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Home , Aul, Central Asia Monitor, Districts of Kazakhstan, Ethnogenesis, Konstantin Kosachev, Pamiris

The International Dimensions of in : Can the Relationship Between International Security, State Sovereignty and Emerging Ethnonationalism be Reconciled in Post-?

Connor Dilleen PhD International Relations 2005 Abstract

The thesis tracks the emergence of western forms of nationalism in of Post- Soviet Central Asia, and assesses the likelihood of in the , and its probably consequences. It also considers the means by which the heterogenous in Central Asia may be more effectively accommodated within the individual republics.

The thesis is conceived in three sections. The first section examines the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict, and discusses the implications of ethnic conflict in Central Asia from the perspective of state sovereignty and international security. The second section assesses the evolution of ethnicity and identity in Central Asia, the impact of Soviet policies and the impact of newly enforceable territorial sovereignty on the interconnected populations of the region. The third, and concluding, section considers the impact of state actors and regional and international institutions on the Central Asian republics, and considers strategies that may mitigate the potential for ethnic conflict in the region.

The thesis concludes that emerging ethnonationalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia poses a real threat to regional and international security. The individual republics are pursuing policies which discriminate against large proportions of their populations. The Central Asian republics are also struggling with their newly found sovereignty, especially in respect to their asymmetrical relationships with states such as , and the U.S.A. The republics should consider alternative forms of governance, such as national cultural autonomy or consociation, which may contribute to a lessening of the tensions between ethnic or identity groups. The international community, in the form of the United or other appropriate organisations, should recognise the potential for ethnic conflict in the region, and should actively encourage the states to adopt innovative forms of government that accommodate the diverse needs of their heterogenous populations. Table of Contents

Introduction...... 1

PART ONE Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in a World of Sovereign States...... 11

Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia...... 13 Ethnic Conflict and the International System...... 13 The Continuing Threat of Ethnic Conflict...... 19 Conflict in Central Asia...... 22 Sources of Conflict in Central Asia...... 26 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism ...... 33 The Concept of Ethnicity...... 33 Ethnicity, the , and Nationalism ...... 38 in Central Asia...... 41 Nationalism and Industrialisation...... 45 Classical Theories of Nationalism ...... 48 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Central Asia...... 53 Why Does Conflict Between Ethnic or National Groups Occur?...... 56 Conflicting Loyalties? State vs ...... 60 Mechanisms of Conflict...... 64 The or the Nationalising State?...... 73 State Sovereignty, Group Rights and the International System...... 78 The Myth Of Territorial Sovereignty...... 83 International Law and the State...... 88 Ethnic Conflict and the State...... 90 The Argument for Greater International Involvement in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict ...... 93 Self Determination and Rights in International Law ...... 95

PART TWO Central Asia: The Legacy of the and the Emergence of the in Central Asia...... 107

Historical Foundations for Ethnicity and Identity in Central Asia ...... 109 The ...... 112 The ...... 116 The ...... 118

i The Turkmen ...... 121 The Kyrgyz...... 123 Sources of and Unity...... 125 Islam in Central Asia ...... 126 Reconciling Historiography with Reality in Central Asia ...... 130 Soviet Nationalities Policy and the Formation of the Central Asian Republics ...... 132 Nationalities Policy and the Development of the Bolshevik Federal Framework...... 134 Stalin and the Evolution of Soviet Federalism...... 143 The Formation of the Central Asian Republics ...... 148 The Emergence of Ethnonationalism in Central Asia? Structures of Identity in a Post-Soviet World...... 169 ...... 174 ...... 176 ...... 177 ...... 180 ...... 187 Border Disputes and – Prospects for Intra- and Interstate Conflict...... 213 Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan Border Demarcation...... 215 Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Border Demarcation...... 221 The Conundrum of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ...... 224 Voluntary and Involuntary Transfer as a Destabilising Factor...... 229 Belligerent Uzbekistan at the Centre: Further Causes and Consequences of Regional Tensions ...... 231

PART THREE Central Asia: Challenges to Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the State...... 241

Impediments to State Evolution: The Influence of Regional and International Factors on State Capacity Building in Central Asia ...... 243 The New : US interests in Central Asia and the prospects for a new ‘Great Game’ ...... 246 A Resurgent Russia in Central Asia – Continued Colonialism or New Opportunities for Development? ...... 250 China – Economic Synergies and Shared Security Concerns?...... 256 The Implications of Regional Dislocation ...... 261 Multilateralism in Central Asia: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? ...... 267 Commonwealth of Independent States...... 270

ii The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ...... 276 The Eurasian Economic Community and GUUAM ...... 281 Other Regional Organisations ...... 284 The Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe ...... 287 The United Nations...... 292 Penetrating State Sovereignty? Problems and Prospects for International Institutional Contributions to State Building and Conflict Resolution in Post Soviet Central Asia..... 294 The International Community and Central Asia - Opportunities for Engagement and Conflict Prevention ...... 300 Constitutional Design as a Solution to Central Asian Woes...... 304 Consociation and the Management of Diverse Populations ...... 306 Non-Territorial National Cultural Autonomy: A Return to Fundamentals?...... 314 The Application of the National Cultural Autonomy model: Challenges and Prospects 316 The Hungarian System of Minority Protection ...... 320 Regional Solutions to the Issue of Protection in Central Asia...... 325 The Application of Innovative Forms of Governance and Citizenship in the Central Asian Space: Implications for State Sovereignty...... 328 Conclusion ...... 333 Consolidating a Rationale for State Capacity Building and Constructive Intervention in Central Asia ...... 333 References...... 346

iii Table of Figures

Graph One: Ethnopolitical Rebellion...... 20 Graph Two: Types of Conflict...... 21 Graph Three: Trends in Ethnic Conflict ...... 24 Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict ...... 57 Ordering of Groups ...... 64 Ethnopolitical Conflicts 1993-1994...... 71 Political Subdivisions Circa 1922...... 150 Distribution of the Major National Groups of Central Asia and the Proportion of Each National Group to the Total Population of Each - 1920...... 151 Political Subdivisions Circa 1936...... 156 Population of Central Asia Republics within Boundaries of September 17, 1939...... 158 National Composition of the Communist Party of in 1922 ...... 162 Ethnic Composition - 1989 ...... 169 Geographical Dispersion of Major Ethnic Groups in 1993 ...... 171 Ethnic Composition - 1999 ...... 172 Geographic Dispersal of Ethnic Groups in Tajikistan in 1992 ...... 174 Migration Balance For Kazakhstan – 1991-1999 ...... 193 Kazakh Percentages of Workforce 1977-1994 ...... 199 Disputed ...... 227 US Financial Assistance – 2002/2003 ...... 246

iv Introduction

Introduction

This thesis focuses on the of post-Soviet Central Asia – namely the Republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan – and examines the potential for ethnic conflict within these states and the implications that this potential has for regional and international security.

The republics of Central Asia have been selected as the focus of this study because the author believes that not only is there a continuing potential for ethnic conflict within the region, but the republics themselves provide a context within which a number of critical issues relating to sovereignty, minority group management and international security can be considered. More specifically, the Central Asian Republics, as a consequence of their history, their construction, their diverse yet interwoven populations, and the nature of the governments that, upon unexpected independence in 1992, assumed control of their territories, provide a prism through which a number of the assumptions that provide the foundation of the international system of sovereign states can be assessed.

A number of the parameters of this assessment are derived from the earlier Masters research project completed by the author that examined the causes and consequences of the events in the former Yugoslav in the early to mid-1990’s. Two key conclusions that are pertinent to this thesis were drawn from the research that underpinned this project.

The first, and broadest, conclusion drawn was that the current international system of sovereign states contains several fundamental flaws. The most significant of these flaws derive from the notion of the sacrosanctity of state sovereignty, and the general principle that once sovereignty is bestowed upon a state, it cannot, acts of war aside, be taken away. Whilst this notion, considered in isolation, appears relatively benign, the modern interpretation of sovereignty fails to acknowledge the existance of factors that can undermine the capability and stability of a state, in particular during the processes of state formation and consolidation.

1 Introduction

The most readily observable of these factors occurs when there is a widespread acceptance or promotion of the idea of the ‘nation-state’ as the logical goal of state development. The reality is that the ‘nation-state’ is a myth, as almost all of the states that comprise the international system are multi-national states, with very few instances of the nation being synonymous with the state. Despite this hereterogenity, the processes of state formation typically see one or more of the nations within a multi- national state mobilising the structures of state to the detriment of the other nations or ethnic groups. This may occur because a particular group may be numerically superior, or may have access to greater economic resources. Unfortunately, tension or even overt conflict between the different groups that constitute the is occasionally inevitable as a result. The ‘majority group’ furthers its own objectives by discriminating against the ‘minority group’, which in turn mobilises in the face of perceived discrimination and denial of opportunity. Therefore, in most instances of overt or violent conflict between different ethnic or national groups within the borders of a state, the government of that state cannot be relied upon to resolve the conflict. This may be because the government is party to the conflict, and consequently unwilling or unable to offer resolutions.

The second conclusion was that certain types of states within the international system may be predisposed to the outbreak of ethnic conflict. This predisposition is often the result of these states lacking either ‘state capacity’ or critical internal legitimacy, in that there is little historical precedent or justification for their constitution, nor is there any particular geographical or ethno-political rationale for their existence. The wealth of literature on state failure and quasi-states and the problems that can confront ‘post- colonial’ states provides ample evidence of the reality of the failing or failed state, and the dramatic consequences that a failed state can have for regional or even international security. In such instances, the international community, in the form of the United Nations (UN) or alternative bodies, has generally been ineffective in contributing to the resolution of the conflict, either directly (through diplomatic, military, economic or humanitarian intervention) or indirectly through the provision of policy advice or the strategic exercise of influence.

2 Introduction

Although the international multilateral system has received a dramatic, but far from positive, shake-up as a consequence of actions by the United States of America (US) in Iraq and the subsequent unilateral US doctrine of pre-emption, the fact that little has been accomplished in the way of developing a comprehensive framework for dealing with instances of ethnic conflict continues to be a source of consternation.

And despite the reduction in recent years in the number of ethnic conflicts from the peak that occurred in the late-1980 to early-1990’s, as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the author believes that events in Central Asia over the last 15 years since the independence of the republics in the region have made the republics no less susceptible to the risk of outbreak of ethnic conflict than they were at independence. Fortunately, with the exception of the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990’s and recent events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the Central Asian republics have been relatively free of conflict of any kind. However, as argued in the central part of this thesis, this absence of ethnic conflict is in no way attributable to the policies of the republics. From a certain perspective, conflict in the region has failed to develop despite the best efforts of governments of the various republics to create divisions between the different ethnic or minority groups within their borders.

Additionally, a number of peculiar features of these states make them collectively worthy of discussion not just from the perspective of their potential for ethnic conflict, but also from the perspective of state sovereignty and intervention. Most notable is the fact that the post-Soviet Central Asian republics were largely ‘cobbled’ together as part of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Communist Revolution in Russia and reflect the ideological objectives of the Marxist-Leninists rather than any legitimate logic of state building. Whilst many post-colonial states in Africa and elsewhere were similarly artificial in their design and creation, the Central Asian republics are almost unique as a consequence of their origins as states being determined entirely as a consequence of deliberate Soviet nationalities policies and border demarcation processes. In some respects these republics were far more experimental than their counterparts within the Soviet Union, in that the Central Asian region was something of a litmus test of the Soviet Union’s ability to facilitate the evolution of nationalities in a manner that reflects broader Marxist-Leninist objectives. Soviet nationalities policies and border

3 Introduction

demarcation processes, when transposed over the historical reality and political traditions of the region, created a uniquely vulnerable type of state within Central Asia. And, as a consequence of the relative failure of the governments of the region to develop durable and effective governance frameworks since independence, it is the author’s opinion that the republics will in the future be prime candidates for the title of ‘failed state’. Recognition of this prospect by the ‘international community’ will provide international institutions such as the UN, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other like-minded bodies with an opportunity to avoid the mistakes it has made in previous occurrences of ‘failed states’ such as in the former Yugoslavia and Central and Western Africa, by seeking to assist or persuade the governments of post-Soviet Central Asia to constructively and positively deal with potential and actual sources of internal conflict now, before conflict becomes inevitable.

The identification and evaluation of the factors that contribute to the potential for ethnic conflict in Central Asia, and the development of an understanding of what issues may prove to be triggers of any future conflict, ethnic or otherwise, is the central objective of this thesis. Without this understanding, it would be practically impossible to proactively or reactively deal with the regional and international security dimensions of ethnic conflict in Central Asia.

The second objective involves qualifying those factors that may constrain either the ability of the state or the international institution to intervene effectively and legitimately in instances of ethnic conflict. As discussed earlier, both sovereign states and international institutions have notoriously poor track records when it comes to dealing with instances of intrastate ethnic conflict. On one hand, the failings of the state can often be attributed to structural or policy failings of the state. On the other hand, the international community is prevented from intervening effectively by the very principles and laws that were established to ensure international stability and security.

The final objective of this thesis is to develop an understanding of the pertinence of the different strategies or solutions that may be available to deal with either potential or actual ethnic conflict in Central Asia. It is possible to identify almost as many ‘solutions’ to ethnic conflict as causes. Options available for consideration by domestic

4 Introduction

and international policy makers can range across an entire spectrum of policy options, bounded on one end by partition and / or population transfer, and on the other end by active policies of or affirmative action. However, no single solution or strategy is going to be applicable for the entire Central Asian region, especially when the reality of the Central Asian ethnopolitical environment is understood. Additionally, the more radical the solution, the less likely it is to be able to be implemented. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to attempt to identify those strategies that may mitigate the potential for ethnic conflict in the region by reducing the significance of identified triggers. However, this discussion will not merely consider effectiveness, but also consider the likelihood that the sovereign republics of the region can actually be persuaded to recognise the value of adopting such strategies.

Achievement of these objectives should ensure that the central question of this thesis, specifically, whether the relationship between international security, state sovereignty and emerging ethnonationalism can actually be reconciled in Central Asia, can be effectively answered.

Inevitably, there is a significant range of issues that will have a bearing on the answer to this question. These issues include the very nature of ethnicity and nationalism and the role played by ethnonationalism in the development of ethnic conflict; the legal and behavioural dimensions of the international system of sovereign states including the practical application of concepts such as sovereignty and self determination; the role of history, in particular the enduring legacy of the Soviet Union, as a determinant of the viability of the modern Central Asian republics; and the impact that engagement with the international system of sovereign states has had on the development of the Central Asian republics. In order to deal with these issues in a structured and coherent manner, this thesis has been conceived in three parts.

The first part, comprised of four chapters, sets the parameters for the entire discussion by considering the nature of ethnic conflict, the rules and conventions that govern the establishment and maintenance of the sovereign state, and the institutions and agreements that govern the international system and constrain the sovereign states that act within it. This part briefly examines the ethnic conflicts that developed across the

5 Introduction

globe in the later part of the 20th century, and also broadly considers regional and international responses to ethnic conflicts. Consideration is also given to Central Asia as a possible location for future ethnic conflicts, with a focus on possible triggers of ethnic conflict within the region. This is then followed by a discussion on the nature of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and nationalism, and the theoretical explanations for the ways identity and allegiance are formed are compared to the reality of identity and ethnicity in Central Asia. The discussion recognises the criticism of much of the literature on ethnicity and ethnonationalism as being ‘ethnocentric’, and considers the utility of these theories in an evaluation of Central Asia.

These points are subsequently developed by considering the question of why conflict occurs within ethnic groups. Although the author recognises the near impossibility of identifying a definitive explanation for occurrences of ethnic conflict, it is still considered pertinent and necessary to survey the theoretical explanations of ethnic conflict. For similar reasons the principles of sovereignty is considered, as is the role played by international law in configuring the relationship between peoples and the state that they reside in, and that state and the international community of states. These concepts have a critical bearing on the direction of this thesis, because the principles of sovereignty and self-determination, and the associated body of international law, provide the framework governing international responses to ethnic conflict.

Part Two of the paper then moves on to an examination of the development of ethnicity and nationalism within the Central Asian context. One of the key goals of this part is to consider how Soviet policies on nationalities and border demarcation determined the shape of the Central Asian republics and in the process irrevocably, and possibly detrimentally, changed the very fabric of society and culture in the region. The historical foundations of ethnicity and identity in the region are summarised, and the discussion then focuses on Soviet nationalities policies, the Soviet border demarcation process, and the impact that these processes had on the traditions of the peoples of Central Asia.

The processes and policies that underpinned the formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics had a critical bearing on the type and form of statehood enjoyed by the

6 Introduction

Central Asian republics upon independence. The legacy of the Soviet Union in Central Asia has only been slightly diluted in the years since independence, and it is the author’s opinion that the first ten years of Soviet rule in the region still haunt the republics today. The main issue was that the delineation of the republics’ borders was directed by the based Soviet regime, with little to no input from the region itself. State boundaries and ethnic composition lacked correspondence and were part of a deliberate, explicit strategy to weaken peripheral resistance to a centralised Soviet regime.

The ideological foundation for Soviet policies on nationalities and border demarcation is also examined, with issues such as self-determination and federalism as dealt with by Lenin and Stalin discussed in detail. These policies had a critical bearing on the 1922- 24 Soviet Constitution and the associated program of ‘national delimitation’, which saw the establishment of the Soviet system of Union Republics. Although Soviet policies pertaining to nationalities evolved over the following half century, the focus at this point of the discussion is limited to the formative years of the Soviet Union when the most marked change was wrought on the social, political, cultural and economic landscape of Central Asia.

The discussion then moves forward to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing upon the theoretical foundations established in Part One, the discussion highlights developments in the region over the last fifteen years that indicate the emergence of ethnonationalism within the region. The basic premise is that, as a consequence of the significant proportions of non-titular nationalities in all of the republics of Central Asia, the adoption of ‘nation-building’ policies that favour the titular group over other groups is almost guaranteed to produce significant tensions between different ‘ethnic’ groups. A survey of government policies and treatments of non-titular nationalities in the various republics suggests that discriminatory ethnonationalism has developed as a prominent political philosophy in the years since independence.

Although the Soviet era did witness some instances of virulent conflict between ethnic groups in the region, most notably in the Ferghana Valley, it is the argument of the author that, as a consequence of ‘nationalising’ policies, many of the Central Asian

7 Introduction

republics are as likely to experience instances of ethnic conflict now as they were fifteen years ago. Furthermore, given the significant irredentist dimension to ethnicity in the region, there is a strong likelihood that ethnic conflict in one region or republic could rapidly escalate and spread to neighbouring republics. As a consequence, the emergence of nationalism could force the development of overt conflict between the constituent groups that would make the conflict in the former Yugoslavia seem insignificant in comparison.

This part also considers the issue of irredentism from the perspective of border delineation, and examines the impact of border disputes on relations between the republics, and the implications of hardening borders for the economies and social structures of the entire region. Although the Central Asian republics possessed full Union Republic status during the Soviet era, independence saw them confronted with the prospect of international boundaries for the first time in their history. Complicating matters was the fact that large stretches of borders between the newly independent republics were ill-defined, and soon provided to be matters of contention between states.

Over time several of the states, most notably Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, came to view non-titular populations that resided near borders with their kin-state with a suspicion that approached the hostility that they felt for their neighbours. Populations straddling borders became the pawns in often heated negotiations on border demarcation, and suffered as a consequence of repeated border closures by republics carried out to score political points on a number of occasions. However the most dramatic impact of the hardening of borders in the region was the significant disruption of the trade and economic activity that was the lifeblood of the border communities across the region. When coupled with the increasingly discriminatory policies emerging across the region, the border issue contributed to a heightened risk of tension amongst groups, and between states and non-titular populations.

The end of Part Two marks the commencement of an examination of the impact of state and institutional actors on the abilities of the Central Asian republics to develop the

8 Introduction

durable political and administrative infrastructure required to function as a sovereign and effective state in the international system.

Although the focus remains upon Central Asia, Part Three is something of a departure from the previous discussion because it attempts to identify and evaluate the external forces, positive and negative, that are influencing the path that the Central Asian states have chosen as theoretically sovereign states. Although the author stops short of definitively categorising the republics of Central Asia as ‘post-colonial’ states, the similarities between such states and the states of Central Asia are significant. The republics are as vulnerable to outside exploitation as they are reliant upon assistance, militarily, economically, technically and administratively, and thus have some parallels with the post-colonial countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960’s.

Therefore, it is considered that those states and the international actors that have dealings, diplomatic or otherwise, with the republics have a critical role to play in assisting these republics to develop the state capacity that they lacked at independence. However, this discussion is about more than just whether such external actors are having a positive or negative impact upon the Central Asian states. It is also concerned with illustrating, via an examination of the relationships that the republics have with external interests such as the US, Russia and China, just how much true sovereignty is enjoyed by the republics in their capacity as sovereign states. Given this entire discussion is about subverting sovereignty to allow for international institutional involvement in the resolution of ethnic conflict, it is critical to determine the level of sovereignty enjoyed by the states in the first place.

To this end, the relationships that the republics maintain with the likes of the US, Russia and China are examined from the perspective of what the republics must concede to continue their asymmetrical relationships with these state actors. Similarly, the role of regional organisations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are examined from a cost-benefit perspective, with the bottom line being judged in terms of how effective these institutions are in equipping the republics with not only state capacity, but also the ability to constructively deal with the issue of group rights and the competing demands

9 Introduction

of their disparate populations. One major issue that emerges during this discussion is that the states and regional organisations seeking to engage the republics of Central Asia are constrained by a lack of coordination on one hand, and a lack of cooperation on the other. Furthermore, in jostling for influence in the region, state actors such as Russia, China and the US are also, inadvertently and deliberately, driving a wedge between the different republics.

This leads into a discussion on the constraints that face international institutions seeking to engage with the republics by assisting them develop effective and appropriate forms of governance. In this instance, sovereignty proves to be more of an impediment to those international actors that theoretically contribute more positively to the development of the states of the region than it does to self serving state actors seeking to achieve their foreign policy objective. One indirect consequence of US engagement, particularly with Uzbekistan, is that the republics have become more wary of external interests – state or institutional – seeking to have them adopt ‘western’ ideas of democracy, political reform and respect for human rights.

It is obvious that any solutions to the problems that beset the Central Asian republics will continue to be constrained not just by the very concept of sovereignty, but by the reality of the international system, in which competing priorities, conflicting interests, and asymmetrical relationships will continue to influence the geopolitical lanscape of the region. However, progress in this regard could be made if states and institutions with an active interest in Central Asia could make several small, but symbolic steps. Firstly, the geostrategic significance of the region needs to be acknowledged as being founded on more than just energy resources and Islamic militancy. The significance of the emergence of nationalism, and the associated destabilising threat of ethnic conflict needs to be recognised not just by the neighbours of the Central Asian republics, but also by the entire international community. Secondly, states and international institutions need to recognise the value of a coordinated approach to dealing with the Central Asian republics, a concession that in the long term will provide them with significantly more benefits than costs.

10 PART ONE

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in a World of Sovereign States

11 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

Chapter One

Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia

Ethnic Conflict and the International System

The immediate post-Cold War period witnessed a significant increase in both the incidence and intensity of confrontation and actual conflict between what are termed “ethnic” groups within a state, or between an ethnic group and a state. By the midpoint of the 1990’s there were several hundred such conflicts occurring on all continents,1 varying in intensity from confrontations between politically mobilised groups to actual warfare. A number of these conflicts continued into the new millennium, and some still show little sign of abating. What is of greater concern to this study is not the frequency of conflict that manifests itself along ethnic lines, but the longevity of such conflicts, and the difficulty typically encountered in formulating resolutions to them. Evaluations of all cases of protracted conflict that have developed in recent history have indicated that they originated in divisions between ethnic groups.2 This increase in ethnic conflict was in certain regards a culmination of a long-term trend that began in the 1950’s with the processes of decolonisation and peaked with the end of the cold war and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.3

Despite the challenges that conflict between ethnic groups poses for domestic, regional and international security, the international community, particularly as represented by the United Nations, has typically proven both unable and unwilling to become involved in the resolution of ethnic conflicts. Although international authorities, including UN Secretaries-General, have recognised the implications that the increase in ethnic conflict has for international security,4 traditionally they have consistently avoided facilitating international involvement by referring to the principle of state sovereignty as the reason

1 Stavenhagen, R., Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State, Macmillan, London, 1996, p1. 2 Crighton, E. and Abele MacIver, M., “The Evolution of Protracted Conflict”, Comparative Politics, January, 1991, pp127-142, p127. 3 Gurr, T., “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane”, Foreign Affairs, vol 79, issue 3, May-June 2000, p52. 4 Stavenhagen, R., 1996, p2.

13 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

for inaction. Such conflicts have, in the past, been classified as "strictly an internal (state) matter and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations".5 Over the last five years, however, there have been some indications of a shift towards a more widespread acceptance of the notion of a shared responsibility for intervening in widespread or systematic violations of human rights. For example, the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, titled The Responsibility to Protect, provided what amounted to a new philosophy of international responsibility for matters long considered off limits. The central theme of this report was “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states”.6

The publication of this report came several years after several cases of what could be categorised as ‘ethnic conflict’ that had forced the international community from its position of inertia and relative indifference to one of action. Intervention in the Bosnian War and its epilogue in Kosovo, however flawed, saw international interests prepared to lend legitimacy to interventionist strategies at the expense of once sacrosanct notions of state sovereignty. NATO’s actions in respect to events in Kosovo:

“…(placed)…human rights above the rights of the state…..although it has no direct mandate from the UN, it did not happen as an act of aggression or out of disrespect for international law. It happened, on the contrary, out of respect for a law that ranks higher than the law that protects the sovereignty of states. The alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and international legal documents dictate.”7

5 U. Thant, quoted in Ryan, S., “Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol 13, no 1, 1990, pp25-47, p26. 6 “The Responsibility to Protect”, 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001, pviii. 7 Czech President Vaclev Havel, in a speech to the Canadian parliament, quoted in Robertson, G., Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, Alan Lane, London, 1999, p73. Robertson discussed how, although NATO action against Serbia in response to their actions in Kosovo was in prima facie contravention of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, is was justified under the evolving principle of humanitarian necessity, whereby “force of a proportionate kind may be used in order to

14 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

So too the long running conflict between local groups in East Timor seeking independence from Indonesian hegemony finally came to the attention of international decision makers. Such actions have been viewed as indicating that the management of ethnic conflict is increasingly becoming accepted as an international responsibility.8 However, as equally significant as the fact that these interventions actually occurred was the fact that the majority of them were categorised as abject failures, and thus drew as much attention to perceived inadequacies of the UN system as to the idea of collective responsibility. Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, in particular, represented crisis points for the UN, and both events forced the UN to introspection. The subsequent highly critical assessments conducted by the UN, and the reports that followed, were merely the first phase of a lengthy process of introspection which culminated in the Brahimi Report on United Nations Peace Operations issued in the second half of 2000.9

Failures on the part of the UN aside, the reality of such interventions was that they were more derived from foreign policy decisions on the part of only a few states, and not some international recognition of the need to shoulder some of the responsibility for managing instances of ethnic conflict. And although in recent years the principles of sovereignty and intervention have come to be recognised as not necessarily mutually exclusive philosophically and legally, there is still a political tendency to use the former term to exclude the latter, or as a justification for non-intervention that is a consequence resulting more from domestic political objectives that an adherence to an immutable rule of international law. Indeed the success or failure of both enforcement action and peacekeeping was perceived by the Brahimi Reports as being dependent upon the political will of the member states. This dependency included not only state support, manifest either through General Assembly or Security Council resolutions, but also a

prevent a humanitarian catastrophe” (p72). However, given the widespread civilian casualties that resulted from NATO bombing, it is debatable whether this action was, in fact, proportionate. 8 Gurr, T., 2000, p52. 9 At the time, The Brahimi Report was considered to be constrained not by a lack of clear recommendations or an ill defined mandate (although there were identified areas of concern beyond its mandate), but by the likelihood that it will “actually be implemented by those elements of the UN that actually count in this area, namely the member states”: see White, Nigel, “Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol 6, no 1, 2001, pp127-146, p138.

15 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

willingness to contribute financially and militarily to operations that were carried out under the auspices of the UN.

“The critical weakness at the heart of both peacekeeping and military enforcement action is the fact that although legally the UN is distinct from its member states, in practice for the UN to mount any type of military operation the member states must contribute troops and resources”.10

The consequence is that, for every case of intervention, there are numerous examples of continued inertia on the part of either regional or international institutions. Conflicts in , , Nagorno-Karabakh, and Palestine gain at best only the sporadic attention of international decision makers, and stand as testament to not only the whimsical nature of the international political community but to the failure of international decision makers to recognise the long term implications of conflicts that manifest along ethno-national lines.

Prior to the invasion by NATO forces, was another classic example of the tendency of the UN and the international community to ignore or misrepresent intrastate conflict. Although this conflict is rarely classified as ethnic, in certain respects it deserves such a tag. With the Taliban dominated by Durrani , and the anti- Taliban forces generally constituted by non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as Uzbeks, Tajiks and , it is ironic that the conflict was painted at various times as one based on religious or regional grounds, or even a war of succession.11 And although the war in Afghanistan had proceeded along the same path since 1994, prior to September 11 2001 the only attention paid to it had been the intermittent concern of aid agencies. Yet, even now, with the largely unilateral action taken by the US and its NATO ‘allies’ against ‘Taliban terrorism’, international action seems grounded on the foreign policy

10 White, Nigel, 2001, pp127-146. 11 Nojumi, Neamatollah, in The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Palgrave, New York, 2002, pp117- 133, discussed the origins of the Taliban. According to Nojumi, many of the Pashtun officers in Najibullah’s army felt marginalised by the influence of non-Pashtun elements in the military, and defected to the Taliban, which, of course was led by Mohammad Omar, a Durrani Pashtun. The Taliban also actively targeted ethnic Pashtun ex-army officers who were refugees in (p127), lending a definite ethnic flavour to the makeup of the Taliban.

16 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

goals of a few states rather than a desire to intervene positively in the resolution of domestic conflict (ethnically-based or otherwise). And although Heads-of-Government such as Tony Blair called for the implementation of a UN administered system within Afghanistan along the lines of the frameworks implemented in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor,12 the reality falls far short of the rhetoric. The US, the main proponent of action in the first instance, has focused its resources on the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and left the responsibility for peace-monitoring, post-invasion reconstruction and ‘democracy-building’ largely to its NATO allies such as . Talk of an ongoing role in the region for organisations such as the UN was met with resistance and not a little consternation, with UN officials looking back to their experiences in missions such as Bosnia and Croatia13 and gauging their responses according to not only the relative lack of success in these missions, but also by the sheer magnitude of what would face them if they decided to intervene in the conflict.

It is a key argument of this thesis that responses to ethnic conflict at both a domestic (state) level and at the international level have to date been flawed, and that the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty that underpins much international decision making needs to be revised considerably to be valid in the post-Cold War World. Despite the fact that arguments in favour of greater levels of intervention on the part of international and regional bodies have in the past attracted many critics, interventionist strategies should come to be seen as increasingly legitimate in an environment of increasing economic and socio-political globalisation.

In view of the increasingly porous nature of state borders, the growing body of international law and treaties, and the increasing power of regional bodies such as the European Union, it is even arguable that traditional notions of state sovereignty are no longer appropriate. In this context sovereignty is more allied to economic or political influence than to any notions of the inviolability of state borders. Consequently a re- evaluation of the concept of state sovereignty would not only remove the hypocrisy that

12 McGeough, Paul, “After the War Comes the Horror”, Sydney Morning Herald, 13-14 October 2001, p33. 13 Judah, Tim, “UN Balks at Post-Taleban Role”, Reporting Central Asia, no 76, 19 October 2001.

17 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

in many respects undermines any prospect of legitimising a system of interventionist strategies to deal with ethnic conflict, but it would also allow for a measure of rationality and predictability to enter into the field of international politics. It is the view of the author that intervention in instances of ethnic conflict can and should be validated by the substantial body of international human rights law. Intervention in ethnic conflict should be treated as synonymous with humanitarian intervention, as ethnic conflict typically entails systematic violation of human rights, and impacts upon civilian, non-combatant elements of a population as much as actual combatants.

However, the author is strongly opposed to the vision of unilateralist intervention propounded by certain interests within the current administration in the US. For intervention to be legitimate, it must be genuinely multilateral. It must reflect not just the will of a single state or a select coalition of similarly principled allies (as was the case in Iraq, irrespective of US attempts to develop legitimacy by having strictly nominal support for its actions from a number of countries), but the will of the international community as manifest through one or a number of international institutions that both reflect and pursue defined principles of international law.

This thesis has several objectives. Firstly, it will examine the nature of ethnic conflict by evaluating the relationship between ethnic groups and the state, and the associated factors that can lead to instances of ethnic conflict. The newly emerged post Soviet republics in Central Asia will be used as a case study for a number of reasons that will be discussed later. It is accepted that it is almost impossible to offer an a priori analysis of the causes of ethnic conflict in any context. The former Yugoslavia and the Baltic region offer classic examples of where, on one hand even the most informed scholars failed to predict what was going to occur, and on the other hand experts anticipated a conflict that never occurred.14 Consequently, it is not the intention of this study to predict the development of more overt forms of conflict within the Central Asian republics. However, it is still considered valid to attempt to identify and analyse those

14 Kurth, J., “ and Ethnic Conflict – In Theory”, Orbis, vol 45, issue 2, Spring 2001, pp281-295, p281.

18 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

factors that may precipitate greater levels of conflict between different groups within Central Asia.

Secondly, the role of external actors, including states, international and regional institutions and organisations in both the development and the resolution of ethnic conflict will be evaluated. An understanding of the way states that are experiencing, or could potentially experience, conflict between ethnic groups interact with and are affected by external interests is critical to framing possible responses to ethnic conflict. Additionally, principles governing intervention in domestic conflicts will be discussed in a context that anticipates the development of strategies, interventionist and otherwise, that could be used in internal, domestic conflict in the post-Soviet Central Asian states. The existing international legal framework for intervention will be contrasted with possible regional cooperative arrangements that could be used to facilitate the adoption of feasible strategies for either mitigating the root causes of ethnic conflict or resolving any actual manifestations of such conflict.

The Continuing Threat of Ethnic Conflict

The term ‘ethnic conflict’ gained significant currency during the last decade of the 20th Century, and, along with the related term ‘’ it has become something of a catchphrase that underpins much of the popular media reporting of conflicts in many parts of the world. However, a number of authors have revised the significance of ethnic conflict to international and regional security. For example, Bowen contended that ethnic conflict has become something of a shorthand concept that is used in describing all violent confrontation between groups of people living in the same . He saw this application of the term ethnic conflict as based on three dangerous assumptions: firstly, that ethnic identities are ancient and unchanging; secondly, that these identities motivate people to persecute and kill; and finally, that ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence.15 However, this is an overly simplistic interpretation of the factors that can give rise to ethnic conflict, and one can certainly talk about ethnic conflict without either accepting of referring to these assumptions.

15 Bowen, J. “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict”, Journal of Democracy, vol 7, no 1, 1996, pp3-14, p3.

19 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

Similarly, Gurr challenges the assumption that there are increasing instances of ethnic conflict. He points to the fact that very few ethnically based campaigns of protest or rebellion have commenced since 1993. He also highlights the fact that between 1993 and 2000, the number of ethnic conflicts that he categorised as wars of self– determination have halved, with the current number of separatist wars being fought along ethnic lines being less than at any time since the early 1970’s.16

The statistics supporting Gurr’s arguments are persuasive. Much of the evidence relating to ethnic conflict indeed shows that ethno-political conflict peaked in the early 1990’s, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the demise of many of the regimes in the Eastern Bloc. The global trends of ethnic conflict are outlined below.

Graph One: Ethnopolitical Rebellion

Source: Centre for Systemic Peace, at: http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm

Many of these conflicts were long term disputes related to the decolonisation processes that were occurring throughout Africa and Asia, and the civil wars that were fuelled by not only the processes of decolonisation, but by the Cold War. It is the opinion of some

16 Gurr, T., 2000, p52.

20 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

authors that the impact of the Cold War has often been understated. Indeed, it has been considered by some that the Cold War was “characterised by increasing incidence and magnitudes of political violence, mostly ‘civil’ wars, that gradually decimated large areas of the world, seduced fragile political relations into hostility and chaos, led many newly emergent and some long-established states to the brink of structural failure (and beyond), and punished and imprisoned hundreds of millions of people in a horrendous mire of irremediable humanitarian crises”.17

However, there were similar patterns in the occurrence of all forms of warfare over the second half of the 20th Century. And although conflict that can be categorised as ethnic warfare was of comparable, if not greater, prevalence, to what can be defined as ‘revolutionary warfare’, the fact that these two forms of conflict occurred in a similar pattern to more ‘conventional’ inter-state warfare suggests that all three forms were driven by similar structural problems or issues.

Graph Two: Types of Conflict

Source: Centre for Systemic Peace, at: http://members.aol.com/9 cspmgm/conflict.htm

17 Centre for Systemic Peace, located at http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm

21 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

Although this graph indicates that there has been a rapid decline in warfare of all kinds between 1990 and 1995, the figures are significant from the perspective of this study because ethnic warfare peaked considerably higher than both inter-state warfare and revolutionary warfare. As mentioned earlier, this peak was largely a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, aside from Tajikistan, the post-Soviet Central Asian republics experienced little or none of the type of conflict that was raging in many of the other ex-communist states. The relatively smooth emergence of these states from the debris of the Soviet Union, however, owed more to the autocratic nature of their governments than to any internal cohesion or good management of the transition process by their governments. The relative absence of overt conflict in the region to date does not necessarily suggest that the region is free of the triggers of ethnopolitical conflict. It is the opinion of this author that rather than having effectively avoided the type of internal conflict experienced in other states, the post-Soviet Central Asian republics have merely deferred the outbreak of conflict between the various ethnic groups. The true test, and the true consequences, of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, will come when the issue of political succession emerges in a more violent way than it did in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Additionally, just as significant as the potential for conflict in the region is the fact that any ethnic conflict that does emerge in the region will adopt a pattern reflective of similar conflicts in other , in that it will be protracted and very difficult to resolve.

Conflict in Central Asia

The republics that comprise the post-Soviet Central Asian region – namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – are interesting case studies from a number of international relations perspectives. From the perspective of state sovereignty this region is particularly interesting because many of these states have only recently emerged from what was effectively a long period of Russian colonialism. The republics were originally constituted into a broader Soviet governance framework, and emerged as states basically by default with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Baltic republics that had actively sought independence from the Soviet Union, the

22 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

leaders of the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics had supported Gorbachev in his demands for the maintenance of a Union underpinned by a strong centre. Thus they felt betrayed by the disbanding of the Soviet Union by what they saw as a conspiracy by the Slavic leaders of the key , and .18 Additionally, the Central Asian republics that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union lacked many of the features that would in certain respects validate their existence. For example, none of these republics possessed anything more than a rudimentary capability to manage their foreign affairs,19 and their vulnerability was further heightened by the fact that they emerged from the Soviet Union with no substantial armed forces of their own, and thus were unable to guarantee their own security.20

The decolonisation process experienced by the Central Asian republics in many respects mirrored what many regions in Africa experienced several decades earlier. The states that emerged as a result of decolonisation in both instances contained very few native institutions or traditional governance structures, , and the linkages between state and society were weak and poorly defined. And although the Central Asian republics have at least established armed forces of their own since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary processes of state formation are still underway.

A question mark still hangs over the abilities of these states, especially Uzbekistan, to develop legitimate, durable and appropriate state structures that would enable them to undertake the key functions of government. The region lacks any domestic traditions of centralised government that, from the perspectives of western commentators, would enable them to meet the challenges of an increasingly globalised and constantly changing international political and economic environment. One key issue, the historical role played by Russia in the region, has significant implications for the abilities of these states to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Russia became involved in the region in the mid to late-19th century, at a point where the domestic

18 Rashid, A, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1994, pp2-5. 19 ibid, pp207-8. 20 ibid, p232.

23 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

political structures were at a semi-feudal level of development.21 Russian influence continued to be a determining factor in the growth of domestic institutions in the region right up to the 1990’s.

In many respects, both the Tsarist and Soviet Russian governments played a role in Central Asia that very closely paralleled the actions of the European colonialists in sub- Saharan Africa. Traditional forms of governance were abolished, and administrative boundaries were established, not in accordance with an ethno-geographical logic, but with an intention to undermine the unity of the region and to sow the seeds of division and thus guarantee security of the colonial interests. The Central Asian states that emerged from the debris of the Soviet Union still largely reflected the intentions of the Tsarist and Soviet bureaucratic and military institutions that, earlier in the century had sought to impose workable territorial boundaries on a huge swathe of newly acquired .22

Graph Three: Trends in Ethnic Conflict

Source: Centre for Systemic Peace at:http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm

21 Juska, Arunas, “Ethno-political transformation in the states of the former USSR”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol 22, no 3, May 1999, pp524-553, p530.

24 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

Consequently these states are still vulnerable to internal conflict and external influence and meddling, particularly from Russia, and it is yet to be seen if the states can avoid the type of conflict experienced by parts of Africa as a result of decolonisation by European powers. The post communist states in general have proven particularly vulnerable to incidents of ethnic conflict, and although the number of conflicts in these countries followed the global trends by peaking in the early 1990’s and then tapering off, there is still perceivably scope for fresh outbreaks of conflict between groups as many of the structural problems that facilitated these conflicts still exist.

Thus it is very timely to examine the web of relations between ‘ethnic’ groups and states within this region. Study of this region may also provide a window of insight into the processes of decolonisation that may complement largely retrospective analyses of post-colonial Africa and South Asia. It may also provide insight into the formation and legitimisation of state structures and institutions in an increasingly globalised world.

From this perspective Central Asia is an interesting example on a number of levels. Most importantly, it could prove to be a major flashpoint of ethnic conflict, with significant levels of conflict between ethnic groups having already occurred. In addition to Soviet era events such as the exodus of the from Uzbekistan, and the violence in Osh and the Batken region of the Ferghana Valley, the civil war in Tajikistan that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union stands as the most brutal reminder of how conflict can unfold. This conflict, which has alternatively been defined in both regional and ethno-religious terms resulted in up to 50,000 deaths and is very pertinent to this study.

The readiness of the Russian government to intervene in this conflict highlights the ongoing hegemony of Russia in this region, an issue that in itself has implications for the actual sovereignty enjoyed by the Central Asian states. The divisions that produced this conflict still exist, and they could continue to undermine the political stability of the Central Asian region. Furthermore, it is arguable that the Central Asian republics are yet to realise the full ramifications of not only the collapse of the Soviet Union, but of

22 Juska, Arunas, 1999, p530.

25 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

the decolonisation processes associated with the decline of Russian ‘imperialist’ activities in the region.

Sources of Conflict in Central Asia

Shirin Akiner identified a number of issues that could act as triggers to conflict in the majority of the Central Asian republics. These potential and actual sources of conflict fall into a number of broad categories which will assist in the examination of the domestic socio-political environments within the Central Asian states, and the relationships between these states:

1. or regional rivalry – The Tajik civil war occurred largely as a result of a number of different geographically based groups (the northern Khojentis, southern Kulyabis and eastern Tavildara) vying for political and economic supremacy.23 An examination of the identities of the different groups, and the web of interrelations that underpin the political and economic structures and activities within the Central Asian states, will illustrate how regionalism is as significant an issue as western interpretations of ethnicity and in the development of identity, allegiance and the manifestation of inter-group conflict.

2. Political succession – Recent events in Kyrgyzstan notwithstanding, the regimes in power in the republics are dominated by those that held power during the Soviet era, and little has been achieved in establishing mechanisms for succession by alternative parties, or more democratic forms of governance.24 The power of the political elites is very much derived from a dependence on the functioning of the centralised bureaucracies that have carried over from the Soviet era.25 It is perceivable that these political elites may actually resist the development of domestic, more democratic forms of political representation and

23 Akiner, Shirin. Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development? Minority Rights Group, United Kingdom, 1997, p11. 24 ibid, p11. 25 Juska, Arunas,1999, p540.

26 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

administration as they seek to maintain their positions, and thus facilitate the development of conflict between themselves and competing groups.

3. Cross-border irredentism – The heterogenous nature of the states’ populations, and the significant division of ‘ethnic groups’ between the states ensures that irredentism will be of continuing concern. And although all the post-Soviet leaders within Central Asia have agreed to honour existing borders,26 in recent years there have been an increasing number of instances where disagreements over border demarcation has seen dramatic responses, including the mobilisation of military units. If there is an increasing trend within the Central Asian republics towards political and economic favouritism of the ‘titular’ nationality, as has occurred in Uzbekistan with an increasing policy of ‘Uzbekinisation’27, then irredentism will be become an issue of increasing significance.

4. Competition for scarce resources, including water – The Soviet system of agriculture saw a significant amount Central Asian land overexploited in the production of cotton and other cash crops requiring intensive irrigation. Much of the region is reliant upon a common system of waterways, and competition for a drastically diminished resource is resulting in conflict not only between groups but between states.28 Dispute over water from shared systems has already coloured relations between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and water has become the main trigger for confrontation between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Ferghana Valley.29 Exacerbating this tension is the fact that 90% of water resources in the region are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the main consumers – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – only able to supply 14% and 45% respectively of their domestic water needs.30 However, it is unclear whether such competition will facilitate the

26 Akiner, Shirin,1997, p12. 27 Juska, Arunas, 1999, p542. 28 Akiner, Shirin, 1997, p12. 29 Lipovski, Igor, “The deterioration of the ecological situation in Central Asia: causes and possible consequences”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 47, no 7, 1995, pp1109-1124. 30 Karaev, Zainiddin, “Water Diplomacy in Central Asia”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol9, no1 ( 2005), pp63, 65. Karaev discussed how the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, lacking in the natural resources of their neighbours, are viewing water as a commodity for trade and profit.

27 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

development of virulent strains of nationalism or militant Islam. Survival of future regimes within the region will rely not on their ability to rally supporters around the causes of nationalism or Islam, but in their power to ensure that their constituency has access to a ready supply of water.31

5. Politicisation of Islam - There is considerable scope for the development of Islamic militarism within the Central Asian republics. The autocratic nature of government, combined with an increase in income inequality, increasing competition for scarce resources and what has been considered a “schizophrenic attitude towards Islam”32 by governments has in many ways made the Central Asian region ripe for the growth of as most recently evidenced by the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan. Although the primary face of militant Islam, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), is still licking its wounds following Afghanistan the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) is continuing to emerge as a movement to be reckoned with.

Naturally, Russia is going to be very wary of any conflicts that develop in Central Asia that possess a nationalist or ethno-religious dimension, yet this wariness goes further than just concern for regional security and stability. The Russian Federation itself is a of ethnic and religious groups that hold varying degrees of autonomy within the federal framework. However, of the thirty two ethnically defined regions within the Russian Federation, the regions that have been most active in agitating for separatism from the Russian Federation are those that religiously and culturally have the greatest affinity, on religious or ethnic terms, with the ethnic groups within Central Asia – namely, , Chechnya and . Generally, republics or autonomous regions within the Russian Federation with traditionally Muslim titular nationalities have proven to be more separatist than other groups.33 Any antagonism that develops within the Central Asian republics towards Russia, or the ethnic who still live within their borders, could perceivably see community or even political support for

31 Lipovski, Igor, 1995. 32 Akiner, Shirin, 1997, p14. 33 Treisman, Daniel, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order”, World Politics, vol 49, no 2, 1997, pp212-249, pp231, 243.

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separatist activities by Russia’s ethnic groups develop within the Central Asian states. The latest Chechen war provides a lucid example of how such support could manifest, with militants from all over the Islamic world, including Central Asia, joining the in their struggle for independence.

Additionally, Russia’s interest in the region’s stability stems from the large populations of Russians that still live within the Central Asian Republics. These populations ensure that the relationship between Russia and Central Asia has social as well as political and economic dimensions. Yet, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian diaspora in Central Asia has created a whole new set of issues for relations between the states.

The existence of large communities of ethnic Russians within Central Asia is a result of the Soviet policy of modernisation within Central Asia that encouraged mass migration of ethnic Russians into the region. Ethnic Russians came to run much of the industry, transportation, educational and medical systems within this region as part of a defined plan by the Kremlin to maintain control over the region.34 Yet, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these ethnic Russians found that in many instances, in particular in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, they were no longer welcome, and their position at the top of the economic and industrial hierarchy was further antagonising their relations with the other groups, in particular the ‘titular’ nationalities.

Although the size of the Russian communities had been declining since the 1970’s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the associated dismantling of the colonial economic and political infrastructures saw mass migration of Russians from the region – by 1994 around one million ethnic Russians had left Central Asia.35 This mass migration produced many issues for both the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation. For Central Asia, the exodus of ethnic Russians impeded the states’ ability to become politically and economically viable, as the departed Russians occupied many of the professional and technical fields in industry and administration. For Russia, there was the issue of accommodating the returning Russians within a domestic economic and

34 Juska, Arunas, 1999, p531. 35 ibid, p540.

29 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

political framework that in itself had yet to develop some measure of stability. It is perceivable that discrimination against ethnic Russians in Central Asia may facilitate the development of a focus on irredentism within the Russian Federation, which over time may work towards the secession of the Russian dominated regions of Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan. This is obviously a matter of concern for the republics, and this concern is reflected in their dealings with the Russian state, and their internal policies regarding the ethnic Russians that reside within their border.

In geopolitical terms, Central Asia poses a number of questions that have implications not only for regional but also for international security. Internationally the countries that comprise Central Asia have typically held a relatively low profile, yet in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union the political stability of these countries is arguably more crucial to regional and international security issues than at any time during the Cold War. Historically, the geopolitical importance of this region has been widely recognised, and in the past, the ‘Great Powers’ of the era rushed to gain influence in this strategically positioned and mineral-rich region. In the nineteenth century England and Russia were involved in a complicated series of confrontations in the region that became known as ‘The Great Game’. World War One saw a continuation of this contest, this time between Russia and the allied states of Germany and . Recent discoveries of substantial oil reserves in the Caspian basin have been seen by some commentators as having ignited a new ‘Great Game’ between countries seeking to control these reserves and the distribution networks associated with them. Additionally, recent events in Afghanistan have seen the republics, in particular Uzbekistan, emerge as crucial partners in a ‘global partnership’ seeking to combat the activities of militant Islamist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These republics, with their secular but autocratic governments have emerged as the front line in this ‘war against terrorism’ and are being courted with new-found enthusiasm by the US and other international players.

As mentioned earlier, the core states that make up the Central Asian region are some of the last states on the planet to emerge from the colonialism that characterised the 19th and 20th centuries. And, as also previously mentioned, the processes of industrialisation

30 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

in these countries occurred under Russian hegemony and thus had limited input from the local communities. In many cases, control of the modes of production was kept within the grasp of a growing Russian community. Similarly, political structures were imposed by the wider Soviet system, and thus allowed limited input from domestic interests, and left little room for traditional political, religious or social structures to influence the form of governance that evolved under the Soviet system. Consequently, the political structures in these countries are fragile, and owe more to the autocracy of the Soviet Union and Russia than to any domestic traditions or any notions of democratic or representative legitimacy. Russia continues to be the nominal hegemon in this region, but the future could see the development of a new, and potentially more destructive Great Game, involving such superpowers as Russia, China and the US, or other players such as Pakistan, India, Turkey and Iran. The capacity of the Central Asian republics to respond to these challenges, and in the process develop the mechanisms by which they can exercise the key functions of the sovereign state is yet to be demonstrated.

Consequently, a broad analysis of this region is useful in illustrating the processes of decolonisation and the implications of this process for the application of accepted notions of state sovereignty and the legitimacy of the state in the post Cold War environment.

Additionally, this analysis will shed light on the issues of ethnicity and identity, nationalism and the mechanisms of ethnic conflict. The removal of effective Soviet hegemony that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union has produced a state of flux, where previously held identities and allegiances are being replaced with new or long-suppressed identities and political, social and ideological structures. The series of inter-relationships and rivalries that characterises the political environment of Uzbekistan, for example, sees cleavages manifest along a variety of the more fundamental criteria of ethnicity: from , to religion, group and notions of ‘race’. Consequently, not only is a broad analysis of this region useful in illustrating the processes of decolonisation and the implications of this process for state sovereignty

31 Ethnic Conflict, the International Community and Central Asia Chapter One

and legitimacy, but it will also shed light on the issues of ethnicity, identity, nationalism and the mechanisms of ethnic conflict.

In order to grasp the complex dimensions of ethnicity and identity in Central Asia, however, it is first necessary to consider some of the more conventional theories of ethnicity and nationalism, and how they may apply to the Central Asian situation. Ethnicity and nationalism are essentially contested terms that are used to categorise, evaluate and understand the nature of relationships between different groups, and to elucidate processes of social mobilisation, political representation and policy making. Ideas of ethnicity and have come to be used as explanations or even excuses for why conflicts occur, defining (as in the case of Serbia) conflicts between groups as the consequence of historical events or processes. Therefore, the following chapter will provide a brief discussion on accepted theories of ethnicity and nationalism, and evaluate the veracity of the claims of proponents of certain schools of thought vis-a- vis the reality of identity and allegiance in Central Asia.

32 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism Chapter Two

Chapter Two

Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism

It is in it that we were born, it is our mother We are men because it reared us We are free because we move in it If we are angered, it soothes our pain… Through it we talk today to our parents who lived thousands of years back Through it our descendants and posterity thousands of years later will know us.1

The Concept of Ethnicity

The very nature of the concept of ethnicity is elusive, and the concept has been ascribed particular characteristics or criteria by a variety of experts, characteristics that are not always complimentary.

From a strict sociological perspective, an ethnic group has been defined as:

“…a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their people-hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliations, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kinship among members of the group.”2

1 Quoted in Connor, Walker, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p205. Connor attributed this quote to an unnamed poet. 2 Schermerhorn, R., Comparative Ethnic Relations, Random House, New York, 1970, p12. Anthony Smith proposed a similar set of criteria that allowed categorisation of an ethnic community, including: a common name; myths of common ancestry; historical memories; one or more distinctive elements of culture; an association with a given territory, and a sense of solidarity. See Smith, Anthony, “Ethnic Identity and in Comparative Perspective” in Alexander Motyl, Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp45-67, p50.

33 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism Chapter Two

This definition is useful because it establishes some of the key attributes of ethnicity and ethnic identity, including notions of kinship, shared heritage and elements of culture. It also highlights the importance of an awareness of belonging to a particular group.

Fredrick Barth, in his seminal work that predated both previous definitions, went one important step further in conceptualising the ethnic group. Like Schermerhorn, Barth flagged the importance of biological self-perpetuation, and the sharing of fundamental cultural values in a context of communication and interaction. But Barth also proposed that not only does an ethnic group have a membership which identifies itself as belonging to a group or category distinguishable from others of the same order, but it is identifiable by others as constituting a distinct category.3

This concept of ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ ascription of ethnic identity is crucial to understanding the dynamic between members of two ‘ethnic groups’. Not only does an individual have to believe or perceive that they are part of a particular ethnic group, with all its characteristics of heritage, culture, language, and religion, but they have to be perceived by others as belonging to that particular group. This includes recognition by both members and non-members of that particular group. Consequently, for ethnic identities to be formed, they must be seen as not only convincing to their members in order to function, but they must also be “acknowledged as legitimate by non-members of the group”.4

There has been much debate over the difference between the concept of ‘ethnicity’ and historical concepts of ‘race’. Eriksen posed the question of whether the study of ethnicity or ethnic relations is any different to the study of race relations. Eriksen sees value in views such as those held by Banton, that race refers to the categorisation of peoples, whilst ethnicity is more concerned with group identity. However, Eriksen also sees the tendency for ethnic ideologies to stress common descent among members as

3 Barth, F., “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries”, in J. Hutchinson, and A. Smith, Ethnicity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp75-83, p75. 4 Eriksen, Thomas, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Pluto Press, London, 1993, p69.

34 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism Chapter Two

creating problems for any attempts to separate ethnicity and the contentious notion of race.5 Such similarities reduce the question of difference between theories of race and theories of ethnicity down to one of degree, where race becomes predominantly a ‘macro-sociological’ classification whereas ethnicity can be interpreted as a ‘micro- sociological’ grouping that is ultimately subsumed into broader notions of race. Alternatively, race as a term has been interpreted as describing a genetically continuous group; nation a historical socio-political group; and ethnic community a cultural group.6 However, the drawing of parallels between ethnicity and race has little value for this study. Although shared ancestry is a defining issue in identity for the peoples of Central Asia, this shared ancestry is based more on tribe than on any flawed notion of a Turkish race. Even the ideology of pan-Turkism is arguably founded on language and culture, and not on race.

In Eriksen’s eyes, in order to gain an understanding of ethnicity, and the criteria for membership of a particular ethnic group, it is crucial to see ethnicity as an aspect of a relationship, not as a property of a group. Eriksen stipulated that cultural difference is not to be seen as the decisive feature of ethnicity. Ethnic variation does not necessarily correspond with cultural variation,7 and as attractive as it is to view the two as synonymous, what is more important than culture is how a group perceives itself with respect to other groups. For an ethnic identity to be formed, a group must have a minimum of contact with other ‘groups’, and “they must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different…in this way ethnicity is viewed as a product of contact and not of isolation”.8 This proposition is supported by other theorists, including John Armstrong who considered that the idea of boundaries was critical to ethnic identity as

5 Eriksen, Thomas, 1993, p5. 6 Balibar, Etienne, “The Construction of Peoplehood: , Nationalism, Ethnicity” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London, 1991, pp71-86, p78. Balibar argued that these three terms emerged because they hinged on one of the basic structural features of the “capitalist world economy”. Race is related to the geographical concentrations associated with the axial division of labour (pp79-80); nation is derived from the political structuring of the world system (p80); and ethnicity was linked to the practice of state boundaries, and the reality that a state tended to have one “nation” and many “ethnic groups” (p83). 7 Eriksen, Thomas,1993, p69. 8 ibid, p35.

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groups tended to define themselves “not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, that is, by comparison to strangers”.9

Therefore, perception is more influential than the cultural reality. ‘Objectivity’ has minimal influence in the delineation of ethnic categories: what is more important is an appreciation of the perceptions and subjectivity of the “ethnic groups” and the processes they undergo in the establishment of the behaviours and belief systems that underpin their sense of identity. Consequently, groups that culturally may be viewed as close to identical by external observers can in fact perceive themselves as separate groups. An example of this is consideration of what it means to be either a Serb or a Croat. What is important in these identities is not that they are ‘ethnically different’ groupings, but that they perceive themselves as different in the course of interaction. Apart from utilising a different written script, and belonging to different versions of the Christian church, Serbs and Croats are almost indistinguishable in terms of language, culture and heritage. They have lived side by side for centuries, and for almost 40 years of the life of the Yugoslav Federation there was significant levels of intermarriage between the two groups: 30% in Bosnia alone.10 With the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation, however, the two groups were unable to reconcile the idea that they were culturally and historically two distinct groups with the fact that they had lived amicably side by side for decades. Yet this incapacity was founded more on the actions of political opportunists seeking to gain power by rallying people around largely manufactured nationalist ideas than in recognition of primordial ethnic or religious differences.11

Indeed, the Yugoslav example provides valuable insight into how ascription of ethnic identity can occur. Michael Ignatieff, in his examination of the Bosnian war, touched upon two of the most important principles in defining ethnicity and nationalism:

9 Armstrong, John, Nations before Nationalism, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982, p5. 10 Bowen, J, “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict”, Journal Of Democracy, issue 7, no 4, 1996, pp3-14, p4. 11 Bowen, J., 1996, p4.

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1. Identity is relational: Ignatieff perceived that, during the course of the war, the Serb came to be unable to define himself, except in relation to Croats (or Bosnian Muslims, as the case may be)12 and;

2. Nationalism manufactures identities: It does not just “express pre-existent identities, but actively constitutes an identity by dividing/separating/ reclassifying differences”.13

Drawing upon the Yugoslav example, the subjective nature of the ascription of ethnic identity, and the development of the belief systems that underpin such ‘awareness’ is best demonstrated by an examination of the role of political elites in influencing how individuals and communities come to perceive themselves. Contrary to the widely accepted view that the Yugoslav conflict was merely a manifestation of a centuries old conflict that had its origins in the 14th century Turkish conquest of the Balkans, the reality was that the course of events following the death of Marshall Tito was largely determined by political and intellectual elites within the Federation.

“It took hard work by unscrupulous politicians to convince ordinary people that the other side consisted not of friends and neighbours they had known for years but of genocidal people who would kill them if they were not killed first. For Milosevic, this meant persuading Serbs that Croats were all crypto-Nazi Ustashe; for Tudjman it meant convincing Croats that Serbs were all Chetnik assassins.”14

The Yugoslav example also illustrated the importance of interaction in the delineation of ethnic groups. Inclusion of this factor into a discussion of ethnicity takes the Barthian proposition that ethnic identity arises out of dual ascription of belonging one step further. Not only does the individual have to see themselves as belonging to a particular group, and to have both members and non-members of that group as likewise

12 Ignatieff, Michael, “Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences”, Theorizing Nationalism, Beiner, Ronald (ed), State University of New York, Albany, 1999, pp91-103, p92. 13 Ignatieff, Michael, 1999, p92. 14 Bowen, J., 1996, pp8-9.

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perceiving their membership to it, but such membership only gains value in the event of contact with members of alternative ethnic groups.

These points will be crucial to gaining insight into the divisions that characterise politics and society in the post-Soviet Central Asian republics that will be discussed later.

Ethnicity, the Nation, and Nationalism

There has been as much conceptual confusion surrounding the ideas of the nation and nationalism as that surrounding ethnicity, and this confusion is compounded by consideration of how the concept of ethnicity fits within the idea of the nation. Often any distinction between the nation and ethnic groups is dispensed with because it is ultimately seen as insignificant. For instance, some authors interpreted the nation as a culture unit, and see no reason to distinguish between tribe, ethnic group and nation because they are simply units of the same kind that happened to vary in size.15 Connor also offered a broad definition of the nation as “the largest group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties”16. David Miller went a step further by identifying a number of distinct attributes of the nation, which included:

1. A community constituted by belief: i.e. members believe that they share the same characteristics; 2. The identity of the nation possesses an historical continuity, with the nation’s existence perceived as stretching backwards into the past; 3. National identity is active, in that the members of the community do things together; 4. The national identity connects the group of people to a particular geographical location; 5. National identity requires that its members should have something in common, such as a ‘common public culture’.17

15 Eriksen, Thomas, 1993, p99. Eriksen discussed at length some of the view of social anthropologist I.M Lewis, who contributed to some of the terminological confusion surrounding the use of these terms. 16 Connor, Walker, 1994, p202. 17 Miller, David, On Nationality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995, pp22-25. Miller also discussed at length an additional feature of nationality: the idea that nations are ethical communities where members

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Many of these features could, theoretically, be shown to have utility in describing an ethnic group, and consequently Miller’s definition does little to dispel the confusion surrounding the difference between ethnic group and nation. Nevertheless, there are a number of issues that have been identified by other commentators that do allow for a more concrete distinction to be drawn between ethnic group and nation. Some authors have proposed that although the nation can be considered as synonymous with the ethnic group, the nation is by definition different to the ethnic group because it is an ideological construction that seeks to establish a link between a particular cultural group and the state.18 Similarly, Oomen considered that an ethnic group evolved into a nation when it acquired a sufficient level of economic and political resources.19 Furthermore, Oomen saw the nation as being differentiated from the concept of the ethnic group because it has the additional dimension of territoriality, with the concept of an ancestral or adopted of fundamental importance.20 Consequently, the nation and the ethnic group share similar features, except dimensions of politicisation and territoriality. This definition may prove both useful and problematic in this discussion of Central Asia. For example, historically, the -states and had a substantial measure of both political and economic resources, and a defined territoriality. Consequently, in terms of this definition it is arguable that they were both entitled to the title of nation.

Connor also defined the national as a large politicised ethnic group, and highlighted the importance of the relationship between the nation and a given territory.21 This bond between people and land has historically been important in Central Asia, and may prove crucial in examining the irredentism that may in the future undermine the legitimacy of the Central Asian states. An Uzbek poet highlighted the importance of the bond between land and Uzbek:

acknowledge that they owe special obligations to fellow members of the nation which they do not owe to other human beings. Miller provides a comprehensive treatment of this proposition. 18 Eriksen, Thomas, 1993, pp99-100. Eriksen compared the theories of and , and he interpreted Gellner’s statement that nationalism was a “theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p1) as suggesting that the two were synonymous. 19 Oomen, M., Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p16. 20 Oomen, M., 1995, p19. 21 Glenn, John, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, Macmillan, London, 1999, p29.

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“So that my generation would comprehend the Homeland’s worth, Men were always transformed to dust, it seems. The Homeland is the remains of our forefathers Who turned into dust for this precious soil.”22

Thus there are two additional elements that can be used to differentiate an ethnic group from a nation – the idea that a nation is a politicised or politically aware ethnic group that possesses or lays claim to a defined territoriality. Awareness of the importance of the political and territorial dimensions of nationality is fundamental to understanding the key concepts of nationalism.

However, an examination of ethnicity and nation in Central Asia can only be valid if the relationship between categories such as tribe, ethnic group and nation is understood. Similarly, conceptual flexibility will be essential in evaluating the importance of even the most devolved levels of identity and sense of belonging. Historically, the peoples of Central Asia have had different and often conflicting identities that did not necessarily correspond with the modern western concept of the nation. Glenn highlighted the difficulty in using largely western notions of ethnic identity to categorise the people of Central Asia. Loyalty or identity of each individual was contained within a hierarchical system that may include , clan, tribe, khanate or even . These identities in turn may be subsumed into the wider Islamic community or the pan-Turkic movement. In this environment, not only is it difficult to identify a discrete group that may quality for the title of ethnic group or nation in the western sense, but it is also difficult to locate the primary point where the individual or groups sense of identity or allegiance resides.

Also of influence in the formation of identity was the lifestyle or social position of an individual. City dwellers would see their primary identity as being defined firstly by their religion – in this case Muslim, and then by their location. For example, residents of Bukhara would define themselves as ‘Bukharaly’. Pastoralists, however, would identify themselves in terms of their clan or tribal affiliation.23 Such has been

22 Quoted in Connor, Walker, 1993, p74. The quote was attributed to an unnamed Uzbek poet. 23 Glenn, John, 1999, p68.

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considered to have serious political implications for the future national development of these republics, especially Kazakhstan, where tribe and clan are especially relevant to modern society.24 However, as identified by Armstrong, the advent of nationalism in the former USSR, including Central Asia, resulted predominantly from the actions of Russian intermediaries who ‘diffused’ or imported western concepts of nationalism into the region. Furthermore, Armstrong argued that many nations rise and disappear, and that national identity may be quiescent over extended periods, and thus nationalism must be approached ‘genetically’ – that is “the temporal (historical) linkages between must be explored”.25 Therefore, in gaining an understanding of how the nation may constitute itself in modern day Central Asia, it is important to not only understand how patterns of allegiance and identity manifest in the past, but also understand the consequences and impact of the Tsarist and Soviet periods on identity and the idea of nation in the region.

Islam in Central Asia

Complicating this pattern of identities in Central Asia is Islam, politicised or otherwise. During the Soviet era, Islam occupied a peculiar place within society and state in Central Asia. Traditionally, Islam in Central Asia has been of the Sunni school. The Soviet era witnessed the establishment of an ‘Official Islam’, which incorporated a system of four territorially defined muftiyyas within a centrally controlled administration. These muftiyyas did not correspond with either nationality or republic.26 Additionally, this system impeded the tendency amongst Muslims to organise politics on the basis of their faith27 because it ensured a definite delineation between politics and religion. What emerged from the debris of the Soviet Union has been interpreted, particularly in Tajikistan, as a form of Islamism that had evolved into a

24 Esenova, Saulesh, “Tribalism and identity in contemporary circumstances: The Case of Kazakhstan”, Central Asian Survey, Oxford, vol 17, no 3, 1998, pp443-462. 25 Armstrong, John, “The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity”, in Alexander Motyl, Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp23-45, pp26-31. 26 Roy, Olivier, The New Central Asia, I.B.Tauris, New York, 2000, pp150-151. 27 Robinson, Francis, “Islam and Muslim Separatism”, in J. Hutchsinson and A. Smith (eds), Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume III, Routledge, London, 2000, pp912-940, p912.

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kind of Islamo-nationalism,28 in the process dropping strict Islamist ideology in favour of ideologies of the nation and democracy.29 During the Soviet era, however, there was an unofficial Islamic network that operated in parallel to the development of the Official Islam sanctioned by the Soviet bureaucracy. And it is this Islamic network, one in which political Islam has gained the upper hand, which is emerging as a key influence in the forging of new identities in Muslim Central Asia.

Gellner, in his comparison of nationalism and Islam, saw Islam as following the same pattern that nationalism followed in the west. Although both systems see the emergence of a pervasive and membership defining culture within a society, Islam expresses itself not in nationalism, but in fundamentalism.30 It is arguable that this pattern is emerging in Central Asia. Religious fundamentalism, typically categorised as Wahhabism,31 is growing in influence in the region, particularly in those sectors of society that are most affected by the dramatic economic and social changes that have been taking place. This new creed is fulfilling the same role as nationalism in homogenising culture and society, but rather than promoting a single ethnic culture, it is attacking all cultures by promoting the strict practice of Islamic ritual without any reference to a national culture.32 In addition to the growth of puritanical versions of Islam, an overtly political form of Islam has emerged, in particular in Uzbekistan, during the past five to ten years.

28 Roy, Olivier, 2000, p157. 29 Roy, Olivier, 2000, p157. 30 Gellner, Ernest, Conditions of Liberty, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1994, p22. 31 As a term, Wahhabism has probably been overused in the last decade to describe a number of related conservative Islamic movements. The term “Wahhabi” has it origins in the 18th century in the teachings of Muhammad bin Adb al-Wahhab, who promoted the idea of Islam returning to its original purity, cleansed of all its innovations, particularly those associated with : see Zelkina, Anna, “Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the Islamic Threat”, in Religion State and Society, vol 27, nos3 ,4, 1999, pp355-372. Zelkina assessed that the Wahhabi movement was the first modern religious movement, and she discussed the “protest” element of the faith which in turn saw the Wahhabists develop a concept of declassification that “accused all those who did not uphold their agenda of being enemies of Islam….and allowed (Wahhabis) to declare holy war against other Muslims”. This is significant in the Central Asian context, because it could see “Wahhabist” groups target other traditional groups, such as Sufis. Furthermore, although conversevative Islamic philosophy has developed a number of different strands since the original Wahhabi doctrine was developed, the term “Wahhabi” is referenced here because it was a term that has gained considerable currency in the , where Islamic militants categorised as “Wahhabist” came to play a significant role in the conflict, and targeted not only Russian Federation forces, but also targeted Sufis, “official Islam” and other Muslims who they considered to have diverged from the true Islamic path – see Souleimanov, Emil, “Chechnya, Wahhabism, and the Invasion of ”, in Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, vol 9, no 4, December 2005, located online at http://meria.idc.ac.il/, accessed on 14 March 2006. 32 Roy, 2000, p157.

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The Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, which originated in the diaspora Palestinian communities in Saudi Arabia and Jordan33, had much in common with puritanical Wahhabist philosophy, but differed from it in that it sought to achieve its goal of a transnational Islamic caliphate via peaceful rather than violent means. The Hizb ut- Tahrir movement has proven popular across Central Asia, and its popularity in Uzbekistan has seen its adherents brutally persecuted by the Karimov government.34 The growth of Wahhabism and the Hizb ut-Tahrir are, to a degree, altering the landscape of Central Asia by introducing an alien interpretation of Islam into the region that is neither compatible with nor accepting of traditional or mainstream Central Asian Islam. The transformational dimension of the popularity of the Hizb ut-Tahrir is in certain respects being enhanced rather than diminished by the Karimov government’s treatment of the movement.35 Not only does such brutal suppression of a religious or political movement rarely prove successful, but it often tends to radicalise the group that is being targeted. The further radicalisation of the Hizb ut-Tahrir is certainly occurring in Central Asia, where a number of members of the movement are becoming disillusioned with the movement’s commitment to non-violent methodology, or are abandoning it altogether.36 Militarisation of the movement aside, however, the Hizb ut- Tahrir, and from a more general perspective Wahhabism, create a number of issues that need to be considered when discussing the role of Islam in that they enhance the homogenising nature of Islam. They both propagate particularly puritanical interpretations of Islamic doctrine that have their modern roots in the Arab world, and

33 Rashid, Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2002, p116 offers a very useful summary of the origins of the Hisb ut-Tahrir movement, and its growth in popularity in Central Asia. 34 Sharham Akbarzadeh, in “Keeping Central Asia Stable”, Third World Quarterly, vol 25, no 4, 2004, pp689-705, considered that the Hiz ut-Tahrir has special qualities that made it more appealing to the general public (than the Islamic Movement of Uzebekistan) and more difficult for the authorities to handle. “It eschews violence and promotes Islamic doctrinal education as the first and necessary step towards the Islamisaton of the state, itself a preparatory step in the general direction of a transnational Islamic polity” (p699). 35 Rashid, 2002,pp125-125, quoted figures from the Independent Human Rights Organisation of Uzbekistan, which estimated that, as of 2001, there were 7,600 political prisoners in Uzbek jails, 5,150 of which wer members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. These prisoners were brutally treated, with the same organisation estimating that in 2000 and 2001 fifty people died in the main detention centre which was known locally as “the place from which no one returns”. 36 Akbarzadeh, 2004, p699, assessed that “it is possible to argue that Hizb ut-Tahrir plays a key role in the transformation of potential Islamists. It indoctrinates Central Asians who, as a general rule, have very limited knowledge of Islam and its teaching, and prepares them, perhaps by default for direct armed action”.

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promote intolerance of local religious and cultural traditions of Central Asia. The extent to which these philosophies are adopted by the local populations will have a critical impact on the formation of identities in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era.

Islam has a peculiar relationship not only with nationalism, but with processes of industrialisation. Malashenko observed that of all the Central Asian republics, nationalism was a factor primarily in Kazakhstan, where Islam has proven to be much weaker than in the other countries in the region.37 Additionally, fundamentalist Islam has proven to be particularly attractive to those elements of the population that are unconnected to the modern industrial sector. Supporting this thesis is the case of , where there is a significant number of large industrial enterprises employing members of the native population, and yet a relative absence of Islamic fundamentalist activities that contrasts with its neighbours.38

Obviously, there may be a number of other factors explaining this relative absence, but the relationship between Islam, nationalism and industrialisation in the Central Asian context needs to be explored to a greater depth. However, at this point it is more pertinent to briefly consider the role of Islam in the formation of identities in the region. Islam has undisputedly played a pivotal role in defining the identity within Central Asia, but other components of this identity, including ethnicity and regionalism, have been considered to exercise a more significant influence on identity. This has particularly been the case with the more politically active segments of the society.39 However, the role of Islam in shaping identity is largely determined through interaction with others, and in the Central Asian example, Islam is just one fact among many. Other determinants, such as family, clan, or broader ethnicity play equally, if not more, significant roles in the delineation of identity in Central Asia. The influence of these factors in shaping the complex patterns of identity structures in the region is an issue that is addressed at length later in the thesis.

37 Malashenko, Alexei, “Islam verses ”, in D. Eickelman (ed), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1993, pp63-79, p70. 38 Malashenko, Valery, 1993, p71. 39 Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St Martins Press, New York, 1995, p192.

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Nationalism and Industrialisation

An understanding of the relational aspect of identity in Central Asia will be crucial to interpreting the interrelationships between the different groupings within society. It is perceivable, however, that the pattern of identity and association within Central Asia today is moving away from what was historically the case. The hierarchy identified by Glenn held most strongly in Central Asia during the pre-industrial era, and as such broadly reflected the stratification of society that historically is typical of pre-industrial agro-pastoral societies. Such highly-stratified cultures are also seen to be largely immune to the spread of nationalism, and the development of the nation because there is no possibility for the development of a single or homogenous culture or society within a given polity. Culture and identity develop within a horizontal framework predicated upon caste or social status, or vertically with the formation of localised communities.40

In the absence of traditionally held tribal or clan affiliations, however, it is plausible that new, equally complex identities may emerge. Esenova perceived that although tribal or clan identity among urban dwellers in Kazakhstan existed predominantly as a form of ‘cultural heritage’, in the future territorial affiliations may replace tribal identity in the self-identification of urban communities.41 Although territorial affiliations have been significant in the past, increased emphasis on territorially-based identity rather than tribal identity may increase, rather than diminish, the prospect for conflict between groups. If the trend of migration to is increased as a result of environmental degradation, territoriality itself may give way to different forms of identity, and there may be a corresponding reduction in the territorial homogeneity of each of these groups.

In addition to increased urbanisation, industrialisation creates a new set of issues pertaining to the development of nationalism. Smith sees industrialised societies as requiring a homogenous culture, with the unification of all members of the state.42 Furthermore, Smith sees many of the enabling features of an industrialised society, in

40 Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London, 1998, p30. 41 Esenova, Saulesh, 1998. 42 Smith, A., 1998, p30.

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particular a generic mass educational system that can facilitate the achievement of universal , as inextricably binding state and culture together.43

Therefore, the enforced industrialisation under Soviet rule may have altered the system by which identity is formed or propagated. Gellner’s analysis of the impact of industrialisation and modernisation on the formation of the concepts of nation and nationalism44 begs the question of how far towards western models of the nation the peoples of Central Asia may have moved. A brief examination of Central Asia proves that many of the traditional forms of identity still hold. However such an examination also demonstrates that the processes of ‘de-structuring’ a society that Gellner perceived as accompanying industrialisation and modernisation45 are having an impact upon the ascription of identity in Central Asia. In the absence of traditional forms of identity, Islam may emerge to be the strongest agent in determining identity, and, if this Islam adopts a fundamentalist guise, then further homogenisation may occur. However, the increasing prevalence of more ‘conventional ethnic’ notions of identity – as evidenced by tensions between Kazakh and Russian on one hand or Uzbek and Tajik on the other - suggests that industrialisation may have created divisions that are more readily definable in the conventional terms of ethnic group and nation.

There is a substantial body of literature supporting the contention that the development of nationalism is essentially linked to the onset of industrialisation and broader processes of modernisation. Gellner perceived that in the pre-industrial world, although culture and power were interrelated, they did not converge to form boundaries of a national-political form. Industrialisation, however, was seen to produce a tendency for both culture and political power to become standardised: political units can be seen to acquire sharply defined boundaries, which also become cultural boundaries.46 Other authors are not so readily accepting of the causal role of industrialisation in the development of nationalism. Anthony Smith, for example considered the number of

43 Smith, A., 1998, pp30-31. 44 Gellner, Ernest, Encounters with Nationalism, Oxford, 1988, pp110-122. Gellner addressed at length the impact of industrialisation on nationalism. He considered that the “most violent phase of nationalism is that which accompanies early industrialism, and the diffusion of industrialism” (p111). 45 Glenn, John, 1999, p39.

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states in which the development of nationalism predated the arrival of industrialisation as reason enough to doubt the existence of a causal relationship between industrialisation and nationalism.47

However, a consideration of the relationship between ‘local elites’ and the processes of industrialisation may have a bearing upon the relationship between industrialisation and nationalism, particularly in the Central Asian context. In many instances the processes of industrialisation that occurred in late-industrialising countries, such as India, China and South-east Asia, were driven by ‘westernised’ intellectuals who were not members of the traditional domestic elite. These individuals typically had to mobilise mass support to compensate for the absence of a solid power base of their own, and in doing so they facilitated the flattening of traditional hierarchies, and the development of a more egalitarian society.48 This flattening of traditional hierarchies could perceivably produce a socio-political environment that is conducive to the development of nationalism, and therefore there is merit in linking industrialisation and the emergence of nationalisation. In the Central Asian example, the fact that industrialisation was largely driven by Soviet bureaucrats, and subsequently managed by a Russian industrial elite, has implications for the development of overt nationalist ideologies. The processes of Soviet industrialisation may not have completely obliterated traditional class structures in the region, and may have actually added an additional veneer in an additional class comprised of privileged Bolshevik party officials. As will be discussed later, the local tribal elites within the Central Asian republics have largely managed to mobilise political power, but they are yet to dominate the domestic industrial infrastructure. The processes of privatisation that accompanied the dismemberment of the Soviet Union placed a sizeable percentage of the Central Asian industry into the hands of these local elites. However, the continued dominance of the professional classes by ethnic Russians has implications for the type of ideology that local cultural and political elites may draw upon, given their relative lack of access to the economic

46 Gellner, Ernest, Encounters with Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, p200. 47 Smith, Anthony. Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London, 1998, p36. 48 Matossian, Mary, “Ideologies of delayed industrialization: some tensions and ambiguities”, in A.D. Smith and J. Hutchinson, (eds), Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume III, 2000, pp805-817, p814.

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power that is associated with ownership of the modes of production. Nationalism, and associated prejudice against ethnic Russians may prove to be the most convenient method by which political elites mobilise support.

Classical Theories of Nationalism

This discussion of the relationship between nationalism and industrialisation links into more detailed analyses of the nature and forms of nationalism. Gellner has defined nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones.49 Or, in other words, nationalism is a political principle based upon the idea that the political and the national unit should be congruent50. This can be extrapolated to the view that nationalism is an ideology that holds that a particular ethnic or national group should dominate a state. The logical conclusion of this ideology is the establishment of a nation state, or a state dominated by an ethnic group that embeds its identity markers into the official symbolism and legislation of the state.51 Such markers may include religion, language, “national” festivals and dress. Despite the fact that western notions of nationalism have historically been largely absent from Central Asia, the significant exodus of “ethnic” Russians from a number of the Central Asian republics may signify the emergence of nationalism within the titular groups in these states. In the event of nationalism, or even Islamic fundamentalism gaining widespread acceptance, the situation in Central Asia will become volatile, especially in respect to the status of Christian Russian and other Slavic minorities that remain.

The above definition of nationalist ideology is controversial and far from definitive, and there are a number of components of nationalism that can be considered separately. Smith broke nationalism down into seven key propositions that shed light onto the logic of nationalism:

49 Gellner, Ernest, 1983, p1. 50 Gellner, Ernest, 1983, p1.

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1. Humanity is divided into nations. 2. Each nation has its own peculiar character. 3. The nation provides the source of all political power. 4. Men must identify with the nation to achieve freedom and self-realisation. 5. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states. 6. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides all other loyalties. 7. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.52

These points complement the definition provided by Gellner by effectively stressing that nationalism is an ideology that sees the nation-state as the most feasible and fundamental form for the state to take. They also illustrate how the nationalist ideology inextricably links the nation with the state. However, in determining a working definition of nationalism that can be drawn upon in an analysis of Central Asia, there are a number of other issues that need to be considered. For example, the previous discussion of the relationship between nationalism and industrialisation segues into one of the more substantial theories of nationalism – that of modernism. The theory of modernism contends that the nation, and thus nationalism, is a wholly modern phenomenon that was only able to emerge through processes of ‘modernisation’, including the rise of modern conditions and policies of modernisation. Far from being deeply rooted in history, the nations that exist today are social constructs designed to regulate the processes of rapid social change accompanying the age of revolution and mass mobilisation.53

Modernism sees nations as best defined not as communities united by blood, culture, religion or shared history, but as territorial political communities that were consciously constructed by their citizens and, more importantly, their elites.54 The idea of a nation being a constructed political community derived from the development of industrialised society is fundamental to the theory of modernism. What is additionally important to

51 Eriksen, Thomas, 1993, p99. 52 Smith, A., Theories of Nationalism, Duckworth, London, 1971, p21. 53 Smith, A., Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London, 1998, pp21-22. 54 Smith, A., 1998, pp19-20.

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this theory is that the state is seen to be instrumental in the homogenisation of culture. Modern society, and the corresponding modern state, has been seen as forcing a type of homogeneity of both language and culture through its diffusion of an ‘official’ language and ‘official’ culture.55 Thus, processes of modernity can be seen to form a trend towards the scenario where the state and the nation are in fact congruent - those members of groups other than the ‘official’ group are assimilated into a ‘majority nation’ that is represented by the state.

Yet, there has been substantial criticism of this theory, with opposition focusing on the debate on whether a sense of nationhood precedes, or is produced by, nationalist policies.56 The frequency that hostile forms of nationalism have manifested in pre- industrial societies, particularly in the Balkans in the 19th century, and in Central Africa in the latter half of the 20th century57 is often raised as a challenge to those who see modernisation and the development of nationalism as inextricably linked. Examples of virulent nationalism occurring in isolation of any processes of industrialisation do raise a warning of the danger of adopting a blanket theory of nationalism. And, attractive as it may be to adopt modernism as the most appropriate theory of nationalism for a discussion of Central Asia, given the role of Soviet policies and Soviet-enforced industrialisation in forging new identities in the region, such a move would limit the validity of any conclusions drawn.

Of the numerous other approaches to the study of nationalism, one of the more significant schools of thought is that of primordialism. Primordialism emerged in the middle half of the 20th century, and contended that societies are vulnerable to the influence of what are considered ‘primordial attachments’ – attachments that include being born into a particular community of shared heritage or religion, speaking a

55 Taylor, Charles,” Nationalism and Modernity”, in John Hall (ed), The State of the Nation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp191-217, p193. 56 Beiner, Ronald, “Nationalism’s Challenge to Political Philosophy”, in R. Beiner, (ed), Theorising Nationalism, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999, pp1-27, p5. 57 Taylor, Charles, 1998, p194.

50 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism Chapter Two

particular language or following particular social practices.58 These primordial attachments are interpreted as derived from spiritual principles rather than sociological principles, and they cannot be analysed in relation to social interaction.59 Primordialism has been categorised as an approach to the issue of nations and nationalism, rather than a theory, and evolved as an umbrella term to describe theorists who considered that nationality was a natural part of human beings, and that nations had existed since time immemorial.60 The nation is depicted as a natural organic61 community, which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it.62 This ignores, and to a degree contradicts, the fundamental notion of ethnicity being an aspect of a relationship as discussed earlier, and thus undermines the applicability of primordialism to many scenarios.

Furthermore, primordialism can be construed as a dangerous creed that justifies virulent and aggressive nationalisms by implying that they are enduring, natural features that persist throughout history, and thus are in some way justified. The primordialist approach has to a degree been paralleled by the perennialist approach. Perennialism offers a slightly different view of the nation as a “constant and fundamental feature of human society throughout recorded history”.63 However, the perennialist differs in some key areas of interpretation.

“The perennialist readily accepts the modernity of nationalism, as a political movement and ideology, but regards nations either as updated versions of

58 Geertz, Clifford, “The integrative revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states, in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds), Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Routledge, London, 2000, pp117-160, p120. 59 Eller, Jack, and Coughlan, Reed, “The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystifying of Ethnic Attachments”, in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds), Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Routledge, London, 2000, pp161-160, p120. 60 Ozkirimli, Umut, Theories of Nationalism, Macmillan, London, 2000, p64. 61 Organic in this context has been best defined by Anthony Smith, with reference to Hans Kohn, as indicating that the nation was a “organism of fixed and indelible character which was stamped on its members at birth and from which they could never free themselves” – this was the corollary of the “voluntarist” type of nationalism which regarded the nation as a “free association of rational human beings entered into voluntarily on an individual basis”. See Smith, A., Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London, 1998, p146. 62 Brown, David, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Affairs, Routledge, London, 2000, p6. 63 Smith, A., 1998, p159.

51 Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism Chapter Two

immemorial ethnic communities, or as collective cultural identities that have existed, alongside ethnic communities, in all epochs of human history.”64

By posing the idea of genetic continuity, both of these theories are of dubious value to an analysis of Central Asia, given the later discussion on how the emergent titular nationalities have been forged from an amalgamation of a variety of tribal and linguistic groups that have moved into the region over a 500 year period. However, it is one thing to question the value of such theories to an objective evaluation of the significance of national identity in the region; it is another thing altogether to consider the implications of governments or titular nationalities in the region interpreting the idea of, say, a Kazakh nation through the lens of primordialism or perennialism.

One observation made by Geertz that may be significant for the present discussion, however, was his identification of a tension inherent in the relationship between primordial sentiments and civil politics.65 Indeed, with reference to Smith’s consideration of the broad categories of voluntarist nationalism versus organic nationalism, it would appear that primordialism and the idea of are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable terms because, from the perspective of primordialism, the only authentic nationalism is .66 In some respects this observation corresponds with the later discussion on the relationship between what have been categorised as civic or majority nationalisms, and ethnic or minority nationalisms.

In reconciling and evaluating the differences between modernist theory and primordialism/perennialism, it is useful to draw upon the work of David Miller, who saw both schools of thought as ‘half right’. Miller contended that ideas of national character have been long standing: what was new was the belief that “nations could be regarded as active political agents, the bearers of the ultimate powers of sovereignty”.67 In some respects, this interpretation has some applicability to the later discussion of the

64 Smith, A., 1998, p159. 65 Geertz, C. p133. 66 Brown, D., 2000, p6. 67 Miller, D., 1995, p31.

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ethnogenesis of the peoples of Central Asia, where historical evidence of certain identified groups does not necessarily prove the existence of a coherent sense of nationhood or nationalism, and thus allows a more measured appraisal of Tsarist and Soviet nationalities policies and their impact on the peoples of the region.

Ethnicity, Nationalism and Central Asia

However, as mentioned earlier, it is debatable how useful conventional concepts of ethnicity and nationalism may be in analysing the divisions that occur in the various Central Asian republics. Even following 60 years of Soviet influence, the social and political institutions underpinning any notions of identity within Central Asia do not necessarily correspond to equivalent entities in Russia or Western Europe, and therefore may defy categorisation in terms that have been considered as ‘ethnocentric’ by some authors. Parekh, for example, criticised a number of the assumptions upon which modern ‘western’ interpretations of nationalism were built. Nationalism can be seen to have a different logic depending upon whether it is articulated in linguistic, ethnic cultural or other terms.68

Parekh foresaw difficulties in utilising the concept of ethnicity, with its associated principles of common descent, kinship and emphasis on homeland, in analysis of non- European contexts, because this principle was only of limited relevance to a greater part of the world: Arabs, for example, tend to view themselves not as an ethnic group but as a community sharing a common culture, history, religion and language; similarly Indians tend to define their identity in terms of castes and linguistic groups, neither of which can be seen to correspond with the western notion of ethnic group.69 In Central Asia, the notion of the Islamic community, or Umma, has historically been fundamental to identity, and at various stages, notions of a pan-Turkic brotherhood have also influenced how members of different communities viewed themselves and others, as has the division between urban communities and rural, semi-nomadic groups. Although the overlay of Soviet policies, which are debatably colonialist in the same sense as

68 Parekh, B., “Ethnocentricity of the nationalist discourse”, Nations and Nationalism, vol 1, no 1, 1995, pp25-52, p44.

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British policies in the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere, has irrevocably changed the cultural, political and religious dynamic of the region, how far the peoples of the region have moved along the spectrum towards western ethnic-centric nationalism is an issue that requires careful consideration.

Although it is not intended to use the preceding discussion on the theoretical basis of ethnicity and nationalism as a definitive template for evaluating identity and allegiance in Central Asia, it does nevertheless provide a starting point for such an evaluation, regardless of how far the reality in the region may or may not diverge from predominantly western notions of ethnicity and nationalism. Such an evaluation is also necessary to determine if ethnonationalism is emerging in a manner that creates a heightened risk of tension or conflict between the state and ‘disenfranchised’ groups pursuing an exclusionary nationalist agenda.

It is undeniable that the conflict and confrontation that has occurred in Central Asia to date has occurred as a result of cleavages based on anything from kinship at a localised tribal level, traditional political loyalty, to religion, language group or even traditionally broad notions of ethnicity – i.e. Slav versus Turk, Turk versus Persian. The importance of the ascription of identity by both self and by others in producing such cleavages, and the divisive and exclusionary outcomes that follow taking these notions of group identity into the political arena will be fundamental to the following analysis of Central Asia. The advantage of drawing upon such a diverse body of theories describing or explaining ethnicity, the nation, and nationalism is that specific theories can be retained or discarded based on their applicability to a certain situation. For example, an understanding of the role of mythology in the creation of national identity ensures an understanding of the propagation of, say, the Alash legend in Kazakhstan, or the Manas myth in Kyrgyzstan, and the implications of the dissemination of such specific indicators of nationhood within a multiethnic state. Similarly, modernism theory to a degree explains the absence of parochial ideas of ethnonationalism in rural Kazakh communities, as opposed to anti-Russian sentiment in Kazakh cities and industrialised urban centres. Given the fragmented, ‘mosaic’ nature of identity in the region, a

69 Parekh, B., p39.

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consolidated approach that draws upon a variety of theories and approaches is likely to have the greatest utility in this instance.

However, an understanding of ethnicity and nationalism, and how western theories may or may not apply to the situation in Central Asia ultimately provides little more than the theoretical foundation necessary for this evaluation of Central Asia. Equally important is an understanding of the dynamic that defines the relationship between the state and the ethnic group, when the state in question is a multi-ethnic or multi-national state. A number of factors have a bearing on this dynamic, including how the state is constituted, how the different groups view themselves, and how they perceive and manage their relationship with other groups and with the state. The vast body of literature that has emerged in the last decade or so on ethnic conflict has focused on these and other issues in seeking to explain why conflict between ethnic groups, or between groups and the state, has occurred. The many attempts at retrospective analysis of the causes and consequences of virulent ethnic conflict, whilst offering often contradictory explanations or divergent interpretations for the more significant ethnic conflicts that have developed since the end of the Cold War, still have utility for this discussion.

Evaluation of specific conflicts in societies that reflect some of the features of Central Asia, especially post-communist, multinational states such as the former Yugoslavia, can provide insight into the triggers of conflicts, and the trends or government policies that may enhance cleavages between groups in the intermediate to long term. Similarly, retrospective analysis of ethnic conflict can sometimes provide the most accurate litmus test of the value of certain theories of nations and nationalism in describing group interaction. Consequently, the next chapter will focus on the causes and consequences of ethnic conflict.

55 Why Does Conflict Between Ethnic or National Groups Occur? Chapter Three

Chapter Three

Why Does Conflict Between Ethnic or National Groups Occur?

Men don’t allow themselves to be killed for their interests They allow themselves to be killed for their passions1

As discussed earlier, the term ethnic conflict has become over utilised by media in their emotive coverage of communal violence in areas as dispersed and diverse as Northern , Bosnia, Kosovo, Ambon and Sudan. Although it is not the intention of this author to argue that such usage of the term is inappropriate, it is considered pertinent to adopt a less emotive version of the term. Rather than use the term ‘ethnic conflict’ to conjure up images of a conflict that in some instances are little more than confrontations between “small bands of criminals and violent opportunists recruited or self-recruited from street gangs and organised mobs”,2 it is useful to adopt a definition that allows for a more balanced and accurate appraisal of ethnic conflict. Melander, in his application of the security dilemma to the relationships between ethnic groups, defined ethnic conflict as that which occurs when “groups that define themselves using ethnic criteria and see themselves as having a common ancestry make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other political actors”.3 This definition is

1 Chateaubriand, quoted in Connor, W., 1994, p206. The original source for this quote was not identified. 2 Mueller, J., “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’”, International Security, vol 25, no 1, 2000, pp42-70, p50. Mueller offered a persuasive argument that ethnic warfare does not actually exist because it is generally waged by small groups of combatants – “bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance”- that “purport to fight and kill in the name of some larger entity”(p42). These groups were, in the Bosnia Serb case, said to comprise “on average of 80% common criminals and 20% fanatical nationalists”(p50). 3 Melander, E. Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Uppsala University, , 2000, p37. Put simply, the security dilemma results when “dogmatic decision-makers or different nations, as a consequence of the respective efforts to defend their nations, generate a conflict spiral which leaves them even less secure than they were before they acted”: see Sandole, Dennis, Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era, Pinter, London, 1999, p21. Melander’s application of the security dilemma, traditionally applied to relations between states, is also useful in evaluating or predicting conflict between ethnic or national groups. Other authors have commented on how, in instances of state failure or the collapse of state structures, ethnic security dilemmas can lead to the escalation and diffusion of ethnic conflict. See Lobell, S., and Mauceri, P., “Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict” in S. Lobel and P. Mauceri, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p4. These issues will be addressed at length later.

56 Why Does Conflict Between Ethnic or National Groups Occur? Chapter Three

useful because it does not restrict the field of enquiry to cases of overt, violent conflict between groups, and allows for consideration of all forms of tension, confrontation and competition between either an ethnic group and a state, or between groups that have manifested along ethnic or national lines.

Although the focus of this chapter is on ethnic conflict, a brief word needs to be said about the various types of internal conflicts, including conflicts along ethnic, class or ideological lines, or conflicts caused by confrontation between criminal groups and the state (as has developed in Colombia). Michael Brown stressed the importance of recognising that there are many different types of internal conflict, and each conflict is fuelled by different factors.4 However, Brown also identified a number of features that could act as underlying causes of different types of internal conflict.

Underlying Causes of Internal Conflict Structural factors Economic/Social factors Weak states Economic problems Inter-state security concerns Discriminatory economic systems Ethnic geography Economic development & modernisation Political factors Cultural/Perceptual Factors Discriminatory political institutions Patterns of cultural discrimination Exclusionary national ideologies Problematic group histories Inter-group politics Elite politics Source: Brown, Michael, “The Causes of Internal Conflict”, in M. Brown, O. Cote Jnr, S. Lynn-Jones and S. Miller (eds) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp3-26, p5.

Of these criteria, the structural and political factors, in particular ethnic geography and exclusionary national ideologies and discriminatory political institutions, are possibly the most pertinent to this discussion. However, before specific features of ethnic conflict are discussed vis-à-vis the above-mentioned causes of internal conflict, it is

4 Brown, Michael, “The Causes of Internal Conflict”, in M. Brown, O. Cote Jnr, S. Lynn-Jones and S. Miller (eds) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp3-26, pp4-13 for a detailed discussion of these factors. Brown stated that the challenge for scholars was to identify the different types of conflicts and the different sets of factors that bring them about, but warned against seeking a single factor or set of factors that explained everything, which he said was comparable to searching for the Holy grail – noble but futile.

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possible to provide a theoretical framework for considering the fundamental drivers of ethnic conflicts. In the most general terms, conflict occurs between ethnic or national groups because of two key reasons. Firstly, the ‘nationalist’s’ stipulation that the state and the nation should be congruent is rarely realised. The vast majority of states in existence today can be classified as multi-ethnic or multinational: that is, they contain a number of ethnic or national subgroupings within the territory that defines the state. There are few instances where the state is even close to being congruent with the nation. Some authors have concluded that this situation is a result of the failure by the modern state to successfully engage in “nation-building processes aimed at the of its citizens.”5 This was contrary to the integrationist perspective that predicted that ethnic groups would disappear as nations modernised and minority groups were assimilated and was prevalent during the decades following the Second World War.6 The reality was that, modernisation and associated advances in communication and transport actually heightened cultural awareness of minorities in the post-war world by making them more aware of the distinctions between themselves and others.7 In this situation of heightened awareness of self and of others by minority groups, the attainment of political or economic goals by one particular group, or the entrenchment of that particular group’s ‘cultural markers’ within the state structure often occurs at the expense of the other groups. This ‘competition’ for the attainment of political or economic goals can deteriorate into conflict between the concerned groups.

Secondly, the groups involved are typically unable to reconcile the question of identity and independent and often mutually exclusive political goals with the need to develop a symmetrical and non-biased system of political and economic structures. Nationalism is very much an exclusionary ideology, both negative and divisive,8 that takes the

5 Guibernau, Monserrat, Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999, p7. Guibernau identified a shift in the relationship between the nation and the state, away from the traditional pre-eminence of the state and its role in nation-building. 6 Ryan, Stephen, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995, p16 7 Connor, Walker, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p37. In discussing the facilitative relationship between modernisation and ethnic identity, Connor methodically debunks the previously widespread proposition that modernisation would effectively break down the barriers between different groups within a state, and thus hasten the process of assimilation. 8 Hobsbawm, Eric, “Ethnic Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century”, in J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Ethnicity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp355-358, p355.

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concept of ethnic divisions to an extreme conclusion by effectively writing all other ethnic groups out of the political equation. Competing ‘nationalisms’, or ambitions to achieve this ideal ‘nation-state’ on the part of a single ethnic group, ultimately fuel conflicts that occur within a state along ethnic or national divisions.

Ignatieff’s extrapolation of Freud’s theory on the Narcissism of Minor Difference into a discussion of the causes of the conflict between Serb and Croat during the collapse of the Yugoslav federation is useful in understanding the role nationalism plays in facilitating conflict:

“A nationalist takes the neutral facts about a people – their language, habitat, culture, tradition and history – and turns these facts into a , whose purpose is to illuminate the self-consciousness of a group, to enable them to think of themselves as a nation with a claim to self- determination.”9

These differences of language, tradition and history remain matters of relative insignificance if there is some “form of political settlement between ethnic groups typically taking the form of an encompassing state that can ensure that each ethnic or national group does not feel threatened or lack security”.10

Unfortunately, there have been very few states that have safeguarded the rights of the various ethnic groups that reside within the territorial boundaries of a state. Examples of federative states such as the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree the current Russian federative arrangements are good examples of administrative approaches to the accommodation of the needs of the constituent or ‘federated’ ethnic groups that reside within their borders. Given the relative dysfunction that emerged within these upon their , it is possibly even more appropriate to view arrangements within , and to a lesser extend Canada as classic examples of what can be achieved in the accommodation of diverse populations.

9 Ignatieff, M. The Warriors Honor, Chatto and Windus, London, 1998, p51. 10 ibid, p52.

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It is the tragedy of the Soviet and post-Soviet federative frameworks that these federations have proven to be most prone to the development of grievances between ethnic groups, or an ethnic group and the state apparatus. Khazanov saw the outbreak of ‘ethnic nationalism’ that occurred during and after as the logical consequence of a nationalities policy that linked state-controlled ethnic identities with specific territories.11 Similarly, in Yugoslavia it has been seen as somewhat inevitable that the constitution that Tito had fashioned in 1974 to facilitate a federal arrangement that was dependent upon consensus at the republic level would, after his death, allow for republican elites to unilaterally place republican law above federal law,12 and thus hasten the demise of the multi-republic state.

Conflicting Loyalties? State vs Ethnic Group

The nature of the state, and the tendency for loyalty to ethnic identity or nationality to be considered as mutually exclusive of and in contravention to notions of allegiance to the state, is something that requires elaboration before the causes of ethnic conflict can be further discussed. There have been attempts to divide the idea of nationalism into two distinct categories - that of state or civic nationalism, and minority or ethnic nationalism.13 State or civic nationalism effectively views the state’s political authority as deriving from the people’s belief that it embodies the nation and consequently represents the nation’s general will.14 It has been defined as a “belief that residence in a common territorial homeland, and involvement in the state and civil society institutions of that homeland, generate a distinctive national character and civic culture, such that all citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community”.15 Minority or ethnic nationalism is based on the more traditional nationalist notion that “minority nationalities (based on ethnicity) have a right to form their own self governing political

11 Khazanov, A., “Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation”, Daedalus, vol 126, no 3, 1997, pp121- 141, pp123-125. 12 Leff, Carol Skalnik, “Democratisation and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Break-up of the Communist Federations”, World Politics, vol51, no2, 1999, pp205-235, pp219-220. 13 Kymlicka, W and Straehle, C. “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature” in European Journal of Democracy, vol7, no1, 1999, pp65-88, pp66-67. 14 Glenn, J. 1999, p26. 15 Brown, M., “Are there good and bad nationalisms?” in Nations and Nationalism, vol5, no2, 1999, pp281-302, p283.

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community either in the form of an independent state or as an autonomous region within an existing state”.16

However, these distinctions are of dubious value to this thesis because ultimately both ‘forms’ of nationalism still derive from assertion of difference, or identities demarcating ‘us’ from ‘them’17. The dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is obvious in the case of ethnic nationalisms, given its tendency towards exclusion. But state or civic nationalism can perceivably be also founded upon an assertion of difference: any groups who do not adopt the socio-cultural marking of the state as their own, by continuing with a preoccupation with their own sense of ethnicity or culture, are often seen as threatening the cohesion of the state.

Discussion of the merits of state or civic nationalism also seem to ignore the question of ‘who’s state?’ and ‘which group is pre-eminent?’ in the establishment of the cultural and social markers that define the state’s identity. All states are derived from a “cultural-linguistic core” which is rooted in a dominant ethnic group, and thus the notions of ethnic and civic nationalisms ultimately posses similar attributes.18 Consequently, it may be more useful to discuss any divisions arising from conflicting loyalty to nation or state in terms of the distinctions drawn by Walker Connor between nationalism and . Connor interpreted nationalism as loyalty to one’s national group, and patriotism as loyalty to one’s state or country, and he perceived a natural tendency for conflict to occur between the two.19 Other authors have presented similar arguments. Parekh, for instance, considered that, given nationalism is ultimately a political doctrine about the proper method of constituting the state, the confusion surrounding the term nationalism, with its cultural, linguistic (and ethnic) overtones, would be lessened if the term nationalism was replaced by such terms as or parochialism.20 Taking these issues into consideration, it is perceivable that the peculiar nature of the Soviet nationalities policies, underpinned as they were by the

16 Kymlicka, W., and Straehle, C., 1999, pp66-67. 17 Brown, M, 1999, p296. 18 Khanazov, A., 1997, p3 19 Connor, W., 1994, p69 20 Parekh, B., 1995, p37.

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establishment of titular nationalities, may have a continuing impact upon the relationships between the various groups within the Central Asian republics. As previously touched upon, there have already been signs that the titular nationalities of several of the republics are adopting particularly parochial policies towards the other nationalities, especially ethnic Russians. Such policies may over time see either an increasing level of exclusion of certain groups from the mechanisms of state, or a gradual assimilation of them into the titular group.

It is doubtful whether the proponents of ‘state’ or ‘civic’ nationalisms even attain the lofty goal of a community of equal rights based on citizenship rather than ethnicity or ancestry in a manner that allows them to be considered superior to ethnic nationalisms. The example of is useful in illustrating the problems associated with the pursuit of the principles of civic nationalism. It can be argued that French nationalism is based upon the suppression of linguistic and cultural pluralism in favour of a uniform system of cultural norms, social values and a constructed historical past, predicating acceptance into the political and social framework of the state upon a willingness to undergo assimilation into the ‘French nation’.21 Yet this tendency to move towards the cultural homogenisation of their constituent populations is far from being restricted to the French example. Consequently, there is value in Parekh’s observation that the desire of the state to become a nation is merely the obverse of the nation’s desire to become a state, and is neither morally superior to nor politically less harmful than the later22. More will be said of the idea of the national state, and the nationalising state, later.

In discussing Central Asia, there may be logic in differentiating between those ‘nations’ that are effectively ‘junior’ or silent partners in the mechanisms of the state, and those nations that are, in effect, the ‘titular’ national group, or the group that has effective control of the state apparatus, and thus able to enshrine its cultural markers within this structure. Drawing once again upon the French state, a good example of this division is the relationship between the ‘French’, who contribute many of the above markers to the apparatus of the French state, and more ‘junior’ nationalities such as the Bretons, who

21 Khazanov, A., 1997. 22 Parekh, B., 1995, p35.

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historically have equal claims to nationality in terms of territoriality and political awareness as the French, but have very few of their cultural markers enshrined within the state apparatus and have been repressed in the name of the universal civic (French) identity.

The term ‘titular’ nationality had particular significance in the Soviet system. A ‘titular’ nationality within the Soviet Union was a group that possessed territorial autonomy, and its status as an ‘indigenous’ community was recognised by it being the only legitimate holder of state level authority within a defined territory. In practice this meant that those members of a titular nationality who happened to reside within the territory to which that nationality was tied could benefit from a system of positive discrimination which included quotas in higher education, access to positions of political, socio-cultural and economic power, and schools offering tuition in the language of the titular nationality. The downside to this system, however, was that members of non-titular nationalities, or members of titular nationalities who happened to reside outside the territory defined for that nationality, had none of their ethno- religious or cultural characteristics protected or even recognised.23 In the post-Soviet Central Asian republics, the traditions of the Soviet Union which, on one hand allowed for the elevation of the rights of a certain nationality in a certain territory, and on the other facilitated the suppression of identities of all other ethnic or cultural groups within that territory pose a number of questions relating to the ability of titular nationalities to accommodate the needs of the other “non”-titular groups that reside within their borders.

Today this division between a ‘titular’ or dominant nationality and a minority nationality ultimately has relevance only in the context of the relationship between the two groups. The formal system of positive discrimination in favour of the titular nationality within its defined territory was abolished with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, in the Central Asian context, it may prove to be no more than broadly

23 Condagnone, Cristiano, and Filippov, Vassily, “Equity, Exit and National Identity in a Multinational Federation: the ‘Multicultural Constitutional Patriotism’ Project in Russia”, in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol26, no2, 2000, pp263-288, p266.

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applicable because the power structures in these states are often not definable in “national” terms, but in terms relating to much more micro societal structures such as tribe or family – classifications that traditionally would be considered too small to be deemed nationalities.

Mechanisms of Conflict

In recognising that the relationship between two or more ethnic groups located within the borders of a given state is rarely equitably reflected in the structure of that state, one comes to the ‘principle’ of ordering of ethnic groups or nations within the structures of that state. Horowitz analysed the ranking of ethnic groups, and in the process managed to elucidate the crucial relationship between ethnicity and class. He perceived the existence of ranked and unranked ethnic systems that reflected either the coincidence or non-coincidence of social class with ethnic origins.

Ordering of Groups Ranked Groups Unranked Groups

A

B A B

Hierarchical Ordering Parallel Ordering (arrows indicate the direction of ethnic conflict)

Source: Horowitz, D. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, California University Press, Berkeley, 1985, p22.

Horowitz considered that nearly all ethnic relationships can be categorised as either ranked or unranked,24 and that the two categories are susceptible to different forms of

24 Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, California University Press, Berkeley 1985, p25.

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ethnic conflict. Because the boundaries of ranked ethnic groups coincide with class lines, conflict in ranked systems typically has a class colouration, and may take the form of a social revolution.25 Unranked systems, although they are equally susceptible to conflict between groups, are more concerned with the politics of inclusion or exclusion than the politics of subordination. Sovereign autonomy, or the exclusion of parallel ethnic groups from a share of the power, is often the goal in unranked systems.26

In the event of a group suffering from collective economic, political or social disadvantages, this group is likely to develop legitimate economic, political and social grievances. These group grievances are likely to lead to group mobilisation, which in turn leads to protest or rebellion.27 This process of deprivation on the basis of group identity can often facilitate the development of a political consciousness within the ethnic group. As discussed by Ted Gurr, when faced with discrimination members of an ethnic group will inevitably develop resentment and anger, and will express their dissatisfaction in a number of ways. For those motivated to action, the greater the discrimination they experience, the more likely they are to organise for action against the sources of the discrimination.28 This would effectively see the ethnic group develop something of a political purpose, and thus arguably evolve into a nation, with all the trappings of nationalist ideology. The state may, in turn, exacerbate the situation by increasingly perceiving the newly emerged ‘nation’ as a threat, and may increase the level of discrimination or suppression, thus creating a security dilemma.

A classic example of this process is the conflict in Northern Ireland. What is now viewed as the archetypal case of a nationalist struggle for independence started off as a popular protest by Catholics in Northern Ireland seeking to achieve equal rights in access to employment, government services and political representation. Although Ireland has a long tradition of nationalist agitation, resulting largely from widespread and institutionalised discrimination against the Catholic minority, the middle half of the

25 ibid, p30. 26 ibid, p31. 27 Fox, J. “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-religious Conflict”, in Nations and Nationalism, vol 5, no4, 1999, pp431-463, p454.

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20th century saw a reduction in the activities of the republican groups seeking to achieve the goal of a united Ireland free from the control of the United Kingdom. The republican movement in Northern Ireland regained its previous vigour as a result of the reaction of both the Protestant majority and the government of Northern Ireland to demands by Catholics for greater access to resources and employment.

In a number of the Central Asian republics, in particular Kazakhstan, a perceived disparity between the economic and political resources of Russians and Kazakhs has led to animosity between the two groups. In some respects the situation of the Russians in Central Asia parallels that of the Protestants in Northern Ireland in that they are also a stranded ‘ethnic’ group that had previously relied upon support from external agencies. Although the Russians in Central Asia have long held the higher socio-economic ground, however they have not mobilised political institutions in the same manner as the Protestants in Northern Ireland. The disparities that exist between Russians and the titular nationalities in all the Central Asian republics will perceivably continue to fuel enmity between the two groups.

In addition to issues of social, political or economic deprivation and the tendency for ethnic groups subject to such disadvantages to mobilise, there are a number of other determinants that can influence or facilitate the development of ethnic conflict. Gurr and Harff developed a number of hypotheses that, by differentiating between internal causes of ethnic mobilisation and external factors that contributed to the development of ethnic conflict, effectively illuminated some of these factors, which included: x The more democratic the political environment, the more likely ethnopolitical groups will voice opposition non-violently; x The more violence is used by political authorities, the greater the likelihood that challenges will respond with increased violence. However, the more extreme force is used, the less likely the chances for open rebellion;

28 Gurr, Ted Robert, and Harff, Barbara, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview, Boulder, 1994, p83-84.

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x The greater the external support for mobilised ethnic groups, the greater the chances the groups will use violent means to challenge authorities; x States containing significant resources are more likely to be supported by the international community, and freer from unwanted interference than those with fewer resources; x The greater the international status of the state, the less likely it is that its internal challengers will be externally supported.29

Of these points, the second and fourth points have particular significance for the current situation in Uzbekistan, where the repressive regime of Karimov, which has long used violence to suppress dissent, was courted by the US for support in the military actions against the Taliban. And although in the past dialogue between the US administration and the Uzbek government has highlighted concerns with the Karimov regime’s poor human rights record, in particular its suppression of Islam and non-violent Islamic organisations, it was apparent soon after the September 11 2001 attacks that the US would ignore the repressive nature of the Uzbek government in seeking to engage potential allies.30

Further to the causes of ethnic conflict, however, Lake and Rothchild offered an alternative model which has some utility for gaining an understanding of the dynamic of such conflict. They argued that in the simplest terms, ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future: “as groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence”.31 Horowitz likewise highlighted the implications of an emergent fear of group extinction at the hands of another group or the state, demonstrating that the fear of succumbing to superior numbers or capacities of another group and thus disappearing was, although extreme and irrational, persistent and

29 Gurr, T.D., and Harff, B., 1994, pp84-86. 30 McGeough, P. “Washington’s new friend is a regime base on fear”, Sydney Morning Herald, 27-28 October 2001, p20. 31 Lake, David, and Rothchild, Donald, “Containing Fear: the origin and management of ethnic conflict”, International Security, v21, no2, 1996, pp41-76, p41.

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widespread and coloured group relations in many ways.32 Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has lent some legitimacy to what Horowitz claimed was the irrational fear of extinction. Since the end of the Second World War, there have been 44 instances of genocide and politicide, resulting in total casualties between seven million and 16 million people.33

There are a number of factors that can trigger such fears of the future. For example, when states lose their ability to either arbitrate between groups or to provide creditable guarantees of protection for various groups, these groups become fearful for their survival and invest in and prepare for violence, actions which actually facilitate violence. State weakness is considered a necessary precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt.34 Such state weakness can facilitate the outbreak of ethnic conflict in several ways. As stated by Roderic Alley, “ethnicity is less the problem than an absence of public processes capable of diluting its impact” and the widespread decay of state function that would have traditionally sought to managing competing identity claims can have far reaching consequences for the nature of relations between competing ethnic groups.35 Secondly, and more significantly, the absence of adequate state infrastructure necessary to ensure that the state can effectively manage functions of law and order can lead to different groups seeking to take their own safety and welfare into their own hands.

“Once the Yugoslav Communist state began to spin apart into its constituent particles, the key questions soon become: will the local Croat policeman protect me if I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or a Muslim”36

32 Horowitz, 1985, p175-181. In proving his point, Horowitz provided quotes from a number of different sources to demonstrate the role that fear of extinction, real or imagined, played in a significant number of conflict over the last 50 years – from Fiji, to Burma and Cyprus. 33 Sandole, Dennis, Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era, Pinter, London, 1999, p138. Sandole deduced that “genocides and politicides are brutal efforts to maintain the security of one’s ‘identity group’ at the total expense of other groups”. 34 Lake, D. and Rothchild, D., 1996, p41. 35 Alley, Roderic, Internal Conflict and the International Community: Wars Without End, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004, p26. 36 Ignatieff, Michael, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Vintage, London, 1994, p30. Ignatieff assessed that, in the Yugoslav example, the answer to these questions was no “because no

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This point closely parallels the application of the security dilemma to ethnic conflict undertaken by Melander. Whilst conceding that ethnic groups live in peaceful contact with other ethnic groups most of the time, Melander also recognizes that ethnic groups can become defensively motivated just as readily as can states, and thus can readily meet the preconditions of the security dilemma:

x That the security dilemma operates on actors who are basically defensively motivated. x There is a defined ‘first strike’ advantage that facilitates the ethnic conflict. x The ratio of defensive to offensive military capability is skewed or difficult to determine. x There is a lack of certainty about the intentions of others.37

Furthermore, Melander identifies the crucial role that the state plays in the development within ethnic groups of a motivation towards defence. He maintained that ethnic groups may organise themselves militarily for self defence when the state fails to provide physical security, and no longer upholds a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Additionally, he perceived that if the state itself targets members of a particular ethnic group, then that group concludes that it can no longer rely upon the government for physical protection, and may take appropriate action.38

Another key facilitator of ethnic conflict identified by Lake and Rothchild is competition for resources in multi-ethnic societies. Property rights, education, language and religious rights, government assistance and development allocations all effectively confer benefits on individuals and groups, yet are all classifiable as scarce resources and are thus objects of competition between individuals and groups.39 If one group is being allocated a disproportionate share of such resources or has an obviously higher level of economic status, as was the case with the slight Protestant majority in Northern Ireland

state remained to enforce the old inter-ethnic bargain. As a result, every individual rushed, pell-mell, to the next available source of protection – the warlord”. 37 Melander, E., 2000, pp38-44. 38 Melander, E., 2000, pp38-44. 39 Lake, D. and Rothchild, D. 1996.

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in the 1960’s, then the negative inequities perceived by the other groups influences the relations between the groups and may prove to be a driving force behind the development of overt conflict between the two. However, Connor, for one, has urged against automatically accepting evidence of economic inequality as the root cause of ethnonational conflict, because economic inequality will almost always be present.40

Lake and Rothchild also provided a novel but useful interpretation of stable ethnic relations as being predicated upon a ‘contract’ between groups, or between a government and an ethnic group – when these groups cannot creditably commit themselves to upholding this mutually beneficial agreement, then ethnic conflict can arise.41 In some respects, this proposition is an extension of the idea of a social contract, but has moved the locus of the mutually obligatory relationship from the individual to the group. The idea of the ‘ethnic contract’ has been adopted by other authors. Lobell and Mauceri interpreted such agreements as specifying the rights and responsibilities, political privileges and access to resources of each ethnic group, and may extend to formal guarantees of power sharing, minority rights and state patronage. The existence of such safeguards ensures that an ethnic minority feels secure in its relationship with the state and/or the dominant ethnic group.42 In this manner, the idea of the ‘ethnic contract’ can be linked to the earlier discussion on the applicability of the security dilemma.

The idea of an ethnic contract suggests a flow of information between the parties involved in the contract, all of whom would perceivably be seeking to further their own interests. When this flow of information is impeded, or when, in the words of Lake and Rothchild, an information failure occurs, then conflict can develop between the groups. When groups cannot acquire or share the information necessary to bridge the bargaining

40 Connor, W., 1994, p147. Connor stated “ one of the great dangers of economic statistics when applied to ethnonational groups…is that the figures are apt to convey far more that they warrant”. Uneven regional development is a global reality, and has inter-state as well as intra-state dimensions. Therefore, as argued by Connor, it is attractive but fallacious to draw upon economic statistics alone to prove instances of discrimination. 41 Lake, D. and Rothchild, D., 1996. 42 Lobell, Steve, and Mauceri, Philip, “Diffusion and Escalation of Ethnic Conflict” in S. Lobel and P. Mauceri, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p2.

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gap between them, then competing interests can produce actual conflict.43 In this way, the impeding of the flow of information between two groups leads to one of the preconditions of the security dilemma, that of increased levels of uncertainty about the intentions of others.

Fox discussed the impact of the religious dimension of ethnicity on the prospect of conflict between ethnic groups. Any examination of ethnic conflict that has occurred in the last 20 years will immediately identify a religious element in the conflict. From the ongoing war between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, to the Bosnian War and the clashes between Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland, religion has been a key differentiating factor between the groups. But the question of whether religion causes conflict, or is used as a tool to mobilise members of an ethnic group, is debatable. There is an established theory that some are more likely to promote violence, conflict and revolution than others.44 Huntington, in his work on intercivilisational conflict, singled out Muslim groups as more disposed towards violence, both towards themselves and towards other groups, than any other group. Huntington identified Muslims as participants in 26 of the 50 ethnopolitcal conflicts that were underway in 1993-94.45

Ethnopolitical Conflicts 1993-1994 Intracivilisation Intercivilisation Total Islam 11 15 26 Others 19 5 24 Total 30 20 50 Source: Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, p257.

Perhaps more significant was the statistic that of the 20 conflicts that were occurring between what Huntington perceived as ‘intercivilisational’ groups, 15 of those were

43 Lake, D. and Rothchild, D., 1996. 44 Fox, J. 1999, p433. 45 Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, p256.

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between Muslims and other groups. Whilst it is not the intention of the author to place undue importance on the broader arguments presented by Huntington in his controversial work46, it is nevertheless considered pertinent to consider these statistics in this discussion, given that Islam is the predominant but not the only significant religion in the region. At present Islam in these states is a greater threat to the secular governments of the region than to the communities of Russian Orthodox Christians. However, if these states continue to align themselves with Russia or the West, then they may increasingly become a target for militant Islamist groups acting within the logic of intercivilisational conflict elucidated by Huntington.

However, seeking to ascribe some of the blame for occurrences of ethnic conflict to religion is something of a circular process. It is almost undeniable that religion invokes passion on the part of its adherents. Any challenge to the religious framework of a particular group is almost guaranteed to provoke a defensive and often conflictive response from the adherents of that religious group, regardless of whether the group challenged occupies a dominant or subordinate role in the society.47

Two additional issues need to be considered before religion can be ascribed a key role in the occurrence of ethnic conflict. Any grievances that manifest among any type of group can lead to the use of religious institutions in the mobilisation of that group, and facilitate conflict. Similarly religious frameworks can be used to legitimise grievances that are not of a religious nature by those seeking to mobilise the ethnic group.48

Although it is undeniable that religion plays a key role in ethnic conflict, and is crucial in understanding Central Asia, it is important to focus also on political, economic and social grievance as the key facilitators of the ethnic group mobilisation that leads to

46 As succinctly stated by Edward Said, “Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make ‘civilizations’ and ‘identities’ into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing”, in Said, Edward, “The Clash of Ignorance”, The Nation, 22 October 22, 2001, located at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011022&s=said 47 Fox, J., 1999, p447. 48 ibid, pp450-451.

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conflict.49 As discussed by Connor, in his evaluation of the role played by religion in the conflict in Northern Ireland, in most cases religion should be treated as just another signifier of national identity: undue focus on the role of religion or civil rights in evaluations of conflicts can lead to analysts failing to realise that they are dealing with ethnic nationalism, pure and simple.50

The Nation State or the Nationalising State?

In attempting to gain something of a general understanding of why ethnic conflict occurs in a certain context, one final point that relates to the central theme of this essay needs to be made – that the legitimacy of the modern state is often undermined by the very nature of its own construction.

With reference to the earlier discussion on the nature of nationalism and the idea of the nation state, not only is the concept of the nation state difficult to realise, but the only alternative to the ‘nation state’, that of a multiethnic or multinational, state, is itself often fundamentally flawed, and in some respect implicitly conducive to the occurrence of ethnic conflict. In the multiethnic or multinational state not only is there a tendency for various ethnic groups to not be accepted as full members of the state, or to be actually excluded from it,51 but there is a tendency for the dominant ethnic groups to institutionalise its economic, numerical, or military dominance within the structures of the state.

Consequently, there is something of a tendency for states that do contain a significant national majority to develop towards the realisation of the nation state. Although there are only a handful of states on the planet that can lay claim to being nation states in the true sense, examination of the ethnic makeup of states over, say, the last 150 years will likely illustrate the homogenising nature of the modern state. And for every multiethnic

49 ibid, p449. 50 Connor, W., 1994, p44. Connor considered that ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon tangible elements such as language, religion or economic inequality: “the question of whether a person is one of us, or one of them, seldom hinges on adherence to overt aspects of culture (p46). 51 Stavenhagen, R., Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation State, Macmillan, London, 1996, p2.

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state such as Switzerland, which has achieved a balanced recognition of the rights and cultures of its constituent nationalities, there are a dozen states like France, which has a long history of suppressing the linguistic and of its minority groups. However, this tendency cannot be explained away as part of a natural evolution of states. Often states evolve towards the nation-state model as a result of explicit nation- building policies adopted by a state in order to diffuse and strengthen a sense of nationhood. These policies include a national educational curricula, support for national media, the adoption of national symbols and laws, citizenship and nationalisation laws, etc. Consequently, many of today’s states are better characterised as ‘nation-building’ or ‘nationalising’ states, rather than nation states52. The process of nation-building has been seen by Smith to be synonymous with the idea of ‘state- making’, containing a number of separate processes, including:

x the growth, cultivation and transmission of a framework of common memories, myths and symbols; x the growth, selection and transmission of historical traditions; x the selection, cultivation and transmission of elements of shared culture, including language and religion; x the dissemination of ‘authentic’ values, knowledge and attitudes through standardised methods and institutions; x the cultivation and transmission of symbols and myths associated with a historical territory or homeland.53

Alternatively, ‘nationalising states’ haves been defined as “ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation”.54 Of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan in particular stands out as a classic example of the nationalising state. As will be discussed in depth later, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government of Nursultan

52 Kymlicka, W. and Straehle, C, 1999, p73. 53 Smith, A.D Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era, Polity Press, London, 1995, pp89-90.

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Nazerbayev has undertaken an overt program of ‘Kazakhification’. This program is focused on establishing the and culture as dominant within political, social and economic structures of the state, to the detriment of the language and cultural rights of other groups within the state, in particular the Russians.

However, a nationalising policy such as that adopted in Kazakhstan often takes a form other than the relatively benign approach of ‘positive assimilation’ as outlined by Smith and mentioned above. Kuzio, in his survey of literature relating to the notion of ‘nationalising states’ and ‘nation-building’ identified a number of features of nationalising policies which are more negative and overt than the ones identified by Smith, and have greater implications for the development of conflict between ethnic groups. These features included:

x Restrictions placed on the non-official within civil society, education and the mass media. x Citizenship laws which are exclusive, leading to the over-domination of the in political office. x Members of the non-titular nation/s are gradually forced out of the state bureaucracy due to the expansion in usage of the official language. x The legal system privileges the customs, practices and institutions of the titular nation.55

This ‘nation-building’ process can, in itself, be viewed as a determinant of ethnic conflict. Anthony Smith considered that contemporary states are facing disintegration because their multi-ethnic character is being undermined by processes of state expansion and modernisation.56 Somewhat ironically, Smith targets both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism as the instigators of nation-building, or in the words of Walker Connor ‘nation-destroying’ policies. They both demand the “eradication of

54 Brubaker, R. “National Minorities, Nationalising States, and External in the New Europe”, Daedalus, vol124, no2, 1995, pp107-132, p109. 55 Kuzio, T. “’Nationalising States’ or Nation Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence”, Nations and Nationalism, vol7, no2, 2001, pp135-154, p139. 56 Smith, A., 1995, p85.

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minority cultures and communities, on the common assumption…not just of equality through uniformity, but that ‘high cultures’ and ‘great nations’ are necessarily of greater value than ‘low’ cultures and small nations or ethnies”.57 Underpinning the state disintegration identified by Smith is the tendency for ethnonational groups to resist pressure to assimilate in accordance with the nation-building activities of a state. Instead, they tend to mobilise along ethnonationalist lines with the goal of establishing their own self-governing political community either as an independent state or as an autonomous region with the larger state. The logical conclusion of this mobilisation can often be realised as conflict between that ethnonationalist group and either the state, or that ethnic group that dominates the apparatus of state.58

These points raise a whole new set of issues that goes to the heart of the legitimacy of the state by questioning a state’s natural ability to manage sometimes competing claims from a variety of ethnic or national groups. Reconciling state sovereignty and territorial integrity with the notion of group rights and the principle of self-determination of peoples is inevitably a difficult process that is ultimately undermined by the reality of governance of the modern state. Many of the points raised above, including the idea of ‘nation-building’ having a natural corollary in the idea of ‘nation-destroying’, gain both clarity and validity when used to evaluate the nature of identity and to the predict the prospect of conflict in Central Asia. Although it is intended to focus this study on ‘ethnic’ conflict in Central Asia, it is also the intention of the author to illustrate a number of wider issues that relate to the legitimacy of the state, self-determination and group rights, and the international political environment.

However, an understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, and the role that issues derived from these two sociological constructs can play in the development of cleavages or even overt conflict between ethnic or national groups provides only half of the conceptual arsenal required for this thesis. Equally important to this discussion is the vast body of international law, in the form of treaties,

57 ibid, p101. Smith perceived that the “assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the national state through acculturation to a hegemonic majority ethnic culture” is a fundamental assumption in both Western democracies and non-Western authoritarian state-nations. 58 Kymlicka, W. and Straehle, C, 1999, pp66-67.

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resolutions, conventions and customary law, which will constrain any discussion on ways to deal with ethnic conflict in Central Asia. Somewhat ironically, many of these legal principles play a somewhat contradictory role. On the one hand they provide the glue by which the international system of states is held together. On the other hand, they impede international actors – states, international organisations and institutions – from constructively dealing with what is one of the more destabilising aspects of the modern political system. In general terms, the principle of state sovereignty is the most significant of these concepts, and it will be addressed at length in the following chapter. Equally important, however, are principles such as self-determination and humanitarian intervention. A brief examination of these principles, and their legal foundations, will provide the foundation upon which this paper can consider how best to deal with both the prospect and reality of ethnic conflict in Central Asia.

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Chapter Four

State Sovereignty, Group Rights and the International System

“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”1

As stated in the preceding chapter, principles such as state sovereignty have a direct bearing on the outcome of this discussion because they not only form the foundation of the international political system, but they will inevitably constrain any consideration of how to deal with ethnic conflict in Central Asia. And, although much of the later discussion that focuses on the peculiar nature of the states in Central Asia is intended, to a degree, to challenge the assumptions that are inherent in these ‘governing’ principles, it is still necessary to conceptualise such challenges by first considering the nature of these ‘governing principles of international law’.

The concept of the sovereign state is over three hundred years old, yet it remains the key to the modern international system. The state, by being deemed territorially sovereign, is, within its borders, the ultimate authority with the power to act without being answerable to others.2 The sovereign state appears to enjoy an autonomy that dictates that no external actor can exercise authority within the borders of that state.3

The principle of the inviolability of a state’s jurisdiction over its territory and the people contained therein is conventionally considered a cornerstone of the modern political system. Yet, one can take a fairly cynical view of this, because it is arguable that such

1 Annan, Kofi, ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 2000, p48. 2 Gow, J., “Serbian Nationalism and the Hissing Snake in the International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?”, in Slavonic and East European Review, vol 72, no 3, 1994, pp456-476, p464. 3 Krasner, Stephen, “Compromising Westphalia”, in International Security, vol20, no3, 1995, pp115-152, p115.

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‘respect’ for the principle of state sovereignty is more frequently achieved not as a result of principled obedience on the part of states but as a result of pragmatic political decision-making. Even a cursory survey of international affairs over the last two decades reveals numerous instances where states, particularly the more powerful states, have ignored even the most liberal interpretation of state sovereignty in their dealings with other states.

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia is commonly held to represent the starting point for the development of the modern notion of state sovereignty. The two treaties which were signed at Munster and Osnabruck in this year brought to an end the Thirty Years War in Germany and the eighty year war between the Netherlands and Spain. This saw the end of a supranational papal order based on notions of Catholic supremacy, and more importantly, the creation of two legally independent states – Switzerland and the Netherlands. This was effectively a reversal of historical process by which the Holy Roman Empire had sought to “unite all nations into a single geographical and spiritual union”.4 The failure of Europe to develop a centralising power that was strong enough to overcome the pluralistic nature of the European community of the time was in many respects counter to a contemporary “world of empires and overarching moral cultures”.5 Accompanying this shift was a move away from the notion of universal sovereignty, characterised by the Holy Roman Empire, towards what would become the dominant concept underpinning the development of a system of international law – the modern theory of state sovereignty.6

Whilst statehood and a form of state sovereignty had existed before the Peace of Westphalia, these two treaties were especially significant because they marked the emergence of a “national society, as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding them in their relations with each

4 Khan, L. The Extinction of Nation States: A World without Borders, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996, p40. 5 Gelber, H. Sovereignty through Interdependence, Kluwer Law, International, London, 1997, p1. 6 Khan, L., 1996, p43.

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other, and of a common interest in maintaining them”.7 The Peace of Westphalia also advanced the ideas of the external and internal sovereignty of states. The external sovereignty of states was effectively advanced by not only the recognition of the rights of the German princes to form alliances outside the empire (thus possessing a mandate to conduct foreign relations), but also by the recognition of both the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation. Similarly, internal sovereignty was advanced by a reaffirmation of the authority of the state over the church,8 a development which significantly enhanced the competency of the state as the predominant institution within a given territory.

In some respects these events were manifestations of the natural conflict that occurred between two competing philosophies of governance and administration – universal sovereignty versus state sovereignty. Universal sovereignty related to the idea of a single world government that applied to all people.9 State sovereignty on the other hand stipulates that the state has control over its territory, and by default, the people contained within its borders. A state can be sovereign only after it fulfils four criteria:

1. It must consist of a territory. 2. It must comprise a people, or peoples. 3. It must contain an effective government. 4. It must have the competence to conduct independent foreign relations.10

These specific criteria of statehood have traditionally been reinforced by a more general principle of effectiveness, and that all criteria for statehood will necessarily be predicated by the concept of effectiveness. However, as discussed at length by Crawford the existence or absence of effectiveness does not always accompany or lead

7 Bull, Hedley, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations”, in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury, and A. Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp65-95, p75-76. Bull considered that sovereign states whose behaviour impinged upon one another had actually emerged in the late 15 century. 8 Bull, H., 1992, p77. 9 Khan, K., 1996, p43. 10 ibid, p61. These principles were first established in Article One of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.

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to the recognition of statehood.11 There may be, for instance, some entities or geographical regions that, for all intents display the competencies of a state, yet are not bequeathed the status of statehood by the international system.12 Similarly, there are states that may not meet the basic criteria of statehood, yet are granted the status of state. The issue of effectiveness and its apparent continued acceptance as a norm of state sovereignty is of particular interest to this discussion, because it segues into the later discussion on the competencies of the state and the idea of quasi- or failed states.

The shift from a more traditional form of sovereignty where sovereignty was seen to relate to the relationship between a ruler and their people and not to dominion of a state over a portion of the earth,13 was a hugely significant shift in political thought. The principle of territorial sovereignty lies at the heart of the modern international system, where the state, or independent political community, possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population.14 More will be said on territorial sovereignty later.

The idea of a sovereign state stipulates that a state possesses both internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the legal authority that a state possesses over a territory and the people included within. This legal authority includes the power to institute a domestic legal system, and the right to pursue political economic, social and cultural aspirations. External sovereignty, on the other hand, relates to the power of the state to establish diplomatic relations, engage in international trade and to exercise the right to self-defence.15 External sovereignty has also been more generally construed as meaning that the state has over it no other authority than that of international law.16

11 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp77-80. 12 The examples discussed by Crawford, 1979, p77-78, included Rhodesia and Formosa, which he considered displayed the competencies of a state but were universally considered not to be states; and Guinea-Bissau, which he suggested was a non-effective entity undeserving of statehood. 13 Henry Maine, quoted in Khan, L., 1996, p62. 14 Bull, H. The Anarchical Society, Macmillan, London, 1977,p8. 15 Khan, L., 1996, p72. 16 Crawford, 1979, p59. Krasner, discussed four meanings of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, referring to the organisation of public authority within a state and the exercise of effective control by those in authority; interdependence sovereignty, meaning the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or

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For the purposes of this discussion, it is considered that it is more appropriate to focus on internal sovereignty because it is more pertinent to a discussion of the relationship between sovereignty and ethnic conflict. Internal sovereignty, as a right enjoyed by all states, was codified in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations:

Article 2(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.17

These articles established durable parameters governing the interaction of states and the UN. However, they also reflect the ultimately conservative nature of the UN interpretation of state sovereignty, and in the process ignore the reality of the dynamic that underpins the relations between states. Although the principle of internal sovereignty as outlined in the Charter of the UN is theoretically sound, as states can theoretically use these articles to shield themselves from ‘interference’ by other states and by international bodies such as the UN, it is arguable that the actual sovereignty enjoyed by states falls far short of the lofty ideals proposed in the Charter. Indeed, it has been noted that the prohibition on the use of forces applies only to the application of armed or military force, and largely avoids the problem of political or economic force. This issue has been contentious, with some countries arguing that the interpretation of the use of force also covers political and economic coercion. However, the prevailing

other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic issues. See Krasner, S., Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p9. 17 Charter of the United Nations, in Simma, Bruno (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

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view is that this is not the case, and that Article 2(4) relates strictly to the application of armed or physical force.18

The Myth Of Territorial Sovereignty

The Westphalian model of sovereignty from which the United Nations derived these principles has in reality never been a formal or controlling structure that restrained the actions of states. The most enduring aspect of the Westphalian model has been the lack of adherence by states acting in the international arena to the idea of the state being territorially sovereign and autonomous.19 States, in maintaining the international economic and political interrelationships that underpin the international system regularly compromise not only the sovereignty of other states through their actions, but also effectively compromise their own sovereignty. The options and strategies that are available to states to limit or impede the real internal sovereignty enjoyed by other states are numerous. This is particularly the case where a state enjoys an economic, diplomatic or military advantage over other states. Many of these options fall well short of the use or threat of force prohibited under Article 2(4), and thus use of them elicits little or no response from other states or international institutions. For example, an economically powerful state may coerce a weaker state into altering its domestic institutions or policies by implicitly threatening them with the imposition of economic sanctions.20

Alternatively, states enter into treaties, conventions and contracts with other states and with international organisations that limit the amount of autonomy and territorial sovereignty that they enjoy.21 One only has to look at the growing body of treaties

18 Simma, B., 1994, p112. The coercive use of political and economic force was addressed in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration adopted by the General Assembly, which stated “no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state”. Simma discussed how the inclusion of this principle of non-intervention in the Friendly Relations Declaration effectively “underlines the fact that the scope of Art 2(4) is restricted to armed force. Economic and other types of coercion are not covered by Art 2(4) but by the general principle of non-intervention”, (pp112- 113). 19 Krasner, S., 1999, p115. 20 ibid, p115. As discussed earlier, such actions do not actually meet the criteria of illegal use of force as enunciated in Article 2(4). 21 Ibid, p115.

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relating to human rights and the environment to appreciate the extent to which states are voluntarily surrendering a measure of their sovereignty. In becoming signatory to these treaties, states are agreeing to conform to a particular pattern of behaviour in their domestic affairs, and thus no longer possess the internal autonomy that is seen fundamental to the exercise of territorial sovereignty.22 Some issues, such as human rights, are seen as falling to a degree outside the domestic jurisdiction of the state.23

Khan outlined three characteristics of the international political and economic system that further challenge the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Firstly, corporate has produced an environment where businesses can effectively defy the internal sovereignty of states. The control and self sufficiency that states once enjoyed over their economies has been broken down by the growth of a corporate transnationalism that effectively shapes national economies and binds them together into an intricate web of interdependence. Secondly, environmental issues are further breaking down state borders by forcing recognition of the fact that humanity, regardless of ethnic or territorial divisions, is all contained within the one biological system. And thirdly, the information revolution is transforming traditional notions of territoriality to reflect the fact that geographical contiguity is becoming increasingly irrelevant.24

The processes generally referred to as globalisation, which include, but are not restricted to, the above points, have significant implications for the sovereignty that is enjoyed by governments. Firstly, though, it needs to be recognised that care must be exercised to avoid the tendency for the significance of transnational process as limiters of state

22 Hannum, H., Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self Determination: the Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1990, p21. Hannum also discussed the impact of international organisations such as the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the Universal Postal Union as effectively binding on all states.23 Hannum, H, 1990, p20. Simma, 1994, outlined the conventional interpretation that the protection of human rights “essentially belongs to the domestic jurisdiction of the state”, but that in certain circumstances, such as when there were systematic violations of human rights, the international system, in the form of the UN, could assume some measure of jurisdiction over the issue (p152-153). 24 Khan, L., 1996, pp119-131.

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sovereignty to be restricted to the post World War Two world, characterised by Bretton Woods institutions. Holton considered that the argument that national sovereignty is under attack from the processes of globalisation was resting upon the false assumption that there was once a time that states possessed some kind of absolute control over not only their territory, but over the movement of resources, people and cultural influences across their borders. If national sovereignty has always been more conditional than was admitted, and consequently, if absolute sovereignty never existed, then one has to question what exactly about sovereignty was being undermined by these allegedly new processes of globalisation.25 Other authors offer similar analyses to Holton. Osiander, for example, identifies the growing interdependence that is considered a key factor of globalisation as a result of industrialisation, and he contends that these processes have been undermining the capacity for self-reliance of states for over a century. Furthermore, Osiander sees the modern global system as more closely resembling the type of system embodied by the Holy Roman Empire than the ‘Wesphalian model’, and he considers that the modern notion of sovereignty is little more than an ideology that had its origins in the “transient nineteenth century heyday of state autonomy”.26

Consequently, it is crucial to recognise that many of the processes that are being considered as characteristic of globalisation are not new occurrences, but merely extensions of processes that have long influenced the interrelationship between states, and between states and peoples. However, as Holton reflected, recognition of the historical parallels with the present is perfectly compatible with arguments focusing on the contemporary global challenges to national sovereignty, and such recognition does not have to obscure the fact that cross-border transactions have rapidly intensified in the latter part of the 20th century.27

One of the main implications for sovereignty deriving from such intensification of cross-border transactions is that the ‘sovereign state’ has lost a measure of its sovereignty to regional and global institutions and multi- and transnational

25 Holton, R. Globalisation and the National-State, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998, pp83-84. 26 Osiander, A. “Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth”, International Organization, vol 55, no 2, 2001, pp251-287. 27 Holton, R., 1998, p84.

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corporations.28 The processes of economic globalisation, which have effectively freed markets from government control, have undermined the allocative roles that have long underpinned the functionality of the state, and in the process have undermined the cohesion of states as coherent and well-defined entities. This in turn has weakened political elites by compromising their abilities to allocate resources and promote stability. Although all states are susceptible to such processes, newly established states, such as the Central Asian republics, are particularly vulnerable because they typically have fewer resources and less experience dealing with the transnational actors that thrive in such an environment.29

The resultant weakening of the state and the fragmentation of political and economic structures has the potential to displace loyalties and allegiances from the traditional state locus to more fundamental perceived commonalities such as ethnic background, religion and language – thus establishing a link between processes of globalisation forces and the contemporary expression of tribalism and cultural identity.30 This link has implications for the stability of the Central Asian region, where the various ethnic groups are increasingly losing faith in the abilities of their governments to meet the challenges posed by the processes of globalisation. Integration in the global economy could perceivably expedite the emergence of new identities in the region, and exacerbate the tensions between the various peoples.

Furthermore, in certain respects the Central Asian states can be seen as particularly vulnerable because they fit the same category of ex-colonial states upon which Jackson focused in his discussion on what he categorised as ‘quasi states’. In this discussion, state-building is described as predominantly a domestic, internally driven process which occurs over a long period of time as a result of a combination of efforts and aspirations of governments and populations. Ex-colonial states arrived at the point of independence and sovereignty more as a result of enfranchisement granted by international society, than because of the possession of substantial or credible statehood. Consequently,

28 Cable, V. “The Diminished nation-state: a study in the loss of economic power”, Daedalus, vol 124, no 2, 1995, pp23-54. 29 Holton, R., 1998, p85. 30 Cable, V., 1995, pp23-54.

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although these new states possessed the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states, they were deficient in a number of other areas.

1. Their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. 2. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority and organised power to protect human rights or provide socio- economic welfare. 3. The concrete benefits which have historically justified the undeniable burdens of sovereign statehood are often restricted to narrow elites and not extended to all citizens, many of whose lives remain unimproved by independence or actually adversely affected by it.31

Jackson’s observations on ‘quasi-states’ highlight the threat that an intensification of the processes of globalisation represents to a number of the states in the international system. They also stand as a template useful in an analysis of the Central Asian states, and of the prospects for these states to develop effective and durable political, economic and social structures that can cushion the impact of globalisation. The trauma associated with the transition from the closed Soviet economy to a global economy dominated by transnational corporations will perhaps be felt more acutely in Central Asia than the other post-Soviet states because of their fragile and ineffective state infrastructures. Of the situation in the post-Soviet newly independent states, it has been said that: “the characteristics of the present crisis enable us to draw an analogy with the economic situation of the 1930’s, almost the only difference being that the great post- socialist depression of the 1990’s was accompanied by inflation”.32 The situation of the Central Asian republics was especially dire because not only were they more tightly integrated into the Soviet economy than many of the Eastern European countries,33 but

31 Jackson, R., Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp21-22. 32 Bernard Chavance, quoted in Akaev, A., Kyrgyzstan: An Economy in Transition, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2001, p1. 33 Pomfret, R. The Economies of Central Asia, Princeton, 1995, p51. Pomfret saw the most immediate problem encountered by the Central Asian Republics upon independence as the lack of their own currency, and thus their susceptibility to the collapse and hyperinflation of the rouble.

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all the Central Asian states are landlocked and completely reliant upon the collapsing Soviet system of trade routes and energy pipelines for the input of essential supplies and the conveyance of exports.34 The transitional nature of the economies and societies of Central Asia, and the threat that globalisation represents to their abilities to establish working economic foundations for their states will be discussed in greater depth later.

International Law and the State

International law places very few explicit limitations on the internal sovereignty that is enjoyed by states. And on face value the UN Charter does not consider the possibility that states are dynamic entities that do not necessarily exist in perpetuity. The bestowal of sovereignty occurs when the international community perceives a state to possess the four attributes outlined by Khan. And sovereignty is in effect only granted once to a state. However, the idea that sovereignty can be taken away from a state, even only to a limited degree, is one that is only addressed indirectly, and typically in relation to the external sovereignty that a state exercises. Nor does the international system encourage the development of alternative or complementary forms of sovereignty.

In theory and in practice the international system ignores the fact that the dynamics of state relations can include a regression away from the four criteria facilitating sovereignty. This regression can result in a weakening of a state in terms of legitimacy and sovereignty, and in particular can impede its ability to meet the essential criteria of possessing an effective government. Conflict between ethnic groups can be a major cause of a reduction of a state’s ability to conduct effective government. And ethnic conflict can also be symptomatic of a state’s increasing inability to meet the essential criteria for statehood and the accompanying sovereignty as defined by Khan. However, with rare exceptions, the international community in the guise of the UN does not see the occurrence of overt ethnic conflict within a state as symptomatic of a decline in the legitimacy enjoyed by a state. Thus it fails to recognise what can be a process of

34 Gurgen, Emine, Economic reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1999, p1.

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evolution where the territorial arrangements of a state can no longer meet the needs of the peoples that reside within its borders. Paradoxically, even the traditional Grotian interpretation of state sovereignty considered that the sovereign state was a dynamic, almost organic structure that was continually evolving in size, character, prestige and influence. States possess a lifecycle that includes birth, dissolution and death. This dynamism can include the merger of different communities into a single state, or the division of an existing state by either peaceable dissolution or by war.35 It is ironic that the UN should enshrine the Grotian principle of sovereignty in its Charter, yet fail to include mechanisms that allow for the recognition of the organic, evolutionary nature of the state. This reluctance to adopt an approach to state sovereignty that incorporates the option of territorial revision has been traced back to the two World Wars, when there was an increased association amongst Western states of territorial revisionism with major war, and a corresponding development of the “territorial integrity norm” as a central pillar of the international order.36 Similarly, one of the key mechanisms of territorial revision – secession – is rarely entertained as a valid option to resolving instances of state failure for two reasons:

1. The right to secession threatens the international order, i.e. the existing system of powers and rules. 2. The right to secession threatens international order, i.e. it will lead to increased international conflict.37

Additionally, there is wisdom in the observation that recognition of a right to secede is not only not likely to end an old bitterness, but is likely to hasten the commencement of a new bitterness.38

35 Khan, L., 1996, p66. 36 Zacher, M., “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force”, International Organization, vol 55, no 2, 2001, pp215-250. 37 Freeman, M., “The Priority of Function over Structure: A new Approach to Secession”, in P. Lehning (ed) Theories of Secession, Routledge, London, 1998, pp12-32, p17 38 Horowitz, D, “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede”, in Journal of Democracy, vol14, no2, April 2003, p9. Horowitz considered that if secession did not solve boundary problems, it was likely to ‘convert a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international one”( p10). Furthermore, Horowitz argued that a string of secessionist claims, which would produce a multitude of homogenous

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Yet secession is not the only way to accommodate the organic nature of the state, or to respond to internal problems such as conflict or confrontation between ethnic groups. It is merely one of the more drastic actions that will be considered during the course of this discussion. The intention here was merely to identify some of the principles of the growing body of international law relating to sovereignty, secession and self- determination that will be dealt with in greater depth later.

Ethnic Conflict and the State

It is paradoxical that the international community in the guise of the United Nations so readily proclaims state sovereignty as the reason that they cannot become involved in ethnic conflict. In reality, sovereignty proves to be essentially a ‘contested term’, and its meaning and content often change according to the needs of a particular government or institution.39 The UN often proclaims the inviolability of state sovereignty when desiring to avoid involvement in certain conflicts. Yet, as events after the two World Wars amply demonstrated, leaders of international ‘community and opinion’ show very little compunction in ignoring previously sacrosanct notions of state sovereignty. Much of the current international political order of states originated in decisions made by key statesmen seeking to enforce order on the dislocation that global conflict wrought.

It can be argued that there is a contradiction inherent in the international system of sovereign states. On the one hand the international system is made up of about 200 territorial states that have the attributes of external and internal sovereignty. Yet, on the other hand, it consists of several thousand ethnic groups, many of whom do not feel represented by, or do not identify with, the state in which they live.40

And, although many ethnic conflicts are perceived to be manifestations of tribal hatreds, or ancient enmities, the reality is that such conflicts are usually confrontations between states, may well “increase the sum total of warfare rather than reduce it. The right direction for international boundaries is upward, not downward, so that states are so heterogeneous that no one ethnic group can plausibly dominate others”. This was also the central argument of Nicholas Sambanis, in “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature”, World Politics, vol52, July 2000, pp437-483, p479. 39 Gow, J., 1994, p463.

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politically mobilised ethnic groups, seeking greater recognition, equality or autonomy, and an existing state.41 Many of the intra-state conflicts that have developed in recent decades have occurred in vastly different socio-political environments. Yet many of these conflicts can be ultimately defined in terms of national self-determination, or confrontation between two or more groups within a state seeking ultimately conflicting goals. These intrastate or ethnic conflicts validate the contention that, except where a community is culturally homogenous, the principle of the nation state means “the success of a majority in achieving self-determination will involve the assimilation, extinction or exclusion of the minority”.42

Northern Ireland was a classic example of how a minority group can be effectively excluded from the social, political and economic apparatus of a state by a majority wishing to preserve its dominance of these structures. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Hercegovina, provided a cogent example of how an ethnic group, effectively mobilised and motivated by a political and intellectual elite, can take the notion of national self-determination to its logical conclusion by seeking to create a culturally homogenous community by exterminating all non-national groups.

As mentioned earlier, many of the states today being racked by ethnic conflict were not formed by evolutionary or even rational processes, but by arbitrary decisions made by external authorities. The territorial sovereignty that was bestowed upon these states was not based on a logical system of geographical and socio-cultural considerations but on the desires of external interests seeking to restore an order that reflected their foreign policy and security objectives. This is particularly the case with the states of Central Asia, which were basically established by administrative fiat by the Soviet regime. Given that the international community, or those dominating it, have had a crucial role not just in the formation of states, but in the allocation and recognition of ‘sovereignty’, then it seems ironic that organisations such as the UN feel a responsibility not to

40 Stavenhagen, R., 1996, p2. 41 ibid, p2. 42 Cobban, A., National Self-Determination, Oxford University Press, London, 1945, p85.

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become involved in ethnic conflict, especially given the implications that ethnic conflict has for regional and international security. The key proposition of this discussion is that the modern concept of the sovereign ‘nation’ state is far from the penultimate form of governance in the modern global world, and that other structures or arrangements should be considered in the event of prolonged ethnic conflict. Although there is considerable argument in favour of the modern state as the most fundamental and effective political / representative structure, there needs to be greater discussion given to the development of other forms of administration that can be adopted in exceptional circumstances such as instances of intrastate conflict. In 95% of cases a state legitimises its sovereignty by fostering appropriate internal structures of governance and representation and by acting responsibly in the international arena. But in a small number of cases a state, either through the design of its governing elite or as a result of failing internal structures, effectively foregoes any entitlement to legitimacy and sovereignty. Often the end result of such deterioration in the effectiveness of a state is conflict between ethnic or national groups.

Passing off such conflicts as strictly internal matters, an approach that is readily adopted by institutions such as the United Nations, is at best irresponsible and at worst antithetical to the maintenance of regional or international security. Regional and international groups and organisations should not only recognise the role that they can and should play in resolving the ethnic conflicts that have characterised the last 50 years of history, but they should adopt more proactive programs that can be implemented in the event of ethnic conflict destabilising states.

State sovereignty and state borders should not be viewed as carved in stone for perpetuity. Many of the states that exist today and form the United Nations are less than a century old, and typically do not reflect any logical or defined process of state formation. There may be a number of alternative administrative arrangements that would prove more workable in dealing with ethnic groups seeking greater self- determination. Two of the more durable empires of recent centuries, those of the Ottoman Turks and the Austro-Hungarian Habsburgs, adopted structures intended to

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reconcile the notion of state sovereignty with the needs of minority groups. An examination of alternative structures such as those implemented by the Habsburgs and the Ottomans may offer solutions to the problems that are increasingly coming to plague multi-national states. Alternatives for administration, such as the system proposed by Otto Bauer for application within the Austro-Hungarian Empire,43 will be discussed in due course. Interestingly, the examples set by these sprawling multinational empires correspond with the argument presented by Sambanis that the more national or minority groups within a state, the less likely one group will come to dominate the others, and therefore it will also be less likely that conflict will develop between the two groups.44 This concept, and its applicability to the case of Central Asia, will be discussed at length in the concluding chapters of this paper.

The Argument for Greater International Involvement in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict

The involvement of the international community, through organisations such as the UN, in ethnic conflict is, notions of state sovereignty aside, both logical and desirable for two important reasons. The first of these is that ethnic conflict is increasingly representing a threat to global security and stability. Although all types of conflict gained an additional dimension with the advent of the nuclear age, the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a marked increase not just in the incidence and ferocity of ethnically based conflict, but in the opportunity for the appropriation of weapons of mass destruction by those involved. As the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Central Africa has demonstrated, conflict between groups can rapidly move outside an individual state, destabilising whole regions. This is almost inevitable when ethnic groups are dispersed across a region, and clashes between groups in one state can soon spread to include the members of those groups residing in other states. Such escalation is likely in Central Asia where ethnic groups are widely fragmented and dispersed amongst the republics. Similarly, ethnic conflict is increasingly demonstrating its ability to pose serious

43 Bauer, O. The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, translated by Joe O’Donnell, E. Nimni (ed), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000. 44 Sambanis, N., 2000. Sambanis established that there was empirical evidence to support the theory that combining large ethnic groups may provide a better and more durable solution to ethnic conflict than partitioning the same groups into homogenous administrative structures.

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security risks for whole regions. The conflict that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia threatened the security of the whole east Mediterranean region. Similarly, conflict in Indonesia, in particular in East Timor, has demonstrated the capacity for localised conflicts to destabilise a country’s political and military infrastructure, and in the process threaten the stability of an entire region. And, as will be later discussed, the Central Asian region could potentially become a locus of significant and widespread conflict between ethnic groups. All of these examples stand as testament to the fact that ethnic conflict can have a major impact upon the international system in a number of ways.45

The second reason is that many ethnic conflicts have the sources of the conflict built into the political and economic structure of the sovereign state, and thus the prospect for the internal resolution of the conflict is generally remote. Following on from the earlier points on the implications of a national majority using the state apparatus to ensure its ‘cultural and national hegemony’, there are many examples that support the contention that the actions of a state in relation to ethnic conflict occurring within its borders typically exacerbate the conflict, if not even furthering the cleavages along which the conflict manifests. In a multiethnic state the majority nationality will usually effectively control a good part of the state apparatus, including military and police forces, and thus would be unlikely to provide balanced resolutions to the conflict. And in cases of minorities controlling crucial state infrastructure, a fear of extinction will inevitably underpin any negotiations they undertake with other national groups seeking a greater share of political decision-making. The value of international intervention to the resolution of ethnic conflict, however, needs to be qualified at this point. As argued by many authors, it is difficult to find examples of where an international intervention into ethnic conflict has been successful.46

45 Ryan, Stephen, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Dathmouth, Aldershot, 1995, p6. Ryan pointed to the neglect of issues of ethnicity in international relations texts up until the 1970s. He also discussed a number of the factors that made ethnicity a topic of concern for the international community, including the problems created by the unstable multinational state on the one hand, and the multi-state nation on the other; the relationship between ethnic conflict and international terrorism; and the international dimensions of the forced oppression of ethnic minorities, which can lead to the expulsion of peoples, genocide, and movements of refugees that destabilises surrounding countries. 46 ibid, p67. Ryan argued that many such interventions were in fact destructive, and questioned whether there was a need to “de-internationalise ethnic conflict”.

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Self Determination and Minority Group Rights in International Law

The Charter of the United Nations, although inherently state-centric in its orientation, does explicitly recognise the issue of self-determination for peoples and its importance. Article 1 of the Charter delineates the United Nations’ responsibilities in terms of the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. This article was followed by Article 1(2) which sought to:

“…develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”47

This principle of self-determination remained a principle, but importantly not an actual right, until 1960, when the UN Resolution 1514 (XV), that contained the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, was adopted. Otherwise known as the “colonial declaration”, this resolution stated that “all people have the right to self determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development”.48 Importantly, Resolution 1514 (XV) accorded this right to peoples emerging from colonial rule, and referred only to “trust and non-self governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence”.49

Six years later the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into force. Article 1 of this Covenant established a general right to self-determination for peoples. Importantly, the Covenant went further in Article 27, where it enshrined the right of

47 This principle of self-determination had achieved the status of an applicable legal rule as a consequence of the UN’s role in implementing the decolonisation process. However, the principle was subsequently enshrined in a number of treaties and conventions, and this evolved from being a political principle to be a “justiciable right”. See Simmi, 1994, p60. The principle of self-determination was also dealt with in Article 55, which discussed it within the context of international economic and social cooperation. 48 Knight, David and Davies, Maureen, Self Determination, Garland, New York, 1987, p4. 49 “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, adopted by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. Text of Declaration located at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm, accessed on 12 March 2006.

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members of minority groups to freely practice their own language, culture and religion.50 The importance of the differentiation between cultural and political self determination is critical to the later discussion on national cultural autonomy.

The UN position was concerned with legitimising the release of colonised people from colonial authority and the achievement of self-government and sovereignty. International law came to derive its position from this, and considered that self- determination can be granted only once to a territory and the people residing within it. Consequently, territory is given primacy and the people located within the territory are deemed to belong to it, even though the population may be complex and regionally differentiated in its plurality.51

There are many critics of the idea that a group has only one chance to exercise a self- determining right, and that having done so are forever wedded to its choice.52 Similarly, there have been numerous commentators who have argued strongly for an extension of the application of the principle of self-determination. Soviet jurist DB Levin said:

“When a nation exercises its right to self determination, forms an independent state, voluntarily remains in a multinational state or joins another multinational state, its right to the free determination of its future internal political, economic, social and cultural status passes to the sphere of state law of the state to which the nation now belongs. But this holds good only as long as the conditions on which the nation became part of the given state are not violated by this state and as long as the nation’s desire to stay within it remains in force, and it is not compelled to

50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. located at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm . Article 27 states that “in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” 51 Knight and Davies, 1987, p5. 52 Buchheit, L., Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, p21.

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do so by coercive means. As soon as one of these phenomena occur, the question again passes from the sphere of state law into the sphere of international law.”53

However, seeking to reconcile a broad interpretation of self-determination with the universal concept of state sovereignty is fraught with difficulties. As early as the formation of the League of Nations there was widespread acceptance of the view that the protection of minorities within states by the state concerned was the only rational solution for providing safeguards to ethnic or religious groups without compromising the territorial sovereignty of the state. This, however, would not be regarded as sufficient in cases where the state manifestly abused its authority to the detriment of minority groups by oppressing or persecuting their members, or were unable or unwilling to implement safeguards protecting the minority group. When this was the case, the dispute or conflict must no longer be considered as solely within the realms of domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty.54

Ultimately, in dealing with any proposal of self-determination two questions have to be asked. The first of these relates to who exactly has a right to self-determination. The second question is to what extent have international law-makers and decision-makers permitted the principle of self-determination to reshape international relations.55 These two questions will be dealt with in the context of Central Asia later.

Demands for self-determination on the part of an ethnic group can in turn lead to a move towards actual secession from an established state. In the eyes of international jurists the right to secede exists only when certain conditions are met. These conditions typically derive from the situation where the central authority of a sovereign state persistently refuses to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, when it grossly or systematically tramples upon their fundamental rights, and when it denies the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the state

53 Levin, D., The Principles of Self-Determination of Nations in International Law, Soviet Y.B. International, 1962, pp45-46. 54 Cassese, A. Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p31. 55 ibid, p2.

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structure.56 However of all the cases of secessionist movements since 1945, all unilateral attempts at secession (where the government of the state in question was opposed to secession) have gained virtually no international support or recognition, even when humanitarian aspects of the situation have triggered widespread concern.57

In Yugoslavia, the body of international rules on self-determination had a remarkable bearing on the whole process of secession.58 However, with reference to the preceding point, the circumstances surrounding the secession were different to the majority of cases because the seceding bodies were actually constituent republics within the Yugoslav Federation. , Bosnia-Hercegovina and Slovenia approached the issue of self-determination and their secession from the Yugoslav Federation in an appropriately measured fashion. All three republics conducted referendums, and only when these polls demonstrated majority support for independence was the process towards independence embarked upon. Significantly, all three republics also obtained European Community recognition, and later United Nations recognition, for their independence relatively soon after their declaration. Consequently, self-determination operated at the level of political rhetoric, and as a set of political principles legitimising the secession of the national state from central oppressive state structures. It also provided the legal tools (i.e., referendums) for establishing the demands of the seceding peoples to gain an independent state.59 Yet the Yugoslav example of how, or how not, to recognise new states is still viewed as controversial, with the actions taken by the European community in respect to recognising the sovereignty of the republics of the former Yugoslav Federation introducing a “new level of ad hoc decision making that will, if this precedent is followed, make the issue of recognition more uncertain and unpredictable than hitherto”.60 In the early 1990’s Europe was confronted with firstly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and secondly, the development of conflict in the Yugoslav Federation. The European Community attempted to accommodate these two

56 ibid, p119. 57 Crawford, J., “State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession”, in A. Bayefsky, (ed). Self-Determination in International Law – Quebec and Lessons Learned, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, pp31-63, p52-53. 58 Cassese, A., 1995, p273. 59 Cassese, A., 1995, p273.

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situations by developing a new regime for the recognition of new states. In December 1991, the European Community Foreign Ministers meeting issues the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, and the Declaration on Yugoslavia. In doing so, the European Community departed significantly from the traditional criteria used to determine statehood by introducing a whole new set of conditions that had to be met before recognition was be granted. These conditions included the promotion of human rights, support for non- proliferation and the encouragement of dispute settlement via peaceful means.61

The Badinter Commission, which was convened to elaborate upon a common European Union policy for recognising the separatist republics of Yugoslavia, further emphasised the need for the fundamental requirement that Yugoslav republics seeking recognition should be able to guarantee minority rights before recognition could take place. Of interest, given subsequent events, was the fact that the Badinter Commission recommended that Slovenia be granted recognition as a sovereign state, but not Croatia, which was “neither in full control of its territory nor in a position to guarantee civil rights to its ethnic minorities”.62

Whilst the intention of the Badinter Commission, and the EC Foreign Ministers meeting for that matter, were laudable in that they were endeavouring to introduce principles of

60 Rich, Roland, “Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union”, European Journal of International Law, vol 36, 1993, pp36 – 65, p55. 61 Rich, 1993, p56. The Guidelines on the new states of Eastern and the former Soviet Union listed as requirements for recognition a number of conditions, including: “Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of and in the Charter of , especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights; Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes; The Community and its Member States will not recognise entities which are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on neighbouring States”. Text of Guidelines obtained from the European Journal of International Law, located at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art6.html#TopOfPage, accessed on 26 March 2006. The Declaration on Yugoslavia included additional tests for any of the republics seeking to secede from the Yugoslav Federation. 62 Bowker, Mike, “The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 50, no 7, November 1998, pp1245-1261, summarises the events that following the publication of the Badinter Report, including Germany’s refusal to accept the report’s recommendations.

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conditionality to recognition at a time were the disintegration of the Soviet Union and communist states in Eastern Europe was creating a degree on uncertainly in respect to the future political landscape of Europe and its periphery. Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the unfolding of events in Yugoslavia, where the recommendations of the Badinter Commission were largely ignored with Germany pushing for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia sooner rather than later,63 the reality of the new philosophy of recognition promoted by the European Community was that it was based on value judgements which would see recognition “used more as an instrument of foreign policy rather than a formal declaration of an ascertainable fact”.64 Despite this interpretation, and the notable flaws in the application of the new philosophy of conditional recognition, events in Europe during this time were nonetheless groundbreaking from the perspective of reconciling sovereignty with minority rights. The responses by the European Community and other regional and international bodies to events in Eastern Europe and elsewhere saw “national minority questions…once more legitimate subjects of international relations both at the United Nations and within European regional organisations”.65 Many secessionist movements in recent years have advanced a claim for legal legitimacy by relying upon the principle of self-determination of peoples.66 As discussed earlier, secession itself, although it may resolve some issues, does create a whole new set of problems that have implications for both the original state and the emergent state. In addition to the matters discussed earlier, secession will almost invariably result in a diminution of a unified state’s wealth, resources and power, and in the process lower its economic stamina, defensive capability and potential for

63 Preece, Jennifer Jackson, “National Minority rights vs State Sovereignty in Europe: Changing norms in International Relations?”, Nations and Nationalism, vol 3, no 3, 1997, pp345-364, p350. 64 Rich, 1993, p55. Rich discussed three aspects to the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics which he considered threw into doubt the traditional criteria for statehood. Firstly, Croatia was recognised as a state despite the fact that it had no control over one third of its territory. Secondly, Bosnia Hecegovina was admitted to the United Nations despite the fact that its government had no effective control over any areas, including its . Thirdly, Macedonia was denied recognition because a neighbouring country (Greece) objected to its name even though it met all the tradtional criteria and appeared to meet the new conditions set by the European Community (p56). 65 Preece, 1997. Despite this assessement, Preece still considered that the proliferation of national minority rights tests produced between 1990 and 1995 ultimately “affirmed the inviolability of existing borders within the nation-states system and the supreme authority of states over their citizens regardless of whether or not those citizens were members of national minorities” ( pp362-363). 66 Buchheit, W., 1978, p8.

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international influence.67 The Central Asian states have already faced significant difficulty in establishing viable post-Soviet economics that are independent of Russian assistance. Any move to further territorial revision, including border alterations to attempt to incorporate the irredentist populations of the titular nationality would further impede their abilities to establish viable and durable economies that can compete in an increasingly global market.

Additionally, in considering the option of secession, one has to consider how divisible the population of a state is in terms of ethnicity or nationalism. Very few states have a population that is so homogeneous that it cannot be subdivided into smaller groups of greater homogeneity simply by altering the standards of what constitutes a ‘distinct group’. Furthermore, once a right to secession is admitted, there are no clear limits to this process, and conceivably it could be carried on until each clan or nuclear family within a society constituted an entity entitled to self-determination.68 This issue is particularly pertinent to the example of Central Asia. In this region, the ‘composite’ identities of the populations make it almost impossible to predict what lines any divisions would occur along.

Thirdly, the secession of a national, ethnic or religious group from a more heterogeneous state may well result in some non-members becoming trapped in the seceding . Consequently, the process of secession would merely invert the factors that facilitated the secessionist process as the isolated group remains behind as aliens in an area which is the creation of strong parochial sentiment and are therefore exposed to the danger of discrimination, harassment or worse.69 The Russian populations that have been ‘trapped’ within the Central Asian republics are being subjected to increasing levels of harassment. Although these republics are already nominally independent of Russia, it can be expected that the situation for the Russian populations will worsen if they move further away from alignment with Russia. And although the break-up of the Soviet Union can hardly be characterised as a result of

67 ibid, p27. 68 Buchheit, W., 1978, p28. 69 ibid, pp29-30.

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secessionist movements, it does highlight some of the side effects of a break-up of a state into smaller units. Consequently, although discussion will continue to question the position implicit in the international system that the territorial integrity of the state is of fundamental importance to the international system,70 secession will not be considered as anything but an option of last resort.

From a different (albeit related) viewpoint most suggestions that international or even regional institutions become involved in intrastate ethnic conflict are seen as contrary to the most fundamental notions of state sovereignty. Yet there is significant scope for effective indirect intervention on the part of international organisations. Direct physical intervention is only pertinent as a last resort, and then only in cases where the sovereign state has actually ceased to function. Furthermore, a more widespread acceptance of the idea that the sovereign state is not necessarily the only form of governance in the modern environment of globalisation and state disintegration would facilitate the development of more workable arrangements to deal with cases where state structures either break down or become demonstrably illogical and unfeasible.

However, there are some mechanisms in international law that arguably allow for direct military intervention on the part of the international community. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, for example, stipulates that the use of force to suppress the exercise of the rights of self-determination constitutes a forbidden use of force. Furthermore, counterforce, and outside help given to that kind of counterforce, constitutes collective self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.71

70 Teson argued that much of the reluctance on the part of international lawyers to accept the ideas of secession and self-determination derived from an anthropomorphic tradition in international law that assumes that, given the preservation of bodily integrity is morally important, so to is the preservation of the body of the state. Teson also argued that the “life of the state is entirely dependent on the rights and interests of the people who populate it…a society needs a territory, but it does not follow that a specific territory is required by principles of justice”. See Teson, Fernando, “Ethnicity, Human Rights and Self- Determination”, in D. Wippman (ed), International Law and Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, pp86-111, pp110-111. 71 Bothe, M., “The Legitimacy of the Use of Force to Protect Peoples and Minorities”, in C. Brolman, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds), Peoples and Minorities in International Law, Matinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993, pp289-301, p291.

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Furthermore, there have been precedents provided by both UN Security Council Resolutions and decisions made at the International Court of Justice that are widening the parameters within which the UN, or other international bodies may be able to operate vis-à-vis physical intervention into the domestic affairs of states. The original Gulf War in the early 1990’s was accompanied by a number of UN. Security Council Resolutions that provided the legal basis for the coalition military action against the government of Iraq. Of these resolutions, Resolution 688, passed on 5 April 1991, is the most pertinent. This resolution condemned “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region.”72

Whilst this resolution seems relatively benign on the surface, it was considered a landmark ruling by the Security Council, because it established a link between internal actions and international security.

“By passing Resolution 688, the United Nations Security Council broke new ground in international law, for the first time approving the right to interfere on humanitarian grounds in the hitherto sacrosanct internal affairs of member states.”73

The actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against Serbia in 1999 followed a similar logic, yet was more radical in that military intervention occurred without the sanction of the UN Security Council or General Assembly. In this instance, NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia would have ordinarily been

72 Resolution 688, United Nations Security Council, April 5, 1991. 73 Mario Bettati, Professor of International Law and former Dean of the Law School at Universite de Paris-Sud, quoted in Moynihan, D., Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p67. The original source, a newspaper article, could not be located. Moynihan discussed how the resolution circumvented Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” by perceiving the flow of refugees as a threat to the peace, and thus action was justified under Chapter Seven of the Charter. Equally tragic and ironic in this instance was the fact that the Security Council was prepared to take a relatively radical view in respect to the security implications of the flow of refugees, yet maintained a conservative line in respect to the demands for self-determination of the who were subjected to the humanitarian abuses.

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construed as direct violations of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the UN. However, NATO’s actions were perceived as legally justifiable under the evolving principle of humanitarian necessity, which allowed for the use of force of a proportionate kind to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.74

One does not have to necessarily argue for the physical intervention of international organisations such as the UN, or for external assistance as under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Unfortunately the concept of ‘international intervention’ has been effectively stigmatised by authors and statesmen alike. ‘Intervention’ on the part of the international community or an international organisation is often construed as dictatorial interference in the affairs of a state, inevitably leading to physical enforcement or the threat of enforcement in the event of non-compliance. The actions of international organisations, however, typically take a benign form. Tactics such as the placing of a matter on the agenda of the General Assembly or the Security Council, and involvement in fact finding missions to determine the validity of each claimant’s contentions and the subsequent tabling of recommendations could perceivably facilitate positive developments in the resolution of ethnic conflicts75.

Additionally, the growth of regional alliances and organisations is also creating opportunities for the constructive involvement of external actors in the resolution or even avoidance of ethnic conflict. The UN is not the only international institution that is seeking to address the issue of minority group rights and ethnic conflict. Other agencies such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are attempting to establish frameworks that encourage states to provide viable solutions to the issue of minority group rights and thus circumvent the prospect of ethnic conflict. The OSCE, for example, through its Commission for National Minorities, has adopted a number of programs and strategies that encourage adherence to the principle of self- governance where “effective participation of minorities in public life may call for non-

74 Robertson, G., 1999, p72. The ICJ Corfu Channel Case, which stressed the importance of “elementary considerations of humanity”, was quoted as providing a necessary exception to sovereignty. Robertson suggested that this ruling had a number of benefits, especially given that humanitarian intervention could not remain the sole prerogative of the UN, given its failings to respond effectively in the past.

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territorial or territorial arrangements of self-governance or a combination thereof”.76 The Lund Recommendations of the OSCE encourage the principle of subsidiarity where states devolve powers, including specific functions of self-government, to improve the opportunities of minorities to exercise authority and control over matters affecting them.77

As much as recommendations made by agencies such as the UN and the OSCE are typically not binding on states, they do represent a slow change in the mind set of policy makers regarding political organisation and previously held notions of the state being the ultimate and inalienable authority within the borders. And ultimately, processes of administrative decentralisation as advocated in documents such as the Lund Recommendations detract less from the sovereignty of the state than does the growing body of international treaties and the increasing globalisation of economic, social and cultural life. These issues do impact heavily upon the capabilities of a state to manage its own domestic affairs, and have especially significant implications for those ‘quasi- states’ that are effectively political entities that possess juridical statehood but have only a tenuous claim to such status.78 Such states are increasingly seen to be the greatest threat to global stability,79 and yet there is little thought given to their legitimacy or their capacity to exercise effective sovereign control over their territories. And although there may be a widespread diminution of traditional forms of sovereignty across the international system, it is the states that lack the most basic governance frameworks that pose the greatest problems. And these states represent the most appropriate starting point for a re-evaluation of the international system of sovereign states.

There are indeed persuasive and logical arguments for the establishment of a new definition of the state that fully reflects its dynamic and evolutionary qualities of it and thus liberates it from the “metaphysical time warp in which it has too long been

75 Hull, R., The Irish Triangle: Conflict in Northern Ireland, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, p243-255. 76 The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, September 1999, III, p14. 77 Lund Recommendations, III, B, (19) 78 Del Rosso, S. “The Insecure State” in Daedalus, vol 24, no 2, 1995, pp175-208. 79 ibid, 1995.

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caged”.80 Yet, even a broad argument in favour of greater international involvement in the event of ‘internal’ ethnic conflict does not contradict the reality of the international system. Interventionist strategies are not that great an ideological leap from the current system of interwoven political, economic and social structures. International bodies such as the UN would introduce a much needed measure of predictability and accountability to the international system if they formalised mechanisms by which the international community can intervene, either through advice or action, in what have been traditionally domestic affairs. This would also require a greater willingness to scrutinise the internal affairs of a state as to predict instances of state failure and to ensure the introduction of countermeasures to preserve the legitimacy of the state.

On face value, the republics of Central Asia could very well fit Jackson’s category of quasi-state. As examples, these states provide invaluable insight into the processes of state formation and the development of legitimacy, and the formation of ethnic, national and supra-national identities. Yet the Central Asian states should not be viewed from afar as cases of potentially failing states. External interests such as Russia, China, Iran, and possibly the US have already gained some measure of influence in the domestic affairs of these states, yet the interests of these states alone will not ensure (and in some cases will impede) the development of legitimate and workable structures of governance. The international community, either through the United Nations or in the guise of regional agencies such as the OSCE should offer alternatives to the arbitrary involvement of these interests by providing the Central Asian states with the genuine, impartial and structured assistance that is required for them to either establish legitimate states or to peaceably dissolve into more rational entities.

80 ibid, 1995.

106 PART TWO

Central Asia: The Legacy of the Soviet Union and the Emergence of the Sovereign State in Central Asia

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Chapter Five

Historical Foundations for Ethnicity and Identity in Central Asia

Historically, allegiances and identities within the Turkic, ‘non-European’ segments of the population of Central Asia were formulated within a hierarchical framework that placed little emphasis on largely western notions of ethnicity or nation. The loyalty or identity of each individual was contained within a hierarchical system that may include village, clan, tribe, khanate or even town. These identities in turn were largely subsumed into the wider Islamic community or the pan-Turkic movement. For example, several of the key groups have historically perceived themselves (and in many instances continue to do so) in terms of membership of a number of loosely defined communities, including millet (community1), tayfa or qabila (tribe), qawn (group), awlad (sub-group, or extended family), and in the case of Uzbeks and Turkmen, additional categories such as urugh and tire (lineage).2 However, this already loose hierarchy was further convoluted by the fact that, in defining relativity or relationships between groups, different groups utilised different criteria in defining themselves in a way that occasionally transcended principles of relativity.3

The influence of lifestyle or social position on identity can also be significant. Urban and rural communities define themselves using different criteria, with city dwellers, for example, identifying themselves firstly as Muslims, and secondly with reference to their city of origin. The example set by residents of Bukhara is pertinent: they would define themselves as ‘Bukharaly’, granting their allegiance to a rudimentary state and in the process negating the significance of linguistic and ethnic difference. Alternatively, rural communities and those maintaining a pastoral lifestyle may identify themselves in terms

1 I will follow Adeeb Khalid’s example here and avoid including an ethnic dimension to millet in this instance. Khalid, Adeeb, “ 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan”, Slavic Review, vol55, no 2, Summer 1996, pp270-296, p275. Khalid argues that, in pre-Soviet times, the term millet lacked an overt ethnic connotation in Turkestan, as there was a greater preponderance of communal, as opposed to ethnic or class, identity in the region. 2 Roy, O., 2000, p14. 3 ibid, p15. Roy used the example of the Gharmis and Kulabis, both Persian-speaking Sunni groups residing within a distinct region of Tajikistan, to illustrate the somewhat vague use of the above categories by the people of Central Asia. When a Gharmi was asked to define him/herself in terms of

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of their clan or tribal affiliation,4 and then on the basis of regionalism, language and religion. However, this hierarchical system was still determined by issues of relativism, with the way in which a person perceives themself, both politically and culturally, determined by who they were interacting with at the time.

“An Uzbek may feel Uzbek, Muslim….or just part of his extended family, depending on the situation, the identity of the interlocutor, or just the mood of the moment. Facing a Kazakh he feels Uzbek, facing a Tatar he feels Turkistani, while confronting a Christian or a Jew he feels Muslim. A Russian makes him feel all three (Uzbek, Turkistani, Muslim) and awakens the latent resentment of a native against a settler.”5

As will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, the ‘national’ divisions that emerged as constituted Soviet Socialist Republics during the Soviet era – Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik - had little historical basis, and owe as much to the efforts of Soviet administrators, bureaucrats, planners and the military who all sought to impose workable territorial boundaries on the huge swathe of newly acquired territories,6 as they do to natural processes of ethnogenesis. An examination of the tribal listings that outline the composition of, say, the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz ‘nations’ demonstrates the common origins of many of the peoples within Central Asia. Glenn, for instance, identified 14 distinct that existed in more than one of the ethnic groups that are identifiable in modern Central Asia.7

The hierarchy identified earlier, however, held most strongly in Central Asia during the pre-industrial era, and as such broadly reflected the stratification of society that historically is typical of pre-industrial agro-pastoral societies. Such highly stratified cultures are also seen to be largely immune to the spread of nationalism, and the development of ‘nations’, because there is no possibility for the development of a single or homogenous culture or society within a given polity. Culture and identity develop qawn, qabila or millet, they may reply Gharmi for all three. Kulabis on the other hand may see themselves as a member of the Turk qawn, yet as a Kulabi or even Tajik when asked about their millet. 4 Glenn, J., 1999, p63-68. 5 Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St Martins Press, New York, 1996, p165. 6 Juska, Arunas, 1999, p530.

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within a horizontal framework predicated upon caste or social status, or vertically with the formation of localised communities.8

As will be discussed at length in the following chapter, the imposition of a rigorous, fixed and hierarchical framework upon the peoples of Central Asia by Soviet ethnographers who worked with the border delimitation commissions was to fundamentally alter the relationships that existed within the region. What they imposed upon Central Asians, in terms of administrative boundaries reflecting supposed ethnic identity was in many respects at odds with the multiple forms of identity that existed in the region at the time.9 And what was unfortunate for the peoples of Central Asia was that the rigorous system of terminology and categorisation was used, in many instances, to decide upon what type of administrative structure people were incorporated within. An additional factor that influenced the bestowal of category was the level of socio- economic development of a group. Consequently, in theory, although a particular group may qualify as a natsionalnost because it possessed a distinct language, it would only qualify as a natsiia, a category that was granted the status of Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), when they reached a certain level of economic development. ‘Less developed’ people were (in order) granted the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), (autonomous region) and (national territory) with corresponding administrative status within the Soviet Union.10

However, the efforts of the Marxist-Leninists were not based on a completely artificial foundation, because the names which were used by the Soviet ethnographers for labelling or categorising the peoples of Central Asia – namely, Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Turkmen and Kyrgyz – did have historical significance. Groups possessing or being

7 Glenn, J., 1999, p61. 8 Smith, A., 1998, p30. 9 Roy, O., 2000, p14. 10 ibid, p64. Soviet defined peoples in terms of plemya (tribe), narod (people), natsiia (ethnic group), and natsionalnost (nationality). See also Hirsh, Francine, “The Soviet Union as a Work- in Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 Censuses” in Slavic Review, vol 56, no 2, 1997, pp251-278. Hirsh drew upon a 1934 issue of Revoliutsiia i natsional’nosti (the journal of the Soviet of Nationalities) to provide definitions of the multitude of terminology used by Soviet ethnographers. In broad terms both narod and natsiia referred to nation; natsional’nost, narodnost, and natsmen’shinstvo referred to national minority, and rasa referred to race. Complicating matters, “while every natsiia could also be listed as a natsional’nost (which could include non-territorial

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referred to by these names can be found in historical sources going back to the fourteenth century, or in some cases even earlier. With respect to the discussion regarding the emergence of western forms of ethnonationalism, the difficulty is determining just what role these names played (and continue to play) as exclusive badges of identity or supposed nationality, or whether they were merely labels imposed by external actors, and thus were not imbued with the same significance by the peoples of Central Asia themselves. The veracity of claims that the various peoples of Central Asia possess a dimension of ethnic continuity aside, it is possible to trace in generic terms the ethnogenesis of the people who are today called Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Turkmen and Kyrgyz. What follows is a brief, and far from definitive, discussion of the groups and tribes that coalesced into the groupings that emerged as allegedly discrete ethnonational groups during the Soviet era.

The Uzbeks

The name Uzbek is purportedly derived from the name of a Khan of the , Ozbeg Khan who ruled from 1312 to 1341. Although some authors perceive that the reign of Ozbeg Khan marked the starting point for the history of the Uzbek people,11 the conventional view is that the term ‘Uzbek’ was first consistently applied to a confederation of Turkic-speaking tribes that came to prominence in the aftermath of the Timurid dynasty in the Transoxania region of Central Asia.12 The original Uzbek confederation consisted of no less than 24 distinct tribes, many of which contained numerous subdivisions.13 Indeed, tribal origin was less important than political

nationalities), not every natsional’nost was a natsiia. Reflecting Soviet nationalities theories, natsional’nost were developed peoples, and narodnosti were still developing” (p267). 11 Ilkhamov, Alisher, “Archaeology of Uzbek Identity”, in Central Asian Survey, vol 23, no 3, December 2004, pp289-326, p292. Ilkhamov sees Ozbeg Khan’s rule as the start of the unification of the Dashti- Kipchap Uzbeks under a strong centralised state. Additionally, he quotes the 13th Century Tarikj-I Guzide (Selected History) of Hamidullah Kazvini that mentions Uzbeks and an Uzbek state – p291. 12 Importantly, Allworth considered that at this time the actual designation Uzbek served outsiders more than it did actual members of the confederation. See Allworth, Edward, The Modern Uzbeks, Hoover Press, Stanford, 1990. 13 Much of the information to follow was sourced from Allworth’s invaluable 1990 work on the Uzbeks. Allworth listed the members of this tribal confederation as the following: Barak, Bayly, Durman, Imchi, Jat, Kenegas, Khitay, Kiyat, Kurlaut, Kushchi, Manghit, Ming, Nayman, Qarluq, Qonghirat, Tangut, Taymas, Tubay, Tuman, Ugrsih-Nayman, Utarchi, Uyghur, Yiyhan/Alaman. However, he also states that a roster of the tribes compiled in the sixteenth century sets the number of nomadic Uzbek tribes at 92. And, of consequence to later discussions regarding the Kazakhs, he states that of the 92 names of Uzbek tribes, at least 20 were shared with the separatist Uzbek- (p34).

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allegiance, and splits in the original Uzbek confederacy were as likely to occur within tribes as between tribes, something that resulted in the shared tribal origins of the Kazakhs and Uzbeks.14 Over time, a number of these tribes died out, split off or separated from the Uzbek confederation to merge with other tribes or tribal groupings. The fifteenth century saw the Uzbeks separate into three sub-orders, namely Siberian- Uzbek, Uzbek-Shabaynid, and Uzbek-Kazakh, a development that saw a fragmenting of their earlier group identity and the specificity of their name.15 Of these groups, the Uzbek-Shaybanid sub order, under the leadership of Mohammad Shaybaniy (who gave the group their name) defeated the last of the Timurid rulers, , in 1500, and seized the key Central Asian city of Samarkand. Seven years later Shaybaniy consolidated his control of a greater part of Central Asia by seizing the second major Central Asian city of Herat.16

Somewhat ironically, following the ascendancy of the Uzbek-Shaybanid part of the original Uzbek confederation, the term Uzbek fell into comparative disuse. The dynasty that Mohammad Shaybaniy established in Samarkand came to be known as Shaybanid, rather than Uzbek. Indeed, Shaybanid was used by local historians to distinguish the new state based in Samarkand from divergent Uzbeks who were not part of the Shaybanid subgrouping, and who remained nomadic in lifestyle.17 Over time, Uzbek came to be used as a pejorative term by the settled Shaybanid, and by outside peoples such as the Safavids in Persia, to describe those who they saw as the enemies of order and sacred law. In this way Uzbek as a term classifying identity lost any association that it may have had with an ethnic or linguistic group.18 The sedentary population of the Shaybanid state, including the original inhabitants who were not part of the original Uzbek-Shaybanid federation, came to use, and be called, Sarts, which further undermined any sense of Uzbek unity by formalising the division between settled and

14 Manz, Beatrice, “Multi-ethnic Empires and the Formation of Identity”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol 26, no 1, January 2003, pp70-101, p87-88. Of interest to this discussion is Manz’s argument that within the Uzbek confederation of tribes, political allegiance was more important to the formation of identity than markers such as language, culture, origin or location, as most independent groups had their genesis in coalitions centring around a specific ruler or line. 15 Allworth, E., 1990, p36. 16 Soucek, S. A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p149. 17 Allworth, E., 1990, p40. 18 ibid, p42.

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nomadic Uzbeks.19 The use of the term ‘Sart’ is a matter of contention, and opinions on the question of Sart identity have varied considerably. As discussed further below, Sart was a term that applied also to Tajik speakers, and an examination of the application of the term Sart up to and including the start of the Soviet era provides an interesting case study on the nature of identity in the region.

In time, the Shaybanid dynasty was superseded by the Astrakhan Khanate, and the Shaybanid name lost significance, although it was linked to the later Khanate of . By this time, the people who had comprised the original Uzbek-Shaybanid federation of tribes had largely merged within the original inhabitants of the region, including the other Turkic-speaking peoples who had preceded them.20 The Astrakhan Khanate, based at Bukhara, competed with two other Khanates, Khiva and Khokand, for dominance of the region until conquest by Russia in the nineteenth century. However, the dynasties that dominated these centres following the end of Shaybanid rule were not markedly different from the Shaybanid in origin, and in many cases were derived from the same original tribal confederation that was first known as Uzbek, combined with elements of the original settled population of Transoxania. The , for example was ruled by a dynasty associated with Mohammad Shaybaniy until 1920. Also, the Khanate of Khokand was established by Shan Rukh, who claimed Shaybanid heritage, in 1710.21

The Shaybanids were largely differentiated from the other groups in the area, including those that preceded them and those that succeeded them, by language. As a general rule, the Shaybanids spoke the Qipchaq version of Turkic. A number of other groups already settled in the area spoke other Turkic variants, an issue that distinguished them from the Shaybanids. The main Turkic population of Khwarzm, which emerged after the end of the Shaybanid dynasty as the Khanate of Khiva, spoke Oghuz. An additional Turkic variant, Turki, was prevalent in the Ferghana Valley and the eastern . However, the literary Turkic language of Chagatay (or Chaghatay), which had developed during the Timurid era, emerged as a universal, supra-ethnic literary

19 Allworth, E., 1990, p42. 20 Akiner, Shirin, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union, Kegan Paul, London, 1983, p270.

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language that remained valid until the twentieth century.22 There were also substantial populations of people who spoke Farsi-Tajik (Persian) in and around the major centres of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khojand. In some respects, the continuity of the languages above provided the only method of discerning any processes or patterns of ethnogenesis that may have occurred from this time up to and after the commencement of the Soviet period. However, language was only of secondary importance to the formation of identity in the region, with political allegiance being a more significant influence in the development of allegiances and identity.23 Thus, the use of language to differentiate between the descendants of the Shaybanid Uzbeks and other groups within the region may provide an inaccurate indication of identity in the region, because language may be significant to the outside observer but not to the people themselves. The significant level of bilingualism that existed in the region at the time further reduces the utility of language as an indicator of identity.

Consequently, any attempts to trace the genesis of the modern Uzbek nation back to the emergence of the original ‘Uzbek’ confederation of tribes in the 15th century is, despite claims of proof by modern proponents of a perennialist interpretation of the modern Uzbek nation, practically impossible. The true turning point in the ethnogenesis of the modern Uzbek nation has been identified as 1924, with the creation of the Soviet Uzbek republic.

“It would be naive to imagine the formation of the Uzbek nation as an ‘objective’ natural, historical development. In reality the formation process of the modern Uzbek identity should be viewed in close connection with the formation of the Uzbek SSR and also to a large extent as a result of efforts by the ruling and cultural elites.”24

21 Grousset, Renee (translated by Naomi Walford), The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 1970, pp487-488. 22 Allworth, E., 1990, p181. 23 Manz, B., 2003, p87. 24 Ilkhamov, A., 2004, p305.

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The Kazakhs

The history of the collection of tribes that emerged as Kazakhs in the 20th century is closely related to that of the Uzbek confederation that emerged in the 15th century. Although some scholars have argued that the origins of the Kazakhs can be traced back to a Bronze Age culture,25 the word ‘Kazakh’ only appeared in written records from the 11th century onwards.26 Interestingly, as with the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen, the modern Kazakh state has adopted a name with generic origins predicated more on lifestyle or social organisation than any sense of shared kinship or ethnic identity.

It was not until the 15th century, however, that the Kazakhs emerged as a distinct people, when Janibek and Kerei Khan broke away from the Uzbek confederation.27 Over the subsequent half century, a centralised that competed with the Uzbek Khanate emerged as a distinct political entity in an area roughly equating with modern Kazakhstan. Although the Kazakh Khanate had tribal origins similar to that of the Shaybanid Uzbeks, it was identifiable as a result of its particular nomadic economy and its territorial isolation.28 Some authors perceive the pastoral lifestyle of the Kazakhs as fundamental in shaping the Kazakh identity by providing a structure that maintained internal and external social relations.29 Indeed, as stated above, the split between ‘Kazakh’ and ‘Uzbek’ occurred as a consequence of political imperatives. Conflict of loyalties to different dynastic lines, combined with protest against the imposition of strong centralised government resulted in a split which, over time, also developed into a distinction between more and less conservative nomadic lifestyles.30 Thus, the Kazakh identity formed not as a result of ethnicity or tribal origin (which, as stated, was an

25 Otarbaeva, Bakhytnur, “A Brief History of the Kazakh Peoples”, Nationalities Papers ,vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp421-432, p421. Otarbaeva argued that the pastoral ‘Andronov’ culture that developed in the Bronze Age marked the starting point for the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs, a process that she divided into three periods – pre-Turkic, Turkic, and Turko-Mongolian. 26 Wheeler, Geoffrey, The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, The Bodley Head, London, 1966, p16. Wheeler stated that ‘Kazakh’ was initially a generic Turkic-language term meaning ‘riders of the steppe’. Olcott, in The Kazakhs, Hoover Press, Stamford, 1987, p4, however, identified a number of other meanings and origins for the term ‘Kazakh’, including ‘Khasaq’ the Mongol word for a wheeled cart that was used by the Kazakhs. And, as mentioned above, Qazaq was also the Turkic word for rebel. 27 Olcott, M., 1987, p8. This separation was part of the process of fragmentation of the Uzbek confederation of tribes that was discussed earlier. 28 Otarbaeva, B., 1998, p423. 29 Esenova, Saulesh, “Soviet Nationality, Identity, and Ethnicity in Central Asia: Historic Narrative and Kazakh Ethnic Identity”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol 22, no 1, 2002, pp11-38, p13. 30 Manz, B., 2003, p88.

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origin common with other groups such as the Uzbeks) but by the political and cultural choice to split from the Uzbek to maintain relative independence and the nomadic way of life.31

The Kazakh Khanate was also characterised by its division into three tribal groupings, the Great (Uly), Middle (Orta) and Small (Kishi) Hordes (). These divisions gained somewhat mythical significance as a consequence of the legends of Alash, with each Zhuz corresponding with one of the 3 sons of Alash, purportedly the founder of the Kazakh peoples.32 The three Zhuz emerged as distinct and somewhat independent entities within the Kazakh Khanate as a result of a variety of historical divisions (including Mongol political divisions and existing tribal structures), the structure of the pastoral economy and geographical factors.33 Over time, the three Zhuz came to be associated with a particular distinct geographical region, each of which contained a combination of summer and winter pasture, critical to the nomadic way of life. The Great Zhuz occupied the north eastern region of modern Kazakhstan, the Middle Zhuz the central region and the Small Zhuz western Kazakhstan.34

Another feature that characterised the Kazakhs was a further division into an aristocratic class and a general population. The aristocratic ‘White-bones’ (or ak suiuk) could trace their ancestry back to Chingis Khan, thus legitimising their rule over the ‘Black-bones’ (or kara suiuk).35

31 Roy, R., 2000, p17. 32 Olcott, M., 1987, p11. The mythology surrounding Alash will be discussed later (given its use in nation building by modern Kazakh nationalists), but, importantly, Olcott sees this story as something invented to strengthen the legitimacy of the three Zhuz by the creation of a common ancestor. 33 Otarbaeva, B., 1998, p423. 34 Olcott, M., 1987, p11. Olcott listed the tribal groups that occurred in the Great Zhuz, which included mainly members of the Usun tribal confederation, but also included the Kangli, Dulat, Albin. Suan, Jalar, Usty, Srgeli, Changshkly and Choprashti tribes (several of which could be traced as far back as the 2nd century B.C.). The Middle Zhuz included the Kerei, Naiman, Argyn, Kipchak, Konrat and Vak tribes (of these, the Konrat tribe was listed as having separated from the Middle Zhuz, and joined with the Uzbek Kokand Khanate in the 19th century). In contrast to the above Zhuz, the Small Zhuz was listed as being comprised of clan groups rather than tribes, the most numerous of which were the Kerden, Adai, and Kereit (all of which were listed as having appeared between the 6th and 13th centuries A.D.). 35 Olcott, M., 1987, p15. Olcott states that qualification to the aristocratic class was later loosened to include people who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the descendents of the Caliph.

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The rule of the Kazakh Khan Tauke in the late 17th century saw the three Zhuz further united under a common system of law that encompassed most of Kazakh life.36 However, Khan Tauke’s death saw the break-up of the Khanate, and the emergence of the three Zhuz as separate and independent entities. Despite this fragmentation, it appeared that a sense of shared identity was maintained among the three Zhuz. The numerous myths of a common Kazakh ancestor, such as the legend of Alash, emerged during this period, something that has been interpreted as indicating that the Kazakhs viewed, and continued to view, themselves as one people.37

The Tajiks

Although some authors argue that the Tajiks can claim a distinct ancient cultural heritage that originated in the 10th century Persian Samanid Empire,38 others argue that not only is it difficult to trace the origins of the Tajiks as a distinct people, but it is correspondingly difficult to define the modern Tajiks because Tajik identity lacked clarity.39 Even the term ‘Tajik’ is of obscure origin.40 The only aspect of the Tajiks and their history that appears to be certain is that they are derived from a sedentary, Iranian- speaking population containing Persian, and Turkic elements that coalesced in Central Asia during the 8th, 9th and 10th centuries.41

36 Otarbaeva, B., 1998, p425. 37 Olcott, M., 1987, pp11-12. 38 Rakowsa-Harmstone, Teresa, “Tadzhikistan and the Tadzhiks” in Z. Katz, R. Rogers, F. Harned, (eds) Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, The Free Press, New York, 1975, pp315-353, p320. 39 Centlivres, Pierre, Centlivres-Demont, Micheline, “Tajikistan and Afghanistan: the Ethnic Groups on Either Side of the Border”, in M.R. Djalili, F. Grare and S. Akiner (eds) Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence, Curzon, Surrey, 1998, pp3-14, p11. 40 Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, 1998, suggested that Tajik may have derived from the terms ‘Taz’ or ‘Tat’, terms used by Sassanid to describe Arabs. Alternatively, the term may have later been used by Arabs to denote Persian speakers within Central Asia; and even later used by Turkic-speakers to firstly denote Central Asian Muslims (prior to the Turk’s conversion to Islam) and later to denote the Iranian-speaking sedentary population. Soucek, 2000, p32, offered similar accounts of the origins of the term Tajik. He maintained that it was derived from the name of an Arab tribe, the Tayy, that lived in Iraq during the Sassanian period. The name came to be used exclusively for Persian-speaking converts to Islam in Central Asia when these people came to outnumber the Arabs in this region. And Akiner, 1983, p304, said that in the 16th and 17th centuries the Russians used the term in a very broad sense to denote “traders from Central Asia”. 41 Rakowsa-Harmstone, T., 1975, p326; Akiner, S., 1987, p303. Wheeler, 1966, p16, claimed that the Tajiks were the descendents of the original Sogdian and Bactrian populations of Central Asia, and thus were the oldest ethnic element in the region. Rashid, 1994, p166, suggested that the Samanids of the 10th century were, themselves, of Tajik origin.

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With the advent of Uzbek rule in the region during the 15th century, the Tajiks were dispersed and effectively incorporated within the Uzbek Khanate.42 Over time, the Tajiks became almost indistinguishable from their Uzbek conquerors. Both groups were sedentary, and there were no cultural differences between the two groups apart from language – Tajiks continued to speak , while the Uzbeks spoke Turkic.43

Ironically, there were greater differences between the various populations of those designated as Tajik than between Tajiks and Uzbeks. The Tajiks that lived in the lowland and urban areas spoke Farsi, which differentiated them from the Tajiks of the mountainous region (often designated as Pamiris or Mountain Tajiks) who spoke eastern Iranian languages that were markedly different from the Farsi spoken in the valleys and lowlands.44 However, even the term ‘Mountain Tajik’ is inaccurate in this context, because it was more useful as a geographical term that an ethnic term: the six groups that constituted the ‘Mountain Tajiks’ of the Gorny-Badakhstan region spoke different east-Iranian languages and referred to themselves by their place of origin.45

The Tajiks were also frequently referred to as ‘Sarts’, a generic term which was used to describe the sedentary populations of Central Asia.46 As discussed earlier, this usage included the Uzbeks, thus further blurring the distinction between the two groups, especially given that shared habitation in urban environments produced a degree of bilingualism in the Tajik and Uzbek populations.47 However, the true meaning and origin of the term ‘Sart’ is almost as contentious an issue as the ethnogenesis of the

42 Rakowska-Harmstone, T., Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzikistan, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p13. Rakowska-Harmstone stated that significant populations of Tajiks later existed in the Bukharan, Khiva, Kokand and Kazakh Khanates, and could also be identified within Chinese Turkestan, northern India, Afghanistan and Khorassan. 43 Rakowska-Harmstone, T., 1975, p326. 44 ibid, pp326-327. 45 Centlivres, P., and Centlivres-Demont, M., 1998, p5. 46 Akiner, S., 1983, p304. Soucek, 2000, pp32-33, traced the etymology of the word back to the sarthavatna, meaning ‘caravan leader’. He argued that the term gained a broader meaning during the Middle Ages to describe the Persian-speaking urban and agricultural populations of Central Asia, thus making Sart and Tajik almost synonymous. Confusing an already complex web of terminology, Soucek went on to state that the meaning and use of the term Sart changed with the arrival of the Uzbeks, who initially used the term to describe all sedentary peoples – Turkic, Tajik or otherwise. The use later came to be restricted to Turki-speakers when the Uzbeks differentiated between Turki-speakers and Iranian- speakers. 47 Soucek, S., 2000, p33.

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peoples of Central Asia, and an evaluation of the different theories on its origin gives an indication of just how indefinable identity in the region was prior to the Soviet Union. Ilkhamov identified three competing schools of thought among Central Asian researchers in respect to the original meaning of ‘Sart’.

The first of these theories, the proponents of which included classical orientalists such as V.V. Bartold, V.V. Radlov and Herman Vamberi, considered that ‘Sart’ as a term first emerged in the 11th century in reference to merchants, and during the Mongol period came to be synonymous with ‘Tajik’, with both terms used to designate the Persian-speaking sedentary or urban population of the region, in contrast to ‘Turk’, which was used in reference to the Turkic-speaking nomadic or semi-nomadic population. However, during the Uzbek period, ‘Sart’ came to apply to all sedentary subjects of the Uzbek confederation.48

The second school of thought argued that the term ‘Sart’ never applied to a specific ethnic group, and could only be applied in respect to the socio-cultural clash between nomadic and settled Uzbeks, and subsequently came to be “applied to all native born population in general, i.e equally to the sedentary Uzbeks and similarly to Tajiks”.49 The third school, dominated by members of the movement and academics who could be categorised as ‘Pan-Turkists’ refused to accept the validity of the term ‘Sart’ at all. As argued by Ilkhamov the idea of ‘Sart’ as an identifier conflicted with the goals of the intelligentsia of Turkestan, who were increasingly promoting a sense of national self-consciousness in the region.50

In some respects the demise of the use of the term ‘Sart’ is symbolic of the changes in the ethnic and social fabric of Central Asia that occurred during the Soviet era. It was inevitable that the grand plan of the to hasten progress of the peoples of

48 Ilkhamov, A., 2004, p296. Ikhhamov draws heavily on the work of V.V Bartold, who, as later argued by Soucek (above) identified the word as a derivation of the Sanscrit word sartadaha, meaning ‘caravan leader’, and which, in the form of saraktai, came to be used by the Mongols to describe “not just merchants, by (the) bearers of Persian-Islamic civilisation” – p296. 49 ibid, p297. 50 ibid, p299. Ilkhamov sees the Jadid’s rejection of the term as “based on some ideological accounts, their fervent willingness to construct a new national identity with cultural and historical symbols, more suitable for mobilising the Turkestani population under the banners of national autonomy”.

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Central Asia along the path to national identity would favour the concept of ‘Uzbek’ identity over ‘Sart’ identity:

“The Uzbeks’ heritage included many national and historical symbols of their earlier glory and greatness…The Sarts, on the contrary, could not claim their historical descendance from either Shaybanids or Temurids…they found themselves without national symbols, without figures of national pride and without history at all”.51

In doing so, the Soviet ethnographers effectively repudiated 500 years of history that had seen the rise of an identity based on social rather than ethnic categorisation.52 And they also drove a wedge between the ‘Tajik’ and ‘Uzbek’ peoples of the region, by promoting an exclusionary identity that exacerbated the significance of language and provided one but not both groups with a sense of historical glory and ethnic superiority.

The Turkmen

The conventional view of the modern Turkmen traces their origins to the Oguz Turk tribes that migrated westward from the Altai region near Mongolia between the 7th and 11th centuries A.D.53 This migration fragmented into a number of elements, two of which established the Seljuk and later Ottoman empires in Anatolia and the Middle East. A number of the Oguz Turk tribes remained in the Khorasan and Khwarz regions of Central Asia, and thus formed the foundation of the future Turkmen nation.54 The term ‘Turkmen’ first appeared in Arab sources in the late 10th century, and by the time

51 Ilkhamov, A., 2004, p305. 52 ibid, p303. Ilkhamov provides persuasive statistics from the 1897 survey to demonstrate that ‘Sart’ was a widely used way of describing identity in the region. And although the term came to be used with derision by nationalist or Pan-Turkic elements, including members of the Jadid movement, the term was still used with pride. 53 Rashid, A., 1994, pp189-190. Also, Murat, Aman, Berdi, “Turkmenistan and the Turkmen”, in Z. Katz, R. Rogers, F. Harned, (eds) Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, The Free Press, New York, 1975, pp262-281, p266. 54 Murat, A., 1975, p264, considers that a number of other peoples were assimilated into the peoples designated as Turkmen in modern times.

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of the Mongol expansion in the 13th century, the term had completely replaced the term ‘Oguz’ for those tribes that had remained in Central Asia.55

As a result of their warlike nature, their nomadic lifestyle and the inhospitable nature of the land that they inhabited, the Turkmen remained largely independent of the cultural and political influences of neighbouring people.56 This ensured that by the 14th and 15th centuries the Turkmen had coalesced into what could rightly be considered a single people united by a common language and common culture.57

However, a shared language and culture were not sufficient to induce the Turkmen tribes to unite politically or even militarily. The tribal nature of the Turkmen remained pre-eminent, and the political independence of the tribes (vis-à-vis other Turkmen tribes) was further strengthened first by the Mongol conquests (which divided the lands occupied by the Turkmen into three regions) and later by territorial divisions created by the Safavid Persians and the Uzbek Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.58 And, although much of the territory occupied by the Turkmen was at one time or another under the control of external powers (such as the Uzbek Khanates or the Safavid Persians), the nomadic lifestyle of the Turkmen combined with linguistic differences59 appear to have allowed them to largely maintain their independence and identity.

Up until the late 18th century, tribalism remained the dominant political characteristic of the Turkmen. Of the six main Turkmen tribes, three – the Tekke, Yomud and the Ersary – were dominant, and came to be associated with a particular geographical region.60 By the time of the Russian advance into the region, however, there had been signs of the development of a centralised political system, with the commencement of a

55 Akiner, S., 1983, p314. Akiner stated that the actual etymology of the word ‘Turkmen’ was unclear, but thought that it may have been first used by Arabs to distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim Oguz Turks. 56 Murat, A., 1975, p264. 57 Akiner, S., 1983, pp314-315. Wheeler, 1966, p17, considered the Turkmen to be the most distinctive of Central Asia. 58 ibid, p315. 59 Murat, A., 1975, p264. Linguistically, the Turkmen were more closely related to the Turks of Anatolia than to the other Turkic groups in Central Asia. 60 Soucek, S., 2000, p182. The Tekke dominated the centre of what was to become Turkmenistan, the Yomud the west and the Ersary the east. Akiner, 1983, p315, listed the main Turkmen tribes, in order of size, as the Tekke, Ersary, Yomud, Sarik, Goklen and Salor.

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process of unification under the Tekke tribe.61 However, any such domestically driven process of centralisation was cut short by Russian conquest and the subsequent incorporation of Turkmen territory into the Russian administrative structure.

The Kyrgyz

The name ‘Kyrgyz’ first appeared in the 8th century Turkic Orkon (Uighur script) inscriptions in reference to a people settled along the Yenisey River in .62 These Kyrgyz spoke a Turkic language, and were considered to be culturally related to the Uighurs, who by this stage had established a Khanate at Orkon.63 They practiced the nomadic lifestyle common to of this period, but they were also involved in agriculture and trade.64 During this period, the Kyrgyz appear to have enjoyed only limited independence as a people.65 Many of the earlier references to the Kyrgyz identified them as a tribal confederation of Siberian, Mongolian and Turkic tribes, under a Turkic ruling clan of T’ieh-le origin that was subordinate to the Uighur Empire.66 These people subsequently overthrew the Uighur Khanate in 840, and established an empire that incorporated southern Siberia, Altai, Mongolia and eastern Turkestan. This empire subsequently fragmented in the 10th century, and in the 13th century elements of those tribes earlier identified as Kyrgyz migrated or merged with the Mongol army on its path to conquest.67

Although some authors suggest that the Kyrgyz only took up occupation of the region encompassing modern day Kyrgyzstan during the 16th and 17th centuries,68 there is

61 Murat, A., 1975, p264. Akiner, 1983, pp315, also stated that the Tekke had gained supremacy over the other tribes by the 1870’s, capturing important and incorporating the Salor tribe into their own tribal structure. However, it may not be entirely appropriate to see signs of an emerging Tekke hegemony over the other tribes also leading to the development of a central government, as claimed by Murat. 62 Akiner, S., 1983, p327. Wheeler, G., 1966. p17. Akiner claimed that the Kyrgyz were first mentioned in ancient Chines chronicles as the ‘Kien-Kuen’. 63 Soucek, S., 2000, p21. 64 ibid, p59. 65 Akiner, S., 1983, p328. After the collapse of the Oirats, the Kyrgyz were nominally under the control of the Chinese, but they were virtually independent. 66 Christian, David, A , Central Asia and Mongolia: Volume One – Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to the , Blackwell, Oxford, 1998, pp271-272. 67 Tchoroev, Tyntchtykbek, “Historiography of Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 34, 2003, pp351-374, pp358-359. 68 Roy, O., 2000, p7, states that the last was that of the Kirgiz, who moved into their present habitat during this period after being driven from the steppes by the Oirats (or ). Menges, in Allworth, 1989, p83, concurs. However, Hetmanek states that records indicated that the

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evidence that indicates that people known as Kyrgyz commenced their southward migration from Siberia during the 10th century.69 The Kyrgyz were temporarily expelled from the Tien Shan Mountains by the Oirats in the 18th century.

By the 19th century, the lands occupied by the Kyrgyz had been incorporated within the Uzbek Khanate of Khokand. They remained part of the Khanate until the Khanate itself was incorporated into the Russian province (oblast) of Ferghana in 1876.70 During this time the Kyrgyz remained relatively autonomous within what was a multi-ethnic state encompassing all of the inhabitants of the Ferghana Valley.71 However, despite their relative autonomy, the Kyrgyz were heavily taxed by what was a foreign power. 72 As a consequence, at the time of Russian annexation of the Khokand Khanate, which in fact was assisted by the manap (chief) of the Kyrgyz Bugu clan confederation who offered to accept Russian rule in exchange for assistance against his Kyrgyz enemies,73 the Kyrgyz had long resided under a political framework that was alien to their own structures of authority and allegiance.

During the period of incorporation into firstly the Khokand Khanate and secondly the , the people identified as Kyrgyz demonstrated little in the way of national consciousness. Kyrgyz society remained atomised, tribal and hierarchic, with the primary focus of identity and loyalty resting firstly on extended family, then clan , clan, and finally clan confederation.74 The strength of clan loyalties, and the corresponding lack of a broad sense of Kyrgyz identity, is best demonstrated by the fact, as mentioned above, that the leader of one Kyrgyz confederation was willing to subject himself and his people to Russian rule merely to obtain military assistance

Kyrgyz had established a predominant position in this area by the early 16th century. See, Hetmanek, Allen, “Kirgizistan and the Kirgiz” in Z. Katz, R. Rogers, F. Harned, (eds) Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, The Free Press, New York, 1975, pp238-262, p240. 69 Akiner, 1983, p328, indicated that Kyrgyz had been occupying the Tien Shan range long before the Mongol expansion in the 13th century. The continued inclusion of the Kyrgyz in accounts of westward migrations up until the 15th and 16th centuries may be explained by many Kyrgyz remaining in their ancestral homeland in Siberia. Tchoroev identified a tendency by ‘official’ Kyrgyz historians to divide the history of the Kyrgyz into two sections: a ‘Kyrgyz’ period prior to the 15th century, and a ‘Kirghiz’ period from then until the 20th century. 70 Hetmanek, A., 1975, p240. Akiner, 1983, p328. 71 Tchoroev, T., 2003, p359. 72 Hetmanek, 1975, p240. 73 ibid, p240. 74 ibid, p253.

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against a rival Kyrgyz confederation. It was only following an extensive period of Russian colonisation during the later part of the 19th century, which led to a significant reduction in the land available for grazing and an associated reduction in the size of the nomads’ flock sizes, that there was a concerted Kyrgyz response to the exploitative actions of the Russian administration.75 Even then, it took the threat of military conscription to mobilise the Kyrgyz, and the resulting outbreak of violence claimed thousands of lives and also instigated another major migration of the Kyrgyz from Russia to China.76

Sources of Solidarity and Unity

On the most fundamental level, the various peoples of Central Asia as described above were united into two groupings on the basis of lifestyle – nomads and those leading sedentary lives.77 Principles of kinship were important features in both groups, yet this principle also further differentiated nomads from city and village dwellers because kinship, manifest through clan and tribal loyalties, remained an overriding factor for the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.78 In contrast to the settled populations of Uzbeks and Tajiks. The Uzbek tribal divisions lost much of their significance as indicators of identity after they swapped nomadic life for the urban environment, and neither the tribe nor the clan have ever been a feature of Tajik social or political organisation.79

Clan politics and tribalism aside, the political landscape of Central Asia up until the establishment of Russian hegemony in the mid-to-late 19th century was dominated by the three Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand. From the 17th century onwards, these Khanates were ruled by Khans of Uzbek tribal origins, with people identifiable as

75 Hetmanek, A., 1975, p240. 76 Akiner, S., 1983, p329. 77 This division provided a basis for categorisation continuing into Soviet times. In 1917 Lenin address the peoples of Central Asia as Kyrgyz and Sarts – Kyrgyz being a reference to nomads and Sarts used for both Uzbeks and Tajiks. See Roy, O., 2000, p17. 78 Wheeler, G., 1966, p20. Roy, 2000, p23, stated that even in modern times tribal belonging was generally recognised among the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen as playing an important role in the functioning of social and political structures. 79 Roy, O., 2000, p23. Roy does state, however, that there is a ‘memory’ of tribalism among certain Uzbek groups, but qualified this by also saying that it is rarely relevant to political affiliations, and it is largely ignored by younger generations. Wheeler, 1966, p20, stated that the urban lifestyle adopted by the settled peoples (Uzbeks and Tajiks) was largely incompatible with the existence of tribal and clan

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Uzbeks representing significant proportions of the populations of all three Khanates.80 However, common heritage, language or religion within the ruling class did not prevent these Khanates from fighting amongst themselves or experiencing internal conflict during the period prior to Russian conquest. Such a sense of shared ancestry and culture did not result in solidarity on the part of the Khanates, (or even within the nomadic Kazakhs, and Turkmen, who despite even closer links than those binding the Khanates could not unite), even in the face of the Russian expansion into their region.

There was one component of identity that historically did provide some degree of unity or solidarity amongst the peoples of Central Asia, however, and that was religion.

Islam in Central Asia

The importance of Islam as a foundation for identity, society and political life in Central Asia prior to Russian conquest is best indicated by the fact that, despite concerted efforts on the part of Tsarist and later Soviet governments to eliminate Islam, it emerged as “central to the historical memory, cultural identity and national pride of the Central Asia peoples”.81

Islam was initially introduced into Central Asia by the Arabs in the 7th century, and within the next one hundred years it had become the dominant religion of the urban and settled areas of the Transoxania region of Central Asia.82 However, it was not until the Mongol conquests of the 13th and 14th centuries that other parts of Central Asia, most notably the steppes to the north and east, came in contact with the Muslim world, and adopted Islam. However, Islam proved to be less successful in the rural areas of Central Asia, with the pattern of adoption of Islam reflecting the observation that Islam

loyalties. Regionalism proved to be more of a determinant of primary identity and allegiance for these groups. 80 Soucek, S., 2000, p177-193, and Wheeler, G., 1966, p15. Wheeler listed the Uzbeks as constituting more than half the population of the Khanate of Khiva, and with about a third of the population of Bukhara also being Uzbek. 81 Hunter, Shireen, “Religion, Politics and Security in Central Asia”, SAIS Review, vol 21, no 2, summer/fall 2001, pp65-89, p68. Hunter stressed that the ability of Islam to survive Russian and Soviet suppression to emerge with its present vitality is a consequence of its “deep historical roots in Central Asia”. 82 Walker, E., “Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia”, Journal of International Affairs, vol 56, no 2, Spring 2003, pp21-41, p23.

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flourishes best in an urban environment.83 Islam was accepted more readily by the sedentary populations of the region’s towns and cities, with the nomadic peoples (and especially those who remained nomadic) converting at a slower rate, and even when they did convert they retained many traditional beliefs and practices.84 When the nomadic peoples such as the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz converted to Islam, the effects of Islam and Islamic culture upon them were somewhat limited by the conditions of nomadic life.85 Islam was adopted as part of popular identity and belief but not as the basis for social organisation. Within other tribal groups and oasis communities, there was a predominance of Sufism, with Sufi masters and Sufi lineages coming to dominate government and society.86 As a result, it is arguable that several forms of Islam emerged within Central Asia. The first of these was a more traditional and scholarly form of Islam that dominated the settled areas, supported by local rulers and Islamic clergy (ulema) and schools (medresses).87 This form reflected the Middle-eastern style of state-organised Islamic societies. 88 The second branch of Islam was a less defined form incorporating many pre-Islamic traditions and practices that were favoured by the nomad Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.89

The importance placed on Islam and traditional Islamic practices in the urban centres of the three major Khanates was significant. It was here that the form of Islam that was to become predominant in Central Asia, namely the Hanafi school of ,

83 Quoted in Rashid, Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, p29. 84 Walker, E., 2003, p23. 85 Wheeler, G., 1966, p21, indicated that as late as the 16th century, the Kyrgyz were still considered heathens. Rashid, A., 2002, p29, stated that Islam did not reach the Kazakh steppes until roughly the same period. 86 Lapidus, Ira, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p338. 87 Rashid, A., 2002, p29. 88 Lapidus, I., 2002, p338. 89 Rashid, A., 2002, p29. This is explained somewhat by Walker, 2003, p23, who stated that the nomadic peoples lacked the elaborate ecclesiastical institutions that developed in the settled and urbanised areas, such as medresses and charitable organisations. Bacon, E, in Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Cultural Change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1966, pp41-43, stated that Islam had only a weak foothold among the Kazakhs prior to the late 18th century. Their religious beliefs following their adoption of Islam incorporated a mix of ancient steppe spirit worship, Iranian influenced (presumably ) practices and Islamic practices. The ‘Five Pillars of Islam’ were observed rarely, and although the Kazakhs were nominally Sunni, Bacon claimed they would have been hard pressed to identify the differences between Sunni and Shia branches of Islam.

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emerged.90 Great centres of Islamic learning developed in many of the cities of Central Asia, including Samarkand, Khiva, Tashkent and, most notably, Bukhara.91 And, over time, Central Asia was to become a centre of Sufi Islam, with many of the more important Sufi brotherhoods, including the Naqshbandi and Kubraviya Brotherhoods, being founded in Central Asia.92 Within the cities of Central Asia, devotion was formalised with rigorous adherence to Islamic ritual often enforced through a system of government inspectors and religious officials.93

However, the popularity of Sufi orders of Islam, which developed parallel to the more formal structures of Hanafi Islam in Central Asia, was to prove a critical factor to the role of Islam as an organising factor in the region. Sufi Islam is a more mystical form of Islam, and it became especially popular in the region as a consequence of its openness to customary beliefs and practices, such as the veneration of ancestors, establishment of shrines and saints and ritualised chanting and dancing.94

Importantly, the different Sufi orders developed their own principles, manifest within hierarchical systems that in some respects contradicted the authority of established Islam. For example, whereas orthodox Islam promotes the idea of Islam, as expressed in the shari’a, as the organising principle for society, the Sufi orders were “rebellious to the power of Law over life and thought”.95 Sufi philosophy, in particular the various manifestations of tariqa, or “way of the pilgrim towards truth”,96 became a fundamental aspect of life, yet made its adherents naturally wary of any form of external control, either by orthodox Islamic structures or by the state. Indeed, Sufism has been perceived as producing a divisive effect, by substituting loyalty to a group for loyalty to the

90 Of consequence to the points raised earlier regarding the incorporation of traditional practices into Islam observance is the argument, raised by Walker, 2003, p23, that Sunni Islam prevailed over in Central Asia because it was more able to accommodate traditional practices and customs. 91 Spencer Trimingham, J., The Sufi Orders of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p94. 92 Walker, E., 2003, p23. 93 Bacon, E., 1966, pp76-77, stated that the Khanates employed special officials (called ‘reis’) to enforce religious observance and to punish lapses. Sharia law was also formally administered through a defined structure of muftis, ulema and qazi. 94 Walker, E., 2003, p23. 95 Spencer Trimingham, J., 1998, p241. 96 Spencer Trimingham, J., p241, suggested the tariqa was at odds with the ‘God-guaranteed way’ of shar’ia, but also stated that the original meaning of shari’a was ‘the path to be followed’, which was arguably more restrictive than the Sufi concept of tariqa.

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community as a whole, and thus was contrary to the spirit of Islam.97 Islam as manifest through an organised ‘ulema bureaucracy’, was typically very supportive of Islamic states such as the and the Bukharan Khanate. Sufi orders, on the other hand, were seen as in opposition to the state, and in some contexts were suppressed by the ‘ulema bureaucracy’ and the state alike.98

Although the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood emerged as the most popular in the region, Sufism contributed to the failure of the Islamic idea of umma, or religious community, taking hold in the Central Asian region. By promoting diverse ideas of community Sufism was, in some respects, at odds with the unifying features of formal orthodox Islam. In this way, the popularity of Sufism ensured that the heterogeneous Central Asian populations would not move towards the Islamic ideal of umma, and would continue to display those varied cultural, social and political features that had long characterised the region. By diluting the potency of Islam as a bond and source of community, Sufism ensured that the political allegiances, tribal sentiments, lifestyles and linguistic differences that had long divided the peoples of Central Asia, continued to do so. Also contributing to this is the relative lack of consistency in the adoption of Islam across the region. Landau observed that Islam in the 19th century was divided not just by the differences in language and ethnic sentiments, but also by large uninhabited areas and populations of Russians and other Christians.99 Further contributing to this division is that even by the 19th century there were still large populations, particularly in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz steppes, that had not adopted Islam, or had adopted it only nominally. Therefore, with Islam, in Sufi or orthodox form, more prevalent in the urban centres of Bukhara and Khiva, it is arguable that Islam actually became something of a divisive feature in that it accentuated the historical difference between sedentary and nomad peoples.

As a consequence, the influence of Islam on identity in Central Asia appears somewhat contradictory. It is irrefutable that Islam became a fundamental part of identity in the

97 Akiner, S., 1983, p7. Akiner identified a number of instances where Sufi leaders had been at the forefront of national struggles, and considered that the role played by Sufi leaders and Sufi philosophers was fundamental in inspiring a sense of community amongst its adherents. 98 Lapidus, I., 2002, pp217-218.

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region, and there is substantial evidence that the peoples of Central Asia viewed themselves first and foremost as Muslims right up to and following the Soviet period. However, Islam in Central Asia does not appear to have developed as a uniting force as it was in other parts of the Islamic world. Islam failed to mitigate many of the numerous divisions that separated the peoples of Central Asia along cultural, linguistic, social, clan or confederation lines. Islamic identity merely became one part, albeit a complex part, of an intricate web of features that shaped ideas of identity and allegiance among the diverse peoples of Central Asia.

Reconciling Historiography with Reality in Central Asia

The fact that the peoples who emerged during the Soviet period as Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajiks can be identified in medieval sources and archaeology does not automatically lead to or support the conclusion that the peoples of modern Central Asia are ancient nations that can trace their lineage back hundreds, if not thousands of years. In some respects, the fact that the names of the modern Central Asians can be traced back to the 10th century blurs the reality of identity and socio- political structures in the region prior to the Soviet period. It would be convenient to assume that, just because the names existed in a certain historical period, the peoples to whom each name applied must have recognised a shared sense of identity and origin. The reality, as demonstrated above, was significantly different to this assumption, and significantly more complex.

The use of the terms Uzbek and ‘Sart’ is possibly the most instructive in this instance, as an assessment of the fluidity of the application of these names provides a glimpse of the elusive, non-exclusionary nature of identity in pre-Soviet times. Similarly, evidence that features such as political allegiance or lifestyle were more important factors than language group or clan affiliation stands as contrary to western forms of identity and allegiance. And finally, the constant migration of peoples to, from and within the region makes it almost impossible, name continuity notwithstanding, to trace a line back from the Uzbeks of today to the Uzbek confederation of the 15th century. These facts

99 Landau, Jacob, The Politics of Pan Islam: Ideology and Organisation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p143.

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make it difficult to view the peoples of modern Central Asia through the prisms of primordialism or perennialism. However, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, not only did the ethnographers of the Soviet Union seek to establish discrete physical and psychological boundaries for the heterogenous population of Central Asia, but they also sought to encourage the adoption of the very notion of the historically defined nation, and thus hasten the peoples of Central Asia along the path to a socialist utopia.

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Chapter Six

Soviet Nationalities Policy and the Formation of the Central Asian Republics

An inevitable consequence of the first two decades of Soviet rule in Central Asia was that the political, economic, cultural, and social fabric of the entire region would be irrevocably changed. Following the suppression of the Basmachi uprising of the 1920s, Soviet political ideology became a pervasive influence on almost all aspects of Central Asian life. With reference to the preceding discussion, this influence certainly extended to the way that the peoples of Central Asia viewed themselves and others, and how they organised themselves politically and culturally. The Soviet concept of nationalities that was literally forced upon the peoples of Central Asia was, in many respects, incompatible with the traditional forms of identity in the region that have just been discussed.

However, the consequences of Bolshevik policy went much further than a mere restructuring of identity in Central Asia. There was a lack of historical precedent for the existence of the Central Asian states themselves, given they were formed not from some logical or inevitable consolidation by an ethnic group or groups, but as a result of explicit administrative decisions. Thus, the role of the Soviet Union in the creation of the states of the region has implications for the notion of the legitimacy of the state, and state sovereignty, as it applies in this region. In certain respects, the development of the independent states within and upon the collapse of the former Soviet Union has diverged significantly from the traditional Westphalian processes of state formation that lead to the development of internal cohesion and thus legitimacy.1 And in many respects the newly emergent states lack the internal structures and processes that are essential to the maintenance of an effective state apparatus.

1 Menon, R. and Spruyt, H. “Possibilities for Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia”, in B. Rubin and J. Snyder (eds), Post- Soviet Political Order, Routledge, 1998, pp104-128, p109.

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In the former Soviet Union, the delineation of territoriality was imposed by external agents and events, with the Central Asian states basically being formed by administrative decisions made by the Soviet regime. The state structures of these republics were imposed from above by Moscow, and the central Soviet authority also decided the territory of these state by arbitrarily drawing and redrawing borders. Consequently, state boundaries and ethnic composition lacked correspondence and were part of a deliberate, explicit strategy to weaken peripheral resistance to a centralised Soviet regime.2 The states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union closely reflect the administrative decisions of the Soviet Union, and thus the logic underpinning their territoriality is undermined by the intentions of the Soviet strategies of state administration.

Additionally, the sovereign states in Central Asia that exist today emerged as independent units as a result of the collapse of the Soviet system rather than the result of strong independence movements. There was no interplay between Soviet collapse and pro-independence nationalist mass movements as in other parts of the former Soviet Union such as .3 The Central Asian states merely emerged ‘fully formed’ in the aftermath of the Soviet Union. In many instances, the regimes that came to power in Central Asia upon the collapse of the Soviet Union were comprised of those that had held power in the republic during Soviet time. For example, approximately 80% of Kazakhstan’s ruling elite are former members of Kazakhstan’s Communist Party nomenklatura.4 These people have largely preserved their positions through the suppression of dissent and the banning of alternative political parties and candidates.

In order to best understand the implications that the era of the Soviet Union has for the prospects for stability within the Central Asian republics, it is necessary to examine the development of the frameworks of government that were adopted within the Soviet Union. Both Lenin and Stalin had fundamental roles in developing the systems of government that were to form the basis of the Soviet Union, and their extensive writing

2 Menon R., and Spruyt, H., 1998, p109. 3 ibid, p109. 4 Conflict in Post Soviet Transitions – Central Asia and the Caucasus, An International Workshop, The Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 22/8/1997, Bishkek.

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on the ‘nationalities question’ and self-determination provide invaluable insight into the political ideologies that guided the early administration of the Soviet Union.

As will be discussed later, the early processes of border delimitation that occurred within the Soviet Union have ongoing implications for not only the internal stability and security that is enjoyed by the Central Asian states, but for the relations between states. However, these processes occurred within a comprehensive ideological framework, and the decisions that influenced and guided the border delimitation processes were as much determined by strict Leninist and Stalinist political ideology as by more generic colonialist imperatives. Given that the vision of a socialist utopia that drove Lenin and later Stalin was critical to the border delimitation processes that gained impetus in the 1920’s and 1930’s, it is important to understand not only the philosophical foundations of Leninist and Stalinist policies, but also the extent to which these two leaders realised their ambitions. Indeed, to best understand the implications of this tumultuous period for the modern Central Asian republics, it is as important to recognise the failings of the early Soviet administration as it is to recognise the successes.

Nationalities Policy and the Development of the Bolshevik Federal Framework

Although the venerable father of modern socialism, Karl Marx, never developed a specific concept of the nation,5 Marxist theory inevitably provided a framework that was later used by both Lenin and Stalin in developing a Soviet policy on nationalities.

Some authors have interpreted Lenin, in particular in his extensive writings on what came to be known as the Soviet nationalities question, as paying homage to two key Marxist principles; firstly, the idea that economic relations are at the heart of every social and political process, and secondly, that nations are the products and processes associated with a particular historical stage of development.6 However, Lenin also argued that Marxism and nationalism were mutually exclusive terms, contending that

5 Gleason, Gregory, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republic Rights in the USSR, Westview, Boulder, 1990, p23. Robert Conquest, in Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, Bodley Head, London, 1967, p15, went so far as to state that “in few fields were the teachings of Marx and Engles of less definite value to Soviet policy makers than in that of the national question”.

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“Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even of the ‘most just”, ‘purest’, most refined and civilised brand”.7

“In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity…”8

Lenin spent considerable time elaborating upon what he perceived as an inevitable historical tendency on the part of ‘developing capitalism’. Firstly, he identified an awakening of national life and national movements, and a corresponding struggle against national oppression, resulting in the creation of national states. He believed nationalism was merely a reaction against discrimination, with the nationalist sentiments held by numerous minority groups within the Tsarist empire being a direct result of the treatment that these peoples received at the hands of the Tsarist government.9 Secondly, Lenin foresaw the development of ‘international intercourse’ which dismantled national boundaries and created international unity of capital, politics and science.10

Consequently, Lenin believed that Marxism could never be reconciled with nationalism of any kind because in place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advanced an amalgamation of all nations to a ‘higher unity’.11 However, given the diverse make-up of the peoples that made up the Russian Tsarist Empire, it was not surprising that the national question would critically influence the choices made by the Bolsheviks in respect to the forms and structures of government for the later Soviet Union.

6 Gleason, G., 1990, p27. 7 Lenin, V.I., “Cultural-National Autonomy”, in V.I. Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976m pp22-29, p23. Lenin conceded that the “principle of nationality is historically inevitable in bourgeois society”, but contended that in order to “prevent this recognition from becoming an apologia of nationalism, it must be strictly limited to what is progressive in such movements” (p23). 8 ibid, p23. 9 Connor, Walker. “Soviet Policies Towards the Non-Russian Peoples in Theoretic and Historical Perspective: What Gorbachev inherited”, in A Motyl (ed) The Post Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, pp30-50, p31. 10 From Lenin’s article “ The Nationalist Bogey of ‘Assimilation’”, in Lenin, V., Critical Remarks on the National Question, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p16. 11 ibid, p23.

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Initially, Lenin was a hardline centralist, and thus was fundamentally opposed to the idea of a federation of peoples or nations, or the devolution of power to a republic or national level.

“Marxists will never, under any circumstances advocate either the federal principle or decentralisation. The great centralised state is a tremendous historical step forward from medieval disunity to the future socialist unity of the whole world and only via such a state inseparably connected with capitalism can there be any road to socialism.”12

Lenin argued that ‘democratic centralism’, rather than leading to tyranny and bureaucracy, actually ensured the maintenance of local self-government and autonomy for regions with specific economic and social conditions and a distinct national composition.13 Indeed, Lenin argued that consideration needed to be given (by a central parliament) to social, economic and national factors in determining the administrative boundaries that would ensure that the national question was appropriately managed:

“…must provide for wide regional autonomy and fully democratic local self government, and the boundaries of the self-governing and autonomous regions must be determined (not by the boundaries of the present gubernias, uyezds etc, but) by the local inhabitants themselves on the basis of their economic and social conditions, national make up of population, etc.”14

Crucially, however, Lenin put an effective limitation on the discretion that could be enjoyed by so-called ‘autonomous regions’ by reserving for the “central parliament the power to determine the boundaries of the autonomous regions and the power of autonomous Diets”.15 Yet, Lenin consistently argued that democratic centralism was reconcilable with the right of nations to self-determination. He stated that the right of nations to self-determination “implies exclusively the right to independence in the

12 Lenin, V., 1976, p35. 13 ibid, p35. 14 ibid, p40.

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political sense, the right to free political separation from the oppressor nation”. However, in elaborating upon this principle, Lenin said that a demand for political democracy did not equate to a “demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression”. 16

“The closer a democratic state system is to complete freedom to secede the less frequent and less ardent will the desire for separation be in practice, because big states afford indisputable advantages.”17

The implications of this are that Lenin perceived that merely the right to self- determination would satisfy the desires of national groups seeking self determination, and that in a democratic centralised government, the desires of individual national groups will be constantly and automatically subordinated to the goals of the proletariat. To this end, the Resolution on the National Question, issued as part of the Notification and Resolutions of the Summer 1913 Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the RSDLP established that:

“The right of nations to self-determination (ie, the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession) must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency of a given nation’s secession. The Social-Democratic Party must decide the later question exclusively on its merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism.”18

Less than a year after the above declaration, in 1914, it became more apparent that the issue of the rights and expectations of Russia’s (and later the Soviet Union’s)

15 ibid, p40. 16 Lenin, V., “The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination”, On National Liberation and Social Emancipation, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p153. 17 Lenin, V., 1986, p153. 18 Lenin, V., 1986, p81. The same Resolution also identified the role of “landowners, the clergy and the bourgeoisie” of the “oppressed nations” using nationalist slogans to disguise the fact they are conspiring with the elites of the ruling nation.

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constituent groups were coming to increasingly occupy Lenin. Around this time, Lenin had drafted a Bill on the Equality of Nations and the Safeguarding of the Rights of National Minorities for presentation at the Fourth Duma by the Bolsheviks. Among other things, this Bill proposed that “boundaries of Russia’s administrative divisions, rural and urban shall be revised on the basis of a register of present day economic conditions and the national composition of the population”.19 Although this Bill was not subsequently introduced in to the Duma by Lenin, it did indicate the direction that Lenin was taking in respect to the question of nationalities, and pre-empted by nearly 10 years the formal process of national delimitation adopted by the Bolsheviks that is discussed later.

There appeared to be definite limits to the degree that Lenin was prepared to accommodate the demands of national or minority groups. For example, Lenin, and later Stalin on his behalf as Commissar of National Affairs, took great pains to repudiate the principles of cultural-national autonomy as elucidated by Otto Bauer. Lenin referred to Bauer’s theory, which is discussed in detail in a later chapter, as a “thoroughly bourgeois and thoroughly false” doctrine that encouraged the separation of all nations from one another, thus ‘constitutionalising nationalism’.20 Bauer’s theory may have provoked the hostility of Lenin and later Stain because it was perceived by them to undermine what they were seeking to achieve in the way of a universal soviet consciousness. Somewhat ironically, when viewed against the backdrop of the later federative arrangements instituted for the entire Soviet Union, the results of both Lenin’s and Stalin’s efforts in constructing the infrastructure of soviet governance produced an outcome not terribly dissimilar to that envisaged by Bauer through the lens of his theory of cultural-national autonomy.

Lenin was pragmatic enough, however, to recognise that the socialist internationalist goal of a universal form of governance was not immediately attainable, and that certain

19 Lenin, V., 1986, p120. Although Lenin was never in the Duma, by writing this Bill for presentation by the Bolsevik group he was seen to attach special importance to the introduction of the bill to the Fourth Duma, because he was trying to “give a popular explanation of the stupidity of cultural-national autonomy and kill the supporters of this stupidity for good”: p313. 20 Lenin, V., 1976, p24. Lenin argued in the same article that cultural-national autonomy converted buregeois nationalism “into an absolute category” (p23), and that it also aimed at “introducing the most refined, most absolute and most extreme nationalism” (p22).

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compromises would have to be made in the interim. Indeed, the necessity of compromise was in certain respects forced upon him by the secessionist tendencies of many of the regions of the former Russian empire. Consequently, the establishment of a union of separate republics that recognised national difference was, although far short of the ideological goal of the creation of a ‘mass soviet consciousness’, a necessary comprise that satisfied in part the desire of secession within different groups of the Union.21

Consequently, in the aftermath on the 1917 Revolution, Lenin increasingly endorsed the federal option for the administration of the former Tsarist empire, a move that has been interpreted by some authors as an ‘ideological about face’ that was little more than a cynically constructed propagandist gesture to the peoples of the European colonial territories, demonstrating to them that a socialist state would equitably treat its non- European peoples.22 The Bolsheviks’ policy on the rights of nations to self- determination has been interpreted by modern authors as shaped more by a desire to garner support for their rebellion against the Tsarist government, and less to do with considerations of principle. Promises of full civil rights, including the right to national self-determination, for all of the Tsarist Empires nationalities proved to be effective in mobilising non-Russian groups during decisive stages of the Russian Civil War.23

In Lenin’s favour, however, he had first indicated his willingness and ability to reconcile the idea of a federation with the key concept of democratic centralism well before the 1917 revolution. As early as 1913, Lenin argued that the notion that privileges should be accorded to one part of the Soviet population via the imposition of a single culture or language upon all others was abhorrent.

“…introducing any privileges of any kind for one of the nations and militating against the equality of nations or the rights of a national minority, shall be declared illegal and ineffective, and any citizen of the state shall have the right to

21 Huttenbach, Henry, “Towards a Unitary Soviet State: Managing a Multinational Society”, in Huttenbach, H., (ed), Soviet Nationalities Policy, Mansell, London, 1990, pp1-9, p5. 22 Roshwald, A. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East 1914-1923, Routledge, London, 2002, p174.

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demand that such a measure be annulled as unconstitutional and that those who attempt to put it into effect be punished.”24

To this end, Lenin articulated his belief that federation, although inherently contradictory of the Marxist tendency towards centralism, was preferable to national inequality.

“One may be a determined opponent of that principle (federation) and a champion of democratic centralism but still prefer federation to national inequality as the only way to full democratic centralism.”25

In Lenin’s view, this concession towards federalism still fitted within the broader Marxist parameters within which he sought to frame Bolshevik policies. He believed that by granting national equality to all peoples, and by encouraging the and culture of the various constituent peoples, the suspicion and distrust that had plagued the relations between peoples in the past would disappear. Nationalism would correspondingly diminish, and as a result a rapprochement of nations would occur, and key Marxist objectives would be achieved.26

Although there was substantial opposition within the Bolshevik party to the idea of a Federation after the Revolution, the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic established the Russian Soviet Republic upon the “basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics”.27 The new Federated Republic of Russia incorporated eight autonomous republics and thirteen autonomous regions. On face value, the new Federation appeared to ‘constitutionalise’ nationalism in a way that contradicted even Lenin’s earlier approaches to the question of nationalities. However, there was such a high degree of centralisation, and almost no

23 Dawisha, K, and Parrott, B, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p9. 24 Lenin, V., 1976, p10. 25 Lenin, V., 1986, p153. Lenin supported his ‘reconciliation’ of the principles of federation and centralism with a reference to comments by Marx regarding the federation of Ireland to England being preferable to the forcible subordination of the Irish to the English. 26 Connor, W., 1992, pp31-33. 27 Pearson, R, “The Historical Background to Soviet Federalism”, in A. McAuley (ed), Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1991, p25.

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delegation of jurisdictional authority to either the republics or the regions, that the federation amounted to little more that a policy advocating “centralism extended to a different area”.28

However, Lenin still appeared to feel compelled to place the idea of federation firmly within the orthodox Marxist interpretation of history. In the Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions that he published in 1920, Lenin subsequently identified federation as merely a transitional form of governance useful in achieving the eventual unity of the working peoples of different nations.29

“It is the task of the Communist International to further develop and also to study and test by experience these new federations, which are arising on the basis of the Soviet system and the Soviet movement. In recognising that federation is a transition form to complete unity, it is necessary to strive for even closer federal unity…"30

In the same passage, Lenin raised the spectre of a hostile capitalist West that continued to threaten the existence of the burgeoning Soviet Union, and claimed that a federation was the best way to ensure the success of communism in the face of such a threat:

“…the Soviet republics, surrounded as they are by the imperialist powers of the whole world – which from the military standpoint are immeasurably stronger – cannot possibly continue to exist without the closest alliance;…a close economic alliance between the Soviet republics is necessary, otherwise the productive forces which have been ruined by imperialism cannot be restored.”31

28 d’Encausse, H, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, Newsweek Books, New York, 1978, p19. With reference to the 1918 Constitution, d’Encausse also quoted Lenin as saying at the time. “The example of the Russian Soviet Republic shows that the federation which we are building will be a step forward toward the unity of Russia’s different nationalities in one Soviet state, centralised and democratic”. 29 Lenin, V., 1986, p278. In the same passage Lenin claimed that the feasibility of federation had already been demonstrated as a result of the good relationship between the RSFSR and other Soviet Republics (such as Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Hungary) and in relation to the nationalities within the RSFSR (including the Bashkir and Tatar autonomous republics which Lenin says formally did not possess statehood nor autonomy). 30 Lenin, V., 1986, p279. 31 ibid, p279.

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It was the 1922-24 Declaration and Treaty of the Constitution of the USSR that formalised the federal arrangements for the Bolshevik state, thus establishing the Soviet Union. This Constitution saw the adoption of a federal model of administration that provided the constituent republics with exclusive jurisdiction within their borders over agriculture, education, justice, public health and social security.32

Ironically, given the Soviets’ distaste for policies such as Bauer’s ‘national-cultural autonomy’ which they considered to ‘constitutionalise nationalism’, the 1922-24 Constitution has been perceived as giving more claims to ethnic identity than the 1918 Constitution for two reasons. Firstly, the advisory council of the original Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkomnats) was moved to the law making level of the state structure, effectively creating a bicameral . Secondly, it provided the new republics joining the union with the power to enact their own legislative code.33 This ‘Compromise Constitution’, as it has become known, in some respects may have sown the seeds for the later disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was designed for the short or medium term management of the ‘nationalities question’, and in no way offered practical solutions to the issues confronted by a centralising regime. In fact, the opposite was true, because by adopting a policy of “national in form, socialist in content” the Bolshevik government permitted a “cultural flowering of the non-Russian nationalities”34 that was antithetical to the fundamental ideology of the Bolshevik government. The implications of this become clear when the processes and rights provided by the 1922-24 Constitution are put into the context of Stalinist Russia. It was during this period that the Soviet Union clearly demonstrated its fundamental inability to constructively reconcile core Soviet ideology with the reality of the federal system that was established in the 1920’s.

The brutality and intolerance of Stalin’s administration provided very little room for the evolution of the republics and peoples of the Soviet Union through the various

32 Pearson, R., 1991, p27. Article One of the Constitution authorised the individual federal authorities “(m) to establish fundamental principles of exploitation and use of the land; (o) to establish the fundamentals of the judicial system and procedure as well as the civil and criminal legislation of the union; (p) to establish the fundamental laws regarding labour”. Excerpts of the constitution quoted in Hazard, John, “Statutory Recognition of Nationality Differences”, in E. Allworth (ed), Soviet Nationality Problems, Columbia University Press, New York, 1971, p85. 33 Hazard, J., 1971, p88.

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‘historical phases of development’ (as identified by Marx, Lenin and Stalin) toward the ‘higher unity’ desired by the Bolsheviks. The volatile mix of increased aspirations with increased repression produced a souring of relations between different groups, especially between ethnic Russians and peoples such as those in Central Asia, which was to characterise Stalinist rule in Russia.

The reality of the federal system within the Soviet Union saw the political sovereignty of the republics minimised, whilst the cultural sovereignty of the constituent units was ensured. On the political side, whilst the right of each of the republics to secede from the Union was enshrined within the Constitution, any such moves were brutally suppressed as subversive. On the cultural side, Union republics utilised their own languages as their official tongue, using them in schools, newspapers, journals, and literary, theatrical and cinematic productions.35 However, even this ‘cultural renaissance’ was driven by certain principles that were not necessarily derived from the reality of the ethno-demographic makeup of the Soviet Union. And, as will be discussed later, the desire on the part of the central Soviet regime to micro-manage the issues of language and culture produced results that were far from positive or durable.

Stalin and the Evolution of Soviet Federalism

Unlike Lenin, Stalin was consistently rigid in his beliefs regarding how nationalities should be accommodated within the Soviet framework. He disagreed fundamentally with the compromise that Lenin was prepared to make in relation to federation because he preferred a Soviet state that was essentially composed of one large unit.36 Stalin’s proposals in the lead up to the adoption of the 1922-24 Constitution focused upon the RSFSR as a model for Federation. He proposed that, as the RSFSR successfully incorporated a number of national groups with (nominally) autonomous status, the power structures of the RSFSR should serve as the organisations of power for the new Soviet federation. This would have produced a system of supposedly autonomous soviet republics dominated by the RSFSR.37

34 Pearson, R. 1991, p30. 35 Roshwald, A., 2002, pp176-177. 36 Huttenbach, H., 1990, p5. 37 d’Encausse, H., 1992, pp129-130.

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Stalin dealt with the issue of the Soviet ‘nationalities question’ at even greater length than Lenin. In his essay Marxism and the National Question, written in 1913, Stalin developed a distinct concept of the ‘nation’ and then placed it within the framework of Marxist ideology. A nation was defined as “a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a community of culture”.38 Stalin’s theory drew heavily upon the work done on nationalities previously by Otto Bauer, which was ironic because both Lenin and Stalin took great lengths to repudiate key aspects of Bauer’s theory of nationalities and national-cultural autonomy.

True to traditional Marxist ideology, Stalin also identified nationalism as a historical phenomenon that was closely related to capitalism. For Stalin, a nation was “not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism”.39 And in an interesting parallel to modern instrumentalist theory that identifies the role of elites in the development of nationalism and conflict between groups, Stalin argued that in many instances nationalism was driven by the competition and conflict between the bourgeoisie of a dominant nation and the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation.40

Furthermore, Stalin also maintained that the national question occupied a specific place within the continuum of history. He stated that the national question was closely linked to:

“the general question of the development of the revolution, that at different stages of the revolution the national question has different aims, corresponding to the character of the revolution at each given historical moment, that the Party’s policy on the national question changes in conformity with this.”41

38 Stalin, J., Marxism and the National Question, Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow, 1935, p8. 39 Stalin, J., 1935, p13. 40 Stalin, J., 1935, p15. 41 Stalin, J., The National Question and , Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950, p31.

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As was to become clear during his leadership, however, it was often Stalin, and Stalin alone, that determined what the specific aims of the national question were to be, and how these aims were to correspond to the ongoing socialist revolution. What proved to be a constant theme of Stalin’s nationality policy was the idea that by hastening the journey of different groups towards nationalism (of course, under the tutelage and direction of the proletariat), one would similarly hasten the process of the merging of different nationalities (sblizhenie), and the attainment of mass soviet consciousness42 one of the fundamental goals of the socialist revolution.

“The flourishing of culture national in form and socialist in content under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country [will lead to] a merger into one common socialist (in form and content) culture with one common language, when the proletariat will win in the whole world and socialism will penetrate the lifestyle.”43

Somewhat ironically, Stalin also dealt at length with the issue of self-determination, and, like Lenin, he proclaimed that nations do have a general right to self determination. In 1917, Stalin and Lenin issued a jointly signed Declaration of Rights of the Nations of Russia that established four principles upon which the Council of Peoples Commissars would base their activities relating to the nationalities of Russia. These principles were:

1. The equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia. 2. The right of the nations of Russia to freedom of self-determination including the right to secede and form independent states. 3. Abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions whatsoever. 4. Freedom of development for the national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.44

42 Huttenback, H., “Towards a Unitary Soviet State: Managing a Multinational Society” in H. Huttenback, Soviet Nationalities Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR, Mansell, London, 1990, pp1-9, p5. 43 Stalin, quoted in Rywkin, M, “Searching for Soviet Nationalities Policy” in H. Huttenback, Soviet Nationalities Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR, Mansell, London, 1990, pp62-73, p67. 44 Soviet Calender, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.

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However, Stalin offered somewhat conflicting definitions of the right to self- determination. On one hand, Stalin established the right of self-determination as meaning that “a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession”.45

On the other hand, Stalin offered a more restrictive definition of the right to self- determination, which said that it meant that “only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its schools and other institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, or curtail its rights”.46 Stalin also established an ideological mechanism by which action could be justly taken against what Stalin referred to as “the pernicious institutions of nations and against the inexpedient demands of nations”.47

“It is the duty of Social-Democrats to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that will best suit the interests of the proletariat. For this reason Social- Democrats, while fighting for the right of nations to self determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tartars, or against national cultural autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for both, while not contrary to the rights of these nations, are contrary “to the precise meaning” of the programme, i.e., to the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.”48

What is also certain is that Stalin firmly subordinated any right to national self- determination to the rights of the working class.

“It should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of nations to self determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right to self-determination is subordinate to this latter right…the right to

45 Stalin,, J., 1935, p19. 46 Stalin, J., 1935, p18. 47 ibid, p53. 48 ibid, p53.

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self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship.”49

These principles guided Stalin’s policies when he assumed the highest position within the Soviet Union, and led to the gradual development of a very centralised system that focused upon Russia. Stalin had long argued that the most logical structure for the governance of the new Bolshevik states was a system that placed Russia, and by default Russians, at the top of an administrative hierarchy. He saw this as a necessary step in facilitating the development of the Soviet state and the progression of the different national groups within it.

“The crux of the national problem in the RSFSR lies in the obligation to put an end to that backwardness (economic, political and cultural) of the nationalities which we have inherited from the past and to afford the backward peoples the opportunity of catching up with Central Russia politically, culturally and economically.”50

When taken within the that was to characterise Stalinist Russia, these principles were to further reinforce an underlying tension between ethnic Russians and the ‘junior nationalities’ within the Soviet Union. The efforts by the Bolsheviks to organise and administer the Central Asian republics consolidated more than fifty years of conquest and engagement undertaken by the preceding Tsarist Russian government. Although the Tsarist administration operated from more traditional colonial imperatives of divide and rule, this period was to have a bearing on the form and substance of the republics that emerged as a consequence of Soviet-era administration. Therefore, before the ways in which Soviet nationalities policies were given form and substance by the border delimitation process will be discussed, the administrative impact of Tsarist Russia on the region will be briefly considered.

49 Stalin, J., Works, Volume 5, p270. 50 From the “Report on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem” delivered at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March 10. 1921, in Stalin, J., Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p103.

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The Formation of the Central Asian Republics

Tsarist Russia had maintained active involvement in the affairs of the Central Asian region from about 1782, when Catherine the Great instituted the Orenburg Border Commission, which was established to deal specifically with Central Asian affairs.51 However, actual Russian conquest of the region only commenced in 1865, and it was nearly 20 years before the Tsarist government had gained control of the region. Russia then consolidated its rule by dividing the Central Asian region into four separate entities: the of the Steppes (which comprised the north-east section of modern Kazakhstan), the Governorate of Turkestan (incorporating Tashkent, Samarkand and much of present day Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) and the of Khiva and Bukhara, within which the traditional rulers were allowed to remain.52 The Governorate of Turkestan attracted the most attention from Tsarist administrative machinery, and was divided into (provinces), uezds (), volosts () and .53

However, the borders, and the associated political and administrative boundaries, were established in a very haphazard manner that not only ignored existing ethnographic realities of the region, but in many cases cut across areas of relatively homogenous populations and contradicted existing religious, linguistic and cultural affinities and common economic interests.54 Additionally, the native populations of the region played a minimal role in determining the boundaries that formally divided Central Asia into four distinct entities.55

Vaidyanath discussed two examples of the arbitrariness of border delimitation. The first of these was from 1873, when the Governor-General of defined the border between Turkistan and the autonomous Emirate of Bukhara with the sole

51 Allworth, E., 1989, p55. 52 Roy, O., 2000, p32. 53 Abdulrakhimova, Nadira, “The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol 34, 2002 pp239-262, p241. The author also identified the imposition of ‘military-territorial’ units – , otdels and rayons – in regions bordering the Khanates in place of the civil units. 54 Vaidyanath, R, The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics: A Study in Soviet Nationalities Policy 1917-1936, Peoples Publishing House, New , 1967, pp155-156. 55 Soucek, S., 2000, p202.

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objective of ensuring that a maximum number of wells came in to Russian possession. The subsequent border divided territory that was predominantly inhabited by Uzbeks and Kazakhs. A similar stratagem was used to demark the border between Turkistan, Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva, where, once again “political and strategic considerations further complicated the already complex ethnographic map of the region”.56

To be fair to the Tsarist administration, however, they proved, on a cultural and spiritual level, to be somewhat benevolent and tolerant colonisers.57 Initially, responsibility for administering the region was left within the hands of the military authorities, who relinquished control of all local affairs not of a political or military nature to the traditional hierarchies within the region.58 As a consequence a “native administration”, elected by the local population continued to play a residual role in the local government of the region59. In this way, Russian intervention in local institutions was limited. Any affair involving neither Russian subjects nor interest, and not falling within politics that might interest the Russian administration, remained the responsibility of the traditional judicial authorities.60 During the period of its rule, however, the Tsarist government increased its influence and control in the region. As a consequence, it left an indelible legacy in the region that in many respects paved the way for the Bolsheviks.61

In the aftermath of the Russian civil war, the Bolsheviks retained the basic administrative structure created by Tsarist Russia for a short period after they overcame domestic resistance and re-incorporated these territories within the new, .

56 Vaidyanath, R., 1967, p155, drawing upon Turkestanskaia Pravda (Tashkent) 191 (408) 29 August 1924. 57 Soucek, S., 2000, p204. 58 Allworth, E., 1989, p154. 59 Abdulrakhimova, Nadira, 2002, p240. Abdulrakimova discussed how the khanate system of administration continued for some time – in the cities an aksakal (elder) was in charge of the native population, and ra’is (chiefs) reported to him. Traditional zakatchi (tax collectors) continued to be in control of raising revenue, and the nomadic population remained divided into clans and subsections which were managed by hereditary positions such as manap, sultan and bey. 60 Allworth, E., 1989, p154. 61 Abdulrakhimova, Nadira, 2002, pp259-260, identified a number of features of the Tsarist ‘military- administrative’ model as having a significant impact on the region. This included the demarcation of the occupied territories; the centralisation of military, civil and legal powers in the hands of the Tsarist

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The Bolsheviks initially created two Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), Turkistan and Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan, and two Peoples Socialist Republics (PSRs), Bukhara and Khwarezm, reflecting the Tsarist administrative arrangements.

The Turkestan ASSR, with Uzbek and Kazakh made the official languages, was the first to be created, in April 1918. This was due, in part, to Lenin perceiving a need for a conciliatory policy as necessary to ensuring the co-operation of Muslims within the region.62 The Kyrgyz/Kazakh ASSR was created in August 1920, with Kazakh made the official language in 1923. And of the two PSRs, the Khwarezm PSR was created in February 1920 following the capture of its capital Khiva by the Bolshevik General Frunze, and the Bukharan PSR was created soon after in September of the same year.63

Political Subdivisions Circa 192264

Of these regions, the so-called Peoples Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm maintained self rule in practice and not just theory for several years after the establishment of

government; and the institutionalisation of the machinery of state to “speed the introduction of a cheaper and more effective system for the exploitation of material and human resources”. 62 Roy, O., 2000, p58. 63 Roy, 2000, p60. 64 Allworth E. (ed), Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, p240.

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Bolshevik control. The 1921 Treaty between the RSFSR and the Bukhara Peoples Soviet Republic established self-rule for this republic.

“Guided by this principle (right to free self determination) and renouncing, in particular, the colonial policy of the former Russian capitalist governments…the Russian SFR unconditionally recognises the full sovereignty and independence of the Bukhara SR with all ensuing consequences and renounces for ever all the rights which Russian tsarism established with respect to Bukhara.”65

Distribution of the Major National Groups of Central Asia and the Proportion of Each National Group to the Total Population of Each Republic - 192066 TURKISTAN BUKHARA KHOREZM/KHIVA National Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of each each each each each each Group nationality in nationality in nationality in nationality in nationality in nationality in relation to its relation to the relation to its relation to the relation to its relation to the total strength population of total strength population of total strength population of in Central the republic in Central the republic in Central Asia the republic Asia Asia Uzbeks 66.5 41.1 22.2 50.1 11.3 61.1 Turkmen 43.2 4.7 27.0 10.6 29.8 28.8 Tajik 47.7 7.7 52.3 31.0 - - Kyrgyz 98.6 10.8 1.4 0.5 - - 68.1 1.4 2.0 0.1 29.9 5.4 Kazakhs 95.9 19.3 2.1 1.5 2.0 3.5

Similarly, the involvement of the RSFSR in Khorezm was limited to certain economic privileges, including the right to exploit natural resources, the exemption of tariffs on imports and exports, and the use of Russian currency.67

As the Bolsheviks developed their nationalities program vis-à-vis Central Asia, however, it soon became apparent that Central Asian Communist leaders may have

65 Text of the treaty quoted in Iroshnikov, M, Kovalenko, D, and Shishkin, V, Genesis of the Soviet Federative State (1917-1925), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p182. 66 Table from Vaidyanath, 1967, p161, reproduced from Alkin, I, “Natsional’no-gosudarstvennoe razmezhevanue Srednei Azii i VII s’ezd sovetov SSR”, Revoliutsionnyi vostok (Moscow) 6 (1934) p115. 67 Pipes, R. “The Establishment of the USSR”, in R. Denber, The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, p47.

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been working contrary to the desires of Moscow-based Bolshevik figures. For example, it soon became apparent that there was considerable local resistance to official plans for the reorganisation of Central Asian borders by groups who sought to unify the peoples of Turkestan within the one republic. During the Fifth Regional Communist Party Congress in Tashkent in 1920, members of the Communist Party of Turkestan managed to have a motion advocating a unified and autonomous Turkic Socialist Republic adopted by the congress.

“In the interests of the international unity of workers and oppressed peoples, be it resolved that we shall oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of Turkic nationals to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and others, and to establish small separate republics. Instead, with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples who so far have not been included within the RSFSR, it is proposed to unify them within a Turkic Soviet Republic, and wherever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity.”68

Ironically, the drive to separate the different groups within individual republics received greater impetus from Moscow than from local interests. Additionally, Russian authorities did not look kindly upon attempts by Central Asian communist party members to influence the structure of the republics within the region. In late 1921, the supposedly independent Republic of Khorezm was purged of three of its highest- ranking party members when they attempted to ensure the continuity of the heterogenous nature of the Khorezm republic.69

Much of the contemporary resistance to partition came from ethnic Uzbeks. Plans to partition the Ferghana Valley, an ethnically heterogenous region, met with strong resistance from delegates to the Twelfth Congress of Councils of Turkistan ASSR in 1924, who demanded the establishment of an autonomous Ferghana political unit that

68 Quoted in Soucek, S., 2000, p22. 69 Allworth, E., 1990, p194.

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incorporated all the different groups within the region.70 In the same year, the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Khwarzm Communist Party formally decided against the ethnic partitioning of the Khwarzm republic. Although Moscow initially ratified this decision, they eventually purged the Khwarzm Communist Party of its leadership (as had occurred in 1921) and instituted its original plans for subdivision.71

The main regional support for segregation came from northern Central Asia, where the local Kazakh population was increasingly demonstrating a tendency towards ‘ethnic’ or ‘national cohesion’. This tendency found a voice within the Alash Orda, a local Kazakh political movement that sought to realise nationalist political objectives. However, even in this situation, the type of administrative framework that was sought by the Kazakh Communist leadership of the time differed substantially from that envisaged by Moscow. In delimitating the borders of Kazakhstan in accordance with national political principles (as discussed later) Moscow viewed the Kazakhs as a relatively homogenous ethnic group. The Kazakh leadership, however, saw things differently, and called for an administrative framework that would recognise the divisions within the Kazakh population by creating a number of ‘clan’ soviets that recognised historical divisions within the Kazakh population. Somewhat contradictorily, they also claimed that Moscow’s plans would create a heterogeneous state within which clan-based identity would be strengthened and interclan conflict would undermine the viability of the state.72

Such attempts by local authorities to create ‘mono-ethnic’ administrative subunits, which would on face value appear to adhere to central policy, were dealt with as contrary to the wishes of the Central Communist party. For example, moves by the Bukharan Central Executive Committee to create a semi- incorporating the Turkmen population of Bukhara were openly criticised by authorities in Moscow as constituting ethnic discrimination.73

70 Ibid, p199. 71 Ibid, pp199-200. 72 Olcott, Martha Brill, The Kazakhs, Hoover Press, Stanford, 1987, p207.

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Such criticisms aside, the consistent policy of the Moscow-based Central Communist party was to counter any moves towards the integration of the disparate groups within Central Asia. And underlying this policy was what has been interpreted as a desire by Moscow to counter the influence of the Uzbeks within the region, and to reduce the likelihood that the Uzbeks, or an Uzbek-led coalition, would emerge as a threat to the dominance enjoyed by Moscow. At this time, the Uzbeks were the largest group within Central Asia, and they were geographically dispersed in a way that gave them influence in the affairs of the three existing Central Asian Republics (see table on page 128). Furthermore, Uzbeks tended to exert a pull of ethnic assimilation on other groups, and they were also well positioned to unite the different subgroups in Southern Central Asia because they dominated the educational and cultural systems of the major cities and metropolitan centres. Thus, segregation of the Uzbeks into six administrative units instead of the three that currently existed became the key component of Soviet policy.74

In 1924, with the final ratification of the new Constitution that created the USSR, the Bolshevik plans for the region were revealed. In June of 1924, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party issued the decree On National Delimitation of the Republics of Central Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm). This decree was based upon the recommendations of a National Delimitation Commission, and stated:

1. The proposals of the Central Committees and Sovnarkoms of Bukhara and Turkestan be accepted in the following manner: a) to carve out the Turkmen parts of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm and establish an independent Turkmen Republic; b) to carve out from Bukhara and Turkestan their Uzbek areas and establish an independent Uzbek Republic; c) to retain the Khorezm Republic in its present form after separation from the Turkmen areas; 2. to merge the Kyrgyz (ie Kazakh) area of Turkestan with the KASSR; 3. to create an Autonomous Kara-Kyrgyz (ie Kyrgyz) Oblast within the RSFR;

73 Allworth, E., 1990, p194. 74 Allworth, E., 1990, pp196-197.

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4. to carve out within the Uzbek Republic a separate Autonomous Oblast of the Tajiks; 5. to conclude a treaty between the USSR and the independent Turkmen and Uzbek Republics on their entrance into the Union in the forthcoming Congress of Soviets of the USSR.75

Consequently, all former administrative arrangements were dissolved and replaced by a complete rewriting of the borders of the region that reflected the principle of “one ethnic group, one territory”.76 In addition to the above-mentioned entities, the Autonomous Region of Karakalpakia was also created. Of these newly formed entities, Kyrgyzia, Kara-Kyrgyzia and Karakalpakia were all attached to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.77

This decree marked the beginning of a process of delimitation that was to continue until 1936. In 1929, Tajikistan separated from Uzbekistan and became a Soviet Republic. However, Samarkand, which was a Tajik city that had historical significance to the Tajiks as a centre of culture and religion, remained within the borders of Uzbekistan.78 About ten years after Tajikistan separated from Uzbekistan, a portion of the Leninabad Province of Tajikistan was returned to Uzbekistan.79 Also in 1929, Kyrgyzia was renamed Kazakhstan, and likewise Kara-Kyrgyzia was renamed Kyrgyzia. Seven years later the two Autonomous Republics were elevated to the status of Soviet Republics. In 1932, Karakalpakia received the status of within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and yet only four years later was merged with Uzbekistan.

75 Text of decree quoted in Vaidyanath, R., 1967, p172. 76 Roy, O., 2000, p61. 77 ibid, p61. 78 ibid, p61. 79 Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, International Crisis Group Asia Report No 33, 4 April 2002, Osh/, p 2.

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Political Subdivisions Circa 1936

Source: Allworth, E. (ed), Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, p258.

Underpinning this process was a special Commission on National Delimitation that received submissions from Uzbek and Turkmen National Commissions in respect to the border delimitation process. One of the first challenges confronting the newly formed Commission arose from the need to select one of two competing principles as a foundation for resolving the issue of borders. The first of these principles was the national-political principle, which took as its base the national composition of the people of a given area, and the need to ensure that any predominance of a given nationality within a defined territory be recognised by maintaining the unity of that territory. The second of these principles was the economic principle, which dictated that borders be fixed only after a study of economic links within a given territory had been completed, and with borders to recognise these links. Of these two principles, the national-political principle was selected because it was perceived to better reflect the Bolshevik policy of the national question.80

80 Vaidyanath, R., 1967, p170.

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The entire process of border delimitation was thus predicated upon a Commission whose first actions included commissioning ethnographic research by the academics working for the Central Territorial Commission. The end result of this ethnographic research was the imposition of “ethnic labels on peoples whose cultural and historical heritages were so diverse, complex, overlapping and intertwined as to defy simple characterisation by any truly objective standard. In many instances the ethnographers were reliant upon responses to additional questions about native language, conversational language, religion and kinship group in order to determine an individual’s ‘nationality’.81 Criticism was contemporaneously levelled at the process by members of the Academy of Sciences who were actually involved with its implementation. Vasilii Bartold, for example, described the overall Soviet efforts to make nations in Turkestan as an “inventive process” that involved “an adaptation of a 19th century West European historical tradition, alien to the region”, in the process distorting local histories in order to achieve the goal of the “ of the East”.82

This, in turn, was seen as an essential step in hastening the consolidation of Soviet power within the region.

“The unification of the dispersed peoples and the formation of national republics was only a means for bringing the toiling masses still closer to the organs of power…and for organising the people better for the struggle for communism.”83

81 Hirsch, Francine, “Towards an Empire of Nations: Border Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities” in The Russian Review, no59 (April 2000), pp201-226, p214. 82 V.V. Bartold, quoted in Hirsch, F., 2000, p214. See also Hirsh’s earlier work - “The Soviet Union as a Work-in Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 Censuses” in Slavic Review, vol 56, no2 (1997), pp251-278. During the three different surveys that were held during the first stage of Soviet rule, even the definition of what constituted a nationality was changed, with ethnographers hard pressed to decide whether nationality was a biological or cultural construct (p258). Evidence from the first survey suggested that the categories of natsional’nost (nationality) and narodnost (people not developed to the state of nation) were not applicable: “ethnographers discovered that peasants in often equated their ‘nationality’ with the town or province they came from; researchers in Central Asia noted that regional was often the most important component of local identity” (p259). This situation resulted in the census taker often having to “prevent people from replacing narodnost’ with native language, religion, grazhdanstvo (citizenship in the pre-revolutionary sense) or residence in a particular locality” (p262). 83 A. Gordenko, quoted in Conquest, R., Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practise, The Bodley Head, London, 1967, p46.

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This process has been categorised as one of ‘double assimilation’, with the “assimilation of diverse peoples into nationality categories, and the assimilation of nationality- categorised groups into the Soviet state and society”.84

Although the process of national delimitation was intended to facilitate the evolution of ‘national’ groups in line with Marxist principles, and thus create equality among all groups, the implementation of the Soviet nationalities policy through the delimitation scheme ultimately produced the opposite effect. By creating dominant and minority nationalities within each republic and oblast, the Soviets actually exacerbated the inequalities between different groups, by creating dominant nationalities and minority nationalities within each administrative unit.85 And with reference to the 1939 borders in Central Asia that proved to be close to definitive, the populations of each of the republics contained very significant percentages of non-titular nationalities. Using the 1939 borders as a reference point, the overall percentage of population of the titular nationalities in the territory that was (in 1939) to constitute their republics decreased during the period between 1926 and 1939.

Population of Central Asia Republics within Boundaries of September 17, 193986 1926 1939 Republic Total Titular Total Titular Population nationality Population Nationality Kazakh SSR 6,074,000 3,713,000 6,094,000 2,640,000 Kyrgyz SSR 1,002,000 661,000 1,458,000 760,000 Tajik SSR 1,032,000 619,000 1,458,000 760,000 Turkmen SSR 998,000 720,000 1,252,000 740,000 Uzbek SSR 4,565,000 3,2999,000 6,336,000 4,080,000

84 Hirsh, F., 2000, p213. Hirsh, 1997, also identified attempts by ethnographers in 1939 to participate in the creation of nationalities policy by suggesting “how border might be adjusted or peoples consolidated to manipulate or eliminate interethnic conflict” - p274. It would be a tragic irony if the ethnographer’s efforts had merely postponed, and in the process exacerbated, the risk of ethnic conflict by 60 years. 85 Hirsch, F., 2000, p214. 86 Figures from Allworth, E., 1989, p96.

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To be fair, the different groups within Central Asia are geographically dispersed and intermingled in such a way that border delimitation in this region could never have been an entirely rational process.87 However, certain elements of the border delimitation process appear to have been calculated to make this already convoluted situation even more complicated. Moscow appears to have deliberately and provocatively included enclaves of non-titular groups within the borders of a number of the republics. For example, two cities that were predominantly Uzbek in population, Chimkent and Osh, were incorporated within the republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan respectively. This was even though the towns were located close to the borders of Uzbekistan, and could have just as easily been incorporated within this republic. Similarly, the major city of Samarkand, the population of which was majority Tajik-speaking and historically has been a Tajik-dominated city, was incorporated within Uzbekistan. This was despite the fact that it was less than 70 kilometres from the Tajik border, and the area of Tajikistan just south of the border with Uzbekistan was, ironically, largely Uzbek in composition.88

The eventual inclusion of the Karakalpak region within the Uzbek republic also poses certain questions pertaining to the ultimate intentions of Moscow. Although the Karakalpaks had historically demonstrated very little sense of unity or national identity, they were most closely aligned to the Kazakhs of all the titular nationalities because they spoke a dialect of Kazakh.89 The logic underpinning the national delimitation process would consequently suggest that it would have been appropriate to include them within the Kazakh republic, thus facilitating their development towards a defined (Kazakh) national identity. However, as already discussed, the Karakalpaks were first granted an autonomous republic of their own, and later incorporated within Uzbekistan. This strategy has been interpreted in a number of ways, including that formal separation of the Karakalpaks from Kazakhstan weakened the influence that the Kazakh republic had within the region, or that incorporation of the Karakalpak region into Uzbekistan

87 Roy, O., 2000, p68. 88 Ibid, pp68-69. 89 Ibid, p71.

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would ease Uzbek dissatisfaction with the elevation of Tajikistan from a province within their republic to a soviet republic in its own right.90

There are examples, though, that those in charge of the delimitation process did on occasion attempt to come to the best possible accommodation of the different groups. However, they were often forced by the ethnographic realities of Central Asia to defer to the need to reduce the risk of local conflict and instability, and thus ignore the ethnographic and economic principles that formed the basis of the delimitation process. The case involving the region of Iskandersk has been identified as an example of the efforts that the border commission went to reach suitable compromises, and the constraints within which they were forced to work.

Iskandersk was included within Kyrgyzstan as a result of the border delimitation process, yet Uzbeks represented the largest ethnic group in the area - 47.3%, as opposed to the 19.8% Tajiks and 31.6% for Kyrgyz and Kazakhs combined.91 Uzbeks from this region subsequently petitioned the regionalisation commission, claiming that they were being subjected to discrimination and harassment by Kyrgyz. The subsequent investigation of the matter by the commission determined that from both ethnographic and economic perspectives, it was logical for the province to be incorporated within Uzbekistan. However, the commission ruled against doing so because it considered that such a move would be contrary to fundamental rules of administrative order – the Iskandersk province, although within Kyrgyzstan, was cut off from Uzbekistan by the Kosh-Kurgansk province of Kazakhstan. Thus, any moves to incorporate Iskandersk into Uzbekistan would also necessitate the inclusion of Kosh-Kurgansk within Uzbekistan, and thus antagonise Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan. The commission offered a solution to this dilemma by making Iskandersk a separate Uzbek national region within Kyrgyzstan, with official business and education to be conducted in Uzbek.92

90 ibid, p71 91 Hirsch, F., 2000, p217. 92 Ibid, pp217-218. Hirsch considered that the example of Iskandersk effectively demonstrated that traditional beliefs that the Soviet nationalities policy was based upon principles of divide and rule were not entirely correct: that administrators would make decisions pertaining to contested regions by collecting detailed information about the matter, and would aim to prevent local conflicts and instability. Interestingly, Hirsch also discussed how in many instances of supposed conflict between local groups in

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Even good intentions on the part of the Soviet commission responsible for the border delimitation process, however, did not prevent the process creating problems for the republics that would increase in significance when they emerged as independent republics upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. One of the more controversial issues currently plaguing the newly independent republics within Central Asia relates to a series of enclaves, similar to that one described above, where Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all host pockets of territory which, although geographically part of their territory, politically are part of one of the other republics. Kyrgyzstan, for example hosts seven enclaves, two of which belong to Tajikistan and the rest belong to Uzbekistan. And ironically, the Ferghana Valley, which, as mentioned earlier, was targeted by local interests in 1924 as an area that should be formally administered as a distinct, heterogeneous province, contains the most pronounced and volatile examples of the enclave issue.93 The impact of the enclave issue on relations between the newly independent republics will be discussed further in a later chapter, and will be examined within a framework of rising ethnonationalism within the republics that contain them.

The categorisation of peoples and groups into distinct groups that could be managed by central Bolshevik authorities was just one of the challenges that faced those seeking to bring Soviet order to Central Asia. Lenin had long perceived the difficulty that would be encountered in encouraging a Bolshevik system of government in what is ultimately an agrarian society that lacked the proletariat fundamental to the Bolshevik struggle. During the Second Congress of the Communist International, he recognised that the Russian proletariat had led the way in Turkestan where the “proletariat is practically non-existent”.94 Not only was the ‘proletariat’ virtually non-existent within Central Asia, and comprised predominantly of the Russian communities that had settled in the region during the Tsarist period, but there was a lack of popular support for, and membership of, the Communist Party at this time. And of the formal support that did exist for the Bolsheviks within the region, nearly 50% of it came from the Russian population. the newly emerged states, grievances were expressed using the language and terminology of the administration, and echoing official “rhetoric about state-sponsored evolutionism”. This observation by Hirsch will be discussed in a later chapter, and will contribute to this thesis’s focus on the role played by the soviet regime in fostering and encouraging nationalistic sentiment within the Central Asian region. 93 Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, International Crisis Report No 33, pp4-5.

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National Composition of the Communist Party of Turkestan in 1922 Nationality Number Percentage Russian 9,424 49.7 Kazakh and Kyrgyz 4,409 23.3 Uzbek 2,021 10.7 Turkmen 867 4.6 Tajik 421 2.2 Tatar, Karakalpak, etc 1,803 9.5 Total 18,945 Source: D’Encausse, H. The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State 1917-1930, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1992, p143.

The relative lack of a ‘proletariat’ within Central Asia proved to be a definitive issue for Russian policy in the region.

“The aim of Soviet policy has always been to teach the people of the Kyrgyz steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower, and the Turkmenian gardener to accept the ideals of the Leningrad worker.”95

When taken within the context of broader Soviet nationalities policy, this situation produced some peculiar difficulties for central authorities. On one hand, the central government took measured and deliberate steps to enhance the identity of the titular nationalities within the region. And on the other hand, members of the ethnic Russian communities scattered throughout Central Asia were placed in positions of superiority above the other groups, including the titular nationality. In many instances this was inevitable because, as mentioned earlier, Communist Party membership within the Central Asian republics was disproportionately Russian. Yet claims of discrimination in favour of ethnic Russians, something that came to be known as ‘’, became more frequent the more the central government consolidated Communist Party control of the region. This proved to be particularly galling for native

94 Quoted in Iroshnikov, M., et al, 1982, p183. 95 M. Kalinin, quoted in R. Conquest, The Soviet of Nationalities, 1960, p118.

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groups, who early on perceived inequities within the Soviet system being forced upon them.

“Our Uzbekisation proceeds in such a way that Uzbeks sit at the head of the institutions, and Uzbeks are the coachmen: some are some are driving, but the work is directed by the Russians. Is this really Uzbekisation? Is this not colonisation by the Russians?”96

Similar claims of discrimination in favour of ethnic Russians, as well as ill-treatment of the local population by expatriate Russians were made in other republics.

“In the northern districts of Kazakhstan…Kazakh workers meet with an extremely unfriendly reception on the ‘grounds’ that one has to do their work for them. In Tashkent, too, in the Ilyich factory, the wage rates for Uzbek workers are lower than for Russian workers for identical skill. We shall not cite examples of the forays in which people of the Black Hundred type beat up and bait indigenous workers.”97

Ironically, responses by Moscow and central authorities to claims of discrimination against local populations by Russians were largely treated with derision, with Russians made immune to claims of chauvinism.

“In the conditions of the National republics, chauvinism can only be displayed on the part of the indigenous nationality.”98

These events, combined with the inflated expectations of the local populations in respect to the opportunities that would be provided to them in respect to political participation, employment and social mobility, created tensions between groups that have yet to be resolved.

96 Text of a note handed to the First Party Secretary of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan in 1930, quoted in Conquest, R., 1967, p52. 97 From the Journal of the Council of Nationalities, 1930, quoted in Conquest, R., 1967, p54-55. 98 Extract from a ruling made by the Assistant Public Prosecutor in Turkmenistan in relation to a case involving ill-treatment of Turkmen workers by a Russian foreman, quoted in Conquest, R., 1967, p54.

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Certain authors have identified a number of tangible benefits arising from the Soviet policy in Central Asia, some of which are difficult to refute. Vaidyanath, for example, saw the National Delimitation program as producing significant political, socio-cultural and economic benefits for the peoples of Central Asia. Firstly, he identified the fact that the Soviet delimitation program enabled greater unification of the disparate segments of the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kara-Kalpak and Kazakh populations within a framework of nationally homogeneous republics. Secondly, he saw Soviet reform of agriculture and land usage, and the development of industry in the Central Asian republics, as producing significant economic gains for the republics. And thirdly, he identified the role that the Soviets played in combating illiteracy, and establishing effective and durable educational systems for all inhabitants of the region.99

There are elements of truth to all these claims, the last of which is particularly difficult to refute. However, Soviet policy in respect to agriculture created enormous hardship for the local populations in the intermediate term, and any long-term gains are of questionable worth in light of the price that was paid by the republics. In terms of agriculture, the main impact that the Soviet Union appear to have had in respect to Central Asian reform was to make the region completely reliant upon cotton production (of which, Central Asia was responsible for around 92% of the entire cotton production of the Soviet Union), and thus unbalance the agricultural economy of the region and making the republics dependent upon imports for subsistence.100 However, the purpose of this paper is not to examine the ramifications of overall Soviet policy in Central Asia, but to examine the implications that Soviet nationalities policy had for the Central Asian republics that have emerged from the debris of the Soviet Union.

The initial intention of the Bolshevik Leninist government was to establish administrative boundaries that reflected the perceived ethnic distribution of the region.101 Each of the five major ethnic groups were made the titular nationality of a state that contained within its borders a number of disparate tribal, clan and linguistic groups. However, the very borders of these ‘autonomous republics’ were far from

99 Vaidyanath, R., 1967, pp228-231. 100 Allworth, E., 1989, p308.

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constant, and the actual territory that the individual states had varied to correspond with the policy of the Soviet regime at the time. Some authors have categorised efforts by the Bolsheviks between 1917 and 1939 as a ‘work-in progress’ comprising of three distinct but overlapping phases of state formation.102 However, tampering by the central Soviet government continued well past the symbolic year 1939. Between 1917 and 1991, the borders of the Soviet Union republics, that have now become independent countries, were changed more than 100 times, sometimes to resolve economic crises but often to create tensions that undermined opposition to the Soviet regime.103

The delimitation process that produced these states has been considered to very closely resemble the processes adopted by the European colonial powers in Central Africa.104 With the Central African states emerging from their ‘colonial’ period much earlier than the Central Asian states, the events in these states following decolonisation may indicate the implications that the Soviet policy has for the future stability of the region. And even though the Central Asian republics achieved independence nearly a decade ago, a number of them still lack border demarcation agreements with their neighbours and are occasionally involved in serious territorial disputes regarding borders.105

As in the case of the European powers in Central Africa, the Soviet role in state formation in Central Asia effectively ignored the reality of identity and allegiance amongst the peoples of Central Asia. Firstly, the Soviet policy failed to recognise that the actual ethnic and national identities within this region were weak, or even non- existent.106 Thus Soviet policy had the effect of fostering identities that had previously not been overt or even in existence. Secondly, although the Soviet policy that underpinned the drawing of boundaries was supposed to institutionalise the rights of

101 Conflict in Post Soviet Transitions – Central Asia and the Caucasus, An International Workshop, The Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 22/8/1997. 102 Hirsch, Francine, “The Soviet Union as a Work-in Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937 and 1939 Censuses”, in Slavic Review, vol 56, no 2, 1997, pp251-278, p254. Hirsch saw the phases as physical conquest (1917 – 1924), conceptual conquest (1924-1928) and consolidation (1927-1939). The final phase saw the “transformation of the new state into a federation of titular nationalities” - pp255-256. 103 Goble, Paul, Kazakhstan: Analysis from Washington – When Borders Aren’t Defined, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Washington, 8 Sep 2000. 104 Glenn, J., 1999, p76. 105 Goble, P., Kazakhstan: Analysis from Washington – When Borders Aren’t Defined, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Washington, 8 Sep 2000.

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ethnic groups, in many instances the Soviet policy actually sought to officially eliminate differences within a given population by incorporating a number of disparate groups under the broad and imprecise category of the titular nationality.107 And one of the key goals of the Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia was, rather than ensure the rights of the various groups within the region, to eliminate allegiances that would undermine loyalty to the wider Soviet regime. For example, the Soviet attempt to build separate national identities within the peoples of Central Asia was intended to not only prevent the emergence of broad pan-Turkic identity, but to destroy traditional institutions such as Islam.108

However, in defining the territoriality of the Central Asian Soviet Republics, the Soviet authorities also created an additional control mechanism by retaining a significant number of minorities in addition to the titular nationalities within each state. This would ensure the Soviet authorities support against any individual state exhibiting overtly nationalistic tendencies and would also introduce a degree of instability into the region that would ensure that no threat to the authority of the central Soviet regime would emerge.109

Consequently, in Central Asia state-building and the development of sovereign, territorial rule has largely been the product of external dynamics. This was contrary to the accepted practice of state-building being “primarily a domestic process occurring over a long period of time that can only be brought about by the combined wills, efforts, and responsibilities of governments and populations”.110 Furthermore, while states are supposed to adhere to territorial rule and possess a centralised and effective administration, in Central Asia the impact of the Soviet imposition of a strong state structure was weakened by the continuation of rival forms of rule such as clan membership, Islam and ethnic and regional affinities,111 features which were contrary to the vision of distinct nationalities promoted by the central Soviet government. However

106 Conflict in Post Soviet Transitions – Central Asia and the Caucasus. 107 Glenn, J., p77. 108 Melvin, Neil, “Conflict and the State in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, in Perspectives on Central Asia, CPSS, vol II, no 15, June 1998. 109 Glenn, J., p49. 110 Jackson, R., 1990, p21. 111 Menon R., and Spruyt, H., 1998, p109.

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this was just one element of the legacy of the Soviet Union in Central Asia. Equally important is the colonial dimension to Soviet rule, and the haste with which the linkages between the republics and the Soviet Union were dismantled. Decolonisation has proven problematic in a number of different countries and regions, and it would be perhaps overly optimistic to conclude that the Central Asian republics have escaped the ravages of civil war that following decolonisation in parts of Africa.

Robert Jackson, in his discussion on the decolonisation processes within the British Commonwealth and within Portuguese, Belgian and French territories in Africa, discussed the problems that arose from accelerated or precipitated decolonisation. With specific reference to decolonisation within the British Empire, Jackson considered that the decolonisation process was “divorced from the capacity for both self-government and political development…the traditional requirement that independence follow development started to erode…”.112 The implication was that, the faster the decolonisation process, the less prepared the was for rule, and the more likely they were to encounter problems in managing their newly found statehood.

“…the colonial peoples least equipped to operate a modern sovereign state were likely to have the shortest apprenticeship in modern statecraft: this is because they are reaching it, not as with the older dependencies because of internal growth, but mainly as a result of external influence and pressures which accelerate the movement to self-government.”113

The parallels between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decolonisation process in Africa are significant, given the Soviet republics also emerged as sovereign states following a ‘decolonisation’ process that lasted less than one year. Furthermore, the states that emerged in Central Asia have inherited the flawed administrative and political structures of the Soviet Union as the means by which they would exercise their newfound governance. As a consequence, it is arguable that, upon independence, the republics of Central Asia could be categorised as ‘quasi-states’ because they possessed

112 Jackson, R., 1990, p95. 113 ibid, p98. Jackson referred to the article ‘The Colonial Dilemma’, by Margery Perham in a 1949 edition of The Listener.

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juridical statehood yet lacked much of the effectiveness traditionally required in the exercise of sovereignty.114 Furthermore, some aspects of the Soviet legacy inherited by the Central Asian republics were not necessarily conducive to the creation of an effective state that can exercise its sovereignty in a meaningful manner.

As discussed above, the intentions of the Bolsheviks overseeing the creation of the Soviet republics was not to provide the republics with the means to operate as sovereign states. Rather, their intention was to create regional administrative structures that would, firstly, incorporate mechanisms that would limit the possibility that the republics, or the peoples within the republics, would challenge the authority of the central administration; and secondly, to encourage the development of discrete nationalities that could be assisted towards the key socialist goal of the creation of a universal socialist consciousness. It is therefore unfortunate that the republics that emerged from the debris of the Soviet Union were largely reliant upon the residual state infrastructure of the Soviet Union, little of which was of benefit to the states seeking to exercise their newly gained sovereignty. The abilities of the states in the region to develop as ‘effective states’ that demonstrate empirical sovereignty as well as possess juridical sovereignty will, to a degree, be predicated upon their abilities to reconcile the Soviet legacy with the need to develop internal legitimacy. One of the key issues that the states will have to contend with is the heterogenous nature of the populations within their borders. Similarly significant will be the abilities of the states to recognise the implications of the irredentist populations that they share with all of their neighbours, and the social and economic interdependence that such irredentism creates. The way that the governments seek to define a sense of ‘nation-hood’, and in the process accommodate the needs of all elements of their population, will be critical to not only the abilities of the states to meaningfully exercise their sovereignty, but also the ongoing security and stability of the entire region.

114 Jackson, R., 1990, p25. Jackson discussed the concept of quasi-states as emerging out of the doctrine of negative sovereignty that underpinned the independence of much of the Third World. This doctrine insisted that just because a colony lacked the means by which it could exercise effective statehood they should be deprived of independence: “the new doctrine justified the independence of every colony which desired it and thereby established a radically different basis of sovereign statehood…”(p 25). In considering the “quasi-state” dimension of Central Asian sovereignty, it is somewhat ironic that states of Central Asia did not even desire independence from the Soviet Union, and were some of the staunchest supporters of a continued union.

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Chapter Seven

The Emergence of Ethnonationalism in Central Asia? Structures of Identity in a Post-Soviet World

An inevitable consequence of the border demarcation processes that occurred during the Soviet era discussed previously was that the composition of the various states in Central Asia as they emerged from the debris of the Soviet Union is far from homogenous, and practically all these states not only posses a substantial representation of the other titular nationalities, but they also contain significant numbers of Russian, Slavic and Caucasian peoples. Although identities and group allegiances within this ‘ethnic’ melting pot may not be able to be categorised in terms of conventional definitions of ethnicity and nationalism, what is certain is that the ongoing stability of the region is contingent upon the continuation of a fragile status quo within a region that has been described as a “vast shatter zone of peoples and cultures”.1

In 1989, just a couple of years prior to their elevation to the status of sovereign states, the five key republics were significantly fragmented in terms of their ethnic makeup.

Ethnic Composition - 19892 Russians Kazaks Kyrgyz Tajiks Turkmen Uzbeks Kazakhstan 38% 39% (negl) (negl) (negl) 2% Kyrgyzstan 22 (negl) 52 (negl) - 13 Tajikistan 7 (negl) 1 62 (negl) 24 Turkmenistan 9 2 - (negl) 71 9 Uzbekistan 8 4 (negl) 5 (negl) 71

From a pessimistic standpoint, the figures in the above table indicate the widespread disruption that would result from clashes between ethnic groups, especially if the possibility of neighbouring republics stepping in to assist members of their ethnic group

1 John Anderson, quoted in Kaplan, R. The Ends of the Earth, Random House, New York, 1996, p247. 2 Central Asia Monitor, vol 1, no3, 1999, p3.

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within other republics is considered. Similarly, militant regimes in individual republics could feasibly use the dispersal of members of their ethnic group throughout other republics as an excuse for action against neighbouring republics to unite members of that ethnic group. At the time, a number of commentators considered that the newly independent states in the region would find the management of such ethnic diversity problematic at best, and that the challenges that were inherent in this situation would continue to test the capabilities of the ruling political elites.

“The titular nationalists in Central Asia now find themselves in the position the Russians occupied prior to 1991: each is a dominant ethnic group, confronting a variety of demands from the minority populations of the region’s forty six oblasts, 35 have a minority group that exceeds 10% of the oblast population. Of these, twenty two have a single minority at 30% or more.”3

Others predicted that the states would adopt nation-building policies that would create a “long and gradual process towards ethnic homogenisation of each state”.4 However, these statistics were to change dramatically over the first ten years of the independence of the Central Asian republics. Significant emigration by Russians and non-titular nationalities from all of the Central Asian republics saw the statistical balance swing in favour of the titular nationalities in each of the republics.

3 Kangas, R., “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia”, in V. Tismaneanu (ed) Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1995, pp271-292, p280. 4 Fuller, G., “Central Asia: The Quest for Identity”, Current History, vol 93, no 582, pp145-149, p146. Fuller was correct in perceiving that the significant degree of ethnic mixture and ethnic overlap of political borders would complicate any attempts at state building in Central Asia, but considered that ethnic homogenisation, whilst not necessarily good, would at least be peaceful. However, this claim is contentious, given the evidence that such attempts at nation building often created conflict between ethnic groups.

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Geographical Dispersion of Major Ethnic Groups in 1993

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps

171 The Emergence of Ethnonationalism in Central Asia? Chapter Seven

Ethnic Composition - 19995 Russians Kazaks Kyrgyz Tajiks Turkmen Uzbeks Kazakhstan 30% 53.4% (negl) (negl) (negl) 2.5% Kyrgyzstan 12.5 (negl) 64.9 (negl) - 13.8 Tajikistan 1 (negl) 1.3 69.9 (negl) 24 Turkmenistan 5.2 2.1 - (negl) 78.5 9.8 Uzbekistan 4.6 4.2 (negl) 5.5 (negl) 76.5

However, the situation in the Central Asian republics is less well defined than the breakdown above indicates. As discussed earlier, historically identity and allegiance in Central Asia did not necessarily follow the pattern that is prevalent in western Europe. More characteristic was a ‘composite’ identity6 that sees individuals identifying with tribe, city, region and not merely in broad ethnonational terms. The implications that this tendency of the ascription of multiple and complex identities has for the development of cleavages within the populations of the various republics are considerable. The civil war in Tajikistan that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union was indicative of the difficulties that people who seek to anticipate or understand conflict by utilising Western centric models will encounter. Although the above figures suggest that Tajikistan was likely to develop cleavages along the lines of the two largest nationalities in the republic, the war that unfolded was driven more by regionalism and localism than by any resurgent Tajik nationalism.7 Membership in particular regional clans that in turn competed for influence in established political parties was more of a driving force in the conflict than any notions of Tajik, Uzbek or Russian nationality. The fact that this conflict has been categorised as “a war of provinces competing for political supremacy”8 is an indication of the opaque nature of political processes and socio-political allegiances within the country.

5 Szayna, T. “Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region”, in T. Szayna and O. Olika, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003, pp145-185, pp153-158. 6 Kaplan, R., 1996, p247. 7 Rubin, B. “Russian hegemony and state breakdown in the periphery: causes and consequences of the civil war in Tajikistan”, in B. Rubin and J. Snyder (eds), Post- Soviet Political Order, Routledge, 1998. pp128-162, p135. 8 Conflict in Post Soviet Transitions – Central Asia and the Caucasus

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There is, however, a growing trend within the republics for people to view themselves in terms of their membership to the titular nationality. Also becoming especially obvious is a growing antagonism on the part of members of a titular nationality (when resident in the named republic) towards members of other groups, especially members of the large Russian-speaking Slavic communities that for so long constituted the professional classes. Kazakhstan provides the most useful case study in respect to evaluating the evolution of ethnonationalism in the region, as it has what may the most easily recognisable program of nation building in the region. Kyrgyzstan, also, provides an interesting example because it has already witnessed acute conflicts between different ethnic groups, most notable the clashes in Osh during the Soviet era. Consequently, it can be expected that any nation-building policy encouraged by the Kyrgyz government could prove even more inflammatory than those programs instituted in neighbouring countries. Unfortunately, anything more than a cursory evaluation of the nation-building processes in all of the Central Asian states is beyond the scope of this study. There is, however, evidence of the existence of some nation- building processes, or at the very least institutionalised discrimination by the titular group against members of non-titular groups in at least two of the three other republics. Uzbekistan, in line with its reputation as the most autocratic and belligerent republic in the region, has probably the most tarnished record in this regard, closely followed (if not actually paralleled) by Turkmenistan.

The development of nation-building or homogenising policies adopted by the different countries will have ramifications that go well beyond being a matter of domestic concern. Banuazizi and Weiner, writing several years after the republics gained independence, argued that the way each republic defined its own identity – separately from or in common with their neighbours – would likely have significant ramifications for the geopolitical framework of the entire region.9

9 Banuazizi, A., and Weiner, M., The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands, I.B. Taurus, London, 1994, p11. The authors considered that emphasis on separate ethnolinguistic identities by Azeris, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz could lead to “both consolidation and conflict within states and between them”. However, the authors were equally sceptical of any moves towards the creation of a “pan-Turkic identity within the framework of a new union or confederation on the basis of a common language”, which they considered would isolate and threaten the region’s Tajik populations, and also pose a threat to China (p11), which contains an substantial Uighur population who theoretically could be attracted to such a confederation. These points are of particular interest, given not only the

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Tajikistan

Interestingly, Tajikistan, the one country that has already been traumatised by a lengthy civil war, has witnessed very little Tajik nation-building, something that is perhaps a result of the fragmented political system of this country. In some respects Tajikistan experienced an acute coalescence of all of the factors that can impede a state transiting to independence. Conflict between clans, regions, and even ethnic groups, specifically Tajiks and Uzbeks, did occur during the lengthy civil war, but biases against one or more ethnic groups (in this instance Tajik or Uzbek) were never seized upon, even though the (nominal) government was dominated by Kulabis. Given the geographic dispersion of Uzbeks in Tajikistan, it is somewhat intriguing that the conflict in Tajikistan, which as discussed earlier has been categorised as conflict between competing regions for supremacy, did not develop into an overt conflict between ethnic groups. Geographic Dispersal of Ethnic Groups in Tajikistan in 1992

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/tajikistan_ethnic_92.jpg

interdependence enjoyed by the region prior to Russian conquest, but also later discussions on the value of regional integration as a solution to the problems of the region.

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Akbarzadeh most lucidly identified the reason why a sense of Tajik nationalism did not take root during or after this conflict:

“The absences of Tajik flags and billboards celebrating the independence of Tajikistan is in stark contrast to the fanfare surrounding independence in neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan…one must acknowledge that the success of a nationalist government in conditions where the central symbols of Tajik national pride, Bukhara and Samarkand, are located beyond Tajikistan’s national borders remains dubious. The establishment of such a government would also have grave repercussions in the relationship between the Tajik and Uzbek states. And this may be part of the reason for the Tajik leadership’s reluctance to play the nationalist card”.10

Other commentators have considered that the choices confronting any statesmen seeking to promote a sense of Tajik national identity impede the prospects of success for such processes. Tajikistan has been categorised as a “community of necessity” that has been forced to wrestle with three choices for the symbols uniting the theoretical Tajik nation: religious identity (Islamic vs secular); ethnic community identity (Tajik – Russian – Uzbek); or regional identity (Persian – Central Asian)11. As valid as such comments are, as propositions governing any possible solutions to the Tajik ‘problem’ they largely miss the major lesson of the Tajik conflict: that if such divisions had been promoted by political elites, then the conflict may have in fact been more destructive and durable.

10 Akbarzadeh, Shahram, “Why did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 48, no7, 1996, 1105-1129, p1126. Akbarzadeh also considered that the Kulabi dominated government had no real comprehension of the need to advance a sense of national cohesion, and that Tajik experience was different because of its incompetent leadership. 11 Beeman, Willian, “The Struggle for Identity in Post-Soviet Tajikistan”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol 3, no.4, December 1999, located at http://meria/idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue4/jv3n4a7.html. The author considered that Tajikistan had taken a step beyond Benedict Anderson’s ‘’. He also, somewhat naively, suggested the promotion of an anniversary of the Samanid Empire of the 9-10th centuries as a symbol of Tajik nationhood. The promotion of such symbols fails to recognise how the other substantial elements of the population – Uzbek and Russian – are ostensibly excluded from the celebration of nationhood.

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Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, on the other hand has almost an oversupply of national symbols, and a more than chequered path in respect to the discrimination of minorities since independence. The most obvious processes of nation-building in Uzbekistan, have been targeted at removing any vestiges of the Soviet era, most critically the . The Karimov government introduced as early as 1995 a new language law that promoted Uzbek as compulsory in the state administration, justice system and the mass media, in the process reducing the status of Russian to that of other national minority languages: however, they have since gone further by introducing English and German as the languages of instruction, in place of Russian.12

Whilst a strategy of distancing itself from its Soviet past is an almost understandable objective for an ex-Soviet state seeking to gain legitimacy as an independent entity and thus engage the international community, the Uzbekistan government has not stopped at targeting Russia and Russians in its quest to forge a new Uzbek nation-state. Indeed, it is possible that even less consideration has been shown to those members of the Kazakh and Tajik minorities of Uzbekistan. The exodus of Uzbekistan’s Kazakhs since independence has almost matched that of Russians departing Uzbek territory, and the reasons for their departure has been as much attributed to discrimination implicit in the Uzbek bureaucratic system as it has by a desire to seek greater economic opportunity in neighbouring Kazakhstan. An inevitable consequence of the policy was that ethnic Uzbeks were favoured in terms of gaining employment and promotional opportunities within the Uzbek government. Furthermore, Kazakhs seeking to provide an education for their children in Kazakh had to seek books and reading materials from Kazakhstan, as the Uzbek government printed practically no school texts in the Kazakh language.13

Ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan have been even less fortunate. Uzbekistan significantly stepped up its harassment of Tajiks following incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990’s. Since that time,

12 Kuzio, Taras, “Soviet-era Uzbek elites erase Russia from National Identity”, EurasiaNet Commentary, located at www.eurasinet.org.

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Uzbekistan has entered into an almost official campaign to isolate its Tajik population. In early 2001, Uzbek officials embarked upon a campaign to destroy “ideologically incorrect” books. One school alone in Samarkand was forced to hand over more than 2,300 textbooks and 1,800 novels for destruction, 90% of which happened to be in Tajik.14

Turkmenistan

The treatment of non-titular minorities in Turkmenistan appears to be determined by the ever expanding cult surrounding (and promoted by) the self styled Turkmenbashi (Father of the Turkmen), Turkmen President Saparmurad Niazov. However, Niazov has been nothing if not comprehensive in his attempts to develop the concept of the Turkmen nation. It was clear almost from the point of independence that Niazov would approach the issue of nation-building with a zeal bordering on fanaticism. Several months after independence, Niazov conducted a symbolic pilgrimage to Gok Tepe, where the Teke Turkmen had soundly defeated a Russian army in 1879. At the time, Niazov indicated that he intended to build a museum to commemorate what he saw as a glorious event in the history of the Turkmen people.15

Much of Niazov’s early efforts were directed at cleansing Turkmenistan of all signs of Russian influence. Turkmen was made the official language of the republic in 1990, and in 1992 attempts to have Russian provided with status as a language under the new constitution were rejected. The itself was dropped in favour of the script in 1993. The use of Russian was actively discouraged, with Russian language broadcasts on the state radio station ceasing in October 1999, and Niazov declaring in 2000 that all officials must speak Turkmen: a declaration that was accompanied by the sacking of Turkmen Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov, who Niazov criticised for his poor knowledge of Turkmen. The constitution of 1992 directed that all Russian terminology for government and administration be changed to their Turkmen

13 Shavkat, Alimov, “Kazakh Exodus”, Reporting Central Asia, no 43, 8 March 2001. 14 Ergashev, Bakhtior, “Tashkent Targets Tajik Minority”, Reporting Central Asia, no 49, 27 April 2001. The article quoted a representative of the Independent Organisation for Human Rights in Uzbekistan: "Only Tajiks live in my village, but there is not a single book in Tajik left in my local library". 15 Akbarzadeh, S., “National Identity and Political Legitimacy in Turkmenistan”, Nationalities Papers, vol 27, no 2, 1999, pp271-290, p273.

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equivalent.16 The development of Turkmen as the main language of state has been perceived as the main pillar of Turkmen nation-building.17 Exacerbating the impact of these changes was the failure of the government to assist the significant number of non- Turkmen speakers in the republic learn Turkmen.18 Niazov also actively encouraged the dissemination of the ‘history’ of the Turkmen, and the promotion of the present territory of Turkmenistan as the vatan (Motherland) of all Turkmen, including those members of the Turkmen communities in neighbouring communities. The creation of a historical narrative for the Turkmen people that stretched back millennia, a process that was reflective of perennialist approaches to nationalism, also sought to establish a link between the modern Turkmen and either the Seljuk Turks or the even more ancient Parthians.19 Indeed, the writing, or in some respects the rewriting, of history has emerged as one of the “pillars of Turkmen…emphasising unique Turkmen national history rather than shared Turkic history and maintaining national solidarity by uniting the history of tribes and regions”.20 The use of written history to forge and promote the idea of a distinct and coherent Turkmen identity is also accompanied by symbolic gestures such as the naming of several months of the year after key figures from Seljuk and Turkmen history,21 and the adoption of a national flag that represented the main Turkmen tribes by incorporating the five carpet designs that belonged to them.22

Whilst much of Turkmen policy impacting on the domestic social environment is derived from this cult and thus is focused on promoting the personality cult of

16 Akbarzadeh, 1999, p275. For example, the traditional soviet regional of oblast was renamed veloyat; the regional subdivision was renamed etrap, and all administrative organs were stripped of their Russian designation and reassigned the vernacular title of hokimiyat. 17 Kuru, Ahmet, “Between the State and Cultural Zones: Nation Building in Turkmenistan”, Central Asian Survey, 2002, vol 21, no 1, pp71-90, p74. 18 Saat, J. Turkmenistan: People! Motherland! Leader?, Central Asian Series, 05/16, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Camberly, p3. Document located at http://www.da.mod.uk.csrc. 19 Akbarzadeh, 1999, pp279-282. Some Turkmen academics are endeavouring to establish a link between the Turkmen and the Parthians of the Roman era, whose capital of Nisa was located near modern day Ashgabat. However, this approach was not supported by Niazov, because the Parthians were an Iranian people. The alternative was to propose the Seljuk dynasty as the “epitome of Oghuz/Turkmen state building” - p281. 20 Kuru, 2002, p76. 21 Saat, 2005, p19. June was renamed Oguz, after the progenitor of the Oghuz Turks; August was renamed Alp Arslan after the founder of the Seljuk Empire; and November was named after Sandzhar, the last rule of the Seljuk empire. Niazov didn’t stop with just naming months after figures from history: he also named January after himself and April after his mother. 22 Akbarzadeh, 1999, p282. The five main tribes are Akhal Teke, Yomut, Salar, Ersari and Kerki.

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Turkmenbashi, there is a more insidious, autocratic side to Niazov’s madness that significantly prejudices the non-Turkmen elements of the population. For example, laws passed under the guise of this program include the banning of all non-Turkmen cultural organisations, the imposition of a USD50,000 fee for the registration of a marriage to a foreigner,23 and the replacement of ethnic Uzbek Imam-hatybs (Mosque leaders) with ethnic Turkmen Imam-hatybs.24 The Turkmen government’s implementation of a nation building policy has proven to be comprehensive and all encompassing, and has included “the development of a vernacular language, channelling the media to promote slogans, symbols and ; using history writing; and shaping propaganda and education to homogenise national identity”.25

Somewhat ironically, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are somewhat intertwined in this regard: Uzbekistan appears to be waging a war of discrimination against ethnic Turkmen within its borders, and, vice versa, Turkmenistan in particular targets ethnic Uzbeks. Possibly the most significant and durable problem in the two countries is that minorities are not only handicapped in accessing educational opportunities in their own tongues, but as a result of poor funding, in many cases they are also not highly fluent in Russian, or the dominant language as a result of their ethnic upbringing. Consequently:

“they have found themselves in a gradual exclusion from the job market for well paid and promising positions…the Uzbek minority in Turkmenistan and the Turkmen minority in Uzbekistan have experienced a steady social and economic decline”.26

What probably mitigates the implications of the policies of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in this regard is the fact that, in comparison to their neighbours, they host within their borders relatively small percentages of non-titular national groups. In some

23 Denber, Rachel, “Looking Behind Turkmenistan’s Cult”, EurasiaNet Commentary, 10 September 2002, located at www.eurasianet.org. 24 Blue, Anoine, “Turkmenistan: State Interfering in Religious Life of ethnic Uzbeks, EurasiaNet, 3 October 2004, located at www.eurasianet.org. 25 Kuru, 2002, p86. In his conclusion, the author considered that as a direct result of Turkmenbashi’s policies, “the Turkmen identity of the 21st century will be, and is in some aspects already is, different from the Turkmen identity of the 20th century”. 26 Peimani, Hooman, “Turkmenistan Reconsiders Relations with Uzbekistan”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 4 June 2003.

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respect this situation both increases the likelihood of the dominant, titular group introducing discriminatory policies, and decreases the likelihood of a violent reaction because of the overwhelming superiority enjoyed by the titular group. However, this logic would offer little comfort to the 15,000 Meshketian Turks27 who were effectively driven from Uzbekistan following the pogroms in Ferghana in 1989.

Kyrgyzstan

An examination of patterns of ethnonationalist policies in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is complicated by the fact that Kyrgyzstan’s potential for ethnic conflict was realised even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan contains a sizable proportion of the Ferghana Valley, which also straddles neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and contains the densest, most ethnically fragmented concentration of people, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik and others, in the entire Central Asian region. During the Soviet period the Ferghana Valley witnessed acute occurrences of ethnic conflict, most notably in 1989 in Uzbekistan between Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks28 and in 1990 in Osh in Kyrgyzstan between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. The events in Osh were triggered by a dispute over the allocation of land for housing, and saw rioting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that led to several hundred deaths.29

Independence has seen the Kyrgyz government pursue the idea of a distinct Kyrgyz nationality, building upon the myth of a clearly defined past, a process best characterised by the elevation of the mythical Kyrgyz warrior Manas to the status of national hero. Indeed, former Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev, initially considered the most liberal and progressive of the Central Asian leaders, was at the forefront of a campaign promoting the idea of a Kyrgyz nation. His policies in this regard have been interpreted as:

27 Whilst the number of Meshketian Turks in Uzbekistan at the time is a topic of some debate, this figure seems the most acceptable. See Carlisle, Donald, “Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks”, Problems of Communism, vol 40, no 5, September 1991, pp23-44, p35. 28 A brief discussion of the violence directed at Meshketian Turks that erupted in Uzbekistan is contained in a later section. 29 Lubin, Nancy, Martin, Keith, and Rubin, Barnett, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p7.

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“…building a national identity from scratch with a serious dearth of usable national history...Akaev is, thus, the primary narrator of Kyrgyzstan’s story, which has become almost exclusively an ethnic Kyrgyz narrative. Wide-scale and/or state sponsored/sanctioned intolerance and/or ethnic conflict and/or benefit are perceived by the population to be the responsibility of Akaev.”30

As in neighbouring countries undergoing similar processes of “nation building”, any attempts to predict the success or outcomes of such programs will be complicated by the fact that many of the divisions that existed historically in the region, not just the divisions between nominal Uzbeks and Kyrgyz but also the clan and regional divisions that underpin Kyrgyz society, still exist to varying degrees. As is the case in neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan, both of which are mountainous countries, geography has played an influential role in the development of identity and allegiances in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is divided into five major valleys, Ferghana, Talas, Chui, Issy-Kul and Naryn, all of which contain distinct cultures that are discernable through differences in speech, dress, and political and social values.31 These differences have led to the development of a regionally based clan structure that still exists in Kyrgyzstan today, and are at odds with a broader promotion of a sense of Kyrgyz nationhood, as promoted by former President Akaev himself.

“These Kyrgyz clan ties, linked by blood or marriage, are profoundly important and highly regional…Kyrgyz clanism contributes greatly to the tribal nature of politics and resource allocations…Akaev holds power through the akim system (local regional governors) whom he appoints directly and who are exclusively ethnic Kyrgyz.”32

A survey conducted in 1997 by the Centre for Social Research of the Kyrgyz Academy of Science33 produced some interesting findings in respect to interethnic relations and

30 Handrahan, Lori, “Gender and Ethnicity in the ‘Transitional Democracy’ of Kyrgyzstan”, Central Asian Survey, 2001, vol 20, no 4, pp467-496, p470. 31 ibid, p472 32 ibid, p472-473 33 Survey findings used in this section were presented in Elebayeva, Ainura, Omuraliev, Nurbek, and Abazov, Rafis, “The Shifting Identities and Loyalties in Kyrgyzstan: The Evidence from the Field”,

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perceptions of possibilities for interethnic conflict. When asked whether a non-Kyrgyz could be the President of Kyrgyzstan: 39.1% replied yes (including 20% of respondents of Kyrgyz origin and over 51% of people of Slav origin; and 36.1% said no (62.9% of respondents of Kyrgyz origin). In response to the question of what role the Kyrgyz should play in present day Kyrgyzstan, 29.3% stated that the Kyrgyz should preserve a leading role among all ethnic groups; 52.6% said that the Kyrgyz were no different from any other ethnic group and should not have any special position; and 15.7% did not know. Whilst such results do not suggest a burgeoning crisis in the relations between groups, or a widely held perception of superiority within Kyrgyz, results to the question “Have you ever participated in or witnessed disputes or other conflicts, related to the ethnic origin of the people?” are concerning: 23.2% of respondents indicated that they had witnessed such situations quite often; 37.9% replied that they had witnessed such situations; 26.4% said that they had never had such an experience themselves, but they had heard about such conflicts from others; 12.4% indicated a belief that there were few such conflicts in reality.34

The figure of 23.2% for people who had witnessed conflicts related to the ethnic origin of people is surprising, given that the respondents were all from Bishkek, a city that has largely been exempt from the type of conflict that occurred in the more southern Osh/Batken region of the country. This fact raises some questions of the validity of the findings, especially given that it is likely that the opinions held by those in the south of Kyrgyzstan would most likely be stronger given the southern Kyrgyz are potentially more nationalist.35 The reality may be far more dire than that suggested by the above- quoted statistics.

The north-south divide that exists in Kyrgyzstan further complicates any attempts to evaluate the prospect for the development of Kyrgyz nationalism. In general terms, the north of the country can be characterised as more Russified and European, with the majority of the Russian population of Kyrgyzstan concentrated in and around Bishkek.

Nationalities Papers, 2000, vol 28, no 2. p-p343-349. The survey targeted a random sample of 1,200 individuals from Bishkek, and thus may not have reflected the views of rural or regional populations. 34 Elebayeva, Ainura, Omuraliev, Nurbek, and Abazov, Rafis, “The Shifting Identities and Loyalties in Kyrgyzstan: The Evidence from the Field”, Nationalities Papers, 200, vol 28, no 2, pp346-347.

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Russian is the dominant language in this region, and many are not fluent in Kyrgyz. The south, on the other hand, is predominantly Kyrgyz speaking, and society is more traditional and more based upon kinship connections. Further complicating this scenario is the fact that Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek population is largely concentrated in the south, representing 30% of the electorate in the region and creating a real prospect for confrontation between the two groups. 36

From an electoral perspective, the nationalist card is something that can be used to increase political support in the south at a time of political crisis. The focus of support for the former government was in the north of the country, and the south, whilst well represented in the Kyrgyz parliament, was typically underrepresented in government administration.37

Not surprisingly, the issue of language emerged in the early 1990’s as one of the more contentious subjects, with the government seizing on the as a tool by which they could foster the development of a sense of Kyrgyz identity, inevitably at the expense of the other national groups. Russian had emerged in the 1960’s as a competitor to Kyrgyz for the pre-eminent position in the republic, assisted by the strict measures imposed to strengthen the study of Russian in Kyrgyz schools, whilst at the same time Kyrgyz was banned in Russian schools in the region. As a result of this initiative, and the fact that the popularity of Russian was also bolstered by Russian fluency being practically a prerequisite for the better universities, Kyrgyz lost significant ground to Russian as the language of choice.38 Whilst Kyrgyz was made the state language in 1989, the language issue remained contentious until 2000 when

35 Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, International Crisis Group Asia Report No 81, 11 August 2004, Osh, Brussels, p18. 36 Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects International Crisis Group Asia Report No 81, 11 August 2004, Osh, Brussels, p18. This Report illustrated how Uzbeks had traditionally voted for the ruling Akaev government, but the increasing significance of the Kyrgyz nationalist card has seen some Uzbek leaders state that they were likely to throw their weight behind the opposition leader because they were “tolerant on interethnic questions”. 37 ibid, p18. The Report quotes the editor of the Kyrgyz newspaper, Zhana Ordo, as stating “for 13 years of Akaev’s rule there has not been a single head of the MVD, the SNB or the Ministry of Defence from the south”. 38 Mulkubatov, Tobtobai, “Kyrgyz Language Dispute”, Reporting Central Asia, no14, 02 August 2000, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The use of Kyrgyz as the language of instruction in schools fell especially sharply in the cities and towns, resulting in a natural divide between the urban Russian- speaking Kyrgyz youth and their rural counterparts.

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Russian was made an official language. This move only occurred during a rapprochement between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, and was interpreted in some quarters as being a cynical attempt by Akaev to curry Russian favour and to stem the flow of ethnic Russians departing Kyrgyzstan for Russia, a pattern of migration that posed a severe economic threat to Kyrgyzstan by reducing the available pool of highly skilled labour.39

However, recent events have indicated that the Kyrgyz government may be reversing its tolerance for the Russian language. Early in 2004, the Kyrgyz parliament commenced debating a law that would make Kyrgyz the language for official communication, and therefore require senior government officials to have a good knowledge of Kyrgyz. The proposed law would also set quotas for the use of Kyrgyz in the media, and encourage its use in the education system.40 Whilst such policies appear on the surface relatively benign, they are inevitably seen by the large Russian-speaking population of Kyrgyzstan as a deliberate diminution of their rights:

“Russians encounter inequalities and humiliations on a daily basis in various areas of life…it’s known as velvet discrimination”.41

Language policies are typically the most contentious from the perspective of nation- building, and irrespective of the government’s overall goals vis-à-vis the introduction of such legislation, in a multiethnic state of the type that exists in Central Asia the ramifications of such policies can be significant. The likelihood of such policies facilitating the assimilation of the non-Kyrgyz elements aside, such policies can be very effective in creating enduring divisions between groups, and increasing animosity towards the dominant (in this instance Kyrgyz) group as the minority elements of the

39 Makarenko, Tamara, “Russian Language in Kyrgyzstan: Balancing Security with Economics”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 10 May 2000. 40 Domagalskaya, Natalia, “Velvet Discrimination in Kyrygzstan”, Reporting Central Asia, no 264, 11 February 2004, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 41 Valery Uleyev, head of the Slavic Diaspora Association in the southern region of Jalalabad, quoted in Domagalskaya, Natalia, “Velvet Discrimination in Kyrygzstan”, Reporting Central Asia, no 264, 11 February 2004, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Although this law would handicap the significant percentage of ethnic Kyrgyz who are not fluent in Kyrgyz, it was seen as a policy which denied representation in government to the members of the minority groups who do not have a strong grasp of Kyrgyz – many of the non-Russian communities (Koreans, , , and Tatars) rely upon Russian as their first language. Additionally, the law would handicap the significant proportions of Uzbeks in the southern region.

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population feel increasingly disenfranchised. Such a process was directly responsible for the violence in Osh in 1990. Whilst the actual trigger for this conflict was protest by elements of the Uzbek population over a decision to allow Kyrgyz to build housing on land being used by Uzbeks for agriculture, the events were a culmination of a number of factors, not the least of which was official discrimination against Uzbeks. Although Uzbeks were successful in farming and commerce, they were grossly underrepresented in official and government positions in the region: occupying only 4.7% of government positions in the Osh region, against the 85.7% of positions occupied by Kyrgyz and 9.5% occupied by Russians. However, this situation was further complicated by the fact that the region had a problem with youth unemployment in the Kyrgyz parts of the population, who envied the success being enjoyed by the Uzbeks in the areas of agriculture and trade, and started squatting on Uzbek-owned land.42 From the perspective of an evaluation of the prospects for interethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, what is instructive about the events in Osh in 1990 is, not that they occurred under the supposedly watchful eye of a Soviet-era republic administration, but that the economic factors, especially high unemployment, still exist in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan today.

Whilst there is little to support an argument that Akaev deliberately introduced divisive policies during his lengthy tenure as Kyrgyz President, the small steps that he made in terms of developing a sense of Kyrgyz national identity may in fact prove to be inflammatory in an environment of high unemployment and conflict for jobs, influence and resources. What is unfortunate is that Akaev made almost no impact upon the significance of clan and regionalism to the political system of Kyrgyzstan, and thus his policies fostering a Kyrgyz national identity have merely overlaid an already established system of bias and discrimination against both minority groups and clans.

Furthermore, the issue of political succession, which has emerged dramatically during the first half of 2005, also has significant implications for ethnic harmony in Kyrgyzstan. Despite Akaev’s questionable record in accommodating minorities within Kyrgyzstan, the representatives of a number of ethnic groups threw their support behind

42 Sadji, “Interethnic Tensions In Kyrgyzstan’s Osh Region”, 17 April 1998, Prism, vol 4, issue 8, The Jamestown Foundation, located at www.jamestown.org.

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Akaev in the lead up to the February 2005 . Although minority groups have been traditionally pro-Akaev, they appeared especially supportive in the lead up to the first round of in 2005, something that was interpreted as indicating that “the communities are sure that another regime would not understand the issues facing them or listen to their problems”.43 Subsequent events did, to a degree, bear out the concerns of minority groups that a change in government could result in greater discrimination against them. The interim government, dominated by former opposition members, has appointed two staunch Kyrgyz nationalists to prominent positions. Azimbek Beknazarov, appointed interim Prosecutor General, and Omurbek Tekebayev, the new Parliament speaker, were both leaders of the former opposition. Their presence in the opposition parties, and the nationalist colouring that accompanied them, has been cited as a key factor in the failure of the opposition to harness Uzbek support during the ‘peoples’ revolution following the February 2005 election.44 It is as yet unclear how markedly the new administration of Kurmanabek Bakiev will differ in this regard. However, the new government’s treatment of Uzbeks fleeing the events in neighbouring in Uzbekistan, could further colour the perception of the ethnic Uzbek population in the south of Kyrgyzstan, and facilitate in a deterioration in the relative harmony in the south. However, more will be said on this in the following chapter.

43 Toralieva, Gulnara, “Kyrgyz Minorities to Back Akaev Parties”, Reporting Central Asia, no 349, 15 February 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Toralieva cited a number of ethnic Uzbek community leaders and analysts who saw Akaev as a good leader who was able to prevent through initiatives such as the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan and the programme ‘Kyrgyzstan, Our Common Home’. 44 Saipjanov, Ahmedjan, “Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan View the Revolution With Caution”, Eurasia Insight, 31 March 2005, Eurasianet.org. The interim government has failed to include any Uzbeks, the largest of Kyrgyzstan’s minority groups, in a prominent position. Saipjanov also discussed how those minority group leaders appointed to the former administration by Akaev are being targeted by the interim government, including Muhamadjan Mamasaidov, the head of the Republican Uzbek National Association and President of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University, who had won a seat in the February election.

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Kazakhstan

“God grant that no one should stir up Kazakhstan on ethnic grounds. It would be far worse than Yugoslavia”45

As is the case in neighbouring republics, ethnic Kazakhs share the Kazakhstan political space with significant number of other ethnic groups. However, the socio-political relationship that ethnic Kazakhs have with the ethnic “European” segment of the population will be the primary focus of this discussion. The “European” population of Kazakhstan at the time of its independence comprised a substantial number of people of Russian origin, as well as peoples of Belarussian, Ukrainian, German and Polish origin, all of whom speak Russian as their primary language. And, although this discussion is trying to avoid the contentious issue of defining what an “ethnic group” actually is, to simplify the argument, these peoples will be simultaneously considered “Russian speaking Europeans” and, where possible, as members of an “ethnic group” defined by their origins – i.e., ethnic German or Pole.

Of all the groupings within Central Asia, the Kazakhs are considered the first to have taken steps towards becoming a nation in the western sense. They have long possessed a highly uniform language that has been disseminated in both spoken and written forms, and they have long dwelt in a well-defined territory.46 They have also been one of the first groups within Central Asia to demonstrate nationalist tendencies. The Alash Orda political party formed in 1917 by Kazakh intellectuals sought political self- determination for the Kazakh peoples, and was preoccupied with the defence of Kazakh land from further Russian invasion or colonization, the development of the Kazakh language, written and spoken, and the promotion of an education program that was founded upon the use of the Kazakh language.47 Alash Orda was successful in establishing an autonomous government within the general area of modern Kazakhstan in December of 1917. However, by 1920, the Alash Orda effectively merged with the

45 Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, reputedly to reporter for Kazakstanskaia pravda, in 1991, quoted in Crowe, David, “The Kazaks and Kazakstan: The Struggle for Ethnic Identity and Nationhood”, in Nationalities Papers, vol26, no3, 1998, pp395-419, p409. 46 Glenn, J., 1999, p70. 47 Esenova, “Tribalism and identity in contemporary circumstance: The Case of Kazakhstan”, Central Asia Survey, vol17, no3, 1998, pp443-463, p455.

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Bolsheviks, with many members joining the Russian Communist party. This was a somewhat pragmatic step encouraged by the Chairman of the Kazakh/Alash Orda government, Akhmet Baytursunov, who was seeking to gain broader support for his party’s goals:

“...by becoming communists, we, nationalists, can use the legal channels for the best interests of the Kazakh peoples”48.

Although the political philosophies espoused by Alash Orda represent precursors to modern nationalist ideology, the very existence of such a movement at this time is also critically important to modern Kazakh nationalism because it establishes a sense of historical continuity that validates the Kazakhs as something more than just a product of Soviet social engineering.49

However, subsequent events indicated that the idea of an independent ‘Kazakh’ state held little interest for the majority of Kazakhs at the time. Any prospect of the Kazakhs forming a united front for independence with the outbreak of the Russian Civil war was undermined by a polarisation of tribal and clan divisions that chose opposing sides in the conflict.50 Furthermore, consolidation of power by the Soviets following the end of the Civil War saw not only a purging of former Alash Orda members from the Communist Party by the early 1930’s, but also something of a repudiation of the modernising, nationalist goals of the Alash Orda, with many Kazakhs turning back to the old clan system for assurance and stability:

“The tribal system had been destroyed…but clan and sub-clan ties, which had remained strong, now took on a new vitality. Furthermore, although the new, more decentralized structure of traditional authority impeded the formation of a

48 Esenova, Saulesh, “Soviet Nationality, Identity and Ethnicity in Central Asia: Historic Narratives and Kazakh Ethnic Identity”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol 22, no1, 2002, pp11-38, p19. 49 Sarsembayev, A., “Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990’s”, Central Asian Survey, vol 18, no 3, 1999, pp319-346, p324. Sarsembayev perceives that the existence of the Alash Orda government is used particularly by contemporary nationalist movements to argue the point of historical continuity. Correspondingly, the Kazakh government had rehabilitated the members of the Alash Orda, contrary to their treatment during Soviet times. Esenova, 1998, p455, also saw Alash Orda as “a most powerful modern symbol or myth of national identity and revival”. 50 Glenn, J., 1999, p70

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unified Kazakh people, it was well suited to traditional Kazakh social patterns. Clans, village and aul authorities simply reconstituted themselves as soviets and governed their populations much as before”.51

However, the subsequent imposition of the Soviet framework upon Central Asia did have a significant bearing upon the traditional social and political structures within the region. Tribalism lost its position as a defining aspect of Kazakh culture: tribal self- identity had always been based upon territorial attachment, and as the tribal community had been destroyed and dispersed, the tribe lost significance as the primary focus of identity,52 and tribal hierarchies were dismantled as the tribal leadership was destroyed. Esenova listed four major features of the imposition of Soviet ideology and practice upon the Kazakhs that are of consequence to this discussion.

1. The development of nationalist philosophies within Kazakhstan was prevented, as all intellectuals and activists associated with Alash Orda were eliminated by the Soviet authorities. 2. Traditional leaders and elites were also (largely) removed from power or positions of influence, by either execution or exile. 3. Pastoral based tribal or clan structures were undermined by the collectivisation of the rural sector, which saw mass migration to urban centres. 4. Collectivisation and sedentarisation in turn resulted in the deaths of over a million Kazakhs.53 This process, combined with the long-standing Russian program of Slavic migration into the region made Kazakhs a minority within their own territory. 54

51 Olcott, M., 1987, p162. 52 Esenova, S., 1998, p456. 53 Olcott, M. “The Collectivisation Drive in Kazakhstan”, Russian Review, vol 40, no 2, April 1981, p122-142, p136. Olcott quoted a study of the census figures for 1926 and 1939 that suggested that 1.5 million Kazakhs died during this period, but also qualified this figure by stating that newly published (as of 1981) archival material indicated that the loss of the Kazakh population was even greater than this. Olcott, 1987, p185 indicated that the number of Kazakh households declined from 1,233,000 to 565,000 during the period 1929 to 1936. Most of these deaths were attributable to starvation and disease, with loss of life greater in Kazakhstan than anywhere else in the Soviet Union. The associated economic costs of the collectivisation process saw crucial herds of sheep and cattle being reduced by nearly 80%. 54 Esenova, S., 1998, pp455-457.

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The settlement or sedenterisation of the Kazakhs, effectively forcing them to abandon their traditional nomadic, pastoralist lifestyle for a sedentary one, was one of the key Soviet policies aimed at breaking up the traditional hierarchies that dominated the steppes, and encouraging the progression of the Kazakhs towards nationality and thus the achievement of a soviet consciousness.

“Settlement is the liquidation of the bai semi-feudals. Settlement is the destruction of tribal attitudes…Settlement is simultaneously the question of socialist construction and the approach of socialism, of the socialist reconstruction of the Kazakh mass without divisions by nationality…”55

This process saw almost 400,000 Kazakhs forcibly settled, mainly in grain growing regions, during the period 1930 to 1937.56 Although the impact of the Soviet policies of collectivisation and sedenterisation upon the Kazakhs appears irrefutable, there has been some debate on just how substantial a residue of traditional tribal structures remained. For example, many of the kolkhoz chairmen were from families that traditionally were influential within Kazakh society, thus ensuring that there was not complete destruction of traditional authority structures.57 And, even more ironically, rather than facilitate the achievement of broader goals vis-à-vis nationalities policy, the collectivisation process also strengthened clan affiliations within the region by putting clans onto the same state run farms: this put mechanisms of power into the hands of clan-based networks, and allowed clans to further benefit by channelling clan members within the Soviet promotional network.58

The Soviet Virgin Land policy of 1953-1965 was another Soviet initiative that had wide ranging implications for the Kazakhs and Kazakh society. The basis of the Virgin Lands policy was Khrushchev’s desire to “create a new breadbasket out of the allegedly

55 F.I.Goloshchekin, First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party during the early 1930’s, quoted in Olcott, M., 1987, p183. 56 Olcott, M., 1987, p187. Olcott said that few of the collective farms upon which the Kazakhs were settled had access to seed, work animals or agricultural equipment. This scenario was aggravated by the fact that many of the collective farms were not economically viable because they were in desert or semi- desert, and thus both unsuitable for grazing cattle and for agriculture. 57 ibid, p237. 58 Collins, Kathleen, “Clans, Pacts and Politics”, Journal of Democracy, vol13, no3, 2002, pp137-152, p144.

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under-utilised lands of southern Siberia and Kazakhstan”.59 Although the Virgin Lands policy has been credited with transforming the traditional Kazakh pastoral economy into a more scientific and centrally directed type of animal husbandry,60 it is of consequence to this discussion because a core component of the policy was the mass migration of (generally Russians) to Kazakhstan. During this period, rural labour imported into Kazakhstan from other areas of the Soviet Union totalled over 800,000 people, 61 and as a result, by 1959 the Kazakhs were even more of an absolute minority within their own republic, being just 30.0% of the population, with ethnic Russians accounting for over 42% of the entire population.62

The consequences of this program were, again, far reaching, and irrevocably changed the face of Kazakh society and culture. Indeed, the dislocation that occurred as a consequence of these far reaching initiatives in many ways made the Kazakhs even more susceptible to the broader Soviet policies on nationalities than their neighbours. Consequently, these changes were felt more acutely in the pastoralist areas of Central Asia than the southern urban areas, and the dramatic demographic changes that accompanied the Virgin Lands policy in particular is only one indication of the impacts.

It was probable that an end result of Soviet policies would be that new, equally complex identities may emerge. Esenova perceived that tribal or clan identity among urban dwellers in Kazakhstan existed predominantly as a form of ‘cultural heritage’, and in the future territorial affiliations may replace tribal identity in the self-identification of urban communities.63 This may see an evolution towards the system of regional or city-based identities that has been prevalent in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both of which have traditionally been split between sedentary, or urban, and pastorals or nomadic groups. Collins, however, considered that Soviet rule in Central Asia merely broke up the large

59 Olcott, M., 1987, p224. 60 ibid, p237. 61 Ibid, p240. 62 Sarsambayev, A., 1999, p326. Sinnott demonstrated that the Russian population of Kazakhstan grew from 39.97% at the time of the 1939 Census (against the 37.84% of Kazakhs) to 42.73% by 1959. See Sinnott, Peter, “Population Politics in Kazakhstan”, Journal Of International Affairs, vol 56, no 2, 2003, pp103-115, p106. 63 Esenova, 1998, p445. Esenova considered that the notion of clan structure was not at all relevant to present-day Kazakh society as a social phenomenon, but in fields such as politics it still had significance (p 452).

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tribal structures, in the process making the smaller clan-based units pre-eminent, and creating the ‘clan-problem’, a central issue facing Central Asia today.64

Although territorial affiliations have been significant in the past, increased emphasis on territorially based identity rather than tribal identity may increase the prospect for conflict between groups. If the trend of migration to cities is increased as a result of environmental degradation, territoriality itself may give way to different forms of identity as groups increasingly compete for scarce resources, and cleavages form within emergent groups.

However, it also appears that traditional tribal and clan allegiances are being replaced by an overt political philosophy of nationalism focused on the principle that ethnic Kazakhs should, by right, dominate the economic, social and political structures of the republic of Kazakhstan.

One factor that could have implications for the development of ethnonationalism in Kazakhstan is the change to the demographic make-up of Kazakhstan that occurred during the 1990’s. The main cause of this demographic change was the mass exodus of Russians and other nationalities that culminated in an estimated 410,000 people emigrating from Kazakhstan in 1994 alone.

By 1994 when the net migration outflow reached its peak, ethnic Kazakhs still represented only 44.3% of the population of Kazakhstan, with Russians dropping to a still substantial 35.8% of the total population.65 The 1999 Census saw ethnic Kazakhs become an absolute majority within Kazakhstan for the first time since 1926. Census returns indicated that Kazakhs represented 53.4% of the national composition of Kazakhstan, as opposed to Russians, who now represented only 30.0%.66

64 Collins, K., 2002, p142. Collins provided a useful definition of a “clan” as it occurs in Central Asia: a “clan is an informal social institution in which actual or notional kinship based on blood or marriage forms the central bond among members”. Clans can range in size from 2,000 to 20,000 members, and “serve as an alternative to formal market institutions and official bureaucracies”. 65 Soucek, S., 2000, p331.

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Migration Balance For Kazakhstan – 1991-1999 Year Net Migration Slavs Kazakhs Flow Germans 1991 -57 686 - - - - 1992 -156 261 - - - - 1993 -221 101 -144 205 -84 123 -5 329 3 490 1994 -410 387 -290 679 -89 796 -10 979 5 484 1995 -238 495 -147 866 -79 742 -5 698 7 779 1996 -175 538 -112 479 -56 943 -4 224 6 903 1997 -261 388 -189 707 -48 095 -7 258 -177 1998 -203 039 -149 592 -38 460 -5 891 1 685 1999 -128 355 -89 432 -31 551 -3 007 1 410 Total -1 852 250 -1 123 960 -428 710 -42 396 26 574 Source: Sinnott, Peter, “Population Politics in Kazakhstan”, Journal Of International Affairs, vol 56, no 2, 2003, pp103-115, p104.

It is important to recognise, however, that the above pattern of mass-migration on the part of non-Kazakhs occurred for reasons other than perceived or real discrimination imposed by ethnic Kazakhs within the newly independent Republic. A survey of those emigrating from Kazakhstan conducted in 1992 indicated that many were departing for economic or family reasons, rather than as a result of ethnically-based discrimination or fear of ethnic violence.67 However, the same survey also indicated that 11% emigrated as a result of worsening interethnic relations, 9% as a result of unsettled living conditions, 14% as a result of (unspecified) changes in workplace, and 11% because of school.68

The political leadership of Kazakhstan has long resided with President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who had held the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and maintained his grip on the top position with his election to the position

66 Sinnott, P., 2003, p105. 67 Davis, Sue and Sabol, Steven, “The Importance of Being Ethnic: Minorities in Post-Soviet States – The case of ”, Nationalities Papers, vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp473-491, p488. The authors cited the results of a survey that indicated that 34% of emigration from Kazakstan was as a result of family circumstances. 68 ibid, p485.

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of President of the newly independent republic in 1991. As the quote attributed to Nazarbaev cited at the start of this chapter suggested, Nazarbaev appeared to be aware of the sensitivity that would have to be shown in dealing with the nationalities question in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. To his credit, Nazarbaev has proven himself to be more effective than some of his peers in managing the relationship between the ethnic Kazakhs and substantial Russian-speaking Slavic populations within Kazakhstan. He was elected president in 1991 with 98% of the vote, with both Kazakhs and Russians united in their approval of him.69 Over the subsequent decade, however, Nazarbaev was to achieve mixed results with regard to the nationalities question, and many critics argue that Nazarbaev has in many respects not offered any real solutions to the problems caused by the ethnic makeup of Kazakhstan. Indeed, in spite of the rhetoric of the Kazakh leadership that Kazakhstan would continue to be “inhabited by representatives of numerous nationalities sure of equal opportunities enjoyed by all the nations but deeming themselves to be citizens of Kazakhstan, first and foremost”70 demographic and representative changes within the Kazakh political space since the collapse of the Soviet Union raise a number of issues.

With the benefit of hindsight, the first inconsistencies in Kazakh policies vis-à-vis the incorporation (or non-incorporation) of all groups into a ‘civic’ based state appeared with the Law of National Independence that was proclaimed upon independence on 16 December 1991. This Law stipulated an all-encompassing form of Kazakh citizenship for all residents of Kazakhstan:

“The citizens of the Republic of all nationalities, united by a shared historical destiny with the Kazak nation, together with it constitute the single people of Kazakhstan, who shall be the sole bearer of sovereignty.”71

69 ibid, p487, cite a survey of approval ratings for Nazerbayev conducted in 1991. This survey returned a “strong approval” rating from Kazakhs / Russians of 49.8% / 41.8%, and “approval” rating of 31.7% / 33%. Interestingly, although Russians returned a higher “no reply” rating for this survey (10.2 to the Kazakhs 4.4%), fewer Russians “disapproved” or “strongly disapproved” of Nazarbaev than ethnic Kazakhs – 2.1% against 3.6% Kazakhs. This poll was far from transparent, however. Consequently, it is difficult to comment on the veracity of these figures. 70 Nazarbaev, Nursultan, “Kazakhstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and Ever Growing Welfare of all Kazakhstanis”, Message of the President of the Country to the Peoples of Kazakhstan. 71 Davis and Sabol, 1998, p486,

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This statement proposed an inclusive, civic basis of citizenship, where all people of Kazakhstan, irrespective of ‘nationality’, were accorded equal rights and responsibilities.72 However, a further passage of the same Law aroused the ire of many of the non-Kazakh citizens of the newly independent Republic by stipulating that the Kazakh state would:

“create conditions for the return to its territory of persons who had to leave the territory during periods of mass repressions and force collectivisation……and their descendents as well as Kazaks residing in the territories of former Union republics.”73

This article was widely criticised for not only discriminating against non-Kazakhs by allowing for de facto dual citizenship for Kazakhs, but also for being a deliberate policy of increasing the ethnic Kazakh percentage of the population.74

The increasing number of comments made by political and intellectual elites that reflect the emergence of nationalist ideology suggested that Kazakhs were anticipating a not- too-distant future where they would enjoy numerical superiority over Russians and thus able to lay claim to the title of majority ethnic group.75

The official Concept for the Forming of a State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan which was released to the official media in Kazakhstan in May 1996 further highlighted the direction that government thinking in Kazakhstan was heading. Although this document was unsigned, it was allegedly authored by the chairman of the influential Majilis Committee on Foreign Affairs,76 and it proposed that the ‘ethnic centre’ of Kazakhs was synonymous with the state of Kazakhstan. The Concept stated that the

72 Davis and Sabol, 1998, p486, 73 ibid, p486. 74 Davis and Sabol, 1998, p486. Both articles of the Law quoted above are sourced from Davis and Sabol. 75 Bremmer, Ian, and Welt, Cory, “Kazakhstan’s Quandary”, Journal of Democracy, vol6, no3, pp139- 154, p151. 76 Kolsto, Pal, “Anticipating Demographic Superiority: Kazakh Thinking on Integration and Nation Building”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 50, no 1, 1998, pp51-70, p58. Kolsto maintained that the chairman of the Majilis Committee claimed to be the main architect of the document during an interview conducted in September of the same year.

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other ethnic groups within Kazakhstan could not advance similarly strong claims to be attached to the state as the Kazakhs could because nowhere else in the world did Kazakhs posses a statehood which was concerned with the preservation of the Kazakh culture, or the development of Kazakh culture, language, traditions and lifestyle.77

The publication of this Concept was not the first time that government officials in Kazakhstan had revealed their attitudes regarding the idea of a pre-eminent ‘Kazakh nation’. In 1995, a member of Parliament, Sultan Sartaev revealed his belief in the importance of the Kazakh nation, stating that “Kazakhstan is the state of the Kazakh nation, since only one nation, the Kazakh nation, lives here…all the others are only representatives of nations, since they have their own ethnic states elsewhere”.78 Similar discussions had underpinned the development of the 1995 constitution that had sought to establish what form the Kazakh state should take vis-à-vis its multinational population. The drafters of this constitution debated whether to include in the constitution’s preamble a statement that the represented ‘Kazakhs’. This idea was eventually discarded in favour of a more benign statement on the foundation of a state on “indigenous Kazakh land”.79

The year 1995 saw the establishment of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan with the mandate of facilitating the development and maintenance of the identities of all the non-Kazakh peoples of Central Asia. However, some authors perceived that Nazarbaev set up this academy with less than a genuinely altruistic intent, foreseeing that the Assembly might actually see a tightening of the grip of Kazakhs on the government infrastructure.80 Although many of the non-Kazakh peoples are Russophones, they are not necessarily of Russian ‘ethnicity”. There is still a large proportion of Europeans – Ukrainians, Germans, and Belarussians – within Kazakhstan, and these groups have largely adopted Russian as their primary language. These peoples also tend to side with ethnic Russians in the face of discrimination against non-

77 Kolsto, P., 1998, p58. 78 From Karavan, 3 February 1995, quoted in Kolsto, 1998, p54. 79 Kusainova, Azher, and Gleason, Gregory, “Constitutional Reform and Regional Politics in Kazakhstan”, Nationalities Papers, vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp534-544, pp534-535. 80 Koltso, Pal, “The price of stability: Kazakhstani control mechanisms in a bipolar cultural and demographic situation”, Paper presented at the conference “Democracy and Pluralism in the Muslim Areas of the Former Soviet Union”, University of Tel Aviv, 7-9 November 1999.

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Kazakhs. However, the Assembly effectively fragments opposition to the government’s policy of Kazakhification, by facilitating a greater identification with regard to ethnicity within the ‘non-titular nationalities’ in Kazakhstan.81 This strategy is similar to that utilised by the Bolsheviks, in that it seeks to create divisions within possible opposing groups by enhancing differences.

Other initiatives that have supposedly been introduced to ensure the linguistic, cultural and political rights of the non-Kazakh ethnic groups also inevitably end up facilitating the converse of such aims. The Language Committee, which Nazarbaev claimed would assist the development of all the languages used within the borders of Kazakhstan, and not just Kazakh, had a representation which was grossly skewed towards the Kazakh language – there were 30 Kazakhs on the committee, as opposed to three Russians, two Uighurs and a single Azeri.82

Dangerously, academics are also weighing into the discussion surrounding the idea of the ‘Kazakh nation’, and an increasing number of the country’s Kazakh intellectual elite have made public comments that are increasingly chauvinistic, particularly towards Russians. One enlightened individual, a history professor, is quoted as commenting:

“How can we call those people ‘Kazakhstanians’ who arrived here some 40 or 50 years ago, or those whose forefathers settled here in the last century, when they pack their suitcases heading for Russia just because life is becoming slightly difficult? Unfortunately, we have millions of such people who were born and raised here, but who do not call Kazakhstan their Motherland.”83

There is more than just rhetoric to the government’s view on the position of the ‘Kazakh’ nation within the state structure. Indeed, there are many indications that the Nazarbaev regime is reversing the previous Soviet era policy of ‘multi-ethnic pluralism’. The Kazakhification84 of the political, social and economic structures of

81 ibid. 82 Kolsto, P., 1998, pp57-58. 83 Saken Dorzhekov, in Kolsto, 1998. p54. 84 Sarsembayev, Azanat, “Imagined Communities: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakhification in the 1990’s”, Central Asia Survey, Oxford, vol18, issue 3, 1999, pp319-346. Karin and Chebotarev identified

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Kazakhstan is becoming increasingly obvious as government policy increases the dominance of Kazakh culture, history and language within the country, at the expense of the large Russian speaking minority.85 This policy has seen a revival of the Kazakh language with the increasing dominance of national television and radio broadcasts, the reversion to Kazakh names for cities, streets and geographical features, and the revision of officially taught history to reflect Kazakh ‘nationalism’.

But perhaps more importantly, the Nazarbaev government appears to have introduced a program to increase the number of ethnic Kazakhs at almost every level of government. This program has particularly targeted regions where Russians are the dominant group. For example, in 1994 ethnic Kazakhs held six of the top eight official positions in the Karaganda Oblast, even though Kazakhs were less than one fifth of the region’s population. Similarly, ethnic Kazakhs held six of the top nine positions in the government of Pavlodar, yet Kazakhs accounted for less than 30% of the population in this region.86 Such a process of ‘Kazakhification’ is not a new phenomenon however, with Kazakh over-representation in certain areas of administration being supported as early as 1960, by former First Secretary Kunaev.87 Kunaev came to prominence as the First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist party at a time when Kazakh politics and administration was divided into two distinct systems. The first of these systems was the political, administrative and economic apparatus that reported directly to Moscow, and involved minimal participation by ethnic Kazakhs, being dominated by Russians. The second system was characterised by Kazakh domination, and included the livestock

four features of the process of Kazakhification, or, as they termed it “Kazakhisation”: 1 – “It is not recognized on the official level; as a matter of fact, it is denied.” 2. - “It is realized under the ideological and propagandistic guise of reviving the Kazakh people's language, culture and traditions, on the one hand; and adherence to the officially recognized principles of internationalism, friendship of peoples, and the building of a multinational state, on the other.” 3 - It is not integrated; it is carried out in the form of various events with respect to domestic, personnel, language, educational, cultural, informational, and other policies, within the framework of current activity of corresponding state structures; nonstate organizations that are close to it; mass media; and private individuals.” 4 - Its defining characteristic is preserving the superiority of basic values and resources of the Kazakhs over those phenomena of the republic's nonindigenous population.” See Karin, E. and Chebotarev, A. “ The Policy of Kazakhization in State and Government Institutions in Kazakhstan”, in N. Oka (ed), The Nationalities Question In Kazakhstan, JETRO Middle East Series, No 51, Chiba, March 2002, located at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Mes/pdf/51_cap2_1.pdf. 85 Cutler, Robert, Central Asia Monitor, 1999. 86 Bremmer I., and Walt, C., 1995, p141. 87, Edmunds, T., 1998, p464.

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breeding economy and the lower levels of government.88 Kunaev managed to alter the existing bias towards Russians somewhat, with Kazakhs coming to increasingly participate in the leadership of both party and state over the subsequent 20 years.89 His policies stand as an interesting precursor to recent trends towards the domination of most avenues of government and administration by Kazakhs, to the detriment of others, in particular Russians. In fact, for the entire late Soviet period, between 1977 and 1992, the Kazakh share of the workforce in nearly all areas of endeavour increased markedly.

Kazakh Percentages of Workforce 1977-1994 1977 1987 1992 Government 34 40 47 Industry 13 21 24 Agriculture 38 52 53 Health 25 38 46 Education 36 43 51 Services 17 23 25 Culture and Arts 36 42 42 Source: cited in Davis, S, and Sabol, S. “The Importance of being Ethnic: Minorities in Post-Soviet States – the Case of Russians in Kazakhstan” in Nationalities Papers, vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp473-491, p483.

However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that significant discrepancies in the proportions of Russians to Kazakhs exist in many spheres, and not just in government and administration. And the fact that these discrepancies are increasing at a rate faster than overall demographic changes of the population is further cause for concern. Education provides an excellent example of the discrimination that is coming to characterise public and private life in Kazakhstan. For example, Kazakhs’ share of places within the higher education system increased substantially during the first decade of independence: from 54.3% in 1991-92 to 64.4% in 1994-95 alone. During the same

88 Olcott, M., 1987, p242. Olcott stated that Russians dominated just about everything apart from the areal is of livestock breeding and local government, in particular cereal crop production, metalurgy and heavy industry/manufacturing, as well as running the republican party and state organisations, and holding all key ministerial portfolios. 89 Olcott, M., 1987, p243. Olcott, p244-245, does indicate, however, despite all the gains made in elevating Kazakhs to positions that were previously denied to them, key economic departments such as heavy industry, agriculture and construction continued to be run by Russians.

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period the number of ethnic Russians accessing higher education decreased in absolute and relative terms, with their share falling from 31.2% to 25.8%.90

However, there are many Kazakhs who would consider such policies to represent a necessary task of compensating for the many years of ‘’ of Kazakhs that had occurred during the Soviet era. This included a significant decline in the use of the Kazakh language, and the teaching of a Russian biased version of history91 that has been considered by many Kazakhs to have played a key role in erosion of Kazakh culture.

The fact that Russification occurred to this extent, given the status of the Kazakhs as a titular nationality during the Soviet era is indicative of the inconsistent results of Soviet policies. The Soviet policy of positive discrimination towards ‘ethnic’ Kazakhs failed to halt the decline in the use of the Kazakh language. And in the 1970’s the Soviet Union reversed the long-standing trend of school instruction in the language of the titular nationality. In Kazakhstan, over 700 Kazakh-language schools were closed during this decade. This trend continued into the following decade, and by 1989, only 923,990 children attended Kazakh-language schools, as opposed to the 2,021,596 who attended Russian language schools.92

Indeed, the declining use of the Kazakh language has proven to be both a major motivator for nationalist groups and a significant impediment to the cohesion of any overt nationalist movement. Although the census undertaken prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union returned a figure of 98.5% of ethnic Kazakhs within the state who claimed Kazakh as their mother tongue93, the genuine level of fluency in the Kazakh language is considered to be much lower, closer to 71%.94 And the significance of this situation was exacerbated by the tendency for the Kazakh political and intellectual elite within the state to have received a Russian language education, and thus often be more fluent

90 Edmunds, Timothy, “Power and powerlessness in Kazakhstani society: Ethnic problems in perspective” Central Asian Survey, vol 17, no 3, 1998, pp463-470, p464. 91 ibid, pp464-466. 92 Khazanov, Anatoly, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Wisconsin University Press, Wisconsin, 1995, p199. 93 Kolsto, P., 1998, p55.

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in Russian than Kazakh.95 Additionally, the proportion of fluency in Kazakh is higher in rural areas than in the urban population. Among city dwellers, 30% do not know Kazakh at all, and only 20.5% are perfectly fluent. These figures contrast with the 25% of rural dwellers who know no Kazakh, and the 42% who are fluent. Only 8.5% of ethnic Russians claim to be fluent in Kazakh, with over 50% having no fluency in Kazakh whatsoever.96 And when all these figures are put into the context of the Russian language, with 85.5% literacy (including a Russian literacy rate of 74.5% amongst ethnic Kazakhs),97 it becomes obvious that bilingualism in Kazakhstan is skewed towards the primacy of Russian. An almost inevitable consequence of this is that the rural Kazakh population come to identify more strongly with the Kazakh nationalists than do the largely Russian speaking urban Kazakhs.98

The constitutional approach to the language issue has been haphazard. Although the revised constitution, introduced in 1995, watered down or removed many of the clauses that had been offensive to non-Kazakh ethnic groups, in particular the phrase defining Kazakhstan as “the form of statehood of the self-determining Kazakh nation”,99 it still did not elevate the Russian language to be on par with Kazakh.100 Moves in September 1996 to introduce a draft law giving the Russian language equal status to Kazakh in government administration saw a group of academics, writers and politician protesting in front of the Kazakhstan Parliament, saying that the new law went too far.101

Russians themselves have not contributed to the development of equitable relations between the two groups. Indeed one of the legacies of the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan is a degree of mutual distrust between Kazakhs and Russians. A precedent for the way that Russian-Kazakh tensions could manifest occurred in 1986, when rioting erupted in Almaty following the appointment of G.V. Kolbin, an ethnic Russian, to the leadership of the Kazakh republic. The rioting escalated over a two day period, and resulted in up

94 Arenov, M. and Kalmukov, S. “The Present Language Situation in Kazakhstan”, Russian Social Science Review, vol 38, no 3 (1997), pp56-64, p56. 95 Koltso, P., 1998, p55. 96 Arenov M., and Kalmykov, S., 1997, p57. 97 ibid, p75. 98 Sarsembayev, A., 1999. 99 Kolsto, P., 1998, p58. 100 OMRI Daily Digest, June 15, 1995. 101 OMRI Daily Digest, September 27 1996.

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to 50 deaths,102 hundreds of injured protestors and possibly one thousand arrests. At the time, the riots were interpreted as possibly the prelude to “another long period of Russian-Kazakh antagonism”.103

Russians voiced their discontent with being ‘stranded’ in Kazakhstan soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In December of 1992, mass demonstrations by ethnic Russians demanding the granting of official status to the Russian language and regional autonomy occurred in Eastern Kazakhstan. This was followed up after the March 1994 election, when Russians all across northern Kazakhstan, where there is the highest percentage of Russians, mobilised to demand regional autonomy.104 Radical elements within the Slavic population in general have tended to tarnish the image of the entire group. Rallying by Cossack groups and other groups often dubbed ‘Moscow nationalists’ are typically interpreted as agitation by groups seeking to secede from Kazakhstan and join the Russian Federation. This is contrary to the groups’ claims that they are seeking to correct the injustices carried out against the country’s non-Kazakh populations, which included the alleged frequent failure by authorities to investigate crimes committed against non-Kazakhs, and the ethnic Kazakhs’ dominance of all positions of authority in the country’s banking system, law enforcement agencies, government and court system.105

To a degree the Slavic population of Kazakhstan – in particular ethnic Russians and Ukrainians – exacerbate tensions between themselves and Kazakhs by maintaining their own prejudices against Kazakhs. Indeed, the end of the Soviet Union did not necessarily equate with the end of ‘Great Russian Chauvinism’ in the Kazakh republic. The view that Russia had ownership of northern Kazakhstan because Kazakhs were nomads and thus temporary inhabitants of the steppe with no claim to ownership of the area, popularised by Aleksander Solzhenitsyn in editorials in Izvestia in the early 1990’s, appears to continue to appeal to the Russian and Ukrainian population in

102 Crowe, M., 1998, p407. 103 Olcott, M., 1987, p256. 104 Bremmer I., and Walt, C., 1995, p151. 105 OMRI Daily Digest, August 14, 1996.

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Kazakhstan.106 Similarly parochial is the popular view amongst Russians and Ukrainians that the Kazakhs are not even a legitimate nation, and that they are little more than the creation of Soviet-era nation-building policies:

“The Kazakh ethnicity is only several decades old, a product of Stalinised times when nationalities were created. The word qazak, meaning a frontiersman or free, was first used by the Russian border guards. Sure, it may have been a Turkic term. But it was used to refer to us Cossacks before the Kazaks were ever called that. Only later this term qazaq was given to the Kazak. The Kazaks are an ethnicity that are only several decades old, created at the time of Stalin.”107

Such statements not only rob Kazakhs of their claims to ethnic legitimacy by claiming that they are an artificial creation of the Soviet era, but also deny them claim to primacy within Kazakhstan by appropriating from them the name qazak and thus denying them access to their own ethnic identity and to the territory of Kazakhstan. Given the presence of the Russian state immediately to Kazakhstan’s north, it should not be surprising that the Kazakh government remained concerned about Russian and Ukrainian agitation for much to the first decade of independence. Indeed, the relationship between the two groups almost developed in the fashion of a security dilemma, where perception of the other was distorted by mutual fear and distrust. Inflammatory statements made by the likes of Solzhenitsyn and others in the Russian press and political arena aroused passions amongst the newly emerged Kazakh nationalists, whose political agenda came to be dominated by fear of a number of possibilities.

106 Eitzen, Hilda, “Refiguring Ethnicity Through Kazak Genealogies” Nationalities Papers, vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp433-451, p434. Eitzen consider that the “the nomad marauder as a temporary inhabitant of the steppe without political affiliation or cultural legitimation often persists as an image in popular post- Soviet thinking”. 107 Eitzen, H., 1998, p434. This statement was made by a man of Cossack heritage in Almaty in 1993. Eitzen also quoted a conversation she had with a group of Russian gymnasts and mountain climbers in Bishkek in 1993, where the Russians questioned the claims of nomads – Kazakhs and Kyrgyz – to nationhood. She considered that Kazakhs would have to “come to terms with the age-old interface between nomad and agrarian, and ‘civilised’”, and that Kazakh and non-Kazakh alike “must inevitably contend with both Soviet and previous Russian definitions of nationality and statehood”.

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1. Loss of ethnic independence within Kazakhstan; 2. Interference by Russia in Kazakhstan’s domestic affairs; 3. Loss of political and economic stability, leading to civil war along national lines; 4. Separation of the northern ; 5. Loss of political independence to Russia.108

One issue that perceivably facilitates equitable relations between Kazakhs and Russians is relatively equal numerical strength of the two groups. Indeed this equilibrium has been interpreted as one of the main reasons that, despite low level antagonism between the two groups and increasingly chauvinistic opinions being ventured by Kazakh political and intellectual elites, there has been a relative lack of bloodshed between the two groups. It could be the ‘ethnic’ equivalent of a cold war, where both groups would be more inclined to accommodate the other as long as neither could hope to prevail over the other.109

There are indications that this equilibrium may be maintained. The massive exodus of non-Kazakh ethnic groups that threatened to tilt the demographic balance towards the ethnic Kazakhs slowed in the second half of the 1990’s. And the image conveyed by the demographic of those departing is deceptive, because of the 122,000 people who actually immigrated to Kazakhstan during this time, two thirds were Russian or Ukrainian.110 There are also indications that the high birth-rates within the ethnic Kazakh section of the population may be slowing, with economic hardship combined with higher infant mortality rates contributing to the decline.

However, many of the ethnic Kazakhs or oralmandar (returnees or repatriates, the singular for which is oralman) immigrating to Kazakhstan, especially those from neighbouring Uzbekistan, are often fleeing from discrimination and declining living

108 “National Problems in the State Policy of Kazakhstan”, International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, Moscow, 1998, located at http://iicas.org/english/publkz.htm. The article discussed a similar list of fears held by the Russian-speaking Slavic population, the most significant of which were loss of language and discrimination. 109 Kolsto, P., 1998, pp62-63. 110 OMRI Daily Digest, June 21, 1996.

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standards.111 It is possible that their experiences in the other countries could negatively influence their thoughts on what form that the structure of the Kazakh state should take. Additionally, they may fall prey to the lure of overt Kazakh nationalism as they seek to establish an identity that was denied to them in their country of origin. Indeed, domestic nationalism has played a significant role in fuelling the return of members of the Kazakh diaspora, a process that has seen some 500,000 ethnic Kazakhs from neighbouring countries immigrate to Kazakhstan in the first 13 years following independence.112 A critical issue posed by the oralmandar is that their return has been largely influence by ‘idealised return myths’ constructed through discourse emanating from Kazakhstan that often “portray the ethno-national homeland in idealised terms, leading to migration flows that commonly stem from a faulty understanding of reality in the destination”.113 The issue of oralmandar is further contentious in that it relates only to those Kazakhs that are identifiable as exiles or the descendents of exiles from the forced and mass exoduses of Kazakhs during the Soviet era. The 1997 Kazakh Law on Population Migration established a legal definition of oralmandar:

“is a person of indigenous nationality exiled outside the historic homeland and denationalised by virtue of mass political repressions, illegal requisition, forced collectivisation, other antihumane actions, and in-migrating to the Republic of Kazakhstan on a voluntary basis for permanent residence, and his offspring.”114

In the early days of independence, the oralmandar were viewed by Kazakh nationalists as a critical component in the development of the Kazakh nation for two reasons. Firstly the returnees contributed to the tipping of the demographic makeup in Kazakhstan in favour of ethnic Kazakhs. Secondly, Kazakh nationalists perceived that the oralmandar would contribute to the cultural rebirth of Kazakhstan, which had long been dominated by Russians and the Russian language. For example, Mongolian

111 Alimov, Shavkat, “Kazakh Exodus”, Reporting Central Asia, no 43, 8 March 2001, International War and Peace Reporting. 112 Diener, Alexander, “Kazakhstan’s Kin State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 57, no 2, March 2005, pp327-348, p327. Diener considered that, with an estimated 4.1 million ethnic Kazakhs living outside the territorial limits of the Kazakh republic, the return of 500,000 oralmandar was “far from overwhelming”. 113 Diener, A., 1995, p329. 114 Law on Population Migration, Chapter 1, Article 1(4). Translated version of the Law located at http://www.iom.kz/index.php?lang=eng&podmenu_id=2&menu_id=3.

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Kazakhs were seen to possess a purer form of the Kazakh language than that which was used in Kazakhstan, because their version contained fewer loan words and grammatical corruptions.115 By possessing a ‘purer’ form of the Kazakh language, and in many cases retaining the nomadic lifestyle that had largely disappeared from Kazakhstan during the Soviet era, oralmandar from Mongolia and China were perceived by idealistic nationalists as facilitating a revitalisation of Kazakh culture within the Kazakh homeland. The concept of a common Kazakh homeland to be shared by native and diaspora Kazakhs emerged soon after independence. During the 1992 World Kuraltai of Kazakhs, President Nazarbaev established a link between the current territory of Kazakhstan and Kazakh diaspora across the region:

“Here hundreds of generations of Kazakhs were born, grew and matured. These endless spaces is our cradle, our heritage, our wealth. Here our forefathers raised a banner of their state system acknowledged by neighbouring and remote states.”116

The oralmandar was merely one component of this policy, which has been interpreted as evidence of the emergence of the idea of a primordial bond existing between ethnic Kazakhs and a specified territory, namely the territory of the modern state of Kazakhstan. Nazarbaev has sensibly avoided extending this territorial link between Kazakhs and territory occupied by Kazakh irredentist populations, recognising soon after independence the need to qualify such primordialist sentiments with the need to ensure territorial integrity. During the same speech at the World Kuraltai of Kazakhs, in which he envisaged a Kazakh homeland for the Kazakh diaspora, Nazarbaev qualified his statements by also stating that:

“We support territorial integrity and unity of independent states, acknowledge inviolability and reality of existing borders…”117

Primordialist sentiments aside, the oralmandar do not necessarily represent the means by which Kazakh nationalists will realise their goal of a flourishing Kazakh nation

115 Diener, A., 2005, pp334-335. 116 Speech by Nazarbaev at Grand Meeting of World Kuraltai of Kazakhs, 1 October 1992. Translated text of speech located at http://www.president.kz/articles/Sover_Kaz/Sover_Kaz.asp?lng=en&art=1992

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within the borders of Kazakhstan. As stated earlier, the oralmandar are largely influenced by the ‘return myths’ propagated by nationalists, and enter Kazakhstan with what has been perceived as unrealistic expectations of modern Kazakh culture and society. Somewhat ironically, integration of Oralman, especially those returning from Iran, Mongolia and China, has been impeded both by their almost absolute lack of Russian language skills, and their rural, often nomadic background, which sees them treated as backward or unsophisticated by urbanised, Russian speaking Kazakhs.118

As a result, rather than create a strengthening of the Kazakh national identity within Kazakhstan, oralmandar are emerging as yet another distinct group within Kazakhstan. Lack of government support promised to them, combined with the extremely low allocation of Kazakh citizenship and lack of voting rights, have all led to an increasing marginalisation of oralmandar within Kazakhstan.119 Furthermore, legal definitions of oralmandar have also facilitated the development of a distinct cleavage within the communities of oralmandar themselves. As discussed earlier, a strict definition of oralman encompasses only those members of the Kazakh diaspora who were forced to flee the territory of modern day Kazakhstan during the Soviet time. Returned Kazakhs who were members not of the diaspora communities but of irredentist communities (i.e Kazakh communities stranded in external territories such as Uzbekistan and Russia by the 1920’s border demarcation process), although often lumped into the category of oralman, are strictly speaking not oralman, and are consequently not entitled to any of the assistance that nominally is provided to oralmandar. This nominal bias in favour of one group of returnees, at the expense of the other (ignoring the reality which sees both groups neglected by the Kazakh government) could also lead to animosity and tension between the two groups. These contrary outcomes create additional issues for the Kazakh government, because it has facilitated further cleavages not just between

117 ibid. 118 Diener, A., 2005, p340. Diener considered that “Kazakhs from the ‘far abroad’ face social dynamics that are readily disillusioning and succeed in promoting either a self-deprecating comportment, wherein their lack of modernisation is denigrated, or an impudent pride, wherein the Russified, modernised Kazakhs of Kazakhstan are viewed as ‘black Russian’ or mankurttar…”. Diener also identified a tendency by oralmandar to congregate as distinct groups in defined territories (p341). 119 Diener, 2005, p341, considered that the oralmandar had been ‘othered’ by the lack of inclusion in the employment, privatisation and naturalisation processes of the state, and by “their sense of what Kazakhs ‘should be’ in contrast to the reality of what many Kazakhs within Kazakhstan have become following decades of Russification”.

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Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, but between Kazakhs themselves. The oralman dilemma is also illustrative of the difficulties that Kazakh nationalists will continue to encounter in their efforts to forge a distinct, vibrant, and self-aware Kazakh nation that will claim a position of pre-eminence within the Kazakh state.

In addition to unforeseen cleavages developing between ‘native’ Kazakhs and oralmandar, there are also indications that significant divisions may be developing between the different zhuz, or tribal confederations, that make up the ethnic Kazakh population of the country. These zhuz have territorial and social significance that derives from the period preceding the Russian colonisation of the region. The Uly (great) zhuz - associated with the aristocracy - is concentrated in the south of the country; the Orta (Middle) zhuz - noted for its writers and intellectuals - occupies central north and east Kazakhstan; while the Kishi (Small) zhuz - characterised by martial tradition - is located in the west.120 Rivalry between these groups has always been significant, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been increasing emphasis placed upon zhuz within the ethnic Kazakh segment of the population. With the consolidation of power within government often being biased towards one of the zhuz,121 problems not just for the relations between members of the different zhuz, but for the stability and legitimacy of the government are emerging. Some observers believe there are growing regional inter-zhuz struggles at all levels of government, with the senior zhuz being increasingly challenged by officials from the junior zhuz who are concentrating finances in their hands and trying to ensure the support of the media.122

However, the emergence of zhuz as divisive features of a Kazakh national identity appears, to a degree, to be countered by official government policy that seeks to utilise the historical symbolism of the zhuz to forge a Kazakh identity.

“...the idea of a tripartite division into zhuzes has been translated into a key symbol of Kazakh cultural integrity and autonomy in the state discourse since

120 Kurakbaev, Sharip, “Kazakh Clans Fall Out”, Reporting Central Asia, no 49, 27 April 2001, International War and Peace Reporting. The three zhuz traced their lineage back to Bekarys, Akarys and Zhanarys, the three sons of Kazakh, who was in turn the son of Alash, the mythical founder of the Kazakh people – Esenova, 2002, p17. 121 Edmunds, T., 1998, p465-466.

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Kazakhstan became an independent state…by recreating zhuz symbolism, the government of Kazakhstan is seeking to emphasise continuity of Kazakh traditional political authority with the present republic, the commitment to equal regional representation, and the unity of the three zhuzes as a source of national strength.”123

The continuation of the idea of zhuz has been closely accompanied by another sociological artefact from the pre-Soviet era – the supremacy of genealogy in determining Kazakh identity. In the early stages of the 20th century, Kazakh nationalists had compiled a genealogical register of all identified Kazakh tribes and lineages. This document came to be known as the Shezhyre. At the time of its compilation, when Russians were consolidating their hold in the region, the Shezhyre was the “most effective way of demonstrating the cultural unity of territorially dispersed and politically disjointed pastoral communities and of building the grounds for nationalist claims”.124 Somewhat surprisingly, the Shezhyre, and the idea of genealogy as a cornerstone of identity, has emerged as a significant influence in post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

“Shezhyre marks Kazakh ethnic boundaries drawn to define them as a culturally distinct people within a multi-cultural environment in Kazakhstan”.125

Whilst on face value, the fact that genealogy is significant to ideas of Kazakh ethnic identity may seem relatively benign, there are several elements to the Shezhyre that could prove problematic for ethnic relations if manipulated by nationalist politicians or media. By linking ancestry with a specific territory (given the relationship between zhuz and genealogy, and zhuz and region), the Shezhyre could be perceived as providing ethnic Kazakhs with primacy within the Kazakh state, at the expense of all those Kazakhs citizens who cannot establish their genealogical credentials.

122 Kurakbaev, S., 2001. 123 Esenova, S., 2002, p24. 124 Esenova, S., 2002, pp12-13. 125 ibid, p25.

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Esenova recounted a discussion with a retired professor from Almaty, who was relieved that his daughter, who had blues eyes and blond hair and thus could be mistaken for a Russian, “could confirm her Kazakh identity by naming seven generations of ancestors”.126 Ethnicity based on genetic heritage is the most exclusionary of all, given birth becomes more important than language, religion, culture or lifestyle. The evolution of an ethnic identity based on such criteria into a theory of nationalism would have tragic consequences for Kazakhstan.

Many of the examples listed above provide evidence of the extent to which a typically ‘western’ philosophy of nationalism, based on language, culture and a defined heritage, is taking hold within administrative and academic spheres of Kazakhstan. The political principle that the Kazakh nation and the state should be congruent is gaining increasing support within political and intellectual circles. From an optimist’s perspective, this concern may be premature, because the ‘nationalism’ that is arising in Kazakhstan, and in other Central Asian republics may merely be a short term side effect for these countries, and the titular nationalities within them who have ascended to the domain of statehood for the first time in their history. But, from a pessimistic viewpoint, the developments in the Central Asian republics over the last decade are merely an indication of what is to come.

Nazarbaev is an almost Tito-esque figure. On the one hand he almost single-handedly guarantees the integrity of the state of Kazakhstan by countering the more radical element in the Kazakh nationalist movement. And on the other hand he is sowing the seeds of the destruction of Kazakhstan by introducing programs that facilitate the development of cleavages between the different groups. The future stability of the country, and indeed the region, may be entirely dependent on the suitability of the successor to the long-lived Nazarbaev. It is almost undeniable that statesmanship of the highest order, as well as a genuine desire to forge the Kazakh and the non-Kazakh elements of the population into a coherent and cohesive multinational state will be crucial to the ongoing survival of Kazakhstan.

126 ibid, p26.

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The situation in the neighbouring republics is not too dissimilar in this regard. There are indications that all of the Presidents, with the exception of the recently deposed Kyrgyz President Akaev, will seek to hold on to their positions at all costs, thus denying the prospect of a planned succession. Although it may be the case that, with some exemptions, the nation-building initiatives introduced across the region have not proven to be as divisive as they possibly could have, such policies have, inevitably, contributed to tensions within states, and across borders. The nation building policies that have been successfully implemented have, in some respects, merely contributed to the already complex mosaic of identity and allegiance that exists in the region. What is further disconcerting is that these policies are merely one element of the policies of the governments of the region that have implications for ethnic harmony. And, although each of the republics have chosen a slightly divergent path in respect to nation-building, and as a consequence have had different experiences in respect to the management of their heterogenous populations, all of the republics are linked by their general disregard for the rights of non-titular peoples.

In the case of Kazakhstan, it is still difficult to predict whether conflict is more likely to develop between Kazakhs and Slavs, or within the Kazakh population itself, given the still substantial divisions that exist between clans, regions and zhuz. Indeed, from some respects Kazakh nationalism is the most intriguing, because the fact that it was one of the first manifestations of nationalism to emerge in the region, in the form of Alash Orda, has not reduced the potential for intraethic conflict within the majority Kazakh population in the republic. It is not yet clear how a continued reduction of the Russian population of Kazakhstan will impact upon this equilibrium.

The other republics, most notably Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are as much characterised by cross-border tensions as they are by inter-communal tensions. Although the significance and impact of the discriminatory language polices that both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have introduced cannot be overestimated, what is perhaps more critical is the fact that both countries have effectively securitised the issue of ethnicity. This is particularly obvious in their treatment of border communities of non- titular peoples, who have suffered as a consequence of the heavy handed policies of the governments.

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Equally intriguing is Kyrgyzstan. Given that ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan is most likely to develop in the Ferghana Valley, the ethnic question in Kyrgyzstan assumes a regional significance that goes beyond the questionable policies that Kyrgyzstan has introduced since independence. Unfortunately, given the general economic and social issues confronting the entire Ferghana Valley, and the pre-existing tensions within the region, there is a strong likelihood that ethnic conflict could develop in this region quite independently of government actions or policies.

The one positive from this discussion is the fact that Tajikistan has, since the ceasefire that ended the civil war, remained relatively free from conflict, ethnic or otherwise. Despite the relative calm of the last eight or so years, however, the potent mix of poverty and widespread government corruption makes it difficult to assess whether peace in Tajikistan will continue.

However, government attempts at nation-building through the implementation of discriminatory policies are just one side of the conundrum of ethnicity and identity in Central Asia. There are a number of different policies and factors, most notably the increasing discord between the states and the corresponding unwillingness to recognise issues of shared concern, that have equally as great potential to nurture the seeds of discord and division as do the strict nation-building policies being implemented. Not surprisingly, given the history of border demarcation in the region, the issue of border delimitation, and resulting border disputes, has emerged as one of the key factors in not only the relationships between the states, but in how the states treat their non-titular minority groups.

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Chapter Eight

Border Disputes and Irredentism – Prospects for Intra- and Interstate Conflict

Given the political imperatives driving the Soviet era border demarcation process, it was no real surprise that the issue of border demarcation would remain an enduring potential trigger of conflict in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. Although this potential for conflict has not yet been realised, relations between the Central Asian states since independence from the Soviet Union have, at times, been strained as a direct consequence of their failure to reach a permanent agreement on border delineation. Acceptance of the old Soviet borders, irrespective of the arbitrary or artificial nature of their creation, was a critical first step by the governments of the region in countering the possibility of a host of irredentist claims tearing apart the geographic fabric of their states.1 Unfortunately, the administrative boundaries inherited by the newly independent states in Central Asia from the Soviet Union were never definitively determined, and in some instances were only general outlines on official maps.2 Therefore, the task set for the governments of the region was a particularly onerous one, as competing objectives impeded the ability of the states to reach a consensus on the matter. Furthermore, the geographic and demographic dimensions of Central Asia ensured that an easy solution would be out of reach of even cooperative governments. Disregarding the political imperatives driving the border demarcation process during the Soviet era, the geographic and demographic reality had effectively defeated several generations of Soviet geographers and planners. And irregardless of how many bilateral border agreements are signed by the governments of the region, it is perceivable that the border issue will haunt the political, cultural and economic landscape of the region for many years to come.

For much of the first decade following independence the issue of border demarcation was not high on the agenda of any of the republics. This situation changed in 1999

1 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, ICG Asia Report No. 33, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels, 4 April 2002, p1.

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when two related developments focused the attention of regional governments on the issue of border demarcation and control. The first of these was the increased activity of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Incursions by groups of IMU guerrillas into Uzbekistan from neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and again in 2000 saw the Uzbek government take unilateral action to secure what were still undefined borders with its neighbours. The second event was the withdrawal by both Russia and Uzbekistan from the 1992 Bishkek Accord that had allowed visa free travel between almost all member countries of the CIS.3 Uzbekistan unilaterally instituted a visa regime regulating the movement of peoples across the Uzbek border, a move that produced reciprocal responses from its neighbours, and in the process changed the economic and demographic landscape of the entire region by hardening what were traditionally porous borders. The border demarcation issue has since come to be a central characteristic of the geopolitical dynamic of the region, especially as Uzbekistan increasingly seeks to belligerently occupy the political and economic centre of the region, if necessary at the expense of many of its neighbours.

As a consequence, over the last four to six years, many of the states of the region have been engaged in an ongoing process of border demarcation and negotiation with their neighbours. This process has met with varying degrees of success, the main limiting factor being that any negotiations on where to actually draw boundaries are predicated on how these states define their national interests,4 interests which unfortunately conflict more often than they correspond. And, on several occasions the outcomes of specific border issues have been resolved more as a consequence of the power dynamics of the region, with the central position occupied by an increasingly belligerent Uzbekistan.

2 ibid. 3 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, 2002, p3. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had actually pre-empted Russia’s moves in this instance by two years by introducing visa requirements for each other. Russia’s withdrawal merely hastened the dismantling of the Bishkek Accord across the entire region.

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Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan Border Demarcation

Kazakhstan enjoys the dubious privilege of having the longest shared border with Uzbekistan, totalling a length of some 2,150 kilometres. The issue of border demarcation came to prominence in relations between the two countries when Uzbekistan border guards were discovered conducting a unilateral demarcation of the Uzbek border with its northern neighbour, allegedly deep inside Kazakh territory, and incorporating building outposts.5 This incident provoked an immediate diplomatic response from Kazakhstan, and led to the establishment of a joint border commission. The commission met on several occasions over the subsequent year, but very little real progress on the matter was achieved until 16 November 2001, when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a Treaty on the Delimitation of the State Border, an agreement that delineated 96 percent of the Kazakh/Uzbek border. Upon signing the agreement, the Kazakhstan President claimed “by signing this agreement, we state that there are no ‘so- called border problems’ between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as no territorial claims to each other”.6 Significantly, however, the Kazakh-Uzbek border delineation process was far from finalised, with the three key sections of the remaining border falling within areas of ethnically mixed populations.7

It did not take long for the implications of such pockets of ethnically mixed populations located close to disputed borders to become apparent. The matter was complicated by the fact that many of the southern provinces of Kazakhstan, those subject to dispute, were among the republic’s most densely populated areas, and the disagreements about water, arable land and pasture that accompanied the border demarcation process exacerbated the region’s existing tensions.8 By 29 December 2001, tensions within a geographical pocket surrounding the villages of Bagys and Turkestanets – a territory of about 300,000 acres containing about 2,000 mainly ethnic Kazakh residents that had been annexed by Uzbekistan in 2000 - had reached a point where the residents of these

4 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, 2002, p1. 5 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, 2002, p7. 6 Bissenova, Alima, “Kazakhstani-Uzbek Border Agreement Sets Stage for Broader Central Asian Cooperation”, Eurasia Insight, 19 November, 2001. 7 ibid. 8 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, 2002, p1. Social tension was attributed to economic recession, declining living standards and high unemployment in the region.

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villages unilaterally seceded from Uzbekistan by proclaiming an independent ‘Bagys Kazakh Republic’. The apparent source of this dispute was that, following Uzbekistan unilaterally demarcating the adjacent border with Kazakhstan to incorporate the disputed territory within Uzbekistan, the ethnic Kazakhs in the region had been subjected to discrimination. This included an Uzbek attempt to introduce into local schools instruction based on rather than the Cyrillic used by Kazakhs, the denial of certain rights such as the right to privatise their homes, and pressure to adopt Uzbek citizenship and traditions.9

Importantly, such events tend to radicalise public opinion in a disproportionate fashion, in the process facilitating an evolution towards more nationalist sentiment in the general population. The initial failure of Nazarbaev to take a stand in the defence of these settlements provoked harsh and enduring criticisms from the more nationalist-minded elements of the population of Kazakhstan. For example, the Organising Committee of the United Democratic Party of Kazakhstan condemned Nazarbaev’s position on the dispute, declaring “the authorities can neither resolve the border problems, nor protect the constitutional rights of the common Kazakh people”.10

The issue of Bagys-Turkestanets remained a sensitive topic for nearly a year, until 9 September 2002, when the Presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a final bilateral agreement on border demarcation. This agreement saw Kazakhstan receive the village of Bagys, while Uzbekistan retained Turkestanets in addition to receiving three largely Uzbek villages from the Kazakh Qyzl-Orda Oblast.11 Although the 2002 agreement legally formalised the entire borderline between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it was revisited in the following year, when the two governments agreed to a re-division of the border. This process saw Uzbekistan receive additional land surrounding Bagys and Turkestanets, while Kazakhstan obtained land between the Chardara reservoir and Lake Arnasai, which provided the Kazakh ‘enclave’ with a direct transportation link with the rest of the country. The agreed border was symbolically proclaimed in May

9 Razumov, Yaroslav, “Kazakhstani-Uzbek Border Flap Threatens to Stoke Regional Tensions”, Eurasia Insight, 26 February 2002. 10 Razumov, Yaroslav, Kazakhstani-Uzbek Border Flap Threatens to Stoke Regional Tensions”, Eurasia Insight, 26 February 2002.

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2004, when the two governments constructed boundary posts adorned with state emblems at the Customs posts of Gishtkuprik and Znibek-zholy. The entire boundary was to be similarly demarcated by the installation of a single row of more than 1,500 boundary posts marked with state symbols for the entire length of the border.12

From the perspective of many Kazakhs, however, the ceding of Turkestanets to Uzbekistan was an unsatisfactory outcome, especially given that implicit in the border agreement was the expectation that Turkestanets’ roughly 1,000 Kazakh residents would abandon their homes and migrate across the newly defined border into Kazakhstan. Indeed, contained within President Nazarbaev’s proclamations on the border agreement was a promise to offer all villagers assistance with repatriation, including immigration status and financial support. Nazarbaev made further reference to the roughly 1.1 million ethnic Kazakhs that resided in Uzbekistan, stating that “there are no restrictions whatsoever for those wishing to move from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan”.13 Superficially noble as such offers may appear, the reality was such that Nazarbaev created a whole new set of issues as a result.

Although this offer was an extension of an enduring law enacted in 1991 by the Kazakh government allowing for the return of oralmandar, the new offer not only focused the expectations of diaspora Kazakhs on the likelihood of government assistance with relocation to Kazakhstan, but it also brought about a new exodus of Kazakhs from Uzbekistan. Those Kazakhs from areas that were stranded on the Uzbek side of the border following the demarcation process merely joined an already lengthy queue of Kazakhs in Uzbekistan who were seeking to leave Uzbekistan as a result of the dire economic situation in the country. Estimates of the number of Kazakhs joining the exodus from Uzbekistan indicate that the total number exceeded the official quota for

11 “Uzbek, Kazakh Presidents Sign Border Treaty”, in Central Asia Report, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 13 September 2002, vol 2, no 35, located at www.rferl.org. 12 Rahimov, M., and Urazaeva, G., Centra Asian Nations and Border Issues, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Central Asian Series, 05/10, March 2005, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Surrey, located at http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc. 13 “Uzbek, Kazakh Presidents Sign Border Treaty”. Uzbek President Karimov called the agreement “the result of a wise compromise that was reached after the two states’ interests had been thoroughly discussed”. Interestingly, the discussions between Karimov and Nazarbaev also focused on issues of economic importance to Kazkhstan, including the construction of a highway between Kungrad in western Uzbekistan and the Kazakh port of Aqtau, and the price Kazakhstan was to pay for natural gas from Uzbekistan.

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oralmandar who are entitled to financial assistance upon return by a factor of three.14 A decline in the economic situation in Kazakhstan could see the government’s enthusiasm for welcoming returnees decline markedly, to the extent that opportunities for return, funded or unfunded, may be reduced. As discussed below there are already some indications that Uzbekistan is becoming increasingly unwilling to accept Uzbek returnees from neighbouring Turkmenistan as a result of the increasing unemployment and poor economic performance in the country. And, as evidenced by the treatment of the non-Kazakh members of returnee families,15 Kazakhstan policy is underpinned by a discriminatory outlook that is not too dissimilar to that driving Kazakhs from Uzbekistan in the first place. As a consequence, even voluntary population transfer is far from being an ideal solution to the issues created by the diaspora communities.

The real effects of a regional trend towards denying members of diaspora communities the right to return remain to be seen. It would not be completely unfeasible to predict, however, that, in such an event, those populations trapped in increasingly unwelcoming countries could become even more a trigger for local conflict. For example, if Kazakhstan effectively ‘washed it’s hands’ of diaspora Kazakhs in Uzbekistan in the near future, as a result of the additional strain placed on the national economy by oralmandar, then it would be likely that diaspora Kazakhs would be subjected to even higher levels of discrimination by Uzbek authorities. The likely consequences of feelings of abandonment have already been indicated by the case of Bagys- Turkestanets. If, theoretically, similar responses were undertaken by the nearly one

14 “Economic problems fuel departure of ethnic Kazakhs”, IRIN, 6 July 2004, located at www.irinnews.org. The entitlements given to those returning to Kazakhstan as part of the official oralman quota include the right to be transported to Kazakhstan free of charge, provision of a house or flat, social security assistance and access to a simplified procedure for obtaining citizenship. Those that returned outside of the formal oralman system generally encountered considerable economic and social hardship. The Kazakh government had, however, increased the quota under the oralman system from 5,000 in 2003, to 10,000 for 2004, and further to 15,000 in 2005. It is also interesting that the Kazakh policy for oralman originating from Kazakhstan largely ignores the strict application of oralman rights to diaspora communities to include irredentist communities. This lack of consistency may have been driven by political recognition of the need to treat Kazakh minorities trapped on Uzbek soil as a consequence of the current border demarcation process with unusual flexibility and sensitivity, given the prospect of unrest in border communities. However, as stated, such ‘flexible policy’ may come back to haunt the Kazakh government by creating increasingly disenfranchised communities on their own soil. 15 The non-Kazakh partners of Kazakh returnees are facing barriers to obtaining citizenship on their return, even though citizenship laws permit them to. See Dosybieva, Olga, “Kazakhstan: Diaspora Kazakhs Face Discrimination”, Reporting Central Asia, No 271, 17 March 2004. The common reason cited as being given for lengthy delays by migration officials is that they “should have married a Kazakh”.

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million Kazakhs who remain spread across a wide geographical area within Uzbekistan, the consequences would be far reaching, irrespective of a response from the Kazakh government.16

It is indisputable, however, that the willingness of governments to reach an enduring consensus on disputes of this nature, irrespective of their initial unpopularity, is a step in the right direction. A compromise, such as what was achieved in the case of Bagys- Turkestanets is vastly preferable to the alternative of continued disputation over borders and territory. Unfortunately, this bilateral agreement achieved little in the way of alleviating border-related tensions between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan’s subsequent heavy handed approach to enforcing border controls has resulted in a number of shooting incidents involving Uzbek border troops and Kazakh citizens seeking to cross the border. Between November 2001 and September 2003, Uzbek border troops were involved in five shooting incidents along the Kazakhstan border. During the same period, Kazakh border troops did not once resort to the use of force, despite recording a reported 1,127 border violations by Uzbeks.17 And, despite justified claims by Kazakhstan that the use of force by Uzbek border troops was taking on a systematic nature, Uzbekistan shrugged off such claims, and went on the offensive, criticising Kazakhstan’s “irresponsible and tactless statements” on the topic, and claiming that Kazakhstan’s behaviour “may not only worsen Uzbek-Kazakh relations but also provoke tension in border areas”.18

Further shootings occurred in mid-2004. The first incident involved the shooting of a Kazakh citizen after an altercation with Uzbek border guards. The second occurred after a crowd gathered in the Uzbek village of Sarhe, near the Kazakh border, and attempted to help an alleged smuggler apprehended by Uzbek border troops. In this

16 The response by the Uzbek government to Bagys declaring its independence was, although not widely documented, reported in the local media as typically heavy handed. Although such accounts, when sourced from the Kazakh media should be taken with a healthy dose of scepticism, there were reports that following the local demonstration that followed the declaration of independence and oath taking by the new “President of the Independent Kazakh Republic of Bagys”, Aidar Adbiramanov, the Uzbek army intervened, and a number of people where arrested and not seen again – Zamana, January 15, 2002, located at www.translationkz.8k.com/articles. 17 Alibekov, Ibragim, “Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Clash Over Border Policy”, in Eurasia Insight, 30 September 2003. 18 Alibekov, Ibragim, “Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Clash Over Border Policy”, Eurasia Insight, 30 September 2003.

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instance, three locals were shot, one of them fatally.19 The inevitable end result of this is that tensions between the governments, especially on a sensitive issue that has direct ramifications for the local populations, tend to manifest locally as well as nationally. As is discussed later, such tensions, when accompanied by high unemployment and a declining economic situation as exists in the border region, can prove to be inflammatory.

Further aggravating the relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is the fact that, although a comprehensive border demarcation agreement has been signed by the two governments, the formal border demarcation process, involving the physical mapping of the border, has yet to be completed and is expected to run for another two years. This process is producing a whole new set of issues for the governments of the region to contend with, as the newly devised border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will, when physically marked out, divide towns, villages and even families, in some cases literally down the middle. The border demarcation process, effectively producing the first fixed borders in the region in history, has proven to be particularly problematic, with the demarcation commission having to make difficult decisions that regularly impact negatively on the local population.

“The most difficult work will be in residential areas. Sometimes the border line runs not only through private plots, streets and fences, but also through people’s houses.”20

The solution to this problem implemented by Uzbekistan was relatively simple: the Uzbek government instituted a program to bulldoze all those homes that straddled the border with its northern neighbour. This, in itself was a problematic approach to the issue, especially as the Uzbek government had no plans to compensate those affected for their loss. However, a more insidious factor behind the Uzbek government’s actions was identified. The speed with which Uzbekistan instituted the demolition program was seen as indicating Uzbekistan’s suspicion of Kazakhstan as a potentially hostile

19 “Uzbekistan: A Fatal Frontier”, Reporting Central Asia, 23 July 2004.

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neighbour.21 If such interpretations are correct, it is possible that the border demarcation process could prove to be the instigator of increased tension between the governments of the region, instead of the development of a détente between increasingly hostile neighbours.

However, the long term strategic implications of border demarcation are overshadowed by a more immediate concern. An inevitable additional consequence is that villages and even families find themselves trapped on the opposite sides of a border that, in the specific case of Uzbekistan, is proving increasingly difficult to cross. The social and economic implications of this scenario are, in the short term at least, far-reaching and divisive. And the problem is common to the demarcation processes being undertaken by all of the countries in the region. However, in the wake of the May -June 2005 events in Uzbekistan, and the subsequent brutal clampdown on dissent by the Uzbek government, control of the Uzbek border, in particular by neighbouring republics seeking to halt the flow of Uzbeks from the violence in their home countries, has become a priority issue for these republics.

Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan Border Demarcation

The Kazakh-Uzbek border commission appears as something of a success when compared to the progress that has been achieved on this issue by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Making the likelihood of an enduring and workable border agreement between these two countries even more remote is the fact that, unlike the other bilateral agreements being signed in the region, the Turkmen-Uzbek border delimitation is undermined by the personal animosity that exists between the Presidents of the two countries. And, unlike the other border demarcation processes underway, this process has its origins in events that occurred before 1999.

20 Bekseil Dyusebaev, Kazakh Government official sitting on the Demarcation Commission, quoted in Dosybieva, Olga, “Kazakh-Uzbek Border: Mapping out the Future”, Reporting Central Asia, no 289, 1 June 2004. 21 Rotar, I., “Uzbekistan Bulldozes Settlements Along Border with Kazakhstan”, Jamestown Monitor, vol 2, issue 9, January 13 2005, located at http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?search=1&volume_id=407&issue_id=3194&article_ id=2369082.

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Upon independence in 1991, the Uzbekistan government inherited substantial long-term leases on oil and gas facilities within Turkmenistan as a result of agreements undertaken during the Soviet era. This rapidly became a significant issue for the fledgling Turkmen government, and it was only in 1996 that Uzbekistan officially recognised Turkmenistan’s right to neutrality, in return for a continued right to own land in Turkmenistan.22 Inevitably, such arrangements complicated any processes of border demarcation, which were completed by a joint Turkmen-Uzbek commission in August 2000. The two countries subsequently wasted no time in marking out their territory, with a potent symbol of the inflexibility of the two countries vis-à-vis border issues being provided by Turkmen President Saparmurat Niazov when he decreed in March 2001 that a 1,700 kilometre fence should be installed on the border with Uzbekistan by the end of the year.23

The Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border commission agreed only in mid 2004 to the return to Turkmenistan of some 18,000 hectares of land, which had been leased to Uzbekistan during the Soviet period. The ethnic Uzbeks in the area had taken up Uzbekistan citizenship upon independence. With the return of this territory, along with its population, to Turkmenistan, in 2004, however, the local Uzbek citizens were technically foreign nationals, given Turkmen law prohibiting the holding of dual citizenship.24 The local ethnic Uzbek residents were provided with the choice of remaining behind and taking on Turkmen citizenship, or abandoning their homes and migrating to Uzbekistan. Turkmen President Niazov made the choice confronting the residents of the region appear deceptively simple, declaring:

“If you want, go to Uzbekistan. If you want, get Turkmen citizenship and stay here. Of course, they will stay here. We have free gas, free electricity. People are happy here.”25

22 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, ICG Asia Report No. 33, Osh/Brussels, 4 April 2002, p10. 23 “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential”, ICG Asia Report No. 33, Osh/Brussels, 4 April 2002, p10. It is not clear, however, just how much work was undertaken on this fence between the two countries. 24 “Turkmen’s Foreign Uzbeks”, Reporting Central Asia, No. 296, 24 June 2004.

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The reality, though, is much more complex. The Turkmen government’s policy of cultural homogeneity, as discussed earlier, means that in addition to surrendering their Uzbek citizenship, ethnic Uzbeks who remained behind in the returned region were also expected to accept discrimination and the erosion of their cultural identity: schools using the Uzbek language in their curriculum have ceased doing so, school children have been forced to adopt traditional ‘Turkmen’ attire, and Turkmen clerics have been imposed upon the local mosques.26 Even the acceptance of such requirements by local Uzbeks have not spared them from being further targeted by political authorities. The personal animosity that has long existed between the leaders of the two countries - which reached its nadir in November 2002 when President Niazov accused Uzbek President Karimov of being behind an assassination attempt – has led to President Niazov treating even those Uzbeks who have taken up Turkmen citizenship with deep suspicion. Soon after the assassination attempt, Niazov implemented a programme of resettlement from the border with Uzbekistan, an area that contained the majority of Turkmenistan’s Uzbek population, to the inhospitable northwest of the country.27 The latest demarcation agreement has done little to calm the suspicions of Niazov or any of the Turkmen political elite. Indeed, there is some evidence that the campaign of targeting Uzbeks for harassment has been expanded: “Why do we need several thousand foreign citizens on our territory when, in fact, there is no legal basis for them to be here”.28

It is unclear what effect the reappointment in early 2004 of an Uzbek Ambassador to Turkmenistan, and the resultant opportunity for discussion between the governments of the two regions, will have for border control and for overall relations between the two states. At the presidential level, the rhetoric promised vastly improved relations between the two countries, with President Karimov promising “the decisions we have

25 Pannier, Bruce, “Uzbek Family finds itself suddenly straddling Turkmen border”, Eurasia Insight, 20 June 2004. 26 ibid. 27 Pannier, Bruce, “Uzbek Family finds itself suddenly straddling Turkmen border”, Eurasia Insight, 20 June 2004. 28 Turkmen Foreign Ministry official, quoted in Bruce Pannier, “Uzbek Family finds itself suddenly straddling Turkmen border”, Eurasia Insight, 20 June 2004. The official went on to claim, perhaps not entirely unjustifiably, that Uzbekistan was not actually interested in accepting migrants, given their high unemployment and shortage of arable land.

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made will turn the border between our nations into a border of peace and friendship”.29 Despite such indications of rapprochement, it is probable that border communities in Turkmenistan will continue to be affected by the new system of border controls inhibiting their movement between the two countries. In fact, the recent rapprochement between the two countries may, in fact, create an equilibrium of government control on both sides of the border. In this environment, it is likely that an increasingly paranoid Uzbekistan, made even more security conscious as a consequence of the events in Andijan in May 2005, may tighten border controls on the Uzbek side. This would make the status of ethnic Uzbeks living on the Turkmen side of the border even more precarious. Where they were once confronted with the choice of whether they wanted to abandon their homes and property and emigrate across the border to Uzbekistan, or remain in Turkmenistan and be forced to accept the erosion of their cultural identity,30 it is possible that consensus on border control by the Turkmen and Uzbek governments may be accompanied by a complete abandonment by the Uzbek government of the Uzbeks of Turkmenistan to the nationalising policies of Turkmenbashi.

The Conundrum of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

The issue of border demarcation and border control became a feature of dialogue between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999 and 2000 as a consequence of IMU incursions from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan. To date, portions of the shared border between the two countries are still to be demarcated. However, the two countries are facing an issue that complicates negotiations on this topic: the existence in Kyrgyzstan of enclaves of Tajik territory. Such enclaves of trapped, irredentist populations, legally part of Tajikistan but separated from the rest of their country by a corridor of land belonging to Kyrgyzstan, remain a sensitive trigger to conflict along borders and between ethnic groups, and a continuing source of dispute between the two countries. In early 2003, a number of clashes were reported along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border that divided Tajikistan’s enclave of Vorukh from the rest of Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region. The source of these clashes appeared to be several new border posts that were established by Kyrgyz authorities around Vorukh. In response to this move, which

29 Karaev, T. “ New Envoy Signals Uzbek-Turkmen Thaw”, Reporting Central Asia, no 343, 21 January 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 30 Karaev, T., 2005.

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limited the freedom of movement historically enjoyed by the ethnic Tajik residents of Vorukh, several hundred residents destroyed one of the newly erected Kyrgyz border posts at the Kyrgyz border town of Koekterek. In response, approximately 100 residents of Koekterek crossed over into Vorukh and destroyed a Tajik border post.31

About 40,000 ethnic Tajiks live in Vorukh, and the town is separated from Tajikistan proper by a 20 kilometre stretch of land that is rich in both water resources and arable land.32 Fuelling the tension is the uncertainty surrounding the future of the disputed territory within the Batken region adjacent to the Tajik border. Kyrgyz residents fear that Tajikistan has designs on the disputed territories, which could accommodate the growing number of people who have been migrating from the impoverished south of Tajikistan to the richer northern region.33 In addition to Vorukh and the second Tajik enclave of Qalicha, there are 71 separate land plots covering 21 square kilometres along the border that are claimed by both countries.34 The governments of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan appear to have recognised the need to deal delicately with the process of border demarcation in this area, and agreed in 2003 that the disputed areas would not be used until the demarcation process was completed. However, the local populations have not adhered to their respective governments’ policy on the use of the area. In early 2004, villages from the Tajik village of Chorku crossed the border and planted hundreds of apricot trees in disputed territory near the Kyrgyz village of Koktash. Although Kyrgyz authorities responded by uprooting the trees, this incident was part of a cycle of minor disputes and retaliatory actions which has seen Tajik citizens also accused of taking over either disputed or Kyrgyz land for cultivation and the grazing of land, and even the building of houses.35

31 Carlsen, Charles, “Tajikistan / Kyrgyzstan: Clashes Reported Along Border”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 6 January 2003, located at www.rferl.org. 32 Jumagulov, Sultan, “Kyrgyz Fears over Tajik Border Talks”, Reporting Central Asia, no 174, 10 January 2003. 33 Jumagulov, Sultan, “Kyrgyz Fears over Tajik Border Talks”, Reporting Central Asia, No. 174, 10 January 2003. The article also quoted International Crises Group analyst Philip Noubel, who identifies the possibility that local Tajiks may have sought to occupy disputed territories because they feared Dusbanbe may negotiate the territories away. Many locals believed that Tajikistan had lost out during similar border demarcation negotiations with China. 34 Khamidov, Alisker, “Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Riots Highlight Building Inter-ethnic Tension in Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, 8 January 2003. 35 Adbrakhmanova, Ainagul and Valiev, Bakhtior, “The Apricot of Discord”, Reporting Central Asia, No. 269, 5 March 2004. Kyrgyz citizens have not been without blame, either, with claims that people on the Kyrgyz side of the border had cut a water pipe supplying the Tajik town of Shurab.

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Further disputes developed in the region, following the shooting of a Tajik villager from Chorku who was collecting wood on the Kyrgyz side of the border in June 2005. Following the shooting, the three Kyrgyz border guards responsible were attacked by Tajiks, who captured and assaulted them. Although the guards were subsequently rescued by Tajik police, the incident was significant enough to warrant the convening of a special meeting between the Kyrgyz governor of Batken and his Tajik counterpart to discuss the incident.36 Furthermore, it prompted passionate responses from residents on both sides of the uncertain border and calls from analysts and government officials for a tightening of the border between the two countries. However, this event was indicative of the difficulty associated with reconciling the need for clearly defined enforceable borders with the importance of accommodating traditional patterns of economic activity and community life. On one hand, commentators used this incident as evidence of the importance of formally delimiting and demarcating the border between the orders. On the other hand, local communities argued that formal division of the region would be difficult because such an action would interrupt traditional lifestyles in the region.37 This appears to be a difficult compromise for the governments of the region to accommodate. In many respects the conundrum that arises from this situation will continue to be a feature of the Central Asian political and socio-economic landscape for some time to come, regardless of how many border agreements are signed and enforced by the governments of the region.

Unfortunately, as petty as these incidents appear, local journalist and political commentary has ensured that events such as the planting of apricot trees on disputed territory, which would ordinarily remain a mildly amusing anecdote, are escalated in significance to become almost matters of national security. The editor in chief of the

36 Kasymailieva, A., Nazarov, Rustam, and Valiev, Bakhtier, “Kyrgyz, Tajik Border Shooting Rings Alarm Bells”, Reporting Central Asia, no 387, 15 June 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 37 Kasymailieva, A., Nazarov, R, and Valiev, B., 2005, quoted a number of the residents of Chorku, who claimed that “several generations of Chorku grew up in these mountains…They spent their leisure time there…”. Furthermore, until recent events in Uzbekistan resulted in an increase in border patrols in the region, Kyrgyz border guards had allowed Chorku residents to make money by gathering timber in the region, subject to payment of a bribe: “usually, we always found a common language with the border guards, gave them some money, and they left us alone…in fact, no one knows where the border actually is in this region”. Interestingly, the authors also quoted local political analysts, who considered that the lack of a clearly marked frontier was the main reason for frequent clashes in the Isfara-Batken region, but who conceded that the “national and territorial divisions did not take into account historical, geographical, natural climate and other factors”.

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Kyrgyz newspaper Tribuna, for one, attached a much stronger significance to the actions of the Tajiks who planted the apricot trees.

“The apricot invasion by the Tajik might lead to a real invasion of Kyrgyz land in the near future, unless the Kyrgyz authorities actually do something and begin seeing the incident as a serious violation of a sovereign state’s territorial integrity…our authorities must finally learn to protect their territory.”38

Disputed Territories

Key 1. Ferghana Valley, Kyrgyzstan 2. Parts of Samarkand and Bukhara Provinces 3 Tajikistan territory that was part of Uzbekistan in 1924-1929 4 Isfara-Batken conflict – enclave immediately to the right of number is part of Tajikistan; the two enclaves to its right are parts of Uzbekistan

Source: Carlisle, Donald, “Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems of Uzbekistan and its Neighbours”, in Roi, Yaacov, Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, Frank Cass, London, 1995, pp71-105, p97.

Although such histrionics on the part of journalists are to be expected, such impassioned references to matters of state sovereignty and territorial integrity have been lent weight

38 Quoted in Adbrakhmanova, Ainagul and Valiev, Bakhtior, “The Apricot of Discord”, Reporting Central Asia, No. 269, 5 March 2004. Somewhat intriguingly, the more recent events in Chorku were interpreted by analysts as not having long term repercussions: “this case is not the result of a policy. It is only an accidental misunderstanding, which will not affect relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan”. See Kasymailieva, A., Nazarov, R., and Valiev, B., 2005. Such analysis appears dangerously oblivious of the ‘mundane’ causes of earlier conflicts in Batken, in Osh, and other areas of the Ferghana Valley.

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by comments on the same matter by various Kyrgyz political figures. Former Kyrgyz Secretary of State, Istenbay Abdrazakov, framed his commentary on the subject in the context of “creeping territorial expansion”:

“Our side is not taking any steps, so Tajiks are continuing to settle our lands…this is laying the ground for an ethnic conflict, which later might turn into an international one.”39

While it can be anticipated that such disputes will be lessened once the governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan agree on a border, the Tajik enclaves will ensure that there is no easy solution to the problems of the region as long as the two countries fail to reach an agreement on how to manage the issue of border control and the movements of peoples and goods between Tajikistan proper and the enclaves. At present, border control in this region is characterised by corruption and bureaucratic impediments similar to that of Uzbek border procedure. There have been almost countless cases of extortion of Kyrgyz commuters by Tajik border guards in what have historically been major thoroughfares, with a classic example of the endemic obstructionism and corruption occurring in September 2002. The Kyrgyz regions of Batken and Leilek are connected by a major highway that passes through the Isfara region of Tajikistan, and historically this highway has been the most used link between the two regions. On this occasion, Tajik authorities blocked the highway, preventing the Kyrgyz commuters from passing through. Although an agreement to reopen the road was reached by local authorities, two days after the highway was reopened a convoy of 12 Kyrgyz trucks carrying an estimated USD5 million worth of produce to the Kyrgyz town of Suluktu were stopped and impounded by local Tajik authorities, who insisted on a payment of USD1,000 per truck for their release.40 Such events are an unnecessary addition to the

39 Quoted in Adbrakhmanova, Ainagul and Valiev, Bakhtior, “The Apricot of Discord”, Reporting Central Asia, no 269, 5 March 2004. The chief editor of the Tajik news agency Varorud, Nejmatullo Mirsaidov, was also quoted on the topic. He provided a different rationale for Tajik claims on the territory, stating that “those Kyrgyz who talk about what they call expansion know in their heart of hearts who some of the territory belongs to…there is not a shred of evidence from archaeological digs to show these land belong to the Kyrgyz…. people are not going to wait until the status of the borderlands is resolved. Where there is a shortage of land in frontier areas, farmers are going to try to work unused land, whether we like it or not.” 40 Karim kyzy, Gulzina, “Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Problems”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002.

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many sources of tension that already exist in the region, and contribute to a dangerous sense of antipathy on the part of the local Kyrgyz population towards Tajik authorities, and, by default, towards local Tajik residents.

Voluntary and Involuntary Population Transfer as a Destabilising Factor

As discussed earlier, several governments in the region, most notably Kazakhstan, instituted positive programs encouraging and assisting the ‘return’ of members of the Kazakh diaspora population, therefore producing an almost voluntary pattern of population transfer. However, there has been an emerging pattern of both expulsion and internal involuntary population transfer, especially in respect to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. This pattern provides evidence of the potential for overt hostile action towards different ‘non-national’ groups on the part of the government, and became particularly apparent in the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks in the US. For example, Kazakhstan expelled over 1,000 illegal Tajik and Kyrgyz immigrants in the month immediately after the attacks in the US. Although, in this instance, the numbers involved are relatively minor, what is problematic is the lack of consistency in governments’ actions in the wake of September 11 2001, providing some evidence of a more insidious policy underpinning such ‘security’ measures. In the Kazakh case, it is difficult from a strictly security perspective to reconcile the above example of expulsion with other actions taken by the Kazakh government: at the same time as the above crack-down on illegal immigrants Kazakhstan was welcoming ethnic Kazakh newcomers from other countries, in particular Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. President Nazarbaev himself extended something of an invitation to ethnic Kazakh refugees in Afghanistan to resettle in Kazakhstan, with USD27 million allocated to the resettlement of Kazakh refugees from Afghanistan.41

Theoretically, if Nazarbaev was genuinely concerned about the risk of a terrorist or fundamental Islamist network taking root in Kazakhstan, then it would be expected that by opening the borders to large numbers of Kazakhs from Afghanistan in particular, where they would have had significant exposure to Taliban and Wahhabi philosophy,

41 Razumov, Yaroslav, “Central Asian Governments Impose Migration Barriers”, Eurasia Insight, 24 October 2001.

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there would be a heightened likelihood of fundamentalist Islamist philosophy being imported into Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, history, especially Soviet history, is pockmarked with examples of mass expulsion and brutal population transfers in response to perceived or fabricated security concerns. In this instance, it is arguable that is it is not an insurmountable step to graduate from the expulsion of a few illegal immigrants who happen to fit a particular national group, and the expulsion of all members of a particular ethnic or national group who are categorised, correctly or incorrectly, as a threat to the security of the state.

Uzbekistan is by far the most belligerent player in the region when it comes to the issue of border demarcation and the prospect of population transfer. Uzbekistan was cited in the October 2003 report issued by the Global Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Project, which also included Turkmenistan in a list of 13 OSCE states that had experienced internal displacement of peoples. Although the situation in Uzbekistan vis- à-vis IDP was assessed as relatively minor, the report still identified up to 3,500 people who had been internally displaced. Whilst it appears that many of these people were displaced as a result of Uzbek government action in response to activities involving the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), what is of interest is that displacement along predominantly ethnic lines can be identified. For example, in 2000 the Uzbek government evacuated 22 villages in the Sukhandaria region along the Tajik border, and forcibly removed the mostly ethnic Tajik villagers from their homes. Although the threat from the IMU was considered to have reduced in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, those peoples displaced as a result of the Uzbek government’s action had, as of 2003, still been refused permission to visit their villages of origin.42

Somewhat ironically, the same report on IDP’s identified ethnic Uzbeks in Turkmenistan as having been subjected to the same type of forcible displacement. As a result of a Presidential decree on 6 January 2003, 2,000 ethnic Uzbeks were moved from the border with Uzbekistan to an area adjacent with Kazakhstan. And, although such forced displacement has been part of a broader pattern of harassment of various

42 “Protecting Internally Displaced Persons: A Neglected Commitment”, Report by the Global Internally Displace Persons Project, presented to the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, ,

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minority religious groups within Turkmenistan,43 there was a continuing risk of displacement of the ethnic Uzbeks living along Turkmenistan’s 1,621 kilometre border with Uzbekistan.44

Belligerent Uzbekistan at the Centre: Further Causes and Consequences of Regional Tensions

Uzbekistan’s use of the threat from Islamic militants as a pretext for broad action extends much further than mere border control and population transfers, and for some time it has been apparent that Uzbekistan may have territorial designs that extend beyond the scope of existing border demarcation disputes. The Ferghana Valley has been seen as the centre of these designs, as control over this valley would not only address many of Uzbekistan’s security concerns, but would also ensure Uzbek dominance of the entire Central Asian region.45 In this regard, it could be expected that Uzbekistan will continue to throw its weight around during negotiations on border demarcation and visa requirements with its smaller neighbours. There appears to be two elements to Uzbekistan’s approach to the matter. The first of these elements relates directly to Uzbekistan’s security concerns, and its attempts to impede the movement of IMU guerrillas through areas of traditional vulnerability.

Uzbekistan’s policy of unilateral mining of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has possibly the most significant immediate ramifications for the region. Uzbekistan began mining its border with its two neighbours in 1999 after the initial IMU incursions, with no consultation with its neighbours. Since this time, the issue of mining the frontier has proven to be a source of ongoing tension between the countries. The most

October 2003, p34, text of report located at http://www.idpproject.org/regions/Europe/Overview_OSCE_IDP_report.pdf. 43 ibid. 44 “Evidence of Forced Displacement, Says Report”, IRIN, 13 October 2003, located at www.IRINnews.org. The article quotes Christopher Beau of the Global Internally Displaced Persons Project. 45 “Uzbekistan Consolidates Domination Hold in Central Asia”, Stratfor, 23 February 2001, located at www.stratfor.com/. The article assessed that Uzbekistan was dragging its feet on the demarcation of borders, and identified instances of Uzbekistan cutting off natural gas supplies to its neighbours, and subsequently asking for territorial compensation in return for a resumption of supply. Furthermore, the article also predicted that, in addition to asserting control over the entire Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan could theoretically annex Northern Tajikistan, which would give them control over most of Tajikistan’s 1.2 million Uzbeks, the most industrialised portion of Tajikistan, and, critically, the road and rail links to the Ferghana.

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immediate consequence of Uzbekistan’s program of mining the borders has been the deaths and injuries within the local populations that have resulted. In the first four years of Uzbekistan’s mining program, at least six Kyrgyz citizens and ‘scores’ of Tajik citizens have been reportedly killed by mines laid by Uzbekistan in unmarked fields.46 The minefield issue has been aggravated by Uzbekistan’s ongoing refusal to provide its neighbours with maps of the unmarked minefields along their borders, despite regular official requests from both regional and national authorities.47 It has been left to the local Red Crescent Society to commence erecting signs warning of minefields in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region, one of the more heavily mined areas along the border.48

The truculent attitude of the Uzbeks in respect to the mine issue has, to a degree, been attributed to the failure of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments to come to an agreement on the issue of border demarcation, with, as of February 2004, over 1,200 kilometres of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border yet to be delimitated. Although Uzbekistan commenced its mining programme in 1999, at the time the issue of border demarcation was being pushed towards the top of the various governments’ lists of priorities, much of Uzbekistan’s mining programme vis-à-vis Kyrgyzstan focused on the disputed frontier territory, in particular the Batken region from where the IMU had launched its 1999 offensive.49 This made both the issue of border demarcation and mine removal, or at least mapping, all the more sensitive for both countries and impeded any resolution that could immediately offer solutions to either issue. Any attempts by Kyrgyz military or government officials to unilaterally approach the issue of de-mining were eventually

46 “Minefields to negotiate as tense border talks restart in Tashkent”, Central Asia Report, vol 3, no 11, 13 March 2003, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In early 2004, the head of Tajikistan’s Mine Action Centre, Jonmahmad Rajabov, indicated that the figure for Tajik casualties resulting from Uzbekistan’s mining program stood at 62 dead and a similar number wounded. He also asserted that “Tashkent justifies its action by the need to protect its border from infiltration by international terrorists, but only Tajik civilians have died from mines so far”, and that Uzbekistan had mined “even those sections of the border which the Uzbekistani side considers our territory”: Kambiz Arman, “Border issues ruffle relations among Central Asia states”, Eurasia Insight, 25 February 2004. 47 “Minefields to negotiate as tense border talks restart in Tashkent”, in Central Asia Report, 13 March 2003, vol 3, no 11. 48 Jumagulov, Sultan and Borisova, Olga, “Uzbek-Kyrgyz Border Danger”, Reporting Central Asia, no 192, 21 March 2002. The authors also quoted Kyrgyz authorities in Bishkek as indicating that deaths resulting from the minefields range as high as 13 as at March 2003, with many more injured. ‘Countless’ number of sheep and cattle were also recorded as having been killed, having an economic impact upon the already impoverished local Batken residents. 49 Jumagulov, Sultan and Borisova, Olga, “Uzbek-Kyrgyz Border Danger”, Reporting Central Asia, no 192, 21 March 2002

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abandoned as futile as a direct consequence of the ill-defined nature of the borders.50 It was only in June 2004, during a meeting of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe did Uzbekistan first indicate a willingness to remove landmines from its Tajik and Kyrgyz borders.51 This progress was followed by further meetings in the subsequent months, and an outcome of talks was that Uzbekistan began clearing minefields in the territory between the enclaves of Sokh and Shakhi-Mardan in late 2004.52 Despite the fact that more than 400 km of the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan remains under dispute53, agreement of the de-mining process was a critical step forward, as it marked a willingness by Uzbekistan to cooperate with its neighbours on critical issues.

This proclamation by Uzbekistan was accompanied by a stated willingness to embark upon a process of greater economic integration with its neighbours,54 a move that would, if implemented, reverse the pattern of isolation and regular border closure that Uzbekistan had adopted over the previous four years. Although Uzbekistan’s demonstrated tendency to close borders with its neighbours on a regular and relatively arbitrary basis may appear less consequential than its mining programme, in the long term such actions may have had an almost equally dramatic impact given the associated disruption to traditional patterns of trade and economic activity that such moves have caused. And while it was inevitable that the imposition of a system of clearly defined borders in Central Asia for the first time in history was going to impact upon the traditional patterns of economic activity, including the movements of peoples, trade and currency, Uzbekistan’s heavy-handed approach to the issue of border control has most dramatically impacted upon both the livelihoods and lifestyles of the significant populations that reside in areas adjacent to the newly agreed borders. Furthermore, as

50 Jumagulov, Sultan and Borisova, Olga, “Uzbek-Kyrgyz Border Danger”, Reporting Central Asia, no 192, 21 March 2002. The authors quoted a Kyrgyz border guard explosives expert, who said “we couldn’t make much headway because we do not know exactly where the border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan lies”. The likely Uzbek response to any demining efforts undertaken by Kyrgyz military personnel was also predicted by Kyrgyz defence ministry official, Tairbek Madymarov, who said “they’ve stated quite clearly that if the Kyrgyz personnel dug up and defused the mines, more would be planted, as it is not yet clear which land belongs to which republic”. 51 “Tashkent Moves To De-Mine Borders With Kyrgyzstan And Tajikistan”, IRIN, 24 June 2004, located at www.irinnews.org. 52 Rahimov, M. and Urazaevea, G. 2005, p19. 53 Rahimov, M. and Urazaevea, G. 2005, p19.

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indicated earlier, Uzbekistan’s unilateral approach to border control and regulation is providing, even after the implementation of border demarcation agreements, a continued source of tension between Uzbekistan and all of its neighbours. On a number of occasions, Uzbekistan’s contentious approach to border control has provoked comments that the country is involved in ‘economic aggression’ against its neighbours.55

From this perspective, the significance of the border issue goes beyond mere land grabs being made by the different governments of the region. Irrespective of governments’ attempts to negotiate border demarcation agreements with their neighbours, the heart of the border issue are the attempts by certain governments’, in particular the Uzbekistan government, to establish control over what have historically been very porous borders, and thus regulate the passage of people, money and goods across state boundaries.

The most disruptive dimension of Uzbekistan’s border control policy is its tendency to arbitrarily close its borders with its neighbours, in particular Kazakhstan. Typically, Uzbekistan provides a not entirely plausible reason for closing the border, such as claiming a health scare56 or threat of an incursion by the IMU from a neighbouring country. Rationale aside, the end result of Uzbekistan closing its borders is invariably the same – the impeding (if not actually halting) of the economic activity that is fundamental to the communities on both sides of the Uzbek border. A classic anecdotal example of this impact is Uzbekistan’s unilateral and unexplained closure of its border with Kazakhstan on 28 December 2002. The informal cross border trade that occurs between the adjacent Uzbek and Kazakh communities is of fundamental benefit to both groups, with thousands of residents from both countries regularly crossing the border to make their livelihoods on the opposite side. Uzbek traders in particular regularly cross the border to sell their goods at the bazaars and markets that are held in southern

54 “Tashkent Moves To De-Mine Borders With Kyrgyzstan And Tajikistan”, IRIN, 24 June 2004, located at www.irinnews.org. 55 “Uzbek Border Row Introduces New Element Of Tension In Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, 21/01/03. 56 In late 2002 to early 2003, when Uzbekistan closed its border with Kazakhstan, Uzbek authorities cited a need to impose quarantine procedures between the two countries, claiming a “growing frequency of case of food poisoning among Uzbek citizens from food products bought in Kazakhstan. See Bukharbaeva, Galima, “Kazak Border Shut After ‘Hygiene Scare’”, Reporting Central Asia, no 174, 10 January 2003.

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Kazakhstan, with the daily receipts from the Uzbek traders being estimated in the vicinity of USD4 million.57

Such Uzbek actions appear to be founded on a desire to stop the tide of people, currency and traded goods that are flowing unregulated between Uzbekistan and its neighbours. Despite Uzbekistan’s numerical superiority and vast natural resources, Kazakhstan’s economy is much stronger, and unemployment is lower and foodstuffs and other staple goods are much more affordable than its southern neighbour. Such activity is referred to in the local press as ‘shuttle consumerism’ which appears largely driven by a combination of the high cost of imported goods, which attract an import duty of up to 90%, and a desire by locals to avoid the smothering nature of Uzbekistan’s state- controlled economy.58 Indeed, in the absence of a continued threat from the IMU, the actions of which until recently appeared to have been largely curtailed by US military actions in Afghanistan, there is strong evidence that the sole rationale for Uzbekistan’s border policy was a desire to “hold back the stream of traders rushing to Kazakh markets”.59 And, on the level of official negotiation between the two countries on the border issue, it is reputed that Uzbekistan demanded as a precondition to the reopening of the borders that Kazakhstan close down its marketplaces close to the border. Naturally, Kazakhstan refused the demand.60

An unfortunate side effect to the situation is the development of parochial rhetoric in journalist and government circles on the topic of cross-border economic activity. Examples include snide comments about Uzbek itinerant workers in Kazakh newspapers such as “we provide work for poor Uzbeks” and equally snide comments by

57 Yermukanov, Marat, “The Kazakh-Uzbek Border: A Bridge Of Friendship Or A Source of Tension”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 29 January 2003. Somewhat ironically, Yermukanov suggested that closure of the border by Uzbekistan impacted hardest on impoverished Uzbek citizens, who travelled to southern Kazakhstan to buy cheaper foodstuffs or undertake casual employment. He also said that Kazakhstan protestations have proven ineffectual to date, and appear to have been somewhat tempered by an implicit need to ensure good relations with its large southern neighbour and thus ensure a continued supply of gas that is so vital to its southern territory. 58 “Uzbek Border Row Introduces New Element Of Tension In Central Asia”, Eurasianet Business and Economics, 27 January 2003, located at www.eurasinet.org. 59 Yermukanov, Marat, “The Kazakh-Uzbek Border: A Bridge Of Friendship Or A Source of Tension”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 29 January 2003. The author quoted Kazakh Interior Minister Ivan Otto as saying that “Uzbek authorities are even deliberately spreading rumours about poisoned vodka and a mumps epidemic in Kazakh markets”. 60 ibid.

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their Uzbek counterparts that “Uzbek traders leave millions of dollars in the supermarkets of Kazakhstan”.61 Such comments, although superficially benign, are interpreted by local analysts as generating intolerance towards neighbours, in particular by creating a stereotypical image of “arrogant Uzbek and Tajik petty traders pushing Kazakhs out of local markets”.62 One only has to consider the events of 1989 in the Ferghana Valley, where a minor altercation between an ethnic Uzbek market stall holder and local member of the Meshketian Turk minority developed into widespread violence and rioting to understand the ease with which minor disputes or criticisms can escalate into widespread violence. 63

On a geopolitical level, such incidents also undermine the level of trust between the countries of the region, and in the process, rather than increasing the level of political and economic integration between them, it will lead to the weakening of an “already fragile trend of integration in the region, and can in future generate international conflict, in particular border disputes”.64 This trend is probably being felt most keenly in the Ferghana Valley, which straddles parts of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In this region, the closure of borders by Uzbekistan “has greatly complicated cross border trade and ethnic interaction, as each portion of the Ferghana Valley, despite geographic boundaries, is pulled to become an integral part of one of three new countries that are developing in different and sometimes incompatible directions”, with

61 ibid. 62 Yermukanov, Marat, “Border Incidents Sour Kazakh-Uzbek Relations”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 16 June 2004. 63 Lubin, Nancy, Martin, Keith, and Rubin, Barnett, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p46. The events in question were initiated by a dispute between an Uzbek woman trader and a Meshketian Turk who overturned the woman’s market stall after complaining about the price she was charging for strawberries. This rapidly developed into widespread violence between the Uzbek and Meshketian Turk communities of the Ferghana Valley, and resulted in hundreds if not thousands of deaths, most of who were Meshketian Turks. As a direct result, practically all Meshketian Turks left not only the Ferghana Valley, but also Uzbekistan. Lubin, et al, considered this event to be of threefold significance. Firstly, it was significant because it indicated how conflicts that manifest along ethnic lines do not have their roots in , but in mounting social and economic pressures, “especially youth unemployment and access to land”. Secondly, it demonstrated how quickly a small, isolated incident could spread throughout the region, fanned by false accusations and rumours. And, thirdly, it highlighted how deeply fellow Muslims and Turks in the region can be divided among themselves. 64 Karim Otebayev, quoted in Yermukanov, Marat, “Border Incidents Sour Kazakh-Uzbek Relations”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 16 June 2004.

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the “ethnic, economic and other cross border ties that once knit the region together…now increasingly sources of competition and strife”.65

In some respects, the Ferghana Valley is a distillation of the rest of Central Asia in terms of demography, and consequently it has experienced even more sharply all of the problems associated with the border demarcation process experienced elsewhere. Therefore, the Ferghana Valley can be viewed as something of an early warning indicator for conflicts, ethnic or otherwise, within the region. And, more importantly, conflict in the Ferghana Valley has the potential to destabilise the entire Central Asia region. Although the Valley only occupies five percent of the territory of Central Asia, it contains almost 20 percent of the population. It is also a major source of water and food for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and has a potent combination of higher population density and poorer economic circumstances than almost every other region of Central Asia.66 The Ferghana Valley has already experienced several instances of overt conflict and rioting between different groups during the late Soviet period; firstly between ethnic Kyrgyz and Tajiks over disputed land in 1989, and a year later in Osh, where rioting between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in this predominantly ethnic Uzbek town within the Kyrgyz republic resulted in an estimated 200 deaths.

Fortunately, aside from the relatively minor riots described above, this potential for conflict in the Ferghana Valley has not yet been realised. However, the policies of the various governments in the region, vis-à-vis border demarcation and control (especially Uzbekistan, whose policies affect practically all of its neighbours), are over time fostering an environment of tension and animosity amongst ‘neighbours’, in addition to increasing the likelihood of increased competition for resources given the deleterious effects of border control on traditional economic activities. From this perspective, then, the recent policies on border demarcation and control could in a short time prove to be inflammatory, triggering dormant hostilities that had carried over from the late Soviet

65 Lubin, N., et al, 1999, p38. These issues have been echoed by other commentators, including Nick Megoran, a political commentator at Cambridge University, who is quoted as saying “the Ferghana Valley borderlands were once a dynamic and intricate mosaic of ethnic groups, kinship networks, land- use patterns and economic activity. Recent border policies of Ferghana Valley states have shattered that mosaic”, See “Kyrgyz-Tajik border riots highlight building inter-ethnic tension in Central Asia”, in Eurasia Insight, 8 January 2003. 66 Lubin, N., et al, 1999, p12.

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period. The potent combination of institutionalised disruption of normal patterns of trade and economic activity, and the equally institutionalised corruption amongst border guards and customs officials who constantly harass and extort the local populace are in themselves a dangerous addition to the fragile makeup of the region. When a border demarcation process is hastily undertaken by the governments of the region, without due consultation with the local communities, the demarcation process can create more problems that it solves, creating a greater likelihood of further conflict occurring.

“Conclusion of a thorough border delimitation treaty followed by demarcation of the boundary ‘on the ground’ normally takes many years; if hurried for political reasons, a delimitation agreement can store up problems for the future…agreements, if made without due regard to the interests of those in the border areas, can actually create hardship and disruption for local residents. As ammunition for populist politicians, they can even intensify conflicts.”67

The current border demarcation process, rather than solve the problems inherited from the Soviet Union, has in many instances further institutionalised and enhanced divisions where previously only vague, negotiable divisions existed. In the process, it has possibly irrevocably changed the economic and cultural fabric of the region, especially in the Ferghana Valley. Even in the more ‘impact neutral’ areas, such as the Uzbek- Kazakh border region, the economic impact of the border demarcation process has created a fertile ground for increased tensions between groups by increasing the prospect of competition for jobs and scarce resources, and thus heightening not only the sense of the ‘other’ in the local communities, but also the prospect of conflicts and disputes similar to those that occurred in the late Soviet era in the Ferghana Valley.

The dismantling of the linkages between communities that has accompanied the hardening of the borders of the region has also been exacerbated by the actions of external states and organisations that have a vested interest in the region. The ability of the various states of the region to reconcile the need to control their borders with the reality of the interdependence of the border regions of Central Asia is as much

67 Nick Megoran, quoted in “Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Riots Highlight Building Inter-Ethnic Tension In Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, 8 January 2003.

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determined by the relationships between the republics themselves as by the way the different republics seek to engage with external states such as the US, Russia and China.

Furthermore, the Central Asia republics also seek to participate within external forums such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.68 It is likely that the various republics will seek to use membership in such organisations as the means by which they can consolidate their identity vis-à-vis their neighbours, in the process forge a distinct sense of ‘statehood’ or ‘nationhood’. The effectiveness of these organisations in developing, on one hand, the linkages between the governments of the region on issues of shared concern, and on the other a sense of independence and demonstrable sovereignty, will be of fundamental importance to the future stability of the region.

68 Althought no Central Asian states are formal members of NATO, a number of them have taken part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

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PART THREE

Central Asia: Challenges to Sovereignty and the Legitimacy of the State

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Chapter Nine

Impediments to State Evolution: The Influence of Regional and International Factors on State Capacity Building in Central Asia

It is irrefutable that the administrative frameworks and policies of the Soviet Union changed the societies and institutions in Central Asia fundamentally and irrevocably. How the republics have dealt with the Soviet legacy has been a critical factor in determining how the states have developed as entities that, theoretically at least, enjoy all the privileges bestowed upon the sovereign state. Nevertheless, it was to be expected that the republics, in flexing their muscle as the sole juridical authority within their territory, would develop and implement policies and practices that diverged from the policies of the Soviet Union, and were part of the acceptable practice of the sovereign state.

It is hardly radical that some of these policies have focused on developing national identities that derive from the perceived cultural and linguistic characteristics of the titular nationality and thus penalised substantial minority groups, as many states across the globe have implemented similar policies. Additionally, it was also to be expected that, in exercising their sovereignty, the republics of the region would seek to control the movement of money, traded goods, and people within their territory and across their borders. What is unfortunate is that, given the particular ethno-linguistic makeup of the republics and the traditional patterns of economic activity in the region, such demonstrations of sovereignty on the part of the republics are creating a whole new set of issues, the significance of which the republics appear oblivious to.

In view of this, it is possible to conclude that the effectiveness of the republics as sovereign states is constrained by more than just the Soviet legacy. The reality may be that, given the particular socio-economic makeup of the region, conventional forms of state construction and the concept of territorial sovereignty may not be the most appropriate foundations for governance for the region. It is difficult to predict, however, whether the region and its constituent peoples will adapt to the consequences

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of the bestowal of sovereignty upon the unprepared and unenthusiastic republics on the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately the republics, as sovereign states, possess the right to forge their own path in the international arena, to make mistakes and to design and implement policies and practices that, from an external viewpoint, may appear counterproductive if not divisive and destabilising. However, given the nature of their construction and the means by which they were bequeathed sovereign status, it is possible that, as suggested by Alex Maroya in his essay on the problems confronting postcolonial frontier states, the deficiencies of the Western model of statehood for managing plural societies will be dramatically amplified1 when imposed upon the Central Asian republics. The state as a “hermetically sealed geographic container in which sovereign power is exercised by an extensive central government”2 is, in Maroya’s view, perhaps not the most appropriate form of governance for post-colonial frontier states, a category within which the Central Asian republics arguably fall.

It is indisputable that, upon independence, the republics of Central Asia lacked many of the attributes of the sovereign state. Most of them lacked anything more than a rudimentary military and border control capability, and they continued to be dominated by Russian economic and foreign policy for the first few years of their independence. As a consequence of this perceived vulnerability, it is arguable that other state actors such as Russia and China, both of whom are vying for the position of regional hegemon, and to a lesser extent the United States of America (US), have all played a fundamental role in shaping the type and form of governance in the region. The state capacity that is so crucial to the exercise of sovereignty is influenced not only by internal processes of state building, but also by the international environment in which the state operates. The roles played by external states have encompassed economic, political and military cooperation and assistance as well as more subtle attempts to influence the domestic and foreign policies of the Central Asian republics in a way that is reflective of their own discrete foreign policy goals.

1 Maroya, A., “Rethinking the Nation State from the Frontier”, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol 32, no2, 2003, pp267-292, p273. Maroya used the examples of Sudan and Somalia to demonstrate this point.

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From a purely geostrategic perspective, it was to be expected that regional powers such as Russia and China would actively seek to project their influence in the region. Similarly the US, with its eye on the vast natural resources of the region and its recognised need to secure a military foothold in Central Asia from which it could conduct its ‘War on Terror’, was to be expected to also seek to gain a measure of influence in the region. These three states in particular sought to significantly further their objectives in the region both unilaterally, and multilaterally. Although engagement of this kind is a fundamental feature of the international system, the relationships that have developed between the republics and regional ‘players’ such as Russia, China and the US have raised several questions critical to this discussion.

The first question is concerned with how the Central Asian republics have managed their relationships with their two most powerful neighbours on the one hand and the US on the other. Given the relative vulnerability of the states, one must question what benefits the Central Asian republics have derived from these relationships, and what negative repercussions have flowed from engagement with other state actors.

The second question relates to the asymmetrical nature of the relationships between the Central Asian republics and their economically, militarily and politically dominant interlocutors, and how this asymmetry has impacted upon the type and form of the sovereignty that has been enjoyed by the republics of the region since independence. Given the lack of political, administrative, military and economic infrastructure that was compatible with the exercising of sovereignty, it is arguable that since independence, the republics were especially vulnerable to outside influence. States such as Russia, China and the US could use their asymmetrical relationships with the republics to leverage their will upon the republics. The implications of these relationships will now be discussed.

2 Maroya, A., 2003, p267. Maroya considered that “ideas of radical decentralisation, confederation and porous borders may provide an opportunity for exploring not just new modes of governance on the frontier but the applicability of such thinking to the state system more broadly”.

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The New Colonialism: US interests in Central Asia and the prospects for a new ‘Great Game’

The US is a relative newcomer to Central Asia, and US engagement with the region is especially instructive because it has brought with it little of the historical baggage that is a characteristic of both Russian and Chinese engagement. Since the events of September 11 2001, the US has used substantial financial inducements to influence policy in the region, most notably as it related to US efforts in the ‘War on Terror’. Given its geographic proximity to Afghanistan and obvious enthusiasm to use the prospect of enhanced engagement with the US to break free from the Russian orbit, Uzbekistan emerged as the big winner in the first year of enhanced US cooperation, receiving more than twice as much funding as its neighbours.3 For the other republics, security programs tended to receive varying proportions of any aid received, the amounts of which were significantly less than that received by Uzbekistan.

US Financial Assistance – 2002/20034 Country Total Assistance - USD Security Programs - USD Uzbekistan 173 million 59.8 million Kazakhstan 81.4 35.7 Kyrgyzstan 49.9 12 Turkmenistan 16.9 8.3 Tajikistan 98.1 9.0

The main thrust of US financial assistance to Uzbekistan was to enhance the military capability of this republic, and thus gain an effective ally in combating the growth of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Specifically, the US policy of security enhancement, based on the provision of aid and specialist military advice to Uzbekistan,

3 “Focus of U.S Assistance to Uzbekistan to Shift from Security to Economic Development”, Central Asia Report, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 17 January 2002, located at www.rfefl.org/centraliasia/2002/01/3-170102.asp. Jim Kolbe, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations indicated that the USD100 million increase in funding to Uzbekistan alone was part of the USD4 billion earmarked by Congress for fighting terrorism. 4 Sourced from Fact Sheets for individual countries, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, 6 June 2002.

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was focused on the goal of creating an Uzbek army that was capable of dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).5

However, the US failed in its attempt to influence the internal political and human rights environment within Uzbekistan specifically, and the region generally. Given that most US attention focused on Uzbekistan, the lack of progress in this republic is an example of a more general failing by the US to play what could have been a positive role in the region. Although reforms such as the creation of a bicameral legislature, and the permission given to opposition parties Birlik and Erk to hold congresses were seen as steps in the right direction, the election held in December 2004 was a largely sham affair, with opposition groups effectively prevented from offering genuine candidates.

Initially, however, there were positive signs that the US–Uzbek relationship was going to bring about a change in the human rights situation, and thus be an example of how to facilitate positive reform in the region. The US presence, and accompanying diplomatic pressure from the US State Department, saw a corresponding drop in arrests on political or religious grounds from an average of 1,500 during any seven month period between 1991-2001, to about 300 arrests for the first seven months of 2002.6 The year 2002 also saw the first official registration of a human rights organisation, the Independent Human Rights Organisation of Uzbekistan, something that was acclaimed as a major step forward,7 as was the visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to Uzbek jails towards the end of the same year.

However, in reality the human rights situation remained bleak in not only Uzbekistan, but in all five of the Central Asian republics, regardless of the statements made by the

5 The US proved successful in assisting military reform in Uzbekistan, and their financial and technical assistance assisted the Uzbek army to evolve into what was effectively the first modern, mobile and well- equipped army in the region. Theoretically, this action alone enhanced the state capacity of Uzbekistan, because it enhanced its ability to conduct self defence and to guarantee its own security. However, the perceived purpose of this reform, as evidenced in the Uzbek military exercises that took place in late 2003 and again during “Operation Frontier-2004”, was to create a military force that could respond to military incursions of the type that the IMU had conducted in Batken in 1999 and 2000: See McDermott, R. and Tolipov, F., “Military Reform in Uzbekistan: “Defining the Priorities”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 27 August 2003, located at www.cacianalyst.org. 6 “Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality”, Asia Report, no 46, 18 February 2003, International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels, p5. 7 ibid, p7.

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US State Department, which, to be fair, was not averse to issuing harsh criticisms of the regimes. Indeed, the State Department’s own annual human rights report into the region in 2003 indicated almost no change in the human rights situation in Central Asia in the previous two years, with overall human rights observance rated as poor in all five countries.8 And two years after initial US engagement with the region, there were still nearly 6,000 people in Uzbek jails for political or religious reasons,9 a figure that was not a significant reduction of pre-2001 figures. During this period, some commentators noticed an actual worsening in the human rights situation not just in Uzbekistan but across the entire region, with political leaders seeing the ‘international war on terrorism’, and the associated US enthusiasm for obtaining their assistance, as legitimising their denial of human rights:

“The government of Kyrgyzstan has, in fact, exploited the tragedy of 11 September in order to justify a much harsher crackdown than we’ve seen in past years on the media, on political opposition.”10

Dangerously, the failure by the US to make real, tangible progress on the issue of human rights, especially in Uzbekistan, and its failure to criticise human rights in the public arena has been interpreted in some quarters as tolerance for the authoritarian practices which produce an environment conducive to the development of Islamic militancy.

“The United States has abetted the rise of domestic radicalism in Uzbekistan because of its unstinting public support for Karimov, who, since the September 11 terrorism tragedy, has emerged as the Bush administration’s key strategic ally in Central Asia.”11

8 Pannier, B. “Central Asia: State Department Sees Little Improvement in Rights Situation”, April 10 2003, located at www.eurasianet.org/deparmentes/rights/articles/eav040503.shtml. 9 “US Reps Urge reforms in Uzbekistan” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 5 April 2004, located at www.cacianalyst.org/. 10 Pannier, B., “Central Asia: Six Months After – Human Rights seen as Backtracking”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 March 2002, located at www.rferl.org.nca/features/2002/03. 11 David Lewis, Central Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group, quoted in “Bad Analysis Makes for Bad Policy”, Eurasia Insight, 21 May 2004, located at www.eurasianet.org.

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Taking such criticisms into account, it appears that the US has not only failed to achieve those policy objectives that may have been positive contributions to the political fabric of the region, but it has actually had a negative influence impact upon policy in the region.

There is an additional dimension to US action in the region that is also bringing about the deterioration in the relationships between the states of the region – the perception that the US had chosen favourites in the region, and was directing its financial assistance accordingly. From the perspective of regional cooperation and enhanced security, the enhancement of the Uzbek-US relationship that occurred as a direct result of the 2002 aid increases and the following Strategic Partnerships has had negative repercussions in that it further altered a balance of power within the region that had already been in Uzbekistan’s favour. Uzbekistan had long been aware of its power, and the Karimov government has certainly taken advantage of the US presence and support to upgrade its military capabilities to position itself even more as the region’s belligerent hegemon.12

Somewhat ironically, the other republics in the region that provided limited support to US actions in Afghanistan were motivated to a degree by a desire for the US to act as a counter to Uzbek influence in the region, rather than enthusiasm for the actions being taken by the US in Afghanistan.13 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular have been vulnerable to the machinations of their large neighbour, and perceived that US engagement with the region has seen Uzbekistan benefit significantly more than they have, a belief that is to a degree reflected in reality. However, there is evidence that relations between all the republics in the region have deteriorated to various degrees, a

12 “Uzbekistan Seeking Regional Dominance”, Stratfor, located at www.stratfor.com/home/0110171700.htm. According to the article, Uzbek plans for regional dominance included an expansion of its borders to incorporate the entire Ferghana Valley (and thus give Tashkent an increased ability to deal with Islamic militants in the region), and control over important infrastructure such as pipelines, and power grids to reduce Uzbekistan’s dependence on other countries. 13 Rasizade, A., “Washington and the Great Came in Central Asia”, Contemporary Review, vol 280, no 1636, May 2002, pp257-270. Rasizade contended that Kyrgyz President Akaev was hoping that US political and economic support would counteract the bullying Kyrgyzstan had been subjected to by Uzbekistan over a variety of political and economic issues, and similarly Tajikistan was hoping that Western engagement would overlay the regional tensions that were being caused by Uzbekistan (p263).

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trend that has been attributed to the competition between the republics for the support, financial and otherwise, that the US has been offering.14

The relative failure of US engagement with the Central Asian republics, most notably Uzbekistan, is intriguing because the US made clear from the outset that it intended to use financial leverage to ‘encourage’ political and human rights reform within the region. It is also a sobering lesson in the difficulties that are to be encountered in attempting to leverage change within a sovereign state. With an eye firmly on its own foreign policy objectives, the US invested a significant amount of money, military support and diplomatic activity in developing its relationship with the Central Asian republics. And whilst it is not entirely surprising to discover that the US engagement with the region has not brought about a corresponding improvement in the economic, political and human rights situations in the country, it is disconcerting to conclude that US engagement has probably had a negative impact upon the security and stability of the region. The most critical aspect is that US engagement appears to have enhanced the cleavages that have developed between the different republics, and thus contributed to the breakdown of traditional economic patterns and the movement of traded goods and peoples across borders. Furthermore, US actions in the region have prompted a response from Russia, who, recognising a threat to the influence that they enjoy in the region, is reinvigorating its relationship with the Central Asian states in a way that may be creating as many problems for the region as it is providing benefits.

A Resurgent Russia in Central Asia – Continued Colonialism or New Opportunities for Development?

Russia has enjoyed residual hegemony in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the 150 years of shared history during the Tsarist and Soviet periods ensuring that economically and politically, the newly independent states remained closely aligned with their previous ‘colonial’ masters. Despite this, for most of the first decade of independence, the Central Asian states, along with many of the other former Soviet republics, sought to divest themselves of many aspects of their previous relationship with Russia, pursuing economic, political and foreign policy objectives that

14 “Will US Policy Backfire in Central Asia”, Reporting Central Asia, no 273, 30 March 2004, located at

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diverged from Russian policies. Nevertheless, there was also the chance that, once the honeymoon of independence had ended, there would either be realignment with Russia, or that Russia, itself struggling to find meaning in the post-Soviet world, would seek to reassert its influence in the region.

Since the election of as President in March 2000, Russia’s actions in Central Asia have been evaluated as having partially resuscitated the influence Russia had enjoyed in the region during the Soviet era, and thus ensuring Russia’s position as the pre-eminent power in the post-Soviet space. Some commentators have seen Putin’s policies in the region as a revival of the policy of , which had originally developed in early 20th century Russia as a concept advocating the cultural and political struggle between the and a distinct Russian-led Eurasian subcontinent.15 While this ideology reflects many of the parochial aspects of not only the ‘Great Russian Chauvinism’ of the Soviet era, but also the far right movements that have developed in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it does illustrate the possible long term foreign policy direction and ideological underpinning of a resurgent Russia under Putin. The doctrine of Eurasianism is of particular interest to this study because over time this policy could have implications for the relations between ethnic Russians and titular national groups in the Central Asian republics.

Aside from an increasing use of fora such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to leverage influence in the domestic and foreign policies of the region, for the first two years of the Putin Presidency, there was little evidence of the more extreme

www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca. 15 Berman, Ilan, “Slouching Toward Eurasia”, Perspective, vol 12, no 1, Sep-Oct 2001, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy, located at www.bu.edu/iscip/vol12/berman.html. Berman identified the influence of Alexander Dugin’s writings on the ideology of Eurasianism on Putin’s foreign policy. Dugin had served as international affairs advisor to a number of senior Russian Parliamentarians, and had written The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, in which he enunciated the key principles of a modern doctrine of Eurasianism. Berman summarised the three key tenets of this theory as being: 1) Land vs. Sea Power – a struggle for international dominance between “land powers” (embodied by Russia) and “sea powers” (embodied by the US and the UK). The globalist “Atlanticism” of these two countries is fundamentally incompatible with Russia’s “Eurasian” distinctness – therefore “the strategic interests of the Russian people must be oriented in an anti-Western fashion” to ensure the preservation of the identity of Russia’s civilisation; 2) Empire as Destiny – the Russian people are “ethnically, culturally, psychologically, religiously and, above all, historically destined to recreate Russian greatness”; 3) Alliance building – the “rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us” were seen as forming the basis for creating a “political and strategic union” with similarly-minded countries.

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tenets of the Eurasianist doctrine in Putin’s foreign policy towards, and increased engagement with, Central Asia. However, renewed Russian interest in the region was ensured when the US focused its foreign policy spotlight on the countries of the region. Since September 11, Russia appears to have re-evaluated its relationship with the Central Asian states, and it is arguable that Russia’s new approach is founded on a desire to counter US engagement with the region. In this respect, some of the more distinct features of the ideology of Eurasianism are manifesting in Russia’s foreign policy. Unfortunately for the Central Asians, some of the strategies adopted by Russia in this regard rely on coercion rather than reward, and include punishments for engaging with the west.

Typically, Russia took a heavy handed approach to dealing with those Central Asian states that allowed themselves to be courted by the US pursing its military objectives in Afghanistan. The most obvious of Russia’s reactions was the calling in of debts owed to it by those countries cooperating with the US. Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries in the region to suffer Russia’s wrath, after they agreed to provide US forces with access to military facilities in Kyrgyzstan, in particular Manas airbase in southern Kyrgyzstan. Prior to these events, Kyrgyz President Akaev had come to an agreement with Moscow to restructure debts totalling some USD133 million in July 2001. In response to news that the US was being provided access to Manas airbase, in return for a significant amount of ‘rent’ and the US funded redevelopment of Manas airport, the Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Sergei Shishkaryov, threatened to reject the previous agreement on debt restructuring.

“Kyrgyzstan has presented its military bases for the housing of the American military contingent and is expecting significant financial injections. For this reason we have the right to ask for the repayments of debts incurred.”16

16 Orozobekova, Cholpon, “Kyrgyzstan: Russia Calls in its Debts”, Reporting Central Asia, no 116, 19 April 2002, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Orozobekova said that at the time of the deal with the US, Kyrgyz officials had claimed that their support for the US military was worth some USD200 million to them, and that some figures were even higher, up to USD270-300 million a year for rent, and USD500 million for the reconstruction of Manas airport.

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Interestingly, Russia convinced Kyrgyzstan to give Russian troops and aircraft access to the Kant airbase near Bishkek in December 2002. Some regional analysts claimed that by pursuing access to an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, in a fashion parallel to the strategy adopted by the US, Russia was seeking to demonstrate that it was “the true master of the post-Soviet space”.17 This move has also been interpreted as reflecting a new ‘colonialist’ aspect to Russian engagement with Central Asia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, with these countries being portrayed as underdeveloped and in need of Russian protection.18

There have been some more controversial aspects to Russia’s attempts to maintain control over its Central Asian neighbours, and possibly the most contentious aspect has been its dealings with Turkmenistan in respect to the distribution of Turkmenistan’s gas supplies.

Turkmenistan is reputed to have the third largest natural gas reserves in the world, with the majority of exports supplied via Russian pipelines to former Soviet states. As a result of this arrangement, Turkmenistan was largely reliant upon Russia for its gas revenues, and the relationship between the two countries had soured from 1997 onwards as a direct result of Russia’s unwillingness to meet the price for gas exports that Turkmenistan was demanding. Inevitably, Turkmenistan commenced reviewing other options for gas sale and distribution that were available, and in December 2002, Turkmen President Niazov signed an agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan to

17 Torbakov, Igor, “Russia Moves to Reassert Influence in Central Asia, Caucasus”, Eurasia Insight, 16 December 2002, EurasiaNet. Torbakov also pointed out the irony that, although Russia had long criticised what it called US imperial behaviour, it was now effectively mimicking the US by seeking to project influence in Central Asia. 18 Ibid. Torbakov identified two related schools of thought reflecting this premise. Firstly, he outlined the writings of historian Vladlen Sirotkin who compared the poorer CIS states to former French in Africa, and in the process argued that Putin could emulate the policy taken by the French in Africa by which he claimed “France has completely restored control over its ‘African CIS’….it has retained its old military bases; it controls the local economy and trade”. Secondly, Torbakov summarised a commentary attributed to Viktor Ilyin, Professor at the Moscow Technical University, which called on Russia to develop its own version of the Monroe doctrine – “The exclusive right of control over the former fragments of the (Russian) empire and support of the friendly regional regimes there is the prerogative of Russia, which strives to reintegrate the (former Soviet) Union space under its leadership”.

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construct a 1,400 kilometre pipeline that would carry gas to Pakistan.19 This would have significantly reduced Turkmenistan’s reliance on Russia.

However, casting a shadow over these developments were claims by President Niazov in November of the same year that he had uncovered an attempted coup against his government that had been facilitated by Russia. While the veracity of Niazov’s claims were viewed with suspicion in most quarters,20 the subsequent 25 year agreement reached between Turkmenistan and Russia guaranteeing the lion’s share of Turkmenistan’s gas exports to Russia at a higher price than that being originally sought by Turkmenistan, suggested that claims that there were nefarious actions behind the scenes were not too far from the truth.

One of the more benign explanations for the changes was that President Niazov had actually engineered the coup attempts himself as an excuse to further persecute his opposition in Turkmenistan. As part of the trade off for the gas deal, Russia agreed to publicly acknowledge and support Niazov’s claims that the coup attempts were, in fact, part of international terrorism, and that his subsequent crackdown on ‘dissidents’ was therefore justified.21 Further disguising the true nature of the events surrounding this deal was the fact that Russia continued to offer sanctuary to a number of not only exiled Turkmen opposition figures, but also several of the alleged conspirators involved in the alleged coup attempts. Such claims and counter claims of Russian involvement in assassination attempts inevitably casts a shadow over the nature of Russia’s policy objectives in the region, and although the gas deal ensures considerable revenue for the Turkmen government, it also effectively ensures the continued political survival of Niazov, arguably one of the most autocratic, brutal and myopic dictators in the region.22

19 Blagov, Sergei, “Russia Gains Big in Central Asian Gas Game”, Asia Time, 12 April 2003, located at www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ED12Ag01.html. 20 Stephen Blank, Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, for one, saw Niazov’s claims of Russia’s involvement in an attempted coup as having some credibility. He saw it as too coincidental that the coup occurred just before Turkmenistan sought to finalise the details of the feasibility study for the proposed Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani pipeline. Blank also considered the attempted coup as engineered to be an effective reminder to President Niazov of Russia’s ability and willingness to undermine his regime if it went against his wishes. See Blank, Stephen, “Russia’s Coercive Moment in Central Asia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 April 2003. 21 Blagov, Sergei, “Russia Gains Big in Central Asian Gas Game”, Asia Time, 12 April 2003. 22 Blagov considered that in the wake of the 25 year gas deal, it would be in Russia’s interests to ensure the survival of Niazov’s regime, something reflected in the April 2003 signing of an agreement on

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Therefore, irrespective of the truth of claims of Russian involvement in the coup attempts, Russia’s willingness to ignore the excesses of the Niazov government in return for a guarantee of gas supplies sets a dangerous precedent for the region. But, if there was truth in claims that Russia was, in fact, behind the assassination attempt, then this event is an indication of the lengths that Russia is prepared to go to ensure that its interests in the region are protected.

Fortunately, such anecdotes are not characteristic of Russia’s role in the region, with Russia tending to use more carrot than stick to lure the somewhat recalcitrant republics back into their sphere of influence. The question of approach aside, Russia’s goals in the region are still significant. Commentators and politicians alike appear to be promoting policies of Russian reengagement that reflect the neo-colonialist attributes of Eurasianism, by promoting the argument that Russia is the most logical benefactor for the region.

“Russian clout with domestic political processes…should be used to promote the development of truly democratic statehood in these countries…they will cease viewing Russia’s dominance on the post-Soviet territory as a threat. Instead, they will regard Russia as a guarantor of stability and the irreversibility of democratic processes.”23

Contributing to this view is the fact there are still large populations of ethnic Russians within the borders of the Central Asian states, and Russia also hosts large populations of peoples similar in culture to the Central Asian nationalities within its borders. The economic and industrial interconnectivity that was developed during the Soviet era remains relatively intact, despite the inroads achieved by other countries. And, despite the contentious nature of Tsarist and Soviet rule in the region, and the emerging ideology of the current Putin administration, Russian politicians and bureaucrats know the region and its people intimately. However, it remains to be seen whether Putin and his successors will use this currency wisely and contribute to the development of state security cooperation. Blagov, Sergei, “Russia Gains Big in Central Asian Gas Game”, Asia Times, 12 April 2003.

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capacity, or whether they will adopt policies that squander rare opportunities to positively influence the economic, political and security structures of the region.

China – Economic Synergies and Shared Security Concerns?

Two general issues have underpinned China’s approach to its relationship with the Central Asian states. Firstly, China recognises the security implications of the 3,000 kilometre border it shares with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, a good proportion of which is yet to be formally demarcated. Secondly, China places significance on the geopolitical importance of the states, and views the region as a critical ‘bridge’ between East and West.24 In this respect, its policies mirror to a degree Russia’s policies, and also reflect Halford Mackinder’s observation that Eurasia represents the “geographical pivot of history”.25 To date, Chinese engagement with Central Asia, politically, economically and culturally, has been measured and deliberate, and thus contrasts with the somewhat ad-hoc and frenetic actions of the US and to a lesser degree Russia. However, given China’s size and growing presence on the world stage, the significance of China to the Central Asian republics cannot be understated, and over time it can be expected that China will increase its influence in the region.

“China is poised to become the single greatest external economic influence on the economies of the rest of Central Asia and possibly on its politics as well. It is also the one state whose power poses a potential threat to the interests of nearly all the other member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.”26

23 Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs committee, quoted in Blagov, Sergei, “Central Asia: Russia Pushes Back against NATO influence”, Eurasia Insight, 7 February 2004. 24 Xing, Guangcheng, “China and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, Central Asian Security, Brookings, Washington, 2001, pp152-170, p153-154. Xing outlined five factors which he considered underpinned China’s approach to the relationships with the region: 1) That the future role of the states is dependent not only on the strength of the individual states, but on how they cooperate with their neighbours and what issues they pursue; 2) That the Central Asian states have a “linking” role, not only in a geographical sense, but in a political and cultural sense, between East and West; 3) The development of bilateral and cross-border relations with the states is a high priority; 4) That relations with the states should be considered from the point of view of the stability and development of , and finally; 5) Given that China had enjoyed friendly relations with the states of the region since ancient times, then they should work together to construct a “Silk Road of modern times”. 25 Mackinder, H., “The Geographic Pivot of History”, The Geographic Journal, vol 23, no 4, April 1904, pp421-437, p434. 26 Fuller, Graham, Starr, S Frederick, The Xinjiang Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, p47. Undated publication.

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The most obvious dimension to Chinese engagement with Central Asia is its interest in the vast gas and oil reserves that are located in the region, in particular Kazakhstan. Agreements on oil supply reached between the two countries, most notably the May 2004 agreement to construct a 1,000 kilometre section of a planned 3,000 kilometre pipeline supplying oil from Kazakhstan’s western oilfields to China, provide significant economic benefits to Kazakhstan. Furthermore, such agreements also reduce Kazakh reliance on Russia in respect to the sale and distribution of its natural resources.27

However, there are indications that China is using the lure of trade as a means of achieving its own peculiar set of policy objectives that relate to the Uighur minorities in the region. China has long been concerned by the threat posed by Muslim Uighur separatism in its most western province of Xinjiang, and this concern certainly stretches to include any activities undertaken by diaspora Uighurs in neighbouring countries. The Uighur issue has been most noticeable in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, both of which contain significant populations of Uighurs. Official statistics indicate there are 50,000 Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan, but unofficial figures suggest that the number is possibly as high as 200,000, because during the Soviet era, many Uighurs were actually registered as Uzbeks.28

The Uighur issue has proven to be particularly sensitive in Kyrgyzstan, where the government recognises the significant economic dividends that have followed the trade agreements reached with its large eastern neighbour. Consequently Kyrgyz government actions in respect to Uighurs have ranged from the relatively benign, such as agreeing to list Uighur groups as terrorist organisations, to actively targeting and harassing Uighur groups. Furthermore, Kyrgyz media have increasingly targeted Uighurs within Kyrgyzstan, labelling them as terrorists or extremists.29

Although Uighurs have long been subjected to a degree of discrimination in the region, especially as chauvinistic forms of nationalism have emerged, a pattern of Uighur

27 Kuanov, Asan, “Chinese Deal Boosts Kazakh Oil Industry” Reporting Central Asia, no 286, 21 May 2004. 28 Mukhamedov, Rustam, “Uighurs in Kyrygzstan Under Careful Government Supervision”, Central-Asia Caucasus Analyst, 28 January 2004. 29 ibid.

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suppression in Kyrgyzstan developed during the negotiations with China over the disputed territory along the Chon-Uzengukuush river and the Kyrgyz border settlements of Erkeshtam and Nuru.30 Ethnic Uighurs are also conspicuously absent from Kyrgyz parliament and representative bodies, and there are also increasing claims that Uighurs are being barred from positions of power for fear of alienating China.31 The disenfranchisement of such a large percentage of the population could pose a long term risk of instability within Kyrgyzstan, even without considering the Uighur diaspora in Kazakhstan and the influence of Uighurs still resident in Xinjiang. The degree to which Chinese influence in Kyrgyzstan is fuelling anti-Uighur sentiment will probably remain a matter of debate, but what is certain is that such tensions contribute nothing towards the establishment of an appropriate security framework encompassing the border region.

Like Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan also contains a significant population of Uighurs – around 200,000, not counting the significant numbers of Uighur traders from Chinese Xinjiang who live and work temporarily in Kazakhstan32 – and thus is also inextricably linked to Chinese security concerns focusing on separatism in their border province. This relationship is further complicated by the fact that there are over 900,000 ethnic Kazakhs within the Chinese province of Xinjiang. Kazakhstan has gained concessions from China in return for cooperation in respect to China’s attempts to control the Uighur ‘problem’. For example, when China and Kazakhstan signed a border demarcation agreement in 1998, effectively resolving long standing disputes over the 1,700km long Chinese-Kazakh border, China gave Kazakhstan additional ‘security guarantees’ in return for a commitment from Kazakhstan not to shelter Uighur activists.33 On a number of occasions, Kazakhstan has deported, to China, Uighurs accused by China of being involved in separatist activities, and has even been accused of being complicit in the assassination of a key Uighur figure in Kazakhstan.

30 Grebenshchikov, Igor, “Kyrgyz Exploit Uigur Minority”, Reporting Central Asia, no 49, 27 April 2001, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 31 Grebenshchikov, Igor, “Kyrgyz Exploit Uigur Minority”, Reporting Central Asia, no 49, 27 April 2001, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The author illustrates the implications of this. “With large numbers of Russians now leaving Kyrgyzstan, experts think Uigurs could become the third largest national group in the country after Kyrgyz and Uzbeks”. 32 Roberts, Sean, “The Uighurs of the Kazakhstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation”, Nationalities Papers, vol 26, no 3, 1998, pp511-530, p526. 33 Levinsson, Claes, and Ingvar Svanberg, “Kazakhstan-China Border Trade Thrives After Demarcation Treaty”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 16 February 2000.

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Kazakhstan has proven to be perhaps a little more devious vis-à-vis the Uighur issue than Kyrgyzstan, recognising that the Uighur issue can in fact be something that provides leverage that the Kazakh government can use in its relationship with China. Kazakhstan recognises the fact that it could potentially become a home for Uighur separatists fleeing Chinese authorities, with some commentators claiming that Kazakhstan has for many years provided sanctuary to two of the main Uighur independence movements, the Uighurstan Liberation Organisation and the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan.34 The veracity of claims that Kazakhstan has a long term agenda in respect to Uighur autonomy in Xinjiang aside, it is obvious that the Uighur issue impacts upon the security environment of the region, especially as China increasingly seeks to draw links between Uighur separatism and wider Islamic militant activity.

The Kazakh government appears to wish to avoid inflaming animosity against the Uighurs, as is occurring in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Following the publication of an article on Kazakhstan’s Uighurs by the newspaper Kazakhstan Pravda, which disparaged the Uighurs as messy and lazy, and also painted them as separatists who planned to take advantage of the hospitality of the Kazakh people to spread extremism, the Kazakh interior ministry saw fit to issue statements in defence of Kazakhstan’s Uighurs, stating:

“We do not consider Uighurs living in our country to be dangerous people. They are our citizens just like any other ethnic group…the media should not plant seeds of hatred between people." 35

34 Alibekov, Ibragim, “Uighur Issues May Become Factor in China-Kazakhstan Relations”, Eurasia Insight, 2 January 2003, EurasiaNet. Alibekov quoted an article in the November edition of Karavan attributed to a retired Russian intelligence officer, Vladimir Suvurov, who argued that Kazakhstan was “unlikely to find any other levers for bringing pressure to bear on China. And the presence of the (Uighur) diaspora, who are hostages in a way, will provide grounds for Uighur extremists having no interest in destabilising the situation in Kazakhstan”. The article also quotes an unnamed Chinese diplomat in Almaty – “we know that there are people in President Nazarbayev’s team who support the idea of an independent (Uighur nation in) Xinjiang…it would be a buffer between Kazakhstan and China”. 35 Bukharbaeva, Galima, “Newspaper Slur Angers Uighurs”, Reporting Central Asia, no 259, 23 January 2004, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The author stated that the writer of the article was not a staff writer for the paper. Intriguingly, the newspaper submitted a retraction of the article, stating: “This paper has repeatedly expressed support for the national liberation movement of Uighurs of Eastern

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Interestingly, members of Kazakhstan’s Uighur community claimed that pro-Chinese forces in Kazakhstan, operating in support of the Chinese secret service, were behind the article.

“China is afraid that the Uighur diaspora might become more politically active, so they constantly try to control and discredit my people.”36

As in Kyrgyzstan, the reaction by Kazakhstan to such comments will inevitably be tempered by a need to maintain positive relations with China. And despite, in this instance, an appropriate and timely renunciation by the Kazakh government of the comments made in the newspaper, many local Uighurs believe that such attacks will continue because Kazakhstan gains significant dividends from its relationship with China.

“Kazakhstan’s partnership with China is becoming more important than human rights…Kazakhstan refuses to admit refugees from China, but refugees from Afghanistan are allowed to enter. In the late Nineties it handed several Uighurs back to the Chinese authorities - who then shot them.”37

It is disconcerting to identify what is a deliberate attempt by an outside state to influence regional policy vis-à-vis the treatment of minorities. Additionally, it is somewhat surprising to learn that it is China, not Russia, that is the offender. Given the history of Russian engagement in the region, it is somewhat comforting to identify no explicit efforts by Russia to use the minority card as a way to destabilise the region. This is especially so, given Russian manipulation of minority tensions in Georgia and elsewhere in the Caucasus, and suggestions that it may have coerced Turkmenistan to concede lucrative trade concessions. However, to discover the long arm of the Chinese state reaching into neighbouring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and dictating, using the

Turkmenistan…we continue to believe that an independent Uighur state serving as a buffer zone for Kazakstan in the east would be very beneficial for our country”. 36 Bukharbaeva, Galima, “Newspaper Slur Angers Uighurs”, Reporting Central Asia, no 259, 23 January 2004, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. This comment was supported by the head of the Society for Uighur Culture in Kazakhstan, who claimed that this was the first time such an attack against Uighurs had been launched in the press since independence. 37 ibid. The author quoted Kakharman Hojamberdi, one of the leaders of Kazakhstan’s Uighurs.

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lure of an enhanced trading relationship, the treatment of what is a substantial minority groups is one of the more interesting aspects of the bilateral relationships the Central Asian republics are entering into.

The Implications of Regional Dislocation

The efforts being undertaken by Russia, China and the US to attract the attention of the Central Asian republics are contributing to the further dismantling of the structures of economic and social interconnectivity that had been critical to the region during Soviet and pre-Soviet times. As identified in the previous chapter, recent efforts to demarcate and control borders in the region have significantly disrupted traditional economic activity and the movement of peoples, goods and money that is so critical to the survival of many of those and communities that straddle the newly defined borders. The ‘bidding war’ being undertaken by Russia, the US, and to a lesser extent China, to obtain influence in the region is further disrupting cooperation between the republics. Despite the shared history and, relatively speaking, the similar cultural, religious and linguistic traditions of the region, the Central Asian republics failed during the first stage of their independence to develop a system of cooperation that recognised their common heritage and economic interdependence.

“The sad thing is that for 10 years of independence...there are no real allies among the Central Asian states. Not one is really strongly allied with another. This is itself one of the worst problems for the region.”38

The competition that has developed between the different republics seeking to gain US favour has not only deepened the divide between them, but has highlighted the increasing inability of the republics to unite in times of crisis.

“There has been competition between all of them to try to get US support, US military bases, US aid, so there has been an element of competition. What we have seen in the past, the last two or three years especially, when there were

38 Pannier, Bruce, “Central Asia: Six Months After – Security Still Top Interregional Issue”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 March 2002.

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attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the IMU, we’ve seen cooperation between the states in time of peace, but in times of guerrilla attacks and war this cooperation tends to break down.”39

Although it is both desirable and necessary for the Central Asian republics to seek to engage politically and economically with countries outside their immediate region, a foreign policy that pursues such relationships whilst ignoring opportunities to develop appropriate economic and trade relationships with immediate neighbours is, for a variety of reasons, courting disaster. In some respects, the willingness of the individual states to seek to enhance relationships with Russia and other ‘external’ powers is both driven by, and exacerbating the divisions developing in the region. For example, although Russia has sought to enhance its cooperative arrangements with Kyrgyzstan as a response to US initiatives in the region, to a degree the encroachment has been as much motivated by Kyrgyz objectives as Russian.

“Fraternal ties with the Kremlin are growing at the same time as our neighbours in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and recently Tajikistan are stepping up their frontier demands.”40

The prediction that a failure to encourage greater levels of regional integration may further impoverish the local population,41 is of particular concern to this study, because the tensions that are manifesting at a state level will, as an indirect consequence of continued economic hardship, inevitably manifest also at the local level. Additionally, as discussed earlier, by disrupting the traditional patterns of economic and social

39 Ahmad Rashid, quoted in Pannier, Bruce, “Central Asia: Six Months After – Security Still Top Interregional Issue”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 March 2002. 40 “Kyrgyzstan Courting Russia”, Reporting Central Asia, no 185, 21 February 2003, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. The article identified the significant number of unsolved border disputes between the states of the region as a major source of friction, and a major motivating factor for smaller states such as Kyrygzstan seeking external support – “As our more powerful neighbours present us with territorial ultimatums, we need to find a reliable protector in Russia”. 41 Madaliev, Sabit, “Central Asia Faces Growing Divisions”, Reporting Central Asia, no 180, 4 February 2003, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Madaliev considered that the failure by the states to promote integration and to develop positive relationships had prompted them to seek alliances with bigger powers outside the region, which have long coveted their natural resources and strategic importance. As a consequence, “ordinary people in the region, angry at their governments' inability to improve their standard of living, are likely to become more discontented. In response, regional leaders will most

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interdependence that had characterised the region prior to and during the Soviet period, by enforcing stricter border controls the states of the region have further increased the likelihood of communal tension by removing a feature that was critical in mitigating the likelihood of conflict between groups.

In many respects, Central Asia is a more volatile region now than in 2001. The direct threat posed by the activities of groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has ironically been overshadowed by other factors that have contributed to tensions between states and between communities. These factors have been exacerbated by not only the reactions of the states of the region to the perceived Islamic militant threat, but by the increased importance of this region to outside players. Whilst the involvement of old and new players, such as Russia, China and the US, in the political, cultural and economic affairs of the region was a necessary element to the emergence of these ‘newly independent states’, such engagement has a downside that needs to be recognised.

In view of the above discussion, bilateral engagement with Central Asia by competing powers has done little to equip the Central Asian republics with the tools required to develop the effective and durable frameworks for governance and economic development. Firstly, by supporting the autocratic governments of the region, states such as the US are inadvertently encouraging the autocratic nature of the regimes and are thus increasing the likelihood that disaffected groups will emerge along religious or ethnic lines within the region. China has gone even further than this, by using the lure of financial rewards to encourage Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to discriminate against, if not actually persecute, members of their Uighur communities.

Secondly, by ‘playing favourites’ within the region, the US and Russia are also encouraging divisions between the states, and thus exacerbating the problems associated with a hardening of the borders in the region that were identified earlier. Taken within the context of emerging national ideologies, and a history (in regions such as the Batken) of competition for scarce resources between communal or ethnic groups, the probably strengthen their authoritarian rule. At the same time, the region will increasingly become a stage for a dangerous rivalry between their powerful foreign allies”.

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actions undertaken by the US, Russia, and to a lesser extent, China, could prove inflammatory in the long term.

Dominated, as they are, by the economic and military might of their eastern and western neighbours, the Central Asian republics have allowed both Russia and China to play an influential role in their domestic and foreign policies, and have in the process conceded a measure of their sovereignty to them. The demonstrated capability of these external state actors, in particular Russia, to interfere in the sovereign affairs of the Central Asian republics is of concern. Whether the action is a punitive response by Russia to Kyrgyz rapprochement with the US, or Chinese coercion of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in respect to the latitude these countries allow Uighurs, there is clear evidence that the Central Asian republics have experienced a diminution of their sovereignty as a consequence of their engagement with these significantly more powerful states. However, this is neither surprising nor the most critical issue arising from this discussion, and is instructive only as an example of the futility in arguing the inviolability of the concept of state sovereignty when discussing the interplay between states within the international arena.

In view of the above discussion, the issue of sovereignty itself appears to be problematic from the perspective of the Central Asian republics. Independence, and the sovereignty associated with it, has seen the Central Asian republics increasingly turning to countries outside of ‘Turkestan’ for economic, military and diplomatic engagement. This process of divergence, as opposed to convergence, of goals and policy objectives has not created entirely favourable outcomes for the region. The economic and social consequences of the dismantling of traditional patterns of trade and the movement of labour are significant, as are indications that many of the republics are increasingly coming to view their relationships with outside powers such as Russia and China as more important than their relationships with their immediate neighbours. Sovereignty has thus produced a weakening of the bonds between the republics, and thus the peoples of the region. This trend not only impacts upon the socio-economic processes discussed above, but also has implications for the future management of the irredentist populations that exist within all of the republics.

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Ascension to the status of sovereign state has also seen the various Central Asian republics enter into what are dramatically unequal relationships with states that are inclined to use their economic, political and to a lesser degree military superiority to leverage change in domestic and regional policies in a way that suits their interests, not the interests of the republics. These relationships are proving, on a cost-benefit basis, to be increasingly costly in terms of freedom enjoyed by the Central Asian republics to determine their own domestic and foreign policies.

What is also surprising is that all three states discussed above – Russia, China and the US have, during their engagement with the sovereign states of Central Asia, brought about or encouraged very little in the way of positive political reform in the region., and thus have failed to provide the impetus for the development of coherent political and economic infrastructure that is so critical to the future stability of the region. All three states have significant interest in the viability of these Central Asian states from an economic, political and security perspective, yet events in the last four years suggest that they lack the political will or capability to actually provide solutions to the issues confronting the entire region.

One final point that arising from this discussion is the assessment that, in the event of increased tensions or outright conflict between states or communal groups, Russia, China and the US would be the most likely states to intervene given their existing engagement with the region. Yet, from the above discussion, it appears that any such engagement would be undermined by the fact that the all three states appear to lack the tools or intentions necessary for the resolution of any such tensions or conflict within the region. Certainly, they would be able to provide short-term military solutions, but the durability and effectiveness of such solutions, when implemented unilaterally, is questionable. It is also probable that any intervention by one or move of these ‘hegemonic’ states would also be determined almost solely by the interests of the intervening states, rather than the interests of the region. As a consequence, intervention by Russia, China or the US into a regional conflict would probably hinder rather than expedite resolution of the conflict.

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However, states are not the only actors within the region, and there are a number of regional and international bodies that also have a demonstrated interest in the region. In contrast to the key ‘state’ actors with an interest in the region, these regional and international bodies represent the ‘collective’ interests of their member states. The relative success or failure of these bodies working with the Central Asian states to develop the institutions, political process and economic opportunities that would mitigate the risk of outbreaks of ethnic conflict in the region stand as interesting counterpoints to the results from unilateral engagement.

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Chapter Ten

Multilateralism in Central Asia: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

The international tapestry of states and institutions that the Central Asian republics are now a part of inevitably provides as many challenges as opportunities. The issues touched upon in the previous chapter, namely the loss of sovereignty within an asymmetrical relationship; the impact of outside influence on the development of effective governance; and the increasing dislocation of economic and political cooperation in the region, do not derive merely from bilateral relations. Multilateral institutions can, theoretically at least, play an equivalent role in the development, or the impediment, of state capacity in the region.

A quick perusal of events in the region since independence highlights a number of organisations or multilateral institutions that have a demonstrated interest in the future of the Central Asian region. The most obvious list would have to include, in no particular order: the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In addition to the above-mentioned roles, such organisations can play an enhanced security governance role as well as counteract the trend towards regional dislocation by encouraging the states to cooperate on matters of shared concern.

Realistically speaking, any attempt to develop even a multilateral approach mitigating the prospect of ethnic conflict by enhancing the ability of the state to manage a heterogenous population and by providing a framework for regional security governance will, by necessity, be a cautious exercise. As lucidly stated by James Sperling, even though it may be reasonable to expect that institutions could perform local security governance roles in Eurasia, “scepticism must none the less be reserved for any claim that a single set of institutions will coalesce into a Eurasian system of

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security governance in the near future”.1 Many of the structures and organisations that have developed in recent years are targeted towards discrete security issues such as the threat of terrorism or the development of domestic military capability in the region.

Nevertheless, organisations developing towards such mandates are of critical importance to this discussion. Firstly, the development of military capability in the region will give the states greater confidence in exercising their mobilisation of the use of force, a critical determinant of sovereignty, and this confidence may encourage the governments of the region to approach the triggers of conflict (in this case ethnic conflict) more constructively than they have in the past. Secondly, even institutions developed to counter the threat of terrorism in the region may be able to evolve in a way that could see them contribute to the resolution of ethnic conflict. The development of militant Islam in Central Asia in recent years owes as much to a combination of the dire economic situation in the region and the repressive, intolerant governments of the region as it does to pervasive radical Islamic ideology. As discussed earlier, the risk of ethnic conflict in the region is exacerbated by a similarly potent mix of poverty, competition for resources, and policies that favour the titular nationality. So, while the organisations discussed below may primarily offer a military solution to any conflicts that develop, irrespective of whether they are fuelled by militant Islam or ethnic cleavages, they should, theoretically, also be able to look beyond the immediate indications of conflict and address the root causes of such conflict constructively. And, although it is tempting to ignore the examples set by regional cooperation on hard security issues as being tangential to the main focus of this thesis, cooperation on such security issues can, when successful, facilitate cooperation on other matters of shared concern.

Whilst it is obvious that it will be difficult to proactively identify strategies and frameworks for conflict resolution, the proposition that regional or multilateral institutions may be able to assume a positive role in implementing remedies to conflict, is especially problematic from the Central Asian perspective. Swanstrom identified a

1 Sperling, James, “Eurasian Security Governance: New Threats, Institutional Adaptations”, in James, Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma, Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, pp3 – 29, p18.

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number of features in the Central Asian political landscape that impeded the development of a conflict resolution framework that could be implemented in the event of conflict within the region. The most significant was what Swanstrom identified as a reluctance on the part of the states to be treated as part of a homogenous region, with Uzbekistan in particular being seen as seeking to distance itself from its neighbours in order to reinforce its Uzbek identity.2

This situation poses something of a conundrum for the Central Asia republics, given that interdependence and cooperation is critical to the stability of the region. The Kazakh foreign policy specialist, Umirserik Kasenov, touched upon the conundrum that faced not only the architects of government policy in all of the Central Asian states but also those seeking to contribute to the development of viable policies and infrastructure by stating that:

“the strengthening of poorly developed state sovereignty in Central Asia is possible only if national development of the former Soviet Asian republics proceeds in parallel with the deepening of interstate cooperation and integration. The effective function of the institutions of Central Asian integration and policy coordination will make possible the acceleration of economic development of each of the individual governments of Central Asia and at the same time will solve the existing and emerging contradictions among them”.3

Unfortunately, as stated by Swanstrom, the likelihood that regional integration can be facilitated by membership of regional organisations is impeded by the fact that the states of the region are neither strong enough nor confident enough to engage fully with

2 Swanstrom, Niklas, “The Prospect for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, March 2004, vol23, no, 1, pp41-53. Swanstrom quoted the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan as saying that the states in Central Asia “would prefer not to be treated as a part of a Central Asian ‘porridge’ because Uzbekistan and all other Central Asian states want to protect their national characteristics” (p42). 3 Kasenov, from Bezopasnost’ Tsentral’noi Azii: natsional’nye, regional’nye, i global’nye problemy (Almaty, Kainar, 1998, p199), quoted in Gleason, Gregory, “Inter-state Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum”, in Europe Asia Studies, vol 53, no 7, 2001, pp1077-1095, p1079.

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regional organisations and thus relinquish part of their sovereignty to those organisations.4

This is unfortunate because interaction among the Central Asian republics at a bilateral and multilateral level is critical to economic stability and security in the region. From one perspective, regional and international organisations can play an enhanced role by offering an alternative to bilateral treaties, and by promoting a collective response to the issues facing the region. However, each of the multilateral organisations under scrutiny are in some respects only the sum of their parts (and in some instances less) and are inevitably constrained by the foreign policy objectives of their member states. Additionally, in all international organisations there inevitably exists a bias towards the stronger states that can subvert collective goals in pursuit of their own objectives.

Commonwealth of Independent States

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established as something of a successor to the former Soviet Union, albeit with a mandate to reconcile the inevitable “journey towards national independence” with the need to realise “more positive forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation”.5 Some commentators interpreted this reconciliation process as a theme that permeated the CIS’s founding documents, with the move towards greater independence assessed as a stronger process than attempts to develop infrastructure that would encourage cooperation and interdependence.6

The CIS was destined to remain a relatively conservative organisation as a consequence of its Charter, which, in addition to establishing the administrative arrangements for the establishment of the CIS, provided the philosophical framework within which the member states would interact. The CIS Charter was in some respects reflective of the

4 Swanstrom, Niklas, “The Prospect for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, vol 23, no 1, March 2004, p42. 5 Gleason, G., 2001, p1079. 6 Sakwa, R, and Webber, Mark, “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol51, no. 3, 1999, pp379-415, p379. The authors assessed that the CIS, by promoting the above-referenced processes, encapsulated two contradictory dynamics, which “have been in constant juxtaposition and at time in open conflict”.

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Charter of the United Nations, as it attempted to reconcile issues of sovereignty and self-determination with notions of collective responsibility for matters of regional security.7

One of the primary mechanisms through which the CIS would further its objectives from a collective security perspective was the Collective Security Treaty (CST) which was also agreed upon in 1992, and came into force two years later. The focus of the CST was illustrated by Article 3 of Chapter II, which stated the goals of the organisation as being:

“…the strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection, on a collective basis – of the independence and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states.”8

Article 5 of the same chapter clarified the nature of the relationships between member states formalised in the Treaty as being based upon:

“…deep respect for the independence, the voluntary participation and the equality of rights and obligations of the member-states. It also acts on the basis of non- interference in affairs that are subject to the national jurisdiction of the member- states.” 9

Unfortunately, during their lives, both the CIS and the CST have attracted more criticism than praise, with their value in encouraging cooperation amongst their member

7 The key Articles of the CIS Charter included Articles Three and Twelve. The first of these articles established the sacrosanctity of the sovereignty of the member states by promoting the following principles: respect of the sovereignty of the member states, the inalienable rights of peoples to self- determination and the right to determine their fate without outside interference; the inviolability of state borders; ensuring human rights and fundamental liberties for all, without distinction based on race, ethnicity, language, religion, political or other convictions. Article Twelve elaborated upon these points by covering the issue of threats to sovereignty or security, in the process establishing broad principles that would govern regional responses to issues of shared concern to the member states of the organisation. Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as adopted on 22 January 1993 in , Belarus. Unofficial translation of full text of the Charter by John Fowler, located at http://www.therussiasite.org/legal/laws/CIScharter.html. 8 Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation of 15 May 1992. The full text version of this Treaty was sourced from Saat, J. H. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Central Asian Series 05/09, February 2005, Conflict Studies Research Centre, located at http://www.da.mod.uk/csrc.

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states coming under increasing scrutiny in recent years. The most important criticism of the CIS/CST from the perspective of this discussion was that both the Collective Security Concept (CSC), that was derived from both the CIS and the CST and was adopted by the CIS member states in February 1995, and the CST were based upon the premise of collective defence, and thus focused on external threats rather than internal ones: the capacity of the CST/CSC to respond to conflicts within or between CIS member states was thus ruled out.10

The Central Asian states have had mixed experiences with the CIS, something that is made somewhat ironic by the fact that, of all the republics of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics were amongst the most supportive of the maintenance of the Soviet Union.11 The ability of the CIS to act in a responsive fashion to security crises in the former Soviet bloc was tested most critically during the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990’s. As a litmus test of the abilities of the CIS as an organisation to respond to such crises, it is difficult to evaluate the subsequent events in Tajikistan for several reasons. Firstly, the civil war in Tajikistan was unfolding at the same time that negotiations on the CIS and the CST were underway. Secondly, as a direct consequence of the CIS infrastructure being, as yet, ill formed, the most immediate response to the conflict in Tajikistan was left to the Soviet 201st motorised rifle division which had remained behind in following the dismantling of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the CIS response to the crisis was guided more by the residual Soviet infrastructure, than any burgeoning organisational capability or developing philosophy of collective response.12 Importantly, there were early signs of preparedness on the part

9 Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. 10 Sakwa and Weber, 1999, p384. The authors clarified this observation by stating that although the above criticism was not entirely supportable given the instances of peacekeeping operations that have involved CIS member states in the region, the point was worth emphasising because it indicated that the entire framework of collective security was flawed as a consequence of the failure of the member states to agree on what constituted an external threat. 11 Gleason, G., 2001, p1080-1081. Gleason commented that the Central Asian deputies at the Congress of Peoples Deputies in 1989 distinguished themselves by being labelled the most sycophantic supporters of the Soviet centre: a position that was further indicated during the national referendum on the Union in March 1991 when the voters in Uzbekistan “voted virtually unanimously in favour of retention of the union”. 12 Neumann, I.B, and Solodovnik, S.V., “Russian and CIS Peace Enforcement in Tajikistan”, NUPI Centre for Russian Studies Publications, 1995, located at http://ww.nupi.no/russland/pub/Notat530.htm.

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of certain members of the CIS to take a collective approach to events. On 3 September 1992 the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan issued a statement in which the situation was categorised as a danger to the entire CIS, and the states further indicated their intention of intervening if the fighting was not halted.13 And whilst a more detailed discussion to the progression and outcome of the civil war in Tajikistan is beyond the scope of this paper, there were a number of issues raised during the conflict that have implications for any future involvement of CIS-related bodies in conflict resolution. The most immediate of these is the fact that, despite initially being deployed in support of the beleaguered government of Akbarshah Iskanderov, the CIS force ended up throwing their weight behind the pro-Moscow opposition forces of Emomali Rakhmonov who subsequently succeeded in toppling Iskanderov and seizing control of the government.14

The question of true motivations aside, the end result of the first intervention involving the newly formed CIS offers some encouragement for any future situations in Central Asia which may require a collective security response. Naturally, the structures associated with the CIS evolved in the decade following its creation, with new and relatively innovative bodies introduced to deal with emerging issues such as militant Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.15 However, the CIS continued to attract criticism,

The authors stated that the CST was formulated both in response to the break up of the Soviet Union, and with an eye to events in Tajikistan. 13 Neumann, I.B, and Solodovnik, 1995. The CIS peacekeeping response to the situation in Tajikistan ultimately involved units of not only Russian and Uzbek troops, but also battalions from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 14 The opposition forces behind which the CIS threw its weight were dominated by Kulyabis and Leninabdis, who were traditional supporters of Moscow in the region and had held control of the republic during the Soviet era. The Iskanderov government which had come to power in the early days of the civil war was dominated by what has been categorised as an alliance of democrats and Islamists, comprising Gharmis and Gorno-Badakhshanis. As such, CIS actions were targeted at the creation of a pro-Russian government in Tajikistan, at the expense of the development of democratic processes: see Neumann, I.B, and Solodovnik, 1995. The authors argued that the fact that the Iskanderov government was found to lack legitimacy as a consequence of a no confidence vote in the Tajik National Assembly was merely a symptom, and not the reason the CIS failed to respond to calls to prop up the Iskanderov government. They also listed a number of the arguments for supporting the Leninbadis and Kulyabis which had developed, most of which had derived from the policy of Russia asserting itself in the region, at the expense of Islamists, democratic forces, and “a general orientation towards Russian non interference in the affairs of other former Soviet republics”. 15 For example, in 1999, six states – , Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrygzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the Protocol on the extension of the Collective Security Treaty, which, among other things saw the development of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force of the Central Asian Collective Security Region to assist with the strengthening of the regions anti-terrorist capability. See Khakimov. B. “Collective Security in the CIS”, International Affairs, no 5, 9/01/2001, pp96-102.

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much of which claimed that it was an increasingly irrelevant organisation that could not continue to claim legitimacy or viability because its mandate was based on a somewhat flawed premise: that the former Soviet Union’s member states could be assisted to achieve viable independence while simultaneously developing frameworks for cooperation and interdependence.16 By 2000, despite attempts by certain member states to revitalise its activities, the CIS and its associated security structures were assessed as failing. The withdrawal of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Georgia from the CST in 1999 had reduced the number of signatories to the treaty to six, down from the original nine member states that signed the treaty in 1992. More significant was the withdrawal of Azerbaijan, which was attributed to “growing dissatisfaction with Russian policies towards the CIS”.17 And equally important was the fact that the Azeri withdrawal came at a time when tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latter of which was favoured by Russia, over Nargono-Karabakh showed no signs of abating.18

The situation in Nargono Karabakh was in some respects an opportunity for the members of the CST to again look at internal threats, rather than focus on external threats, as suggested by the provisions of the treaty. Furthermore, the events in this region were fuelled by issues that have parallels in Central Asia: namely competition between two neighbouring states over disputed territory containing an irredentist population. The reactions of the CST member states, or in this case their inaction, provide an indication of how they may respond if a similar situation developed in Central Asia. Importantly, in determining which of the competing states in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be assessed as the winner, it appears that as in the case of the Tajik civil war, the faction favoured by Moscow came out in front. Such results indicated a dangerous level of subjectivity in the activities of the Russian government, and, by default, the activities of the CIS as implemented through the CST.

16 “CIS Security Union Crumbles”, Global Intelligence Update Feb. 10, 1999, Stratfor, located at http://www.stratfor.com. 17 ibid. The assessment focused on the implications of a move on the part of the different republics to exercising greater levels of independence and autonomy from Russia, coming at a time when Russian was seeking to reassert its strategic influence in the region. 18 Khakimov, B, 2001, p97. Khakimov concluded that the antagonisms between member states of the Treaty were “patently more acute than any conceivable threat from without”.

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Thus, the CIS, and most likely other regional, multilateral bodies in which Russia is a dominant player, will, by necessity, be constrained by two factors. Firstly, such organisations will be viewed suspiciously by the countries of the region as being an extension of Russia’s newly re-invigorated colonial attitude towards the Central Asian republics. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the CIS and the CST, whilst proving relatively effective in enhancing the military capability of the Central Asian republics, appear capable of only offering military solutions to the region’s woes.

Additionally, Russia has, on one hand, demonstrated its inability to successfully implement military solutions to domestic conflicts (as in Chechnya), and on the other, proven incapable of resisting the urge to leverage its will in the region by encouraging existing or developing ethnic cleavages in neighbouring states (as has occurred in Georgia and ).19 When these factors are taken within the context of the CIS’s charter and declining interest on the part of the members of the CIS in the CST, as indicated by the withdrawal of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan, the CIS appears to be lacking both the capability and legitimacy (in the eyes of the Central Asian member states) required for it to assume a leading role in resolving any future ethnic conflict in the Central Asian region. Indeed, the CST has come to be categorised as a core group of six Russophile states: “Belarus and Armenia had no interest in security problems in Central Asia or outside their immediate regions. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan looked to Russia, while Tajikistan remains a de facto Russian protectorate”.20

Nevertheless, the CST should not be discounted as an organisation that can effectively contribute in an effective manner to conflict resolution strategies in the event of ethnic conflict in Central Asia. Despite the inauspicious first decade of the organisation’s life, events post-September 2001 have seen attempts to revitalise the organisation being made by its member states. For example, in May 2002, the members of the CST agreed to formalise their relationship through the establishment of the Collective Security

19 Taras Kuzio argued that countries such as Uzbekistan viewed with suspicion “Russia’s use of ‘peacekeepers’ to freeze conflicts on the ground, rather than resolve them, which has worked to Russia’s advantage in , , the Trans-Dniester and Nagorno-Karabakh”. See Kuzio, Taras, “Geopolitical Rivalries in Eurasia”, Prism, vol 7, issue 12, 19 December 2001, The Jamestown Foundation, located at http://www.jamestown.org/publciations_details.php?volume_id=8&issue_id=452&art 20 ibid.

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Treaty Organisation (CSTO).21 This move was accompanied by the development of a new charter for the organisation, and a commitment to not only the preservation of the territorial integrity of the member states, but a stated intention to cooperate closely with the UN, the OSCE, SCO and NATO.

The CIS had significant potential as the successor to the Soviet Union, and it was well positioned to contribute to the shared capabilities of its member states as they took their first, tentative steps as sovereign entities. In certain respects, the dual goals of assisting the republics along the path to independence whilst ensuring the maintenance and enhancement of cooperation was not only desirable by also achievable. These basic goals appear to have been thwarted predominantly as a consequence of Russian heavy handedness within the context of the CIS and related institutions. The CIS has come to be regarded in some circles as synonymous with Russian hegemony. This has resulted in initially enthusiastic republics such as Uzbekistan turning its back on the potential of the CIS as a unifying and empowering force within the Central Asian region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

In the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), however, the critical issue of Russian dominance is countered to a degree by Chinese influence within the organisation. The SCO has its origins in a program of dialogue that developed in 1993 between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the topic of demarcation of common borders. This in turn was formalised in April 1996, when the presidents of the five states agreed to a number of agreements on common border issues that was subsequently called the Shanghai Accord. These five states – which by this point had been labelled the Shanghai Five, or Shanghai Forum – worked together in developing a “region-wide united front to address the challenges to political normalisation in the Central Asian region”.22

21 Allison, Roy, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia”, International Affairs, vol 80, no 3, 2004, pp463-483, p469. Allison argues that because both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are absent from the CSTO, the organisation “cannot develop region-wide operational plans for Central Asia…though in principle the CSTO is open to new member states” (p71). 22 Gleason, G., 2001, p1092.

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Membership of the group was expanded in 2000 by the addition of Uzbekistan, and in June 2001, the member states issued a joint Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Given the organisation’s origins in a relatively informal grouping of states established to address issues of border demarcation, it is somewhat intriguing to see that the 2001 Declaration extended the mandate of the organisation to include issues of common security and economic integration. Not only did the member states agree to “undertake joint effort in the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region”, but they also recognised the importance of building “a new, democratic, just and rational international political and economic order”.23 Most importantly, the Declaration stressed that the SCO was, first and foremost a “cooperation” organisation, and “not an alliance directed against other states and regions”, adhering to “…principles of openness…(and declaring) its willingness to develop dialogue, contacts and cooperation” and “on the basis of consensus, to admit as new members states which share the objectives and goals of cooperation”.24

Somewhat surprising have been signs of developing tensions between Russia and China within the context of cooperative activities facilitated by the SCO. In May 2004, the Russian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov criticised the presence of Chinese troops in Central Asia. Although these troops were present as part of joint exercises under the auspices of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent, Trubnikov strongly criticised the presence of both Chinese and US troops in the region and in the process emphasising that Central Asia was a sphere of influence vital to Russian interest, raising the prospect that China’s efforts to develop the various structures of the SCO will be countered by Russian obstructionism.25 A dominant China would be as detrimental to SCO as a dominating Russia has proven to be to the CST and the CIS generally, and the Central Asian republics are cognisant of the need to

23 Article Two, Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 15 June 2001, Shanghai, translation of Declaration located at http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/sco/sco02.htm. 24 Article Seven, Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 25 Blank, S. “Is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Cracking?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 May 2004, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, located at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?atcicleid=2378. Blank commented that, although the then Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov complained in 2002 that the SCO was ineffectual, it appeared that the SCO may become “too effective for Moscow’s taste and too much of an instrument of Chinese, as opposed to Russian, or even collective security policy”.

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counterweight competition and rivalry between China, Russia and the US with genuine frameworks of cooperation.

Irrespective of whether the shared objectives of the SCO were being subverted by the desires of two key states, the SCO would be somewhat redeemed if the Central Asian members viewed the organisation as a viable forum within which they could pursue matters of shared concern. Unfortunately, there is evidence that the smaller members of this grouping view the intentions of Russia and China almost as suspiciously as Russia and China regard each other. Even as early as June 2002, when the SCO’s Charter was formalised and the organisation was transformed into a legitimate international organisation, Central Asian leaders were expressing their concerns that the introduction of an economic element to the organisation would see them exploited by their larger neighbours. For example, Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev indicated that he was wary of agreeing to the expansion of SCO’s mandate to include economic affairs, and that he would insist upon the establishment of guidelines concerning the extraction of minerals or the use of fuel and water resources as a precursor to greater economic cooperation.26 As discussed in the preceding chapter, the unilateral actions of both China and Russia have attracted criticism from certain quarters in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere for being little more than disguised attempts to exploit the natural resources of the region. It remains to be seen whether multilateral engagement levels out the playing field and thus reduces the likelihood of such charges being levelled at Central Asia’s larger neighbours.

Such issues aside, one significant and durable factor that will continue to act as a facilitator of engagement within the SCO format is the issue that brought about the creation of the forum in the first place: border demarcation. Although, as discussed in the earlier chapter on this topic, many of the more contentious border demarcation issues are being resolved, the possibility of future irredentist claims is perceived as a compelling reason for cooperation amongst SCO member states. Irrespective of whether borders have been agreed upon, the complex ethnic mix that the Central Asian

26 “SCO Anointed as International Organisation”, Central Asia Report, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 13 June 2002, vol 2, no 23, located at http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/06/23-130602.asp.

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republics share with Russia and China remains a potent trigger for destabilising conflict between the countries. Shared recognition of the implications of this has led the member states of the SCO to favour a policy of mutual non-interference in minority affairs:

“...as far as secessionism is concerned, all the republics’ leaders had an interest in resisting any such pressure on the part of groups linked to majorities in neighbouring states, and all were keen to stress that support by a neighbouring regime for any such group could lead to greater instability or to retaliatory treatment.”27

From the point of view of this discussion, however, it is not clear whether this rationale for cooperation is more promising for the future of the region than it is problematic. On the one hand, it is encouraging to learn that the states of the region, including Russia and China, recognise the need to treat the issue of irredentist populations cautiously and are prepared to cooperate to ensure significant problems do not emerge. On the other hand, it is possible to consider that such a ‘hands off’ approach on the part of the SCO may lead the various states perceiving that they have a free range when it comes to dealing with their constituent minorities. As a consequence, in the event of an outbreak of conflict between ethnic groups, the SCO may be constrained from responding, as each of the member states would perceivably seek to avoid creating a precedent justifying similar interventions on its own territory in the future.28

Additionally, there are indications that the SCO is also working contrary to the idea of collective international responsibility for human rights issues, by insisting that the

Akaev’s preference was for the SCO to focus on combating terrorism and developing regional transport and communications networks. 27 Misra, Amalendu, “Shanghai Five and the Emerging Alliance in Central Asia: The Closed Society and its Enemies”, Central Asian Survey, vol 20, no3, 2001, pp305-321, p314. 28 This point is contrary to the arguments made by Misra, who stated “although there is scope for state- centric nationalism, based on the promotion of a dominant ethnic group as a defining element of the new identity, the presence of powerful minorities is a major stumbling block in this regard” (2001, p313). However, in respect to the contention that the member states of the SCO recognised the mutual damage that would result from meddling in the ethnic-related affairs of its neighbours and thus declare such action as a no-go area, if this was the glue that held the SCO together, then there would be nothing to constrain the actions of the states vis-à-vis nationalising policies. Reprisals would only occur in the event of either

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international community adopt a ‘hands off’ approach with Central Asian issues. Recent meetings of the SCO have been assessed as indicating that the organisation is adopting a much more conservative approach, aimed at the creation “of a working, functioning structure to support stability, to preserve those political systems that have taken shape in the post-Soviet Asiatic states”.29

“In the area of human rights it is necessary to respect strictly and consecutively historical traditions and national features of every people, sovereign equality of all states.”30

This statement can be construed as a justification of the continuation of the autocratic nature of governance in the region, especially given that the pre-Soviet political traditions were founded upon autocracy and literally tyrannical rule within the Khanates. If this ‘historical tradition’ is being held up as the model for governance in the region by the SCO, then the likelihood of progress in the area of political reform in the direction of a more nuanced approach to the management of heterogenous populations is slim, if not non-existent.

Probably the most promising aspect of the SCO is that it combines, in theory at the very least, issues of common security and economic integration within its mandate. This approach could prove beneficial in the long term, in that it could counter the processes of dislocation that are resulting from the proliferation of bilateral treaties and relationships in the region. Only time will tell, however, whether Russian and Chinese attempts to counter each other's influence via the SCO forum will result in benefits or costs to the Central Asian republics.

cross-border promotion of ethnic identity or solidarity, or attempts to defend the rights of related groups in neighbouring states. 29 Kimmage, Daniel, “SCO: Shoring up the Post-Soviet Status Quo”, Eurasia Insight, 9 July 2005. 30 Unofficial translation from Section Two of Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, July 5, 2005, Astana, located at http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=407&LanguageID=2.

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The Eurasian Economic Community and GUUAM

In the same period that the SCO was developing, the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan undertook another initiative by jointly signing an agreement on Central Asian economic integration that formed the basis of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). This community, which also included Russia, was assessed as the logical next step in the incremental movement towards greater economic policy harmonisation in the region, and was seen at the time as possibly offering the “greatest opportunities for successful inter-state cooperation in the post-Soviet period”.31

The EEC was formed in late October 2000 following a decision by a number of CIS states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Tajikistan – to create a new organisation to replace the CIS Customs Union. The intention was to create a new organisation that would facilitate the “real integration of the former Soviet space”.32 However, from the outset, it was clear that the EEC was constrained by two key features. Firstly, and most critically from the perspective of this discussion, Uzbekistan was not included within its membership. Consequently the ability of the EEC to achieve its key objective of “ensuring economic security on the outer border of the community”33 was immediately constrained by the absence of one of the key players in the region. Secondly, the EEC was further constrained by the fact that, although it was established as a successor to the CIS Customs Union, is was also established in response to the influence of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) organisation.34

GUUAM had been established in 1997,35 as a counter to Russian influence and policy by states that were increasingly looking to engage with the West. GUUAM had a clearly defined set of priorities, which included:

31 Gleason, G. 2001, p1092. 32 Kakachia, Kornely, “Will GUUAM and EEC bury the CIS”, Perspective, vol xi, no 2, November- December 2000, located at http://www.bu.edu.iscip/vol11/kakachia.html. 33 Allison, R., “Structures and Frameworks for Security Policy Cooperation in Central Asia”, in Allison, R., and Jonson, L. (eds), Central Asian Security, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, 2001, pp219- 246, p227. 34 Kakachia, 2000. 35 However, at this time its membership did not include Uzbekistan, thus it was known as the GUAM grouping.

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1. Opposition to aggressive separatism and regional conflicts; 2. The development of the Eurasian and Transcaucasian transportation corridors; 3. Support for the fundamental norms and principles of international law, including respect for sovereignty and internationally recognised borders.36

These priorities went more comprehensive than the largely economic objectives of the EEC, and thus do not appear to be completely at odds with the objectives of the EEC. However, despite the overt commitment to regional integration and security, GUUAM was significant because it was a testament to the intentions of the member states to turn away from the CIS and seek to increasingly move out of Russia’s orbit. In this way, it placed Uzbekistan at odds with its Central Asian neighbours, who were seeking to maintain, if not actually enhance, their relationship with Russia. Additionally, and perhaps more critically, GUUAM also focused Uzbekistan’s attention on programs of integration and security cooperation with its western neighbours, again at the expense of its relationship with the other Central Asian states.

To date, neither organisation appears to have enjoyed much success in achieving its set objectives. The EEC appears to have achieved little in the way of regional economic integration, something that has been attributed to Russia’s desire to not create a free trade zone that would “cost the country tens of millions of dollars in transporting energy and other resources”.37 GUUAM, on the other hand, has been limited by the failure of its members to commit to deep security cooperation within the organisation’s framework. Additionally, several of the member states also deviated from the declared goals of the organisation, and at the same time inexorably moving closer to Moscow as a result of economic imperatives and a shared concern over terrorism.38 For example, prior to the change of government that occurred in 2003, Georgia was perceived to have become increasingly reliant upon Russian support in dealing with secessionist

36 Kakachia, 2000. GUUAM also tended to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures. 37 Willerton, John, and Cockerham, Geoffrey, “Russia, the CIS and Eurasian Interconnections”, in James Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma, Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, pp185-207, p202. Despite these observations, the authors consider that the EEC has the potential to “eventually facilitate the coordination of member states’ economic policies and foreign relations”. 38 Kay, Sean, “Geopolitical Constraints and Institutional Innovation: The Dynamics of Multilateralism in Eurasia”, in James Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma, Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, pp125-143, p135.

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challenges, and similarly the election of the Moldovan Communist party to government in the last election has seen something of a return to traditional policy for Moldova.39 The toppling of the pro-Russian governments in Georgia and Ukraine certainly had implications for the hegemony that Russia had enjoyed within the region, and these events may have provided an opportunity for GUUAM to achieve its implicit goal of providing a counterweight to Russian influence in the region. Unfortunately, the more successful GUUAM is in achieving this aim, the more likely it will also focus the attentions of Uzbekistan on relationship-building outside of Central Asia, to the detriment of cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours.

Consequently, the value of either organisation in their current form to this discussion, and their ability to provide meaningful input to solutions to localised, internal conflict in Central Asia, is questionable. It is arguable that although each of the organisations is founded on different principles, the fact that the EEC was established as a counterweight to GUUAM suggests that they may work at cross purposes, and in the process accentuate the developing differences between the states of Central Asia. Also, the fact that the two organisations contain discrete memberships is only the most superficial indication of the intentions of the member states, and thus may be symptomatic of the extent to which the intentions of the Central Asian states diverge along a cleavage that centres on Uzbekistan.

Nevertheless, the stated aims of the two organisations are, in principle at least, conducive to the development of closer economic, political and social bonds between the republics. It is unfortunate that regional cooperation is being dealt with in such a fragmented manner that, as demonstrated in this example, sees economic issues dealt with separately to political issues such as separatism or Russian dominance. In this instance, a combination of the two approaches would, by enhancing the economic capacity of the region through recognition of the value of economic linkages across borders, not only improve the economic performance of the republics but also give the region as a whole greater leverage when dealing with its belligerent neighbour.

39 Willerton, John, and Cockerham, Geoffrey, “Russia, the CIS and Eurasian Interconnections”, in James Sperling, Sean Kay, and S. Victor Papacosma, Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, pp185-207, p206.

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Although this would mean that the goals of the individual states would be subordinated to the goals of the region as a whole, the dividends to those involved would be substantial.

Other Regional Organisations

One issue that is noteworthy from the perspective of this discussion was the fact that, in addition to the above mentioned groupings, the 1990s saw the development of a number of other initiatives involving Central Asian states that were either even less notable or actually stillborn.40 Many of these proposed organisations were, unlike the organisations listed above, initiatives of the Central Asian states themselves, rather than sponsored or driven by external countries such as Russia. Therefore it is unfortunate that most organisations failed to develop into meaningful institutions in which the Central Asian states had a sense of investment.

The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), which included all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan, failed to achieve its primary goal of developing an appropriate structure to coordinate the region’s economic, trade or security policies.41 More promising was the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which was originally proposed by Kazakh President Nazarbaev soon after independence. The CICA was modelled on the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and its membership stretched from the Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan), Russia and China, to Turkey, India, Pakistan and several other Asian states. Unfortunately, the CICA has also attracted criticism for failing to develop into an effective institution, being more concerned with issuing “bland resolutions on strengthening peace, stability and cooperation in Asia”.42

40 Bohr, Annette, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order”, International Affairs, vol 80, no 3, 2004, pp 485-502, pp488-489. 41 Bohr, A., 2004, p486. 42 Allison, Roy, “Structures and Frameworks for Security policy Cooperation in Central Asia”, in Lena Jonson and Roy Allison (eds), Central Asian Security, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001, pp219-246, p223. Allison concluded that the CICA had “little operational value in coordinating the security policies of the CIS Central Asian states”.

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Adding to the uncertainly of the effectiveness of such organisations are the conflicting arguments surrounding the value of the plethora of regional organisations that have developed in recent years. One school of thought sees the number of organisations in the region seeking to gain a security mandate as working in a cooperative rather than competitive manner. For example, the former State Secretary of the Kyrgyz Republic Adburazakov saw the SCO as being only one of four tools that promoted regional security in Central Asia, alongside the US-led coalition in Afghanistan, the CST and the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.43 On the other hand, the proliferation of organisations in the region has been viewed as possibly creating more problems that it solves.

“No single Eurasian security space currently exists…it remains fragmentary and diffuse and to some extent internally contradictory, some of its elements not only fail to harmonize, but compete with one another…it is necessary to delimit the spheres of influence in matters of safeguarding collective security between existing integration structures in the region – CIS, the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Community, the CSTO and others.”44

With an eye on the enhancement of interdependence within the region, and the development of a regional approach to issues of shared security and the management of minority groups, what may be the most durable outcome from this diverse array of multilateral institutions is that they are, within a number of different contexts, bringing the various states of Central Asia to the same table, and facilitating discussions between them on a wide range of issues. This scenario theoretically provides more opportunity for consultation between the states than what is occurring at a bilateral level, and in the process brings about a convergence of policy conducive to the constructive management of ethnic pluralism within each state.

43 Lukin, A., “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Problems and Prospects”, International Affairs, no 3, 30 June 2004, pp31-40, p34. 44 General Secretary of the CIS Nikolai Bordyuzha, quoted in “CIS Defence System Disintegrating, CIS ‘slowly dying’ says Russian Paper”, in BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, London, 16 February 2005, located at http://proquest.umi.com/pdlink?did=793939021&sid=4&Fmt=3&clientid=25620&RDT=309&vName=P QD. The article, sourced from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 14 February 2005, pp1-2, focused on the implications of the perceived disintegration of the CIS, as evidenced by the planned abolition of the CIS Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation (or ShKVS), one of the key agencies within the CIS.

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The success or failure of the above organisations will have wide ranging ramifications for the future of the region. The main risk derives from what format for interaction the different states choose for pursuing their security, economic and foreign policy objectives. On one hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, they can choose to focus primarily on the development of bilateral relations with the likes of Russia, the US or China. On the other hand, they can seek to engage with their immediate neighbours on issues of shared concern in the context of the multilateral fora discussed above. The evidence points towards a clear preference for bilateral agreements over multilateral consultations. One key assessment is that Central Asian states appear to have “placed little trust in regional formats that are poorly institutionalised and may prove ephemeral in a period of rapid geopolitical transition…(while) bilateral agreements with strong states can be used to help develop national military forces structured to meet emerging threats…or simply reinforce sovereignty”.45 However, as discussed earlier, these bilateral relationships are doing little to enhance the sovereignty enjoyed by the Central Asian republics, and in some instances have produced a diminution of sovereignty because the republics’ needs are being subverted by the goals of their larger neighbours. Given the way that both Russia and China have, to varying degrees, influenced the goals of the key regional organisations to reflect their own objectives, it is no surprise that the smaller states have lost faith in the capability or validity of these organisations.

There are, however, two discernable functions that can be undertaken by such multilateral institutions. The first function is to contribute to the development of general principles of governance and state capacity in the region, and to encourage greater levels of cooperation and interdependence among the republics. The second more specific function is to assist the republics with the development of means of accommodating the diverse needs of their heterogeneous populations, and, if necessary, respond meaningfully to the manifestation of ethnic tensions or conflict in the region. Based on the brief survey of events in the region conducted above, it appears that, Russian-led CIS efforts in Tajikistan aside, the regional institutions that currently exist in the region largely lack the mandate or capability to offer either proactive or reactive

45 Allison, Roy, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia”, International Affairs, vol 80, no 3, 2004, pp463-483, p482. Allison considers such trends will sometimes

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solutions to instances of ethnic or intrastate conflict in Central Asia. As a consequence, any attempts to develop a logical, pre-emptive framework for future situations will inevitably have to look beyond the region to other international actors.

There are a number of such institutions or organisations that currently play a role within the Central Asian region. A comprehensive survey of these bodies would range from regional alliances and bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe, to formal international institutions such as the United Nations, and the World Bank. Unfortunately, anything more than a cursory examination of even a handful of such bodies is beyond the scope of this discussion, as the engagement of bodies such as the United Nations and the OSCE with the Central Asian states would alone be worthwhile topics for individual theses. However, even a brief survey is instructive, in that it can illustrate the history and capabilities of such organisations, and in doing so assess their potential to contribute to the resolutions of existing and future ethnonational issues in Central Asia.

The Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe

One organisation that has focused on encouraging the governments of Central Asia to adopt positive initiatives in this regard is the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE evolved from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with the CSCE becoming a fully fledged organisation as a consequence of its 1994 Summit Declaration, which reaffirmed the Organisation’s commitment to diplomatic, rather than treaty-based, responses to conflict prevention and dispute resolution. OSCE engagement with Central Asia commenced in 1994, when the organisation opened a field office in Tajikistan, and the organisation assumed a role as guarantor of the General Peace Accord implemented at the conclusion of the Tajik civil war in 1997. Since this time, the OSCE has played an effective role in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in Tajikistan, and has also established field offices in the other four Central Asian republics. All of these offices were established under a mandate agreed by the OSCE Permanent Council and the host

occur at “the expense of neighbouring states in a region of contested borders and disputed access to resources”.

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government, and sought to achieve the integration of the Central Asian states into the OSCE community by focusing on representation and conflict prevention.46

A major initiative of the CSCE was the creation of the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The position of HCNM was created by the CSCE’s Helsinki Document, and was provided with a mandate to proactively identify possible sources of ethnic conflict within the CSCE area.47 Although the office lacks any means to enforce recommendations that it may make in relation to a particular issue, the position of HCNM is effective in that the High Commissioner is mandated to investigate issues of minority rights, and to draw widespread political attention to matters of concern. The HCNM regularly conducts evaluations in-country, and issues formal recommendations outlining what the recipient country should do to improve the position of minorities within its borders. The HCNM conducted several such visits to both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the 1990’s. The outcomes of these visits were formal letters written to the Foreign Ministries of the two republics, in which the HCNM at the time, Max van der Stoel, outlined the results of his investigations into the minority rights situation in both countries. In the case of the Kyrgyz visit, the HCNM provided a list of recommendations, including the establishment of National Cultural Centres “which have competencies which affect the interest of the various minorities in Kyrgyzstan”.48

The message preached by the HCNM is relatively simple, and presented in accordance with the particular situation of the recipient country.

46 “The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy”, International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no 38, 11 September 2003, Osh/Brussels, p3. The report argued that the mandates for the field offices are so broad as to be almost useless as a guide to what each mission did. However this did provide an advantage by ensuring that each head of mission had to flexibility to respond quickly to a wide range of events and issues. 47 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, located at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/07/4046_en.pdf. The Helsinki document spoke in terms of an ‘early warning’ function: “The High Commissioner will provide ‘early warning’ and, as appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States, requiring the attention of and action by the Council or the CSO.

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“My task is not assimilation of minorities nor separation, but to find the middle ground of integration in harmony. As High Commissioner, I thus strive to find the best ways to accommodate the legitimate concerns of majorities and minorities; seeking the means by which they can build the national society together in such a way that the State is the common home for all of them; where none are treated as second class citizens. Where those in the minority as well as those in the majority can preserve their identity and yet also share with other groups in society the identity of the national society as a whole. That is, all who so wish should be able to have dual or even multiple identities: as members of the national society as a whole and, simultaneously, as members of ethnic, linguistic or religious groups.”49

One common theme, though, is the value of educational systems that encompass the requirements of minority groups. The incumbent HCNM has addressed this issue at length, actively encouraging and assisting a number of governments within the OSCE area to develop and implement educational programs that not only ensure that “persons belonging to different ethnic communities have the opportunity to protect and develop their language, history and cultures through the educational process”, but also ensuring that there are “places in the school system to bring children from different backgrounds together to learn from each other, rather than separating them on the basis of one particular identity”.50

48 Letter from OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Her Excellency, Mrs Roza Otunbaeva, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, dated 7 August 1995, ref: no. 897/95/Lm, located at www.osce.org. 49 Laying the Foundations for Integration: Language and Education in Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan, Address by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, to the OSCE HCNM – Cimera Roundtable, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 15 April 2003, located at www.osce.org. Cimera is an NGO based in the city of Osh. 50 “Education as a Means of Integration in Multi-ethnic Societies”, Address by Rolf Ekeus, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, at the Conference: Building Understanding and Tolerance in Multiethnic Societies: Promoting Integration and the Role of the International Community, OSCE/Ministry of Education and Assembly of the People of Kyrgyzstan Conference, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 3 November 2003. During the speech, the HCNM outlined some of his strategies for encouraging such initiatives, including “support for the development of pluralism in the curriculum, for the provision of diversity in textbooks, and for assisting teachers to develop new skills appropriate for working in multicultural contexts…also offered encouragement for the development of materials that reflect the views of all groups in society and to initiatives that seek to raise awareness from an early age on the need for tolerance and understanding of other cultures.” It is not known if this “encouragement” takes the form of financial assistance or provision of resources, but Ekeus did talk in terms of the contribution of the international community to these activities in light of the lack of funds domestically.

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The major impediment to the success of the HCNM in encouraging reform and the adoption of ‘minority-friendly’ policies is the lack of any real means to compel recipient countries to adopt his advice. Possibly the strongest action available to the HCNM, as stipulated in his mandate, is the ability to issue an ‘early warning’ to the OSCE Chairman in Office that there is prime facie risk of potential ethnic conflict.51 The OSCE’s CSO can also engage the United Nations Security Council on issues arising from its own peacekeeping activities, and thus can act as something of a ‘referral agency’ by bringing such matters to the close attention of the member states of the UN Security Council.

In other respects the OSCE is very well positioned to undertake the role of assisting the republics in Central Asia forge more appropriate and durable forms of governance, representation and resource allocation. It has created a specific position, the HCNM, to achieve this end, and has equipped this position with considerable political currency. In the guise of the HCNM, the OSCE had also developed practical expertise on the issue of integration and accommodation of minority groups within multiethnic states that is probably not equalled in any other international institution or organisation.

What is lacking is the ability to focus this expertise more intensely upon the leadership of the region, in the form of political pressure, assistance programs, and grants for the establishment of community consultative councils. The real test of the OSCE’s ability, in its current form drawing upon existing tools, to produce positive outcomes in Central Asia vis-à-vis the issue of national minorities, has theoretically already occurred. It has been engaging with the region on the issue of minority rights, both directly through the HCNM and indirectly through other institutions such as the Office for Democratic

51 The Chairman in Office can then refer the matter to the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials, which can take action in accordance with the Articles contained within Chapter Three of the 1992 Helsinki Document. Options available at this stage range from the establishment of a fact-finding and rapporteur mission to the implementation of an OSCE peacekeeping operation. The OSCE is mandated to establish peacekeeping operations, supported by its member states that will “involve civilian and/or military personnel, may range from small-scale to large-scale, and may assume a variety of forms including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces…to supervise and help maintain cease- fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees”. See Article 18, Chapter 3, Helsinki Document 1992. The other articles governing the conduct of peacekeeping deployments include: Article 22: Peacekeeping operations will not entail enforcement action; Article 23: Peacekeeping operations require the consent of the parties directly concerned; Article 24: Peacekeeping operations will be conducted impartially, and Article 25: Peacekeeping operations cannot be considered a substitute for a negotiated settlement and therefore must be understood to be limited in time.

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Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), since the early 1990’s when the leaderships of the Central Asian republics were still considering how best to proceed along the path to consolidated statehood. Most, if not all, of the HCNM’s formal recommendations to the republics of the region, most notably Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, were based upon sound and readily adoptable principles which were presented in a way that highlighted the benefits to the recipient republic of adopting them. Unfortunately, although the OSCE has achieved some successes in the region, the strongest indictment of its actions is the fact that the governments of the region have still continued to adopt policies and programs that are far from reflective of the advice being offered on the issue of accommodating minority rights. The OSCE recognises this, and continues to engage the region, in particular Kyrgyzstan, on the issue of minority rights. Indeed, the HCNM has used the recent events in Kyrgyzstan to bring into sharp focus the immediate need for the new government to adopt the advice that the HCNM has for so long been offering.

“Now is a vital time for Kyrgyzstan. The decisions of today will, to a considerable extent, set the tone for the future. In this regard, I believe that attention should be paid to ensuring that the ethnic diversity of Kyrgyzstan is properly reflected in the representation of persons from all ethnic communities within the different levels of the state."52

The real challenge confronting the OSCE will obviously be in presenting such suggestions in a manner that makes them attractive to the governments of the region. However, as argued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, it is also critical that the OSCE devotes more money, resources, and political focus to the issues confronting Central Asia. It is arguable that this region, more than any other that falls within the OSCE’s mandate, is demanding immediate attention. This is the main thrust of the ICG’s recommendations on the OSCE, which concluded that Central Asia and the Caucasus, not south-eastern Europe (where so much of the OSCE’s attention and resources is currently focused) should be the primary

52 Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, quoted in OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities calls for increased attention to inter-ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan, OSCE Press Release, Bishkek/the Hague, 19 April 2005.

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focus of the OSCE.53 What is in question is not the ability of the OSCE, via the HCNM, to offer solutions to the issues confronting the Central Asian republics, but their ability to convince these states to act on their recommendations.

The United Nations

The historical role of the United Nations (UN) in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement globally is largely a matter of public record, and does not need to be revisited here in anything more than a cursory fashion. A survey of the history of UN- led interventions, from the relative successes of Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and East Timor, to the declared failures of Somalia and Bosnia- Hercegovina54 demonstrates that the most qualitative aspect of the UN’s activities to date have been in respect to post-conflict interventions, rather than preventative activities. Many explanations and excuses for the UN’s less-than-exemplary track record have been offered by proponents and detractors alike. Proponents have argued that those disputes referred to the UN for resolution or mediation are, by their very nature, the most intractable and difficult to solve. Detractors consider that not only are UN interventions constrained by a faulty logic of intervention that considers that intervention should be both limited and impartial,55 but that the UN as an organisation is incapable of effectively mediating complex international disputes.56

53 “The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy”, International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no 38, 11 September 2003, Osh/Brussels, pp20-21. The ICG maintained that other security and political structures will always be more influential in southeast Europe than the OSCE. However, there are few organisations in Central Asia/Caucasus that have a local presence or specialist knowledge. As the security of this region is fundamental to the security of Europe, the OSCE should then take a leading role. 54 Dobbins, James, “The UN’s Role in Nation-building From the Belgian Congo to Iraq”, Survival, vol 46, no 4, Winter 2005, pp81-102. Of the interventions named above, the author saw the first four as successes because they culminated in reasonably free and fair elections, and “resulted in a sustained period of civil peace which endured after the United Nation’s withdrawal” (p84). The named UN failures resulted, in part, because the intervention occurred whilst the conflict was still unfolding, with the “UN- led peacekeeping forces…inserted into societies where there was no peace to keep”(p85). 55 Betts, Richard, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention”, Foreign Affairs, vol 73, no 6, Sep/Oct 1994. Betts considered that limited intervention only had a chance to end a war if the intervenor took sides, and thus tilted the local balance of power and helped one of the rivals to win. Similarly, Betts considered that impartial intervention could only end a war if the outsiders took complete command of the situation, overawed the local competitors, and imposed a peace settlement from the top down (p21). 56 Touval, Saadia, “Why the U.N. Fails”, Foreign Affairs, vol 73, no 5, Sep/Oct 1994, pp44-57, p45. Touval considered that the UN did not serve well as an authoritative channel for communication; that it possessed very little real political leverage; its promises and threats lacked credibility; and that it was incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible and dynamic negotiations in line with an overall strategy.

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The UN has, to a limited degree, demonstrated its capabilities, or lack thereof, in the area of ‘peace-building’ in Central Asia, through the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP). This office was established in June 2000 as a replacement for the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan. UNTOP’s mandate focused on the “national reconciliation and consolidated of peace and stability in Tajikistan”.57 Although UNTOP’s primary purpose was to facilitate discussions between the parties to the 1997 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, it also introduced a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights in post-conflict Tajikistan.58

As discussed earlier, Russia and the CIS played the predominant role in the resolution of the civil war in Tajikistan, and the UN’s engagement occurred after peace had been declared between the competing factions in Tajikistan. As a consequence, it is difficult to evaluate the true utility of the UN’s presence in post-conflict Tajikistan, as their presence was atypical, and was based upon a relatively vague mandate that ensured that it played a role subordinate to that played by the CIS. However, given the nature of the conflict in Tajikistan, and the UN’s poor track record in terms of intervention, it is likely that had the UN intervened earlier in either a peace-enforcing or peacekeeping role, it would have encountered the same difficulties that undermined many of its earlier and subsequent interventions.

Possibly of more consequence to this discussion, is the reform process that the UN is currently undergoing, both in policy direction and structural reform, and the likelihood that this process will make the UN a more responsive, proactive organisation that can more effectively engage with the Central Asian region to prevent and, if necessary, resolve instances of ethnic conflict.

57 Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, reference S/2003/542, located at www.un.org. 58 These initiatives included a) The establishment of a national government commission on human rights treaty reporting; b) The establishment of a Human Rights Information and Documentation Centre; c) Study visits to Slovakia for senior officials from the Supreme and Constitutional Courts and the Ministries of Justice, Interior and Security, aimed at improving the operations of the various Tajik ministries. From Letter dated 8 May 2003.

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Discussion of the capabilities of other international organisations to contribute to the development of comprehensive strategies dealing with the management of plural societies, and any associated triggers of ethnic conflict is restricted to these two organisations because of the special position they occupy within the expanding club of international institutions. The OSCE is noteworthy because as a matter of course it contemplates governance as it relates to the management of plural societies, in the process examining the dynamics of relations between ethnic groups, and between minority groups and a state. The expertise and insight that the HCNM has developed over the past decade on these matters would ensure that the HCNM’s input into any future strategies dealing with the diverse societies in Central Asia would be invaluable.

Similarly, the UN is dealt with, albeit in a cursory manner, because it remains, despite its obvious flaws, the premier institution administrating the expanding body of international law and convention relating to sovereignty, self-determination and human rights. The legal tools at the UN’s disposal would provide the best foundation upon which any future interventionist strategies seeking to control or resolve a conflict occurring along ethnic lines could be constructed. This legal dimension is complemented by the fact that the UN, in particular the Security Council, remains (again, despite its flaws) the predominant forum within which consensus for action in relation to ethnic conflict can be sought. Although the UN’s track record in relation to peace-keeping or peace-enforcing actions in areas where ethnic conflict is occurring, such as the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, is far from flawless, it is should not be excluded from any attempts to develop and implement workable solutions to instances of ethnic conflict.

Penetrating State Sovereignty? Problems and Prospects for International Institutional Contributions to State Building and Conflict Resolution in Post Soviet Central Asia

It will always be difficult to identify a proactive approach to dealing with the threat of possible ethnic conflict that can be adopted by international institutions. In the absence of actual ethnic conflict it is both theoretically and practically difficult to muster the international political will required to leverage influence in a state or region, and to convince a state to relinquish a measure of sovereignty to an outside interest who may

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be able to implement strategies proactively countering the development of ethnic conflict. This is reflected in reality in Central Asia, where the regional mechanisms are “directed at crisis management in the later stages of the conflict process…due to the lack of political willingness of the regional actors to surrender some of the national jurisdiction to a regional organisation, the sovereignty principle is so strong that the apparent benefits of long term consequences of national strengthening are disregarded”.59

From a rational perspective, one could be forgiven for deducing that recent events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would provide the incentive for the governments of the region to seek to introduce structural and political changes in their respective countries. The OSCE was one organisation that was quick to proclaim that the political succession in Kyrgyzstan provided an invaluable opportunity for the government to reconsider how it was dealing with the question of ethnic diversity within its borders. Unfortunately, it appears that the recent events have made the region’s governments less open to the prospect of external interests having a say in how they run their countries. This was illustrated by the rejection by Islam Karimov of an offer by the UN to conduct an inquiry into the events in Andijan in early May 2005.60 There have even been signs within the new Kyrgyz administration that there was little enthusiasm for external institutions such as the OSCE assuming a role in setting the agenda for the new government. In the lead up to the July Presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE had drafted a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ establishing protocols for the behaviour of candidates during the election. The agreement, which was interpreted as morally but not legally binding, stipulated that presidential candidates were to “refrain from speeches provoking violence, hatred, ethnic, racial and religious hostility”, and not to “use any methods of physical and psychological force and intimidation during the period of preparing and conducting elections and after election”.61

59 Swanstrom, 2004, p51. Swanstrom considered that “the present prospects for effective conflict prevention in Central Asia look rather grim and the improvements need to come from within the states before truly regional and effective mechanisms can be established.” 60 Noubel, Filip, “Who’s to Blame in Uzbekistan?” Reporting Central Asia, no 380, 20 May 2005, Institute of War and Peace Reporting. 61 Saralaeva, L., “Kyrgyzstan: OSCE Election Charter ‘Patronising’”, Reporting Central Asia, no 388, 17 June 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

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In proposing these guidelines, the OSCE was intending to set the tone not just for the election, but also for the future administration of Kyrgyzstan. Given the direction taken by the previous Akaev government, and the rioting and political machinations that had led to and followed Akaev’s deposition, the OSCE election charter was a largely symbolic, but nonetheless important, initiative. However, of the seven presidential candidates endorsed by the Kyrgyz Central Election Commission who were to run in the election, four refused to sign the charter. The general reason given for refusing to sign was that the charter was an “unnecessary and patronising intervention by a foreign organisation into Kyrgyz domestic politics”.62 Such resistance to what was an attempt on the part of an international institution to elicit support for a largely symbolic gesture is very disconcerting, especially given the continuing prospect for destabilising conflict in Kyrgyzstan and other republics, most importantly Uzbekistan.

In the case of Uzbekistan, it is possible that the potential for conflict, along ethnic or other lines, may have already reached a ‘critical mass’, and any attempts on the part of the international community to encourage or pressure the Uzbek government into adopting more constructive policies may paradoxically hasten the outbreak of violence directed towards the government. This, in turn could create very fertile ground for the development of conflict between different ethnic groups within the republic. The situation in Uzbekistan has been compared to Iran in the lead up to the 1979 revolution. In both instances, over a period of time, the US offered significant financial, military and political support to the government, only to reverse its policies by insisting on progress on human rights and democratic reform. In the Iran example, the Shah responded to US pressure by implementing a program of liberalisation, only to be unable to meet the increasing demands of opposition and Islamic groups.63

62 Saralaeva, L, 17 June 2005. Saralaeva quoted presidential candidate Toktaiym Umetalieva, who argued that Kyrgyzstan was a “highly developed civil society which is not obliged at the order of outside experts to sign the conditions of a d-grade pupil or bandit”. However, other candidates who signed the charter were very supportive. 63 Fredholm, M., “Revolt and Repression in Uzbekistan: the Dilemma of Western Response”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Fredholm outlined how the Iranian Islamic movement increased in confidence with each concession made by the government, and adopted more violent means of protest as the government became more reluctant to use force to suppress protests. Fredholm concluded “by first supporting, then censoring Karimov, the West might eventually release the very same forces in Uzbekistan that overthrew the Shah of Iran a generation ago”.

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Although it is becoming apparent that Uzbekistan is increasingly turning away from engagement with the US, to the benefit of less ‘demanding’ allies such as Russia and China, a process comparable to that which led to the revolution in Iran has been initiated by US engagement with the republic. The initial US engagement, as discussed earlier in Chapter Nine, fostered a hope within the populations of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan that western interest in their countries would improve the economic and human rights situations in the republics. When this hope was not matched by US and western efforts, much of the populations became disenchanted with the west. Compounding this is the fact that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan both increased their suppression of dissent in the name of the war of terror, an approach that arguably indirectly contributed to the events in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The end result is that both the governments and the citizens of the republics of Central Asia are somewhat suspicious of the capabilities and intentions of external ‘western’ interests, and are thus less open to allowing them a measure of influence in their internal affairs.

Another disconcerting development in the region is the increasing resistance from both the CIS and SCO to ‘western influence’ in the region. SCO in particular has developed as an explicit counter to US, and thus western, influence in Central Asia. Following events in Andijan, SCO increased its demands that the US remove its bases, and thus by implication its military presence and program of cooperation, from both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Although the US initially rejected the requests from SCO to withdraw its military presence from the region,64 there was also been increasing political resistance to the presence within the governments of the region. This resistance culminated in the July 2005 demand from Uzbekistan that the US close its bases within its borders and withdraw its military presence. Much of this regional resistance has been attributed to a perception amongst the leaders of the region that the “Bush administration’s aggressive democratisation policies have helped foment political upheaval in the former Soviet Union, leading to regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan”.65

64 “US Rejects Setting Central Asia Withdrawal Date”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Wednesday 6 July 2005. The report quotes US Sate Department Spokesman Scott McCormack who told reporters that “ the American military presence in the region is determined by bilateral agreements and that the United States and the Central Asian countries have concluded there are benefits to both sides from the basing arrangements”. The US subsequently closed its bases in Uzbekistan. 65 Blagov, S., “The Geopolitical Balance in Central Asia Tilts Towards Russia”, Eurasia Insight, EurasiaNet.

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Whilst such rejections of US initiatives do not necessarily equate with rejection of international efforts to encourage more responsible and inclusive forms of governance in the region, this trend is indicative of a somewhat polarised approach to state-building in Central Asia by regional and international state and institutional interests. On one hand, the CIS and SCO, dominated as they are by likeminded states, are seeking to develop frameworks promoting economic, political and security cooperation, with no interest in political reform, democratisation and human rights issues. In fact, this grouping of state interests is also characterised by its resistance to political reform. On the other hand, the US, NATO, the OSCE, and to a lesser degree the UN, are similarly seeking to develop frameworks promoting cooperation on political, economic and security issues. Critically, however, these interests are also pursuing domestic political reform and the development of democratic forms of government and respect for ‘western’ notions of human rights. Such polarisation can, especially in the case of US efforts, lead to not just tension and conflict between the different blocs with an interest in the region, but also contribute to an overall decline in the cooperation between states and organisations on matters of shared concern such as regional security and stability.

As argued by Tetjuro Iji, in his evaluation of peacemaking in Tajikistan, enhanced cooperation involving a wide variety of states and international institutions was a critical factor in the success of peacekeeping efforts in Tajikistan in the early 1990’s. In this situation:

“…multiple mediators played different but complementary roles, jointly contributing to the settlement of the Tajik conflict. Russia and Iran worked in tandem to deliver their respective clients to the agreement, while the other states provided additional pressure and good offices. The UN mediators injected neutral facilitation and formulation, and international legitimacy into state- centred peacemaking diplomacy. The OSCE endorsed the centrality of the UN in the Tajik peace process and helped it become impartial and legitimate, while

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the CIS supplied the military muscle necessary for ‘peacekeeping’ that the UN was lacking.”66

Events in Tajikistan, and the subsequent regional and international response to the conflict, provide an invaluable lesson on the value of a coordinated approach to conflict resolution that engages all state and institutional actors with an interest in the outcome. Cooperation and coordination on the part of such external interests would theoretically be as critical during pre-conflict state building as in post-conflict peacekeeping. It is obvious that such complementarity on the part of the actions and intentions of external actors in Central Asia is lacking, and in some circumstances the norm is becoming confrontation and competition between states and institutions rather than cooperation and coordination of effort.

Therefore, it is even more critical that, in the Central Asian example, state and institutional interests consolidate and coordinate their political will to bring about change in the policies of the Central Asian republics. Such engagement is critical to assisting the republics develop the state effectiveness that is fundamental to their abilities to constructively manage the needs of their heterogenous populations, and it may also provide an opportunity to minimise the impact of asymmetrical bilateral relationships. These issues need to be recognised by all external state and institutional interests, who need to put aside their differences and their discrete intermediate policy objectives, and work together to develop solutions to the many problems confronting the Central Asian republics.

66 Iji, Tetsuro, “Cooperation, Coordination and Complementarity in International Peacemaking: the Tajikistan Experience”, International Peacekeeping, vol 12, no 2, Summer 2005, p189-204, p201.

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Chapter Eleven

The International Community and Central Asia - Opportunities for Engagement and Conflict Prevention

From the discussion in the preceding chapters, one can conclude that many of the triggers of conflict between ethnic or identity groups are developing in the Central Asian Region. There are strong indications that the nationalising policies of many, if not all, of the states of Central Asia are not only contributing to the development of cleavages between different groups in each of the states, but are also putting the governments of the region increasingly at odds with a significant percentage of their constituency. Similarly, economic hardship in many regions combined with government policies aimed at hardening borders, further dislocating traditional economic infrastructure and patterns of trade, are compounding the likelihood of competition for scarce resources between community groups.

What is additionally interesting is that these trends appear to be largely ignored by external states that have a demonstrated interest in the region. As discussed earlier, these states appear to be focused either on achieving economic dividends or combating the development of militant Islam that threatens their security interests in the region. State actors such as Russia, China, and the US are, in pursuing their own foreign policy objectives, contributing to not only the strengthening of the autocratic nature of the governments of the region, but also to the further dislocation of the critically important economic, social and cultural linkages between the Central Asian states by fostering competition between the republics. Regional organisations, both those created as initiatives of the Central Asian states themselves and those sponsored predominantly by interests such as Russia, have also proven relatively ineffective in reconciling the Central Asian states’ desire to develop a sense of identity with the need to maintain the traditional structures of interdependence that are so critical to the stability of the region.

Furthermore, both state actors and regional organisations appear to lack either the intention or the capability to play an effective role in the prevention or resolution of conflict in the region, ethnic or otherwise. Similarly, the plethora of regional bodies

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that have developed in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIS, the EEC, and SCO, to name a few, appear to be fundamentally constrained by either competition or rivalry between key parties (as with Russia and China in the SCO) or by inadequate or vague mandates. Although it is irrefutable that these organisations have achieved some successes in developing regional fora promoting issues of shared concern and as a consequence have contributed to the enhancement of links between the Central Asian republics, it appears from the discussion in the preceding chapters, that it would be unlikely that, in the event of ethnic conflict in Central Asia, the organisations as they exist today would be able to agree upon a coherent and viable course of action. Despite this assessment, it would be premature to assess that these organisations could not develop into more viable institutions. And although each individual organisation may be inadequately equipped or mandated to contribute meaningfully to the stability of the region, collectively, they are having a somewhat positive effect in the region by encouraging cooperation and engagement on issues of shared concern.

However, in the event of increased tensions or conflict between different ethnic (Kazakh, Uzbek, etc) or identity groups (zhuz, clan, or regional grouping) a large degree of responsibility for assisting the states of the region to develop strategies and solutions to such problems may, by default, need to be assumed by international institutions. It is possible to construe from the strategies adopted by state actors, such as the US, Russia and China, that the principal players still lack an appropriate conceptual understanding of the true nature Central Asian society, the myriad issues confronting the Central Asian republics and the potential for ethnic conflict in the region. Their attention appears to be on either Islamic extremism or the actions of competing states rather than the risk of conflict developing amongst the various titular or ethnic groups within the region.

This is somewhat surprising, given the wealth of literature that has been published in the last 15 years on the ethnic dimensions of Central Asian society and politics, and the identified possibility of ethnic conflict developing in the region. But the reality may be that these external states lack not the understanding of the ethnonational dimensions of Central Asia, but the will to recognise and address issues that have arisen as a consequence of developments over the last 15 years. From the perspective of regional security, it is possible that decision-making has been guided by the principle that it is

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perhaps easier to confront the emerging issue of Islamic fundamentalism than it is to confront the possibility of ethnic conflict in the region. In the Central Asian context, the latter threat goes well beyond the threat posed to international security by because it may necessitate not just a change of government policy in the region, but an actual change of governments, and even more drastic measures such as reconsideration of state borders.

Although the concept of multilateralism has taken something of a battering as a consequence of the actions taken by the US in respect to Iraq, in the case of Central Asia, it is, for reasons discussed above, likely that a global (as opposed to regional) multilateral organisation such as the United Nations is the best placed to contribute to solutions. This is especially the case when the global geostrategic strategic significance of the Central Asian region is considered. As demonstrated in Osh, in Batken, during the exodus of Meshketian Turks from Ferghana, and in recent events in Andijan where anti-government protestors have been forced across the border into Kyrgyzstan, even regional or localised conflict in Central Asia impacts upon neighbouring republics. And, in the process, an escalation of conflict in the region would have ramifications for those states that border it, including, but not limited to China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. State failure in the region would deny access to valuable energy resources, and also create an even more fertile ground for the growth and consolidation of international terrorism, organised transnational crime and drug production, weapons and people trafficking.1

But in certain respects, the heritage of the Central Asian republics means that it is not entirely appropriate to focus this discussion merely on strategies for conflict resolution. The nature of state creation, combined with the issues associated with the Central Asian republics emergence as sovereign entities necessitates consideration of strategies that go well beyond conventional policies that focus on reactive ethnic conflict resolution, by considering the very nature of state construction and the meaning of sovereignty in the region.

1 Oliker, Olga, and Szayna, Thomas, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003.

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The problems created by the region’s Soviet heritage, in particular the consequences of the Soviet nationalities policies and the arbitrary nature of the related border demarcation process are, unfortunately, part of the reality of the situation in Central Asia today. Aside from completely redrawing the boundaries of the republics, and embarking upon a program of forced population transfer that would humble even Stalin’s efforts, there is little that can be done to correct the more substantial results of earlier Soviet processes. Nevertheless, consideration should still be given to any policies that may be effective in improving the regional management of minority populations, in the process mitigating the negative implications of Russian and Soviet ‘colonial’ rule in Central Asia.

Recognition of the need for action is the first critical step in developing the leverage required to effect positive change by breaching the sovereignty of the independent states of Central Asia. The second step is the identification of strategies or reforms that will mitigate the prospect of ethnic conflict in the region. Any future ethnic conflict in Central Asia will be a consequence of a combination of structural issues, in particular the interplay between borders, economies and irredentist populations, and policy issues, namely nation-building policies implemented across the region. A comprehensive and suitably nuanced approach to ethnic conflict resolution will, by necessity, address both.

In some respects progress on the later policy issues is more readily achievable than the former. The OSCE in particular has identified discrete policy areas that need to be targeted, ranging from education and to political representation and transparency. The greatest progress in this area resulted from initiatives of the former HCNM, Max van der Stoel, who, through the coordination of a number of experts on international and constitutional law and minority group management, was instrumental in development of The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participate of National Minorities in Public Life. These recommendations, which were completed in September 1999, included a comprehensive framework designed to “encourage and facilitate the adoption by states of specific measures to alleviate tensions related to national minorities and thus serve the ultimate conflict prevention goal of the HCNM”.2

2 The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participate of National Minorities in Public Life, & Explanatory Note, Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, September 1999, p4, located at

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Other strategies may include both policy and structural components, and range from constitutional redesign to the establishment of frameworks for community representation that provide a collective voice for minority and majority ethnic groups within each republic.

Ignoring the resistance to outside ‘interference’ in domestic political issues that is developing in the region, there are a number of options that may provide truly innovative ways of addressing the issues that are increasingly confronting the republics. This is especially the case given that many of the issues arise from the increasing dislocation of communities, and the divergence of the republics from a sense of shared goals. The development of regional structures encouraging greater integration of economies is fundamentally important. However, integration should not be limited to economic processes, and a strategy that deals with economic concerns in isolation from other socio-political issues is likely to enjoy only limited success from the perspective of addressing sources of ethnic tension or conflict in the region. Consequently, the focus of this discussion will remain on the ethnopolitical issues emerging in the region.

On the surface, the solution to this dilemma is deceptively simple: the Central Asian republics have to be convinced of the value of ensuring, either through the implementation of new laws or the reform of existing laws, that all non-titular nationalities and cultural groups are guaranteed protection of their identities and cultural/ethnic markers – such as language, religion, dress – and are provided with proportional access to appropriate political representation and proportional influence over affairs of the state. This objective could, in theory, be realised by a number of different approaches, several of which are discussed below.

Constitutional Design as a Solution to Central Asian Woes

Although the authors of the various constitutions implemented in the Central Asian republics have, with some notable exceptions, avoided the temptation to comprehensively enshrine the superiority of the titular nationality within the http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/lund.html. The Lund Recommendations were constructed upon a general premise that adopting states would be in compliance with other human rights obligations. This

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constitution and within structures of government, they also accomplished very little in the way of instituting safeguards for the rights and interests of minority, non-titular groups within their borders.3 Much of the discrimination against minority groups that was discussed earlier has developed outside of the constitutional frameworks of the republics. Consequently, there is some merit to approaching the constitutions of the various republics as the primary place from which to consider the best way to accommodate the needs of the disparate populations, and thus pre-empt the development of overt ethnic conflict in the region.

Arend Lijphart, in his discussion on the establishment of democratic government in divided societies, identified two elements that contributed to the success of such initiatives: power sharing and group autonomy. Power sharing is best defined as the involvement of all significant communal groups in political decision making, whereas group autonomy related to the authority that these groups possessed to manage their own internal affairs such as education and culture. 4 The incorporation of these two principles into a democratic system of government is often referred to as consociational democracy, which is also generally characterised by proportional representation and the right of veto for minorities on issues that are vital to their interests and rights.5

precondition is, unfortunately, absent from Central Asia. 3 Although some authors consider the Central Asia republics differed markedly from the post-Soviet states in eastern Europe in that they did not attempt to conceal their priorities and their single minded foucs on ethnocultural policies. See Djumaev, A., “Nation-Building, Culture and problems of Ethnocultural Identity in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan”, in W. Kymlicka and M. Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp320-344, p323, Nonetheless, the Central Asian republics could have gone much further, have could have been significantly more blatant in ‘nation-building’ that they have been. 4 Lijphart, A., “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal of Democracy, vol 15, no 2, April 2004, pp96-109, p97. 5 Lijphart, 2004, p97, p107. Lijphart identified nine areas of ‘constitutional choice’ that would influence the characteristics of a consociational model of government that would need to be taken into account to ensure that it was the best fit. The most important of these areas included 1) the choice of legislative electoral systems, with proportional representation being preferred to majoritarian and intermediate systems; 2) deciding between parliamentary or presidential government, with a parliamentary system identified as the preferred choice; 3) power sharing within the executive; 4) cabinet stability; 5) federalism and decentralisation, with federalism identified as an excellent way to provide autonomy for groups; 6) provision of autonomy on a non-territorial basis, and 7) the sharing of power beyond cabinet and parliament, to include the civil service, judiciary, police and military: pp99-106.

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Consociation and the Management of Diverse Populations

Consociation, when realised along these lines, is something of a first step towards decentralisation. As discussed by Keating, decentralisation of political decision making, either through devolution or the establishment of a federal system, is a classic response to the conundrums posed by diversity or plurinationalities within a state, as it allows communities to manage their own affairs, control their own resources and make their own policy choices.6

However, the question of whether the extension of cultural and political autonomy is either desirable or achievable in Central Asia, using constitutional design, is one that is necessarily determined by both the region’s historical legacy and the current socio- political reality. One of the obvious consequences of the autocratic governments that have held power since independence (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan) is that there has been almost no room for the development of demands by minority groups for autonomy of any kind. Governments have allowed no effective opposition to their rule and thus have silenced political demands of every type and form. And when mass mobilisation has emerged, as occurred in Andijan in mid-2005, the response from the incumbent government has been swift, unambiguous and brutal. Thus, denial of minority rights, as occurs in many of the republics has occurred in a context where the question of minority group rights, either political or cultural, is almost irrelevant because individuals are practically denied an opportunity to develop a political voice as a citizen of the state.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that tensions have developed as a consequence of the denial of cultural identity of non-titular groups by the governments of the various regions. Further complicating matters is the fact that, as a consequence of the

6 Keating, M., Plurinational Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p102. Keating acknowledged many of the contending views on the value of decentralisation or federal frameworks to the accommodation of diversity, citing a number of authors who claim either that ethnically based federations will not work, or that federalism appeared to “require a degree of national homogeneity or at least a strong commitment to shared values, to balance the centrifugal forces of decentralisation”. However, Keating that plurinationalism went much further than multiculturalism, and related more to “the coexistance within a political order of more than one national identity…plurinationalism, is more than multiculturalism (in that)…more than one national identity can pertain to a single group or even an indivdual, opening up the possibility of multiple nationalities which in turn may be nested or may overlap in less tidy ways” (pp26-27). This description is very useful for interpreting and understanding identity and ethnicity in Central Asia, which we have earlier categorised as “composite” identities.

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composite or mosaic characteristics of ethnicity and identity within the region, it is difficult to judge the parameters of identity that will provide the foundations for any constitutional basis for minority rights in the region. In each republic, the only group identity that has gained formal recognition is that of the titular group. Despite this, identity in the region has retained both a non-territorial dimension (i.e., the scattered and disparate communities of Kazakhs in Uzbekistan) and a territorial dimension (i.e. in parts of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) where location is often just as important a determinant of identity as more conventional markers such as culture or language. Therefore, it is somewhat problematic to predict whether conventional strategies of constitutional design to achieve consociation will, in fact, be effective.

Despite this, the accommodation of both territorial and non-territorial cultural autonomy is a more realistic proposition for this paper to consider than political autonomy. Either approach, however, could prove problematic in the post-Soviet world. A correlation between status as an autonomous region and a tendency towards rebellion in post-Soviet Eurasia has been identified, with many of the conflicts that have occurred in the former Soviet Union since its dissolution occurring within regions that previously held autonomous status. This includes Azerbaijan (the in Nagorno), Georgia ( and ), and Russia (Chechnya). In comparison, republics in Central Asia, where there were fewer autonomous regions, have been relatively free of conflict.7

Within the Central Asian context, the issue that will forever plague a proposition in favour of consociation and constitutional recognition of identity or ethnicity is the perception that, as strategies, they enhance and formalise difference. As a consequence, although a communal group may be concerned that its members can no longer receive a primary, secondary or university education in its language, the constitutional or legislative enshrinement of this difference that would accompany the introduction of a

7 Cornell, S., “The Devaluation of the Concept of Autonomy: National Minorities in the Former Soviet Union”, Central Asian Survey, vol 18, no 2,, 1999, pp185-196. Cornell argued that the key issue was that the centralised and totalitarian character of the Soviet state meant that the hierarchy of autonomous structures was little more than rhetoric to disguise the suppression of minorities and the denial of autonomy. This experience has informed the views held by minorities vis-à-vis autonomous status within an existing republic, and makes them less likely to accept autonomous status instead of actual self rule (p193).

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clause or a law stipulating language rights may in fact escalate this difference to a level which previously had not been considered. Additionally, given the mosaic aspect of identity in Central Asia, a decision made at the state level on what may be an appropriate classification for ethnicity may not necessarily correspond to that chosen by the individual. This process reflects the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity, in that it accentuated the role of elites in the forging of ethnic identity.

A classic example of this process is the case of the Gagauz in post-Soviet Moldova. The Gagauz were a minority group that had been bestowed full citizenship during the Soviet era8 yet had only ever comprised a very small proportion of the population of Moldova.9 Three years after independence, the Moldovan republic effectively constituted the existence of the Gagauz as a nation by legislating the protection of their autonomy. As discussed, with a hint of irony, by Tishkov, in the Gagauz case no changes in cultural or social characteristics either preceded or accompanied the decision to enshrine Gagauz autonomy and national identity in legislation.10 As a case study, the progression of the Gagauz minority to nation-status within Moldova was indicative of the truth to Eriksen’s assertion that “the nation…is the product of nationalist ideology…a nation exists from the moment a handful of influential group of people decides that it should be so”.11 In view of this assessment, it could be considered that the enshrinement of minority group rights, legislatively or constitutionally, may be doing little more that continuing the work of Soviet-era ethnographers by formalising divisions within republics that didn’t previously exist. Indeed, consociation as a theory has been substantially criticised for “its excessive emphasis on elites, for consolidating ethnic and national cleavages, and focusing too much into closing communities, and not allowing trans-communal links to develop”.12 However, as argued by Keating,

8 Akiner, S., 1983, p398. 9 Katz, Rogers, Harned, 1975, p418, stated that the 1970 census indicated that the Turkish-speaking Gagauzy represented only 3.5% of the total population of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. 10 Tishkov, V., “Forget the Nation: Post-nationalist Understanding of Nationalism, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol 23, no 4, 2000, pp625-650, p647. Tishkov claimed that, whatever else happened, there was no nation formation accompanying this decision by the Moldovan Parliament. 11 Eriksen, T., 1993, p105. 12 Nimni, E. “Introduction: the national cultural autonomy model revisited”, in E. Nimni (ed), National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics”, Routledge, London, 2005, pp1-14, p9.

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recognition of the existence of multiple nationalities within a state may indeed be the first critical step in addressing the problems that arise from them.13

An additional problem arising from the consociational model and its utility to the Central Asian region relates to certain preconditions that are required in order for it to operate. These preconditions include a “balance of power between segments, a multiparty system, cross-cutting cleavages and traditions of elite accommodation”.14 These preconditions are largely absent from the Central Asian sociopolitical landscape. With the exception of Kazakhstan with its substantial population of Russians, the balance of power in the republics is dramatically skewed in favour of the titular nationalities. Additionally, all of the republics are arguably one party systems, with the incumbent governments providing almost no opportunity for the development of a viable opposition. Nevertheless, it is still plausible to discuss consociational arrangements as a possible source of inspiration for alternative methods for constituting the various republics, as certain elements of this model will remain applicable to the region, irrespective of the absence of identified preconditions.

An exemption to some of the criticisms levelled at the consociational model, and thus its applicability in Central Asia, appears to be provided by the very nature of the discriminatory policies being implemented within the various republics of Central Asia. By enshrining certain elements of the linguistic and cultural identity of the titular nationality in legislation, republics such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have implicitly acknowledged the existence of the other within their borders. This difference is accentuated most significantly by government policies, not by ideologies or beliefs held by minority groups. Therefore, this difference gains its significance by what is denied to, rather than what is sought by, the minority group. Critically, as identified earlier, groups tend to mobilise in the face of persecution or the denial of freedom to practice the key aspects of their identity. As a consequence of these two assessments, it is possible to argue that enshrinement of difference within legislation or an overarching constitution in a fashion that benefits the minority groups is significantly more

13 Keating, M., 2001, p107. Keating used the example of Canada in the 1990’s to argue that most states paradoxically found it easier to countenance secession that to acknowledge internal diversity. 14 Nimni, E., 2005, pp8-9.

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preferable to the continuation of discriminatory policies that may inevitably lead to greater mobilisation along ethnic lines. The end result, the emergence of a distinct group, may be the same, but the former option will most likely mitigate any associated tensions arising from this cleavage, whereas the later option will probably significantly exacerbate tensions between groups.

The geographic dispersal of minority groups is also problematic. With reference to the maps on pages 161 and 164, while all of the republics contain concentrations of minority groups, these pockets are widely dispersed and are also representative of only small proportions of each minority group in question. For example, as demonstrated by the maps in Chapter Seven, illustrating the dispersal of non-Tajik communities within Tajikistan, whilst some of the communities of Uzbeks are closely located to the border with Uzbekistan, the Uzbek community within Tajikistan is more characterised by dispersal than contiguity. In this respect, it is somewhat difficult to argue in favour of a strictly territorial solution to any ethnopolitical problems, because the implementation of a territorial solution, either by the establishment of a federal system of government,15 territorial autonomy or outright independence,16 will only encompass a small proportion of the overall minority population. It is unfortunate that federalism, designed along consociational lines, does not appear compatible with Central Asia, because it has proven to be an effective framework in many other contexts, where it has “not only managing the conflicts arising from their competing national identities in a peaceful and democratic way, by have also secured a high degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizen”.17

15 Cornell, S., 1999, p186. Cornell offered a concise definition of federalism as a “constitutional arrangement through which power is divided between the central government and the local (provincial or regional) governments”. 16 Cornell, S., 1999, pp185-186. Cornell rightly considered that any such territorial solution would presuppose the geographic concentration of the ethnic minority within a certain area of the control. 17 Kymlicka, W. “Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, issue 4, 2002, p11, located at http://www.ecmi.de . Kymlicka pointed to the successful consociational federal systems in Switzerland, Canada and Belgium as evidence of the effectiveness of the federal model for managing ethnic diversity. Walter Kemp considered that although in theory federalism was the “ideal paradigm for multiethnic states, especially those with territorially concentrated groups”, when power within a weak centre and few integrative structures was decentralised or devolved to regions, the end result was likely to be disintegration. See Kemp, W., in “Applying the Nationality Principle: Handle with Care”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, issue 4, 2002, located at http://www.ecmi.de , p8.

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There are exceptions, however, and the most notable of these are the populations of Russians and other Russian-speaking Slavs within Kazakhstan. Of all the Russian communities scattered across the territory encompassed by the former Soviet Union, Russians in Kazakhstan are amongst the least likely to identify as part of the titular group, that is, as Kazakh, as opposed to Russian.18 Agitation and the prospect of calls for greater levels of self-determination is most characteristic of the Russian-speakers in East Kazakhstan, as well as within Cossack Groups in western Kazakhstan and other communities of Russians in the north.19 Interestingly, Laitin, in his discussion of the development of identity within the Russian-speaking populations in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, somewhat pessimistically concluded that the non-Kazakh Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan were not likely to persist as a group, as most of them, or their children, will eventually emigrate to Russia.20 Further complicating any theoretical attempts to adopt a consociational approach in this context is the fact that the use of the classification of a Russian-speaking population as a means to differentiate between groups and thus establish the consociation is in itself problematic. Whilst ethnic Russians within Kazakhstan are identifiable as a group, it is apparent that discrimination by the titular group is levelled not just at Russians, but also at all Russian speaking groups. However, this later category is itself fragmented, as it

18 Poppe, E., and Hagendoorn, L., “Titular Identification of Russians in Former Soviet Republics”, in Europe-Asia Studies, vol 55, no 5, 2003, pp771-787, p781. The authors evaluated the way in which groups who lose societal status, in this case Russians in other former Soviet republics, react. The most intriguing of these is the idea that low-status groups may try to change their position in the society by becoming members of the high status group, in this case Kazakh (‘exit’); p771. 19 Cutler, R., “Self-Determination Issues in Central Eurasia”, Foreign Policy in Focus, Special Report Number 18, May 2002, p4. Located at www.fpif.org. Interestingly, Cutler also highlighted issues of self- determination even within those deemed Kazakh. The example given was the tensions developing between the oil-rich western provinces and the political centre of Kazakhstan, which is perceived to be not providing an appropriate share of energy revenue with the west. Given that these divisions broadly correlate to the divisions between zhuz, this issue could increase in significance over time. David Laitin offered a similar assessment, assessing that “the principle mechanism holding back internationality tensions from erupting into violence are first the balance of power and, second, the pre-eminence of intraethnic tensions within the titular community. See Laitin, D., Identity in Formation: The Russian- Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, p18. 20 Laitin, 1998, p18. Russian emigration from Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Central Asia has slowed somewhat since Laitin made this assessment. Additionally, as discussed earlier, there had actually been Russian migration to Kazakhstan during the same period. Laitin’s conclusion is nonetheless important, because he based it not on an evaluation of migration statistics, but on the evolution of identity and perceptions of place within the Russian-speaking communities throughout the former Soviet Union.

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includes not only Russians, but ethnic Ukrainians, Belorussians, Cossacks, Germans, Koreans and mankurty, or Russified Kazakhs.21

Other examples of identified self-determination ‘hot-spots’ that may provide an opportunity to consider the implementation of consociational principles would include Andijan and the Karakalpak autonomous region in Uzbekistan, Gorny in Tajikistan,22 and the other enclaves of stranded communities that exist in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that were discussed in Chapter Eight. However, even such clearly defined regions such as Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan evade clear categorisation as cultural units. Karakalpakstan was one of the few regions within Soviet Central Asia to possess the status of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The territory of Karakalpakstan today constitutes about 37% of the entire territory of Uzbekistan. However, the region is sparsely populated, and the Karakalpaks comprised only 32% of the population of the Karakalpak region in 1989.23 Importantly, a Karakalpak national movement, Kholk Map, has emerged in the last 15 years, and Uzbekistan’s suppression of this movement is indicative of the fact that the government views Karakalpak nationalism as a legitimate threat to political stability.24 However, the existence of Kholk Map does not necessarily indicate a desire on the part of the Karakalpaks for independence or greater autonomy within Uzbekistan, and there appears little additional

21 Laitin, 1998, pp286-288. Although Russian is still largely dominant in government and administration, the term mankurt is used to denote Kazakhs for whom Russian is their first language. Laitin, however, considers that the term “Russian-speaking” was used to categorise Russians and Ukrainians in opposition to Kazakhs; p285. 22 Cutler, 2002, p4. Cutler also incorporated boundary issues in the category of self-determination issues, albeit only partially. 23 Hanks, R., “A Separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, in Europe-Asia Studies, vol 52, no 5, 2000, pp939-953, p939-940. Karakalpaks at the time of independence comprised only 2.1% of the total population of Uzbekistan, and constituted about 400 000 of the total population of Karakalpakstan of 1.2 million people. The Uzbeks comprised just under 33% of the population of Karakalpakstan at this time, and the next largest group was the Kazakhs at about 26% of the population of Karakalpakstan. Figures for 1999 indicated that there may have been a slight increase in favour of the Karakalpaks, with the number of Karakalpaks in all of Uzbekistan increasing to 2.3% of the entire population of Uzbekistan. See Szayna, T. “Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region”, in O. Oliker, and T. Szayna (eds), Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, Rand, Santa Monica 2003, pp145- 181, 24 Hanks, 2000, p940, considered that the Uzbek suppression of any sign of Karakalpak nationalism indicated that “the risk of a centrifugal tendency in Karakalpakstan is viewed quite seriously by the Uzbek administration”. He also said that very little was known about the Kholk Map, the extent of its membership or its goals.

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evidence to suggest that the Karakalpaks are actively seeking greater autonomy from Uzbekistan.25

Nevertheless, given the peculiar status of Karakalpakstan as a notionally autonomous region within Uzbekistan, it may be is worth considering the selective application of a consociational model of governance within this region. Although the heterogenous nature of the population of Karakalpakstan effectively rules out its theoretical incorporation into an Uzbekistan-wide consociational framework, given the numerical split between Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks, it is possible that a consociational model may be applicable within Karakalpakstan itself. Although there is an obvious lack of local political traditions, Kholk Map aside, the relative statistical balance between the three main groups within the region may provide scope for a power sharing system along consociational lines. Unfortunately, the viability of such an arrangement would inevitably be constrained by the fact that, given its poor economic position and high levels of environmental degradation,26 Karakalpakstan would still be heavily reliant upon the central Uzbek government for financial assistance, and thus forever subjected to Uzbek domination.

However, such examples of relatively contiguous ethnic groups are relatively rare in the Central Asian situation. As a consequence, it is difficult to argue that consociation and territorial autonomy may provide appropriate universal solutions to the problems caused by such instances of tensions or claims for self-determination in the Central Asian context. Additionally, the transborder aspect of ethnicity and identity in the region creates a whole new set of issues, some of which will be discussed later.

25 Hanks, 2000, p951. As discussed by Hanks, the dire economic situation in Karakalpakstan, one of the most underdeveloped and poorest regions in Uzbekistan, on one hand makes the prospect of claims for autonomy unlikely, but on the other creates tensions between Karakalpaks and Uzbeks. Hanks therefore considered that the region ultimately has significant potential to destabilise not only Uzbekistan by the entire Central Asian region. 26 Hanks, 2000, pp949-951, claimed that Karakalpakstan was the site of the worst environmental disaster of modern times, with the disappearance of the Aral Sea as a consequence of over irrigation having a catastrophic impact on the surrounding ecology. Additionally, overuse of pesticides and fertilisers in support of the cotton monoculture that was developed during the Soviet era has made Karakalpakstan the site of some of the highest rates of cancer and debilitating disease on the planet.

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Non-Territorial National Cultural Autonomy: A Return to Fundamentals?

Consequently, in the Central Asian situation, non-territorial autonomy, but along cultural rather than political lines, may be the more pertinent strategy. The idea of non- territorial cultural autonomy is one that dates back to the writings of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, and as a concept the architects of the Soviet nationalities policies savagely refuted it. Bauer and Renner’s seminal works on national cultural autonomy provided the conceptual foundations upon which much of the recent work on consociation has been based.27 In summary, the idea of non-territorial national cultural autonomy as proposed by Bauer and Renner stipulated that autonomous communities could be organised as sovereign collectives, irrespective of their residential locations within a multinational or multiethnic state. The arrangement allowed for peoples of different ethnic identities to coexist within the same territory without straining the principle of national autonomy.28

This model was seen as particularly useful in instances where minorities demanded significant autonomy, but for specific reasons could not have a separate state.29 The key achievement of the theory was to differentiate between two competing principles of organisation: the territorial principle and the personality principle. Bauer considered that the territorial principle was based on the premise that “simplest form in which the realisation of national autonomy can be imagined is the constitution of the nation as a territorial corporation. The areas of settlement of the individual nations are demarcated from one another”.30 Opposing this principle was the personality principle, which Bauer described as the constitution of:

“…the nation not as a territorial corporation, but as an association of persons. The national bodies regulated by public law would thus constitute territorial

27 Nimni, E., 2005, p9 28 Nimni, E., “Introduction for the English-Reading Audience”, in O. Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, translated by Joe O’Donnell, E. Nimni (ed), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000, ppxv-xlvi, pxxv. In comparison with more conventional theories of national autonomy, which required a territorial base for the autonomous national community Nimni considered that Bauer and Renner’s theory was closer to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, but differed even from this system because it allowed for the democratic organisation of the different communities. 29 Nimni, E., 2000, pxxvi.

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bodies only insofar as the efficacy could not extend, of course, beyond the borders of the empire.”31

Critically, Bauer argued that it was not up to the state to determine who would be regarded as a member of each nationality, but that “it would be the mature citizen who was accorded the right to determine to which nationality he wished to belong.32 This was an innovative idea, and in respect to the reality of the composite identities of Central Asia, a system that approaches non-territorial cultural autonomy using as a foundation a voluntary register of minority groups may avoid the dangers of generalisation and false categorisation that could theoretically undermine any alternative approaches.

The work completed by Karl Renner on national cultural autonomy, and in particular the personality principle, closely paralleled Bauer’s efforts. In Renner’s view, one of the greatest strengths of the personality principle was that it resolved the national question in “the context of the most strenuous centralisation or the most far-reaching autonomy. Legislation can be centralist and administration decentralised”.33

As a concept, non-territorial national cultural autonomy has been assessed as being useful in contexts where national minorities are too dispersed or few in number to either exercise or even seek territorial autonomy. However, it has also been criticised for not

30 Bauer, O., 2000, p259. 31 Bauer, O., 2000, p281. Bauer envisaged that each nation, wherever its members resided, would form a body that independently administered its own affairs. “It would very often be the case that two or more nations would construct their own national administrative bodies within the one city, erect national educational institutions side by side, but undisturbed by one another”. 32 Bauer, O., 2000, p281. Bauer discussed what he saw as the failings of the national register that had been introduced by Karl Renner in Moravia, the main flaw being that it was an ostensibly involuntary register that provided few provisions to ensure that freedom of declaration of nationality was actually granted. Bauer considered that if a “national register was to become the foundation of national self- determination, it is imperative that the free declaring of nationality be protected through a system of penalties that contain the influence of the politically and economically powerful – p282. 33 Renner, K., “State and Nation”, in E. Nimni (ed), National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, Routledge, London, 2005, pp15-49, p35. Renner elaborated on this claim by discussing a model that would allow for differentiation. Two of the critical elements were firstly, legislation would be conducted at the level of the state as a whole, by a central parliament with universal competence; secondly, territorial legislation would be achievable by national communities, or cantons, constituting electoral districts. This would ensure the personality principle would address both the question of minority representation and the separate electoral curias, and “unite the people according to opinions and interests, not in terms of territorial electoral districts” – p38.

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being substantive enough, as it addresses only cultural matters for most nationally mobilised groups, and lacks the means to address issues of minority representation in government institutions.34

As a model, national cultural autonomy addresses both the issue of minority rights and the idea of sovereignty by offering a solution to the conundrum, identified by Renner over 100 years ago, that “rather than eliminating national conflicts, the national territorial state produces and heightens them…it can never guarantee the peaceful, secure enjoyment of national rights in a multilingual, under the rule of law”.35 As an alternative, the national cultural model deconstructs “sovereignty into various components and defining parallel partially sovereign non-territorial communities through the proposal that national communities…are outside the reach of the capricious sovereignty of the national majority”.36

The Application of the National Cultural Autonomy model: Challenges and Prospects

The national cultural autonomy model has been applied with some success in the Russian Federation and in Hungary. The experiences of these two multiethnic states give a useful indication of the applicability of the national cultural autonomy within the Central Asian context, and highlight some of the challenges that will confront those who may endeavour to implement the model.

Given the fierce Marxist-Leninist opposition to the idea of national cultural autonomy, it is somewhat ironic that national cultural autonomy emerged as a policy option within the Russian Federation within a year of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The multinational federalism that developed in Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Union was constrained by the limited protection provided by the application of the principle of

34 McGarry, J., and Moore, M., “Karl Renner, power sharing and non-territorial autonomy”, in E. Nimni, (ed) National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, Routledge, London, 2005, pp74-94, pp82-85. McGarry and Moore did, however, identify the mechanism that Renner proposed for addressing the issue of minorities within central government institutions, namely a bicameral legislature that allowed for different national communities to vote for representatives. 35 Renner, in Nimni, 2005, p30. 36 Nimni, E., “Conclusion: The sovereign predicament of dispersed nations”, in E. Nimni, (ed) National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, Routledge, London, 2005, pp236-253, p240.

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national territoriality. As discussed by Codagnone and Filippov, the fact that Russian federalism only enshrined the protection of ethno-cultural differences and interests through the application of national territoriality, meant that approximately 18 million individuals belonging to nationalities other than Russian would be left with little or no such protection.37 The national cultural autonomy model emerged as a complement to the existing federal arrangements when the then head of the Goskomnants (the State Committee on Nationalities), Valery Tishkov, presented the model to then President Yeltsin as an appropriate nationalities policy for the new Russian Federation.38

National cultural autonomy in Russia was effectively enshrined in the 1996 Federal Law on the National-Cultural Autonomy that was adopted by the in May 1996. This law was intended to establish the “juridical conditions for the interaction between the State and the society for the defence of national interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in the process of choice of the ways and forms of their national- cultural development”.39 The basic principles of national cultural autonomy were outlined in Article Two of the Act as:

x free will of citizens when considering their belonging to a certain ethnic community; x self-organisation and self-government; x diversity of internal organisation forms of the national-cultural autonomy; combination of public initiative with the state support; x respect of the language, culture, traditions and customs of different ethnic communities.40

37 Codagnone, C., and Filippov, V., “Equity, Exit and National Identity in a Multinational Federation: The ‘Multinational Constitutional Patriotism’ Project in Russia”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol 26, no 2, April 2000, pp263-288, p269-270. The authors discussed the ‘double minorities’: those that resided in a republic but were not members of the titular nationality and were thus subjected to the nationalising policies of the republic. 38 Bowring, Bill, “Austro-Marxism’s Last Laugh?: the Struggle for Recognition of National Cultural Autonomy for Rossians and Russians”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol 54, no 2, 2002, pp229-250, p240. It was not until 1994 that the model began to gather institutional support, with the establishment of the Congress of National Associations of Russia and the subsequent creation of an Advisory Council on NCA. 39 Preamble, Federal Law on the National-Cultural Autonomy, 17 June 1996, as Adopted by the State Duma, 22 May 1996, and Approved by the Council of the Federation, 5 June 1996. Unofficial English Translation of the Law located at http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Russia/Russia_CultAut_English.htm 40 Federal Law on the National-Cultural Autonomy.

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The legal status of the national cultural autonomies was subsequently dealt with in Article Three, and Article Four dealt with the rights of the national cultural autonomies at length, including the right to receive support from government bodies for the preservation of national identity and the development of national language and national culture. Article 16 established principles for financing the national cultural autonomies, with the financial base of each national cultural autonomy to come from the national cultural autonomy itself and from private persons, and from the federal budget, the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation and from local budgets. By 1999 over 120 national cultural autonomies emerged within the Russian Federation, ranging from significant Ukrainian, Polish and German autonomies through to smaller registered ethnic-cultural organisations (ECOs) within individual oblasts.41

The introduction of national cultural autonomies in Russia has not been without problems, nor has the initiative escaped criticism from a wide number of interests, both in Russian politics and in academia. The first identified problem, discussed by Codagnone and Filippov, was that the Russian Law did not solve the issue of whether a local national cultural autonomy should include all ethnic associations of a given group within a given territory, nor did it indicate whether official representatives from local national cultural autonomies were formally subordinated to those of regional or state- wide national cultural autonomies. This produced an ambiguous situation where intra- ethnic competition or tension could flourish, both at the local level and throughout the notional hierarchy of national cultural autonomies.42 It is not clear, however, whether there is a workable alternative to this ambiguity. If national cultural autonomies were required to operate within a strict hierarchy of authority, the system would most likely not be able to appropriately address the regional differences that exist within a particular

41 Bowring, 2002, p242. Bowring discussed what appeared to be a proliferation of ECOs and national cultural autonomies (NCAs) within the , identifying 40 officially registered bodies, “including two Armenian, three Azerbaijani, four Cossack, one Georgian, three German, one Gypsy, twelve Jewish, one Kazak, one Korean, three Mordovian, one Polish, seven Russian, one Tajik, three Tatar, two Ukrainian and three Chuvash”. What is interesting about this example is that it demonstrates that the NCA principle does not force relative homogeneity onto each identified ethno-cultural group, but allows then to organise along a variety of lines in a many which presumably best suits their particular situation. As discussed below, such flexibility in choosing forms and types of collective organisation would be critical to the Central Asia example, where the composite identities of the region could theoretically confound a more rigid approach to the idea of NCA. Condagnone and Filippov, 2000, p280, quoted the total figure of 227 registered NCAs in 1999, with 160, 60 regional and seven federal NCAs. By 2002, this number had increased to over 300 NCAs: see Bowring, 2005, p202.

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ethnic or national group, as those that assumed authority at the higher level of organisation would theoretically retain a controlling influence over more localised bodies. This result would be problematic in the Central Asian context, where a more devolved form of national cultural autonomy may better reflect the true nature of identity and community organisation. A related problem was that the question of how relations between the national cultural autonomy and state authorities were to be managed had not been adequately answered. There was no defined link between the two dimensions, with no position identified as the point of contact between state and national cultural autonomy.43

The second major criticism levelled at the national cultural autonomy model is that it ignores the titular nationality by providing solely for the minority groups within the state or territory. The Russian national cultural autonomy model has attracted the ire of Russian nationalists, who have interpreted the law as “confirmation that ethnic Russians are a discriminated majority whose identity and culture is being erased”.44 Russians that live in republics or regions where they are minorities have been defined as regionally non-dominant titular peoples that are not entitled to the classification of national minority, yet are still entitled to certain minimum rights as enjoyed by national minorities.45 And although it is unlikely that the application of a model of national cultural autonomy within the framework of the Russian Federation is resulting in a significant diminution of the rights enjoyed by ethnic Russians within other federal republics, it could be expected that such problems could be avoided within a more unitary republic as those within Central Asia.

Despite these flaws, the national cultural autonomy model as realised within the Russian Federation has even been assessed by its critics as the one policy innovation that “would

42 Codagnone and Filippov, 2000, p280. 43 Bowring, 2002, p245, discussed the view that the NCAs should have the right to found consultative bodies attached to state authorities, but that their authority should only extend to ethno-cultural activities. 44 Codagnone and Filippov, 2000, p284. The authors referred to the NCA model as the ‘multicultural constitutional patriotism ‘project, and concluded that it was “squeezed by the opposing flanks of peripheral and hegemonic nationalism. From one side it is criticised because of its attempt to neutralise ethno-territoriality, from the other because of its concessions to cultures other than Russian, and for not stressing sufficiently the role of Russian language and culture”. 45 Potier, T., “Regionally Non-Dominant Titular Peoples: The Next Phase in Minority Rights”, Journal on Ethnopoliticals and Minority Issues in Europe, July 2001, European Centre for Minority Issues, located at http://www.ecmi.de .

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genuinely improve the protection of ethno-cultural rights of all nationalities and which addresses the issue of equity for all those groups not titular of territorial autonomy”.46 Consequently, as a model that could provide inspiration for the Central Asian republics, there are certainly a number of elements to Russia’s attempt to develop national cultural autonomy that would merit further consideration. However, the Russian Federation is not the only sovereign state to experiment with the concept of national cultural autonomy, and the model of national cultural autonomy introduced by Hungary may even be applicable to Central Asia.

The Hungarian System of Minority Protection

The Republic of Hungary introduced a minority protection system in 1993 that was not only comparable to that implemented in the Russian Federation, but also clearly identifiable as being closely modelled on the original principles outlined by Renner and Bauer.47 Although general provisions for the protection of minorities had been provided in Article 68 of the Hungarian Constitution, Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities took these general provisions further, declaring that the Republic of Hungary “regards the right to national and ethnic identity as a universal human right, that the special individual and collective rights of national and ethnic minorities are fundamental rights of freedom, which it will respect and enforce in the Republic of Hungary”.48

The Act stated that the minority protection system accommodated only those groups categorised as ‘historical minorities’ which were defined as:

46 Codagnone and Filippov, 2000, pp283-284. This quote is particularly interesting, given that Bowring, 2002, identified one of the authors, Vassily Filippov, as one “of the most trenchant critics of the NCA model” (p244). 47 Krizsan, A., “The Hungarian Minority Protection System: a flexible approach to the adjudication of ethnic claims”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol 26, no 2, April 2000, pp247-263, p250. Krizsan discussed the input of Hungarian scholar Oszkar Jaszi, who modified the work of the original Austro-Marxists, and saw the model proposed by Renner s “the ‘upper limit’ in terms of the rights to be granted different nationalities”, as opposed to the ‘minimum program’ for a state which was “the provision of the basic needs of a minority population in its mother tongue”: p252. 48 Preamble, Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Unofficial English Translation located at: http://archiv.meh.hu/nekh/Angol/93LXXVIIkistv.htm

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“...any ethnic group with a history of at least one century of living in the Republic of Hungary, which represents a numerical minority among the citizens of the state, the members of which are Hungarian citizens, and are distinguished from the rest of the citizens by their own language, culture and traditions, and at the same time demonstrate a sense of belonging together, which is aimed at the preservation of all these, and the expression and protection of the interests of their communities, which have been formed in the course of history.”49

As with the original model of national cultural autonomy, the Hungarian model ensures that identification is a voluntary process. Article 7 of the Act ensures that not only is “admission and acknowledgement of the fact that one belongs to a national or ethnic group or minority… the exclusive and inalienable right of the individual (with no obligation) to make a statement concerning the issue of which minority one belongs to”, but that “the right to national and ethnic identity and the acknowledgement and admission of membership of such a minority does not preclude the recognition of dual or multi-affiliation”.

The Act was also suitably comprehensive in setting up the administrative framework required for the effective functioning of a minority protection and representation system. In addition to establishing effective mechanisms by which ethnic and national minorities can establish self-government at a local or national level,50 the Act also established two authorities to monitor the minority rights situation. The first of these was the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, a quasi-judicial position that was mandated to protect and promote the rights of ethnic and national minorities, and in doing so interpret existing law and call for amendments

49 Article One, Chapter One, Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. Article Two states that the Act “does not apply to refugees, immigrants, foreign citizens settled in Hungary, or to persons of no fixed abode”. Thirteen national and ethnic minorities have been officially recognised under the Act: Armenians, , Croats, Germans, , Gypsies, Poles, , Ruthenes, Serbs, , Slovenes, and Ukrainians. However, Article 61 (2) establishes the provision that “If a minority other than those listed in par (1) (as listed above) wish to prove that they meet the requirements specified in this Act, they may submit a petition related to this subject to the Speaker of the National Assembly if supported by at least 1,000 voters who declare themselves members of this minority”. 50 Chapter Four of the Act established the parameters for minority self government, with minorities having “the right to establish a minority municipal government or a directly or indirectly formed local minority self-government in townships, towns, or the districts of the capital city, as well as a national

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when appropriate.51 The second authority was the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, which was established as a mediator between minority interests and the executive branch of the Hungarian government.

The Hungarian system of national cultural autonomy is of particular interest to this discussion not just because of the innovations that it has introduced in attempting to develop a framework managing national minorities, but also because the situation confronting ethnic and national minorities in Hungary possibly has closer parallels to the situation in Central Asia than the Russian situation. Whereas the Russian model of national cultural autonomy, and its applicability to the Central Asian situation, needs to be considered with an eye on the federal system in Russia, the Hungarian Republic is a unitary state where:

“...each one of the indigenous national minorities on the territory of the Republic of Hungary is characterised by a state of being dispersed across the country, dual identity, an advanced state of assimilation, loss of language and a strong sense of belonging - both emotionally and culturally - to the native land, Hungary.”52

As is the case in Central Asia, many of these dispersed minorities reside alongside a border with their kin-state, for example, ethnic Romanians living in the eastern region of Hungary, or in the Central Asian example ethnic Russians living in northwest Kazakhstan. This situation can result in particular tensions, as members of the minority group may look across the border at other members of their ethnic group or nationalities for inspiration and often support. The success enjoyed by the Hungarian system in managing associated tensions would be most welcome within Central Asia.

minority self-government”. Chapter Eight outlined the means by which the minority governments would be funded. 51 Krizsan, 2000, pp254-255. According to Krizsan, the Commissioner would have the competence to not only look at cases where there was an obvious breach of positive law by the public administration, but also make assessments of whether acts which are ostensibly in accordance with the law are still unreasonable, unfair or unjust. 52 Report No. J/3670 of the Government of the Republic of Hungary to the National Assembly on the situation of the national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary, located at http://archiv.meh.hu/nekh/Angol/report.htm.

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The Hungarian model also contains features that allow it to straddle the spectrum from territorial autonomy to non-territorial national cultural autonomy. In the event of more than half of the local council elected within a defined being elected as representatives of a national or ethnic minority, that local government can then declare itself a minority settlement local government.53 It the process, the Hungarian model recognises that in some contexts, a critical mass is reached in respect to minority group representation within a defined geographical region, and allows them to assume greater control over key elements of administration that impacts upon their cultural rights. This feature would be especially useful in Central Asia, because it would allow those non- titular groups that represent a majority within a certain region, for example Tajiks in certain parts of southern Uzbekistan, to assume a greater role in administration and local government than may ordinarily be provided by national cultural autonomy, which could theoretically develop in a manner that best reflects the needs of its constituent members.

From one perspective, it is inevitable that that such strategies do ultimately validate the early effort of the Soviet Union to forge distinct nationalities from a complex web of interrelated identities by legislating into existence the very identities that Soviet-era ethnographers tried so hard to distil from the complex web of interrelated identities in the region. Unfortunately, such categorisation is the only effective way that the cultural or linguistic rights of minority groups can be assured: the absence of such categorisation makes it literally impossible to legislate such protection. The concepts of consociation and national cultural autonomy offer some intriguing principles that may be applicable in Central Asia. It is unfortunate that many of the prerequisites for consociation are largely absent from the Central Asian landscape. Given the increasing levels of discrimination against non-titular nationalities in employment, in the provision of government services and education, the consociational model combining a bicameral parliament and powersharing mechanisms may have proven to be an effective way of addressing many of the root causes of tension in the region.

53 Krizsan, 2000, p253. This government could exercise competence over some cultural matters, and have consultative rights in all issues concerning the minority they represent.

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National cultural autonomy does appear to offer a more flexible approach to the management of minority groups, because as a model it can be tailored in a fashion that best accommodates the reality of a dramatically fragmented society as occurs in Central Asia. The non-territorial dimension of national cultural autonomy is also particularly attractive. Not only would a system of cultural autonomy that was dispensed on a cultural rather than territorial basis be more in line with the dispersed nature of ethnocultural groups in Central Asia, but by removing the territorial element from the question of autonomy, it is arguable that national cultural autonomy poses less of a threat to the territorial sovereignty of the state than alternative, territorial based models. National cultural autonomy offers a useful post-sovereign54 solution to many of the issues confronting Central Asia, because it can reconcile competing needs as well as accommodate the diverse, composite identities that are a key characteristic of the region. It is therefore more likely that the Central Asian republics could be encouraged to consider national cultural autonomy as a policy option.

However, these two strategies address only one aspect of the dilemma that is emerging in Central Asia in respect to the accommodation of minority groups in the face of growing titular group ethnonationalism. Neither theory addresses the irredentist dimension of ethnicity and identity in the region, nor do they consider the issue of cross-border communal interdependence and the associated linkages that have been dislocated as a consequence of the hardening of borders in the region. Consequently, whilst consideration of the above mentioned strategies may be a useful first step in respect to mitigating the prospect of ethnic tensions in the region, it would be logical to consider other options that adopt a regional approach to the issue.

54 Keating, 2001, pp27-28, defined post-sovereignty as not meaning the end of all principles of authority, but rather relating to the idea of sovereignty being dispersed and divided among a number of different actors within the jurisdiction of the state. As a term, post-sovereignty also encapsulates the political demands and movements that do not want to establish a sovereign state, but desire to more effectively “insert themselves into the new complex webs of authority”. Keating also suggested that federalism itself was something of a post-sovereign concept because it contains a “coordinating system of authority that is neither fully sovereign and neither superior to the other” (p14).

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Regional Solutions to the Issue of Minority Rights Protection in Central Asia

One useful example of an effective regional approach to minority group protection is the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which entered into force in January 1998. The Framework Convention, which as of March 2006 had been ratified by 38 of the member states of the Council of Europe55, set a number of general principles for the protection of minority rights within Europe. The Framework Convention has been assessed as the first legally binding international instrument for the protection of persons belonging to minority groups, which converted the political declarations and intentions of the member states of the Council of Europe into legal terms.56 The Framework Convention established a number of general principles on the protection of minority rights, including the following:

1. Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights that are connected to that choice.

2. Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community with others.57

55 42 states had signed the Convention at this time, but were yet to ratify it. Details of the signatory states available from the CEDIME-SE Guide to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, located at website of the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/minorities/2._FRAMEWORK_CONVENTION_%28MONITORI NG%29/2._Monitoring_mechanism/Chart_sigs_rats.asp 56 Gal, K. “The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and its Impact on Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Winter 2000, p2, located at http://www.ecmi.de . 57 Article Three, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe European Treaties, ETS No. 157, located at http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/minelres/coe/fcnm.htm . Gal, 2000, p4, summarised the core issues dealt with under the Framework Convention as follows: 1) the right to non-discrimination, protection of cultural, linguistic, religious identity; 2) the right to language use in private and public; 3) right to education; 4) right to effective participation and representation; 5) right to trans-frontier co-operation for minority communities living in border regions. This last point is of particular value to the situation in Central Asia, because denial of this right, resulting from hardening of borders, is the cause of many of the problems in the region.

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In addition to establishing general principles, the Framework Convention also committed the ratifying states to translating these principles into national law.58 Although the Framework Convention has attracted criticisms and is not without its flaws, not the least of which has been its failure to actually define what a minority group is,59 it has attracted a relatively high level of compliance from its member states and has produced a number of positive outcomes vis-à-vis the protection of minority rights. The means by which the Framework Convention accomplished positive outcomes was by introducing a monitoring system that required member states to periodically submit reports on the status of minority protection for consideration by an advisory committee.60

Whilst there have been some examples of flagrant breaches of the principles of the Framework Convention by ratifying states, as in the case of Slovakia with its Law on the State Language,61 the Framework Convention has been assessed as positive predominantly because it facilitated the establishment of a legal framework for adequate minority protection within signatory states.62 And whilst there is little that is radical about the approach taken by the Council of Europe in adopting the Framework Convention, this framework is of particular interest to this discussion because it demonstrated that a system of minority protection that is applied to a collection of states that are linked politically, economically, and to a degree culturally, can provide workable solutions to the governance of minorities. The Framework Convention

58 Scherrer, C. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights, and Multilateral Regimes, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003, p169. 59 Gal, 2000, p3. However, Gal considered that the very flexibility of terminology within the Framework Convention was one of the reasons for the very high rate of ratification among the member states of the Council of Europe, and that vague terminology allowed for positive, as well as negative, interpretation. Once again, this flexibility is an attractive dimension when the applicability of elements of the Framework Convention are considered from the perspective of Central Asia. 60 Article 25 of the Framework Convention established the monitoring arrangements: 1. Within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework Convention in respect of a Contracting Party, the latter shall transmit to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe full information on the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to the principles set out in this framework Convention; 2. Thereafter, each Party shall transmit to the Secretary General on a periodical basis and whenever the Committee of Ministers so requests any further information of relevance to the implementation of this framework Convention. 61 Gal, 2000, p12, briefly discussed the implications of the introduction of this law, which significantly limited the use of languages other than Slovak in schools, state institutions and media, soon after Slovakia ratified the Framework Convention. 62 Gal, 2000, p12, qualified this assessment by stating that the flaw in the Framework Convention was that it did not ensure that states would automatically fulfil their obligations in this regard in practice.

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successfully takes as its starting point the premise that minority rights protection is the responsibility of the Council of Europe as a body, and not just a matter that falls within the purview of the state. There would be considerable merit in the adoption of a similar approach in Central Asia, with the protection of the rights of non-titular nationalities in each of the republics viewed as a matter of regional concern, and not just a matter for the individual republics.

A commitment to a regional agreement or convention from each of the five Central Asian republics that was equal to the commitment made by those European states that ratified the Framework Convention would go a long way to remedying the problems confronting the non-titular nationalities across the region. Alternatively, given the occasions where the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention was expanded to include a number of ‘non-member’ states63 a proposal to include the Central Asian republics within the Framework Convention but not necessarily provide them with an opportunity to become member states of the Council of Europe, would also not be without precedent. Such a proposal may actually provide a greater level of impartiality in terms of interpretation and assessment on progress towards shared goals, because the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe’s Framework Committee would remain removed from the political dynamic of the region and thus be better able to exercise its mandate in Central Asia free from influence.

As a model, the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention may also be compatible with models of consociation and national cultural autonomy, and could theoretically enhance the effectiveness of such state-based initiatives. Consociation or national cultural autonomy could theoretically be introduced by states who in a parallel process become signatory to the Framework Convention. However, this dynamic can occasionally assume an unexpected form, as evidenced by the predicament that Russia found itself in when its 1996 Law on National Cultural Autonomy was found to be

63 Historical data sourced from Gal, 2000, p2, indicated that as of July 2000 the Framework Convention counted as signatories a number of states which were not actually member states of the Council of Europe, including Russia, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Bosnia Hercegovian. Since this time, however, all of these states have become member states of the Council of Europe. This historical data is of interest to this discussion because it demonstrates the flexibility of the Council of Europe in regards to expanding involvement in the Framework Convention to non-member states.

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inconsistent with Russia’s treaty options under the Framework Convention.64 The end result of such interplay should, in most cases, be an improvement in the circumstances enjoyed by minority groups, and offers further encouragement to states wrestling with dilemmas of minority group management to adopt a proactive and responsive approach to the matter.

The Application of Innovative Forms of Governance and Citizenship in the Central Asian Space: Implications for State Sovereignty

In theory, national cultural autonomy and to a lesser extent consociation both appear very attractive options that the republics of Central Asia should be encouraged to consider. Similarly, the success enjoyed by the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention provides an excellent example of what can be accomplished regionally in respect to the legislative protection of minority rights, and provides a template for how the regional dimension of ethnicity in Central Asia could be accommodated. The one constraint is that these strategies were developed within a European context, where the development of multiculturalism and minority rights have been influenced by the region’s ethnocultural and political heritage, which diverge markedly from the experience of Central Asia.

It is uncertain whether this divergence would have implications for the transportability of aspects of national cultural autonomy or consociation to Central Asia. Kymlicka identified three factors that made trends towards multiculturalism and minority rights possible, if not actually inevitable. These features included increasing populations, in particular minority populations; secondly, an increase in rights consciousness, with more people aware of a basic entitlement to human rights; and, thirdly, an increase in democracy or points of access for safe political mobilisation.65 Whilst US engagement in the region did bring about a corresponding increase in the expectation of improved human rights conditions in the region, none of these features are particularly apparent

64 Bowring, 2005, pp202-203, considered Russia’s response to the Council of Europe’s assessment, which had criticised the exclusion of ‘non-citizens’ from the entitlements provided under the 1996 Law on National Cultural Autonomy, as disingenuous, and suggested that Russia had “…decided to pursue a bold experiment in legal provision of NCAs, rather than developing a law on the protection of national minorities”.

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within Central Asia. Whilst there has been little or no assimilation of minority groups into the titular group in the region, emigration by minority groups to either their kin- state or other neighbouring states has seen a general increase in the numerical superiority of the titular groups. Therefore, it is possible to conclude, obviously with little certainty, that in the absence of any dramatic political changes in the region, minority rights regimes will not develop within the region without the encouragement or input of outside interests. It remains to be seen whether the absence of these ‘preconditions’ will similarly impede the capabilities of outside interests to encourage the adoption of such principles by the Central Asian republics.

Nevertheless, it may not be overly optimistic to predict that ‘recalcitrant’ states such as those within Central Asia may still recognise what is persuasive logic in favour of adopting a minority protection regime similar to what was discussed above. An argument in favour of the adoption of such a regime could take as its starting point the observation that national cultural autonomy or similar models would represent a significantly reduced threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty enjoyed by the state than that posed by the emerging threat of ethnopolitical violence, which indisputably poses a threat to the security of the entire region.

Furthermore, it could be considered that the prospect of an innovative form of non- territorial autonomy for non-titular groups is something that could enhance rather than diminish sovereignty, because it can form the basis of a proactive negotiation between the state and aggrieved minority groups. One suggestion for facilitating the implementation of a form of national cultural autonomy is that it could be viewed as the basis for a process of arbitration between the state and the minority group. Theoretically, the state could agree to accommodate the cultural needs and representational rights of the minority group, in return for a commitment from the minority group to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state and allegiance to the state’s governing bodies.66 Even Donald Horowitz, an avowed opponent of the

65 Kymlicka, W. “Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: West and East”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, issue 4, 2002, located at http://www.ecmi.de. 66 Porter, K., “The Realisation of National Minority Rights”, Macquarie Law Journal, vol 3, 2000, pp51- 71, pp66-69. Porter outlined five principles that could be addressed in a negotiation process, and thus lead to a concession by the state that sovereignty was divisible, and agreement from minority groups that

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idea of consociation, and by extension national cultural autonomy, concedes that the adoption of an alternative form of government, such as federalism or regional autonomy, may alleviate some of the grievances motivating secessionist minorities.67

National cultural autonomy can be considered to sit somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of state constitution, lying midway between the idea of the centralised state on one end, and the concept of federalism on the other. Ignoring the debate on the true value of the federal system to the management of a multiethnic or multinational state,68 national cultural autonomy is attractive for the very reason it is something of a compromise that provides a substantial degree of cultural autonomy for minority groups, yet does not necessarily enhance the prospect of secessionist tendencies developing amongst minority groups by facilitating the development of claims for greater political autonomy. National cultural autonomy is additionally attractive because it possesses an inherent flexibility that ensures that it can be implemented in a manner that best reflects the ethnocultural reality of a particular region, and avoids dangerous generalisations on who constitutes a minority group by devolving such identification down to the people themselves.

Nevertheless, it will remain difficult to predict with any certainty the consequences of the provision of autonomy, political, cultural or otherwise on sovereignty and the likelihood of secession in Central Asia. What is more certain is that the Central Asian

the provision of basic legal and administrative rights would see them refrain from making any moves towards secession. These principles were 1) an assurance from the national minority that they are not seeking to secede from the state; 2) the state must acknowledge that the minority is entitle to maintain its distinct cultural identity; 3) the national minority and the state must commit themselves publicly to these concessions; 4) The state should acknowledge that they law must respect the freedom of the national minority to maintain its identity, albeit without imposing an additional commitment on the state; 5) minorities should have influence over legislation. 67 Horowitz, D., “The Cracked Foundations o the Rights to Secede”, Journal of Democracy, vol 14, no 2, April 2003, pp5-17, p6. Horowitz is demonstrably sceptical of the merits of consociation, and proclaimed his own preferred strategy of using political incentives to encourage interethnic moderation, which he considers a theory which, unlike consociational theory, provides a motive for compromise behaviour (p15). Incentive theory has been intentionally excluded from this discussion because it is not considered applicable to the particular political situation in Central Asia in that it presupposes a degree of political responsiveness that is entirely lacking in autocratic Central Asia. 68 Kymlicka, for one, in his consideration of federalism as a viable alternative to actual secession, concluded that federalism may provide national minorities with a workable alternative to secession, but it also contributed to secession becoming a more realistic alternative to federalism. See Kymlikca, W., “Is Federalism a viable Alternative to Secession?”, in Theories of Secession, P. Lehning (ed), Routledge, London, 1998, pp111-150, p142.

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republics are not developing durable and appropriate strategies for the management of the non-titular populations. The nation-building policies focusing on the dominant titular nationality that have been adopted over the last 15 years since independence have arguably aggravated the prospect for secessionist tendencies among minority groups. National cultural autonomy, and to a lesser degree consociation, contain a number of provisions which, whilst costing the state very little in terms of sovereignty or resources, can be very effective in mitigating demands for greater autonomy, while also reducing the likelihood of ethnopolitical violence.

Convincing the republics of Central Asia of the merits of national cultural autonomy or consociation, as the case may be, is merely the first, albeit most difficult, phase in the implementation of an effective means to manage minority groups. The means by which this could be accomplished is well beyond the scope of this discussion, and would be a worthy topic for a separate thesis. What is critical to this discussion is recognition of the value of these models, particularly national cultural autonomy, as possible solutions to the emerging ethnocultural issues in Central Asia.

Equally important is recognition of the need to adopt a region-wide approach to the issue of minority group management. Irredentism, combined with the prospect for revanchism on the part of the individual states, ensures that although each state may require a tailored solution, these tailored solutions must fit into a region wide strategy. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention provides a useful example of how this may be managed. However, accession to this treaty by the republics of Central Asia, providing of course that the opportunity for them to do so presented itself, may not be the most appropriate action. A reinvigoration of many of the regional institutions discussed in the preceding chapter may provide an opportunity for the incorporation of the idea of minority group management into the mandate of one or more of these organisations. Russia would be very well placed to do so, given its own experimentation with a national cultural autonomy model and the influence it continues to wield in the region. However, given the relative failure of the plethora of regional organisations to achieve their existing limited objectives, it is unlikely that any of them, in their current form, would provide a viable mechanism for the implementation of a Eurasian model for national cultural autonomy.

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What is needed is a regional framework dedicated to effective minority group management that involves the equal input of all of the Central Asian republics. Although each republic will continue to contend with its own peculiar set of issues in this regard, policies or frameworks adopted in one country must, as a consequence of the intertwined ethnocultural makeup of the region, be coordinated with the adoption of similar policies in neighbouring republics. The republics should heed the examples set by Russia and Hungary, both of whom have introduced models of national cultural autonomy, at little or no cost to their sovereignty. Although it is not the intention of this thesis to argue for a straight adoption of either the Russian or Hungarian models, the Central Asian republics could learn some valuable lessons from scrutiny of these models. Additionally, the individual republics should recognise that all their attempts to build a cohesive and independent nation will come to nothing if they neglect their responsibilities to their constituent populations by discriminating against one group whilst favouring another.

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Conclusion

Consolidating a Rationale for State Capacity Building and Constructive Intervention in Central Asia

The states that emerged in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union inherited a number of features that impinged upon the abilities of these states to develop the institutional capability and effectiveness critical to their new status as sovereign states. Nevertheless, the first 15 years following independence provided an excellent opportunity for the governments of the region to forge a new path towards effective statehood that, whilst not ignoring the Soviet legacy, capitalised upon the rich natural resources and the innovative social and cultural traditions common to all the republics.

The reality of the political, social and economic development in the region has unfortunately fallen far short of this potential for success. The reasons for this are complex and varied, but there are a number of factors that have contributed to the failure of the governments of the region to develop the durable economic, political and administrative infrastructure necessary for effective governance. Fortunately, the region has been relatively free of conflict, ethnic or otherwise, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the civil war in Tajikistan the only major occurrence of any kind of conflict in the region since independence. However, this relative absence of conflict does not, in the author’s opinion, indicate that the republics of Central Asia have successfully negotiated the problems associated with their newly obtained status as sovereign states. Nor does it suggest that the states have successfully reconciled the legacy of the Soviet Union with the particular realities that constitute their current economic, political and ethnocultural landscape.

A key conclusion of this thesis is that not only do the republics continue to wrestle with the legacy of the Soviet Union, but they have arguably exacerbated the structural dimensions of the Soviet legacy by introducing policies and border controls that enhance rather than accommodate the social and cultural divisions that are a dominant feature of the entire region. Additionally, the external interests that are engaging with the region, including sovereign states and regional and international bodies, have also

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achieved very little in terms of equipping the Central Asian republics with the tools necessary for the exercising of sovereignty. It is also probable that this engagement is also further contributing to the ethnic, cultural and political divisions within the region by encouraging unproductive competition amongst the Central Asian republics. As a consequence, it is arguable that a number of the republics in the region are in as volatile a position in terms of economic and political stability and ethnocultural harmony as they were when they gained independence 15 years ago.

The structural and policy-related factors that have contributed to the ongoing volatility of the region were discussed at length in the central chapters of this thesis. The first of these factors is the continuing legacy of the Soviet Union, and the structural and institutional features of governance that the various republics inherited from the Soviet Union. The most significant of these legacies derive from the Soviet nationalities and border demarcation policies of the 1920’s and 1930’s. These policies were flawed and inherently contradictory, and although they were never intended to demarcate independent states, they nevertheless created a number of enduring problems by enhancing divisions within Central Asia in a manner that ignored the patterns of interdependence and cooperation that had characterised the region. The borders inherited by the Central Asian republics on independence reflected these imperatives, and 15 years of continuous border demarcation in the region has only just succeeded in resolving little more than the uncertainty of where one country ends and the other begins. Indeed, it is arguable that the impact of the Soviet border demarcation policies is being felt more keenly now than at any time during the Soviet era, because only since independence have borders gained any real significance as enforceable limits to the territorial sovereignty of the states of Central Asia. Independence and the bestowal of sovereignty has brought into sharp focus the fact that the Central Asian republics were never intended to be provided with such status in the first place.

The second factor is the development of ethnocentric policies within the administrations of the republics, as evidenced by the emergence of ethnonationalism in the region. As discussed earlier, Central Asia had historically been characterised as possessing a ‘mosaic’ identity, with varying emphasis placed on ideas of shared ancestry, language, religion, culture and location. However, it is clear from the discussions and assessments

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in Chapter Eight of this thesis that western-inspired notions of ‘ethnonationalism’ have come to play a prominent role in a number of the republics since they became independent. This trend is most obvious in the adoption of discriminatory forms of ethnic nationalism designed to give titular nationalities control over key state infrastructure. Whilst many of the traditional forms of identity have persisted in the region, ethnonationalism is dramatically changing the landscape of the entire region. The exclusionary policies that favour one group over others are almost guaranteed to create divisions and tensions between the different constituent groups within a state, and to fuel irredentist aspirations in all of the republics. It is not yet clear how these tensions may manifest over time, but it is certain that the divisive impact of these policies will have implications for the future stability of the entire region.

Thirdly, as a result of the events of September 2001, the republics of Central Asia have instituted border control mechanisms that have dramatically impacted upon the cultural and economic interdependence of the Central Asian states. The newly formed borders have, for the first time in history, come to increasingly represent impediments to age-old patterns of economic processes and inter-community activity across the region. Although the ramifications of this disruption are yet to be truly understood, at the most superficial level the interruption of cross-border trade that has resulted from the hardening of borders creates additional economic hardships for substantial populations along the borders of all of the republics. This in turn has forced greater competition for resources amongst the local populations, and created fertile ground for the development of overt conflict between different ethnic and identity groups. As an additional consequence of events in the US and elsewhere, the various states of Central Asia have, to varying degrees, come to securitise1 minority populations as either threats to their national security, or convenient scapegoats for the socio-economic problems that are plaguing the region. The global ‘War on Terror’ has been used by a number of the governments in the region, most notably Uzbekistan, as an excuse for clamping down on dissent of all kinds within their borders.

1 Although I have not referred to his work directly in this thesis, I would like to acknowledge the writings of Ole Waever on the securitisation of minorities.

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Fourthly, the roles played by state actors – in particular Russia, China and the US – and regional institutions and organisations – have also been less than benign. In some instances it is arguable that the actions taken by such external actors have in fact further reduced the levels of interdependence in the region, something that is critical to ongoing stability in the region. In seeking to gain the favour of their powerful neighbours, the republics of Central Asia have turned their attention outward, at the expense of their relationships with the other republics. In this respect, the Central Asian republics have not been well served by the bestowal of sovereignty. Not only has the region fragmented as each republic sought to forge its own path in the international arena, but the republics have also attempted to engage in asymmetrical relationships with outside interests who are pursuing agendas that do not necessarily accord with the needs or the interests of the region.

The fifth factor is that there is a distinct lack of coordination of effort on the part of state and institutional actors with a vested interest in regional security and the ongoing stability of the region. Although the development and consolidation of institutions such as the CIS and the SCO have to a degree countered the fracturing of relationships amongst the republics of the region, by forcing them to cooperate within regional frameworks, such benefits on their own are not sufficient to mitigate the real risk of ethnic conflict in the region. Equally, if not more critical, is the abilities of these state and institutional actors to recognise the lessons learnt from the Tajik experience, and cooperate and coordinate their efforts to enhance the state effectiveness of the republics of the region.

What is also of concern is the fact that external state and institutional interests also lack either the capability or the intention, or in some instances both, to not only respond productively in the event of ethnic conflict in the region, but to act proactively by attempting to develop and implement strategies to mitigate the prospect of ethnic conflict. Organisations such as the OSCE and the UN possess the intent and possibly the policy capability to develop such strategies, but they lack the physical and political capability required to implement these strategies. On the other hand, organisations such as the CIS and SCO, and states such as China, Russia, and to a lesser degree the US,

336 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

possess the latent physical capability to implement such strategies, but lack the philosophical or policy capability, as well as the intention to do so.

The implications of the lack of coordination and cooperation amongst these states and institutions will remain significant. However, this lack of coordination or complementarity is possibly the most readily surmountable of the impediments to developing a programme of pre-emptively dealing with the threat of ethnic conflict in Central Asia. Any strategies developed to achieve this aim, consideration of which was unfortunately well beyond the scope of this paper, would firstly have to consider how to get all interested and appropriate parties – states, regional and international organisations – to recognise the real risk and consequences of ethnic conflict in Central Asia. Secondly, these ‘actors’ would need to commit to a coordinated course of action to encourage, equip, and where necessary pressure, the republics of the region into adopting strategies and policies that constructively manage their disparate populations in a manner that mitigates the possibility of overt conflict developing. Anything short of the total commitment of those states and institutions that have a vested interest in Central Asia will almost guarantee that any attempts to intervene in future ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, or to constructively engage with the states of the region in developing solutions for ethnic conflict, are doomed to fail.

Individually, each of these issues, and the implications that they have for the ongoing security and stability of Central Asia, would most likely be of marginal concern to statesmen and policy makers with an interest in the region. However, when these issues are considered collectively, it is difficult to argue against the proposition that there is a real risk of ethnic conflict in Central Asia, and that 15 years of independence has done very little to equip the republics of the region with the means to deal constructively with this risk.

As so brutally illustrated in many conflicts in the past, economic hardship and lack of employment opportunities, coupled with community perceptions of discrimination along tribal, clan, religious or ethnic lines, create fertile ground for the development of tension or conflict between the constituent groups of a multiethnic or multinational state. The true implications of the issues identified above will most likely become

337 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

apparent either when political succession becomes problematic as a result of the unwillingness of the incumbent government to relinquish power in the face of protest or overwhelming popular opposition, or when interethnic tensions reach a critical mass and spill over into violence that that cannot be suppressed or contained by whichever republic they emerge within. It is perceivable that the authoritarian and autocratic nature of the governments that have held power since the demise of the Soviet Union have on one hand been responsible for the development of many of the triggers of ethnic conflict in the region, and on the other hand been largely successful in preventing ethnic conflict by brutally suppressing any declaration of protest or revolt, along ethnic lines or otherwise. It is likely that the governments have not permanently avoided the threat of ethnic conflict, however, but merely postponed its likely emergence. As demonstrated in the Yugoslav example, the issue of succession can bring to the surface dormant tensions and divisions between ethnic or identity groups.

Despite these relatively pessimistic findings, the situation in Central Asia is not beyond salvation, as many of the issues identified above and the problems that they are causing can be resolved. And, encouragingly, the opportunity to take early and preventative action to address the issues that may lead to increased tensions remains.

Recognition of the ongoing potential threat of ethnic conflict in Central Asia is the critical first step in taking a more proactive approach to ethnic tensions or conflict in the region. Unfortunately this recognition, either by the republics of the region or by outside state or institutional interests, appears to be lacking. As discussed earlier, in the modern international system of sovereign states it is extremely difficult to muster the political will to deal with potential rather than actual issues. Not only is the potential risk of ethnic conflict in Central Asian largely ignored by those ‘actors’ with an interest in the region, but the regional and international consequences of ethnic conflict in the region also appears to be largely misunderstood or underestimated.

This is hardly surprising. Despite efforts in recent years in forums such as the United Nations and the OSCE to make ethnic conflict a matter for international concern, the principle of state sovereignty remains a significant impediment to greater international involvement in dealing with ethnic conflict, actual or potential. State and institutional

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actors continue to adopt a position of inertia when it comes to either actual ethnic conflict, as illustrated by recent events in Sudan, or potential ethnic conflict, as argued in this thesis.

With reference to the central chapters of this thesis, it is appropriate to argue that early intervention by external interests is far less likely to breach the principles of state sovereignty than is a laissez-faire approach that ignores the warning signs, and lets the potential for conflict develop. The cost to the state, in terms of sovereignty relinquished, would be far less if the state agreed to either external assistance or mediation than if they were subjected to physical intervention in the form of military- based peace enforcement involving outside states and organisations.

It is fortunate that many of the potential triggers of ethnic conflict can be readily identified, and therefore can theoretically be addressed before the potential for conflict within the region becomes an inevitability. The most obvious of these triggers are the ethnonational policies of the various states. Broadly speaking, the republics, with appropriate encouragement from external state and institutional actors, should adopt more inclusive policies in respect to the non-titular nationalities within their borders. However, the various republics have an opportunity to consider solutions to the question of minority group management that go far beyond consideration of discrete policy reform to include truly innovative ways to accommodate the needs of their minority groups.

One possible solution can be found in the concept of national cultural autonomy, which provides possibly the most appropriate framework with which the republics of the region may be able to address the ethnonational issues emerging in the region. As a model, national cultural autonomy is inherently flexible, and thus may be able to accommodate the peculiar nature of the composite identities within the region. In terms of possible options available to the states, national cultural autonomy may be an acceptable compromise vis-à-vis sovereignty because it stops short of allocating territorial autonomy and thus poses little threat to the territorial integrity of the region.

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In specific regions of Central Asia, such as northern Kazakhstan, it may even be appropriate to consider more defined territorially based systems such as consociation. Whilst such strategies attract the criticism that they may enhance the prospect for secessionist tendencies within the communities in question, a consociational model may correspond most closely with the aspirations and cultural and political needs of the Russian communities of Kazakhstan. Therefore a concession towards consociation may contribute significantly to the future stability of Kazakhstan, by removing many of the sources of discontent emerging within the Russian community, and providing them with a foundation from which they can consider themselves citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Both of these strategies offer somewhat novel ways of constituting the state, and may appear at odds with more conservative interpretations of the concept of sovereignty. However, given the socio-political makeup of the region, a more diffused concept of sovereignty may better meet the needs of the peoples and the governments of the region. The entire Central Asian region has not been well served by the idea of the territorially discrete and sovereign state that ultimately contradicts many of the realities of the ethnopolitical and economic fabric of the region. Despite the most vigorous attempts on the part of the various governments of the region to forge unitary and independent states, the Central Asian region remains largely characterised by interdependence and social, cultural and economic linkages across borders.

As a consequence, a more diffused version of sovereignty, as provided through either national cultural autonomy or consociation, may better serve the needs of the region than a more restrictive interpretation in which territoriality is the prime determinant. After all, national cultural autonomy was, unlike the traditional unitary organisation of the sovereign state, designed with the multinational state in mind. In the Central Asian situation, where state composition is perhaps best considered as plurinational rather than multinational, national cultural autonomy may go a long way to reconciling the disparate needs of the constituent groups, and thus strengthen, rather than diminish the form of sovereignty enjoyed by the state. And whilst the precedents that demonstrate the success of the national cultural autonomy model – Hungary and Russia – occurred in environments that are markedly different to Central Asia, the relative success in these

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multinational states demonstrates the ability of the model to accommodate diverse populations. As demonstrated in Hungary and Russia, the flexibility of the national cultural autonomy model allows it to be adopted at the local, regional or national level, and offers a means by which minority groups can contribute to the maintenance of those cultural markers that are fundamental to their identities, while ensuring that the national government continues to exercise control over the critical apparatus of state. In the Central Asian situation, adoption of a model of national cultural autonomy would, at the very least, counteract the homogenising policies adopted since independence by allowing minority groups to have a role in safeguarding their languages and cultural traditions.

This suggestion, however, leads to the major conundrum facing the key arguments of this thesis – the question of how to convince the Central Asian republics to recognise the risk of ethnic conflict in the region that is being exacerbated by their policies, while adopting policies or governance structures that may actually challenge their own sense of independent political identity.2 The very recognition of the risk of ethnic conflict in Central Asia by the republics themselves could prove counterproductive in that the states could take a realist approach by further targeting ethnic minorities as threats to state security rather than targeting the root causes of ethnic conflict. Even the adoption of strategies designed to mitigate the risk of ethnic conflict is not without problems. The very act of implementing a strategy such as national cultural autonomy can be interpreted as the validation of ethnonationalist ideology, and may lead to a hardening rather than a softening of divisions between groups. Nevertheless, the first steps towards a situation where ethnic conflict becomes a possibility were taken by the governments of the region, and therefore adoption of a strategy such as national cultural autonomy will accomplish little in the way of negative results that the governments themselves have not already achieved. As discussed in the first part of this thesis, ethnic or national identity becomes of paramount importance when it is under threat. Any constructive approach to minority group management in Central Asia that counters

2 I would like to acknowledge the comments made by one of my thesis examiners at this point. His observations on what he saw as a “contradiction between ethno-nationalism in Central Asia and the solution to ethnic conflict which could be resolved only by a transcendence of ethno-nationalism, not by any reconciliation with it” guided much of this section of the conclusion. As he rightly pointed out, an

341 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

the emerging threat to identities has to be preferable to the increasing ethnonationalist policies of the governments of the region which places identities other than the titular nationality under threat and thus could potentially create a self fulfilling prophecy.

Additionally, although the author considers that it is not only appropriate but also desirable to obtain the input of external actors in the formulation of strategies for dealing with potential ethnic conflict, it is also recognised that it is important to remain cautious in avoiding the suggestion that external interests should sponsor the protection of specific minorities within a sovereign state. As discussed by Rainer Baubock in his examination of Renner’s theories of national cultural autonomy, it is possible that the external protection of national minorities, either real or imagined, may result in the minorities being turned from “co-citizens into quasi-foreigners whose rights are precarious and resented exactly because they are protected by a government located outside the nation’s territory”.3 Such an outcome would obviously be contrary to the objectives of the exercise. Nevertheless, if ethnic conflict did actually occur in Central Asia, many of these observations would be little more than academic because, as discussed earlier, external involvement would be critical to resolving the conflict, as the state within which the conflict developed would not be in a position to deal with it constructively.

The prospect for reform, vis-à-vis the accommodation of minority groups is further reduced by the fact that a number of the Central Asian republics, most notably Uzbekistan, remain cautious and sceptical of the intentions of other states and regional bodies. In the Uzbek example, the natural belligerence of the Karimov government was enhanced rather than diminished by its engagement with the US. Similarly, even as impartial an organisation as the OSCE met with a frosty response from Kyrgyzstan to suggestions about how to manage elections. Both scenarios paint a grim picture of the prospects of reform in the region, and indicate the ongoing difficulty that will confront

exaggeration of the dangers of ethnic conflict in the Central Asian situation would do little more than make the transcendence of ethno-nationalism less likely. 3 Baubock, Rainer, “Political autonomy or cultural minority rights? A conceptual critique of Renner’s model”, Nimni, Ephraim, (ed) National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, Routledge, London, 2005, pp97-111, p104.

342 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

organisations such as the OSCE that seek to tailor proactive solutions to ethnic conflict and then encourage the republics to adopt them.

Nevertheless, the arguments in favour of dealing with the potential threat of ethnic conflict in Central Asia now, before tensions develop into actual conflict, are persuasive and should not be discounted on the basis of the perceived difficulty in convincing the Central Asian republics of their merits. Equally valid is the argument for supporting the adoption of innovative ways of managing ethnic minority groups, such as national cultural autonomy or consociation. And whilst it may be difficult for external actors – states, organisations and institutions – to assume a proactive and productive role in this situation that avoids assuming the role of sponsor of the specific minority groups, while facilitating the adoption of appropriate policies, the costs associated with not doing so are far greater than the cost of failure.

However, these issues underpin only some of the factors that may contribute to the potential for ethnic conflict in Central Asia, and adoption of innovative policies would be merely the first step towards the reconciliation of security, state sovereignty and ethnonationalism in post-Soviet Central Asia. It is equally critical that the cross-border political, cultural and economic linkages that persisted during the Soviet era be restored. As a goal, this can be accomplished only as a consequence of the political will of the region’s leaders, who should be encouraged to abandon their divergent foreign policy objectives and seek greater engagement with their immediate neighbours.

Unfortunately there is no policy or set of strategies that can accomplish the objective of reinvigorated regional engagement. In general terms, this objective could be accomplished by the republics’ reversing their policies of increasing border controls and adopting more flexible policies in relation to the movements of peoples across the region. Furthermore, the republics should recognise that the enforcement of strict border controls will not reduce the threat posed by militarised Islamic groups and transnational criminal syndicates. A greater indirect threat is posed by the increased disruption of traditional economic activity in the border regions that accompanies a tightening of border controls. Such disruption impacts significantly on the economic conditions of a large percentage of the population of the region, and creates fertile

343 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

ground for the development of not only fundamentalist and militant Islam, but the emergence of tensions between different ethnic groups who are increasingly forced to compete for diminishing resources. The true difficulty will, once again, be in persuading the leaders of the Central Asian republics to recognise the implications of their policies in respect to border controls and persuade them of the benefits that can be achieved through better management of border regulations.

However, the onus for solving the potential problem of ethnic conflict does not rest upon the Central Asian republics alone. External actors, both state and institutional, definitely have a role, and they should at the very least recognise that their engagement with the region has not necessarily contributed to the future stability of the region, and that competition for influence can actually lead to further destabilisation of the relations between the Central Asian republics. External actors must recognise that they can play a critical role in assisting the fledgling republics develop the effectiveness that will ensure their capability to meet the challenges facing the sovereign state in the 21st century. Additionally, they must work with the various republics of the region in a way that encourages cooperation amongst the republics, rather than contributes to the development of cleavages between the different states.

As broad and deceptively simple as these recommendations are, in many respects the issues outlined above have not yet been acknowledged, let alone confronted, by states or by institutions with a vested interest in the ongoing stability of Central Asia. However, the rewards that would flow from a commitment to these suggestions would be significant and durable, and would ensure that the central question of this thesis can be answered. International security, state sovereignty and emerging nationalism in Central Asia can be reconciled by the introduction of innovative ways of accommodating minority groups within the state, and by increasing the levels of cooperation, coordination and interdependence among the Central Asian republics.

Unfortunately, the prospects for real progress on these issues are, and will remain, bleak. This is not because of the intractability of the root causes of these issues, but because it is difficult in a practical sense to engage with the republics of Central Asia on these matter, and to encourage them to adopt the above-mentioned strategies that would

344 Consolidating a Logic of Intervention in Central Asia Conclusion

go a long way to mitigating the ongoing risk of ethnic conflict in the region. This is unfortunate, because the issues confronting Central Asia that were identified in this thesis are most certainly solvable. Ethnic conflict in Central Asia is still a potential, not an actual, reality, and there remains an opportunity to avoid the events that have torn apart so many states in the last 15 to 20 years. However, as demonstrated in events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2005 when the volatility of the region became apparent in the form of political protest on the one hand and violent suppression of dissent on the other, the security and the stability of the region is still uncertain, and the window of opportunity for positive reform and effective action in Central Asia may be rapidly closing.

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