new realities, in the first place the removal of the corset of corset the ideology Communist rigid of removal the place first the in realities, new The of apolice state. methods of use violence the by the and maintained is order this state’, if eventhe of strength ‘the and der’ the public,Russian officersarethe thesecurity embodiments of ‘or of view the in – state’ the of interests the of service the in nobility ‘aor Chekists’, new hands’, hot ‘Orthodox clean and coldminds with hearts, ‘people as – propaganda in presented were they how regardless of soil: fertile on fell approach This day. this to Russia in power of helm the at KGBremain peoplewho the and Putin of tion into influx politics, mass associated their their aswith promowell

Russia and has control over them. over control has and Russia of force in institutions the all of he as directs of being as any importance, them supervision President’s the consider to hard is It supervision. external ensure that the Russian system of special services is services of special system Russian the that ensure 1990s the in Russia in adopted structures organisational and legal The ties. opportuni funding non-budget and financing good as size well budget),as and structure, organisational services’ the covers secrecy (state countries in other a unparalleled with level of them secrecy provides and services, the to powers new grants still and granted no freely President the services improved: tably special the for situation the power, took Putin Vladimir After Russia. of and minister prime Union, later Primakov, Yevgeny Soviet was 1996) the (until of leader Agency Intelligence Their Federation. of Russian the Service of that Foreign next Intelligence the Central the of name the adopted the of KGB initially Directorate TheFirst mer KGBon reorganisations. relied It intelligence point of the for emphasising service at that the is worth this groups, green environmental defenders of various kinds, sexual deviants, deviants, sexual kinds, various of defenders environmental green groups, far-right and left-wing both sponsors Kremlin “the writes, Brzeski Rafał As 25 , as well as the rapid the as , well and as pace of social 24 . siloviki de facto , which was as was which , deprived of deprived any ------sive foreign policy are only an enhanced version old of ones. the enhanced an only sive are foreign policy toolbox, today’s which that means problems Russia’s with aggres the audiencetarget It without to any intermediaries. provided a new access and anonymity provides internet The interpretation). own imposition of their ofdeletion objectionablethe content, and duplication,the easy world, its the throughout (itsdissemination content crafted of dissemination rapid the for opportunities ated media) cre social and media online new (traditional media called development so- the of the time, same At the actions. getsof their tar the into penetration digital instant effect to services special the allowing time, real in information to access provided It tion. communica and information to barriers previous the abolished new the turbulent development The by internet the realities. of technological encouraged also were services special Russian The links. spying up world these build to used the and was CIS the around scattered diaspora Russian 25 million-strong tion, the addi In available. cover social or economic political, any under respondents), moment from this on werethey able to work abroad cor foreign of offices representatives, sales offices, West (Aeroflot of the guise diplomatic in placements the recognised and facilities gence operatives had been embedded in foreign residencies under intelli time KGB’s the during Whereas bodies.” intelligence the with ties their disclosing without organisations and enterprises departments, ministries, in positions occupy may service gence intelli the of employees “full-time that stated It 1992. August in by the FIS) on the Russian Federation’s intelligence bodies adopted (prepared law the in guaranteed was which purposefulness, and legalism of aura an in operated beginning very its since has vice ser intelligence the President, the and to directly country Reporting abroad. the within both services, security opportunities Russian the the for broadened have transformations, economic niepoprawni.pl/blog/rafal-brzeski/agresywna-propaganda-kremla http://elite”; niepoprawni.pl/blog/rafal-brzeski/agresywna-propaganda-kremla financial world the into people trusted its same introduces itthe at time and groups, anti-system of sorts all and anti-globalisationists ------31 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 32 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 fronts, and forfronts, and new generations trained. to be of them various the on ‘soldiers’ its of mobilisation the and concepts the of renewal constant to the requires which calculated time, long a war, last permanent a is by This proxy-entities. measures the surrogate (non-military) by conducted emy, en alleged the of against conduct war the proxy is ideological-psychological culture this of manifestation constant A international community. the to approach confrontational a creating and world, the of in ofand terms imposing realism; political an ideologised image thinking over thinking ideological and psychological of primacy the syndrome; siege’ under ‘fortress the forces; cial spe the external and army the forces, toown its mythologising society enemies; Russian within tensions internal ring transfer by regime the of legitimation the include culture this of elements fundamental The culture. strategic and cal politi Russian from derives measures, active of durability the including methods, tested and tried to commitment This years years he was a correspondent for many for and Politburo, the of members for candidates of list the headed He services. intelligence the in figure well-established a been already had he measures, ofactive practitioner experienced an as KGB, the of days largely the in Back was Yevgeny Primakov. to This thanks increased. clearly policy foreign and security of creation the in services intelligence the of role the 1991, After 2. obce o frin oiy ad odce mn diplomatic many conducted and policy, foreign on Gorbachev Mikhail to adviser an finally and Committee, Peace Soviet the of Soviet Party); Communist at the same time, he was vice-chairman ofthe Committee Central the KGB and for the research did which Studies, Oriental of Institute the and IMEMO of director deputy was (he analysts academic so-called of group the of resentative of geopolitical confrontation geopolitical of doctrine’:The ‘Primakov arepackaged technology Pravda ; in the 1970s he was a rep a was he 1970s the in ; - - - - - 27 26 status this maintain to army arevitalised and service intelligence strong a neededit superpower,and a still was Russia of ateborders of the Federation. vicinity Russian the vision, In his immedi the in zone buffer a maintaining world;and the in ance bal strategic the maintaining system; trade global the into sion nuclear conditions deterrent; the guaranteeing for Russia’s inclu main state’sthe taining defenceoption CIS; the capabilities, including of the the within integration close integrity; territorial its follows: as Russia of interests vital the define to first the was FIS the of head The 1990s. the in policy foreignRussia’s behind cept con primary the became it doctrine, intelligence an as mulated For doctrine’. ‘Primakov the as known became later which ism, real geopolitical of concept a pushed Primakov 1980s, the From orientation. confrontational its and Communism with broken had who democrat proclaimed self- a and West, the with cooperation of supporter a bureaucrat, flexible a of image the acquired already had he services, ligence intel the of director became he When initiative. his at missions ter of foreign affairs and prime minister (1996-9)minister prime and affairs foreign of ter minis as time his during policy security and Russia’sforeign by formed also was doctrine His thought. rational of path the tered en had Russia that opinion public global convincing pragmatism, demonstrated mainly Primakov this, of Because fatigue’. empire ‘Soviet of syndrome a by dominated was society Russian and ed, exhaust been had model economy planned the potential; social and economic its of and nation, the of state the of assessment tic realis a other the on and modernisation, its bypreceded be must policy global arena ontothe superpower a as Russia of return the that belief the lies hand, one the on doctrine, this of core the At

vened a meeting with the ambassadors of Russia in the CIS countries, in countries, CIS the in Russia of ambassadors the with meeting a vened he con Affairs of Foreign Minister becoming after Russia immediately abroad, and both in front anti-NATO broad a mobilise to order in example, For поле политики, Moscow 2007, Moscow pp. 103-28. политики, поле Минное Примаков, Евгений memoirs: his e.g. see topic, this on more For 27 . In the second the In . 26 . ------33 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 34 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 sabotage of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, which was sabotage of was NATO’s which for Peace programme, Partnership the to referred this reality, In CIS’. the and Russia within ments senti separatist fomented which West the in organisations alist European Western residencies and in the CIS countries’ US as well as ‘extremist opened ‘newly and nation the on focused tially ini intelligence political the memoirs, his in wrote Primakov As etc.). offer, could contractors foreign what verified and checked and market, hydrocarbons the on outlook economic the amined ex also it Russia; to returned Union Soviet the by granted loans having of possibility the considered and sales, arms for options the of assessment an undertook also intelligence civilian crisis, the foreground, as did economic intelligence (due to moved technologies) to the financial critical so-called (the intelligence logical techno and scientific priorities: intelligence new the defined sia, tives and priorities. The main objective, the ofmodernisation Rus intelligence’s Russian of objechierarchy the redefined Primakov sibly Tehran. a strategic alliance between Moscow,of Beijing construction andthe Delhi, announced plus Russia posstrategy: ‘Eurasian’ the by dominated was policy Official back. turn to States United visit the to official an to on flying was he plane the ordered Primakov round – at news the of NATO’s intervention former in Yugoslavia, turna ‘Primakov the forgetting not and OSCE; the of reform the the as well as Union, to Soviet the dissolution of the NATO after created states with guarantees mutual its through architecture NATO Russia’senlargement, attempts Europe’s to realign security to resistance of Moscow’s by into campaign demonstrated as Russia account, of interests the take to countries on other for insisting need the assertively, more presented was position Russian became tone. The moreanti-American clearly a conceptionacquired and entrenched, calculated politically this 1990s, the of half structing them: “In our policy towards NATO we need the support of the CIS. CIS. the of support the ( support.” need this we organise NATO and this, of care take to towards required are embassies policy The our “In them: structing Дипломатический Вестник Дипломатический , no. 9/1996). ------the West; however, this did not apply to the policy concerning the the concerning policy the apply to not did however,West; this the of influencing less aggressive methods subtle, required policy eign for Russian of objectives short-term the of implementation The etc.). countries, for CIS the front common a represented it that suggested and enlargement; NATO against arguments provided it conflicts; social and ethnic nuclear of weapons by countries which orwere unstable, politically riven possessionby the with associated risks the highlighted FIS the example, (for actions information and moves diplomatic with Russia, and at the same time provided forprepared scenarios issues these negotiate to need the emphasised they Washington; to Russia by CIS). offers specific represent intended to These were the in Russia of interests vital the to 1994 of that and largement, NATOen potential of effects of 1993 weapons,the to that nuclear non-proliferationof the to dedicated was 1992report (theby FIS the prepared reports public the and archives the of opening tial the par byserved was deeptransparency ostentatious This traditions. its from departing were they mean not did services the of de-ideologisation the however, that stressed, was It democracies. Western the against tricks’ ‘dirty or substances, psychotropic of use the or opponents of abduction the as such methods civilised’ ‘un1992, notadoptedusing byin services intelligence lawonthe of law, the limits the the with accordance in within acted services special the declaration, Primakov’s to According transparency. of demonstrations and de-KGB-isation (de-Communisation), tion de-politicisa legalism, emphasised FIS the activities public its In Federation public. in Russian the of position the present to able was analysts, intelligence the unlike which, (RISI), Studies Strategic for Institute Russian called the institute analytical another created Yeltsin Boris 1992 in request, Primakov’s At opinion. public shaping of task the given were Analysts services. intelligence the ofcomponent analytical curity zone. Primakov saw another priority in strengthening the being devised at that time, and to of the construction a se Russian ------35 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 36 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 of foreign residencies, for the Russian secret services the the services secret Russian the for residencies, reduction foreign the of and nation the of state the to due Generally, up, employed available. they means any sum To membership. NATO for prerequisite a was issue this that realising Lithuania, signed with a border agreement it already had of ratification the as well as Estonia, and Latvia with borders the MoscowRussia. delayedalso ofthe signing agreements concerning on the sanctions food trade inand the fishing Baltic Sea imposed by centre of Riga, and the Latvia in lost held were an estimated US$300 citizens million due to Russian-speaking by protests addition, In the press in and Latvia abroad placed the blame on the Russian FSB. investigate; them help to FBI the asked service special Latvian the and provocations, Russian be to incidents these deemed thorities au Latvian The Riga. in embassy Russian the of front in bin bish rub a in planted was bomb a and Riga, and Liepaja in on synagogues attacks were there desecrated, the were 1998 soldiers as Soviet of recently graves as used: were methods ‘dirty’ various flict, even and fascism and ethnic cleansing. racism In order to apartheid, internationalise violations, the con rights human of accused was Latvia country). the of residents Russian all to citizenship of granting i.e.option, the zero the (Moscow demanded examination to citizenship, which citizens required undergo language a Latvian to Latvia’s accession related 1998, to NATOin and the EU,conflict as well as itsRussian-Latvian new law the on of dur escalation example the for ing seen was as states, Russian-speaking member other the of of nationals use make to began provocations Their conflicts. and separatisms regional foment to continued services The CIS. Russian the within actions a move Americans’ the to curb head of James Woolsey,CIA, the in Westthe interpreted was this as the by Moscow to visit official an with coincided assassination the rity adviser to President Eduard Shevardnadze, was shot. Because a year later).stances In 1993, officersecu Fred a CIA the Woodruff, to inflee 1992Tbilisi died(hecircum under sakhurdia mysterious Gam Zviadpresident Georgian the led campaigns disinformation aggressive and provocations example, For abroad’. ‘near so-called ------tain landmark events (such landmark as tain the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, cer after radicalised especially became rhetoric This integration. Eurasian of process assumed the introduced counteracted and which chaos global something as community, this of antithesis the became The West.West the from separate was which munity com civilisational Eurasian a of context the in appeared CIS the in interests Russia’s vital rhetoric, official In transformed’. been Europe’, in ‘the old Cold StatesWar have divisions but not have disappeared, merely United the of instrument Cold policy the the and of War relic anti-Russian an is ‘become ‘NATO policeman’, has global States a United the Alliance’, the and States United the of target the become has Russia enlargement NATO ‘through discus Russia’, public betrayed had West and ‘the appeared: statements arguments new sions, official in but Russia, of sation moderni the of banner the under passed still term first Putin’s of beginning The knees’. its from Russia ‘raising of concept nist Puti the to linked became doctrine’ ‘Primakov geopolitical The 3. ‘ the tee, Lackingfunding andinstructions from theCentral Commit which fresh. of still was symptom, authorities,clear a 1991was August in coup the the to loyalty KGB’s the in crisis the of memory The visible. clearly most were they where is this case, any in activity; economic and political domestic CIS, of and the within activity of period a mainly were mid-1990s in their criminalisation. their in other, the on and abroad; act to services Russian the for ties opportuni expanded in resulted this hand one the On time. the at place taking privatisation of process the supervising as well as companies, new the to related services protection the instance, first the of business force, in which the flourishing resulted of in private – business into went time, the at armed formationserally services) and werespecial described and ideology and of state the return the Putin: of Vladimir The rule Lumpenmilitariat ’, as the institutions of force (gen force of institutions the ’, as ------37 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 38 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 at the same time emphasising the role of the forces and special special and forces the of role the while emphasising time aspect, same the military at a them gave which Russia’, against war information West’s ‘the including wars, civilisational and tural were included of in the paradigm the new generation of cul wars, ‘active measures’ had their systemic nature restored as to them. They to referred methods the power, to came Putin Vladimir After US. the check to potential the has Russia only and influences, of reach the aboutcontest a is game political idea of the consumer society. Theythearethatglobal proving geo the from deviate that ideals and values any world, destroying the upon constitutions state economyand the of understanding own its imposing is States United the space, information global the in predominates it As processes. civilisational and economic litical, po of direction covert ‘controlledchaos’,the i.e.revolutions’and of‘colour use outthe by carried being mainly is policy foreign US mainly States.United military ofthe interests geopolitical implement to the serve American the of products are that technology cyber- and digital modern the all that argue analysts ple, Russian new ideology today’stakes into realities account. Today, for exam intensively with the privatisation process in St. Petersburg St. in process privatisation the with intensively dealt 1990she the KGBin the ofgeneration middle frustrated the of representative typical a as when activity, past own his things) other (amongof result a as ruptured had that power of struction time the importance of the ideological ‘glueing together’ of same the con the at perceived organisation, his of element key a as vices ser special the and state centralised the established who Putin, Kremlin. by the U-turn ideological an indicated rhetoric assertive This others). and ion, Un Economic Eurasian the of 2008, creation the in of announcement the Georgia with war the 2007, Munich in speech Putin’s 28

Korporacja zabójców Korporacja as Polish in published Age of Assassins, the to afterword Pribylovsky, The his ofPolish edition and Vladimir the book by in Yuri Felshtinsky topic this discusses Marciniak Włodzimierz Prof. , Warsaw 2008. , Warsaw 28 . The . ------30 29 relations”) ofinternational use softpowerin the to right the has Russia world, the in states the all (“Like power’ soft ‘Russian as presented is advantage, cultural and spiritual leged al its values, own its of NATO’). propaganda Westand The the of expansion the by threatened is Russia threaten, not does (‘Russia conflicts initiated which aggressor ofan defensive role,a notthat world’,is, that unipolar a to or States United hegemonythe of the to consent not ‘did which states those of and citizens own its of er’ ‘defend role the of in Russia located paradigm new This services. world and emphasising the importance of the factors of space and and space of factors the of importance the emphasising and world multi-polar ofa view the imposing matrix, geopolitical a in matted political myths and ideologies. From the beginning these were for The ideological void ofthe 1990swas filledquickly by newdoctrines, of foreign values. destruction the i.e. societies, their of disintegration the and countries other of position the weakens inevitably values own its of propaganda ception of the world; in fact, it camouflages the use of deceitful deceitful actions of use the camouflages it fact, in world; the of ception per knowledgeof management and the control, political and cial so for technology a as use ‘soft ofpower’, its to however,inclines

Wewnętrznego Bezpieczeństwa Forces],Przegląd Armed RF’s the of Staff General strate the of the gists by understood as war’ of generation new ‘a of concept [The FR’ generacji „wojny nowej Wewnętrznego support – just as the Western countries do, unconcerned with the costs.” costs.” 2014). on 20June the appeared post (www.rs.gov.ru; this with unconcerned do, countries of Western points the as real into just – – us support to unknown still partly elemental, partially tered, scat – abroad Russia for support of links those unite to systematically, and consistently continue, must power. We soft foreign against defenceless not us. And we to as endeavour and isolated our opponents portray certainly are “we lonely not as are motherland”: to the of Crimea return “since the topical become has particularly former head of agency the state Rossotrudnichestvo, tosoftpower, according the YevgenyKosachov, Russian oftask building The paradygmat operacji rosyjskich operacji informacyjno-psychologicznych w XXI w. XXI w 21 the in operations psychological and information informacyjno-psychologicznych Russian of paradigm operating the operacji as Management [Reflective rosyjskich operacji paradygmat Wojnowski, Michał see topic this on more For 30 . What is more, Russia’s defence of its interests and the the and interests its of defenceRussia’s more, is What . [Review of Internal Security], no. 13/2015. Security], of Internal [Review [Review of Internal Security], no. 12/2015; no. Security], Internal of [Review w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych Zbrojnych Sił Generalnego Sztabu strategów w ujęciu st century], century], Zarządzanie jakorefleksyjne Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Bezpieczeństwa Przegląd 29 . The practice . The practice ibid . Koncepcja Koncepcja ------

39 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 40 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 nostalgia.” Soviet replace to intended identity new fora ref of search the in erence points important as serve also and solutions, constitutional [of many current] behind the impetus the Empire,are which sian Rus the of traditions great four towards attitude the by wielded been all above has thought geopolitical Russian of lines main the shaping on influence “enormous Wojnowski, Michał to According ideology,munist abright faced future. which Com from strongly differ they which in past, the towards turned adapted and to today’s however, realities: are they for most part the history of well the from drawn been have symbols slogans propaganda and their constructs, ideological Many States. United the of consti hegemonythe ideology to consent not does which world Russian a for offer an tutes modern the that stress conceptualists Russian although ideology, universalist single a have not Rus does sia result, a As empires. pre-Soviet the and Soviet the both of days the from constructs ideological linking matrix, is neo-imperialist this a time same the At others. and neighbours, immediate sia’s Rus of sovereignty limited the neo-Stalinism, Chekism, Orthodox world,’ Russian ‘the conservatism, neo-Slavophilia, Occidentalism, isolationism, neo-Byzantism, Eurasianism, realism, geopolitical of concepts political above-mentioned the as such technologies, and concepts trends, of variety a combining spacious, remarkably be to proved far so has matrix society.geopolitical The Russian of ism plural religious and ethnic the all above realities, Russian by cult diffi made undoubtedly is which something developed, been not still has this today evenHowever, together. state superpower the hold will which idea national a for search to resources intellectual its stimulates Kremlin the Russia, in government the legitimises worldview geopolitical the because And moves. policy lin’sforeign Krem the justifying thus it, re-organise to need the on focus tists scien political Russian space, global the interpret they As power. 31

Federacji Rosyjskiej w XXI wieku? w XXI Rosyjskiej Federacji Wojnowski, Michał 31 In this context, the author lists the heritage of Kievan Kievan of heritage the lists author the context, this In „Neobizantyzm”: polityczna utopia czy nowa ideologia elit elit ideologia nowa czy utopia polityczna „Neobizantyzm”: [Neo-Byzantism: a political utopia or the new new the or utopia political a [Neo-Byzantism: ------One of the more recognisable of these systemic projects is the the is ( projects world’ systemic ‘Russian these of recognisable more the of One world. the change to act, to instruction an it represents tradition to it;according ideologynot describes only Russian new the world, the of vision own its imposing By world.whole the of space geopolitical the reorganise to potential the is, that – velop de to potential the to, used it as has, empire new the that thesis the It justifies value. another has also empires pre-Soviet and viet So the convergence of conceptual The Russia. in government the sacralising, even or legitimising, of role the given been now has Church Orthodox Eastern the ‘Chekism’; of that like nipulation, ma of techniques the of one was which symbols of use semiotic skilful the to testifies faith’) of become shield the and have truth of sword sword ‘the and shield (the symbolism this of renewal significant The Chekism’. ‘Orthodox of construct ideological the power, by evidenced as ofthis instrument an as included also are authorities are a joint religious element of the the Byzantine heritage. and The special services state the present at environment, hostile a as infiltrated and recruited were convictions ideological Communist of clergy times, Soviet in Whereas State. the of ally an become now has Church Orthodox the church: the and state the between relationship the of reinterpretation important most newthese concepts, which at has made same the time possible the of light the in reinterpreted been has heritage Russia’shistorical of Mongols Peter reign I. the the and of reign Moscow), the of Duchy Grand the in and Russia in both Empire (which legacy a ofRus, Byzantine key the was conceptthe cept of Eurasianism developed in the 1920s. developed the in The idea cept spiritual ofof a Eurasianism con the as well as Rome, third the as Moscow of and Byzantism, ofconcept Imperial the to refers It civilisation. separate a of cept Warsaw 2013,Warsaw p. 154. edition. special Security], of Internal [Review Wewnętrznego Bezpieczeństwa ideology of the elite of the Russian Federation in the 21 the in Federation Russian the of elite the of ideology russkiymir ). At its roots lies the geopolitical con geopolitical the lies roots its ).At st st century?], Przegląd Przegląd - - - - - 41 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 42 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 world’, regardless of their nationality and citizenship. If such such If from help for citizenship. asks person a and nationality their of regardless world’, ‘Russian the with identifies who person any mean to comes man’ ‘country a definition, this Russia”. In in interested sincerely are who those all and language, Russian the of Russian, teachers and students speaking nationals foreign descendants, their Russia, from emigrants abroad, farther and nearer the of countries the in compatriots our to “refers websitewww.russkiymir.ru, the on world’,‘compatriots’ ‘Russian The read as we haveextended. been and world’ ‘Russian terms the of interpretations the operations, influence broader-scale the of needs the meet to years, recent In Ukraine. and of Belarus emancipation political and ian-Russian), comenational the has Russia to inhibit entific concept ofthe ‘triunepseudosci the to Rus’ian nation’thanks heritage, historical own (Belarusian-Ukrain its as Rus’ over into transformed a state-political (Russian) community. By taking empire the of and its power. sacralisation the The ‘Rus’ian’ served and spiritual Empire (Orthodox) Russian communitythe was of pillars ideological the of one was community Slavonic Eastern community with Russia at its centre has also become the offer of offer the become also has centre its at Russia with community a civilisational of creation artificial the More: area. post-Soviet the of territories the of reintegration the for platform ideological an become has world’ ‘Russian the of 2010. myth of The Doctrine Military the in included was which concept a abroad’, Russians forbecometoolone‘protecting forcehas way,Military on. so and in a compact settled are citizens gions in Russian-speaking which re those in separatism foment to potential the with area Soviet divided nation in world’;the ofcountries the itpost-the threatens largest ‘the and world’ ‘Russian the ofdefending terms in Donbas the and Crimea Georgia, in interventions its justified has Russia ‘shelter’ for important it. an as acting service, intelligence ofthe ally becomesan way, diaspora the this in path: not unilateral a is this that assumed be must It it. getting on count can they for Support and Defence of the Rights of Compatriots Abroad, then Rossotrudnichestvo or the Foundation the or - - - - as part of their anti-Russian policy.” anti-Russian their of part as interests geopolitical their pursuing organisations international and structures state foreign by actions destructive of target the is memory historical “Russian 2016: December 29 on Society cal Histori Russian the of meeting a during said Service, Intelligence have a message: clear the head ofas Sergei the ForeignNaryshkin, to the breakdown of statehood and “the rupture of the cultural nation”. code of the cultural spiritual and the of rupture “the and statehood of breakdown the to ters’ of Russia in the 20 the in of ters’ Russia disas ‘national two Federation, abouthespoke the Russian ofthe 2013, on the occasion of the 20 the of occasion the on 2013, 32 100 the of brations at and prepared run, Putin’s carefully are decree, such as the cele fication ofhistory’. Russian Wide-rangingcampaigns information falsi the ‘demystifying campaigns aggressive of use the sees day con Every CIS. the the and Russia to winners’, of ‘community a of contributed struction has Army’ Red ‘invincible the of myth Thestage. international the onposition own its ofbuilding vision Russian the in role huge a played always have myths Historical ‘American of world’, values the er-society Americana Pax consum the from deviates which values’ of community global ‘a phe of the 20 the ofphe tegration of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastro disin the of spoke he presidency his of beginning the at whereas context: this in noted be should Putin by U-turn significant One ef managerial fectiveness of Stalin’, ‘the or ‘amost recently borders’).without Russia Army’, Red the by liberation at black ingratitude ‘the example, (for Russia modern of identity political the constructs he as messages, political Putin’s President in appear

sational and executive bases devised during the celebrations of the 100 the of celebrations the during devised bases organi the executive on and founded be sational will campaign the that predict organisers The khodim-dlya-isvlecheniya-urokov.html revolyutsii-1917-goda/s-e-naryshkin-yubilej-revolyutsii-1917-goda-neob http://rushistory.org/proekty/100-letie- I, World War ofanniversary th century’, at a meeting of the National Assembly in in Assembly National the of meeting a century’,at th anniversary of the October Revolution. These These Revolution. October the of anniversary th century (in 1917 1991), century and led had which th anniversary of the Constitution Constitution the of anniversary 32 Historical film-clips often often film-clips Historical . th th ------43 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 44 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 6. memes on social networks, have many uses. The constant use use constant The uses. many have networks, social on as memes and debates television in employed repeatedly myths, These Ukraine. in tions ac Russia’s justify to used been has fascism’ ‘Ukrainian against on the eve of accessiontheir to States NATO and the Baltic EU; the latterly, the fight discredit to used were it against fight Russian the as the Great Patriotic War. In our of time, the symbols and fascism Russia in World Second known the War, is which during renewed was This pattern pattern. cultural gy and an established inspiring ideolo Communist the of superiority the confirmed war civil the in victory propaganda: Soviet to linked clearly are programmes These West. the by intervention armed the as well as attitudes), ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘patriotic’ (juxtaposing time the of war civil the around focus will revolution the of anniversary 100-year the of celebration the subject, latter the on TV state Russian by shown already documentaries the of basis the on assume should we As 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. abroad: ‘falsified’ mostoften are which facts the listed again once experts Council’s the 2016, ber Octo in question this to dedicated meeting a During Federation. Russian the of Council Security workthe of the in presence stant con its by evidenced is problem this to approach systematic The 33

TV Rossiya, 29 October 2016; http://kommersant.ru/doc/3131019 29 October Rossiya, TV the revolutionthe of 1917. the Molotov-Ribbentropthe pact; over fascism; victory role Union Soviet the of in the the Union; Soviet of policy the nationalities the Empire; Russian of policy the nationalities the United States the of emissaries by organised revolutions colour and groms po anti-Communist as light, contemporary a in interpreted are (which countries Eastern-bloc other and Czechoslovakia Union’sSoviet GDR,the the Hungary, in crises to the response 33 ); and - - - - - tangible sign of real Russian power. In this sense, the ‘victorious the sense, this power.In Russian real of sign tangible only the is this fact, in demonstrated: then is force of factor the fails, thefactor ideological When reasons. fiedideological false by candidate is choicecontinually re-elected. This thenmust be justi cy’ doesvalve of not same safety the elections: free have social the ‘soft’is negligible. political methods Russian ‘controlled democra by allies win to ability its thus and unattractive, is development of model Russian the that only not is problem The power.state’s the of image the by replaced being today is country the of image the opinion, his in attraction: its of strength the and country ofthe attractiveness the as such factors of importance the belittled 34 Nikolaychuk Igor (RISI), Research Strategic of Institute Russian the of Centre Research Defence the of head the example, For abroad. media Russian the and analysts by perpetuated ally Presidentis continuof the victors’,image community of This etc. of ‘a new lands’, architect the whoRussian is of the gathering ‘the aboutset has whowhointerests, and effectively defends its knees from its Russia the raised one has who firm, and its leader: strong of image the by replaced been thus has state the of image ganda ‘errors’and of West, the it blaming for The its propa own failures. ‘aggression’ the by policy its of failure the explains Kremlin The modernisation. all failed country’s above the and associated empire’ ‘stolen the is with world the in Russia of image the Today legitimacy. this extend 1990s.renewed, order in to the today in it And constantly is being government Russian the of legitimacy the of crisis the overcome to helped has Russia, with warfare psychological of intervention, the Russian government. Theimage ofthe enemy, ofof conspiracy, actions of the legitimise to serves and evaluate, to hard is confrontation which for potential a both has sense, geopolitical the in blur identified enemy, as The peace. they and war between as boundaries the society, of militarisation and po the consolidation serve litical victory of cult the and enemy the of image the of

http://riss.ru/smi/6696 34 , has has , - - - - - 45 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 46 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 between Russia and the West. the and Russia between confrontation geopolitical the of technology a as of thought be primarily should it power: soft Western with do to little enemy. the i.e. weakening divisions, It controversies has and and choosing itdiscourse, that narratives allow to emphasise by contentmanipulating which is already present in political values, but is rather the destroying values of others. It does so assumed own its imposing not is Today, Russia potential. tive crea a not potential, destructive a exploit They enemy. the image of the on based are negativewhich concepts, are These West, enemy’sthe the gration with weakening position, etc.). - West the neutralising ernisation of countries and the preventingsurrounding regime, inte- Putin the legitimising tools (of of power. kindThis ofconcept is intended to provide a toolbox factor the and space of factor the of importance the phasises em which matrix, geopolitical a in formatted are ideology, Russian political myths, which have risen to the rank of a new operations. of use military the through tive measures ac in Russia’sstrengthen war to demonstrated desire clearly have Syria the and Crimea of annexation the Georgia, in war’ little governmental (in this particular case, the the case, both particular actors, this (in governmental many by out carried being is project The it. to able inte- systemic, thetools avail all uses Kremlin The state. of the the activity grated of expression the represent they First, lin’s implemented. are foreign policy Krem the supporting operations current how in trends several them Russia’s orbit,within it keep and cultural political us allows to perceive to order in states, post-Soviet the cover to extended pro flagship When nature. a in functional as Russia’spower’, ‘soft was of West gramme the to addressed originally was which world’, ‘Russian the of project systemic the beginning, the From 4. The of old organisation innovation fundaments and Russkiy Mir Russkiy foundation foundation ------a year later 35 the and 2007, in established or Aleksandr Matyushin, the leader of the voluntary voluntary the of leader the Matyushin, Aleksandr or the lever of war, by the liquidating Right Sector sabotage groups”); “pulled he it, put he (as People’s Republics so-called Lugansk and the Donetsk of separatists the of operation military the for ity People’s responsibil Donetsk Republic’,took who the of minister Igor the FSB reservist ‘Strelkov’,a.k.a. Girkin, the former ‘defence as such criminals ordinary as well as Cossacks, organisations, ist paramilitary extrem controlled and nationalists, joinedwere byRussian activities military The activated. were world’ ‘Russian the supporting actors of series Spring’,a ‘Russian entitled action Donbas, the in war psychological-ideological top-down a by the accompanied was which and Crimea of annexation the During acommon objective. of whompursuing are all itself, to actors many subjected has system brief, In the media. the and army sian Rus the Church, project Orthodox in the include the participants important Other them. finance to or scholarships) and grants as (such programmes individual implement to instructed are who Malofeyev, Konstantin like oligarchs private or companies, koil Lu and Gazprom the as (such business diplomacy), public sian Rus develop to aims which Foundation, Gorchakov the as (such

in 2015, celebrations of the 70 the of celebrations 2015, in Crimea; of annexation the after for Russia for support appeals initiating and memory, 2014,IT training historical education, on In focused patriotic activities their concerts. and anniversaries of celebrations as well as science, and culture of Russian in centres presentations and seminars tions) conferences, delega diplomatic (in with and also sors cooperation oflanguage; the Russian - profes and of teachers conferences World’; international Russian the annual of ‘Summit a organise they year Every long term. the work to in oriented are a clear and overt element of support for Russianpoliti policy.and cal technologisthistorian These Vyacheslavorganisationsscientist, Nikonovpolitical the (a by grandson headed ofis Vyacheslav which foundation, Molotov), is The The history, attempts to diminish the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union in in Union Soviet the of contribution victims. war to of monuments profanation the decisive and Nazism, over the victory the diminish to attempts history, of falsification the counteract to need the emphasised summits compatriots’ the of resolutions the 2016, In predominated. Russophobia against fight the modus operandi modus 35 ), and the so-called non-governmental organisations organisations non-governmental so-called the ), and of the the of Rossotrudnichestvo th anniversary of the end of World War II and Rossotrudnichestvo agency and the the and agency gny founded agency Russkiy Varyag

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47 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 48 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 Style’ extremist organisation and and organisation extremist Style’ ‘Russian illegal the in lie origins whose Donbas, the in battalion Nikolai Starikov, the the of Starikov, Nikolai party Homeland Great the Union, Rightist-Conservative the as such organisations Fraudulent Nationalists). Russian of tion mer GRU analysts who initiated a project entitled ‘Academy for ‘Academy entitled project a initiated who analysts GRU mer for the of case the in as form, public conspicuously a Sometimes on takes it resources. executive the expand to also and action, executive and conceptual between convergence a for need the to gavebirth which services, special Russian the by lytics’,inspired Both these centres represent what is known as ‘information ana Fradkov. Mikhail FIS former head of the the by run currently is it Reshetnikov; Leonid analyst telligence in the by headed was it years many For Administration. dential Presi the of structures the within operates it present at service; Russia’s intelligence of Until think-tank official integration. the was and RISI the Diaspora 2008 of Institute the as known States,also CIS of Institute the and (RISI) Research Strategic Insti of tute Russian the by on worked being is) still (and was project develop and organisational mental. conceptual, project: of kind this of levels all at present are services special Secondly,the whoRegions, now lives Moscow. in of Party a Leshchenko, from pro-Russian the politician Ukrainian Nikolai stood which of head the at Weapons, without Donbass a for Foundation International new the by evidenced today,as contin ues boom organisational This Wolves. Night the called club biker the of leader the ‘Surgeon’), the (a.k.a. Alek and Zaldostanov sandr Starikov nationalists the by run those have including banner arisen, Anti-Maidan the under movements Several war’. civil ‘Ukrainian a as presented being are day this to which tions ac armed the in time soldiers Russian of same participation the the concealing at while separatists, Ukrainian for support ised organ have etc., YouthUnion, Eurasian the movement, Donbass Officially, in the institutional sense, the ‘Russian world’ world’ ‘Russian the sense, institutional the in Officially, Novorossiya movement, the Battle for the the for Battle the movement, BORN te re Organisa Armed (the ------36 Voyny matsionnyje entitled periodical quarterly 2008.a Itissues in created was tion, a project entitled ‘The Academy ofSelf-Defence’ Informational inspira its At Ministry. Defence the and services special the analysts from former of group a by co-created was which 1995, in sin Academy Russian of Sciences, by established a decree of YeltBoris the is support policy of segment this in entity The longest-running (assets). resources development and ofreproducibility analytical sabotage), the and and prevention(the analytical identification of defence analytic misinformation), (analytical world-outlook), warfare and analytical project of terms in (analysis project litical in Russia nation’s geopo the of for support self-sufficiency, parameters analytical clude: security analytical the thinking, his in security’; ‘analytical of concept the devised also has Kozyrev analysis. such of functions the among initiatives)authorities’ the do not reject au citizens (to the which thorities in a situation achieve the in confidence of build-up analytic the and etc. cretions, ac foreign from core national the lies, from truth distinguish to ability their unlocking i.e. citizens, of unblocking’ ‘mental the ed list has ministry) headthe foreign first ofRussian the with fused Nebopolitiki Institut Heaven-Politics (Ru. of Institute The Management. Development for a new generation of psychological warfare with the West, is an West, an is the with forwarfare new generationa of psychological training, of kind increasing an This candidates. doctoral and include students of number authors The influence. psychological of of techniques perfection lies the interest War. of their heart At the draw science,upon also and Soviet Coldfrom the theories military in achievements Western describe authors Its analysts. of eration Russia’sforbase educating a new gen security, intellectual an and on discussions forpopularising platform a project, educational an

documents studies/2016-06-27/russias-armed-forces-information-war-front-strategic- Studies Studies, OSW Eastern for Centre documents, Strategic front. war information the on forces armed Russia’s Darczewska, Jolanta see more www.iwars.su; 2 Jn 21, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- 2016, June 27 , Ifrain Wars) (Information ). Its co-author Andrei Kozyrev (not to be con be (not to Kozyrev ).co-authorAndrei Its 36 , which is simultaneously simultaneously is which , Infor ------49 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 50 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 the guidelines from the Security Council of the Russian Federa tion Russian the of Council Security the from guidelines the with accordance in programmes: state’straining the of extension 37 ciations are most often organisations of the of organisations asso often most are ciations Russian The operations. of range extensive an undertake private financial background,thanks to whichthey canafford to haveorganisations).non-governmental (government-These public- a organised GONGOs so-called or NGOs, state are These tion. Founda History Fatherland’s the and Foundation Gorchakov the Mir The state. the by created are and state the of interest the in work foundations, and associations clubs, various by resented rep as NGOs, so-called Russian society. of interests the in work and initiative private at formed are organisations governmental sector, i.e. non-governmental organisations. third so-called the imitate today which organisations, front through implemented being still are measures’ ‘active Third, curricula. educational civilian and military the in places permanent taken now have propaganda’ and mation destroyed by the so-called Islamic State, etc.). Islamic so-called by the destroyed churches rebuilds for aid Syria, humanitarian organises example for which East, the in Christianity of Development the for ciety So the includes group (This FSB. the of predecessor the Service, Counterintelligence Federal the of head as including sector, rity secu the in positions ofprominent variety whoa held Stepashin, Sergei General under Society Palestinian Orthodox and Imperial Shoigu; the Sergei General Society, defence, of minister Geographical the by Russian chaired the Naryshkin; Sergei service, intelligence the of chief current the by headed currently Society, Historical Russian the as such reactivated, have been ganisations or older Many expanded. being constantly is sector GONGO The potential. institutional have significant

http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/information/ Foundation was set up at the decree of the President, as was was as President, the of decree the at up set was Foundation 37 , the subjects of‘geopolitics’,‘disinfor and subjects the war’ , ‘information nomenklatura In the West, non- West, the In , which which , Russkiy Russkiy ------rn nm of name brand the under operated previously had which stations radio foreign the workof the Moscow from coordinates and integrates which Kiselyov, project, Sputnik, Dmitry multimedia unveiled another company, state this of director-general the 2014, November In establishment of the Russia Today International Agency ( Agency International Today Russia the of establishment ofrest worldthe end ofthe have2013 been transformed: saw the the to Russia’smessage broadcasting media the mission, global pand the circle of ‘understanders of Russia.’ heads of Russian influence onthe West,and and ex organise bridge - the up build also they misinformation: disseminate to or policy Russian for framework media favourable a ate - cre to work only not do abroad media Russian the Fourth, West. the in tacts con of networks up build to serve they other, the on cism’, and they hand, one the On the and with fight West the in ideological platforms are concerts). ‘Atlanti actions, protest marches, ences, confer as (such events agitation-propaganda arrange also They lin. Theytheandserve Russian foreignas media opinion leaders. in Democracy of Institute the Washington or the Institute for as Dialogue of Civilisations in Ber such abroad, including created others, those many and Organisation, Monitoring tional Interna CIS-EMO the Initiatives, Civil Support to Foundation Diplomacy’ ‘Public the Conservatism, Dynamic of Institute the Katehon the Club, Experts, the Izborski Orthodox of Club, Association also known the under Foundation, the nameCulture of Strategic the include names their sector least; saythe to numerous are third so-called Russia’s of representatives of Examples the radio station station radio the Segodnya ya cal journalists and opinion leaders. Thetask journalists the ofcal new company lored to conditions;local use ofthe services they increasingly lo tai is message propaganda radio RT,the of model the On tions. applica mobile and broadcasting digital and analogue agency, guages, is multiplied by the newsexponentially internet portals, ), which merged the TV station RT (Russia Today),(Russia RT station TV the merged which ), oo Rossii Golos Golos Rossii Golos Ti msae bodat n 0 lan 30 in broadcast message, This . and the RIA Novosti press agency. As As part of Russia’s Rossi ------51 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 52 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 plained by the FSB Colonel Yuri Kurnosov, the originator of the the of originator the Kurnosov, Yuri Colonel FSB the by plained ex As analytics. informational abovementioned the of work the of area one is networkof kind this Building centres. control their and them between link the detect to difficult involved), is it was is, themselves; to factor that human the trolls the detected thanks were factories’ ‘troll (the networks social on and media ditional tra spreading of websites the in of sections comments trolls the in and misinformation bloggers paid of role the to contrast In network. the nodes in resent so-called controlled social movements and youthnet organisations. associations, foundations, Russian above-mentioned These The the rep code. co-create works cultural ‘foreign’ the with confrontation its code, in cultural own its with accordance in action and hierarchy a principle only ofsystem permits of Russian strict the nature the experts: problemforRussian research serious Westa present the of in networks horizontality the and of activities decentralisation the reason, this For executive. the of instructions the with ance accord in matrix, ideological of common a framework the collectivism’, within ‘network of principles the with accordance in act and centralised, strictly are They system. the of nature hermetic the ensures which top, the from adjusted and controlled rected, di and top, the from organised are spaces. structures network Russian informational virtual and real both involve and widely cross-link to used being message. are Russian the tanks, think non-governmental the so-called like sector, the and media new the Fifth, them.” you need only organise to everywhere, are “Russophiles as co-operation, author in involved and ities leaders local get to as well as audience, listening and above quoted RISI for analyst the IgorNikolaychuk, by explained was 38

http://riss.ru/smi/6696 38 : it is to achieve the maximum extension of the viewing viewing the of extension maximum the achieve to is it : Networking technologies are understood understood are technologies Networking ------39 project Analysis’ of School ‘Russian specificities of the target area to be taken into account, and helps and account, into taken be to area target the of specificities regionalisation. their by characterised is measures active of use modern the Seventh, means. by military measures active of use the support to desire the to testify clearly Syria, in action Russian the as well as Donbas, the in war the and Crimea of tion annexa the 2008, in Georgia in war’ little ‘victorious the sense, this In status. Russia’s of great-power manifestation tangible only the fact, in is, force of factor The model. development attractive Russia’sto un inappropriate and which factor,artificial as abroad perceived is ideological the of limitations the to part in due is Russia’s justifying an argument become has it Today influence. of spheres building and sure pres political imposing for deterrence, of instrument global an power, a as position Russia’s of marker a as regarded invariably been was has this centuries the policy. Over foreign Kremlin’s the in force component military strengthened. operations’ the Sixthly, of audience. deceptive on the impact channels the broadening in as well as countries, target in situation the toring technologies, which have in created moni also new opportunities communication modern of use good make networks Russian The projects”. implementation the of special as well sation, as self-organi their of mechanisms the of management the cluding in systems, social ofhierarchized management the situation; cal geopoliti new a to transition the of perspective historical the of takeover Russia’s following: the guarantee to intended is which (...),work analytical collective of technologies new of mentation

мастерства в аналитической работе, Moscow 2015 and others. 2015 and Moscow работе, books ваналитической his мастерства in project Секреты this аналитики. of Moscow 2012; Алгебра оружие, интеллектуальное founding the presented Kurnosov This is linked to the important role thefactor theimportant of of to linked is This This allows the regional and cultural cultural and regional the allows This raison d’état raison 39 i i bsd on based is it , as a superpower. This This superpower. a as

Аналитика Аналитика как te imple “the ------53 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 54 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 would be difficult or or impossible to identify.would difficult be which methods ‘secret’ them call to difficult is purposes),it their the open information space. in activities their of range wide the to all above applies This projects. the ofimplementation the in participation their of camouflage total the of principle the from departure a serve ob we services special Russian the of activities the in Eighth, tanks. think out by Russian carried being is ‘ and misinformation of offensive mechanisms worldsidethrough to regard with roletheir the in ures, influencing outin particular meas active of arsenal the in tool important an as actions considering these By audience. target the of mind the in spe services Russian cial the of ubiquity the confirms inspiration, Russian ing tial grant for the study of Polish elites Polish of study the for grant tial 2011 the Kaliningrad Polish Research Centre received in that coincidence no a presidenis it Kremlin: the by supported is research elites and the public of each the other.against target country Such to set the services special byRussian used the techniques neering Thesedemands. popular analyses formthe basis ofthe engi social of status the and culture political the of also but situation, litical influence depends onanalyses theof of balance power theand po of operation the of effectiveness The actions. his of target the and aggressor the between distance cultural to and reduce mental the 40 maskirovka

http://www.ruvek.ru/?module=articlesp&action=view&id=5856 ’ (distractions from the attacker’s real activities and and activities real attacker’s the from (distractions ’ Leaving traces of, or even suggest 40 . Research in this direction . direction in Research this ------are supposed to be its positions regarding Kosovo or Syria. regarding positions supposed its be to are which of law, examples international of and state the of ereignty negationthe of of kinds hierarchy, all whereas it defends sov the inthe world,Russia is balisation, anarchism withfightingalso i.e. man’ ( ‘Russian the of essence spiritual the and faith, family, the of institutions the demolishing culture, for substitute American the by culture national of is marginalisation the threat foreground: the in spiritual and civilisational the currently emphasised, was resources Russia’sofmaterial exploitationraw the 1990s the in Whereas sovereignty. its limit to and degradation, cultural its territory, its of disintegration the destabilisation, weakening, its the of Federation,Russian to assets,to seizeabout its bring affairs internal the in interfere to attempts as defined are These Russia. the conceptin found redefining expression to threats ofprimarily 41 approach this on based were which documents gic strate Russian later the and doctrines these in Both grounds. al cultur and philosophical on geopolitical based These works were 2000. year the from Federation Russian the of Doctrine Military the and Federation Russian the of Security Doc Information of the trine on work during crystallised was activities support its and sector’ ‘force so-called the of role the of conception new The 1. III. russkiy chelovek russkiy

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T toda R he y’ ‘ ussian s cha ). Russian strategists argue that in fighting glo fighting in that argue strategists Russian ). OSW Point of View OSW ll acti g en v , https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ , es e ’ threat : 41 , these ideas ideas these , ------55 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 56 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 erations, and which often play a key role in these operations these in role key a play op often which and military erations, of complex the of logic the in existing entities as services special civilian so-called the ofposition the of doctrine so-called official and in sanctioning the space demonstrates measures non-military information the on emphasis the Laying space’.combat four-dimensional and the in measures military non-military connecting of methods non-traditional ‘new, of Federa Russian importance the on the laid 2016),is emphasis December of (from tion Security Information of Doctrine the and 2014) December (from Federation Russian the of Doctrine Military the of editions new the In coordinated. been has role services’ special the to approach doctrinal the years, recent In policies” State’s (itemthe 23). security information to effectiveness “raise of the care addition in itto and take has task, thesame (item has 21). traditions” sector patriotic and Thesecurity spiritual historical, preserving of and young; the on place first the in society, on impact psychological-informational the “neutralising of job the has department defence (the defence of field the in tive objec astrategic is security people, ‘Civilisational’ intensifying”. is the impact on of young in society the information Russia, primarily tendentious Federationincreasing; is Russian ofthe policy state ofthe opinions containing materials of amount the media Western the increasing”, is “in media mass Russian against “discrimination states”; of integrity territorial and sovereignty the of world, the violations and of regions different in situation social and political the of psychologi and leadingto theinfluencecal expanding, is destabilisation constantly information of measures the of application of range “the (...) 12: section in assessed As 2016. December of Information from Security Doctrine the of edition latest the by confirmed is the above, This mentioned evaluation ofbeen global situation has radicalised. current the publications the of editions successive In 42

formational and other non-military measures, implemented by a broad use use broad a by implemented measures, non-military other and in economic, formational political, as well as forces, armed the of use comprehensive include:These “the to whose participate. services would the special implementation activities potential of description a encounter we document this In 42 - - - - - . things justifies the services’ activity aimed at isolating society society isolating influences. at external from aimed activity services’ the justifies things other among society, ofwhich defenders the of butalso interests, those of defenders key of role the in only not puts services Russia special the of interests vital the violating is West the that idea the of adoption permanent The world. retain the in will position strong Russia its that guarantees which objective an as bility sta this present they system, political authoritarian the by ated cre stability the maintaining in role power their Russian highlighting By the elite. of thinking the to testify them into porated incor changes the that noting enemy, the worth itis ofdeterring the intothemscheme role their into propaganda account,as fitting and taking and documents doctrinal Russia’s analysing While tensions. social voking pro or homeland, the of defence the of traditions patriotic and ing youngspiritual people, historical, the in order to undermine includ population, the on information of impact the and vices; with military threat. These are: sabotage by foreign associated notbeen hitherto had which specialareas highlights ser threats 43 force of institutions the of petences implementation to the related com oflegal the is directly which been have of adjustments elimination the threats, Doctrine, internal potential of list the to made Military the of text the In

integrity of the Russian Federation. Russian of the integrity and territorial at aimed the sovereignty violating and or individuals ganisations terrorist of activities the infrastructure; information of and properties military and state important power, state of organs the of operation the of disruption the country, the in situation social and political domestic destabilisation the of the Federation, Russian the of regime constitutional the force of by overthrow the at aimed activity includes: risks internal of list The managed from outside”. from managed and funded movements social and forces of use opera political the methods; tional asymmetric and indirect airspace, of use in the companies; space, armed private and information global the in land and sea; participation territory, his in the activities of irregular military throughout formation the enemy influencing forces; operations special of and protest of potential the of 43 . The catalogue of external external of catalogue The . ------57 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 58 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 sian sian Federation from 1996 (and the reference to them in the law on Rus the of service intelligence foreign the on law the of extracts by demonstrated is This actions. economic and military political, of conduct and organisation long-term whoseis to operations actively diplomatic,support aim planning, the to refers which word ing include also jurisdiction services’ special the of laws The objectives. political of achievement specific the serve violence),physical and coercion which direct of outmethods rule not do scientists political some (although behaviour human lating of manipu methods psychological and engineering social mainly activities, and methods overt nutshell, and covert complexof a a means this In science. political Russian in popularity gained immense has which technology’, ‘political of concept broader the within falls also It theoreticians. many by emphasised been has which of distinctiveness the concepts, of system cultural and cal ideologi own its for terms Western adapting another Russia of represents example concept This 16). and 15 (paragraphs states cal and military ends to intervene in the internal affairs of other ‘sword’, the as West’salso the weapon for used information politi Federation (section 8), Russian ofthe nation and multi-ethnic the ervation of the cultural,pres the historical and Federation and spiritual-ethicalRussian the of sovereignty values the offending de of aim the ‘shield’, a with as contexts: of variety a in occurs it Security, where of Information Doctrine newof edition the the in included been also has It elaboration. detailed more any without from December 2014, Doctrine the term technology’ ‘information appeared, Military the of version recent most ‘informational-technical the In operations’. or operations’ ‘infor operations’, mational-psychological ‘informational formations’, armed irregular organising sabotage, wrecking, as such action, ‘indirect means’, as such ‘non-military specific, and general concepts, both various the in in subsequent editions itDoctrine; replaced was 2000by Military appeared This influence’. of means ‘special term distinctive the most was The measures’. ‘active expression the in of papers strategy stead the in used are terms different of variety A ------– – – 45 44 include: FSB and FIS, the of Thetasks GRUof intelligence the institutions. tasks the specify 2003), which in introduced Service Security Federal the work of the special services’ historians, as well as in operational operational ‘ as jargon in as well as historians, services’ special the of work References to the term ‘active today measures’ in appear mainly the a kind of cultural code understood by its organisers and actors and by organisers its code understood of cultural a kind become has term slang this activities, propaganda-disinformation the in that assumed be must measures).It active in (i.e.specialists activists” Western by instructed were terrorists “the respondent, cor the to According crimes”. war Russian of victims as West the make children how “are in shown and paint, red and of use ash the up with themselves showing footage with thesis his illustrated He terrorists.” of potential the of itself avails and allies, NATO its Unitedand States the by [group],an-Nusrabacked Jabhad is which anti-Assadist the of responsibility the is Aleppo in targets civilian and humanitarian of convoy a of bombing Yevgeny“The stated: correspondent Poddubny war the 2016, October 12 from TV ya-24 – – –

Federal law on the foreign intelligence service of 10 January 1996: http:// 1996: www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/8732January 10 of service intelligence foreign the on law Federal vstrane_i_mire/content/201702240643-w01a.htmhttp://tvzvezda.ru/news/ Ukraine], in upheaval the for Soros blamed and States Obama United the in [Activists Украине в перевороте на Сороса в For США и обвинили Активисты see example, entitled Обаму the material of security (article 5, paragraph 2); 5, paragraph (article of security field the in Federation Russian the of policy the of mentation imple successful the to conducive environment an ensuring 2); paragraph Federation 2, (article the state in of the interest ofthe security the Russian ensuring by undertakings of implementation the in support providing graph 3)graph 5,para Federation (article Russian ofthe security ofthe ance assur military-technical the and country the of progress cal techni and scientific development, economic the supporting aktivka 44 . ’, ‘activists’ etc. For example, in a report for Rossi for report a in For example, ’,etc. ‘activists’

45 . ------59 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 60 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 the West. This is determined by the following factors: the following by is determined West.the This in systems service existing the with incompatible is system vice The problemsthatser above theoutlined special Russian confirm The involvement of the of involvement The projects’. ‘active of range wide a out carry to capacity sufficient the whether of question the leaves open Mediterranean, the to Arctic the from rivalry, and conflict of fronts new of Russia’sopening increased. Foralso has been increased. obvious intelligence activity reasons, has wartime during function to ability its of verification the and administration mobilisation of civil to the related the of exercises range the Moreover, troops. of types different of actions the port sup which force, of institutions the of involvement the by nied accompa been has activity forces’ armed The readiness. combat permanent of state a in been have Russia, of regions successive around rotation in train continuously which Federation, Russian the of forces armed the 2013,of beginning the Since force. of tor sec so-called the in position their confirmed has military system security the into services special the of inclusion doctrinal The 2. 46 the become has services, cial spe Russian the before tasks the of enormity the to due service, this that USA) demonstrates the and States (e.g. Baltic area the in of of gence A service. issue separate is developmentthe of potential the tial elections in the United States the in elections tial GRU’sdenced by presidenthe context of the the in recent actions evi as security, military of field the with only associated longer

the Russian situation Russian the forces: armed place the services’ in The special military intelligence military sheet-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact- Harassment, and Activity Cyber Malicious Russian to Response in Actions ForeignServices Intelligence Federal Security Service Security Federal , whose activities in cyberspace are no are cyberspace in activities whose , de facto de 46 . intelligence-counterintelli are able to maintain maintain to able are revealed in this this in revealed

------– – – o-rnprn dcso-aig rcse hv bcm dis of Putin’s features tinctive regime. become have processes decision-making non-transparent and relationships Moreover,informal struggle. political ongoing the and tasks embroiled political in becoming are services special the Kremlin, the from orders Upon expands). authority tionary special the discre expanded, are covered (the bysecrecy state areas services of methods operational the over take can authority civil of organs the that is this of consequence levels).One torial terri and regional (at administration state the of apparatus the to regard with position superior a in and bodies, state executive other the to regard with position autonomous an in institutions sector’s the puts function integrative The Russia. in regime rent cur the and sector security the both for consequences has This – – – funded from outside the state budget; state outside from the funded be also can education).services The higher or culture as such order’, budget, of but the sections much of other it in hidden is legal ofprotection and the item coveredof the under ‘Security size not only the are expenses (their services special budget structure, of the and countries: organisational the other covers in secrecy unparalleled strict internalisation of level a policy; Kremlin’s wide a have range of powers, each of services which is toola multi-functional of the Russian the consideration: into come not does order) legal the protecting and counterintelligence (intelligence, services of classification conventional the that means competences,which of delimitation strict a of lack the facts desirable from the point of of the view Russia’s from desirable facts authorities). ating’ function (the generation and‘moder creationa as well ofstate), as phenomena the of apparatus and administrative the links which factor a is apparatus security (the function tional repressive), thepreventive, Russian control, servicessecurity, (information, additionally services typical special serveof functions an integra to addition in out: carry they functions the ------61 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 62 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 A separate issue is the use of cyber technology to weaken critical critical weaken to technology cyber of use the is issue separate violence.A of for use the the of cases, extreme support in in and Russia, of policy initiatives eign financing for channels organising flag’, a foreign ‘under often activities inspirational of out carrying the resources, espionage of use the borders, Russia’soutside ing operat officers services special of participation the account into take They goal. political established an of implementation the to subject combinations, operational long-term and complicated of often operations, offensive covert i.e. sources, open for available not are which offenactivities counterintelligence covers and intelligence topicsive this Furthermore task. easy an not is policy an integrated, broad complex in of government supporting activities services special the of role the describing that means this All institutions. security its and state Russian the of image the of compromise a risk would this with, dealt consistently and publicised were scandals these If muted. effectively are conflicts actual but nature, very its by conflictual is services special Russian the of system The alone. sassinations as violence with levelof illegal high the theyinvolved,as well are as which in scandals corruption the by confirmed is as ties, activi illegal and abuses commit to temptation their increases them over supervision or control effective of lack The rhetoric. mission of in state declared the official as stressed their building or effectiveness their with equated be not should system litical po the of hierarchy the the in services reason, special the this of position high For sector. security the in criminalisation of a way Itfor is that citizens. equal is all a also factor in maintenance the in law the of enforcement effective the prevents which of power, abuse and corruption including economic system, and Russia’spolitical in defects the of fossilisation the to leads This secrecy.of privilege the and state the of busi support enjoysthe ness This crime. organised and sector people security by state the controlled from businesses the namely meeting politics, of the point at commitments institutional informal special the services’ of continuity the ensures order legal informal The ------– – – – reflection on this topic requires: this on reflection analytical Any services. special Russian the of‘activeby projects’ risk at areas of identification preliminary the is challenge major another information, of sources open with working analysts For scene. domesticpolitical of the destabilisation the in aforeign country, from for may result which example a politician discredit to example for purposes, political for used are data tive sensi of theft the with associated other cyberspace in the activities On hand, scenarios. action military of part as attacks point pin of features the has project, support a as classified be should it in foreign typecountries. Thisof activity,although infrastructure – – – – marginal significance); to importance events of spiracy theories, particular importing con lobby’, promoting ‘pro-Russian the of activity overt (the organisations orpeople certain of nature pro-Russian the ing highlight by conclusions simple drawing transparency, tive demonstra is which of expression agent’, an ‘false a of image the of services special Russian by construction the of result a as including risks, of identification correct the hinder which activities masking and of camouflaging interpretation careful services; involvement of special the thesis Russian the of the supporting conclusions of evaluation the as well as observed, events of causes the of assessment the to approach areas, critical a selected in processes social and economic and ments develop political of analysis and monitoring continuous the from Russia; influence to susceptible well of as institutions groups and social which potentially are as services, special Russian the to interest operational ticular par of areas of results) and aims (through identification the objectives of foreign policy ofRussia; the tactical and strategic the in observed events of contextualisation the ------63 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 64 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 – – – – fensive targets in Europe in fensive targets of strategic policy’s the identify to is task primary the services, special Russian the of projects active the to vulnerable par ticularly are which areas identifying in helpful be can which point, starting a as goals Russia’s policy foreign Byrecognising declared 3. 47

– – – – Areas affected by Russian actions affected by Russian Areas studies/2013-10-14/greater-europe-putins-vision-european-dis-integration Studies OSW Studies, Eastern for Centre (dis)integration, European the of vision Putin’s and Europe. Greater enemy-russian-policy-towards-united-states-putins-era; States United the https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2017-02-15/russias-best- towards policy Russian was enemy. Studies, for 2017: Eastern Centre Putin’s in era, best Russia’s to ; policy 2013 foreign Question-4.pdf from Russian Menkiszak atlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Pages-from-The_Eastern_ of Marek by aims West: the and What WentRussia Wrong- WeCan and https://trans Do Better?, publications the on of based description This between the member states and limiting the influence of the of influence the limiting and states member the between disputes stoking by Union European the of disintegration  the of NATO; flank eastern the of weakening part as states, Baltic the destabilise to striving and Ukraine, over control gaining re Belarus, over control keeping dimension: regional the  in of Russia; interests the elites ofcal states in to European actions accordance with take the politi influencing methods of fluence, effective finding by in of sphere the of expansion possible and maintenance  the field of ongoing support projects. the in including services, special Russian the of experiences historical the upon draw to In helpful prove pragmatism. may it cases, of political such basis the on explain to are which difficult facts interpret to possible it make – culture tegic – and Political its activities. services’ culture descendant, stra special the of context cultural the of interpretation broader a , 14 October 2013 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-2013 October 14 , 47 . These are: . These OSW Point of View of Point OSW , 15 February 2017,, 15 February ------– – s sgiiat oeta fr etblsto ascae wt the with associated destabilisation for potential significant a is there Germany, where to applied are measures Different stances. circum cultural and social political, internal as well as cerned, con country the with economicrelations and political in climate current the on depends used are they way the and others, among structures, Russia church and non-governmental countries. parties, political European uses most in conducted being are They long-term and nature. in systematic projects are these and war’, ‘surrogate a as treated are services cial spe Russian the by out carried being measures political fensive of These Russia. from pressure military and economic political, resist to society’s desire reduce to intended is activity This stage. international the on authorities its discrediting as well as state, lisation of the situation on of part or of all ofthe territory a foreign of public’sthe undermining authorities, in their destabi the trust continual the is which of objective strategic the states, foreign of territories the on out carried activities covert and overt of range wide a cover These countries. other in crises creating on focused outRussia’s by are Today,carried services operations support the – – aims of Russian policy; of Russian aims the of achievement the for harder it make may that alliances economic and military political, separate build to plans ofer) oth each against partners the setting (by deconstruction  the Europe); Central defence in of policy the efficiency the limiting (including security European of shape NATO, ation revision of within current the a the as and result, United States in Europe, byincluding cooper with interfering is intended to weaken any determination to oppose such actions. such oppose to determination any weaken to intended is turn in which requests’,Russia’s‘reasonable accept to having of notion the society pro- in a perpetuate to of is aim lobby,whose building Russian consistent the and Europe, of societies and elites authorities, the among sentiment anti-American stoking ------65 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 66 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 – – – the following universal areas of action: areas following universal the distinguish to us allows operations support Russian of Analysis which economic objectives. Russian pursue companies in politicians Western former of hiring open the or banks), European via Russia from assets financial veying con covertly of aim the with example, (for corruption for nisms mecha of creation the is arsenal services’ special the in weapon important One environment. pro-Russian strong Russia a where through acts France, in and diaspora; Russian-speaking large – – – to Russia is doomed to failure, stoking negative ideas through through negativeideas stoking failure, to doomed is Russia to opposition that belief the Moscow,instilling of policy the ing justify arguments Russian popularising at aimed activities of Russia to favourable groups supporting of defence); state improve to the undertaken being actions for defence responsible preparations institutions the and military structures, infiltrating disavowing to with regard them, particular disrupt to attempting and services intelligence counter of capacity the assessing at aimed activity telligence in weapons, nuclear tactical of use the about information of dissemination the countries, other in morale public lowering thus and region, the in forces NATO over advantage military Russia’soblast, demonstrating for the Kaliningrad unblocking scenarios include example for could which countries, NATO action tary mili take might demon Russia that ofsuggest to force factor,of strations military psychological the of use the sources); Russian from information to approach player,of regional an uncritical mechanisms as dissemination and global important an as Russia of image desired the ating cre outlets, media major to out reaching Russia’sposition, to theircamouflage nature pro-Russian while lendingcredibility influence oninformation space mltr mneve na te onais of boundaries the near manoeuvres (military (creating web portals (creating which web portals (a wide spectrum spectrum wide (a ------– – – – – – – – oprto, ot ecag porme, ritc groups, associations); fans’ sports artistic programmes, exchange youth cooperation, arguments; their strengthening NATO and US the with cooperation or EU the within tegration in closer of critical groups supporting and penetrating West; the in circles conservative with agreement an for basis the form can ideology conservative where state a as Russia West’), promoting the of friend a as Russia ‘pragmatic im image upof a false building Russia, with trade ofpact economic limiting adverse the highlighting governments, tries’ coun the of policies ‘anti-EU’ or ‘pro-American’ the discredit order in to disputes internal instrumentalising and media the elections in a given country). in elections presidential or parliamentary during especially conflict, cal compromisingin order materials to politi exacerbate internal fabricating by elite political the of representatives promising com Federation, Russian the of policy foreign the in of support demonstrations organising sentiments, Russophobic ing of stokaccusations and to Russia related of symbols struction de the crisis, migration a create to ability the infrastructure, critical to disruption population; local the among panic ating sensitive forinformation NATO; of at sabotageacts cre aimed poor forpreparation at aimed protection demonstrating ofthe destabilisation internal of threat of level the raising at aimed operations pinpoint special society; infiltrate to them using and trading) arms groups criminal of instrumentalisation the objectives cal politi Russian of implementation the support wittingly un which or Russia to friendly are which groups lectual the

long-term construction of social, political and intel and political social, of construction long-term , or which represent extreme nationalist views, and and views, nationalist extreme represent which or (local authorities, business circles, educational educational circles, business authorities, (local (such as cyber-attacks cyber-attacks as (such (smuggling, (smuggling, ------67 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 68 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 – – – implement international initiatives contrary to Russian aims. aims. Russian include: These to contrary initiatives international implement to difficult more it make and policies foreign their discredit to is aim their and the countries, other of influence governments and opinion to public attempts are these of Symptoms state’. ‘target the of territory the outsideout carried also are activities Russian der the auspices of the Russian Anti-Globalist Movement, with with Movement, Anti-Globalist Russian the of auspices the der 2016un September in Moscow in organised conference the was services of example this work spectacular One groups. to consolidate such special the by instructed and controlled organisations ties and movements in Europe. and Russian political parties social par political separatist radical, and Eurosceptic anti-American, populist, for propaganda) and information and financial, tional, support is activities these of feature prominent One – – – constant stoking of ethnic conflicts, especially in Belarus, Belarus, in especially states. Baltic the and Ukraine conflicts, ethnic of stoking the constant is tools these of One Europe. Eastern and Central and States Baltic the Europe, coopera Eastern in countries intensifying with tion at aimed initiatives preventing policy,foreign irresponsible an leading and unstable being as Russia towards itself asserts that country any of negative the West, sity the in atimage aimed maintaining inten of levels varying of operations media conducting contacts; business Russian in themselves involve services special Russian the context, this In interests. mutual on based countries, EU other with Russia of relations economic and political the exploiting include methods These institutions. EU in countries individual towards titude at unfavourable an building and activities monitoring spired by Russia; spired in been have who journalists and media local using mented imple are methods These security. European to threatening (organisa and ------

es are able to inspire actions resembling preparations for acoup. preparations resembling actions able inspire to es are in situation internal the Montenegro in October 2016that Russia’s confirms servic destabilise special to attempt The Germans. Russian-speaking and diaspora Russian the of participation the with demonstrations anti-immigrant local by accompanied were authorities German the of critical Ministry Foreign Russian the from 2016,statements when January in girl) underage an of ance disappear the about information false of use the affair’, ‘Liza (the cellor Angela Merkel was Chan a diplomatic-propagandaRussian at action aimed Germany in situation the destabilise to attempt An apparatus. security Russian the with cooperate to countries groups), crime organised and authoritiesforcing the oftures both struc power Russian of participation the with likely (most land Fin north-east and Norway northern to Russia from migration of channels individual creation of2016) February the to 2015 was September (from this of example One pressure. political exert to order in situation given a of destabilisation pinpoint at tempt at the is enterprises active Russian of manifestations the of One services. special Russian of the machinations who (consciously groups or unconsciously)and be peoplecan used in the operational out calling in step initial an just be to sumed as be should groups, professional of cooperation the or cultures of dialogue a to example for dedicated are which conferences, cal politi neutral seemingly of organisation The created Putin. FoundationPresident by Charity the by funded was and nations’, of ‘Adialogue of banner the under held was others).It and Lebanon, Somalia Moldova, California, and Texas of states US the Italy, (from organisations of twelveforeignseparatist participation the ------69 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 70 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017 – – – – Operations conducted by the Russian special services revealed revealed include: decade last the during services special Russian the by conducted Operations actions. of these targets the are that countries of those situation political domestic the and policy foreign the ing tion, of as actions well as operational espionage ataimed demoralisa influenc and compromise discreditation, disinformation, his enemy, the with games operational conducting surroundings, his enemyand ofthe camp upespionage the build in to positions are: These recalling. worth are workwhich commonelements include counterintelligence of this were beginning cited atwhich the aspects intelligence and their in measures active of definitions The relations. international in Russia for position significant a least then at if not a dominant, aimed atoffensive obtaining ert actions state. the Theyhave notthequestionedwisdom of continuing cov offorces the special in ofsystem and the political the organisation rolethe elite concerning political the Russian of thinking the fied modi nothave architecture security European the of change the and the 1990s of crisis the Union, Soviet the of disintegration The t S – – – – u he inhe he mmar destabilising operations to stir up social unrest or disrupt disrupt or unrest elections; parliamentary as procedures, such democratic social up stir to operations destabilising mation; disinfor distributing operators of networks of expansion the organisations; social and parties political foreign Russia-friendly of financing the nenko; Litvi Aleksandr officer FSB former the and Yandarbiyev the murder of the former president of Zelimkhan Chechnya y r i ta n c e a nd t nd he pr he esen t - - - - - ­ – – uodntd o h ssei, emnn, ogtr offensive long-term state. of the strategy permanent, systemic, the to subordinated been have actions these that demonstrates measures, and forces military of Federation’s policy foreign Russian the for support of arsenal the in inclusion the as well as basis, this on support tive execu and conceptual a of expansion systematic the Moreover, pragmatism. of terms in psychological thinking over of thinking ideological primacy and the by things other among acterised char is which culture, strategic Russian of durability the strates demon also This West. ‘aggressive’ the oppose to forced is ests, of Russia, while supposedly civilisations: defending its inter vital rivalry a of context the in located are before, as operations, These nature. nomic eco or social military, political, diplomatic, a of ment’sactivities govern Russian the support to is purpose whose operations, cial spe long-termout carry and organise plan, to continue services special Russian The changes. substantial any undergone not has the thatofTheserepertoire demonstrate actions ‘active measures’ – – sult, the reduction of support for those countries’ authorities. of for reduction countries’ support those the sult, re a as and countries, of other societies the among uncertainty or insecurity provoking information false of dissemination the assertive an Russia; towards posture adopt which countries discredit to operations J D olanta arc z ewska , P Ż iotr oc h owski ------71 POINT OF VIEW 06/2017