Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 33

EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA (Part I)

by Mark N. Katz·

Developments in the newly independent states of the Central Asian republics can affect their relations Central Asia have engaged the attention of policy-mak­ with outsiders. ers and scholars both in the region itself as well as far At present, there appear to be thrce possible paths beyond it. This is because the future course of Central that the political evolution of Central Asia might take. Asia's international relations affects the interests of The first is preservation of the status quo in which the many nations outside the region. Communist Party apparatus, however renamed, contin­ There are several reasons why this region is of con­ ues to exercise predominant or monopoly power. The cern to the outside world. First, it borders on three na­ second is the evolution of pluralist democracy. 1b.is path tions or areas that have often had antagonistic relations does not rule out political participation by formcr with one another: Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Communists or by Islamists. The third is the emergence Second. it is potentially a very important region ec0­ of radicalized Islamic regimes in the area which are both nomically due primarily to its enormous wealth in oil, anti-Communist and anti-democratic. gas. and other natural resources. Third, the region has This paper will first examine Ccntral Asia's political become important due to the fear or hope (depending on evolution as well as the foreign policies favored both by one's point of view) that it might be susceptible to Is­ ruling and non-ruling parties in the region. Next, the lamic revolution. And fourth, Central Asia has become foreign policies toward Central Asia of important exter­ important because others think it is important; the re­ nal powers will be studied in order to explore how they gion has become an arena where several nations hope to might affect the region's political evolution. Lastly, extend their own influence as well as fear the conse­ there will be a discussion of how both the political evo­ quences of their opponents doing so. lution of the various Central Asian states and the foreign Much has already been written about the interna­ policies of external actors toward them interact and may tional relations of newly independent Central Asia. For affect the region's international relations. the most part. however, this analysis has focused on the foreign policies of outside powers toward this region. Central Asian Political Evolution The states of Central Asia tend to be treated as relatively passive actors in the foreign policy field. But outside There has been a significant degree of variation in the powers seeking to pursue their various goals in the re­ political evolution of the five different Central AsilUl re­ gion will only succeed to the extent that domestic poli­ publics since they became independent. tics in the region allow them to. An outside power is KyrgY7Stan has made the most progress along the only likely to be influential in any given Central Asian path toward pluralist democracy. Non-rulingparties have state if the group enjoying political predominance there been allowed to operate relatively freely. There is a free allows it to be. The groups which are, or become, polit­ press. The Kyrgyz government has demonstrated a ically predominant in the five Central Asian states, then, commitment to the protection of human rights.1 will have a crucial effect on their countries' relations In Kazakhstan, the former conUDunist party clite with the rest of the world. continues to predominate both the government and the Outside powers. of course, play an important role in media. Two non-ruling parties, though, have been al­ assisting various groups to retain power. or with some­ lowed to register. The activities of others are tolerated to what more difficulty. to gain or regain it. Hence it is some extent. There is some degree of press freedom. important to understand the goals of important outside While the Kazakh government has acted primarily to powers toward the region as well as how capable they preserve the political status quo, it has also displayed are of pursuing them. But it is also important to under­ stand how ~e evolution of domestic politics in each of 1U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation ojthe Helsinki Accords: Human 'Mark N. Katz is an associate professor of government and Rights and DemocratiT.ation in the Newly /ndepelldem politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, VA. Republics (January 1993). pp. 170-77. 34 Central Asia Monitor, No.1, 1994 some willingness to allow gradual progress toward de­ ruling parties seek broad recognition for their country as mocratization.1 well as foreign aid, investment, and trade. Additionally, Uzbekistan's government appears firmly committed both ruling and non-ruling parties usually seek to max­ to preserving the status quo of continued rule by Com­ imize their country's independence and avoid foreign munist apparatchiks not only in Uzbekistan, but in dominance. neighboring Tajikistan as well. Only one real opposi­ Nevertheless, the disagreements between ruling and tion party, Erk, was allowed to register; its candidate ran non-ruling parties on domestic issues have an important unsuccessfully for president in December 1991. After effect on their respective approaches to foreign policy is­ that, however, the government has severely limited the sues. For ruling parties in Central Asia, the primary activity ofall non-ruling parties. The media is also very domestic political goal is to remain in power. They all tightly controlled.2 pursue a foreign policy which they believe assists them Turkmenistan's government is even more firmly in doing so. Similarly, the primary domestic political committed to preserving the status quo of continued rule goal for non-ruling parties in Central Asia is to gain or by the renamed Communist party. Unlike Uzbekistan share power. The foreign policies they advocate or pur­ where some opposition party activity was permitted for sue are ones they hope will help achieve this objective. a time, such activity has not been tolerated in Turk­ The above statements, of course, are generalities menistan at all. The press is very finnly controlled by which are true for the foreign policies of ruling and non­ the regime.3 ruling parties in all countries. What are the specifics Tajikistan has experienced a brutal ci vil war. While with regard to Central Asia? this ci vil war is in one sense a dispute between various regions of Tajikistan, it can also be seen as a conflict Ruling Parties between forces wishing to preserve the status quo and Despite their differing attitudes toward political forces seeking to bring about political change. The evolution in their respective countries, the ruling parties forces seeking change claimed that they want to bring in all five Central Asian republics have pursued pluralistic democracy to Tajikistan. Those opposing remarkably similar foreign policies. Unlike in Ukraine, them claimed they sought to establish an anti-demo­ the ruling parties in all five Central Asian republics cratic, radicalized Islamic regime. At independence it was have chosen not to maintain large defense estab­ the former Communists, or forces seeking to preserve lishments themselves but to rely primarily on Russia to the status quo, who were in power. By mid-1992 they provide them with security. Apart from Armenia, only had become so unpopular that they were driven first to four Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzst.m, sharing power with and then ceding it to the forces seek­ Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the May 15, 1992 ing change. By the end of 1992, however, the forces CIS collective security treaty with Russia. lbis collec­ seeking to preserve the status quo had forcibly regained tive security agreement specifically forbade the signato­ power. The civil war, though, continues with the in­ ries from joining alliances directed at other signatories to volvement ofRussian and Uzbek armed forces.4 this one. Through this treaty, the Central Asian signato­ ries essentially agreed to maintain an exclusive security Central Asian Foreign Policies relationship with Russia and not ally militarily with any nation outside the CIS. Although Turkmenistan did not Ruling and non-ruling parties in Central Asia, as sign this treaty, it did sign a bilateral security agreement well as everywhere else, pursue or advocate foreign poli­ with Russia iIi. June 1992 which also established an ex­ clusive military relationship between the two coun­ cies within the specific domestic political context in s which they operate. Yet even though they may disagree tries. on domestic issues, there are often some areas of agree­ Why those ruling parties seeking firmly to maintain ment shared by ruling and non-ruling parties in the for­ the status quo (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the for­ eign policy sphere. For instance, both ruling and non- mer Communists in Tajikistan) would seek a close mili­ tary relationship with Russia is clear: they want Moscow to help them stay in power. (Why Russia Ilbid. pp. 189-204. would want to do this will be addressed later.) A similar 2/bid, pp. 205-21. motive may be present for the ruling party in Kaza- 3/bid. pp. 178-88. 4/bid. pp. 222-32. For coverage of the civil war. see the SRobert V. Barylsld. "Central Asia and the Post-Soviet "Events in Tajikistan" section or Central Asia Monitor Military System in the Fonnative Year. 1992," Central Asia beginning with issue no. 3. (1992) onward. Monitor, no. 6 (1992), p. 24. Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 35

khstan. Here. though. the issue is complicated by the There appears to be a two-fold incentive for Cenlral ethnic situation in that country.1 Any effort to rapidly Asian governments to have good relations with Iran: I) replace the predominantly Russian military establish­ to dissuade Iran from undertaking actions hostile toward ment with a predominantly Kazakh one might increase them; and 2) to raise concern among the many Western secessionist sentiment within the Russian population and Middle Eastern nations which fear that "Iranian in­ predominant in northern Kazakhstan. fluence is rising in Central Asia" and thus induce them The motive for the democratizing government in to provide assistance to Central Asia -- much as many Kyrgyzstan to ally with Russia is also comprehensible. Third World nations played on Western fears ofexpand­ Kyrgyzstan is surrounded by larger. more powerful ing Soviet influence to obtain aid from the West during neighbors whose governments are either hostile to or the Cold War. ambivalent toward democracy. Because ofits remote lo­ But while seeking good stale-to-slate relations with cation, it is highly doubtful that meaningful security as­ Iran and other Muslim governments. the status quo sistance would be available from the Western democra­ regimes in particular have tended to denounce opposition cies if Kyrgyzstan's democracy was threatened. An al­ parties as being Islamic revolutionaries even if they are liance with democratizing Russia. then. is probably the not. In addition to its domestic political implications. best external guarantee for the preservation ofdemocrati­ this policy appears designed to deflect or mute criticism zation in Kyrgyzstan. from the West as well as Russian democrats of st~ltus In its brief period in office. the democratic/Islamic quo regimes' internal policies. The fact that status quo government in Tajikistan called upon Russia to inter­ regimes denounce as Islamic revolutionary non-ruling vene in the civil war there.2 It seems to have hoped that parties which are not suggests that these regimes may a democratizing Russia would have an in~t in defend­ calculate that Western and Russian democratic fears of ing a democratizing government inTajikistan as well as Islamic revolution coming to Central Asia outweigh preventing the Communist apparatchiks from returning their desire to foster democracy in the region. And to the to power. This hope. however. proved to be unfounded. extent that the West and Russia fears Islamic revolution. In addition to the military sphere. the foreign poli­ status quo regimes hope thal external pressure on them cies of the five Central Asian republics have been simi­ to democratize will be minimized. lar in other respects. All havejoined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as well as a Non-ruling Parties host of other international groupings. All have sought In addition to the ruling parties, there are a host of good relations with the West (meaning here not just the non-ruling parties in Central Asia which pursue a U.S. and Western Europe. but also Japan and South Ko­ variety of political goals. There are parties which UIe rea). China. Iran. Pakistan. Saudi Arabia. Turkey. and. primarily democratic. others which are primarily even Israel. as well as others. nationalist. and still others whicb are primarily Islamic. Even those status quo Central Asian governments These different programs. though. are not necessarily which have most loudly denounced all opposition parties mutually exclusive. as being Islamic revolutionaries (whether the charge was Each of these parties tends to gravitate toward those accurate or not) have sought friendly relations with the states with which they share common views of what is a Islamic Republic of Iran. The most striking example of desirable political order. Islamist parties tend to seek this was the visit of Uzbekistan's President Karimov to support from Iran, Saudi Arabia. and Pakistan. Secular Tehran in November 1992 to improve relations with nationalist parties in the republics with ethnic and lin­ that country coinciding with the Uzbek-assisted suppres­ guistic links to Turkey often see Turkey as a role model. sion of the democraticlIslamic government in Tajik­ Democratic parties seek sympathy for their cause from istan.3 Western as well as other democracies. In the immediate post-independence period. though. these non-ruling parties were not hostile to external 1For a detailed study of this issue, see Philip S. Gillette, powers that have an internal political SlrUcture different "Ethnic Balance and Imbalance in Kazakhstan's Regions," from the one which each party seeks to build in its re­ Central Asia Monitor, no. 3 (1993), pp. 17-23. public. For example. the Islamic parties were not impla­ 2See "Civil War in Tajikistan," Central Asia Monitor, no. 5 cably hostile toward the United States and the West. Nor (1992), p. 8; and "Events in Tajikistan." Central Asia were the democratic parties implacably hostile towned Monitor, no. 6 (1992), pp. 2. 4. Iran. On the other hand. these Cenlral Asian non-ruling 3Christopher J. Panico. "Uzbekistan's Southern parties were not so enamored of the external power with Diplomacy." RFEIRL Research Report, 26 March 1993, pp. the political system they admired that they want that 42-4. 36 Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 foreign country to have particularly strong influence in establishment of a pluralist democracy. while several their republics. Secular nationalist parties, for example, parties in Tajikistan envisioned an Islamic government which saw Turkey as a model to emulate did not want being democratic. Those who fear these parties. how­ their republics to become subordinate to Turkey. Simi­ ever, claim that such moderate statements are merely larly. Islamist parties did not necessarily want to see propaganda intended for Western consumption and that their republics become subordinate to Iran or establish their true aim is to establish anti-democratic. Islamic an Iranian-style Islamic republic. regimes. This last point is worth elaborating on. A staff re­ But except for Russian nationalist groups (mainly in port of the U.S. Congress's Commission on Security KaWbstan). different non-ruling parties in Central Asia and Cooperation in Europe noted that while many peo­ have tended to have similar views about states outside ple describe the Alash party in KaWbstan as extremist, the region. Just as Russia is seen by the ruling parties "its leaders maintain they favor a multi-party democracy as an ally acting to help them stay in power. it is and are opposed to fundamentalism and dictatorship of viewed as an opponent by non-ruling parties seeking all kinds."1 The co-chair of Alash. Saltanat Ermekova, change. Non-ruling parties in general have hoped that stated. "If an Islamic regime came to power in Kaza­ the concern for democratization on the part of Western khstan, we would be the first to fight it."2 countries would lead them -- as well as democrats in In a series of interviews published during the sum­ Russia .. to support their efforts to bring about political mer of 1992 (i.e., before the return to power of the change. Non-ruling parties see a whole host of countries Communists) in the Tajik weekly Tojikiston. leaders -- Western. Asian. and Muslim -- as potential sources of from many political parties did indicate a desire for close aid. trade. and investment. Finally. Muslim govern­ relations with Iran. with which Tajikistan bas cultural ments are seen as supporters of change. but also states and linguistic ties. Often. though. a desire for broader R> to be kept at arms length to a certain extent. Non-ruling lations with the outside world or for limiting ties with parties in Central Asia do not want to see their countries Iran to some degree were also indicated. The leader ofthe go from being dominated by Russia to being dominated Rastokhez National Front, Tohir Abdujabbor. said his by any other state. party seeks close ties with Iran. but that "we are ready to There has. however. been a change in the foreign establish industrial and economic ties with any country policy outlook of some non-ruling parties following the that is so inclined ... .II On the role of Islam, he said reimposition of Communist rule in Tajikistan as well as that lithe government system. the state organs, and the the political crackdown in Uzbekistan. Their hopes that prosecutor's office must not interfere with people's lives, Russian democrats would support parties seeking demo­ nor have anything to do with ideology.tt3 Thefounder of cratic evolution have been dashed. Hopes that America the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Shodmon Yusuf, and the West would also provide assistance in bringing called for a Tajik-Iranian alliance. but also called for about political change have also been disappointed. A freedom of religion.4 Two officials of the Islamic Re­ leader of the exiled Democratic Party ofTajikistan. Dr. vivalist Party did call for the creation of an Islamic gov­ Dust Muhammad Dust. stated, "It is a bitter irony that ernment. but specified that such a government must the West would prefer the old 'communist' guard to stay in power simply because the only alternative. in their have a parliament and leaders "chosen by the people.II They called for closerelations with other Muslim coun­ perception, is Islamicfundamentalism. Nothing couldbe tries, but stated. "We are not funded by any other coun· further from the truth.n6 Shukbrat Ismatulaev ofthe Bir­ try and we are completely independent.10 Iik Party in Uzbekistan warned. "When democratic orga­ What this shows is that while Islamist parties op­ nizations are suppressed, the initiative can pass to ex­ posed preserving the status quo. they did not necessarily tremists. and a peaceful course can [no longer] be the support the goal of establishing a radical. anti-demo­ way to control dissatisfaction."7 cratic Islamic regime. Alash, for example. advocates the In other words. when non-ruling parties seeking peaceful political evolution are crushed. the opposition may become radicalized and dominaled by leaders who do lCommission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, p. seek to establish an anti-democratic Islamic republic. 191. This may well be happening. The anti-communist 2lbid. p. 199. democraticJIslamic parties inTajikistan appealed for help 3Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. "The 'Tajilc Spring or 1992,'" Central Asia Monitor. no. 2 (1993), p. 23. 6Quoted in Mara! Akchurin. "Tajikistan: Another Bosnia in 41bid, p. 24. the Making?" Central Asia Monilor, no 3, (1993), p. 9. Sibid. pp. 25-6. 7Quoted in Tadjbakhsh, p. 14. Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994 37 from the West and even from Russia during the autumn of the RFElRL Research Institute put it, 'ry-he repres­ of 1992 when they were trying to prevent the Commu­ sion of the democratic Uzbek nationalists may prove to nists from returning to power. Since then, however. have removed an important moderating force from the what remains of these democraticJlslamic parties are re­ political scene, and the country may find its conservative ceiving the bulk of their assistance from extremist Is­ communist leadership facing an Afghan-supported Is­ lamic groups in Afghanistan. Similarly, while the lamic insurgency that would finish off hopes for rapid Uzbek government aackdown may have ended the activi­ integration into the outside world."1 ties of the two main democratic parties, Erk and Birlik, Muslim fundamentalist groups in Uzbekistan are appar­ 1Bess Brown, "Tajik Civil War Prompts Crackdown !I' ently still active _. and may also be rec:eiving assistance Uzbekistan," RFEIRL Res. Report, 12 March 1993, p.. 6. from extremist groups in Afghanistan. As Bess Brown

The Rule of Law Initiative of USAID in Central Asia

In a first meeting of its kind, the senior staff of Chemonics International (Washington Office) met with embassy personnel from the Central Asian representatives to the United States to discuss how the rule of law project is projected to operate in each of the countries of the region. Represented in person were the governments of Kazakhstan (Almaz Khamzaev, Charge d'Affaires), Kyrgyzstan (Roza Otunbayeva, Ambassador) and Uzbekistan (Faith Teshabaev, Charge d'Affaires). A fax from the Tajik representative to the United Nations, Lakim Kayumov, addressed the subject of the meeting. The Turkmen representative had not responded by the time the meeting adjourned. Each of the representatives, beginning with Ambassador Otunbayeva, expressed the nuance of need in terms of rule of law within his or her country. The Ambassador stressed especially the importance of training -- intensive legal training seminars such as those conducted by the International Law Institute -- which can benefit local legal experts, as well as utilizing the training of Muskie Fellows in law from Central Asia in developing in-country projects. She also pointed to the need to deal with the problem of duplicated projects· that can occur without an in-country tracking system when so many international, national and private funders are becoming involved with Central Asia. Others stressed the need for development of business and investment law, election law and constitutional law. The Chemonics team will spend several of the winter months establishing a base in Almaty and assessing the specific projects they will undertake over the next three years. The meeting with official representatives of the countries in which they will work provided a valuable opportunity to continue the process ofbecoming attuned to the region and its needs. Many of the participants in the Rule of Law project emphasized the importance of communications among groups working within each country, and among those concerned with specific issues such as environment or democracy. The Monitor will also atlemptto keep readers informed of major projects and to this end urges recipients of CAM to send information about projects with which they are involved. Central Asia Monitor, No.2, 1994 23

EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS J. OF CENTRAL ASIA (Conclusion) by Mark N. Katz·

External Powers and Central Asia democrats do indeed genuinely fear that Islamic national­ ism will spread throughout Central Asia and into the In this section, the foreign policies toward Central predominantly Muslim regions of Russia itself. They Asia of the major external powers which do or could may also maintain this position so as not to allow Rus­ play an important role in the region will be examined to sia's conservatives to credibly accuse them of being in­ determine which outcome in the domestic political sufficiently nationalist. Russia's democrats. in other struggle within Central Asia the policies of these out­ words. see preserving Moscow's influence in Central side powers support as well as how strongly they do so. Asia to be important for domestic political reasons in These important external actors include Russia. America Russia. and the West. Muslim states. and important non-Mus­ Russian democrats. then, also support the preserva­ lim Asian states. It must. of course, be kept in mind tion of the status quo in Central Asia. In the summer of that nations do not pursue foreign policies monolithi­ 1993. Moscow sent an additional 10,000 Russian troops cally. Often. a nation's foreign policy is ambiguous. to guard Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. from This may be the case because there are different groups where the opponents ofTajikistan's restored Communist struggling for power in which competing foreign policy regime receive arms and sanctuary. These Russian border visions are a part of their overall rivalry. Ambiguity troops have even launched raids into Afghanistan. On may also occur even when a government is firmly COD­ the other hand. fears in Russia bave reportedly risen trolled by one group which deliberately pursues a dual about the possibility ofMoscow becoming dragged inlo strategy. another costly guerrilla war as in Afghanistan. President Russia is still the most influential external power in Yeltsin has called upon the Tajik governmenl to negoti­ Central Asia. As was mentioned before. Moscow has ate with its opponents (something that government has close ties with all the existing governments. It contin­ been unwilling to do) and has asked Afghanistan, Pak­ ues to maintain tens of thousands of troops in the region istan, and even Iran to help negotiate a peace settlement and to have very close economic ties with it. The for­ in Tajikistan.3 eign policy of Russia's hard-line Communists and ultra­ Thus, while Moscow has been willing to undertake nationalists toward Central Asia is fairly clear. Seeking some military action in order to preserve the status quo to preserve the power of the former bureaucrats and limit in Central Asia, it is not clear whether the democrats or democratization in Russia itself, they also support the the nationalists in Russia would be politically able to preservation of the status quo regimes in Central Asia as undertake a prolonged andlor expanded effort to do so. In well as Russia' predominant influence there.1 other words. Russian commitment to preserving the s~ While opposed to the hard-line Communists and the tus quo in Central Asia is relatively firm if the effort ultra-nationalists on most domestic issues, Yeltsin and needed to do so is relatively modest. The more difficult the democrats also generally support the status quo the task becomes, however. the more doubtful Russia's regimes in Central Asia. Even Andrei Kozyrev -- the re­ commitment to preserving the status quo may become. formist Foreign Minister who has been highly criticized The United States govemmenthas actively promoted by the conservatives -- has defended Russian intervention democratization in Central Asia. As with other former in the Tajik civil war by claiming that it is needed to Soviet republics, American recognition of the newly in­ halt "the spread of Islamic nationalism."2 Russia's dependent states ofCentral Asia only occurred after they agreed to abide by CSCE principles. Washington has praised Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan for the progress they Ian the foreign policy· of "Russia's right-wing, see Vera have made toward democratization, and has criticized the Tolz, "The Burden of the Imperial Legacy.· RFEIRL Research Report. 14 May 1993. pp. 41-6. 2"The Empire Strikes Back," The Economist. August 7. 3/bid. and Fred Hiau. ·Yeltsin. Central Asian Leaders Meet 1993, p. 36. on Tajik Connict." The Washington Post, August 8, 1993. I l 24 Central Asia Monitor, No.2, 1994 I' II I lack ofsuch progress in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan. and ble. Thus, while Western Europe, Japan, and South Ko­ Tajikistan. rea can be said to favor the status quo in Central Asia, Yet whileWashingtOD wouldideally prefer democra­ they are not wedded to it. tization to the status quo in the region. it definitely Chinabas one important security concern with regard prefers the status quo to the possibility of Islamic rev~ to Central Asia: Beijing does not want to see the inde­ lution. Thus. despite its tense relations with the status pendent states of the region support the secessionist ef­ quo regimes. Washington seems prepared to work with forts of their ethnic kinsmen, the Uighurs, in Xinjiang, them. as well as Russia. to prevent the coming to power the Chinese province which borders the region. China ofIslamic fundamentalist forces. Many in Washington -­ bas sought to forestall this ~y offering economic incen­ often outside the administration -- warn that encourage>­ tives to the newly independent states -- which are not ment of democratization may be the best way to dampen eager to annoy Ibeir more powerful neighbor anyway.3 the popularity of Islamic revolutionaries.1 But in prac­ The Chinese government probably prefers the status tice. Washington has been unwilling to press the status quo ex-Communist regimes in the area to either democ­ quo very hard to democratize. Nor is it likely that the ratizing or Islamic revolutionary governments. Beijing, u.s. could or would do much itself to protect the status Ibough, bas displayed a willingness to peacefully co-ex­ quo regimes if they were seriously challenged by Islamic ist with democratizing Kyrgyzstan. Andjust as it enjoys revolutionary forces. good relations with revolutionary Iran, Beijing may well Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea would all be able to establish friendly ties with Islamic regimes in welcome democratization in Central Asia, but are less Central Asia •• especially if they have hostile relations vocal about promoting it than the United States. Central with Russia and the West. Thus. while China prefers the Asia's economic potential is of more importance to status quo, it is primarily concerned with preserving it these countries than either its political development or only in Xinjiang -- a task which Beijing can probably its strategic importance.2 They are willing to work with accomplish whether or not the status quo in Central all the existing regimes. whether democratizing or Asia is maintained. firmly status quo, and would definitely prefer not to see Iran bas an Islamic revolutionary regime, and would Islamic fundamentalist regimes come to power in the re­ like to see this fonn of government spread to other pre­ gion. dominantly Muslim states, including those in Central But Japan. South Korea, and most of Western Eu­ Asia. But Iranian foreign policy is complex. The Iranian rope were able to quickly establish good working rela­ leadership is confident that Islamicrevolution will occur tions with the revolutionary regime in Iran soon after in these countries in the long run. In the meantime, the downfall of the Shah. If Islamic revolutionary Tehran seeks to establish good relations with the exist­ regimes came to power in Central Asia, it is probable ing governments of the region, including those which that Japan, South Korea, and most of Western Europe are anti-Islamic. The Iranians fear that a premature effort would be able to establish friendly relations with them on their part to promote Islamic revolution could lead to too. For external powers with primarily economic inter­ a nationalist, anti-Iranian backlash in Ibe region which ests in the region, the maintenance of order under any would only enhance the influence of America, Turkey, regime which allows them to trade and invest peacefully and otherrivals ofTehran. Thus. Iran reportedly did little is preferable to civil war or other forms of disorder to assist the democratic/Islamic forces in the Tajik civil which would make these activities difficult or impossi- war. Tehran apparently feared that the victory of these forces in Tajikistan. the one Central Asian Slale with predominant cultural links to Iran, would alienate the 1There is a growing literature on the U.S. and Central Asia four other states in the region with predominant cultural See David Hoffman, "Power Competition in Central Asia,· links to Turkey.4 The Washington Post, February 14, 1992; ·Congressional On the other hand, if status quo regimes in Central Hearing: United States Policy toward Central Asia,· Central Asia become unpopular and Muslim opposition to them Asia Monitor, no. 2 (1992), pp. 21·31; James Rupert, grows strong and turns to Tehran for support, Iran would "Dateline Tashkent Post-Soviet Central Asia," Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 175-95; and James Critchlow, ·What Is the U.S. Interest in Central Asia's 3Bess Brown, ·Central Asia: The First Year of Unexpected Future?" Central Asia Monitor, no. 5 (1992), pp. 27-9. Statehood," RFEIRL Research Report, 1 January 1993, p. 20n Central Asia's foreign economic ties, see Sheila 29. Mamie and Erik Whitlock, ·Central Asia and Economic 4panico, pp. 43-4. See also Shireen T. Hunter, ·Central Integration," RFEIRL Research Report, 2 April 1993, pp. Asia and the Middle East: Patterns of Interaction and 34-44. Influence,· Central Asia Monitor, no. 6 (1992), pp. 13-14. Central Asia Monitor, No.2, 1994 25

be in a good position to assist them. Iran. then. would to promote Islam may actually undercut them; many of prefer Islamic revolutionary regimes to come to power the missionaries and other aid workers sent over by r in Central Asia. but realizes this is unlikely to occur Saudi Arabia are. in fact, Islamic zealots whom Riyadh I i soon. But aside from Islamic regimes. Tehran probably prefers to send out of the Kingdom. And just as with .. prefers to see firmly anti-Islamic status quo regimes in many of the young Saudis who went to help the Afghan Central Asia rather than democratizing ones; for an au­ mujahideen when they were fighting against the Soviets. thoritarian status quo regime which does not permit a many of those sent to Central Asia have an Islamic rev­ democratic opposition to arise may serve as a better in­ 01utionary agenda which they hope to implement not cubator of an anti-democratic Islamic revolutionary op­ only in Central Asia. but in Saudi Arabia itself. In addi­ position than would a democratizing government which tion. many wealthy Saudis provide generous financial . i would allow non-ruling parties to bring about change assistance to Islamic revolutionaries throughout the without resort to violence. Muslim world. including Central Asia. Some do this Iran. though. is not the only country whose actions unwittingly. thinking only that they are somehow support Islamic revolution. While strife-torn "helping Islam." Others. however, oppose the Saudi Mghanistan does not have a unified government. most monarchy and support Islamic revolution elsewhere in of the various factions there are Islamic. The demo­ the hope that its success in other Muslim nations will cratic/Islamic forces in Tajikistan have been receiving increase the prospects for it in Saudi Arabia itself.3 military assistance from various groups in Mghanistan. Thus. while the Saudi government may support the It is also reported that Gulbudin Hekmatyar. the radical preservation of the status quo in Central Asia. both its Islamic Pushtun leader. is providing them with military own actions as well as those of some of its citizens may aid. I This assistance seems to be going to the Islamic serve to undercut the status quo and promote Islamic revolutionary elements within the Tajik opposition. revolution. thus strengthening them vis-a-vis the democrats who had Turkey is a Western-oriented. secular. democratic been stronger during their brief period in office. state. It has sought to extend its influence in Central Pakistan has sought to establish good relations with Asia as well as limit that of Iran there. But while the the existing Central Asian governments. But Pakistan is Turkish government favors democratization, it also fears also the primary supporter ofHekmatyar in Mghanistan. the spread of Islamic revolution. Like the United States, If reports that he is aiding the Tajik opposition are true. then. it prefers the existing status quo regimes to the he is probably doing so with Islamabad's blessing. Pak­ prospect of Islamic revolutionary ones.4 istanis policy toward the region. then. may be similar to The very existence of democracy ill Turkey, though. Iran's: willing to work with the status quo regimes. but serves as a model for those ruling and non-ruling parties able to support Islamic revolution when the opportunity in Central Asia which also favor democratization. But arises. Despite its ambitions to play an important role democracy is not completely secure in Turkey. There in Central Asia. however. Pakistan's ability to do so have been occasions when the anny has seized power. may be quite limited due to its relative poverty.2 There is also a growing movement which wishes to see Saudi Arabia is a conservative Muslim state which the secular state replaced with an Islamic regime. If ei­ opposes Islamic revolution. It has provided assistance. ther the army or an Islamic revolutionary government especially in the form of revitalizing Islam. in the hope came to power in Ankara. Turkey would no longer work oflimiting the influence of Iran and other revolutionary to promote democracy in Central Asia. But despite its Islamic regimes. as well as offering its own version of cultural links to four of the five Central Asian republics Islam as a non-revolutionary model for Central Asians. and its desire to playa large role there, Turkey's ability But Saudi Arabia's policy toward Central Asia is to affect the political evolution of Central Asia is lim­ somewhat complicated. It opposes Islamic revolution. ited by its geographic distance from the region. In addi­ but it also opposes democratization -- which the Saudi tion. although Turkey's economy has grown signifi­ royal family does not wish to see spread to the Middle cantly in recent years. it is not in a position to provide East. The Saudi government is more comfortable with large-scale economic assistance to Central Asia. the status quo regimes of the region. but its own efforts

I.Events in Tajikistan.~ Cenlral Asia Monilor, no. 3 (1993). p. 5. See also Bess Brown. ·Central Asian States 3SIeve Coli and David Hoffman. "Radical Movements Seek Russian Help," RFEIRL Research Reporl. 18 June Thrive on Loose Structure. Strict Ideology. • The 1993. pp. 87-8. WashingIon Post, August 2. 1993. 2Hunter. pp. 14-15. 4Hunter. pp. 12-13. 26 Central Asia Monitor, No.2, 1994

The Correlation of Forces somehow different from people everywhere else. and that Central Asians prefer the status quo of being ruled by Apart from certain Muslim states, most external Communist apparatchiks to making decisions for them­ powers support Ihe existing governments in Central selves. And while Russian military assistance may help Asia. whether Ihey are democratizing or firmly status status quo regimes remain in power. it will not necessar­ quo. Except for Russia. however. external support for ily make them more stable. Indeed, popular discontent these Central Asian governments is not particularly with status quo regimes may well be inflamed by the strong. Russia is probably the only government willing perception that they are the puppets of a foreign power. and able to intervene militarily in support of the exist­ Finally. if a status quo regime weakens and civil war ing Central Asian governments. There may. however, be erupts, Russian military involvement may not be sus­ a limit to how much the Russian public might be will­ tainable if it becomes unpopular with the Russian pub­ ing to tolerate military intervention there if it appears lic. And without Russian assistance, the survivability of that a quagmire ofAfghan proportions is developing. On an unpopular status quo regime is highly doubtful. the other hand. with the exception of support from vari­ ous factions in Afghanistan to Islamic forces in Tajik­ Democratization istan and possibly elsewhere, external powers which To the extent that governments in Kyrgyzstan and, want to see political change of one sort or another come to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan have pennilted democrati­ to Central Asia are not working especially vigorously to zation, the populace bas embraced it. But where Central bring it about. Thus. despite press accounts describing Asian governments do not permit democratization. it active rivalry among external powers for influence in the appears to have no real prospect for occurring in the region, the political evolution ofCentral Asia may actu­ short term. ally depend more on the relative strength of the various In the long term, the prospects for Western-style de­ internal forces there vis-a-vis one another. mocratization in the nations with status quo regimes is What can be said about Ihe prospects for each of the open to question. While Islamic revolution appears to be possible directions -- maintenance of the status quo, de­ far less popular than Western-style democracy among mocratization, and Islamic revolution -- in which Cen­ Central Asians now, the forces seeking democracy could tral Asia might evolve politically both in Ihe short-term suffer serious disadvantages vis-a-vis the forces seeking and the long-term? This questions requires a discussion Islamic revolution if civil war erupted. In a situation of the relative strengths and weaknesses ofthe ruling and where Moscow was aiding a status quo regime in a war non-ruling parties in Central Asia pursuing these alter­ that was unpopular in Russia, Islamic states were aiding native political paths as well as the effects of the foreign the Islamic revolutionaries and no one was helping the policies pursued by external powers in the region. democrats. Islamic revolutionary forces may be in the best position to come to power after the downfall of the Maintenance of the Status Quo. status quo regime. This might be avoided if the status In the short term. status quo regimes consisting of quo regime permitted democratization to occur peacefullY ex-communists can easily maintain themselves in -- but it is highly doubtful that any of them will do this power, especially with Russian help. The ruling parties any time soon. have the power to deny non-ruling parties the ability to legally and peacefully compete for power. And in case of Islamic Revolution armed struggle with their opponents. the ex-Commu­ Hard-line. Iranian-style Islamic revolution appears nists either possess greatly superior forces to their p0­ unlikely in the short run not only because the existing tential opponents. or as in the case of Tajikistan. can governments and Russia are strong enough to defeat it. call upon external allies who do. but also -- indeed mainly -- because it simply is not a In the long term, however, the prospects for the sur­ particularly popular ideology in Central Asia now. vivability of the bard-line status quo regimes are proba­ If Western-style democratization is not allowed to bly poor. This statement can be made with some confi­ occur peacefully, however. the prospects for Islamic rev­ dence simply based on the fact that the demand for de­ 01ution may increase. This could occur, as was men­ mocratization has spread to many countries throughout tioned before, if outside powers were aiding Islamic rev­ the world where it has never or rarely been present be­ olutionaries and no one was aiding the democrats. But fore. Many dictatorial regimes, including Communist the popular appeal of Islamic revolution within Central ones once thought to be invulnerable. have fallen. Most Asia might increase if its proponents are successfully of the rest are on the defensive. It simply defies all cred­ able to persuade enough people that I) Russia and the ibility to believe that the people of Central Asia are West do not want democracy to come to Central Asia

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Central Asia Monitor, No.2, 1994

and hence help the former Communists stay in power; tion succeeds. Russia. America. and the West may be 2) Islamic revolutionary states opposed to Russia and able to help bring about democracy if the status quo the West are Central Asia's "true friends~" and 3) Islamic regime invites their assistance in bringing about the .., revolution is "true democracy" -- something that all rev­ transition. I olutionaries claim about their ideology. In a situation On the other hand. those status quo regimes which where an unpopular. foreign-backed dictatorship is think they can retain power indefinitely without democ­ strong enough to suppress democratic opposition. Is­ ratizing may actually serve to strengthen the prospect for lamic revolution may look increasingly appealing to a Islamic revolution occurring. For while status quo populace that is impatient for change and disillusioned regimes can easily suppress their democratic opponents. with Russia and the West. This might also be an oppor­ they are unlikely to avoid becoming increasingly un­ tunity for Islamic revolutionary governments to become popular domestically. People impatient for change may involved and extend their influence. just as the Soviet see externally-armed Islamic revolutionaries as more ca­ Union used to do with Third World Marxist revolution­ pable of deposing the hated status quo regime than un­ ary movements at the time that the unpopular regime armed democrats receiving no meaningful foreign sup­ they were fighting against was weakening. port. As Islamic revolutionary opposition to the status Conclusion quo regime grows. the latter may realize that it probably lbis analysis suggests that while status quo regimes cannot survive without instituting refonn. But such ef­ are likely to remain in power. their ability to do so in forts may come too late. The attempt to institute democ­ the long term is highly doubtful. Such regimes tend to ratization by a status quo regime when it has become ex­ become unpopular domestically. And while there is tremely unpopular may be seen as a sign of weakness some external backing for these regimes. it may prove which may only serve to accelerate armed opposition on to be relatively limited. The public in Russia. America. the part of the Islamists who not only wish to oust the and the West have shown in the past that they are un­ regime. but also prevent their democratic opponents willing to tolerate prolonged efforts to prop up unpopu­ from being able to come to power through peaceful lar regimes abroad. It is highly doubtful that their atti­ means. Neither Russia nor the West is likely to be will­ tude will change in the future. ing or able to successfully intervene if conditions deteri­ But ifstatus quo regimes are unlikely to last in Cen­ orate to this extent. On the other hand. even limited ex­ tral Asia. it is still very much an open question whether ternal assistance from external Islamic revolutionary liberal democracy or Islamic revolution will come there. regimes may prove decisive in assisting Central Asian It is obviously too early to judge in which direction Islamic revolutionaries achieve their aims. Central Asia's political future will evolve. Some might argue that democratization in Central Ironically. the most important factor in shaping Cen­ Asia is extremely risky. They argue that if the status tral Asian public opinion about the relative merits of quo regimes allowed democratization. this may simply liberal democracy and Islamic revolution may be the atti­ lead to Islamic revolutionaries coming to power via elec­ tude of the status quo regimes. Ifthese governments rec­ tions. This. of course. is possible. But even if it did 0c­ ognize that their ability to remain in power over the cur. the likelihood that the Islamists would be under the long term is probably limited. they themselves are influence of extemallslamic powers appears less if they I likely to prefer democratization to Islamic revolution. came to power by democratic means without Iranian or ,I. For under democracy. the supporters ofthe current status Afghan help than if they came to power through armed quo would have a chance to participate in free elections. struggle with their assistance. They may actually win such elections and remain in But while it is possible that an Islamic revolutionary power. But even if they lose. they can at least remain as party could come to power through electoral means. this a loyal opposition party with the prospect of winning does not appear likely. It is highly significant that in subsequent elections -- as the former Communists have those Central Asian states where democratization has done in lithuania proceeded the furthest -- Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan -­ Ifan Islamic revolution succeeds. however, the sup­ Islamic parties have not attracted much of a popular fol­ porters of the current status quo regime recognize that lowing. The truly ominous case is Tajikistan where the they will probably not be ~lowed to play any signifi­ democrats held the upper band in the anti-status quo cant political role after falling from power. A status quo coalition that ruled there briefly in 1992. but where the regime recognizing its own mortality. then. is likely to Islamic revolutionaries appear to be gaining the ascen­ work to bring about democratization since its supporters dancy within the opposition after the forcible return to are likely to fare better under it than if Islamic revolu- power of the Communist apparatchiks. .