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Regeneration and hegemony: Franco-Batavian relations in the Era: A legal approach (1795-1803) Kubben, R.M.H.

Publication date: 2009

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Citation for published version (APA): Kubben, R. M. H. (2009). Regeneration and hegemony: Franco-Batavian relations in the Revolutionary Era: A legal approach (1795-1803). Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP).

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REGENERATION AND HEGEMONY

Franco-Batavian Relations in the Revolutionary Era; a legal approach

1795-1803

PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op vrijdag 19 juni 2009 om 14.15 uur

door

Raymond Maria Hubertus Kubben

geboren op 18 mei 1980 te Geleen promotiecommissie promotores: Prof. dr. R.C.H. Lesaffer Prof. mr. B.C.M. van Erp-Jacobs overige leden: Prof. dr. M. Belissa Prof. dr. A. Carty Prof. mr. W.J.M. van Genugten Prof. dr. F. Stevens

ii

During that twenty-year period an immense number of fields were left untilled, houses were burned, trade changed its direction, millions of men migrated, were impoverished or were enriched, and millions of Christian men professing the law of love of their fellows slew one another. What does all this mean? Why did it happen? What made those people burn houses and slay their fellow men? What were the causes of these events? What force made men act so? These are the instinctive, plain, and most legitimate questions humanity asks itself when it encounters the monuments and traditions of that period. [...] What force moves the nations?

Leo Tolstoy (1868, p. 940 and p. 942)

iii

Contents

Preface ix

Part I. Révolution sans frontières

Introduction 3 1. Power and law in international order 23 2. The and the European order 71

Part II. Icy rivers, chains of gold: the Franco-Batavian alliance

1. Gallicus amicus 125 2. Clapping hands, fraternal style 146 3. A constitutive treaty? 199 4. War and peace 247 5. The limits of independence 330 6. The alliance renewed 407

Part III. The Batavian and the struggle for peace

1. Revolutionary peace 439 2. Peace at last 461 3. Negotiating with Britain 498 4. A gathering in Rastatt 541 5. The ‘s peace 574 6. Bridging the Channel 602

Part IV. The Revolutionary alliance 621

Samenvatting 653

Appendices 670

Archivalia and Bibliography 686

iv

v

Part I

Revolution sans frontières

”Order is a lawyer‘s paradise. Establishing and maintaining order is what law seems to be all about.‘ - Paul Vinogradoff -1

1 Vinogradoff, 1923, p. 4. 1 2 Introduction

”Don't you realise I have power either to free you or to crucify you?‘ exclaimed Pontius Pilate, according to the Gospel by St. John,2 in reaction to the way the suspect brought before him responded to the accusations raised against Him. In a brave attempt to say anything sensible from a legal point of view about what probably is the most famous ”historical trial‘ in Western civilization, Eltjo Schrage claims to see in this verse one of the most impressing expressions of the preca- rious relation between power and law.3 If there was a trial altogether, the Roman governor in Judea here dropped the veil of justice to refer to his power. Law exists to bring and maintain order, to moderate power and prevent its arbitrary use and, at the same time, law needs power to be effective and power can make use of law. A sword can wound and kill and yet it has to be an attribute of justice, whereas the sword needs the scales and blindfold, too. Neither positions to which the law is nothing more than the command of those in power, nor ones to which the law upholds moral standards independent of and most often against mere power, can ignore this ambiguous relation between power and law that has dominated the domains of political philosophy and public law for centuries and will probably do so for as long as human society exists. At the national level power and law have merged into authority: legitimised, institutionalised and channelled power embedded in a constitution and centred in a political organisation that acts as the commanding sovereign and has monopolised the legitimate use of force. Characteristically for the modern states system, this national level is separated from the supranational or international level, where the relation between power and law is more ambiguous. International society, to use Hedley Bull‘s characterisation, is anarchical.4 There the ”struggle for power‘ peculiar to all politics takes place in different ways and within the framework of different institutions.5 It lacks a supreme command centre that determines what the law is and how the law is interpreted, administered, and enforced. That is not a sign of international law‘s immaturity œ it not having developed into a real and complete legal system yet, as Edward H. Carr has it œ,6 but of the very foundations international society is based upon: the co-existence of territorially based, autonomous political communities called sove- reign states. In that anarchical society both power and law can exist separately and in relation to one another.

2 John 19:10. 3 Schrage, 2003, p. 363. 4 Bull, 2002. 5 Morgenthau, 2004, p. 52. 6 Carr, 2001, p. 159. 3 At the centre of this study are the ways power affects the international legal order. Is power translated into law, legal status and legal procedures? Is power recognised by the law of nations and incorporated within the international legal order? Does law contain power or is law an instrument in the hands of the powerful? Unlike most studies in diplomatic history,7 the argument is not on great powers, but on relations between great powers and minor powers providing a case study on Revolutionary and one of its satellite . Thus, this is especially a book on a period in European history œ the era of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) œ in which one power œ the French Republic œ got in a political and military position that enabled it to undermine the legal assumption of the equality of autonomous actors within the international system, or at least in western Europe. This book sets out to find out whether France did and was allowed to do precisely this. One is not lead to believe that the kind of great power-minor power relations described and analysed throughout this volume is peculiar to the Revolutionary era. Asymmetric alliances and political dependence of formally independent entities, personal unions or entities united because of dynastic links between their respective rulers were not exceptional in early modern Europe: e.g. and its Italian dominions and secundogenitures, Britain and Portugal, Britain and the United Provinces, Prussia and northern , and Parma. Nevertheless, this study sets out to deliver a case study on one of those situations in which a minor power was brought under the political and military control of a neighbouring power within a very specific context. Franco-Batavian relations, no doubt, were contingent of the Revolution and Revolutionary Wars. The Revolutionary Wars, in addition to the crisis in eastern Europe during the 1770s and 1780s,8 disrupted the European balance of power and the eighteenth-century political and legal order that had arisen after the great peace conferences of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.9 For some years Revolutionary and Napoleonic France dominated western Europe. Even in 1799-1800, when the joint effort of all other great powers save neutral Prussia gave the French a difficult time, the Revolutionary armies succeeded in turning the tide. From 1794 until the (16-19 October 1813) there was an ever-increasing political and military imbalance within the European states system. The advance of the French Revolutionary armies caused the creation of allied republics in the , , and . At the same time, that period witnessed an intensive debate on the European order and the law of nations due to a sense of a new world

7 Black, 2002, p. 42. 8 Schroeder, 1994, p. 23. 9 Kissinger, 1974, p. 4. 4 order arising or to be created. The Revolution introduced into political practice some, more or less new political and legal ideas that had potentially severe consequences for the international legal order. In the first place the influence of Enlightened idealism and cosmopolitanism was still felt, e.g. in the stress on pacifism, good faith in interstate relations and ”federalism.‘10 In the second place, the Revolutionary concept of challenged or threatened to change some of the fundamentals of the European order: e.g. statehood, legal personality, sovereignty, recognition, the principle of (non-)intervention, the right of conquest, and the binding force of treaties. These ideas in combination with political and military developments both within and among states counterpoised the existing order and called for an intellectual exercise defined by Marc Belissa as ”répenser l‘ordre européen.‘11 The Revolutionary period appears to be somewhat neglected in the historiography of the law of nations. Ever since diplomatic archives were disclosed in the midnineteenth century, specialists have worked on the period.12 Their accounts have hardly made their way into general exposés on the history of the law of nations, though. Karl- Heinz Ziegler claims that Revolutionary ideas on the law of nations hardly influenced legal practice at the time.13 Stephan Verosta, while giving some, although rather succinct attention to the French Revolution and the Revolutionary and , claims that the ”Westphalian‘ political order in Europe14 ended with the defeat of France, after which a new political order arose formulated at the Vienna Congress.15 However, the beginning of a new order does not necessarily coincide with the end of the old one. The European order that had arisen after the peace conferences of Westphalia and was indeed disrupted and rejected some years earlier. Heinhard Steiger is closer to the historical truth by talking about ”the intermediate events of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.‘16 Likewise, Wilhelm Grewe calls the years after the French Revolution ”a particular, transitory stage.‘17 The latter, although devoting a chapter to the Revolutionary period in his Epochs, argues that in the period of the French Revolution ”the effectiveness of the

10 Hodé, 1921; Onuf and Onuf, 1993; Von Höffe. 1995a. 11 Belissa, 2006. 12 Laurent, 1867 and 1869; Dufraisse, 1867; Nye, 1896; Redslob, 1974; Basdevant, 1910; Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928 and 1950; Belissa 1995, 1998, 2006 and 2007. 13 Ziegler, 2007, p. 145. 14 That is to say the European order that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). What is not meant here is the kind of international (legal) order international lawyers tend to call ”Westphalian,‘ that came into being after the breakdown of the ”concert de l‘Europe‘ in the mid-nineteenth century. 15 Verosta, 1995, p. 749. 16 Steiger, 2001, p. 183. 17 Grewe, 2000, p. 413. 5 legal order was more or less suspended.‘18 This view that the Revolution caused a temporal break down of the international legal order is quite generally shared.19 Paul Vinogradoff does not get further than stating that the period of the French Revolution œ although he speaks of ”the end of the century‘ œ ”witnessed a titanic attempt to put these theories [Enlightenment ideas on international relations; RK] into practice.‘20 However, the qualification of being ”intermediate‘ or ”transitory‘ does not justify glossing over the question whether the era left an heritage in that it contributed to the further development of the law of nations and if so, in what ways. Moreover, in retrospect they indeed have been ”intermediate events,‘ but at the time itself, the and envisioned and even made or at least claimed to make attempts of their own to create a new European order. Or at least in the rhetoric around the Revolutionary Wars some ideological lines on international relations and the law of nations based on enlightened cosmopolitanism or liberal internationalism and the concept of popular sovereignty culminated. To be sure, neither the Revolutionary national-idealistic scheme, nor the Napoleonic imperial one21 managed to create a lasting system because of a lack of trust and political stability and the absence of consensus. But there have actually been two projects for a new political order in Europe in the period of twenty to thirty years between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the fall of Napoleon. Recently some scholars have paid attention to these projects from an ideological and conceptual point of view by analysing public and academic debate, primarily basing their research on parliamentary debates, newspapers, and pamphlets.22 Although there is an abundance of studies on diplomatic practice, studying matters of law from diplomatic practice has still been neglected. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to have a look at diplomatic practice. In that case attention shifts from academic, political, and public debate to the ”living law‘23 part of the law of nations, that is, how legal order was organised and conceived by practitioners, the concepts and rules of conduct that are recognised by relevant actors within the international legal order as legally binding or as sources providing legal claims and arguments. Moreover, attention shifts from public debates and writings to more official, secret or at least non-public documents.

18 Grewe 1999 p. 36 19 Kissinger, 1974, p. 4; Armstrong, 1993, p. 85; Wendt, 1999, p. 270, p. 297 and p. 312. 20 Vinogradoff, 1923, p. 53. 21 The second project, Napoleon‘s empire œ in its essence an alteration of the Revolutionary project with the addition of the idea of universal monarchy based on the structure of the Roman or Carolingian empires with the Emperor as a supranational institution, and bound together by family relations of various rulers with the Emperor œ will not be addressed in this study. See e.g. Woolf, 1991, p. 27; Tulard, 2005. 22 E.g. Belissa, 1995 and 2006. 23 For the concept of ”living law‘ see below. 6 This study aims to do exactly this for the period of the Revolutionary Wars from the time that the French Revolutionary armies crossed their nations‘ ”natural borders‘ to the creation of Napoleon‘s Empire (1795-1804). Thus, this book focuses on a period usually lost between the journées of the early Revolutionary period œ 14 July 1789, 10 August 1792, the 1792 September days, the Terror of 1793-1794 œ and the grandeur of the Empire, all more appealing to the imagination. This neglect is totally inapt, especially where international affairs are concerned, for while less exciting prima facie, this is the period that the Republican armies actually crossed the French borders and changed the maps of western Europe, decisions were made that determined Napoleon‘s possibilities and the groundwork was laid for him to build his Empire on; the Grand Empire was a path dependent enterprise and the path was chosen during the Directoire and Consulat periods. This volume sets out to offer a case study for relations between France as the prime great power and one of the neighbouring minor powers: the , as the northern part of the came to be called. The Batavian Republic was the first (enduring) of the French Republic‘s so-called sister republics; befriended republics along the Rhine and Alps, liberated and regenerated by French military aid and bound to the French Republic by common social and political institutions.24 After the French inva- sion of 1795, it became part of the French sphere of influence for the remaining period of the Revolutionary Wars. Against the background of those wars and in the face of Revolutionary ideas on international relations and European order, Franco-Batavian relations of the years 1795-1804 offer an excellent case to elucidate the interaction between power and law. In 1806, the Batavian Republic was transferred into the Kingdom of . This book will not cover the entire period of the Batavian Republic‘s existence, though. The discussion in this book will end with the renewed outbreak of war with Britain in 1803 and the resultant renewal of the Franco-Batavian alliance. A short while afterwards, Napoleon was made Emperor of the French25 and Franco-Batavian

24 The Batavian Republic (1795), the (1796) that later merged with Lombardy into the (1797; from 1802 onwards the Italian Republic), the (1797), the (1798), the (1798), the Neapolitan or (1799), the Republic of the (1802) and some very small ones that existed only briefly before being incorporated into France or one of the larger and longer-lasting sister republics. Plans were also made for a Catalan Republic in Spain œ which failed to be established because of the Franco-Spanish Peace of 1795 (Sorel, 1906IV, p. 91) œ, a Cisrhenan Republic in Germany œ which did not come into being as France annexed the left bank of the Rhine œ and a in , which did not materialise as the invasion of the island failed. See e.g. Harouel, 1997b; Vovelle, 2000; Frijthoff, Santing, Van Sas and De Valk, 2002. 25 The imperial dignity was imposed on Napoleon on 18 May 1804 (http://www.conseil- constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de- 7 relations entered another period, that of Napoleonic imperialism. The rupture of the Peace of (27 March 1802) in 1803, hence, demarcated the start of a new period that would take yet another volume. At the core of this study is the distinction between legal equality and hierarchy in international order. The egalitarian ideal did stand as a cornerstone of eighteenth-century thought on the law of nations and Revolutionary ideology. Le droit public de l‘Europe that gradually arose after the Peaces of Westphalia (1648) and Utrecht (1713-1714), centred on the principles of equality and independence of nations.26 Peter Kooijmans traces back the origins of the idea of equality of states to the seventeenth century asserting that equality of states was introduced by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and formed into a legal concept by Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) after which the notion spread throughout the eighteenth century.27 Without assessing whether he is correct, it can be established here that juridical equality of states was widely accepted on the eve of the French Revolution. The idea of the equality of states might have been most strongly expressed by Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) in his 1758 Droit des gens: ”Un nain est aussi bien un homme qu'un géant. Une petite république n'est pas moins un État souverain que le plus puissant royaume.‘28 Georg Friedrich von Martens held brief for a legal equality of states as well: ”Entre les nations comme entre les individus il y a une egalité parfaite de droits naturels et absolus; c‘est à dire qu‘indépendamment de la diversité du territoire, de la population, des forces, de la religion, de la constitution, de l‘ancienneté du gouvernement établi, tous ont un même droit d‘entreprendre ce qui est compatible avec l‘indépendance des autres, et que dans l‘état absolu aucun n‘est au droit de les forcer à un acte positif quelconque en sa faveur.‘29 Admittedly, eighteenth-century diplomatic practice did recognise some inequalities: guarantees of treaties and constitutional arrangements by Europe‘s main powers often lacked reciprocity, and in diplomatic ceremony a set hierarchy reflecting differences in status was to be strictly respected. Moreover, in political terms, the European powers were distinguished from each other as powers of the first, second, or third rank.30 The ideal of legal equality, firmly based in natural law, was widely shared, though. For instance, after the

la-france/constitution-de-l-an-xii-empire-28-floreal-an-xii.5090.html). The coronation took place on 2 December 1804. 26 Krisch, 2005, p. 377; Osiander, 2003, p. 87. 27 Kooijmans, 1964, p. 71, 28 Vattel, 1758, p. 11 [Preliminaires § 11]. 29 Martens, 1821, p. 232. 30 E.g. Mably, 1757, Chapters IV-VIII and introduction thereto by Belissa, pp. 19-21. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the distinction is still being referred to in diplomatic sources from the Revolutionary era. See also Duchhardt, 1997, p. 95; Black, 2002, pp. 39-40. 8 French Revolution had started, it was voiced in Constantin-François Volney‘s proposal for an article on the ius ad bellum in the French Constitution and the Abbé Henri de Grégoire‘s drafts for a declaration of the law of nations. According to the preamble of Volney‘s proposal, ”les États […] jouissent des mêmes droits naturels.‘31 ”Les peuples sont respectivement indépendants et souverains, quelque soit le nombre d‘individus qui les composent et l‘étendue du territoire qu‘ils occupent,‘ wrote Grégoire in his 1795 draft.32 To these Revolutionaries equality of nations was just a specification of the ”egalité‘ in the Revolution‘s slogan. And yet, in the years after the thermidor coup d‘état (27-28 July 1794) the French Republic reached and claimed a hegemonic position. Politically, at least, the sister republics‘ regimes were dependent on the French government. However, the factual inequality in power and influence, does not give a conclusive indication of the sister republics‘ legal position and their position within the international legal order. Vattel and Grégoire recognised the existence of factual inequalities, which did not stop them from claiming juridical equality. So the question remains whether French hegemony, despite the ideological stress on equality, was transmitted into unequal juridical status and forms? Was there a legalised hegemony œ defined by Gerry Simpson as ”the realisation through legal forms of Great Power prerogatives‘ œ,33 that is to say, was a special role œ in terms of rights, obligations and responsibilities œ within the international legal order attributed to the French Republic vis-à-vis the Batavian Republic? Did a legal hierarchy arise between them?

Method

The history of the law of nations tends to be studied on the basis of international legal doctrine.34 Focusing on actual relations between two states and their position in the international legal order at large, this book takes another approach. It turns to the treaties and conventions the two Republics used to settle their mutual relations and a range of diplomatic sources on the formation, implementation, and interpretation of those documents. The focus on treaties hardly needs any explanation. Treaties were already recognised by contemporaries as the main sources of the law of nations.35 The great peace treaties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries occupied a central place in the international legal

31 Reiterated in: Nys, 1896, p. 361. 32 Nys, 1896, p. 395. 33 Simpson, 2004, p. x. 34 Lesaffer, 2005b, p. 32. 35 Mirkine-Guetzevitch, 1928, p. 302. 9 order,36 for instance as a point of reference to rights, obligations, legal titles, and generally recognised rules of the law of nations. In the words of Gabriel de Mably (1709-1785): ”Tout le monde sçait que les Traités sont les archives des Nations, qu‘ils renferment les titres de tous les peuples, les engagemens réciproques qui les lient, les loix qu‘ils se sont imposées, les droits qu‘ils ont acquis ou perdus.‘37 Admittedly, looking at treaties seems to imply a positivist or voluntarist approach to the law of nations.38 Indeed, treaties are deliberately concluded by states to settle their mutual relations, but an analysis of treaty practice does provide some cases in which references to a more objective law of nations were made or more general rules were reflected in treaty provisions. Central to diplomatic practice as treaties were at the time, diplomatic discourse leading to their formation or settling disputes on interpretation and implementation might prove to be informative on the law of nations in a wider sense. Diplomatic correspondence may be less obvious as a source to answer questions on the law of nations and the international legal order. Nonetheless, it is exactly in the official intercourse between governments and diplomats that the applicable law and legal concepts are to be found. This book will search for legal relations at the place where international law and international politics meet, precisely from the assumption that the law of nations gains meaning and substance only within the context of international politics. The instance law is considered to be man-made instead of conceived in natural law terms as transcendental and preordained, law is intrinsically connected with politics.39 The law of nations is not even ”a by-product of politics.‘40 Philip Allott is right in stressing that the law of nations results from a political struggle on the formulation of values and the power to make and enforce law,41 but this is just part of the story. The law of nations is part of international politics.42 It is that aspect of international politics that formulates binding rules to conduct politics.43 The law of nations is a living law, part of a political context in which its rules are formed and are given their meaning on the one hand, and, conversely, for which it provides institutionalised and binding rules of conduct by which the game of international politics has to be played.44 Henceforth, the law of nations is not primarily to be found in the writings of scholars but in diplomatic

36 Ziegler, 2007, p. 150. 37 Mably, 1764, I, p. iii. 38 Lesaffer, 1999a, p. xxii. 39 Georgiev, 1993, p. 3. 40 Allott, 1990, p. 46. 41 Allott, 2002, p. 153. 42 Scott, 1994, p. 317; Krisch, 2005, p. 408. 43 Kooijmans, 1964, p. 124. 44 On the innate connection between law and politics, see: Carr, 2001, p. 164 and p. 166. 10 practice itself and a historical period‘s diplomatic practice has left its remnants in diplomatic archives. Formalistic legal positivists find it hard to deal with the law of nations, because they are solely capable of perceiving law in terms of emanating from a sovereign power or of doctrinal systems.45 Dealing with actual relations between actual states, this study needs to set off from a different point of view. Within the purview of this study, the law of nations is not approached as, like Martti Koskenniemi does, ”what lawyers [...] think,‘46 ”an effect of lawyers‘ imagination,‘47 ”a technical craft,‘48 or ”something imagined and operated by lawyers.‘49 For the actual law of nations is not to be found in legal doctrine. Legal doctrine cannot always be trusted to provide valid information on applicable law.50 Sometimes it does reflect the law as it was; more often it was an academic exercise reflecting wishful legal thinking determined by political, moral, religious, economic, or cultural views and endeavouring to impose on law a scientifically ideal system and scholarly assumptions of what law is. Once it becomes an object of academic study law easily loses touch with society. Thus, private law jurists have appropriated private law to the extent that hardly any layman is even aware of the legal rules and concepts that become applicable the moment he puts his groceries on the conveyor belt at a super market‘s checkout and the law comes into sight only once problems arise and the matter is referred to lawyers; hence being virtually irrelevant to most actors and transactions it is supposed to regulate. In other words, the moment law becomes recognisable as law to legal scholars lawyers deprive law of its social functions. Contrariwise, the law of nations has not lost its touch with the reality of social intercourse yet. The law of nations is not the kind of neat scientific system private law jurists have created for themselves; the kind of lawyers‘ law no state with a proper sense of self-interest and the means to act upon it, would ever entirely and always adhere to. Hence, for methodological reasons, instead of doctrine, a more sociological approach to law in international relations is taken here. The law of nations works within a political system. The features of that system are determinative for the law. At the international level, law is a law in action, the living law of international politics. The law of nations is not a law of scholars, but a law of statesmen, soldiers, and diplomats. The law in its essence is a social and inherently practical phenomenon; hence any true history of the law of nations should be a study of practice instead of doctrine. Most prominently, the Austrian legal sociologist, Eugen Ehrlich, has argued that law is a

45 Hall, 2001, p. 271. 46 Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 7. 47 Koskenniemi, 2004, p. 361. 48 Koskenniemi, 2006, p. 7. 49 Koskenniemi, 2006, p. 10. 50 Lesaffer, 2006, p. 98. 11 social fact and results from social intercourse.51 The phrase ”living law‘ is his.52 According to Ehrlich, law does not evolve or develop through legislation or the judiciary, but in society itself.53 He adheres to a practical concept of law according to which law is perceptible in social relations and interactions. Basically, legal norms are rules of conduct caught in a normative formula.54 Law is a living law because it is the formal expression of the internal order of a social group and functions as a reference for behaviour.55 Whereas internal perspectives might regard the legal order as legal because it has a ”self-contained systematic coherence,‘ a sociological approach regards an order as legal because it is an order that springs from social intercourse.56 In this approach, then, the origin and foundation of the law of nations are clear: it is the system of states itself. Rules of conduct and legal mechanisms for dispute settlement, enforcement etc. have resulted from the very process of existing closely together and interacting with each other. Hence, law can be observed in social activities and interactions.57 Ehrlich‘s concept of law is taken as the basis for this study‘s methodology. Since law essentially is a social and practical phenomenon, practice will be studied here. Essentially a sociological approach deviates from structuralist thinking. Instead of conceptual sources of law and legal obligation linked to a specific political structure, one starts to think from social functions. As Sanne Taekema has argued, a functionalist approach allows for recognising rules as law without the state.58 Peter Kooijmans has refuted the denial of international law by radical positivists based on the non-existence of a sovereign lawgiver. He accepts that legal norms need to be ”positivised,‘ but it does not necessarily take a government to enact and enforce rules.59 Moreover, Kooijmans has stressed that enforcement, though relevant to law, cannot be part of the definition of law, because that would turn the definition of law into a tautology.60 One cannot enforce something that does not exist yet. Hence, the existence of law precedes its enforcement. Therefore, enforcement has to be extraneous to defining law. One of the most authoritative expressions of a functionalist approach to law has been offered by Karl Llewellyn. He has identified several ”law jobs‘ independent of who or what kind of institutions is

51 Jones, 1969, p. 187 and p. 191; Ziegert, 1996, p. 634. 52 Ehrlich, 1911 and 1913, pp. 315-331. 53 Ziegert, 1996, p. 630. 54 Ziegert, 1996, p. 634; Tyler, 2007, p. 3. 55 Ziegert, 1996, pp. 635-637. 56 Ziegert, 1996, p. 637; Allott, 2002, p. 48 and p. 56. 57 Ziegert, 1996, p. 638. 58 Taekema, 2008, p. 56. 59 Kooijmans, 1964, p. 15. 60 Kooijmans, 1964, p. 16. 12 charged with these functions. In his view, law has various functions that are essential to the existence and functioning of society: 1) dispute settlement, 2) (re)channelling of conduct and expectations, 3) allocating authority by establishing procedures and assigning powers for legal decision making, 4) organising society as a collective by formulating collective visions and interests as well as contributing to a sense of togetherness and solidarity, and 5) juristic method.61 These functions or ”jobs‘ are to be looked for in diplomatic practice to establish what international legal order was like. Likewise, Hedley Bull œ regarding international order as a social order œ62 distinguishes several functions law has within a society. In the first place, law identifies the principles of political organisation.63 That is to say, that law identifies the members of a society,64 and attributes basic political functions like making, communicating, administering, interpreting, enforcing, legitimising, and protecting rules of law.65 In the second place, law sets the ”basic rules of coexistence among states.‘ In the third place, law furthers the observance of those rules.66 In line with Herbert Hart‘s distinction between primary and secondary rules,67 one would then be looking for 1) an accepted code of conduct or a sense of appropriate behaviour, and 2) forms of institutionalised co-existence from which the code of conduct emanates. As a ”living law,‘ the law of nations equals the concepts and rules of conduct that are recognised as ”law,‘ as legally binding or as sources providing legal claims and arguments by relevant actors within the international legal order that arise while reading more official, secret or at least non public documents. A pattern of behaviour might be evidence of law, but the law of nations in this sense is not just what states do or want. It is about what they conceive as law, what they think they can get away with,68 what kind of behaviour they accept from others and what kind of behaviour other states will accept. In short, the law of nations is about the rules of conduct states sense they and others should adapt their actions to, as well as the mechanisms a society has to identify, modify, interpret, and enforce these rules. The best way to discover these rules and mechanisms is by studying actions of states, the justifications states issue to sustain their actions, and the normative reactions by other states.

61 Llewellyn, 1940, pp. 1373-1397; on Llewellyn‘s notion of ”law jobs‘ see also: Taekema, 2008, pp. 57-60. 62 Keene, 2002, p. ix. 63 Bull, 2002, p. 135. 64 Bull, 2002, p. 65. 65 Bull, 2002, p. 54 and p. 59. 66 Bull, 2002, p. 135. 67 Hart, 1997, p. 79. 68 Lesaffer, 2006, p. 174. 13 Statements states make about their own behaviour or that of others are specifically instructive. Whether other states endorse actions or protest against them might be quite indicative, although one should preferably establish why they did so. It is in these statements, actions and reactions that the law of nations is expressed in diplomatic practice. Legal arguments in such statements might be primarily rhetorical, but they can only have the intended rhetorical effect if they refer to opinions, views, perceptions, political theoretical concepts and so on that apparently were forceful and common enough to provide valid arguments. States may not state the true reasons of their action, but they do usually endeavour to justify what they do or do not do by legal or moral arguments.69 Hans Morgenthau appraises these references as (self-)deceit,70 but legitimating one‘s own behaviour or denying legitimacy to behaviour of others by necessity refers to ”normative beliefs‘ in attempting to connect behaviour with accepted rules, moral or legal principles.71 Arguing in terms of justice or legitimacy while actions are actually driven by political reasons usually intends to persuade others to support or at least not to resist actions and thus will refer to views on acceptable behaviour.72 Since arguments will be adapted to the intended audience,73 depending on who one tries to convince and the public or private nature of the statements, they might inform us of what the author himself believes in and/or what he conceives to be the believes of the addressee(s) or third parties. States are expected to argue in terms of law and justice. Therefore, it is hard for states to refrain from legal and moral discourse. As Goldsmith and Posner have stressed, legal argumentation might be sincere or a disguise for self-interest and power, but not framing a justification of action in a legal and moral discourse is really telling. Because arguing in legal and moral terms, according to Goldsmith and Posner, is ”cheap,‘ not arguing in legal and moral terms will easily be taken as a contrario evidence that a state deems its action not to be lawful and just.74 Nevertheless, one might wonder whether Goldsmith and Posner are entirely right in claiming that references to the law of nations and justice are cheap. Although detrimental effects will be noticeable only in the long run, legal and moral arguments might backfire if a state‘s behaviour turns out not to be consistent with the law of nations or previous statements. This sociological approach does not prejudice on the nature of legal relations between the two sister republics or the ways they were conceived. Leon Duguit has criticized sociological approaches to the

69 Baehr, 1994, p. 210 and p. 214. 70 Morgenthau, 2004, pp. 101-103. 71 Piirimäe, 2002, p. 501; Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, pp. 168-169. 72 Lesaffer, 2006, p. 100 and p. 162. 73 Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 180. 74 Goldsmith and Posner, 2007, p. 174. 14 law of nations arguing that recognition of the existence of social rules does not imply that these rules are actually law. He claims that rules‘ social aspect merely explains the substance of legal norms, whereas it takes a formal aspect to explain their legal character.75 The latter aspect takes an internal perspective, whereas the sociological aspect takes an external perspective. Both approaches need to be clearly distinguished. For methodological reasons, an external view to the law of nations is adhered to here, whereas the law of nations from an internal perspective is under scrutiny throughout the present study. It is one thing to depart from the idea that the law of nations is a social and political phenomenon consisting of rules of conduct and concepts that enable people to understand the world they live in and that develop in social and political practice in order to study the law of nations within a specific historical context. It is an entirely different thing to ask if, how and why these rules and concepts were conceived as law from within by contemporaries. These external and internal approaches to the law of nations are distinct from each other. The latter can be an object of investigation, while the first is taken as the methodological basis of that investigation. The period of the Revolutionary Wars has left a vast number of diplomatic sources. Covering all diplomatic correspondence between the French and Batavian Republics from early 1795 to the summer of 1803 is not feasible. Hence a selection had to be made. This was done on the basis of a case selection based on secondary literature and the themes this study focuses on as expounded in Chapter I.1. This case selection focused on the Alliance Treaty, subsequent conventions, peace negotiations, and disputes as well as diplomatic initiatives to bring about modifications of the Alliance Treaty and conventions known from secondary literature. The texts of the relevant treaties and conventions have been taken from the Consolidated Treaties Series or Kerautret‘s anthology,76 if the original was not found directly in the consulted archives. Some diplomatic sources as well as various Batavian constitutional texts from the period have been published.77 The minutes and decrees of the Batavian Nationale Vergadering are available on the Internet,78 as are the French constitutions from the period.79 Most material used throughout this book has been harvested in diplomatic archives, though. Research has been conducted in the Dutch Nationaal Archief in (NA), and the French Archives Nationales (AN) and the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (AAE) in Paris. In addition, some sources were found in the Swiss Bundesarchiv in Bern

75 Gilson, 1984, pp. 278-279. 76 Kerautret, 2002. 77 Du Casse, 1855; Colenbrander, 1905, 1906, and 1907; De Gou, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990, and 1995; Van Hasselt, 1987. 78 http://192.87.107.12:8080/decreten. 79 http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 15 (SBA) and the Archivio di Stato in Milan (ASMi). The archival research focused on the relations between France and the Batavian Republic. Remarks on the context of great power politics as well as introductory chapters and paragraphs are necessarily based on secondary sources. For practical reasons, the archival research started in The Hague. Mainly the archives of the Batavian legation in Paris and the Batavian Department van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in The Hague have been consulted. The correspondence within the rhombus formed by the French and Batavian Foreign Secretaries,80 the Batavian envoy(s) in Paris, and the French envoy in The Hague was the main focus of the research. Next, correspondence between these Foreign Secretaries with their governments (the Directoire or Premier Consul in Paris, and the Uitvoerend Bewind or Staatsbewind in The Hague) and direct correspondence between Batavian and French envoys with other government ministers in their place of residence have been gone through, too. Correspondence with French military commanders has been excluded. Although the military line of command formed an alternative line of communication with Paris,81 this would have extended the number of sources beyond the range of possibility. The books with copies of sent letters of the Batavian Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken are chronologically ordered. Since they are not itemised according to the nationality of senders and recipients, correspondence with Batavian envoys accredited elsewhere than Paris and the entire corps diplomatique in The Hague could easily be included, though. Both with regard to correspondence and minutes a distinction between ordinary and secret is made within the Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken‘s archives. It probably does not come as a surprise that the boxes with secret documents turned out to contain the most relevant information. Received letters and other documents are ordered by sender and subsequently chronologically. This allowed for clearly focusing on correspondence from French envoys. Finally, the foreign office‘s archives contain some boxes in which material with regard to a specific theme is gathered. This concerns, for instance, documents on negotiations in Lille, Rastatt, Amiens, and diplomatic instructions. The archives of the Batavian legation in Paris mainly subsist of sent and received correspondence. Outgoing and incoming letters are ordered respectively by addressee or sender and subsequently chronologically. As to outgoing documents, letters to the Staten Generaal, the Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, the Batavian Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken, and French ministers and

80 On the Batavian side, prior to the establishment of the Agentschap der Buitenlandsche betrekkingen in March 1798, the Staten Generaal‘s Secreet Besogne and the Nationale Vergadering‘s Commissie van Buitenlandsche Zaaken. 81 Woolf, 1991, p. 124. 16 other authorities have been consulted. As to incoming documents, letters from the Staten Generaal, the Departement van Buitenlandsche Zaaken in The Hague, French ministers and other authorities as well as foreign representatives in France have been gone through. Finally, some thematic boxes, for instance with documents on Flushing, have been looked at. The archives of the Staten Generaal, the Uitvoerend Bewind, the Staatsbewind, and legislative bodies contain some direct correspondence with the French government or French envoys. These archives are ordered in a way that allows for singling out these letters rather swift. In addition, minutes and decrees of the Staten Generaal, the Uitvoerend Bewind, and the Staatsbewind as well as public statements by their members, if completely included or added to minutes or dispatches, have been looked at. Furthermore, if referred to in other sources, the minutes of the Nationale Vergadering (the Dagverhaal) have been consulted. The private archives of Maarten van der Goes, Batavian Foreign Secretary throughout the better part of the period, proved to contain some interesting documents as well. The case selection served to determine what to look at in Paris, too. The experience gained at The Hague served as a guide to the research in the Paris archives. In the French Foreign Office‘s archives relevant sources are to be found in the Correspondance Politique (CP) and the Mémoires et Documents (MD). The CP is ordered according to place of residence of a legation and contains all correspondence with regard to the country in question in chronological order. The CP mainly contains correspondence between the Ministre des Rélations extérieures on the one hand and the French government (the Directoire 1795-1799 and the Premier Consul 1800-1804), the French envoy in the concerned country and that country‘s envoy in Paris on the other. In addition, some correspondence with other French government ministers, correspondence between the French envoy or the French government with authorities in the country in question, and some miscellaneous documents are to be found in the CP. Most relevant to this study is the CP Hollande. Since it is ordered chronologically the entire period could be covered, although most attention was paid to the more specific periods indicated by the case selection. In addition, the CP Suisse and CP Milanais have been consulted in search for relevant documents with regard or from the other main sister republics. Next to the records concerned with the sister republics, parts of the CP Angleterre (peace negotiations in Lille in 1796-1797, the run-up to the Peace of Amiens in 1801-1802, the outbreak of war with Britain in 1803), the CP Autriche (peace negotiations leading to the Peace of Campoformio in 1797, and the Peace of Lunéville in 1801), and the CP Prusse (Batavian attempts to provoke Prussian intervention in order to have Batavian neutrality recognised in the summer of 1799) have been looked at. The MD contains an extensive number of various kinds of documents: reports,

17 policy advices, records, decrees, publications, and so on. The MD is subdivided geographically. Although within the geographical divisions little systematic order exists, the inventory is very detailed indicating the subject of every single document. Hence, it was possible to select relevant documents from the inventory. In the French Archives nationales mainly those records have been examined that contain documents with regard to internal decision making of the French government. Unfortunately, the records of the Directoire and Consulat are confined to somewhat extended resolutions. In these records some documents with regard to special missions and direct correspondence between the French government and envoys or foreign governments have been found too. Moreover, some private archives of leading politicians are to be found in the Archives nationales. Especially, Sieyes‘ archives contain several rele- vant documents. In Bern, several boxes from the Zentralarchiv der Helvetischen Republik (Hauptabteilung B) and the Archiv der Mediationszeit (Hauptabteilung C) have been perused. In Milan, various numbers from Potenze estere post. 1535, Potenze sovrane post. 1535, Trattati, Autografi, Principi e sovrani, Archivio della vice presidenza Melzi, Archivio della Prima Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Parigi (Marescalchi), Archivio della Seconda Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Milano (Testi) have been consulted. In both cases, similar documents were looked at as in The Hague and Paris and boxes were selected according to the same case selections. In purporting to establish legal relations in political practice, this study deals with theory in practice. And practice is not the philosopher‘s paradise. For practical reasons and because of the limited capability of abstraction and comprehension in most practitio- ners, philosophical jewels of conceptualisation and systematisation appear in vulgarised forms and deprived of profound substance and meaning. The reader will hardly meet any philosophers throughout this study and all the more politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, and trained or untrained diplomats. To be sure, most of them were lawyers or otherwise educated men, but œ with the possible exception of Emmanuel de Sieyes, on the scarce occasions he was willing to philosophise œ none of them belongs to the Parnassus of political and legal philosophy. It is thus that we have to descend from the heights of the Platonic world of ideas to the shady world of the cave were legal concepts and rules are only to be observed in the vulgarised form of shadows of the logically consistent, and philosophically comprehensive ideas. John Dunn, writing about , makes a distinction between the word and the idea, both having a separate existence and influence on political practice.82 The same is true for revolutionary discourse. Even without practitioners and addressees

82 Dunn, 2005, p. 20. 18 fully understanding the ideas of , democracy, republic, nation, human rights, sovereignty and so on, the use of these words had a political and rhetorical meaning and effect. It is more as words than as ideas that we come across them in diplomatic correspondence. Sporadically, philosophical notions will be referred to in an attempt to clarify positions taken, but, in general, the vulgarised or even nominal form in which ideas and concepts functioned in political and diplomatic discourse will be respected throughout this book. In addition, not all questions, no matter how interesting they might be, can be addressed. The questions one can put to historical sources are limited and determined by the sources themselves. Henceforth, the reader expecting profound conceptual elaborations throughout this book or a consistent image of international legal order that came into being after the French Revolution or that was conceived by contemporaries will find himself disappointed at the end. To avoid any chance of confusion the names of the various state institutions are used in the various languages of the sister republics œ Dutch for the Batavian Republic, German for the Helvetic Republic and Italian for the Cisalpine Republic œ whereas French is reserved for the French Republic‘s institutions. A list of translations of Dutch terms and names is to be found in the appendices. Geographical locations, names of provinces, cities, rivers etc. are in English for as far as English translations of the names in the local vernacular exist. Denominators like ”,‘ ‘Germany,‘ and ”Italy‘ are used since they were used in contemporary sources as well. It has to be noted, however, that they refer to geographical areas instead of political entities. A lot of people appear throughout this book. The years of their birth and death are indicated if they lived prior to the Revolutionary period. All others were in some stage of their active political, military, or diplomatic careers at the time or concern writers from the late nineteenth century onwards. Unless indicated otherwise all translations of primary sources are the author‘s. Most sources were dated according to the French Revolutionary calendar. For the references in this book these dates have been converted to the Gregorian calendar.

Content

This book sets out to offer a case study to elucidate the interaction between power and law in international relations. Translated to the period under scrutiny, this theme raises the questions whether and if so, in what ways French political and military preponderance affected legal relations between France and one of its neighbours. This part of the book continues with two introductory chapters. Chapter I.1 elaborates on international order and the relation between power and law in international relations from a theoretical point of

19 view. It sets out to offer a typology of international order based on the major works of international relations theory. Furthermore, it will address the notion of equality of states as a crucial distinctive feature within the typology. What does equality mean from a legal point of view and when is inequality legally relevant? In addition, some remarks on interstate relations from a perspective of interaction between power and law will be made. This theoretical framework will allow for the main question to be elaborated and refined. Chapter I.2 will discuss the politico-historical and ideological context of the present case study. After a brief sketch of the eighteenth-century states system, the French Revolution, French domestic politics, and European politics of the period of the Revolutionary Wars will be addressed. This chapter will go more deeply into Revolutionary visions on European order and the law of nations, as well as into eighteenth-century diplomatic practice these visions reacted against. The French Revolution posed a special situation to international relations due to the role of ideology and military events. The influence of Revolutionary thought on views on interstate relations will be addressed in interaction with traditions in French foreign policy since the French attitude towards the Batavian Republic was determined both by the ideological and political background of the Revolution and traditional views on France‘s position and role within Europe and on the best ways to guarantee French security. French debates were dominated between the dialectic between cosmopolitan fraternity and internationalism on the one hand and national interests and security on the other and the (partly corresponding) dialectic between the eighteenth-century federal vision and the Vattelian view of international order of independent states co-existing under natural law. It was within the purview of these dialectics that the French formulated, abandoned, and redefined their policy of sister republics. Franco-Batavian relations will be addressed along two lines. Both lines will confine Franco-Batavian relations to the international level. A wide range of literature has already been written on the Batavian Republic‘s constitutions.83 Although it would be interesting to find out whether the Revolutionary alliance was already an imperial order years prior to the proclamation of the French Empire (18 May 1804) and the rise of the Great Empire after the (2 December 1805) œ i.e. whether the French Republic intervened in domestic affairs, especially constitutional affairs, and in what ways and how these interventions were justified œ, this book will focus on the Batavian Republic‘s external relations.

83 Verhagen, 1949; Geyl, 1959; Bauer, 1962; Van Hasselt, 1987; De Wit, 1983; De Gou, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995; Schama, 1989; Harouel, 1997b; Moorman van Kappen, 2000; Moorman van Kappen and Coppens, 2001; Elias, 2001; Van Namen, 2002; Van Sas, 2004; Rosendaal, 2008. 20 Part II will elaborate on direct, bilateral relations between the two states setting of from the question whether de facto preponderance was legally translated. Part II sets out to find out how Franco- Batavian relations were perceived. On the one hand, discourse on mutual relations will be analysed. Thereto discourse will be contrasted to legal documents and arguments. Part II starts with a chapter on Franco-Batavian relations prior to the Revolutionary Wars by way of introduction. The second chapter discusses the debate on what the relation between the French and Batavian Republics was to be set off by the French invasion of the United Provinces in January 1795 and the formation of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague. Diplomatic and political discourse not taken into consideration, Franco-Batavian relations were caught in and dominated by the Alliance Treaty. The Treaty of The Hague and additional conventions will be discussed in thematic chapters (3, 4, and 5). The treaty provisions can be divided in those addressing political, financial, military, and territorial issues. Chapter 3 elaborates on political and financial issues like the Batavian Republic‘s recognition by France, the indemnity to be paid to France, and the political character of the alliance, that is, did ideology and the republican form of government matter and to what extent did the alliance express already existing, ”natural‘ bonds between the two Republics. Chapter 4 addresses military issues like the military character (defensive and/or offensive) and duration of the alliance, obligations of mutual aid and contribution to each other‘s war efforts, the presence of French troops on Batavian soil, the command of troops in case of joined action and supreme command of military forces within the Batavian Republic, and measures of economic warfare. This chapter focuses on the questions whether the Alliance Treaty was constitutive both for the Batavian Republic and for Franco-Batavian relations. In addition, attempts by the Batavian government to get rid of the (offensive) alliance and return to a neutral status and French responses will be discussed. Chapter 5 elaborates on territorial issues. The French had set their mind on attaining part of Dutch territory. Negotiations on the Franco-Batavian border and the final settlement in the Alliance Treaty will be discussed. Further attention will be paid to the settlement with regard to the port of Flushing that would end up in the Treaty of The Hague. This settlement œ either allowing the to use the port or vesting a condominium œ continuously caused disputes between the two Republics. Both disputes on Flushing and negotiations on the mutual border are quite illustrative for the interaction between power and law in Franco-Batavian relations and for the relation between state and territory in contemporary thought and practice. Part II will end with a chapter on the renewal of the Franco-Batavian alliance after the renewed outbreak of war with Britain in 1803. Throughout these chapters the focus will be on formal consent, reciprocity and

21 (a)symmetry in rights, responsibilities, and obligations as features of equality. Part III will take the argument to the international level at large investigating the Batavian Republic‘s freedom to determine its foreign policy and ability to play a role on the international scene. After some remarks on Batavian diplomatic relations, Part III will address the Batavian Republic‘s involvement in peace negotiations and the Peace Treaties between the French Republic on the one hand and Britain and Austria or the Empire on the other. Throughout the eighteenth- century fundamental questions regarding European order and the law of nations had been addressed especially at peace congresses ending major wars. Hence, great power peace negotiations offer an excellent opportunity to discuss whether equality or great power leadership ruled in international politics. Finally, Part IV attempts to bring the elaborate discussion of Franco-Batavian relations of the previous parts together into a synthetic exposé and conclusion addressing the question whether Franco-Batavian relations, both de facto and as they were envisioned by contemporaries, best befitted a pluralistic-egalitarian order of sovereign states or a hegemonic or federative order and the question what role and position was attributed to law and power.

22 [...]

23 24

Part II

Icy rivers, chains of gold: the Franco-Batavian Alliance

Nolum sanctum dare gratis. Quod promittunt sub ingressu Sanctae mentis in excessu Postquam sedent iam securi Contradictunt sancto iuri. œ Carmina Burana œ

25 [...]

26 Part III

THE BATAVIAN REPUBLIC AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

Omne bellum sumi facile, ceterum aegerrime desinere.

œ Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum œ

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28

Part IV

The Revolutionary alliance

”les petites Républiques doivent se reposer sur la loyauté de la grande Nation!‘ – Jean de Bry84 œ

84 Jean de Bry to Carel van Grasveld in Rastatt; Vreede, 1863, p. vii. 29

30 Morning mist still whirled above the Seine as coach wheels rattled over the bridge near the Palais Bourbon. The carriage‘s doors were decorated with a painting of a lion and a woman dressed in white and holding a lance with a hat on it; the coat of arms of the Batavian Republic, a union between the Dutch lion deprived of his crown and the Batavian virgin. Sitting inside the coach was a man of middle age. For hours he had been nodding away without really catching sleep. He had travelled enough in his lifetime to be accustomed to the jolts of a coach on French roads in spring. So the travel itself did not keep him awake. His mind was not at rest. Tired as he was, he kept staring at the object in his hands; a file covered with dark blue velvet and gold and silver embroidery and two thick cords attached to it. In this file was an authentic copy of the . Just a few days ago a canon shot had announced the news of this Treaty and Paris had celebrated abundantly, but this morning rest had returned to the city. The man in the coach was Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, returning from Amiens. He was one of the four men who, by putting a signature on a piece of paper, had ended a war that had lasted for nine years, had cost thousands of men their lives, and had changed the map of Europe. If the Peace would last, he had contributed to a settlement equal to Westphalia or Utrecht; at least that was what the papers wrote. But had he really earned a place in history books, our traveller wondered. To be sure, the man who would receive the credits for the peace resided in the palace the carriage had just passed by. In fact, judging from the lights burning inside the Tuileries, the great man was already awake and at work. Peace had been concluded and the man in charge of French politics and military forces was still restless. Oh, he admired the man. Destined to spend his life as an anonymous artillery officer, the man had instead conquered Italy and , and now the hearts of the French people. He had a vision and the talent to shape the world according to it. But that was exactly Schimmelpenninck‘s main worry. Weeks ago, he had reconciled with not being able to restore Ceylon to his country or to relieve it of the burdens from the alliance with France. Every time he thought it over, the question whether the price paid for French aid in throwing the Orangists out had not been too high came to the fore. But he was sure peace would be welcomed in The Hague and even more by his merchant friends in . No, Schimmelpenninck worried that the peace would not last, that the moment the Batavian Republic could divert all its energy and resources to national regeneration had not come yet. Indepen- dence and freedom were still a dream to be realised. How wonderful that dream had seemed just ten years ago at a time the French still spoke of brotherhood, of the unity of mankind, of spreading liberty. Austria and Britain had concluded peace because they were exhausted and isolated. Everyone could see that. Bonaparte needed

31 peace to put things right at home. Nothing prevented him from raising French ambitions once he had done that. Lunéville and Amiens had changed nothing in France‘s position in western Europe. France was still preponderant. Nothing could stop Bonaparte from maintaining control of the allied republics. Nothing but the sleeping giant of the east could stop him gaining control of central Europe as well once he would have resorted to arms again. The European order had not returned to equilibrium yet. Oh, had he served his country well, our traveller wondered, when the coach passed through the gate into the embassy‘s courtyard. As the carriage halted, the embassy secretary was already in the doorway of the modest hôtel. He held a letter with a red seal. Schimmelpenninck could sort out that seal from any distance by then, even though his eyesight troubled him lately. It was a letter from Talleyrand informing the Batavian ambassador of official celebrations of the Amiens Peace he was to attend as one of the Premier Consul‘s special guests together with his Spanish colleague. They would be taken to the palace by abundantly decorated coaches headed by cavalry escorts; so far for republican plainness. Ah well, at least in public appearances of Batavian independence were kept up.

The Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802) ended a war between France and Britain that had lasted for nine years. The had entered the war as a British ally in 1793. Within two years, French forces had occupied its entire territory, enabling Dutch Patriots to take control of government and transform the United Provinces into the Batavian Republic. Dutch Patriots concluded a treaty of peace and alliance œ the Treaty of The Hague (16 May 1795) œ with France, thus changing sides in the course of the war. Against all odds, the Revolution, born out of the French government‘s political and financial crisis of the 1780s, had allowed the French to overcome their country‘s military impotence. British dominance of the sea and the rise of Russia in the east had caused a sense of French insecurity throughout Louis XVI‘s reign. This sense was not dispelled by the new élan of the Revolution. To the contrary, the Revolution with its conspiracy theories and the siege mentality of the initial, rather disastrous stages of the Revolutionary Wars strengthened this sense and added an element of fundamental distrust. In a period of domestic and international turmoil, the new regime was built on a tottery basis. ”La patrie‘ was ”en danger.‘ The republican regime in Paris was ever more driven by the need to secure the Revolution‘s achievements and to stabilise and normalise the political situation both within and without. Moreover, the French government still faced a desperate financial position. The Revolution might have incited France with a new self-awareness and zeal, but it had not solved the financial crisis. Simultaneously, the French‘s sense

32 of cultural superiority clashed with the awareness that their country had missed the boat of economic growth, political reform, and territorial aggrandisement throughout the last decades of the ”ancien régime.‘ In the three decades prior to the Revolution, western Europe had been at relative rest due to the Franco-Austrian Alliance of 1756. Due to the Revolution, great power rivalry burst out in western Europe within the context of an ideological conflict. French Revolutionaries were obsessed with security in their foreign policy orientation. France‘s traditional foreign and security policy had been upset some decades prior to the Revolution. Ever since the early seventeenth century, France had been balancing the German powers by intervening in the German Empire and through allying itself with eastern powers. Vergennes had realised that the rise of the two flank powers œ Britain and Russia œ posed the main threat to France. Mainly the latter‘s rise undermined the position of France‘s traditional allies in the east thus rendering the ”barrière de l‘est‘ œ the cornerstone of France‘s security policy throughout the eighteenth century œ obsolete. The royal government had already conducted a policy of counterbalancing Britain, e.g. by supporting Dutch Patriots against the pro-British Stadhouder in the mid-1780s. The Revolutionary Wars had added the temporal union of Prussia and Austria against France to this undermining of traditional policy, although Prussia would return to neutrality in 1795. The republican regime continued Vergennes‘ policy aims, but it also adhered to the views of the opposition against the royal government, that is, they broke with Vergennes‘ preference for moderating French ambitions and opposed the 1756 alliance with Austria. Dominant factions among French Revolutionaries, especially by 1795, wished to enhance France‘s position in the West, either by expanding French territory to decrease France‘s vulnerability or by opting for all-out hegemony in western Europe. Because of military events, the latter option gained the upper hand. France adopted dominance as a foreign policy aim because its successes on the battlefield made it a feasible option. War would indeed dominate Franco-Batavian relations throughout the Batavian Republic‘s existence.

In the embrace of France

The Enlightenment‘s cosmopolitan spirit still dominated public discourse in the years 1790-1792. In those years, inspired by eighteenth-century projects for ”perpetual peace‘ focusing on a federal order in combination with anti-monarchical sentiments, formulated a policy of forming a buffer of friendly republics along the Rhine and Alps, regenerated by French military aid and bound to the French Republic by common social and political institutions; the so-

33 called ”sister republics.‘ In their view, in order to win the war, France had to bring the other nations of Europe into its own orbit by spreading the Revolutionary programme of political and social reform. Thus the leading Revolutionaries in these years contemplated ”républicaniser l‘Europe.‘ For the time being these plans remained to be ”a policy‘ due to the war situation. Moreover, during the Terror, enduring fear for foreign, Counter-revolutionary forces in combination with the need to organise a popular army of volunteers and conscripts increased xenophobia and appeals to national sentiments and national interests. The Revolutionary attitude towards international relations turned from œ to use Marc Belissa‘s words œ ”fraternité universel‘ to ”intérêt national.‘85 With the return of Girondins to a position of some political influence in Paris after the fall of Robespierre during the thermidor coup d‘état and a change of tide in military success, the notion of sister republics returned. The relations between France and its ”sisters‘ were one aspect of Revolutionary international politics where Revolutionary ideas on European order and a shifting balance of power met. The Batavian Republic was the first of the sister republics to become part of the French sphere of influence being dependent on the French Republic both politically and militarily. By no means does did volume claim to sketch a representative image of the relation between France and all its sister republics. The present volume offers a case study focusing on Franco-Batavian relations. By the time French armies actually crossed France‘s borders, idealist, cosmopolitan policies had become outdated. Due to the military experience of the years 1793-1794, French security and the interests of the French nation definitely came first. Even to Revolutionaries still adhering to a more cosmopolitan or international stand, French national interests were to be reconciled with international revolutionism. As a free and enlightened nation the French might be entitled and obliged to be the protector and the guide of other nations as well as to bring about a new European order. But, since the liberation and subsequently the freedom of other nations depended on French support and protection, ”France first‘ was in their interest as well. This is a position Randall Lesaffer œ writing on the start of the war between France and Spain in 1635 œ calls ”hegemonic defense,‘ that is, a great power identifying its own interest and notion of justice with that of the international order at large œ either to maintain the existing one or to reform it.86 The French Revolution had provoked the revival of Franco- Austrian and Franco-Anglo rivalry. Both conflicts encouraged the French Republic to bring the second and third rank powers of western Europe within its sphere of influence. Since the ”barrière de l‘est‘ had

85 Belissa, 1995. 86 Lesaffer, 2006, p. 177. 34 become obsolete because of Swedish and Ottoman hostility to the Revolution and French Republic as well as their relative decline, and above all because of ‘s partitioning, France was forced to reformulate its security policy. Unable to balance Russia and Austria in the East, Paris eventually set out for hegemony in the West by annexing the left bank of the Rhine and creating sister republics in the Low Countries, Italy, and Switzerland, hence expelling Austria œ the erstwhile enemy œ from western Europe and thus away from France‘s borders. In addition, because France had still not overcome the financial difficulties that had caused the Revolution, financial and material contributions œ in the form of a financial indemnity, of putting troops and vessels at France‘s disposal or of supplying and paying French troops œ were to be drawn from the sister republics. In short, they were expected to contribute to the war effort in a way that might be best described as exporting the ”levée en masse.‘ It is worth noticing that factual dependence was, thus, reciprocal to a certain extent. The sister republics might have been dominated by France politically and militarily, but the French Republic depended on its sister republics financially and because of the necessity of controlling the buffer as a precondition for French security. The main priority of thermidorian foreign policy was to create international guarantees for French security. , however, profoundly disagreed on the ways France could best protect itself. Throughout the winter of 1794-1795, the French Convention nationale was divided. Protagonists of the ancient borders opposed Revolutionary zealots. Most Thermidorians stood in between being rather moderate, but still concerned about securing the gains of the Revolution especially by extending French territory towards the natural borders. In the light of that political situation in Paris, the creation of actual sister republics in 1795 œ the Batavian Republic œ and 1797-1798 œ the Cispadane, Cisalpine, Ligurian, Helvetic, Roman, and Parthenopean Republics œ resulted from military contingencies rather than from an intentionally and consistently implemented policy. Nonetheless, from a point of view of French national interest, the sister republics formed an excellent military buffer as well as a provision store and treasure chest. The kind of dominance or hegemony French policy makers thought necessary to establish and uphold was essentially political and militarily since it primarily was to serve French security against foreign threats. Political and military dominance or basically diffe- rences in power do not necessarily affect legal equality and inde- pendence, though. The question remains whether French dominance was translated into law and if so, how this was done and how this translation was justified. At the centre of this study are the ways power affects the international legal order. Was power translated into law, legal status and legal procedures? Was power relevant to and recognised by the law of nations and incorporated within the inter-

35 national legal order? What kind of international legal order did con- temporaries envision? This volume set out to answer these questions based on a typology of international orders that distinguishes various types by the degree of hierarchy between units and the degree of integration and institutionalisation. This typology is essentially of a political nature, but it can be transmitted into different legal orders. Thereto, the typology is primarily structuralist. It has to be complemented by analysing various cultural aspects of international order. Six ideal types of international order are defined: 1) a stage of true without any politically organised entities or without sufficiently frequent contacts between entities for a system to develop, 2) a pluralistic-egalitarian stage of co-existing autonomous entities that do, nonetheless, form part of a system, 3) hegemony in which hierarchy and differentiation of tasks, rights, and duties between states in the sphere of international politics arise, 4) within the same trend of subjection, empire in which an imperial power is also entitled to interfere in subjected states‘ domestic spheres, 5) within a trend of unification, federation, in which entities are still equal but perpetually join together and establish federal institutions, 6) union in which the trend of unification has proceeded that far that the dualism of a fundamental distinction between distinct political and legal spheres is no longer preserved.

HEGEMONY EMPIRE

AN ARCHY PLURALIST- EGALITARIAN ORDER

FEDERATION UNION

Republican Units?

Any international order has two elements: 1) the type of units the order consists of, and 2) the relation between these units. Hence, the first issue to elaborate on is the kind of entities that formed international order or an envisioned future order was to consist of. Both states under investigation here were republics. They appeared in treaties as ”the French Republic‘ and ”the Batavian Republic,‘ although on the French side treaty preambles changed after the establishment of the Consulat into ”the First Consul in name of the French people.‘ The 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling declared that

36 treaties were to be concluded ”in the name of the Batavian people.‘ After the French invasion and the the United Provinces changed their name and their constitution. A pro-French, Patriot regime replaced the former pro-British regime. Basically a republic already existed in the Netherlands before the French invasion. A sister republic did not need to be created. Despite Girondin rhetoric of sister republics being used, the Franco-Batavian alliance would have been concluded even without a policy of sister republics on the French part. The alliance fitted in the French foreign policy already pursued by Vergennes, while Batavian Patriots had made an alliance with France the core of their foreign policy in the early 1780s. The Revolutionary notion of republican government did contradict the constitutional fundamentals of the United Provinces. The Dutch Republic had been aristocratic and confederal. Revolutionary/Patriot programmes of state reform opposed another notion of sovereignty and a notion of a centralised to the traditional constitution. These would be the pillars under the 1798 Bataafse Staatsregeling. In part this was a matter of spontaneous imitating the French Republic, in part the French government had urged for reform along these lines. Above all, however, constitutional reform in 1796-1798 was a continuation of the 1780s Patriot programme with some major modifications due to the 1787 experience. The ”people‘ had been a catchword of Patriot discourse in the Netherlands long before the Revolution in France. References to popular sovereignty raised expectations on the nation-state œ a state at the service of the people œ but in the context of major war the French and Batavian Revolutions led to the state-nation, that is, a Revolutionary avant-garde took control of the state apparatus in favour of its particular political programme and to mobilise national resources for the war effort.87 The Patriot regimes in Paris and The Hague were as much political elites as any other regime, but they were political elites that created and redefined their states‘ political centres and defined their countries‘ population as ”people‘ in order to legitimate their rule by making the claim of being representatives of the people. At this juncture, one might wonder whether a republic in the Revolutionary sense was meant to be the exclusive and only legitimate unit type of international order. In 1791-1792 this might have been the dream of many a Revolutionary and Patriot. In 1795, although Kant argued that every state should have a republican form of government in his Zum ewigen Frieden, the core of French policy makers had reconciled with heterogeneity of unit types. However, peace treaties were concluded with a whole range of princes and the French

87 On the distinction between the nation-state as a state in the service of the people and the state-nation as a state that mobilises the nation, see Bobbit, 2003, p. 146. 37 Republic even entered into an alliance with the King of Spain, whereas an alliance with the King of Prussia was contemplated. Despite the public and academic debate on the stability of a heterogeneous order, French diplomacy after thermidor did not discriminate between republics and monarchies. The Batavian Republic, too, maintained diplomatic relations with a great number of powers with forms of government at variance with popular sovereignty. Moreover, The Hague neglected its Swiss and Italian siblings in favour of its monarch-led trade partners. The sister republics‘ form of government œ their ”type identity‘88œ might have been relevant to international relations because of their intended function as buffer along France‘s eastern and north-eastern border, since it was thought to enhance France‘s capacity to control the buffer, whereas the alliance with the King of Spain had an entirely different function. Moreover, a French- inspired constitution would ensure the stability and force necessary for the Batavian government to mobilise national resources. This expectation was, however, based on the rational element of a centralised and unified state rather than the democratic one of representative government.

The degree of unification

The second element of any international order is its structure, that is, the way units relate to each other. The Batavian Republic has been called a French satellite or vassal.89 These were politico-empirical appreciations though. This volume is concerned with interstate relations from a legal perspective. The typology of international orders that serves to characterise Franco-Batavian relations throughout this volume identifies two structural trends: a trend focusing on the degree of unification and a trend focusing on the degree of hierarchy. These trends uncover two distinct forms of integration. Both unification and hierarchy turn a system of states into a more cohesive and integrated one. Whereas in the trend of unification states only lose indepen- dence, in the second trend states also lose equality vis-à-vis each other. If clearly distinguished these trends allow for six ideal types of international order to be defined, but one should not rule out the possibility of aspects from the two trends to be combined. Throughout the entire period this study covers, France and the Batavian Republic existed as separate political entities within a European system of states. To whatever extent one might claim that the Revolution disrupted the existing legal and political order, the standardised and regulated character of interstate relations at the system-level is undeniable. Henceforth, true anarchy can be ruled out

88 Wendt, 1999, p. 226 and p. 353. 89 E.g. Smit, 1950, pp. 114-115. 38 in advance. The same goes for union, since political entities and do- mestic and international spheres were clearly distinguished. Anachar- sis Cloots had advocated a ”universal republic,‘ but his schemes were hardly taken serious by his contemporaries. Establishing whether French dominance amounted to empire would have called for an addi- tional investigation of intermingling in the Batavian Republic‘s domestic sphere. This investigation has not been undertaken. The present analysis is confined to the sphere of international politics and, hence, concentrates on the triangle formed by a pluralistic-egalitarian order, a hegemonic order, and a federative order. The main question, then, is whether French dominance lead to establishing a federation, to ”legalised hegemony,‘90 or whether the forms of a pluralistic-egalitarian legal order were kept upright. The typology of international orders presented here is a continuum. The six orders are ideal types. One will not be able to indicate the dividing lines accurately in diplomatic practice. Characterising international orders, thus, is a matter of degree. Henceforth, it has to be determined whether Franco-Batavian relations tended more to a truly pluralistic- egalitarian system or to a hegemonic or federative order or, in other words, on what spot within the triangle Franco-Batavian relations or the international order they formed part of are to be situated. Consequently, equality and independence play a significant role as key features of a pluralistic-egalitarian order and counterparts of the key features of hegemonic and federative orders. The eighteenth century offered three conceptual traditions of international order to safeguard security. In the first place, the balance of power had come to be conceived of as a mechanism against foreign domination. It was part of a political discourse of rationality that emphasised reason of state as a determinant for foreign policy. Within the category of great powers the balance of power had evolved in a principle that justified annexation in the form of ”compensation‘ for other powers‘ gains. Hence, this first position perceived aggran- disement as a means of security. However, this strategy called for ignoring legal rights and lacked any justification besides the interest of the obtaining state and the alleged contribution to the stability of the European order at large; poor comfort to the minor power at whose expense compensation was accomplished. The other two traditions were part of legal discourse both countering the Hobbesian denial of the possibility of a positive law of nations in a different way. In both traditions security of all entities forming the international order is basically safeguarded through law. The first of these envisio- ned a legal order of independent entities co-existing under a law of nations based in natural law but deriving from the will of nations, that is, a pluralistic-egalitarian order but with a strong sense of legal and moral obligation at the international level. This position is called a

90 Simpson, 2004, p. x. 39 Vattelian worldview here.91 The final tradition is that of cosmopolitan federalism. Instead of the autonomy of distinct political entities this tradition stresses the unity of mankind and the universality of political, legal, and moral principles. Establishing perpetual peace and a true legal order, the sole real conditions of security, called for nations to enter into a federative union with common institutions. The latter two traditions dominated the Revolutionary mindset. Moreover, equality and independence were among the core principles of eighteenth-century international political and legal discourse. Equality and independence originated from the anti-hegemonic struggle against universal monarchy that had dominated European politics from the early sixteenth century onwards. Because of this struggle, the idea of equality of autonomous political entities as being of the same rank, that is, as entities exercising the same kind of (supreme) authority within their territory, came to the fore. The image of international order that arose from the struggle against hegemony was that of a knotted cone with sovereign powers all being positioned on the section. Hence, despite some deviations and exceptions in the sphere of diplomatic ceremonial, and despite the factual rise of great powers as a distinct category, hegemony was suspect. Once the French Revolutionaries had to formulate views on international politics they were inspired by their concept of the nation and popular sovereignty and by enlightened cosmopolitanism. The ”liberté et egalité‘ of the Revolution‘s slogan were translated into the equality of nations and their sovereignty and independence at the international level. Nations were to exercise popular sovereignty unhindered. Those Revolutionaries adhering to the federal vision in 1791-1792 based their federation of nations on equality and the reciprocal guarantee of rights, too. The Revolution that set out to implement the Enlightenment‘s promise of a better state and society and an improved condition for man and mankind based on liberty, equality, reason, individual rights, and popular sovereignty, the Revolution that strongly opposed hierarchy among men was unlikely to provide the conceptual framework for hierarchy among nations, French traditional security policy and a sense of French mission, exceptionalism, and superiority notwithstanding. France‘s dominance was to fit in any of the two legal traditions: Vattelian independence or cosmopolitan federation. Explicating French dominance legally was inacceptable from a conceptual and cognitive point of view. Having explored the Revolutionaries‘ and Patriots‘ mindsets, the question this volume sets out to answer calls for investigating the way interstate relations were constructed and international politics was conducted in practice. Focusing on the degree of unification first, the main questions that arise are whether the federal vision did still

91 Although it has to be remarked that Vattel himself did attribute an essential role to the balance of power. 40 influence legal practice at the expense of the independence of states and whether the sister republics were to form a republican subsystem. Federation is an institutionalised form of perpetual and exclusive cooperation. By entering into a federation, states subordinate their self-interest to the common good. Although primarily a structural category, a federation has a cultural core, since a federal order calls for international solidarity with other nations, a minimum degree of collective identity, and the acceptance of international responsibility towards others. In that sense, a federation is a structure with a strong cultural base. Bonds of cooperation between states are legally con- strued and federal institutions for dispute settlement, law formation, and enforcement are established. A federation externally acts as one. From a structural point of view, the sister republics did not nor were to form a federation. No suprastate institutions were established or even contemplated. With the stress on national interest in France after the 1793 campaign, the federal vision had served its turn. Marc Belissa has argued that the French ”conception centrale-hégémonique‘ obstructed a federation of republican nations.92 Batavian Patriots, however, did not advocate a federative order either. On the Batavian side, an international order of independent nations completed by a legal and moral dimension of interstate relations served as the image of international order for times to come. Once in power, Batavian Patriots held brief for an independent and regenerated Batavian Republic within the European system at large. Batavian foreign policy was entirely directed at national security and affluence. To be sure, Batavian Patriots were in two minds about what policy to pursue in order to attain these ends œ natural borders in the east to allow the Batavian Republic to defend itself or tightly aligning with France, peace and neutrality or actively contributing to bringing down British despotism of the seas œ, but the orientation on national independence was clear. A Vattelian worldview was left as the sole conceptual basis available. The legal form chosen to set down mutual relations fitted this view. At the start of negotiations in 1795, leading French politicians considered either an alliance or friendly co-existence œ with or without extensive annexations. Batavian Patriots had set their mind on an alliance with France to be formalised by a treaty. By its very nature, a treaty is a legal instrument adapted to horizontal relations. One might, therefore, argue that the French Republic instrumentalised a legal form of a pluralistic-egalitarian order to style its hegemony. With regard to the Batavian Republic this is hard to maintain. If one of the two parties instrumentalised the Alliance Treaty for political purposes it was the Batavian Republic. To the Batavian Patriots, the Alliance Treaty was to be their life insurance

92 Belissa, 2008, p. 122. 41 policy. The Batavians initiated talks on an alliance. Subsequently, all kinds of concessions had to be made to sell the alliance to the French. The French only used the Treaty to legalise their gains in the territorial sphere and procure military cooperation. France would conclude alliance treaties with the other sister republics, too. This greater ”Revolutionary alliance‘ did not form a republican subsystem within the European system of states. Neither the French government nor the Batavian championed a multilateral alliance. The Directoire and Consulat ruled out a multilateral alliance figuring that France would be better able to control a France-centred network of bilateral alliances.93 The Batavian Republic, too, wished to confine the alliance to a bilateral relation with France. To be sure, the bilateral alliance was extended by an alliance with Spain for the course of the present war. Spain was a monarchy, though. Thereto, the alliance with Spain was essentially anti-British and, by consequence, maritime. The Batavian Republic focused on the sea. The Swiss and Italian sister republics were situated on an entirely different theatre of the war; one where the Batavian Republic did not think to have any business. One might argue that Paris nevertheless was the central node of a republican subsystem charged with external relations. This rebuttal is unwarranted, though, for the Batavian Republic, while favouring relations with Paris and instructing its envoys to keep on good terms and preferably act in concert with French ones, maintained diplomatic relations with powers all over Europe without discrimination. Hence, relations between the republics and the monarchical part of Europe were not centralised. The French and Batavian Republics each were directly integrated in the European system at large. The French and Batavian Republics did not form a federation from a structuralist point of view. This does not yet exclude the possi- bility of the two Republics referring to the alliance with a federative discourse or to conceive their mutual relations in terms of a culture befitting an alliance. Wendt‘s ”Kantian logic of anarchy‘ with the friend role identity or,94 in general, a tightly integrated society of states in the Bullian sense95 would approach the culture underpinning a federation. A society implies shared values, identification and solidarity with others, and responsibilities to the whole. In a society or in Wendt‘s ”Kantian logic‘ states feel tied to each other and they incor- porate others in their self image.96 Friends are likely to form a collec- tive security system and abstain from violence to settle disputes

93 Belissa, 2008, p. 122; Krisch, 2005, p. 389. 94 Wendt, 1999, p. 18. 95 Bull, 2003, p. 13 and p. 225. 96 Wendt, 1999, pp. 212-213. 42 among each other.97 Did the two sister republics under scrutiny here form (part of) a society and did they conceive each other as friends? With the exception of Britain as adversary, the defensive and offensive alliance would only last for the course of the present war. In public rhetoric references to the ”cause commun‘ were manifold and the alliance was widened to a common fight for liberty against despotism, but the Hague Treaty did not really establish a perpetual collective security system. The alliance‘s duration and geographical scope were just too specific. As to the other aspect, the two sister republics in general were not likely to use force against each other. This was not explicitly excluded, though. Moreover, on one occasion the government in The Hague did consider deploying cavalry units to the Franco-Batavian border to prevent French officials from violating Batavian territorial integrity. On the other hand, throughout the Lequoy negotiations on Flushing, the French commissioner argued that arbitration was superfluous since the two Republics should be able to come to an agreement in concert. This would amount to the proposition that the two sister republics were to settle disputes bilaterally by amicable diplomacy. As to the element of society, the alliance was mainly based in a community of interests. These interests were primarily defined in pragmatic terms, that is, security, commerce, colonial restoration, and other material interests dominated. These interests partly coincided, but although one frequently referred to shared interests it cannot be ignored here that the two governments viewed the war in different ways. Above all, the relation vis-à-vis Prussia and Austria was entirely different. The Batavian Patriots considered Prussia to be the main Continental threat, whereas Paris wished to obtain Prussia as a partner against Austria. The two Republics did share adversity against Britain. Even with regard to Britain, the two Republics were, however, mainly driven by their own security and economic interests. The additional, sporadically dominant discourse of liberty did refer to shared values and couched the alliance in terms of these values: fighting despotism, fighting for the freedom of the sea. The notion of natural allies that was occasionally applied to the French and Batavian Republics likewise points in the direction of societal bonds. According to the discourse surrounding Franco-Batavian relations, good terms and bonds of friendship and fraternity did exist prior to and beyond the scope of the Alliance Treaty. The Treaty confirmed and perpetu- ated these bonds, even though the Treaty itself was continuously re- ferred to as the legal basis for mutual rights, claims, and duties.

97 Wendt, 1999, p. 18 and p. 265. 43 The degree of hierarchy

Whereas a federation in a structural sense amounts to closer and perpetually institutionalised alignment between equals, the second trend leads to a distinction between international orders based on the degree of hierarchy. In a pluralistic-egalitarian order political entities are equal. The counterpart of this equality is subordination. In a hege- monic order this subordination is restricted to the sphere of inter- national politics. Inequality then comes down to legally accepted dominance resulting in task differentiation with regard to the for- mation and enforcement of law and dispute settlement, special rights, exemption from legal obligations, and recognised leadership. By consequence, a hegemonic power is able and entitled to control inter- national politics. In the first place, Gerry Simpson has identified existential equality as one aspect of equality of entities forming an international order together.98 Existential equality amounts to an equal right to exist, that is, an equal right to international legal personality, territorial integri- ty, and internal self-determination. The Revolution‘s theory of the state was based on social contract theory according to which the state (or nation) is the political community of citizens originating from their joint and expressed will to form a state. Once applied in practice, this rational-political notion of the state was reconciled with existing territories, but even then this turned the creation and legitimacy of the state into an entirely internal affair. Since the citizens‘ will sufficed to form a state, recognition by other powers was not constitutive for the existence of the state. Nevertheless, recognition by other powers was not deemed irrelevant. To be sure, the Batavian sense of a need for recognition was inspired by political reasons. Especially in the case of Prussia, recognition added to the Batavian Republic‘s security exactly because Prussia would recognise the new Republic‘s right to exist. Moreover, recognition was constitutive in the sense that it was a condition for maintaining official diplomatic relations. The very moment Berlin recognised the new regime in The Hague relations were restored. Hence, recognition of the Batavian Republic‘s existence was constitutive for the faculty to participate in international politics œ next to maintaining diplomatic relations that would see to concluding treaties and declaring war œ or, in other words, the Batavian Republic‘s international legal personality depended on the recognition by other powers. The requirement of recognition is not ipso facto a sign of inequality. However, recognition by the great powers seems to have been deemed more relevant. The Batavian government requested France to tender its good offices having the Batavian Republic recognised by Prussia. No indications have been

98 Simpson, 2004, p. 48 and p. 53. 44 come across that a similar effort was made with regard to e.g. Bavaria, even though the Elector did not recognise the Batavian Republic until 1801.99 Austria recognised the Batavian Republic in the Treaties of Campoformio and Lunéville. France made sure of that, while the Batavian Republic was merely included in peace treaties with other powers rendering recognition thus at the most implicit. Britain never recognised the Batavian Republic explicitly. The Batavian Republic was accepted as a treaty partner in Amiens and it was referred to as a potential treaty partner in the Paris and Lille negotiations of 1796- 1797. The British declaration of war to the Batavian Republic of September 1795 might have already implied recognition or might indicate that the British, too, acknowledged no discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. Recognition of the Batavian Republic by France was a somewhat different matter. A Batavian offer to recognise the French Republic was declined. Hence, the recognition of the Batavian Republic was unilateral. Moreover, the Comité de Salut public set conditions to recognition, thus even adding to the asymmetry. The Batavians attached great value to recognition by France, but they disagreed with their liberators on the character of that recognition. Despite the initial proclamation of Batavian independence by the ”représentants en mission,‘ the French commissioners held brief for discontinuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. The United Provinces had been abolished by the French conquest. Thereto, the French commissioners argued that the Batavian Republic did not exist yet. It was a new state. According to the version of social contract theory Sieyes adhered to in his 1789 pamphlet, the origin of a state was a deliberate act of constitution. Hence, the Batavians were deemed to be in an intermediate stage in which they did not form an independent political entity with sovereignty over Dutch territory yet. In line with social contract theory, the Batavian Republic would be constituted once a constitution went into force or, at the earliest, a constituent assembly convened. To emphasise this position, the French commissioners refused to use the denominator ”Batavian Republic‘ in the Treaty of The Hague. By consequence, the French restored Dutch territory to the United Provinces and the recognition in the Treaty applied to the United Provinces instead of the Batavian Republic. Nonetheless, there are indications that the French deemed their recognition as conqueror constitutive for the Batavians political existence. After denying the Batavians a political character throughout the negotiations, the French Republic did after all conclude a treaty with them and transferred possession and jurisdiction over the best part of Dutch territory to the Dutch Republic in the end. In this line of reasoning, the Batavian Republic‘s existential equality did, thus, depend on French recognition. To be sure, this was a once-only event.

99 Spaans, 2005, pp. 30-31. 45 Conversely, the Batavian Patriots, on their part, held out for continuity between the United Provinces and the Batavian Republic. Therefore, the Batavian Republic‘s existential equality had to be respected from the start. It is worth elaborating somewhat more on the matter of territorial integrity here. A first thing to note is that the Batavian Republic œ or in general ”a state‘ œ was not identified with its territory. The state œ either a nation or a prince as incorporation of the public body œ was a corporate entity with a dual relationship with territory. A state had possession of its territory and held sovereignty (or jurisdiction) over it. Therefore, the French Republic could restore Dutch territory œ allegedly in the possession of France because of the right of conquest œ to the Dutch Republic. In the Batavian line, this distinction between state and territory did indeed allow for maintaining the position of continuity despite the French occupation. The application of the right of conquest was repudiated. Furthermore, the cession of territory was connected to the notion of popular sovereignty, since the Batavians claimed that constituent parts of any of the sovereign Provinces were only to be ceded with the consent of their populations. In the French line of discontinuity, this restoration coincided with the recognition. References to the necessity of popular consent were put aside or ignored by the French. In their view, the faculty to consent to cession accrued to the people as a constituted community, which did not exist yet. Thereto, cession did not matter to individuals because in either case they would be citizens of a state with a representative government, that is, they would be free and partaking in popular sovereignty whether they lived in the French or in the Batavian Republic. The distinction between state (or nation) and territory allowed for the argument that they were free to move if they did not want to become French. Only the territory would be transferred from the one state to another, not its inhabitants unless œ by consequence of the practical identification of the French nation with the existing territory œ they implicitly adhered to the social contract by not moving. Because of the alleged discontinuity, no independent Batavian nation in possession of Dutch territory existed yet prior to the Treaty of The Hague. In general, territory would be restored to the Dutch Republic by France with some parts exempted instead of the Dutch Republic ceding part of its territory to France. More substantially, the acquisition of part of Dutch territory was justified as a just indemnity for war expenses, and based on the right of conquest and the concept of natural borders next to military necessity. Whereas the French and Batavian negotiators differed on the situation prior to French recognition, they agreed that once the Batavian Republic would be recognised as an independent power, relations between the two Republics would be directed by the rules of conduct of an order of equal and independent powers, and Batavian

46 territorial integrity would have to be respected. The Batavians seem to have considered territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction as the core element of independence. They were continuously alert on violations of their territorial integrity and lodged protests on virtually every occasion whether it concerned privateer activity in their territo- rial waters, actions by French policemen or customs officers along the southern border, or French activity in Flushing. To be sure, the port was an exception to the French respect for the Batavian Republic‘s territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction, but this was concealed by the French stand that Flushing was held in condomi- nium. The French did indeed have the exclusive right to lay garrison there. On matters of customs, local taxes, prohibition of British goods, and jurisdiction over Frenchmen disputes arose. The Batavian govern- ment would adhere to the modern notion of sovereignty as indivisible and exclusive jurisdiction, whereas the French referred to the Flushing settlement in terms of the feudal notion of joint lordship. A final aspect of existential equality is a state‘s internal self- determination. This volume has not addressed the questions whether the French interfered in Batavian domestic affairs, in what way and to what extent they did that. It has to be noted here, that France and Austria recognised the Batavian Republic‘s right of internal self- determination in the Treaty of Lunéville. Thereto, at several instances the argument in this volume has come across indications that domes- tic affairs were deemed relevant to international politics, that is, inter- nal stability was considered a condition for external action and success at the international level. Simpson distinguishes two further aspects of legal equality œ formal and legislative equality œ that are more considered with rela- tions between states and a state‘s actions at the international level.100 Moreover, one must consider the external element of independence œ the freedom of action at the international level œ and the element of reciprocity of rights and obligations, benefits and burdens. With regard to freedom of action at the international level, three aspects of international politics will be addressed here. In the first place, independent states are free to decide for themselves what states to maintain diplomatic relations with. The Batavian Republic continued the Dutch Republic‘s traditional Europe- an network, although relations with various powers were interrupted because of their non-recognition of the new Republic or their enemy status vis-à-vis France. The French Republic does not seem to have interfered in the Batavian government‘s decisions on what powers to maintain diplomatic relations with and the choice of diplomats. There are only two exceptions to this non-interference and these either concern direct diplomatic relations with France œ Blauw‘s recall in

100 Simpson, 2004, p. 33 and pp. 47-53. 47 1796 œ or can be traced back to the Alliance Treaty. The Hague Treaty stipulated that all enemies of either ally were enemies of the other too. This did not call for the Batavian Republic to declare war on all enemies of the French Republic. It did call for the Batavian Republic to break off diplomatic relations as was made explicit in the case of the Portuguese envoy. Moreover, this limitation derived from a treaty clause formally consented to. Besides this clause in the Alliance Treaty, there were no limitations to the Batavian government‘s freedom to decide on its country‘s diplomatic relations. In the second place, independent states are free to declare war or not. The Alliance Treaty did not affect the faculty to wage war with other powers. The offensive alliance called for each ally to consider the other‘s enemies as one‘s own, but this did not imply an obligation to declare war. In the third place, independent states are free to conclude treaties (of peace or otherwise) or not. The Hague Treaty prohibited entering into negotiations or concluding peace with Britain separately. This was a reciprocal prohibition and one freely consented to. Moreover, France was obliged to include the Batavian Republic in peace treaties with other powers. These stipulations were quite common to alliance treaties and did not curtail either ally‘s equality or independence. Beyond the Alliance Treaty there were no formal limitations to the free exercise of the ius pactandi. To be sure, the Batavian Republic hardly concluded any treaties or conventions with another power than France. The Batavian Republic did adhere to the Franco-Spanish Alliance Treaty and subsequently concluded a military convention with Spain. The adherence to the Treaty of San Ildefonso (19 August 1796) was on French invitation. The Treaty of Amiens (27 March 1802) was not a bilateral treaty with a third power without French involvement either. Nevertheless, no formal limitations of the right to conclude treaties can be derived from this factual lack of treaties or conventions with other powers. The period under scrutiny was rather short and characterised by continuous war. The number of treaties powers entered into was not that high yet in the eighteenth century for rendering the lack of any treaties throughout this period exceptional. As said before, France opposed alliance treaties between the sister republics, but the Batavian government had no intention concluding any œ it was even surprised when the Premier Consul suddenly did conclude the 1803 Convention on behalf of the Italian Republic too. Hence, a dispute over the right to conclude these treaties did not arise. Due to the war situation, it was not the time to conclude any treaties of commerce with third powers. The Batavian government did contemplate extending the Batavian border to the east, which would have called for a treaty with Prussia or the Empire at large. This scheme was obstructed in Rastatt, though. France did negotiate with Prussia on cession of the enclaves in to the Batavian Repu- blic on the latter‘s behalf. Partly this was due to the fact that Berlin did

48 not recognise the Batavian Republic yet. On the other hand, the cession would be part of a general territorial settlement in the Empire. France and Austria wished to exclude as many powers as possible from negotiations on this settlement. Hence, the Batavian Republic was kept outside of these negotiations. In general, France‘s policy of separate peace treaties prevented Batavian involvement in any peace treaties save the Treaty of Amiens, even though the Batavian government expressed the desire to participate in the build-up to the Rastatt and Lunéville congresses. Thus, the Batavian Republic was deprived of the possibility to further its interests. In the case of negotiations with Austria or the Empire, The Hague did accept this exclusion because of the Batavian Republic‘s auxiliary status. To return to Simpson‘s classification, formal equality sees to the equal application of law and equal means to enforce one‘s legal rights and claims. In a situation of two states with a considerable power difference between them, the most powerful of the two is more likely to back out of its obligations than the other because the means and costs of coercion are unequally divided. Given the state of the law of nations at the time, the clearest legal obligations were the ones in purview of the Hague Treaty. The Batavian Republic did indeed honour its obligations to the best of its capability, albeit not always wholeheartedly. This was the case with the supply of the French auxiliary corps, with not maintaining diplomatic relations with powers France was at war with, and it was the case with deploying a Batavian contingent to fight alongside French forces in Germany. The Batavian Republic did not manage to pay the indemnity or to put the squadron of men-of-war to sea in time. This was not a matter of withdrawal from legal obligations, however, but of factual incapacity to perform. The Batavian Republic did wish to back out of the offensive alliance soon, but it did not do so unilaterally. The clausula rebus sic stantibus was not invoked. Instead, the French government was to be persuaded to alter the Treaty in concert. This was refused time and again. Once the Alliance Treaty had been concluded, Paris made use of the necessity of mutual consent to prevent Batavian neutrality. The big question is, then, whether the French Republic did show the same respect for its treaty obligations. Despite the relative instability of Batavian politics, hardly any situation occurred in which the constitutional guarantee could have been invoked. Nevertheless, France refused to conclude any agreement with Britain on peace or with Prussia on recognition of the Batavian Republic and cession of the enclaves that left open the possibility of an Orangist restoration. Pursuant to the Hague Treaty the Batavian Republic, at the time of the general peace, had a right to territorial compensation for territories that had become French in 1795. The ”at the general peace‘ turned out to be the tricky part. For as long as the war with Britain continued, France was able to ignore Batavian urging for

49 aggrandisement without actually ignoring this clause. After Amiens, France failed to live up to this obligation, however, since only the Prussian dominions enclaved in the Batavian Republic were procured as part of the territorial settlement of the Empire. By no means did these enclaves equal in surface Dutch Flanders, Venlo, and Maastricht with its surroundings. The guarantee of Batavian colonies is a hard one to crack. Ceylon was lost to the Batavians in Amiens. To be sure, the Batavian Republic consented to this loss by signing and ratifying the Treaty of Amiens, but France had already committed itself to the cession of Ceylon to Britain in the London Preliminaries (1 October 1801). In Lille, the French had honoured the colonial guarantee in the end. Britain‘s refusal to restore all occupied Dutch colonies was used as the pretext to break off negotiations. In part, however, this was merely a pretext to Directors who did not wish to conclude peace altogether. Thereto, the French government had geopolitical reasons to oppose Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope becoming British. Most remarkably, though, is that the French government had been inclined to yield to British claims in the course of negotiations. Had the fructidor coup d‘état been staged by another faction, France would probably have conclu- ded peace with Britain without honouring the colonial guarantee. Pursuant to the Alliance Treaty no separate peace with Britain was concluded. France was close to do so in Lille, though. Furthermore, negotiations with Britain were commenced in 1800-1801 without the knowledge of the Batavian government. In sum, France was on the verge of flagrantly infringing on Article 5 of the Hague Treaty. Admittedly, this infringement was almost as common to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century state practice as the appearance of this clause in alliance treaties. France did back out of the arbitration clause in the Flushing regulations. Refusing to submit the disputes over Flushing to arbiters once the Batavians invoked the clause was a violation of the regulations. Lequoy argued that arbitration did not befit two states that related to each other in a way that corresponded to what Wendt would later describe as the friend role identity.101 However, this does not alter the fact that France did withdraw to politics; even though it was politics in the alleged form of amicable diplomacy. France clearly violated the obligation to pull back French forces from the Batavian Republic once the war had ended. Initially this violation was covered under stalling tactics and practical pretexts. In the end, pulling back French troops was openly refused and Batavian independence was even ignored as the French unilaterally took various military measures in the spring of 1803. In general, France did not straightforwardly back out of its legal obligations. To be sure, the French government exploited every room

101 Wendt, 1999, p. 258 and pp. 298-300. 50 the Alliance Treaty or the law of nations in general provided and any loophole they left. The bow of the law was bent to the very limits of what it could bear, but it was hardly ever broken. Because of the lack of legal mechanisms to enforce one‘s rights and legal claims save war, the difference in power did influence the factual capacity to enforce legal rights and claims on the Batavian side. Despite continuous Batavian objections, the French got their way. Batavian objections do, however, indicate that these French claims and actions were deemed violations of the law of nations in the Batavian view. The Treaty of The Hague was often referred to as the legal basis of mutual relations. The French and Batavian governments frequently disagreed on what the Treaty or the law exactly called for. Disputes arose over the interpretation of the command clause, over the Flushing settlement, over deploying Batavian troops abroad, and over the laws regulating privateering. It has to be noted here that most of the times disputes were about the interpretation of treaty provisions. Hence, an international legal discourse was not avoided in these disputes. There were, however, some exceptions in which France did withdraw to politics or domestic law. The refusal to submit disputes over Flushing to arbiters has already been mentioned as an example of withdrawal to politics. Flushing was the side of examples of withdrawal to domestic law, too. The claim that Flushing was a Franco-Batavian condominium partly excluded this aspect of Franco- Batavian relations from the international sphere. It provided the French with a legal argument to enforce measures of economic war- fare against Britain, to establish a customs office and pilot service, and to duck out of local taxes. Likewise, misconduct by Frenchmen in Flushing or soldiers and officers of the French corps in pay of the Batavian Republic as well as privateer activity were withdrawn from the international sphere by claiming jurisdiction for French courts and the applicability of French laws. On a more general level, the notion of a legal order between and/or above states was still influential. Especially the Batavians fre- quently referred to ”the law of nations‘ or to basic principles like good faith and the sanctity of treaties. Clearly, they adhered to the idea that interstate relations were governed by law. Negotiations on the territorial settlement in the Alliance Treaty, for instance, abounded with legal arguments. On no occasion did the French deny the validity of the rules of law or principles that were referred to. The proposition that the Revolution and Revolutionary Wars had caused a stage of lawlessness102 cannot be maintained as far as diplomatic practice is concerned. Treaties and conventions as well as the law of nations in general were recognised as legally binding. However, a distinction has to be made between French officials in the field who basically did as they wished and the French government. In reaction to Batavian

102 E.g. Belissa, 2006, p. 51. 51 objections, the latter did apologise and promise to mend its way most of the times; publicly manifesting respect for the law of nations and treaty obligations. Although French security and other interests were paramount, Paris was aloof to openly abandon legal discourse even if short-term French interests would be served by infringing on the law of nations or treaty obligations. In sum, there was no simple dialectic between power and law as far as the applicability of the law of nations or the respect for treaty bonds were concerned. Legislative equality, that is equal participation in the formation of law, hardly deviated from the general image sketched thus far. Tailored to law formation by means of treaties, this kind of equality has three aspects: 1) the right to participate in the formation of law by which one is going to be bound or by which one‘s interests are affected, 2) equality in the procedures of negotiations, 3) formal consent to legal bonds as opposed to imposition of law by others e.g. in the form of a command. A distinction has to be made here between treaties and conventions between the two Republics and peace treaties with third powers. In mutual relations between the French and Batavian Republics the Treaty of The Hague stands out. Despite the fact that French troops had occupied the Dutch Republic‘s territory, the Hague Treaty was a negotiated one. Negotiations were conducted in due form. Both sides were able to submit drafts and these were substantively discussed in conferences. To be sure, the Batavians were placed in a somewhat disadvantageous position due to the French refusal to recognise the Batavian envoys in their formal capacity. Furthermore, the French unilaterally changed the rules of the game in the course of the process by transferring negotiations to The Hague. Moreover, the French dominated the agenda by keeping to the contemplated exchange between recognition of the Batavian Republic on the one hand and indemnity and a border settlement on the other. Conversely, the Batavian envoys managed to cut down on French demands and time and again refused agreeing to provisions they deemed contrary to their country‘s independence and dignity. Occasionally, both parties put pressure on negotiations. In the end, the loss of territory, the indemnity, and legal obligations under the alliance were formally consented to in accordance with constitutional procedures of ratification. Subsequent conventions and regulations, too, were negotiated and formally consented to. The main exception was the 1803 Convention. The Batavian commissioners were not really given a chance to negotiate. At the very end, the Batavian Republic was bullied into signing a convention, although formally the principle of consent was upheld. The Alliance Treaty with Spain might count as an exception as well. The Batavian Republic was invited to accede to this Treaty. There was nothing odd with this and formally the Batavian Republic was entitled to refuse doing so, but basically the Batavian Republic was withheld any influence on the Treaty‘s substance.

52 Legislative equality is a whole lot more difficult to maintain with regard to peace treaties with third powers. In general, the Batavian Republic was kept out of negotiations due to France‘s policy of separate peace treaties. The French government did indeed succeed in preventing a general congress, which ipso facto can be regarded as a successful attempt to reshape treaty practice. Sporadically, French officials made statements that indicate views on differentiation between great powers and secondary powers with regard to treaty formation by consequence of which secondary rank powers should be content with a subsidiary role in the peace process. This was not, however, the official position of the French government, which was more subtle. The Batavian government had not requested participation in the Campoformio negotiations since it awaited a general congress to step in. In Rastatt, the Batavian Republic was denied the right to participate in order to further its interests and advocate its territorial schemes directly. The Hague reconciled with French mediation in negotiations with the Empire. In Lunéville, the Batavian Republic was not allowed to further its interests in the peace settlement with the Empire either, although a Batavian envoy had been appointed. Hence, the Batavian Republic was excluded from the formal forum where it might have furthered its interests and plans directly. The Batavian government was adamant not to be excluded from negotiations with Britain. The main difference between negotiations with Austria and with Britain was that the Batavian Republic was a belligerent in its own right in the war against Britain, while it operated as an auxiliary in the war against Austria. This difference in role is the primary explanation of a more active involvement on the Batavian part in negotiations with Britain; next to the British desired cession of Dutch colonies that is. The Batavian Republic‘s right to participate was recognised in general, but in Lille the French did propose and even- tually insist on representing their allies. This attempt of reshaping treaty practice to accommodate French preponderance was not accep- ted, though. The Hague kept insisting on direct participation as its lawful right as an independent power and as a matter of the sanctity of treaties. In Amiens, the Batavian Republic was allowed to have a Batavian envoy partake in the peace congress. That time, the policy of separate peace treaties no longer obstructed participation since peace with Austria had already been concluded. In peace treaties with various powers of the second or third rank, the Batavian Republic was almost always included pursuant to Article 6 of the Hague Treaty. Finally, it has to be noted that none of the Treaties in which the Batavian Republic was merely included contained any legal obligations for the Batavian Republic. Since the Batavian Republic was only allowed to partake in the Amiens negotiations, the question whether equality in negotiation procedures was upheld arises with regard to Amiens alone. The

53 Batavian envoy clearly played the second fiddle. France and Britain had set the agenda for negotiations in London and this agenda was not to be altered. Schimmelpenninck did not attend all conferences. If matters relevant to the Batavian Republic were discussed, he was present and he did manage to mitigate the settlement with regard to the Cape of Good Hope. The Batavian government did formally consent to the Treaty. In the text of the Treaty no traces of inequality are to be found. A final aspect of equality is the reciprocity of rights and obliga- tions, benefits and burdens. Formally, the offensive and defensive alliance was reciprocal. From a military point of view France benefited more from the offensive alliance since France was more likely to take the offensive. On the other hand, the defensive alliance was essential to the Batavian Patriots, whereas Batavian assistance was merely con- venient to the French. The obligation to expel political refugees and the colonial guarantee were reciprocal, too. French ”émigrés‘ were more likely still to be on Batavian soil than Orangists having fled to France, but this obligation was not really a burden to either of the two allies. The Batavian Republic was to benefit from the colonial guarantee more, because France would be in a better position to negotiate with Britain œ the single power to threaten French or Dutch colonies. Free navigation of the Rhine, Meuse, and Scheldt was reciprocal, too, but France profited more from this provision because of Antwerp. With regard to military cooperation, rights and obliga- tions were not reciprocal. On the one hand, France was to provide an auxiliary force to defend the Batavian Republic paid by the defended power. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic was to provide a fixed contribution in terms of men-of-war and troops to fight abroad once requested and had to pay for them. The financial burden was entirely on the Batavian Republic‘s shoulder. In theory, the benefit from a military point of view was larger to the Batavian Republic because it would not have been able to defend itself against a great power attack on its own. The main burdens the Hague Treaty contained rested on the Batavian Republic: the indemnity and the loss of territory. In exchange, the Batavians had obtained a unilateral constitutional guarantee, a promise of territorial compensation, the return of armouries, navy and army store houses, and the cession of the House of Orange‘s possessions. As a concession for Dutch Brabant not becoming French, France attained the right to occupy fortifications in times of war. Furthermore, the Alliance Treaty in general counted as life insurance policy to the Batavian Patriot regime. The more secure the Patriot regime in The Hague felt the less paramount this general benefit was sensed and the heavier the financial and military burdens became. It was no coincidence that pleas for neutrality tailed off after the 1799 Anglo-Russian invasion, because that event made Batavian Patriots appreciate the alliance again. Moreover, the Batavian envoys had cut back on the indemnity

54 and the loss of territory until a price for liberty that was just acceptable. France had precedence with regard to command of troops in case of joint action and with regard to coordinating operations. The prohibition of separate negotiations or a separate peace with Britain was reciprocal. The obligation to include the Batavian Republic in peace treaties with other powers was unilateral. Apparently the Batavian Republic was already expected to be at war with Britain only. The non-reciprocity with regard to command, coordinating operations and peace can be explained based on the present war situation. The present war was essentially one waged by France, whereas the Batavian Republic had a subordinate and more specific role to play. In the war on the Continent, the Batavian Republic was an auxiliary. The Batavian Republic was mainly concerned with its own security rather than winning the war. This difference in roles and aims partly explains differentiation and non-reciprocity next to or even instead of inequality in power. In sum, although rights and obligations did differ and the allocation of burdens and benefits was slightly asymmetric, it cannot be concluded that the Treaty of The Hague was essentially lop- sided. As a general typification the French and Batavian Republics did not form part of an international order nor envisioned one structural- ly based on functional differentiation, hierarchy, French leadership and French control of international politics. State practice did not deviate far from the dominant Vattelian worldview. The Alliance Treaty to a large extent contained legal forms, rights and obligations in conformity with a system of states based on independence and equality. The long-term perspective in all public statements clearly was independence and sovereignty. The legal forms of an international order based on state sovereignty and independence were wielded as well as avowed and respected en public. The Patriot regime in The Hague attached great value to its country‘s independence. This should not come as a surprise. A time in which liberty and equality were the catchwords of the day did not allow for open foreign intervention despite Enlightenment cosmopolitanism and clear fac- tual preponderance. and popular sovereignty stressed the freedom and independence of the nation. In fact, national ”regene- ration‘ œ that is recovery of the country‘s economy and political standing by republican virtues, political and social reforms from what Patriots experienced as decline œ was at the core of the Patriot programme. This sense was particularly influential in the French and Batavian Republics. Both countries endeavoured to overcome a period of weakness. Thereto, Batavian Patriots did not need to make a great effort convincing the French to intervene on their behalf in 1794-1795 by emphasising international revolution and fraternity. The ”libera- tion‘ of the Dutch Republic was a by-product of military events con- fronting French isolationists with an accomplished fact. Hence, co- existence and cooperation of independent and free nations was the

55 logical consequence of Revolutionary Patriotism for international relations. The tragedy of Patriotism as an Atlantic movement in the sense Robert Palmer has described the phenomenon103 was not that French Revolutionaries did not share their foreign brothers‘ urge for independence and national regeneration. The tragedy was that the definition of French regeneration called for safeguarding France‘s security and restoring France‘s role as great power by obtaining natural borders and vesting French hegemony in western Europe. This definition collided with France‘s neighbours‘ pursuit of regene- ration. The clash was particularly strong in the case of the Batavian Republic, because the Batavian Patriot Movement built on a domestic republican tradition and the memory of the 1780s Patriot Revolt.104 There was a strong conceptual drive preventing the French government from legalising French preponderance. Even if the members of the French government had not internalised respect for other countries‘ independence and equality, at least the Directoire still had to reckon with a considerable minority in the legislative councils and the electorate that took Vattelian values dead serious. Next to domestic political considerations France was held back from making its dominance explicit in legal terms by considerations of European politics. In the first place, France was simply not strong enough to dominate the German great powers beyond the short-term aftermath of military victory and certainly not if Prussia and Austria would join forces. Hence, Prussia was to be kept neutral or was even to be persuaded to align with France. Thereto, Paris needed Berlin‘s coope- ration to counter Austria during negotiations on a territorial settle- ment for the Empire that included the Rhine as France‘s border. For both reasons, the French government was determined not to offend Prussia and the King of Prussia œ while reluctantly abandoning his brother-in-law œ was not expected being keen on French control of the entire Low Countries because of geopolitical and commercial reasons. The role attributed to Prussia in French foreign policy was a major determinant of how France treated the Batavian Republic in practice.105 In addition, Britain was anticipated not to be willing to return Dutch colonies with great geopolitical value to the Batavian Republic if the latter‘s independence would be questionable. Finally, the extent to which the French government showed respect for or at least paid lip service to Batavian independence was determined by the necessity of active Batavian cooperation in implementing plans to invade the British Isles. These plans occasionally came to the fore for a short period. Hence, the influence of this drive varied. The deviations from or exceptions to the general image of a pluralistic-egalitarian order are threefold. The first category consists

103 Palmer, 1959, p. 4. 104 Schama, 1989, p. 40. 105 Van Hamel, 1918, pp. 339-340. 56 of deviations and exceptions that were based on the idea of a transi- tory stage. Unilateral actions or hierarchical notions were confined to the period of military occupation between the French invasion and the Treaty of The Hague throughout which, the French claimed, the Batavians did not form an independent state yet. This allowed for the French to argue that their territorial claims were not adverse to the Batavians‘ (popular) sovereignty. On the few occasions Frenchmen justified unilateral action or differentiation in terms of French tute- lage they referred to a transitory situation, too. After reforms had been implemented and after the French and Batavian Revolutions had been secured by winning the war, the Batavian Republic would be and be treated like an independent, free and equal republic. To be sure, once this moment seemed to have arrived in 1802-1803, the French government did find it hard to renounce its control. A second category of deviations and exceptions can be traced back to military leadership within the present war situation. Deprived of any great power allies, republican France endeavoured to compensate its isolated position by allying with a great number of second rank powers. By consequence, an entirely different kind of alliance structure evolved characterised by a network of bilateral relations and with clear military and political leadership concentrated in Paris. The Revolutionary alliance clearly had a centralised character. A great deal of French dominance came down to alliance management in a war situation. Even this military leadership was hardly formalised. The Alliance Treaty and subsequent conventions merely provided for French command in case of joint actions and liaison officers to be send to Paris. The French Republic was the primary and fully committed belligerent, whereas the Batavian Republic mainly acted as auxiliary. De facto, Paris did determine the major plans of campaign, but the Batavian Republic could decide on its own to deploy troops or men-of-war since its forces were never fully and permanently integrated in what might have been called ”allied forces.‘ This role differentiation also explains why the Batavian contribution to the war effort was fixed in the Alliance Treaty unlike the French one. The Batavian government also tried to curtail French military leadership as much as possible. The French general commanding the French corps was charged with supreme command of all forces on Batavian soil on several occasions, but it was stressed every time that this was a temporal measure. Thereto, The Hague did maintain its position that the French commander in chief was subordinated to Batavian civil authorities and needed permission, for instance, to move troops. Simultaneously, the short-term military and financial situation impelled the French government to ”instrumentalise‘ the Batavian Republic. The basis for this instrumentalisation was laid in the Hague Treaty and subsequent conventions, that is, in consensual agreements that France was able to fully exploit. This caused non-reciprocity and

57 inequality more than any vision of a hierarchical order. Infringements on Batavian independence in the sphere of measures against British goods resulted from the present war situation, too. In general, the notion that French security was in the common interest œ what has been called the ”lifeguard principle‘ in Chapter II.4 œ served as justification for France‘s claim to privileges and the right to be spared nagging and fussing from its allies. It can be questioned whether in a future conflict with Britain in which the Batavian Republic would be the primary belligerent roles and by consequence rights and obliga- tions would have been reversed. One can only speculate on an answer to this question. It is hard to image that France would have settled for the role of auxiliary and would have accepted Batavian leadership of the alliance in such a case. Basically, however, the entire period of the Batavian Republic‘s and the Revolutionary alliance‘s existence was dominated by a single war situation from which one cannot abstract. In any case, the Hague Treaty did not provide for military cooperation in future conflicts but for the general extension of the defensive and offensive alliance to all future wars against Britain. Finally, it has to be noted that deviations and exceptions from a pluralistic-egalitarian order did cause real friction once the war had ended. From 27 March 1802 onwards, the war did no longer serve as a justification for deviations and exceptions, which compelled the French government to openly ignore and disrespect Batavian independence and treaty provisions in order to keep and œ in the spring of 1803 œ strengthen military control of the Batavian Republic. A final category of deviations and exceptions from a pluralistic- egalitarian order concerned great power peace negotiations. France‘s policy of separate peaces and the great powers inclination to reach agreements amongst one another at the expense of minor powers in general, excluded the Batavian Republic from congresses or attributed it a secondary role. On the other hand, the Batavian Republic‘s backward position in negotiations with Austria and the Empire, too, can be explained from the role difference between France as bellige- rent and the Batavian Republic as auxiliary. France‘s attempt to repre- sent the Batavian Republic in negotiations with Britain eventually failed, though. Thereto, in the end, Batavian consent to the cession of Ceylon was still considered necessary. Because of these deviations and exceptions Franco-Batavian relations did not entirely conform to the ideal type of a pluralistic- egalitarian order. Their mutual relations are to be situated about on the spot where the X is in the triangle below. The long-term pulled in the direction of the top corner, public discourse in the direction of the right bottom corner, and short-term French dominance towards the left bottom corner. The dominant line and the majority vision of the future was based on a pluralistic-egalitarian order of co-existing, equal, free and independent states with a legal and moral dimension

58 to interstate relations, but also with some (temporal) aspects of hegemony and traces of a culture of federation.

Pluralistic- Egalitarian

X

Hegemony Federation

Beyond state-centrism

If deviations from equality and independence were exceptional, the question remains how the French Republic exercised its dominance within a framework of a pluralistic-egalitarian order. At the core of the answer to this question is a particular kind of withdrawal to politics state-centric international relations theory is blind to. The French government made use of factionalism, that is, internal political division and cross border ideological and political alignments. A great power with hegemonic or imperial ambitions can make use of this factionalism to bring states into its sphere of influence without violating the legal forms and concepts of an egalitarian, pluralistic states system. Particularly in times of revolution and fundamental political divisions within states, cross border alignments between factions tend to override state‘s interests and national sentiments.106 As Robert Palmer has shown the ”democratic revolution‘ was an Atlantic phenomenon with Patriot movements all over Europe.107 Patriotism was concentrated in what Michael Broers calls the ”Lotharingian isthmus‘ œ the urbanised regions of western Europe from the Low Countries to Lombardy œ and he rightly claims that shared ideology and political interdependence made cross border bonds between these movements stronger than bonds with some

106 Wight, 1977, p. 36; Bull, 2002, pp. 238-239. 107 Palmer, 1959, p. 4. 59 fellow citizens within each country.108 The buffer of sister republics more or less coincided with this ”isthmus.‘ The French made use of this to establish control without fundamentally questioning sovereign equality and independence. In fact, local Patriots even provoked French intervention. Admittedly, Dutch, German, Swiss, and Italian Patriots were not simply adhering to French ideas; nor were they going to follow the French lead like meek lambs. Each Patriot movement had its own local programme and the Patriot movements varied according to the local political situation and the local Patriots‘ social background, but the shared ideology was employed to gain cooperation from local Patriots. Thus, French dominance was mainly exercised through contacts between French diplomatic representatives and military commanders with governing Patriots behind the screens. The French government exploited what Tim Blanning has referred to as ”the joy of the satellite state.‘ Cooperation of one domestic faction in control or taking control of government sufficed.109 Of course this strategy was not without disadvantages. French dominance depended on the stability of local Patriot regimes, power take-overs in Paris had to affect the sister republics‘ governments and Paris had to be sure that those governments were manned by depen- dable figures; men to be trusted, strong enough to control their own countries while not strong enough to act independently from Paris. By consequence, the French got involved in or even initiated a series of coups d‘états in every sister republic. These coups were as much the core as a consequence of the strategy of controlling the sister republics from behind the scenes. Moreover, because of this strategy, France had an interest in the domestic constitutional order of the sister republics. Their constitutions not only had to confirm the ideological bonds between the Republics, they had to assure a sufficiently rational and strong administration as well, because this was what the strength of the buffer and the capacity to draw on the sister republics‘ resour- ces depended on. Hence, one of the main features of interstate relations in western Europe in the years after 1795 is exactly a clear intermingling of international and domestic politics. The strategy, while pursued in order to pay lip service to independence, called in fact for ongoing intervention. French influence had to be covert in order not to go against the notion of popular sovereignty. Furthermore, Paris had to act very carefully not to compromise the sister republics‘ independence too openly. To form a stable buffer, Prussia and Austria had to accept the existence of the sister republics and until 1805-1806 France was not yet sufficiently strong to force their hand. In other words, one of the reasons that prevented France from formalising its hegemony œ

108 Broers, 2001, p. 137, p. 139, and p. 141. 109 Blanning, 1996, p. 171. 60 reckoning with the other Continental great powers œ made that the French government still had to tread on eggs vis-à-vis the sister republics in exercising informal dominance, too. Nonetheless, as long as the government in Paris was able to control the sister republics by means of their own constitutional system through local Francophile factions, formal independence could still be respected and formal relations between France and its sister republics could be restricted to an alliance structure. This is, however, not just a plea for a reductionist approach œ turning to domestic politics and replacing states by political factions œ instead of a state- centred, structuralist one. The interstate dimension is not to be sneezed at entirely. In the first place, the Batavian Republic operated diplomatic relations of its own. It continued a Europe-wide network of resident envoys œ with the temporal exclusion of the powers it or the French Republic was at war with. In the second place, the Batavian governments were very sensitive to maintain their countries territorial integrity and the exclusiveness of their jurisdiction; objecting to French violations of their territories tenaciously and opposing the ces- sion of territory to France vehemently. In the third place, the Batavian governments clearly repudiated the French ”offer‘ to negotiate on their behalf with Britain. They wanted to be involved in peace negotiations directly to take care of their countries‘ interests. In the fourth place, and more in general, national interests and national dignity of the Batavian Republic did frequently appear in diplomatic correspon- dence and minutes of negotiations from the period. As national regeneration was the main promise of the Patriots to their own populations, references to one‘s own national interests were crucial to gaining and maintaining the support for the Patriot regime at home. Overindulgence towards France might compromise the domestic power base. Moreover, the financial burdens of the alliance with France threatened to destroy state finances and the national economy, and to undermine the success of domestic reform plans. Conversely, local Patriots were well aware that the survival of their regimes œ threatened both by domestic and foreign enemies œ to a large extent depended on French support. The balance between national interest and the French alignment was determined then by the international and domestic political and military situation. While local Patriots became more conciliatory under military threat or domestic political turmoil, they tried to attain a more independent position or even to get out of the alliance in times of military success and relative calm. The more political stability, the more the state or national interest dimension dominated. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century international legal doctrine was full of ”self-preservation,‘110 but in the case of the Batavian Republic the ”self‘ to be preserved changed. At first, Batavian Patriots

110 See e.g. Tuck, 2001, p. 9. 61 were concerned with the preservation of their rule and were willing to pay the price for French support. Once their regime was stabilised domestically, more or less accepted internationally, and they acknow- ledged French egocentrism, the Batavian Patriots became more con- cerned with preserving the Batavian Republic as an at least nominally independent state or, in the words of the Uitvoerend Bewind ”our Republic‘s political existence.‘111 Henceforth, only a way of thought in terms of a matrix both taking interstate relations and cross border factionalism and domestic poli- tics into regard may provide us with full comprehension of great power-minor power relations in western Europe throughout the Revolutionary era. Franco-Batavian relations were determined by the dialectic between regeneration and hegemony.

111 ”het staatkundig bestaan [...] dezer republiek‘; 3 September 1801, Uitvoerend Bewind to Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam; NA 2.01.01.01 no. 533. Likewise, 13 October 1798, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes; NA 1.02.14 no. 639; 10 MAy 1803, Schimmelpenninck to Van der Goes (private letter); NA 2.21.073 no. 18. 62 SAMENVATTING

In weinig rechtsgebieden treedt de inherente en ambigue dialectiek tussen macht en recht zo scherp op de voorgrond als in het volkenrecht. Op nationaal niveau zijn recht en macht samengevloeid in gezag: gelegitimeerde, geïnstitutionaliseerde en gekanaliseerde macht die is ingebed in een constitutioneel bestel. Op internationaal niveau ontbreekt die inbedding grotendeels. De strijd om de macht œ de kern van politiek œ krijgt daar op een andere wijze en binnen andere instituties vorm. Dat heeft consequenties voor het recht dat interstatelijke betrekkingen beoogt te ordenen en normeren en dat maakt dat de verhouding tussen macht en recht op boven- of tussenstatelijk niveau anders en vooral diffuser is. De onderliggende studie richt zich op de interactie tussen recht en macht in tussenstatelijke betrekkingen: welk effect heeft macht op de interstatelijke rechtsorde? Werkt macht door in recht, juridische status en juridische procedures? Erkent het recht macht en machtsverschillen? Houdt het recht macht in bedwang of is het recht een instrument in de handen van de machtigen? Daarbij staat in tegenstelling tot de meeste boeken over internationale betrekkingen niet de verhouding tussen grootmachten centraal, maar de verhouding tussen grootmachten en zwakkere mogendheden. Het is precies in die verhouding dat machtsverschillen zichtbaar worden en juridische relaties kunnen beïnvloeden. Bovenstaande vragen staan centraal in een gevalsstudie naar de betrekkingen tussen de Franse Republiek en de Bataafse Republiek tijdens de Revolutionaire oorlogen (1792-1802); een van die situaties in de geschiedenis van Europa waarin een mogendheid onder de politieke en militaire controle van een machtige buurstaat werd gebracht. De Franse politieke en militaire overmacht mag gevoeglijk als een gegeven beschouwd worden. Vervolgens is het de vraag of het Franse overwicht vertaald werd in ongelijke juridische status? Werd de Franse hegemonie juridisch erkend en vertaald in een juridische hiërarchie? Of werd in de juridische sfeer het beeld van de gelijkheid van staten overeind gehouden en gerespecteerd? Tegen elke verwachting in leidde de Franse Revolutie, het gevolg van een politieke en financiële crisis, ertoe dat Frankrijk een moment van militaire en diplomatieke zwakte juist te boven kwam. In de loop van Lodewijk XVI‘s bewind hadden de Britse dominantie ter zee en de opkomst van Rusland een gevoel van onveiligheid bij de Fransen veroorzaakt. Het nieuwe elan van de Revolutie nam dit gevoel niet weg. Het onzekerheidsgevoel werd zelfs versterkt door de samenzweringstheorieën en het gevoel aangevallen te worden van de eerste, nogal desastreuze fasen van de Revolutionaire oorlogen. De basis van het nieuwe regime in Parijs was wankel; het ”vaderland‘ was in gevaar. De Franse regering werd steeds meer gedreven door de

63 behoefte om de verworvenheden van de Revolutie veilig te stellen tegen binnenlandse en buitenlandse dreigingen. Daarbij kwam nog dat de uitzichtloze toestand van de staatsfinanciën aanhield. Tegelijkertijd botste het cultureel superioriteitsgevoel van de Fransen met het besef dat het land de boot van economische groei, politieke hervorming en territoriale expansie in de afgelopen decennia gemist had. Sinds de Frans-Oostenrijkse alliantie van 1756 was het in West- Europa enige decennia rustig geweest. Vanwege de Revolutie barstte de rivaliteit tussen de grootmachten in West-Europa weer in volle hevigheid los tegen de achtergrond van een ideologisch conflict. Frankrijks traditionele veiligheidsbeleid was gebaseerd op een bondgenootschap met mogendheden in Oost-Europa en Duitse vorsten. Deze ”barrière de l‘est‘ was evenwel ondermijnd door de opkomst van Rusland, de relatieve verzwakking van Zweden en het Ottomaanse Rijk en door de opdeling van Polen. Met de (tijdelijke) vereniging van Pruisen en Oostenrijk aan het begin van de Revolutionaire oorlogen was het oude beleid helemaal obsoleet geworden. In het westen had de koninklijke regering al een beleid ingezet om tegenwicht te bieden aan de opkomst van het Britse Rijk, onder andere door de pro-Franse Patriotten in de Republiek te steunen in hun strijd tegen de pro-Britse stadhouder. De revolutionairen continueerden het anti-Britse beleid van de prerevolutionaire regering, maar verwierp tegelijk het bondgenootschap met Oostenrijk en de neiging om Franse ambities te matigen. Om overeind te blijven in een Europa waarin de flankmogendheden steeds sterker werden moest de kwetsbaarheid van Frankrijk door annexaties verminderd worden of moest de Franse hegemonie over West-Europa gevestigd worden. Militaire overwinningen brachten de laatste optie binnen bereik. Wat bleek te kunnen, bleek ook te moeten. In de eerste jaren van de revolutionaire periode was de invloed van de kosmopolitische geest van de Verlichting nog sterk aanwezig in het publieke discours in Frankrijk. Geïnspireerd door projecten voor een ”eeuwige vrede‘ door middel van een federale orde in Europa gecombineerd met antimonarchale sentimenten, formuleerden de Girondijnen een beleid om te komen tot een buffer van bevriende republieken langs de Rijn en de Alpen. Met Franse militaire steun en onder tijdelijke Franse voogdij zouden deze ”zusterrepublieken‘ bevrijd en geregenereerd of geschapen moeten worden, waarna ze met de Franse Republiek verbonden zouden zijn door gedeelde sociale en politieke instituties. De staten van West-Europa zouden zo in de Franse invloedssfeer gebracht worden door het verspreiden van het revolutionaire programma. Verwezenlijking van dit beleid vroeg om militaire successen en die bleven uit. Tijdens de Terreur kwamen referenties aan nationale sentimenten en belangen op als gevolg van angst voor buitenlandse, contrarevolutionaire krachten en de

64 noodzaak om vrijwilligers en dienstplichtigen te enthousiasmeren. Om met Marc Belissa te spreken, de revolutionaire attitude veranderde van ”fraternité universel‘ in ”intérêt national.‘112 De notie van zusterrepublieken keerde pas terug na de val van Robespierre tijdens de staatsgreep van thermidor en een kerend tij van militair succes. Dit keer stond ook hier het Franse belang echter voorop. Het buitenlandse beleid van de thermidorianen en het in 1795 aantredend Directoire was gericht op het scheppen van voorwaarden voor de Franse veiligheid. Over wanneer Frankrijk veilig zou zijn verschilden de meningen. De betrekkingen tussen Frankrijk en haar ”zusjes‘ is een van de aspecten van de revolutionaire internationale politiek waarbij revolutionaire ideeën over de Europese orde en een veranderend machtsevenwicht bijeenkwamen. De Bataafse Republiek was de eerste buurstaat die als zusterrepubliek onderdeel van de Franse invloedssfeer uit ging maken en zou dat tot haar opheffing in 1806 blijven. De Bataafse Republiek moest onder Franse invloed blijven en haar financiële en natuurlijke hulpbronnen inzetten voor de Franse oorlogsvoering. Aangezien de invloedssfeer de Franse veiligheid moest dienen, was de hegemonie die de Franse beleidsmakers voorstond vooral politiek en militair van aard. Een politiek en militair overwicht is echter nog geen juridische hegemonie, geen juridisch erkende hiërarchie. Feitelijke machtsverschillen doen niet noodzakelijkerwijs af aan onafhankelijkheid en juridische gelijkheid. De onderhavige gevalsstudie gaat in de kern over de manieren waarop macht doorwerkt in de internationale rechtsorde. Wordt macht vertaald in recht, in juridische status en juridische procedures? Wordt macht erkend door het volkenrecht en geïncorporeerd in de internationale rechtsorde? Welke ideeën hadden tijdgenoten over de internationale rechtsorde in het licht van grote machtsverschillen tussen staten? Dit boek beoogt deze vragen te beantwoorden aan de hand van een typologie van internationale ordes onderscheiden op basis van de mate van hiërarchie en de mate van integratie tussen eenheden. Er zijn zes ideaaltypen te onderscheiden: 1) ware anarchie waarin elke vorm van politieke organisatie ontbreekt of waarin contacten tussen politieke entiteiten te sporadisch zijn om een systeem te vormen, 2) een pluralistisch-egalitaire orde van co-existente, autonome eenheden die niettemin wel een systeem vormen, 3) hegemonie, waarbij sprake is van hiërarchie en differentiatie van taken, rechten en plichten in de sfeer van internationale politiek, 4) ”empire,‘ een volgende stap in de lijn van onderwerping, waarbij een imperialistische mogendheid ook in interne aangelegenheden van onderworpen staten ingrijpt, 5) federatie, binnen de alternatieve lijn van unificatie, waarbij entiteiten nog steeds gelijk zijn maar zich duurzaam aaneensluiten en federale instituties instellen, 6) een universele orde, waarbij unificatie zo ver

112 Belissa, 1995. 65 gaat dat er van een dualisme tussen fundamenteel gescheiden sferen geen sprake meer is. Deze typologie is primair politiek, maar kan juridisch vertaald worden. Daarnaast is de typologie structuralistisch. Een aanvullende analyse van culturele aspecten van internationale orde is nodig. De intocht van de Franse legers in de Verenigde Nederlanden viel samen met een fundamenteel debat in Parijs over het te volgen buitenlands beleid. Gematigde leden van de Nationale Conventie bepleitten isolationisme en het terugkeren naar de oude grenzen. Zij werden echter overstemd door andere facties die annexatie van grondgebied tot aan de natuurlijke grenzen al dan niet in combinatie met het vestigen van zusterrepublieken voorstonden. De vraag wat te doen met de Republiek nu deze zo plotseling en ietwat onverwacht in Franse handen was gevallen kwam op tegen de achtergrond van dit debat. Was Frankrijk het meest gediend met een bondgenootschap voor de lange termijn of moesten vooral materiële voordelen op de korte termijn veiliggesteld worden? Voor de Bataafse patriotten stond de toekomstige relatie al lang vast. Een bondgenootschap met Frankrijk was onontbeerlijk voor de stabiliteit en het voortbestaan van een patriots bewind in Den Haag. Het Bataafse initiatief om te komen tot een alliantie deed in Parijs de balans in de richting van deze optie doorslaan, maar om voldoende draagvlak in Frankrijk te creëren moest het bondgenootschap wel gekocht worden. De Bataafse patriotten waren traditioneel pro-Frans en de Bataafse Republiek had een eigen republikeinse traditie. Noch de hervormingen in de Republiek, noch de alliantie met Frankrijk hadden dus een beleid van zusterrepublieken nodig om te materialiseren. Het Directoire zou die notie van een militaire buffer van bevriende buurstaten wel steeds meer tot de zijne maken. Bij gebrek aan een grootmacht als bondgenoot moest de geïsoleerde positie van de Franse Republiek gecompenseerd worden door het aangaan van banden of het onderwerpen van mogendheden van de tweede of derde rang. Dat leverde een alliantiestructuur op die gekarakteriseerd werd door een netwerk van bilaterale banden en een duidelijk politiek en militair leiderschap vanuit Parijs. Een belangrijk deel van de Franse dominantie kwam neer op het managen van dit centralistische bondgenootschap in de context van de actuele oorlog. Zelfs dit militaire leiderschap was evenwel nauwelijks geformaliseerd. Het Verdrag van Den Haag (16 mei 1795), dat de juridische belichaming van de band tussen de twee republieken werd, voorzag wel in het sturen van een officier naar Parijs als liaison en een Frans commando in geval van gezamenlijk optreden van Franse en Bataafse troepen. Feitelijk bepaalde Parijs de campagneplannen. De Bataafse regering was verder vrij in het mobiliseren, verplaatsen of inzetten van troepen en vlooteenheden. Het Bataafse leger is nooit geheel geïntegreerd in een geallieerde troepenmacht. Het verdrag, alsmede latere conventies voorzagen wel in financiële en materiële bijdragen

66 van de Bataafse Republiek œ deels als eenmalige schadeloosstelling voor de gedane moeite ter bevrijding van de Bataafse broeders, deels als bijdrage aan de oorlogsvoering. Een tijd waarin ”vrijheid‘ en ”gelijkheid‘ het publieke discours bepaalden stond geen openlijke buitenlandse interventie en geen openlijke beperking van de nationale onafhankelijkheid toe. Republicanisme en volkssoevereiniteit benadrukten de vrijheid en onafhankelijkheid van alle volkeren. Nationale ”regeneratie‘ œ het herstel van de nationale welvaart en politieke status door republikeinse deugd, politieke en sociale hervormingen œ vormde de kern van het patriots programma. Een Vatteliaans beeld van naast elkaar bestaande, onafhankelijke en vrije volken was dan ook de logische consequentie van revolutionair patriottisme voor wat betreft internationale betrekkingen. De kosmopolitische ondertoon van het Verlichtingsdenken kwam vervolgens naar voren in het benadrukken dat de betrekkingen tussen de volken wel door moraal, recht en goede trouw beheerst worden. Ondanks de radicale stellingen aan weerszijden van het publieke debat dat de Revolutie een nieuw volkenrecht zou voortbrengen (revolutionairen) of juist een rechtloze toestand voortgebracht had (contrarevolutionairen) werd het bestaan van volkenrechtelijke regels en normen voor het interstatelijk verkeer in de praktijk zowel door Bataafse als door Franse diplomaten als vanzelfsprekend aangenomen. Het langetermijnperspectief was dan ook precies een orde van onafhankelijkheid en soevereiniteit, maar met de toevoeging van een morele dimensie aan onderlinge betrekkingen en een internationale rechtsorde. In de regel werden de juridische vormen van een pluralistisch-egalitaire orde gerespecteerd en in het publiek beleden. Noch de achttiende-eeuwse federale of kosmopolitische visies, noch het Franse politieke en militaire overwicht hebben geleid tot het gieten van de betrekkingen tussen de Franse en Bataafse Republieken in meer asymmetrische, ongelijkwaardige, hiërarchische juridische vormen. Er was een sterke ideologische incentive die de Fransen weerhield om hun overmacht te formaliseren. Bovendien moest in deze fase van de revolutionaire periode nog rekening gehouden worden met de andere Europese grootmachten. De uitzonderingen op deze regel beperken zich tot 1) de overgangsfase tussen militaire invasie en het sluiten van het verdrag behelzende de erkenning van de Republiek door de Fransen, 2) het militaire leiderschap gedurende de actuele, door Frankrijk geïnitieerde oorlog, 3) de sfeer van de vredesonderhandelingen, die met name tot een zaak van de grootmachten gemaakt werd. Voor het overige maakte de Franse regering gebruik van de juridische vormen van een pluralistisch-egalitaire orde om de eigen doelen en met name de militaire en financiële functies van de Bataafse Republiek te verwezenlijken en te juridificeren of wist de Franse regering invloed en controle uit te oefenen op manieren die juridische vormgeving

67 ontweken. Nico Krisch onderscheidt een aantal manieren waarop grootmachten met het volkenrecht omgaan en er in slagen het naar hun hand te zetten.113 Volgens Krisch kunnen grootmachten hetzij het bestaande volkenrecht gebruiken om hun dominantie uit te oefenen œ instrumentaliseren œ, hetzij het volkenrecht proberen te veranderen zodat het meer overeenkomt met hun dominante positie œ hervormen œ, hetzij het bestaande volkenrecht ontwijken door terug te vallen op een politiek discours œ uitwijken œ of door terug te vallen op het eigen nationale recht. Al deze strategieën zijn waar te nemen in de Frans-Nederlandse betrekkingen in de revolutionaire periode. De onderlinge relaties werden geformaliseerd door een horizontale overeenkomst œ het vredes- en alliantieverdrag van Den Haag; bij uitstek een instrument van een pluralistisch-egalitaire orde. Hoewel het machtsverschil tijdens de onderhandelingen over dit verdrag evident zichtbaar werden, was het verdrag het resultaat van echte onderhandelingen en was er zo sprake van formele instemming met alle verplichtingen die voor de Bataafse Republiek uit de alliantie voortvloeiden. Hetzelfde kan gezegd worden van latere conventies, hoewel de onderlinge relatie daarbij wel steeds onevenwichtiger werd. Tijdens vredesonderhandelingen met Groot-Brittannië in 1797 en 1801-1802 probeerde de Franse regering het recht erkend te krijgen om voor de geallieerde mogendheden van de tweede rang te onderhandelen. Dit werd noch door de Britten, noch door de Bataven geaccepteerd en uiteindelijk zou Schimmelpenninck namens de Bataafse Republiek meeonderhandelen en de Vrede van Amiens (27 maart 1802) mee ondertekenen. Deze poging om het verdragsrecht te hervormen mislukte dus. De Fransen vielen terug op het eigen nationale recht in het kader van de economische oorlogsvoering en de jurisdictie over Franse militairen en kapers. Door Franse kapers naar Bataafse havens opgebrachte schepen werden niettemin door Franse rechtbanken berecht. De Franse regering trachtte Den Haag ertoe te bewegen economische blokkademaatregelen tegen de Britten over te nemen en de Franse douane probeerde de Franse wetten te handhaven in . Ten slotte, laten de aanhoudende geschillen over de haven van Vlissingen een mooi voorbeeld zien van het verplaatsen van het discours van een juridische naar een politieke context. Het Directoire weigerde de geschillen conform het reglement op het gemeenschappelijk gebruik van de haven naar arbiters te verwijzen en hield vast aan het oplossen van de gerezen conflicten in onderling overleg. Het staatscentrisme dat het denken over internationale betrekkingen beheerst en het formalistische karakter van het moderne volkenrecht verhullen evenwel de belangrijkste manier waarop de Franse invloed en controle zich aan het volkenrecht van een

113 Krisch, 2003; idem, 2005. 68 pluralistisch-egalitaire orde onttrokken. De dominante paradigmata in de leer van de internationale betrekkingen zijn blind voor binnenlandse politiek. Juist in periodes van revolutie en fundamentele politieke tegenstellingen binnen staten kunnen grensoverschrijdende verbanden tussen geestverwante politieke facties nationale sentimenten en de staatsraison overtreffen. De Franse regering maakte precies van dit factionalisme gebruik om controle over de Bataafse Republiek uit te oefenen zonder de juridische gelijkheid en onafhankelijkheid van soevereine staten ter discussie te stellen. Zoals Robert Palmer heeft betoogd was de ”democratische revolutie‘ een Atlantisch fenomeen met patriottenbewegingen in alle delen van Europa.114 Nederlandse, Duitse, Zwitserse en Italiaanse patriotten volgden niet simpelweg Franse ideeën. Elke nationale patriottenbeweging had een eigen hervormingsprogramma toegespitst op de eigen lokale context en de sociale achtergrond van de lokale patriotten. Zelfs met inachtneming van deze nuance hadden de Franse revolutionairen ideologisch meer gemeen met patriotten in de Nederlanden, het Rijnland, Zwitserland en Italië dan met menig landgenoot. Bovendien deelden de verschillende patriotten dezelfde binnen- en buitenlandse vijanden en tegenstanders. Het patriottisme concentreerde zich in wat Michael Broers de ”Lotharingian isthmus‘ noemt œ de verstedelijkte gebieden van West-Europa van de Noordzee tot in Lombardije œ en hij claimt met recht dat een gedeelde ideologie en politieke wederzijdse afhankelijkheid grensoverschrijdende banden en samenwerking tussen de patriottenbewegingen sterker maakten dan banden met medeburgers in de onderscheiden landen.115 De gedeelde ideologie werd ingezet om de medewerking van lokale patriotten te verwerven en te behouden, terwijl de Bataafse patriotten van hun kant sterk hechtten aan goede banden met de Franse regering om het voortbestaan van het eigen bewind te verzekeren. Tot de opkomst van het Napoleontische keizerrijk œ 1804 in Frankrijk zelf en omgevormd naar een Europese visie na de slag bij Austerlitz (2 december 1805) œ werd het Franse overwicht met name uitgeoefend door contacten achter de schermen tussen Franse diplomatieke vertegenwoordigers en militaire commandanten enerzijds en Bataafse patriotten in controle van de Bataafse uitvoerende en wetgevende macht anderzijds. De strategie was niet verstoken van nadelen en beperkingen. Franse invloed moest verdekt blijven om niet in strijd te komen met de beleden volkssoevereiniteit. Te open interventie zou het draagvlak van het patriots bewind in Den Haag te zeer ondermijnen en zou ook in Frankrijk op protesten stuiten. Ook internationaal was het van belang de onafhankelijkheid van de Bataafse Republiek niet al te zeer

114 Palmer, 1959-1964. 115 Broers, 2001. 69 te compromitteren. Om daadwerkelijk een stabiele buffer te vormen was het noodzakelijk dat Pruisen en Oostenrijk het bestaan van de zusterrepublieken accepteerden en tot 1805-1806 was Frankrijk nog niet sterk genoeg om hen te dwingen. Met name het neutrale Pruisen stelde belang in de Nederlanden om geopolitieke en commerciële redenen. Daar kwam nog bij dat de Britse regering waarschijnlijk de ingenomen Bataafse koloniën bij de vrede niet terug zou geven als de Bataafse Republiek overduidelijk onder Franse controle stond. Een belangrijk nadeel was dat de Franse invloed in deze strategie afhing van de stabiliteit van het patriots bewind en zijn vermogen om de Bataafse Republiek te beheersen en nationale hulpbronnen te mobiliseren en dat machtswisselingen in Parijs doorgaans door moesten werken in Den Haag om te garanderen dat de Bataafse regering uit geestverwante en betrouwbare lieden bestond; mannen die vertrouwd konden worden en mannen die sterk genoeg waren om het eigen land te beheersen maar niet sterk genoeg om een al te onafhankelijke koers te varen. Bij gevolg raakten de Fransen verstrikt in de Bataafse factiepolitiek en staatsgrepen of initieerden zij zelf staatsgrepen. Deze staatsgrepen waren evenzeer de kern als een consequentie van de strategie om de Bataafse Republiek te beheersen van achter de schermen. Bovendien gaf deze strategie de Franse regering een belang in de binnenlandse constitutionele orde van de Bataafse Republiek. De Bataafse staatsinrichting moest niet alleen de ideologische verbondenheid van de twee republieken bevestigen. Zij moest tevens een voldoende rationeel en sterk bestuur verzekeren, omdat de kracht van de militaire buffer en het vermogen om de nationale hulpbronnen ten behoeve van de Franse oorlogsvoering te mobiliseren daarmee stond of viel. De interstatelijke verhoudingen in het West-Europa van de jaren na 1795 worden dan ook gekenmerkt door het door elkaar lopen van internationale en binnenlandse politiek. De strategie die gevoerd werd om lippendienst te bewijzen aan de onafhankelijkheid van de Bataafse Republiek vroeg in wezen om voortdurende bemoeienis. Niettemin, zolang de regering in Parijs in staat was om de Bataafse Republiek in voldoende mate te controleren via het eigen constitutionele systeem door pro-Franse c.q. pro-revolutionaire facties konden formele onafhankelijkheid en de bijbehorende juridische vormen gerespecteerd worden en konden de formele, juridische betrekkingen tussen de twee republieken beperkt blijven tot een bondgenootschap. Dit is evenwel geen pleidooi voor een reductionistische in plaats van structuralistische benadering van internationale politiek en internationale betrekkingen. De interstatelijke dimensie kan niet helemaal veronachtzaamd worden. De Bataafse Republiek bleef eigen diplomatieke betrekkingen onderhouden en hield vast aan het traditionele, brede netwerk van diplomatieke vertegenwoordiging. Bovenal was de Bataafse regering, welke factie binnen de Bataafse

70 patriotten ook het overwicht had, zeer gevoelig voor en alert op het handhaven van de territoriale integriteit van het land en de exclusiviteit van haar jurisdictie. Schendingen van het Bataafse grondgebied door Franse functionarissen konden consequent op protesten œ zij het van wisselende kracht œ rekenen en tegen cessie van grondgebied aan Frankrijk werd stevig weerstand geboden. De Bataafse regering had zelfs eigen uitbreidingsplannen oostwaarts. Het Franse ”aanbod‘ om namens de Bataafse Republiek met de Britten te onderhandelen werd stellig van de hand gewezen; een onafhankelijke mogendheid behartigt haar belangen immers zelf. Dat de Bataafse regering bij de vredesonderhandelingen met Oostenrijk en de kleinere Duitse en Italiaanse mogendheden wel een indirecte rol accepteerde kan teruggevoerd worden op het verschil in rol van de Bataafse Republiek in de oorlog tegen Groot-Brittannië en de oorlog tegen Oostenrijk. In het eerste geval was de Bataafse Republiek zelf een oorlogvoerende mogendheid, terwijl zij in het tweede geval slechts een auxiliair was. Ten slotte kan opgemerkt worden dat het publiek en diplomatiek discours aan Bataafse zijde bol stond van noties van nationale belangen en nationale waardigheid. De patriotten hadden de Nederlanders nationale regeneratie beloofd. Het bewerkstelligen van nationale economische voorspoed, het verzekeren van nationale veiligheid, het handhaven van de territoriale integriteit, het spelen van een eigen rol in de internationale politiek waren dan ook cruciaal voor het verwerven en behouden van binnenlandse steun voor het patriots bewind. Een al te grote toegeeflijkheid jegens Frankrijk zou de interne machtsbasis ondermijnen. Bovendien dreigden de financiële lasten van de alliantie de eigen staatsfinanciën en economie te ruïneren en het binnenlands hervormingsprogramma te hinderen. Anderzijds waren de Bataafse patriotten zich er terdege van bewust dat het voortbestaan van hun bewind in belangrijke mate afhankelijk was van Franse steun. De balans tussen nationaal belang en factiebelang, tussen het benadrukken van de eigen statelijkheid en het benadrukken van de verbondenheid met Frankrijk hing af van de internationale, militaire en binnenlands politieke situatie. Waar Bataafse patriotten onder militaire dreiging œ de onzekerheid over de herhaling van een Pruisische invasie c.q. tegenaanval in het voorjaar van 1795 of de Engels-Russische invasie van de zomer van 1799 œ meer geneigd waren toe te geven aan Franse eisen en Franse druk, daar probeerden zij een meer zelfstandige koers te varen of zich zelfs aan de alliantie te onttrekken in tijden van militaire voorspoed en relatieve kalmte. Hoe groter de politieke stabiliteit œ intern en extern œ hoe meer de statelijke dimensie de boventoon voerde. Alleen een gemengde benadering waarbij zowel gedacht wordt in statelijke termen en termen van interstatelijke relaties als in termen van grensoverschrijdende banden en relaties tussen politieke facties met inachtneming van de binnenlandse politieke context kan ons helpen de relaties tussen grootmachten en andere mogendheden in de

71 revolutionaire periode te doorgronden. Frans-Bataafse betrekkingen werden bepaald door de dialectiek van regeneratie en hegemonie.

72 [...]

73 Archivalia

AAE, CP (Paris) ° Angleterre: 590, 591, 595, 598 ° Angleterre Supplément: 30 ° Autriche: 366, 367, 370 ° Milanais: 55, 57, 59, 60 ° Milanais Supplément: 5 ° Hollande: 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 595, 596, 597, 598, 600, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607 ° Hollande Supplément: 22 ° Prusse: 225, 226 ° Suisse: 473, 480

AAE, MD (Paris) ° Angleterre: 105 bis ° Autriche: 8, 70 ° France: 335, 524, 652, 655, 656, 1414, 1811 ° Italie: 12

AN (Paris) ° AF II Conseil exécutif provisoire et Convention, Comité de Salut Public, Cartons: 64 ° AF II* Conseil exécutif provisoire et Convention, Comité de Salut Public, Registres: 49, 50 ° AF III Directoire exécutif ans IV-VIII, Cartons: 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 59, 70 ° AF III* Directoire exécutif ans IV-VIII, Registres: 20, 176, 178 ° AF IV Secrétairerie d‘État impériale; Consulat et Empire: 912 ° AP Roederer: 29AP 21, 22, 23 ° AP Sieyes: 284AP 10

ASMi (Milan) ° Trattati: 112 ° Autografi, Principi e sovrani: 71 ° Archivio della Prima Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Parigi (Marescalchi): 21 ° Archivio della Seconda Divisione del Ministero degli Esteri, residente a Milano (Testi): 323

SBA (Bern) ° Hauptabteilung B, Das Zentralarchiv der Helvetischen Republik: 433b, 792, 3324, 3339, 3360

74

NA (The Hague) ° 1.01.03 Staten Generaal Resoluties 1576-1796: 1723, 3862, 4556 ° 1.01.08 Inventaris van het archief van de Staten-Generaal Deel VI Vervolg Loketkast œ Secrete kast Tractaten en Ratificaties, overgedragen archivalia: 12597.283 ° 1.02.14 Legatiearchief Frankrijk: 593, 596, 598, 599, 600, 601, 604, 607, 608, 610, 611, 612, 628, 631, 633, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 654, 657, 659, 660, 668, 683, 684, 685, 686, 694, 702, 703, 704, 707, 709, 711, 713, 727, 780 ° 2.01.01.01 Archieven van de wetgevende colleges 1796- 1810: 189, 509, 528, 533 ° 2.01.01.04 Archieven van het Uitvoerend Bewind 1798- 1801: 221, 223, 458A, 458B, 458C, 479, 482, 485, 665, 667 ° 2.01.01.05 Archieven van het Staatsbewind 1801-1805: 445 ° 2.01.08 Archieven van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken 1796-1810: 26, 28, 40, 50, 52, 53, 55B, 102, 103, 104, 104A, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 217, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 342, 360, 361, 363A, 390, 396, 397, ° 2.21.073 Collectie Maarten baron Van der Goes Heer van Dirxland 1751-1826: 7, 17, 18, 19, 35, 47, 51, 56, 103 ° 3.02.01 Archief van de Provisionele Representanten van het Volk van Holland 1795-1796: 440, 461

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