TITLE: THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASI A AUTHOR: RAJAN MENON ; Lehigh University THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEA N RESEARC H TITLE VIII PROGRA M 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W . Washington, D .C. 20036 PROJECT INFORMATION : 1 CONTRACTOR : Lehigh University PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Rajan Meno n COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 808-08 DATE : November 7, 199 5 COPYRIGHT INFORMATIO N Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b y Council Contract. The Council and the U .S. Government have the right to duplicate written reports and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th e Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials fo r their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o r make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without th e written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o f Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law . 1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s) . CONTENTS Executive Summary The Dynamics of Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia 1 I. Setting the Context 1 II. Determinants of Regional Security 8 Russia's Preponderant Power 8 Russia's Political Dynamics 8 Regional Imbalance and Irredentism 1 3 Political Institutionalization and Social Mobilization 1 5 Economic Dislocations and Political Instability 1 8 III. Post-Imperial Scenarios 20 Scenario 1 : Good Neighbors 2 1 Scenario 2: Living Quietly Next to the Bear 2 1 Scenario 3 : Democratic Russia/Turbulent Periphery 22 Scenario 4 : Hypernationalism on All Sides 24 IV. Managing Russian Preponderance 25 V. Implications for U.S . Policy 31 THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA : AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY From the nineteenth century until 1991 Central Asia was the periphery of an empire whos e center of power, whether in the Tsarist or Soviet era, lay in Russia . The implosion of the Sovie t empire in 1991 led to the rise of five independent Central Asian states . The fundamental questio n to be addressed in considering the security of Central Asia is the nature of future Russia n conduct. The continued salience of the Russian factor should be obvious in light of the historica l legacy just noted. But it stems, as well, from the stark imbalance of power between core (Russia ) and periphery (Central Asia) ; the ease with which Russia can inject its power into the region ; the tendency of Russian elites, whether liberals or ultranationalists, to see the region as one in whic h Russia has special interests and prerogatives ; the existence of a Russian diaspora of 16 million i n Central Asia; and the dependence of the region on Russia for an array of needs ranging fro m arms and military expertise to essential economic imports . It is now a commonplace to stress the diminution in Russia's power and the wider range o f options that Central Asia's leaders therefore have . But the imprint of history, the immutabl e factors of geography, and the still-robust coils of dependency should not be glossed over . True, it is not easy for colonial powers to dominate their peripheries after they gain independence . Britain, which emerged from World War II in a weakened state, understood this . France learned the lesson only after the expenditure of blood and treasure in Vietnam and Algeria . But, for Russia, proximity makes post-imperial dominance less formidable a challenge--and therefor e perhaps more tempting . The notion that Russia's multiple crises rule this out is, as the events i n Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan show, demonstrably false . The overarching question about the nature of Russia's future policy in Central Asia hide s four others that are more specific : 1) Will Russia act as a benign hegemon in Central Asia? Tha t is, while insisting that its basic interests (peripheral security, the safety of the Russian diaspora , and a degree of influence greater than any other external power) be respected, will it be conten t to calibrate the balance of power among the Central Asian states while also safeguarding them against external threats? 2) Or will Russia act as an neo-imperial power? Will it, in other words , go beyond a preoccupation with the balance of power among the Central Asian states and between itself and other states (China, Iran, Turkey, the United States) in Central Asia to try t o shape the internal order of Central Asian countries? 3) If Russia does pursue such a neo-imperia l agenda, what countervailing strategies are available to Central Asian leaders? Can they balanc e Russia by turning to other extra-regional powers? 4) What are American interests in Centra l Asia? Should the United States undertake the responsibility of acting as a counterweight to a neo - imperial Russia? The four questions just specified arise in the context of a post-Soviet transition, an epocha l and uncertain struggle to remake the states that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet empire . In the economic sphere, this involves discarding the centrally-planned economic system based o n state control of productive assets and administered prices in favor of an alternative featurin g private property and the market . Politically, it entails establishing regimes with organizationa l characteristics and legitimating principles fundamentally different from those of the Soviet polity . To be sure, the nature of the economic and political transition will vary from state to state ; so will the degree to which democracy (civil society, a free press, and competitive elections) an d markets take root . These particulars, while important, need not concern us here . What is mor e important is that the magnitude of change--whether anticipated or not--in the post-Soviet state s will be accompanied by instability regardless of the pace and direction of change . This is a safe assumption : at issue, after all, is the replacement, under unexpected and difficult circumstances , of a system that set the political and economic ground rules and the parameters of politica l discourse for 70 years . This transformation will be marked by three characteristics which, as I explain later, wil l shape Russian-Central Asian security dynamics : 1) The Contest between Political Institutionalization and Social Mobilization : Politica l institutionalization refers to the creation of legitimate and effective state institutions . Such state structures are able to gain acceptance from most citizens ; and they are strong enough to keep th e peace, collect taxes, and replenish legitimacy by improving popular welfare . Social mobilization denotes the process of citizens, energized by new ideological and cultural influences, makin g demands upon the state--either peacefully within institutions (systemically) or violently on th e streets (extra-systemically) . The likelihood of this struggle between political institutionalizatio n and social mobilization results from several conditions . They have not acquired stron g foundations or worked out viable legitimating principles . To complicate matters, the era of the docile citizen may be over. In the Soviet years, the USSR was closed off from outside influences - -or, at the very least, the regime regulated citizens' exposure to the outside world and it s messages . This is no longer possible . The post-Soviet states lack the capacity to do this ; more importantly, they are attempting to seek economic progress through linkages with the globa l economy, and this is inconsistent with a strategy of intellectual and cultural isolation . (This is something that China's leaders have found out . The quest for global economic competitivenes s requires coping with CNN and sending students to Berkeley, but these influences can also sti r things up at home .) Outside influences (religious, cultural, and economic) permeate both Russi a and Central Asia now as never before . This is bound to raise popular expectations, make peopl e think differently, and create a sense of relative deprivation . Simply put, having opened itself up , the struggling post-Soviet state is bound to experience a great deal of social mobilization . To tak e ii the case of Central Asia, trade with Iran, China, and Turkey, or visits to the Persian Gul f emirates by Turkmen traders seeking consumer goods to resell at home, will have consequence s beyond the economic sphere . 2) The Rise of Nationalism: The danger of radical and exclusionary "ethnic" (as oppose d to "civic" and inclusive) variants of nationalism that privilege titular nationalities is considerabl e in the post-Soviet space. The reason is that existing state boundaries in Central Asia are arbitrary demarcations imposed from above by fiat between 1924 and 1929 . Their legacy in Central Asia i s a disjuncture between national and ethnic boundaries . Consider, for example, the borders betwee n Russia and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, whic h create irredentist temptations for the stronger powers, Russia and Uzbekistan, to make ethnic an d state borders coincide . The high-capacity Soviet state deterred irredentist conflict ; when deterrence failed repression was used . But the situation may prove more unstable with the adven t of low-capacity post-Soviet states . To divert attention from the hardships imposed by the post - Soviet economic transition, their ruling elites may play the nationalist card to shore up falterin g legitimacy by seeking to initiate border changes aimed at harmonizing state and nation and b y posing as the protector of ethnic kin abroad .