EMERGING PATTERNS in the INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of CENTRAL ASIA (Part I)
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Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 33 EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA (Part I) by Mark N. Katz· Developments in the newly independent states of the Central Asian republics can affect their relations Central Asia have engaged the attention of policy-mak with outsiders. ers and scholars both in the region itself as well as far At present, there appear to be thrce possible paths beyond it. This is because the future course of Central that the political evolution of Central Asia might take. Asia's international relations affects the interests of The first is preservation of the status quo in which the many nations outside the region. Communist Party apparatus, however renamed, contin There are several reasons why this region is of con ues to exercise predominant or monopoly power. The cern to the outside world. First, it borders on three na second is the evolution of pluralist democracy. 1b.is path tions or areas that have often had antagonistic relations does not rule out political participation by formcr with one another: Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Communists or by Islamists. The third is the emergence Second. it is potentially a very important region ec0 of radicalized Islamic regimes in the area which are both nomically due primarily to its enormous wealth in oil, anti-Communist and anti-democratic. gas. and other natural resources. Third, the region has This paper will first examine Ccntral Asia's political become important due to the fear or hope (depending on evolution as well as the foreign policies favored both by one's point of view) that it might be susceptible to Is ruling and non-ruling parties in the region. Next, the lamic revolution. And fourth, Central Asia has become foreign policies toward Central Asia of important exter important because others think it is important; the re nal powers will be studied in order to explore how they gion has become an arena where several nations hope to might affect the region's political evolution. Lastly, extend their own influence as well as fear the conse there will be a discussion of how both the political evo quences of their opponents doing so. lution of the various Central Asian states and the foreign Much has already been written about the interna policies of external actors toward them interact and may tional relations of newly independent Central Asia. For affect the region's international relations. the most part. however, this analysis has focused on the foreign policies of outside powers toward this region. Central Asian Political Evolution The states of Central Asia tend to be treated as relatively passive actors in the foreign policy field. But outside There has been a significant degree of variation in the powers seeking to pursue their various goals in the re political evolution of the five different Central AsilUl re gion will only succeed to the extent that domestic poli publics since they became independent. tics in the region allow them to. An outside power is KyrgY7Stan has made the most progress along the only likely to be influential in any given Central Asian path toward pluralist democracy. Non-rulingparties have state if the group enjoying political predominance there been allowed to operate relatively freely. There is a free allows it to be. The groups which are, or become, polit press. The Kyrgyz government has demonstrated a ically predominant in the five Central Asian states, then, commitment to the protection of human rights.1 will have a crucial effect on their countries' relations In Kazakhstan, the former conUDunist party clite with the rest of the world. continues to predominate both the government and the Outside powers. of course, play an important role in media. Two non-ruling parties, though, have been al assisting various groups to retain power. or with some lowed to register. The activities of others are tolerated to what more difficulty. to gain or regain it. Hence it is some extent. There is some degree of press freedom. important to understand the goals of important outside While the Kazakh government has acted primarily to powers toward the region as well as how capable they preserve the political status quo, it has also displayed are of pursuing them. But it is also important to under stand how ~e evolution of domestic politics in each of 1U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation ojthe Helsinki Accords: Human 'Mark N. Katz is an associate professor of government and Rights and DemocratiT.ation in the Newly /ndepelldem politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, VA. Republics (January 1993). pp. 170-77. 34 Central Asia Monitor, No.1, 1994 some willingness to allow gradual progress toward de ruling parties seek broad recognition for their country as mocratization.1 well as foreign aid, investment, and trade. Additionally, Uzbekistan's government appears firmly committed both ruling and non-ruling parties usually seek to max to preserving the status quo of continued rule by Com imize their country's independence and avoid foreign munist apparatchiks not only in Uzbekistan, but in dominance. neighboring Tajikistan as well. Only one real opposi Nevertheless, the disagreements between ruling and tion party, Erk, was allowed to register; its candidate ran non-ruling parties on domestic issues have an important unsuccessfully for president in December 1991. After effect on their respective approaches to foreign policy is that, however, the government has severely limited the sues. For ruling parties in Central Asia, the primary activity ofall non-ruling parties. The media is also very domestic political goal is to remain in power. They all tightly controlled.2 pursue a foreign policy which they believe assists them Turkmenistan's government is even more firmly in doing so. Similarly, the primary domestic political committed to preserving the status quo of continued rule goal for non-ruling parties in Central Asia is to gain or by the renamed Communist party. Unlike Uzbekistan share power. The foreign policies they advocate or pur where some opposition party activity was permitted for sue are ones they hope will help achieve this objective. a time, such activity has not been tolerated in Turk The above statements, of course, are generalities menistan at all. The press is very finnly controlled by which are true for the foreign policies of ruling and non the regime.3 ruling parties in all countries. What are the specifics Tajikistan has experienced a brutal ci vil war. While with regard to Central Asia? this ci vil war is in one sense a dispute between various regions of Tajikistan, it can also be seen as a conflict Ruling Parties between forces wishing to preserve the status quo and Despite their differing attitudes toward political forces seeking to bring about political change. The evolution in their respective countries, the ruling parties forces seeking change claimed that they want to bring in all five Central Asian republics have pursued pluralistic democracy to Tajikistan. Those opposing remarkably similar foreign policies. Unlike in Ukraine, them claimed they sought to establish an anti-demo the ruling parties in all five Central Asian republics cratic, radicalized Islamic regime. At independence it was have chosen not to maintain large defense estab the former Communists, or forces seeking to preserve lishments themselves but to rely primarily on Russia to the status quo, who were in power. By mid-1992 they provide them with security. Apart from Armenia, only had become so unpopular that they were driven first to four Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzst.m, sharing power with and then ceding it to the forces seek Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the May 15, 1992 ing change. By the end of 1992, however, the forces CIS collective security treaty with Russia. lbis collec seeking to preserve the status quo had forcibly regained tive security agreement specifically forbade the signato power. The civil war, though, continues with the in ries from joining alliances directed at other signatories to volvement ofRussian and Uzbek armed forces.4 this one. Through this treaty, the Central Asian signato ries essentially agreed to maintain an exclusive security Central Asian Foreign Policies relationship with Russia and not ally militarily with any nation outside the CIS. Although Turkmenistan did not Ruling and non-ruling parties in Central Asia, as sign this treaty, it did sign a bilateral security agreement well as everywhere else, pursue or advocate foreign poli with Russia iIi. June 1992 which also established an ex clusive military relationship between the two coun cies within the specific domestic political context in s which they operate. Yet even though they may disagree tries. on domestic issues, there are often some areas of agree Why those ruling parties seeking firmly to maintain ment shared by ruling and non-ruling parties in the for the status quo (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the for eign policy sphere. For instance, both ruling and non- mer Communists in Tajikistan) would seek a close mili tary relationship with Russia is clear: they want Moscow to help them stay in power. (Why Russia Ilbid. pp. 189-204. would want to do this will be addressed later.) A similar 2/bid, pp. 205-21. motive may be present for the ruling party in Kaza- 3/bid. pp. 178-88. 4/bid. pp. 222-32. For coverage of the civil war. see the SRobert V. Barylsld. "Central Asia and the Post-Soviet "Events in Tajikistan" section or Central Asia Monitor Military System in the Fonnative Year. 1992," Central Asia beginning with issue no. 3. (1992) onward. Monitor, no. 6 (1992), p. 24. Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 35 khstan.