SYRIA and the LEBANESE CRISIS Adeed I. Dawisha
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By the same author EGYPT IN THE ARAB WORLD: The Elements of Foreign Policy SAUDI ARABIA: Search for Security SYRIA AND THE LEBANESE CRISIS Adeed I. Dawisha Assistant Director of Studies The Royal Institute of International Affairs FOR KAREN © Adeed I. Dawisha 1980 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1980 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission First published 1980 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Dawisha, Adeed Isam Syria and the Lebanese crisis 1. Lebanon- History- Civil War, 1975- 2. Syria- Foreign relations- Lebanon 3. Lebanon- Foreign relations- Syria I. Title 327.5691'05692 DS87.5 ISBN 978-1-349-05373-5 ISBN 978-1-349-05371-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-05371-1 Contents List of Tables Vll Preface IX Acknowledgements Xll I A Methodological Introduction PART ONE THE SETTING 15 2 The Historical Setting 17 3 External and Internal Setting 32 The Global Environment 32 The Regional Environment 34 The Military Capability 37 The Economic Capability 41 The Political Structure 44 Interest Groups 55 Competing Elites 61 Conclusion 62 PART TWO PRE-CRISIS PERIOD 23 May 1975-18 January 1976 67 4 Decision and Environment 69 Decisions 69 The Decision-Makers 70 The Psychological Environment 71 Values and Attitudes 72 Images 74 5 Decision Process 85 Phase One: 23 May- 31 August 1975 85 Phase Two: 1 September 1975-18 January 1976 90 v VI Contents PART THREE CRISIS PERIOD 18 January-30 September 1976 97 6 Decisions and Environment 99 Decisions 99 The Decision-Makers 100 The Psychological Environment 102 Values and Attitudes 103 Images 106 7 Decision Process 116 Phase One: 18 January-15 March 1976 116 Phase Two: 15 March-31 May 1976 124 Phase Three: 1 June-30 September 1976 135 PART FOUR POST-CRISIS PERIOD 30 September-15 November 1976 143 8 Decisions and Environment 145 Decisions 145 The Decision-Makers 145 The Psychological Environment 146 Values and Attitudes 146 Images 148 9 Decision Process 157 Phase One: 30 September-15 October 1976 157 Phase Two: 15 October-15 November 1976 162 PART FIVE CONCLUSIONS 167 10 Findings 169 Psychological Environment for Decisions 169 The Pattern of Information 173 Consultative and Decisional Units in Crisis 174 Alternatives: Search and Evaluation 179 11 Epilogue: Syria in Lebanon, 1976-79 185 Bibliography 195 Index 201 List of Tables Table 3.1 Total Arms Transfers of Major Suppliers to Selected Middle Eastern States, 1966-1975 33 Table 3.2 Syrian Higher Education Students Holding Government Scholarships, 1965-1975 34 Table 3.3 Defence Expenditure of Selected Middle Eastern States, 1976 39 Table 3.4 The Expansion of Education in Syria, 1965- 1975 40 Table 3.5 The Structure of Syria's GDP by Sectors, 1971-1975 41 Table 3.6 Third Five-Year Plan, 1971-1975 42 Table 3.7 Oil Production and Earnings, 1971-1976 43 Table 3.8 Export of Commodities, 1972-1975 43 Table 3.9 Syrian Ethno-Religious Groups 59 Table 3.10 Sectarian Representation in Syria's Cabinets and the Baath Party's Regional Commands, 1970-1976 61 Table 10.1 Syria's Decisional and Consultative Units during the Lebanese Civil War 175 vii Preface As an associate volume of the International Crisis Behaviour Project (ICB), this book endeavours to analyse Syria's decision making process in relation to Lebanon's civil war. The assump tion underlying the study is that the civil war constituted a 'crisis situation' for Syria's foreign policy-making elite. The Syrian decision-makers perceived the domestic conflict in Lebanon as a clear and ominous threat to fundamental Syrian values that had to be defended at all times, even at the risk of military involvement. Crisis in this respect is conceived as a three-stage process, beginning with the inception of the crisis (the pre-crisis period), its peak (the crisis period), and its decline (the post-crisis period). The book begins by setting out the methodological under pinning of the study. However, before moving on to analysing Syria's behaviour towards the Lebanese conflict, the historical and institutional setting of the crisis actor, Syria, is elaborated. This is done in Part One of the book, comprising Chapters 2 and 3. Parts Two, Three and Four, consisting of Chapters 4 to 9 are devoted to the analysis of Syria's decision-making behaviour during the crisis as it unfolded in its three stages: the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. In the concluding Part Five, Chapter 10 endeavours to posit a number of generalisations arrived at through an analysis of the psychological environment, the coping mechanisms, and the process of choice of Syria's decision-making elite, and Chapter ll examines the subsequent development of Syrian policies in Lebanon. The book, therefore, has two intellectual concerns: the theoretical analysis of crisis behaviour and the empirical study of Syria's political system and decision-making process. Each is meant to complement, without taking precedence over, the other. It is obvious that a book of this kind would not have seen the light of day had it not been for the support and encouragement of many people. In this respect, no one has done more than the IX X Preface director of the ICB project, Professor Michael Brecher of McGill University. In the three years of our association over this project, Professor Brecher patiently and diplomatically persevered with the ups and downs of this study. To say that the final product is better as a result of his rigorous thinking would not do justice to Professor Brecher's immense contribution to this book. I am also greatly indebted to the Canada Council who provided generous funds towards the completion of the book. Similar gratitude is extended to the many Syrians who were willing to broaden my knowledge of the characteristics of their country's decision making process in general and specifically in relation to the Lebanese civil war. Their frankness and willingness to discuss with me in some instances very sensitive matters were particularly gratifying, especially as a number of people in England, citing the 'secretive' and 'conspiratorial' nature of the Syrian political system, had given this study very little chance of ever being completed. I am thus greatly indebted to Syria's Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr Adnan Omran, who in an informal three-hour meeting in early 1977 convinced me, by his candid and forthright manner, that the study was not just credible, but also possible. He was also directly involved in facilitating for me the initial contacts in Damascus which led to a number of formal and informal interviews, without which this book would not have been possible. Of these I would like to particularly mention the assistance, service and information extended to me by the Director of Information at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Haseeb Al-lstiwani, who was always the perfect diplomat, and who in the process became a good friend. Of the many others who gave generously of their time, I would like to mention the Syrian Minister of Information, Mr Ahmad lskander Ahmed, the President's Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Dr Adib al-Dawoodi, the Deputy Foreign Minister during 1977-8, Dr Abdulla al-Khani, the present Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Nasir Qadoor, the Director-General of the West European Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr Rafiq Jweijati, the Director-General of the Arab Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Mohammed Khidhr, the Director-General of the East European Depart ment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Adnan Nashabi, and the Director of External Relations at the Ministry of Information, Mr Zuhair Jinan. For their assistance and 'general Preface Xl background information', I would also like to mention Mr Mohammed Mubarrak and Mr Abdu Abood of the Ministry of Information. To those and to the others, I am very grateful. My thanks also go to Mr Samir Muttawi, who first introduced me to the Syrian Ambassador in London, and was thus in strumental in launching this project, and to Mr Mikhail Wahba of the Syrian Embassy in London who helped immeasurably, particularly in the provision of documents and written material. I am also indebted to Mr Albert Hourani and Dr Roger Owen, both ofSt Antony's College, Oxford, for their valuable comments on part of an earlier draft of the book. Similar thanks go to Professor Moshe Ma'oz of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who, in a chance meeting at St Antony's College, offered to read the entire manuscript and subsequently made very constructive comments. Moreover, I benefited considerably from discussing various parts of the book in public lectures at the following British academic and research institutions: the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, St Antony's College, Oxford, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the University of Reading. It would, furthermore, be a gross injustice to enumerate the people who helped in this intellectual effort without mentioning the head librarian and staff of the main and press libraries at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I also gratefully acknowledge similar assistance which was exten ded, often on her own initiative, by Miss Isabel Silver of the library of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. And last but not least my thanks go to Mrs Maureen Simkin and Mrs Betty Appleby of the Department of International Relations, University of Keele, for efficiently typing the manuscript under extreme conditions of stress, which they did not allow to turn into a 'crisis'.