Pierre Riel, the Marquis De Beurnonville at the Spanish Court and Napoleon Bonaparte's Spanish Policy, 1802-05 Michael W
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Toussaint Louverture: Relations with Great Britain and the United States, 1798-1802
Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1950 Toussaint Louverture: Relations with Great Britain and the United States, 1798-1802 Rosemary Downey Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Downey, Rosemary, "Toussaint Louverture: Relations with Great Britain and the United States, 1798-1802" (1950). Master's Theses. 753. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/753 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1950 Rosemary Downey .. TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE: REL1TIO~S WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1798-1802 by Mother Rosemary Downey, B.S.O.J. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULF ILLlIlENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY Febru.a.ry 1950 TABLE OF OONTENTS Page Preface. •. 111 Chapter I THE EMERGENOE OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE....................... 1 Birth of Toussaint Louverture - His Parentage - Condition of Slaves in Saint-DomingQe - Lot of Toussaint - Opinions of His Oharacter - British - Mulatto - The Slave Insurrec tion - Toussaint in Power II ANGLo-FRENOH WAR IN SAINT-DOMINGUE 1793-1798 •••••••••••••••• 15 British Attitude toward French Revolution - War with the French Republic - Cooperation of Saint-Domingue Planters - Value of the French Colony - Strategy of Pitt and Dundas - English-French Coalition Terms - Early Success of British Expedition - Expense - Reverses - Withdrawal Forced by Toussaint III BRITISH-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN 1798 •••••••••••••••••••••• 29 Problem of British-American Relations - Mercantilism v.s. -
The Treaty of Lunéville J. David Markham When Napoleon Became
The Treaty of Lunéville J. David Markham When Napoleon became First Consul in 1799, his first order of business was to defend France against the so-called Second Coalition. This coalition was made up of a number of smaller countries led by Austria, Russia and Britain. The Austrians had armies in Germany and in Piedmont, Italy. Napoleon sent General Jean Moreau to Germany while he, Napoleon, marched through Switzerland to Milan and then further south, toward Alessandria. As Napoleon, as First Consul, was not technically able to lead an army, the French were technically under the command of General Louis Alexandre Berthier. There, on 14 June 1800, the French defeated the Austrian army led by General Michael von Melas. This victory, coupled with Moreau’s success in Germany, lead to a general peace negotiation resulting in the Treaty of Lunéville (named after the town in France where the treaty was signed by Count Ludwig von Cobenzl for Austria and Joseph Bonaparte for Austria. The treaty secured France’s borders on the left bank of the Rhine River and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. France ceded territory and fortresses on the right bank, and various republics were guaranteed their independence. This translation is taken from the website of the Fondation Napoléon and can be found at the following URL: https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the- two-empires/articles/treaty-of-luneville/. I am deeply grateful for the permission granted to use it by Dr. Peter Hicks of the Fondation. That French organization does an outstanding job of promoting Napoleonic history throughout the world. -
The Memoirs of General the Baron De Marbot in 2 Volumes
The Memoirs of General the Baron de Marbot in 2 Volumes by the Baron de Marbot THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL THE BARON DE MARBOT. Table of Contents THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL THE BARON DE MARBOT......................................1 Volume I....................................................................2 Introduction...........................................................2 Chap. 1................................................................6 Chap. 2...............................................................11 Chap. 3...............................................................17 Chap. 4...............................................................24 Chap. 5...............................................................31 Chap. 6...............................................................39 Chap. 7...............................................................41 Chap. 8...............................................................54 Chap. 9...............................................................67 Chap. 10..............................................................75 Chap. 11..............................................................85 Chap. 12..............................................................96 Chap. 13.............................................................102 Chap. 14.............................................................109 Chap. 15.............................................................112 Chap. 16.............................................................122 Chap. 17.............................................................132 -
The Age of Napoleon & the Triumph of Romanticism Chapter 20
The Age of Napoleon & the Triumph of Romanticism Chapter 20 The Rise of Napoleon - Chief danger to the Directory came from royalists o Émigrés returned to France o Spring 1797 – royalists won elections o To preserve the Republic . Directory staged a coup d’etat (Sept. 4, 1797) Placed their supporters back in power - Napoleon o Born 1769 on the island of Corsica . Went to French schools . Pursued military career 1785 – artillery officer . favored the revolution was a fiery Jacobin . 1793- General - Early military victories o Crushed Austria and Sardinia in Italy . Made Treaty of Camp Formino in Oct 1797 on his own accord Returned to France a hero - Britain . Only remaining enemy Too risky to cross channel o Chose to attack in Egypt . Wanted to cut off English trade and communication with India Failure - Russia Alarmed . 2nd coalition formed in 1799 Russia, Ottomans, Austria, Britain o Beat French in Italy and Switzerland 1 Constitution Year VII - Economic troubles and international situation o Directory lost support o Abbe Sieyes, proposed a new constitution . Wanted a strong executive Would require another coup d’etat o October 1799 . Napoleon left army in Egypt November 10, 1799 o Successful coup Napoleon issued the Constitution in December (Year VIII) o First Consul The Consulate in France (1799-1804) - Closed the French Revolution - Achieved wealth and property opportunities o Napoleon’s constitution was voted in overwhelmingly - Napoleon made peace with French enemies o 1801 Treaty of Luneville – took Austria out of war o 1802 Treaty of Amiens – peace with Britain o Peace at home . Employed all political factions (if they were loyal) . -
The Castle and the Virgin in Medieval
I 1+ M. Vox THE CASTLE AND THE VIRGIN IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY RENAISSANCE DRAMA John H. Meagher III A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December, 1976 Approved by Doctoral Committee BOWLING GREEN UN1V. LIBRARY 13 © 1977 JOHN HENRY MEAGHER III ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 11 ABSTRACT This study examined architectural metaphor and setting in civic pageantry, religious processions, and selected re ligious plays of the middle ages and renaissance. A review of critical works revealed the use of an architectural setting and metaphor in classical Greek literature that continued in Roman and medieval literature. Related examples were the Palace of Venus, the House of Fortune, and the temple or castle of the Virgin. The study then explained the devotion to the Virgin Mother in the middle ages and renaissance. The study showed that two doctrines, the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary, were illustrated in art, literature, and drama, show ing Mary as an active interceding figure. In civic pageantry from 1377 to 1556, the study found that the architectural metaphor and setting was symbolic of a heaven or structure which housed virgins personifying virtues, symbolically protective of royal genealogy. Pro tection of the royal line was associated with Mary, because she was a link in the royal line from David and Solomon to Jesus. As architecture was symbolic in civic pageantry of a protective place for the royal line, so architecture in religious drama was symbolic of, or associated with the Virgin Mother. -
Waterloo in Myth and Memory: the Battles of Waterloo 1815-1915 Timothy Fitzpatrick
Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2013 Waterloo in Myth and Memory: The Battles of Waterloo 1815-1915 Timothy Fitzpatrick Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES WATERLOO IN MYTH AND MEMORY: THE BATTLES OF WATERLOO 1815-1915 By TIMOTHY FITZPATRICK A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2013 Timothy Fitzpatrick defended this dissertation on November 6, 2013. The members of the supervisory committee were: Rafe Blaufarb Professor Directing Dissertation Amiée Boutin University Representative James P. Jones Committee Member Michael Creswell Committee Member Jonathan Grant Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii For my Family iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Drs. Rafe Blaufarb, Aimée Boutin, Michael Creswell, Jonathan Grant and James P. Jones for being on my committee. They have been wonderful mentors during my time at Florida State University. I would also like to thank Dr. Donald Howard for bringing me to FSU. Without Dr. Blaufarb’s and Dr. Horward’s help this project would not have been possible. Dr. Ben Wieder supported my research through various scholarships and grants. I would like to thank The Institute on Napoleon and French Revolution professors, students and alumni for our discussions, interaction and support of this project. -
40 880 46 12 [email protected] ∙ Le Claire Kunst Seit 1982
LE CLAIRE KUNST SEIT 1982 MAGDALENENSTRASSE 50 ∙ 20148 HAMBURG ∙ TELEFON +49 (0)40 881 06 46 ∙ FAX +49 (0)40 880 46 12 [email protected] ∙ WWW.LECLAIRE-KUNST.DE LE CLAIRE KUNST SEIT 1982 ANTOINE-JEAN GROS, BARON GROS 1771 Paris - Meudon 1835 Portrait of Marquis Pierre Gaston Henri de Livron, Aide-de-Camp of Maréchal Murat Oil sketch on canvas; executed c.1812. 21.6 x 19.6 cm PROVENANCE: Vente de l’atelier de l’artiste, Paris, 23 November 1835, no. 28, ‘Portrait en petite proportion du marquis de Livron’ – Auguste-Joseph Carrier (1797-Paris-1875, painter, miniaturist and pupil of A.-J. Gros) – Vente après décès du peintre et miniaturiste Auguste-Joseph Carrier, Hôtel Drouot, Paris, 5 May 1875, no. 175 – Germain Seligman (1893 Paris - New York 1978), art dealer, collector and historian; 1955-79 – Private collection, France LITERATURE: Jean-Baptiste Delestre, Gros et ses ouvrages, Paris 1867 (2nd edn.), pp. 163-70, p. 373 – Justin Tripier Le Franc, Histoire de la vie et de la mort du baron Gros, Paris, 1880, pp. 312, 675, n. 1 – John Richardson (ed.), The Collection of Germain Seligman. Paintings, drawings and works of art, New York 1979, no. 31, repr. EXHIBITIONS: Jacques Seligmann & Co., Baron Antoine-Jean Gros, New York, 15 November - 10 December 1955, p. 34, no. 15, repr. (exhibition travelling to the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, 4 - 21 January 1956 and to Cleveland Museum of Art, 8 March - 15 April 1956) This very fine portrait by Antoine-Jean Gros depicts the French military officer Marquis Pierre Gaston Henri de Livron (1770-1831). -
The Historiography of Henry IV's Military Leadership
Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons History Faculty Publications History 2005 The aF ux Pas of a Vert Galant: The iH storiography of Henry IV's Military Leadership Annette Finley-Croswhite Old Dominion University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_fac_pubs Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Repository Citation Finley-Croswhite, Annette, "The aF ux Pas of a Vert Galant: The iH storiography of Henry IV's Military Leadership" (2005). History Faculty Publications. 21. https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_fac_pubs/21 Original Publication Citation Finley-Croswhite, A. (2005). The faux pas of a vert galant: The historiography of Henry IV's military leadership. Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 33, 79-94. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Faux pas of a Vert Galant: The Historiography of Henry IV's Military Leadership Annette Finley-Croswhite* Old Dominion University Henry IV is one of the few historical figures whose military reputation rests on the fact that he operated successfully during the course of his life at all definable levels of military command: as a soldier and partisan leader, a battlefield tactician, a campaigner, and a national strategist. He fought in over two hundred engagements, never lost a battle, and was the major victor in four landmark battles. Nevertheless, until recently most judgments by French, British, and American historians, scholars like Pierre de Vaissière, Sir Charles Oman, Lynn Montross, and David Buisseret, have portrayed Henry IV not as a great military commander, but as a risk-taking opportunist, always the Vert Galant in the guise of a skilled tactician and cavalryman. -
Le 13 Vendémiaire, Sacre Républicain De Bonaparte
MÉMOIRE POUR AUJOURD’HUI Le 13 Vendémiaire, sacre républicain de Bonaparte L’année 2021 marquera le bicentenaire de la mort de Napoléon. Le géné- ral Michel Franceschi nous fait découvrir ici et partager dans les prochains numéros quelques unes des innombrables facettes, souvent méconnues, parfois dénigrées, de ces 20 ans d’histoire de France. En complément, nous évoquerons, dans la rubrique Culture de cette revue, certains des ouvrages que l’auteur a déjà édités à l’occasion de cet anniversaire. Souhaitons que la repentance ne conduise pas nos autorités et nos médias à altérer voire à effacer cette incomparable page grandiose de notre histoire. En cet automne 1795, le jeune général Napoléon Bonaparte se trouve à Paris en attente d’un hypothétique départ en mission à Constantinople, faute du commandement militaire impor- tant qu’aurait dû valoir au « capitaine canon » sa bril- lante victoire à Toulon sur les Anglais en décembre 1793. Son refus d’un comman- dement en Vendée contre les Chouans (« Jamais mon épée contre le peuple ») l’a même rendu suspect au pouvoir politique. Battant le pavé, découragé et famé- lique, il se morfond à Paris, désespérant de son avenir. Dans le pays, l’inquiétude La journée du 13 Vendémiaire (5 octobre 1795). Le général Bonaparte commande au plus près des combats ses pièces d’artillerie est générale. Ayant succédé à l’Assemblée législative le 21 septembre 1792, la Convention nationale est en situation poli- tique précaire, menacée sur ses deux ailes. À gauche, les derniers partisans jacobins de Robespierre, surnommés les « Sans-culottes », ne se résignent pas à leur perte du pouvoir et entretiennent une sanglante agitation dans tout le pays. -
Napoleon, Talleyrand, and the Future of France
Trinity College Trinity College Digital Repository Senior Theses and Projects Student Scholarship Spring 2017 Visionaries in opposition: Napoleon, Talleyrand, and the future of France Seth J. Browner Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Browner, Seth J., "Visionaries in opposition: Napoleon, Talleyrand, and the future of France". Senior Theses, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 2017. Trinity College Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/621 Visionaries in opposition: Napoleon, Talleyrand, and the Future of France Seth Browner History Senior Thesis Professor Kathleen Kete Spring, 2017 2 Introduction: Two men and France in the balance It was January 28, 1809. Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned Emperor of the French in 1804, returned to Paris. Napoleon spent most of his time as emperor away, fighting various wars. But, frightful words had reached his ears that impelled him to return to France. He was told that Joseph Fouché, the Minister of Police, and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, had held a meeting behind his back. The fact alone that Fouché and Talleyrand were meeting was curious. They loathed each other. Fouché and Talleyrand had launched public attacks against each other for years. When Napoleon heard these two were trying to reach a reconciliation, he greeted it with suspicion immediately. He called Fouché and Talleyrand to his office along with three other high-ranking members of the government. Napoleon reminded Fouché and Talleyrand that they swore an oath of allegiance when the coup of 18 Brumaire was staged in 1799. -
Testing the Narrative of Prussian Decline: the Rhineland Campaign of 1793
Selected Papers of the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era (2020). Testing the Narrative of Prussian Decline: The Rhineland Campaign of 1793 Ethan Soefje University of North Texas On 14 October 1806, the Prussian army, long considered Europe’s best, collided with Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grande Armée at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt. In these engagements, Prussia suffered one of the worst military disasters in modern history. In a single day, the Prussian army effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force. In the following year, Napoleon forced Prussia to accept a peace that made it little more than a subordinate ally. However, over the next six years, a group of Prussian officers attempted to reform the Prussian army and state at almost every level in order to liberate Prussia from Napoleon’s control. They increased the army’s light infantry, adopted combined arms divisions as well as a new General Staff system, and endeavored to create a national army similar to the French model. While not all of their measures were successful, they produced a powerful modern army that played a leading role in driving Napoleon from Germany in 1813. This story of Prussia’s defeat and subsequent reform has dominated the historiography of Napoleonic Prussia. While Napoleon has received the vast majority of historical attention, those who have written on Prussia have focused on the Prussian reform movement or the Prussian army’s campaigns against Napoleon. Historians such as Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and T. C. W. Blanning all argue for the ineffectiveness of the Prussian army before the reform movement.1 These historians present the Prussian army before 1807 as an ossified relic, a hopelessly backward and rigid army commanded by a series of septuagenarians.2 The complete collapse of the Prussian army in 1806 has colored historians’ understanding of it from the end of the Seven Years War to the Jena campaign. -
Napoleon's Heavy Cavalry, the Cuirassier and Carabinier: Their Arms, Armor, and Tactics
Napoleon's Heavy Cavalry, the Cuirassier and Carabinier: Their Arms, Armor, and Tactics Ricky E. Parrish Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in France after his coup of 18 Rmmaire year WIT (9 November 1799). Guided by his organizational genius, each branch of the French army- infantry, cavalry, and artillery-underwent a reorganization. Napoleon had definite ideas as to the role of each of these services, and he wanted to mold them into the most efficient army in Europe. According to Napoleon, there were four types of cavalry: scouts, light cavalry, dragoons, and Cuirus- siers (heavy cavalry).' On 17 September 1802, Napoleon ordered the heavy cavalry within the army to be reduced to twenty regiments: two Carabiniers and eighteen cuirassier^.^ (The Carabi- niers were elite heavy cavalry units), Originally, only six of these units were to be issued the cuirass; however, by the first problem was the weight of the weapon. The flat, end of 1803 twelve regiments of armored heavy cavalry unfullered blade was very heavy, and the troopers com- existed within the French army. 'l'wo more regiments of plained about this weight. The second problem was the Cuirassier were added by 1810, and the two Carabinier construction of the hilt. The three side bars did not extend regiments were armored after taking heavy casualties during into the pommel, which was a cause of weakness in the hilt. the 1809 campaign.3 Therefore, there were a total of sixteen The lack of a brass ferrule at the base of the grip gave the armored cavalry regiments in the French army at the height of weapon a tendency to split.