Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 1 HAQ CONTENTS

HAQ Editorial Staff 4 Economics and Security in Central Asia Editor in Chief Robert M. Cutler Suzzanne Yao Robert Cutler presents a comprehensive survey of the most significant economic and Harvard Law School security issues in contemporary Central Asia, including an analysis of their evolution Executive Editor since 1991 and an evaluation of their future prospects. Thomas Cheng Harvard Law School

Managing Editor Michael Arbogast Harvard Law School 13 ‘Asian Values’ and the Democratic Transition in Central Asia Production Editor Alice Yu Gregory Gleason Harvard Law School Gregory Gleason analyzes the significance of cultural differences for public policy in Photography Editor the countries of Central Asia and explains why international efforts to promote Alice Yu democratic institutions and processes have met with limited success. Harvard Law School

Web Editor Matthias Lind Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 21 The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Area Editors Samanids Lindsay Beck, Co-China Editor Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Kirill Nourzhanov Julianna Lee, Korea Editor Producing a nationalist version of history has acquired special importance for the Graduate of School of Arts and Sciences leaders of independent Tajikistan as a means of reinforcing common Tajik identity, Owen Lewis, Japan Editor Harvard Law School particularly in the aftermath of the civil war. This article discusses the particulars of a Weishi Li, Co-China Editor campaign launched by President Rahmonov in March 1997 to reinvent and glorify the Harvard Law School Samanids and the ways in which it contributes to the general political discourse in Mario Moore, South Asia Editor Tajikistan. Harvard Law School Michou Nguyen, ASEAN Editor Harvard Law School

Associate Editors Harvard Law School 31 From Tamerlane to Terrorism: The Shifting Basis of Joshua Bloodworth Hua Chen Uzbek Foreign Policy Kok-On Chen William D. Shingleton & John McConnell Malou Feliciano In February 1999, a series of major bombings in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent altered Gillian Koh Graduate School of Arts and Sciences the face of Uzbekistan’s government. The bombings caused a shift in foreign policy Xin Zhou based on nationalism to one focused on counter-terrorism. In this article, the impact of this shift on Uzbekistan’s relations with ‘greater Uzbekistan’, the other former Harvard Asia Quarterly Publishing Board Virginia Harper-Ho Soviet states, and the outside world are discussed. Harvard Law School `01 Victor Shih Graduate School of Arts and Sciences `02 Harvard Asia Quarterly 34 Elections in Central Asia: A New Beginning for a Faculty Advisory Board Professor W.P. Alford Comprehensive Environmental Strategy? Harvard Law School Daphne Biliouri Dean David Smith Harvard Law School The recent elections in three of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Professor Hue-Tam Ho Tai and Uzbekistan) over the past two years have raised concerns over the path to Faculty of Arts and Sciences democracy and the effect such will have on the environmental policy of the region. Professor Ezra Vogel This article provides an overview of the existing situation and suggests that though Faculty of Arts and Sciences Professor Shang-Jin Wei the environment has become a priority for the leaders of Central Asia, the question Kennedy School of Government remains whether the international community is providing necessary assistance and support.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 2 Winter 2001 Volume V, No. 1. Winter 2001

HARVARD ASIA QUARTERLY is a student publication affiliated with the Harvard Asia Center. HAQ was established in 1997 by members of 39 Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons in the Past the Harvard Asia Law Society in conjunction with Twelve Years students from other graduate and professional programs at Harvard University as an interdis- Dr. Li Shuguang ciplinary journal of Asian affairs. In this article, Professor Li examines the current state of bankruptcy law in China. He also outlines problems in the enforcement of the current bankruptcy law and LETTERS suggests how these problems can be remedied. HAQ welcomes readers’ letters and comments. HAQ reserves the right to decline to print correspondence, and to edit correspondence for length and format prior to printing. Letters should be addressed to the editor and submitted to the address below. 47 Was World Bank Support for the Qinghai Anti- SUBMISSIONS Poverty Project in China Ill-Considered? HAQ invites the submission of unsolicited ar- Pieter Bottelier ticles and essays to be considered for publica- In July 2000, China withdrew its request for World Bank financing for the Qinghai tion. Submissions should address matters of contemporary concern to Asia in the following anti-poverty project, one of the most controversial projects in the 54-year history of or related fields: political science; law; econom- the Bank. Mr. Bottelier expertly traces the events leading to the decision and raises ics; business and finance; social criticism; inter- important questions regarding the validity of the charges against the project and national relations; design; and the arts. Sub- the appropriate role and responsibility of the World Bank. missions should be delivered in hard copy and in electronic form on diskette. All submissions materials become property of HAQ. To receive HAQ Editorial Guidelines, submissions sched- ules, or additional information, please contact HAQ at the address below. 56 The US-Vietnam Trade Agreement SUBSCRIPTIONS Tai Van Ta Annual subscriptions to HAQ are available at a In this article, Tai Van Ta examines the US-Vietnam trade agreement and its rate of $28.00 for four issues for subscriptions likely impact on the Vietnamese economy and society. delivered in the United States and $45.00 for deliveries elsewhere. For more information, please contact HAQ or your academic periodi- cal subscription service.

62 Interview with Doan Viet Hoat Michou Nguyen On December 8, 2000, ASEAN editor Michou Nguyen conducted an interview Please address all correspondence to: with Vietnamese human rights observer Doan Viet Hoat. Dr. Hoat spoke on a Harvard Asia Quarterly variety of issues, from free trade and economic stability to President Clinton’s c/o Harvard Asia Center reception by the Vietnamese people. 1737 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

Fax: (617) 495-9976 65 The Meaning of President Clinton’s Trip to Vietnam www.haqonline.org Chan Tran Chan Tran reflects upon President Clinton’s trip to Vietnam and its possible implications for human rights advancement in the country. Credits: Cover Design by Alice Yu 67 Book Review

Phar Kim Beng No material appearing in this publication may Phar Kim Beng reviews Amitav Archarya’s The Quest for Identity: International be reproduced without the permission of the pub- Relations of Southeast Asia: “By his own admission, Amitav Archarya is not an lisher. The opinions expressed in this publica- Asianist. Rather, his niche is ‘Asian Pacific regionalism’. Two questions obviously tion are those of the contributors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or publishers. emerge: Can an entity as diverse as Asia-Pacific be labeled a ‘region’ without All statements of fact and opinion represent the skewing the meaning of the term? More importantly, have contemporary social work of the author, who remains solely respon- sciences developed the necessary tools and lenses to examine it?” sible for the content. All editorial rights reserved. Copyright © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. (ISSN 1522-4147).

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 3 ECONOMICS AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

BY ROBERT M. CUTLER eography puts Central Asia at a crossroads of global economy and security. At the height of the Roman Empire, the territory of Robert M. Cutler is Research Fellow at the Institute Gpresent-day Uzbekistan was astride the transcontinental trade of European and Russian Studies, Carleton routes between China and the West. The first Turkic state was estab- University, Canada. He was educated at the lished in present-day Mongolia in the middle of the sixth century. From Massachusetts Institute of Technology and earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of the eighth to the twelfth centuries, Islam expanded into the Caucasus Michigan. He has extensive practical experience and Central Asia from Arabia in the southwest. Next the migrations in Central Asia and former Soviet areas including came from the northeast, with the Mongol invasions during the 1200s Caspian-region energy development. He has done and 1300s, while other Turkic peoples came to Central Asia at the same consulting for a variety of international and nonprofit organizations and the business time. Subsequently, Muscovy (Moscow) consolidated its rule and pre- community, and served as an NGO Representative pared to expand into the Caspian region in the nineteenth and to the UN Economic and Social Council. He can be twentiethcenturies from the northwest. reached at . Homepage: Today, the region is only re-acquiring its historical position as a . stage across which there sweep vast waves of people and goods from nearly all directions of the compass. It opens to China and the rest of Asia in the east, Iran and Afghanistan and the rest of the Islamic world to the south, and Russia and the “new Eastern Europe” to the north and west. If the southeast is the only direction of the compass from which world-historical waves have not rolled over Central Asia, this is because the Himalayas block mass international migration; however, they have not been a barrier to influences from India, Pakistan, and Afghani- stan in the south or from China in the east. Indeed, broadly speaking, “the East” has, since the fall of the USSR, come once again to signify the broad belt of culture stretching from North Africa to the Pacific that it was under the British Empire: the old Near East, which we now call the Middle East; the old Middle East, which we now call Southwest and Central Asia; and the Far East, which we now call the Asian-Pa- cific Rim. The identification of what we today call Central Asia is relatively new. In the pre-Communist Russian Empire, “Central Asia” referred to the Asia that was part of the Empire. In the Soviet period, the term “Middle Asia” was used in Russian to refer to four of the five Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) but not Kazakhstan, reflecting Moscow’s strategic and geopolitical perspec- tives, including Soviet Russian claims of various sorts on northern Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea littoral. By contrast, the same term “Middle Asia” in Turkic languages has historically referred to lands populated by the broad swath of Turkic-speaking people eastward up to Mongolia, including China’s Xinjiang province, which the native inhabitants to this day call “Eastern Turkestan”. Indeed, from the standpoint of demography and physical geography, Central Asia includes northern Afghanistan as well as western China. Following the Tashkent summit in January 1992, the term “Central Asia” was generally adopted to refer to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This article focuses on these five countries. Since it is impossible to consider them in a vacuum, the discussion of regional security contexts ranges a bit more widely.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 4 Winter 2001 1. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT PROBLEMS to provide for the creation of a single unified economic space. Kyrgyzstan joined that space at the end of April 1994, es- One good approach to understanding present-day eco- tablishing the Central Asian Union (CAU), which sought to nomic and security problems in Central Asia is to begin with develop multilateral cooperation in the economic and finan- Uzbekistan, the most populous country in the region, with 26 cial sphere. A trilateral development bank was established million inhabitants. The country’s median age is in the low to that end. 20s, making the country ripe for heavy growth. By the year In need of setting Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations with 2010, the population will explode to between 30 and 35 mil- Russia in a multilateral context, so as to rally other partners lion,1 and most of the growth will occur in regions unlikely to to increase leverage, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev pro- experience job creation. The effects of population growth on posed in 1994 to create an Euro-Asiatic Union (EAU). The the environment, the economy, and the potential for increased idea behind this initiative was that the CIS was moribund tension have already been visibly negative. The country’s and bogged down in peace and security matters and that economic stagnation is at the root of the region’s most acute another organization (a “natural development” of the CIS security problem. Therefore, the economic background con- that would not supplant it) was required to promote deeper ditioning this security problem needs to be briefly set out. financial integration and economic cooperation across the former Soviet area. Nazarbaev 1.1. THE COLLAPSE OF THE RUBLE specifically excluded from even- ZONE tual EAU membership those states involved in civil or inter- That economic background Today, the region is only re-acquiring its national military conflict. The began with deepening crisis in the historical position as a stage across which initiative for the EAU was still- early 1990s throughout Central there sweep vast waves of people and born when Uzbekistan, testify- Asia. This came to a head in goods from nearly all directions of the ing to its differences with Rus- spring and summer of 1993, when compass. It opens to China and the rest of sia, declined to participate. In questions of trade and payments Asia in the east, Iran and Afghanistan and addition, another reason for among the former Soviet repub- the rest of the Islamic world to the south, Uzbekistan’s refusal to partici- lics became increasingly acute. and Russia and the “new Eastern Europe” pate in the EAU was the com- During this early period, the re- to the north and west. petitive nature of Uzbekistani- publics negotiated many agree- Kazakhstani relations, based on ments for currency and financial the long and complex cultural cooperation that were successively overtaken by events. history between the two ethnic The issue of the ruble zone’s status was brought to the fore groups these states represent. This is one of the reasons by the fact that banks in these new states continued to issue why the country sought designation from Washington as credit denominated in rubles, for which they were not finan- the “strategic partner” of the U.S. in Central Asia in 1995. cially accountable. Continuing subsidies from Moscow to When Kazakhstan was also designated a “strategic part- former Soviet industrial plants in the newly independent ner” in 1997, Uzbekistan President Karimov’s response, in states only increased the acuity of the ruble-zone crisis. 1999, was to join the GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan- In September 1993, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an Moldova) entente, turning it into GUUAM. accord to unify the monetary systems of the two countries. Russia would assume responsibility for Kazakhstan’s for- 1.3. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN eign debts in return for title to Soviet assets on Kazakhstani territory. Uzbekistan almost immediately sought to join this Economic circumstances in the mid-1990s intervened cooperation, and in September 1993, a multilateral agree- to drive a wedge between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. An ment on a new ruble zone was signed that included these extremely poor cotton crop in Uzbekistan in 1994 led three countries plus Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan. How- Tashkent to impose currency-exchange restrictions, which ever, Kazakhstan left this ruble zone within two months, in turn effectively stymied CAU-based cooperation. What forced out of it with the other former republics by Russia’s has most retarded the development of the CAU still to this requirement to deposit, in Moscow, gold and hard currency day has been President Karimov’s refusal to lift all controls reserves equivalent to roughly half the total volume of rubles on the convertibility of Uzbekistan’s national currency. The in circulation in the given former republic. banking system in Uzbekistan has not been adequately re- formed, and the IMF has for several years suspended assis- 1.2. ATTEMPTS AT CENTRAL ASIAN COOPERATION tance to the country although it still maintains a mission in Tashkent. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan almost immediately intro- Kazakhstan, in contrast to Uzbekistan, accepted all rec- duced their respective national currencies, the tenge and the ommendations made to it by the IMF, including those re- som, and initiatives for trade and economic policy coordi- lated to macroeconomic policy in particular. The country nation between the two countries began to take shape. The has completed its banking system reform, and is set to expe- treaty that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had signed in late rience real economic growth, although a very significant June 1992 on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance portion of the population remains in very dire straits as a was deepened at a January 1993 meeting in Tashkent, so as result of the hardships of the last decade. This poverty is

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 5 spread throughout the country but is especially felt in the water among the states of the region. Yet it is difficult to heavily populated and ethno-nationalist south, traditional foresee a diminution of water usage, since altogether 45 mil- home to the Greater (or Elder) Horde, one of the three large lion people depend economically upon the Amu Darya and Kazakh social and political formations that for centuries gov- Syr Darya Rivers. Cutting cotton production would be one erned the nomadic ethnic group’s life. One of the most impossible solution, especially since Central Asian cotton har- poverished areas in this already poor region is around the vests are late, crop failures are widespread, and climate can city of Kzyl-Orda, which suffers from the desiccation of the be problematic because the growing regions are the furthest Aral Sea. of all, worldwide, from the equator. However, domestic political and economic interests militate against this, particu- 2. ECOLOGY AND HUMAN SECURITY larly since cotton production generates hard currency in the 2.1. WATER MANAGEMENT AND POLLUTION short term and has become central to Karimov’s import-sub- stitution development strategy. Although the Aral Sea’s degradation directly affects only Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, its waters rise 2.2. HEALTH AND HUMAN SECURITY in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan. Because the issue of water management affects It is impossible to evoke eco- all states of the region, in theory logical and environmental issues it has the potential to become a without lamenting most unequivo- focal point for economic coop- cally that vast majority of the eration throughout Central Asia. Solving these problems requires population throughout the region Several years ago, the United rationing the use of water among the have scarce access to the basic Nations held a conference about states of the region. Yet it is difficult to needs of food, shelter, and medi- the Aral Sea in Nukus, foresee a diminution of water usage, cal care. Ensuring sufficient sup- Uzbekistan. This conference was since altogether 45 million people ply of economic and political re- to concentrate on sustainable de- depend economically upon the Amu sources to the population would velopment and on providing Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. have been difficult enough for any clean water and health care to newly independent state. This is the region. However, President even more difficult in Central Asia Karimov used it to suggest resuscitating an old Soviet-era because there were no well-estab- mega-project, which his water management ministry had lished institutions of governance or pre-existing national never really abandoned for its own bureaucratic reasons, to economy, that could, for example, even absorb and channel divert Siberian rivers to the Aral Sea. The Nukus initiative in a regularized fashion the large revenue streams that imme- continues as an international technical-scientific study diate energy development and export would have created. project with participation by highly qualified experts from What was left of the Soviet social safety net after the West. However, its practical effects were limited by the Gorbachev’s reforms soon disappeared, and it is not much somewhat transparent use of the conference by regional of an exaggeration to say that only pre-existing social net- leaders to justify their efforts to obtain general international works (some elaborately developed from traditional forms aid. Moreover, the “Nukus episode” illustrates how even and surviving even through the Soviet era) remained to take attempts to address the water problem are enmeshed in up the slack. In Tajikistan’s civil war, for example, the basic Uzbekistan’s regional diplomatic competition with cleavage was not between communists and Islamists, or even Kazakhstan. Relations with Turkmenistan are also strained clans per se. The civil war was, rather, a conflict between by competition for this scarce natural resource. regions, based on opposing identities. Clans have not been Karimov politically marginalizes the two ethnic groups irrelevant, but the real issue is the opposition among social most affected by the ecological disaster, the Karakalpaks (a networks that developed under Soviet administration. In the separate group also composed of Turkic Muslims) and the early 1990s, these provided the organizational basis for fur- Khorezm Uzbeks, who speak a nonstandard dialect. nishing security goods after the Tajikistani state apparatus Karakalpakstan, which formally has autonomous republic fell apart under conditions of general economic deprivation. status within Uzbekistan, is located on the lower Amu Darya, Tajikistan is thus a sort of Central Asian “worst case” exem- where the river empties into the Aral Sea. The population is plifying the most extreme results of the privatization of that about 1.3 million people with a population density of about public good called “social order”. 10 per square mile. It is more rural than Uzbekistan as a As bad as things were a few years ago, they are now whole, and some parts of the region have no urban centers worse and disaster threatens. There are two reasons for this: at all. Yet its population is much younger than the national drugs and disease, the latter including, but not limited to, average, and the rate of population growth is very high. The AIDS. The illegal drugs now afflicting populations of many shrinking of the Aral Sea and the consequences of the long- former Soviet republics, and not just in Central Asia, are term use of chemicals for irrigation in agriculture have made several, but heroin is the one that invites most attention. The Karakalpakstan one of the poorest and most environmen- rate of heroin use has soared in the last several years, mainly tally devastated parts of Uzbekistan if not the former Soviet since the Taliban conquest of Kabul. It is well known, and area altogether. has been for some time, that much agriculture in Afghani- Solving these problems requires rationing the use of stan is given over to poppy cultivation because this is a

Harvard Asia Quarterly 6 Winter 2001 highly profitable cash crop with guaranteed demand. through earlier this year for several reasons. First, Azerbaijan Statistical evidence on disease abounds. Temirtau is a made a huge offshore gas discovery in the Shah-Deniz field city in central Kazakhstan, less than one hundred miles from and wanted more of the pipeline volume than Turkmenistan the new capital Astana. It is, in fact, the city where Nazarbaev was willing to relinquish. In fact, the Shah-Deniz consor- started his political career in 1967 as a local administrator. tium now has plans under way to pipe its own gas alone to Reports indicate that whereas the percentage of the popula- Turkey. Second, President Niyazov imposed unacceptable tion that was HIV-positive was in single digits in 1997, this conditions on the consortium that would have built it, in- figure has soared to about forty per cent. If space permitted, cluding a huge signing bonus. However, such a bonus was I could multiply such statistics and personalize them with unlikely, inasmuch as the U.S. Department of Justice had individual anecdotes to bring home to the reader the weight recently begun an investigation of the relationship between and tragedy of this misery in human terms. But for this ar- Mr. James Giffen and President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan.2 ticle it must suffice it to say that the sector of population Third, Niyazov just tried to play too many ends against the most affected is that of working age, and that there is a great middle, talking now with the trans-Caspian consortium, now deal of social denial that complicates prevention. with the Russians, now with Iran, and even with China. He The implications of this phenomenon on prospective juggled uncertainties for so long that the audience packed rates of economic growth follow up and went home, leaving him inexorably, and those on poten- with the Russians. Capital for the tial effects on political stability construction of a pipeline still more inexorably, when one through Iran is nowhere to be considers that the population it- The possibility of efficient development found; and the pipeline to China self will increase in absolute and export of Central Asia’s energy is simply unrealistic. terms while the general produc- resources seemed at one time to promise The construction of a pipe- tivity of the working-age cohorts economic and social progress. However, line from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil will decline along with their this has been complicated by technical deposit, across southern Russia health. The cynical view that if difficulties in the exploitation of the to the port of Novorossiisk on enough people are ill, then no resources, as well as by the compexity of the Black Sea was recently com- one will be left to destabilize the political manueverings. pleted. This was long sought as regimes, is mistaken. Macroeco- a way to get Tengiz oil to market. nomic performance figures will Yet it remains to be seen exactly probably improve in coming how much Kazakhstani oil Mos- years in at least some of the countries concerned; however, cow will let into the pipeline. The Russian regions in the area such statistics should not be ingested unsalted. If there is want to include some of their own production in the through- one thing that the Stalin experiment taught Western econo- put, and Russia’s recent offshore discovery in North mists, it is that macroeconomic figures are not always reli- Kashagan, which is still to be developed, is a natural for the able indicators of microeconomic well being. Novorossiisk pipeline. Some Kazakhstani production goes to central Russia via the Soviet-era pipeline through Samara. 3. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: NOT A PANACEA However, both the Tengiz oil deposit and the Karachanagak natural gas deposit still await reliable transport to market in The possibility of efficient development and export of large quantity. Proposed oil pipelines from Kazakhstan Central Asia’s energy resources seemed at one time to prom- through Iran via Turkmenistan, and across Central Asia to ise economic and social progress. However, this has been China run into the same problems as similar pipelines pro- complicated by technical difficulties in the exploitation of posed for Turkmenistani gas. the resources, as well as by the complexity of political maneuverings. In Central Asia, Turkmenistan (mainly natu- 4. NOT JUST IDENTITY POLITICS ral gas with some oil) and Kazakhstan (mainly oil but a good 4.1. UZBEKISTAN’S “ETHNIC REACH”: RESOURCE OR deal of natural gas) are the two countries with significant LIABILITY? amounts of energy to export. Uzbekistan (some natural gas) also has some quantities. Uzbekistan’s diplomatic concern with South Asia is con- All these countries share the problem that their only ditioned by its geopolitical situation and by the country’s available export pipelines run through Russia. Turkmenistan, close inter-ethnic relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. for example, with some of the largest natural gas reserves in In the early 1990s, the civil war in Tajikistan represented, the world, exported nearly 85 billion cubic meters (bcm) of for the Uzbekistani government, an external threat that could gas in 1991 but only 13 bcm in 1998 and 23 bcm in 1999. lead to domestic unrest because ethnic Uzbeks constitute Throughout the 1990s, it has haggled with Russia over price about a quarter of Tajikistan’s population and dominate the and periodically suspended exports over such disputes, only northern part of the country. Samarkand and Bukhara, in to be reminded by a foreign-exchange earnings crunch that present-day Uzbekistan, are historical centers of Tajik settle- it has no other major customer. ment and influence. The figure sometimes given, of a five A planned pipeline under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, per cent Tajik component in Uzbekistan’s population, is but which would have continued through Georgia to take an artifact of Soviet census procedures. The actual figure is Turkmenistani gas into hard-currency-paying Turkey, fell several times higher than that.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 7 The ethnic Uzbek’s “reach” into neighboring countries sents a move to fill what appears from Moscow as a security is matched by its neighbors’ sensitivities to Uzbek influ- vacuum. It is part of a broader Eurasian trend in Russian ence, which can sometimes seem overbearing. For example, foreign policy that includes the development of limited stra- Tashkent has on several occasions sent its troops across tegic cooperation with China. In fact, China has stealthily Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s border to conduct exercises, become deeply involved in Central Asian affairs. This de- without seeking permission to enter the respective territo- velopment may be traced back to one of the more interesting ries. One-seventh of Kyrgyzstan’s population is ethnic Uzbek, security initiatives in the region: Kazakhstan’s attempt in and Uzbekistan is the pre-eminent the 1990s to organize a Confer- power in southern Kyrgyzstan, ence on Interactions and Confi- which is linked to the northern dence-Building Measures in part of the country only by air Asia (CICA), with a view towards routes. Russia’s re-assertion of influence in subsequently establishing a Central Asia represents a move to fill Conference on Security and 4.2. RUSSIA RETURNS TO CENTRAL what appears from Moscow as a security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA). ASIA vacuum. It is part of a broader Eurasian The Conference seeks neither to trend in Russian foreign policy that organize a collective security The question of Islamic mili- includes the development of limited regime nor to reproduce the tancy in Central Asia leapt to in- strategic cooperation with China. Conference on Security and ternational attention when a se- Cooperation in Europe in the ries of bomb attacks hit Tashkent Asian theater. In the conception in 1998. The attention intensified of Kazakhstani diplomacy, the when the area of Batken, Kyrgyzstan was taken by forces CICA is a conference where states have the opportunity to under the command of Juma Namangani, an Islamic militant, discuss problems and organizational mechanisms to assure in the summer and autumn of 1999. Central Asia as a whole security in all domains. began drawing closer to Russia as the year 2000 began, partly Several preparatory meetings were held in view of con- in response to these events and partly out of recognition voking the CICA. These meetings revealed three essential that Russia was the only diplomatic power actually prepared difficulties with the initiative. First, the geographical scope to dispatch troops to the region to quell the insurgent forces. of the participating countries was ill-defined. Second, and As it became clear that President Vladimir Putin was willing related to the first, there was concern with duplicating the to take concrete action in support of his stated objective to activities and functions of other organizations and structures. restore his country’s prestige and diplomatic status, this Third, the heterogeneity of the Asian countries themselves, rapprochement with Russia deepened. Central Asia was a including cultural differences, rendered the overall initia- natural place for Putin to begin to reassert, by practical steps, tive more difficult by complicating the discussions of non- a Russian sphere of interest. Already as Prime Minister in military issues. The U.S. declined an invitation from 1999, he had responded favorably to Kyrgyzstan President Kazakhstan in the mid-1990s to participate in the CICA’s Akaev’s request for assistance in the Batken episode. Executive Organizing Committee. However, Russia and China In early 2000, Putin, as head of the CIS newly elected by both accepted. The serious development of security and its Council, signaled a new special security relationship with economic ties between the two countries, including their Uzbekistan. The two countries have had ambiguous rela- rapprochement around “anti-superpower” rhetoric, may be tions for the whole of the last decade. After eliminating Is- dated from their cooperation in that forum. CICA itself con- lamic parties in the Ferghana Valley in 1989, President tinues its activities, and in September 1999 the foreign mem- Karimov of Uzbekistan sent troops to fight in Tajikistan’s bers of the participating countries agreed a “Declaration of civil war in the early 1990s, a period when Russia could Principles”, of which the significance may in retrospect come neither define nor assert an interest in Tajikistan. Different to rival that of the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Secu- Russian Army military formations supported different sides, rity and Cooperation in Europe. CICA itself has also de- each for idiosyncratic reasons, but Uzbekistan had well de- volved issue-specific cooperation to what are effectively fined interests and acted on them.3 By the time post-Soviet spin-off formations, of which the Shanghai Forum (previ- Russia got around to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan had played its ously the “Shanghai-5”) is one.4 military role there. Tashkent tried to distance itself from Moscow throughout the 1990s by undertaking autonomous 4.3. OTHER REGIONAL INFLUENCES diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia and turning to the United 4.3.1. CHINA States as a “strategic partner”. However, since summer 2000, partly because Russia is the only major country willing to China and Russia have undertaken a rapprochement over send troops to assist Uzbekistan’s fight against Islamic in- the last decade that makes Central Asia a region of common surgency, relations between the two countries have once interest. Yet their designs are not held in common. Russia again drawn closer. These relations are also economic and looks southward from the Eurasian landmass and sees Cen- so include, for example, renewed Russian purchases of tral Asia as a traditional sphere of influence and buffer zone Uzbekistan’s natural gas, which are in tandem with Russia’s against social and political chaos. China looks westward from increased gas purchases from Turkmenistan as well. the Pacific Rim and sees Central Asia as a springboard to the Russia’s re-assertion of influence in Central Asia repre- greater Caspian/Black Sea meta-region, opening onto South-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 8 Winter 2001 west Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Europe. Xinjiang Asia in the 1990s was greatly to its advantage. Turkey’s is the platform providing the run-up to that springboard. relations with Central Asia are of three kinds: cultural, eco- China’s aim is to make Xinjiang a “pole of attraction” for nomic, and political. Cultural initiatives involve the spread of economic development, linking the South Caucasus and the Turkish language and of the Latin alphabet. Economic Asia Minor to the Chinese Pacific Rim via transportation relations include cooperation for development of infrastruc- infrastructures passing through Central Asia. ture and building-construction. The Central Asian countries, since they are the ones Iran’s relative lack of diplomatic and economic resources actually in region, have them- means that even its attempts to selves a more intensive interna- promote energy cooperation with tional agenda than either China the Central Asian countries have or Russia. It is dominated by foundered. Nevertheless, there is three combined security and China’s demographic policy causes a confluence of interests between economic issues: energy devel- increasing social tensions in the region. Iran and China on energy policy, opment, counter-insurgency, There is evidence of an officially as both seek to counter the vari- and economic cooperation. Rus- sanctioned policy to encourage ous Russian and Western pipeline sia is deeply involved in all three emigration by young ethnic Han males to plans with alternative options. throughout the region. China is Kazakhstan in particular, where they Iran also finds its interests coin- the only other country also in- acquire land and marry local women, ciding with China’s on such volved in all three, though not much to the discontent of young ethno-nationalist related issues as so deeply as Russia. China’s at- Kazakh males. ethnic policy in Xinjiang, the tempts to promote energy devel- resolution of the conflict in opment in Central Asia have Tajikistan, and anti-Taliban mostly foundered but not for policy. The result has been a dip- want of trying. Its energy cooperation with Turkmenistan lomatic distancing of China from its long-standing friend and Kazakhstan is tending to increase but remains still at Pakistan. very low levels due to a general lack of capital. Long before the Shanghai Forum was convened to intensify anti-Islamic 4.3.3. PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN security cooperation among its members, China had successfully pressured all these countries to abrogate their in- Recently, Pakistan’s regional policy has itself undergone ternational treaty obligations with respect to treatment of an important shift, with direct implications for Central Asia. refugees, and to return summarily to China any Xinjiang In May, General Pervaiz Musharraf, for the first time, pub- Uighurs found in their territory, even though Uighurs are licly stated his country’s rationale for supporting the Taliban perhaps the Turkic people in the region least likely to har- regime in Afghanistan. He specifically invoked the close eth- bor Islamic-militant sentiments. As for economic coopera- nic ties between Pakistan’s influential Pushtuns, who are his tion, China does not have the wherewithal to engage in country’s second largest ethnic group, and Afghanistan’s foreign direct investment to any great degree but is seeking Pushtuns, who are their country’s largest ethnic group.5 This to piggyback its political influence upon Japan’s significant strategy, which we may call pan-Pushtunism, implicitly re- investments. gards Central Asia as a Pakistani hinterland. In such a strat- China’s demographic policy causes increasing social egy, Pakistan seeks to carve out a sphere of influence in Cen- tensions in the region. There is evidence of an officially tral Asia by penetrating it through military proxies whose sanctioned policy to encourage emigration by young ethnic ethnic composition draws attention to the Pushtun “fact” in Han males to Kazakhstan in particular, where they acquire South Asia in general, and in Pakistan and Afghanistan in land and marry local women, much to the discontent of particular. Seeking to co-opt his own country’s ethno-nation- young Kazakh males. Unofficial estimates put the level of alist Pushtuns, Musharraf does not concede security inter- this illegal immigration at several hundred thousand. Since ests in Afghanistan to any other country. This policy, which the population of Kazakhstan is now about 15 million, and has weakened Pakistan’s credibility as a fair arbiter of the half of these are male, of whom we may assume half to be Afghanistan conflict, is therefore rightly called dangerous. of working age, we may estimate that even only 350,000 This pan-Pushtun policy is manifested in the summer young Han males would represent one-tenth the size of the and autumn of the year 2000. At that time, the Taliban-abet- corresponding ethnic Kazakh population. This is rather more ted Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) sent fighters than a drop in the bucket. across Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into eastern Uzbekistan and the Ferghana valley. There they set up a network of bases 4.3.2. IRAN AND TURKEY and supplies as well as communications lines for agitation and propaganda work during subsequent months. This IMU Even Iran and Turkey, which form a perennial trio with operation coincided with the Taliban’s successful drive in- Russia where the Central Asian security questions are con- side Afghanistan to capture the city of Taloqan, the head- cerned, are potentially influential in only one of the above- quarters of the Northern Alliance that opposes the Kabul enumerated issue areas, energy. Turkey’s international po- regime. The ensemble of these events has served to take out sition declined along with the strategic importance of the of political deep-freeze the (still less than likely) proposal to Bosphorus in the late 1980s, but the situation in Central build a pipeline for Turkmenistan’s natural gas across Af-

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 9 ghanistan to Pakistan. Even more significant, after the Taliban among the elites and especially the sub-elites in Tashkent victory in Taloqan, first Karimov and then Nazarbaev re- and the regional centers, upon whose allegiance his author- ceived Musharraf in their respective capitals and articulated ity rests.6 Since the political institutions in Uzbekistan have a more conciliatory line towards the Taliban regime in Kabul. no legitimacy independent of Karimov’s personal authority, However, these means are unlikely to palliate the threat such a challenge to his pre-eminence could, if successful, to the Central Asian regimes from Islamic militancy in the produce a vacuum of political power. Such a vacuum could region. It is unclear whether then spread throughout the coun- Uzbekistani rapprochement with Pa- try as regional prefects and notables kistan and conciliation with Afghani- shift their loyalty or, to forestall stan will produce pan-Pushtun self- their own downfall, proclaim their restraint. Even if the Afghanistani The worst-case scenario in autonomy locally by decree. government (and by implication their Kazakhstan is rather like that in Counter-elites in Tashkent may seek Pakistani allies) limit their logistical Uzbekistan, with presidential rule to seize the commanding heights of support for the IMU, the latter is nei- becoming imperiled by the loss of the existing political regime in such ther entirely under their control nor allegiance of counter-elites and a crisis, but here is no future guar- the only Islamic-militant organization sub-elites. antee of their success in being able in the region, although it is the only to command anything in the coun- important one having at present a strategy of armed con- try from those heights.7 frontation. The Hezbollah group in the Ferghana Valley is no The outlook is both better and worse in Kazakhstan. less militant for refraining from immediate combat. The Hizb- Economically the Central Asian country most interdepen- e Tahrir group has a longer-term, more studious approach to dent with Russia, it is four times the size of Texas with less propagating Islamic influence that seeks to penetrate the than three times the population of the District of Columbia. political institutions with “agents of influence,” so as to Mass social mobilization capable of overtly threatening the establish later a regional Islamic Caliphate. The group nev- regime’s balance is unlikely. However, the ethno-nationalist ertheless concedes the eventual necessity of armed struggle and relatively densely populated southern region of the coun- but parts company from the IMU concerning the latter’s try exerted a continual pull on Nazarbaev’s policies through- present tactics. out the 1990s. Family and clan structures continue to be strong there. Nazarbaev himself is from the south but from 5. ONCE MORE ON UZBEKISTAN (AND KAZAKHSTAN) one of the minor clans. That is one reason, among several, why he moved the capital from Almaty to Astana (formerly The IMU is still the most immediate threat, yet Presi- named Aqmola) in the center of the country. Influence from dent Karimov of Uzbekistan has boxed himself in over the sub-elites in the south is responsible for his discarding in last decade by eliminating options for both himself and those practice a “civic-nationalist” approach to Kazakhstani state who stand against him. This he identity. He has continually had has done through his uncompro- to balance among the different mising eradication of all opposi- clan interests from this region. tion, including Islamic-oriented The worst-case scenario in groups that might have articulated Kazakhstan is rather like that in platforms for peaceful change Uzbekistan, with presidential within a tolerant political system rule becoming imperiled by the that they would have been loss of allegiance of counter- thereby brought to support as a elites and sub-elites. However, system. However, the unambigu- this scenario in Kazakhstan ous failure of economic reform in holds still deeper implications the country has only immiserated for the region. Already the members of what middle class the north and east of the country, country has left. The alienation of which have long been heavily this middle class has been com- settled by ethnic Russians, have pounded by such political mea- made local political moves to- sures as increasingly draconian wards autonomy and, possibly, restrictions on civil rights and the separatism. These moves have summary arrest and detention of been repressed but not crushed. thousands of citizens on suspicion of Islamic sympathies. There is a great deal of discontent in the oil-rich west of the The danger to President Karimov in Uzbekistan is not country, because the president’s prefects have had their eye necessarily that a force of Talibanesque sympathizers will on their constituency in Astana by which they are appointed, conquer his capital Tashkent, although a few armed clashes rather than the local population who view them as interested have already occurred within a hundred miles of it. Rather, interlopers who send the energy revenue out of the region his ever-increasingly authoritarian rule may be undermined instead of improving local conditions. The center of the coun- by a militarized crisis of civil control in one or more of the try is largely desert. outlying provinces, triggering a crisis of political authority Islamic sympathies have the best chance in southern

Harvard Asia Quarterly 10 Winter 2001 Kazakhstan, where they would be most dangerous. The popu- ever, his domestic policies make it unlikely that the people lation is highly impoverished and retains cohesive forms of of Turkmenistan will experience any economic benefit from social organization inherited from the Kazakh cultural past.8 the development and export of the country’s energy re- The south of the country continues to have rich agriculture, sources. Finally, as explained just above at greater length, providing structures of political organization focused on the the economic stagnation in Uzbekistan tends to cast its long- management of irrigation systems (like other great civiliza- term political stability into doubt. tions of the East), as well as significant urban conglomera- In the late twentieth century, it became evident that re- tions, such as the industrial city of Shymkent, which have gional international systems may be organized around litto- already witnessed demonstrations of popular unrest over rals (e.g., Asia-Pacific Rim) as well as continentally. The social conditions. events of the last decade have shown the proliferation of It also contains the historic city of Turkestan, which this emergent characteristic of international politics. With carries great weight in the popular consciousness. The the fall of the Soviet Union, there are now self-organized Turkestan area, not far from the Ferghana Valley, is histori- regional systems around the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and cally the cradle of empires in the region. It has been the the Aral Sea. Looking at a demographic map of Central Asia, central political and economic region of the Western Turkic what strikes the eye is how large a central part of the region empire (late 6th and early 7th centuries A.D.), the is desert. Central Asia, therefore, although a continental en- Kharkhanid Empire (960-1210, the first Turkic Muslim tity, is itself a sort of littoral as well. It is a regional demo- state), the Mongol state of Chagatai (13th-15th centuries.), graphic littoral surrounding a mainly barren regional center. the Kokand khanate and the Kazakh Elder Horde (18th-19th The populated areas are not closely connected enough for centuries.), as well as the short-lived Kokand republic (a something like an Albanian-style insurrection to pass, as pan-Turkic state that was born and died in 1917). Should the like a wave, from one to another, thus threatening the region’s Islamic-militant movements now threatening Uzbekistan make political constellation. propaganda and breakthroughs in To be sure, the population is southern Kazakhstan, the historical largely so concerned with obtain- city and region of Turkestan would ing the means to sustain physical exercise a strong pull on historically existence on a daily basis, that such informed social consciousness. This In the late twentieth century, it a threat is at present peripheral. region is the rich under-belly of became evident that regional However, this population will grow, Kazakhstan, and its demonstrated international systems may be become more educated, and de- popular disaffection would signal a organized around littorals (e.g., Asia- mand greater control over the cir- threat to the country’s political and Pacific Rim) as well as continentally. cumstances of their lives. Under- social integrity. It is probably the area The events of the last decade have ground Islamic-based education is ultimately targeted by the strategists shown the proliferation of this already being propagated through- among Islamic militants in the region. emergent characteristic of out the region by the Hizb-e Tahrir international politics. group. 6. CONCLUSION The failure of state-based integration may be compensated for by just such a kind of Continual low-level civil conflict is foreseeable, espe- transnational societal integration. We will not know until it cially given the impoverishment of populations throughout bursts out, seemingly unanticipated. If this occurs, it may the region. Kazakhstan should begin to experience economic take a generation, but the forerunner is already evident in growth in the near future, but it is not certain that this will the Ferghana Valley. The states in the region are largely trickle down to the society at large. The country suffers from unable to counter such a development on their own. Rather, such serious corruption that virtually none of the large World it is Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and perhaps Bank grants from the early 1990s, targeted at modernizing India and Turkey, whose interplay, not only in the geopoliti- the south’s irrigation system, actually reached the region. cal space but also in the issue-area space, will condition, but Kyrgyzstan, once seemingly on course to becoming a model not determine, the region’s future. The United States has of tolerant pluralism in the region, has succumbed to the until now abnegated a serious role, and Europe will be pre- ascendance of incentive structures grounded in the specific occupied with consolidating its enlargement for at least the interests of particular elite groups, coupled with increased next decade or two. Low-profile “private” and voluntary political intolerance, over a general sense of the common groups from the West, in for the long haul and operating at good that would be linked to more liberal lines of political the grass-roots level, may play a crucial palliative and inter- development. mediary role. Tajikistan is comparatively stable but has few hopes for significant economic development in the near future, and its security concerns are threatened now not only by the cru- ENDNOTES cible of the Ferghana Valley but also by the Taliban conquest of northern Afghanistan up to their common border. 1 Five of the eight most densely populated provinces in the Turkmenistan is politically stable, thanks to the iron fist of former Soviet area are in Uzbekistan, including the capital Turkmenbashi (“leader of the Turkmens”) President region Tashkent. The others are Andijan, Ferghana, Saparmurat Niyazov. On the economic side of things, how- Namangan, and Khorezm.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 11 2 Giffen, an American industrialist-turned-lobbyist/advisor now based in Almaty, is publicly reported, based on Swiss bank documents, to have possibly contravened U.S. law by playing a role that facilitating exactly such types of fund transfers to leading Kazakhstani politicians. 3 Karimov used the conflict in Tajikistan as an excuse to suppress domestic political opposition beginning in June 1992. He also cited other foreign developments, such as the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, to justify the suppression of political rights. 4 The Shanghai Forum includes Kazakhstan, Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Participants in CICA include these five, plus Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Paki- stan, India, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Palestinian administration. 5 However, the Pushtuns are not a majority of the population, they account for forty per cent of it. 6 “Sub-elites” are middle-level administrative and political personnel who transmit instructions from the higher, au- thoritative decision-making elite to the lower executive levels, and who report back to the former on the results of the latter’s implementation. 7 “Counter-elites” are elites who represent themselves as alternatives to the elite in power, whom they usually seek to replace. On infrequent occasion, a coherent and self-conscious sub-elite can, in the absence of actual counter-elites, itself act as a counter-elite and become the new ruling power. An example is in the April 1974 Portuguese overthrow of Salazar’s fascism, which had systematically prohibited all political opposition. There, a cohesive and repesentative collection of army majors and captains, long disenchanted with the regime’s unending colonial wars in Africa, proclaimed a National Junta of Salvation and the old regime collapsed without bloodshed. 8 Ethnic Kazakhs remained nomadic with traditional cultural structures until only a few decades ago, when Stalin collec- tivized their animal husbandry and forced them into fixed settlements.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 12 Winter 2001 ‘ASIAN VALUES’ AND THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CENTRAL ASIA

BY GREGORY GLEASON alues, not institutions, have played the determining role in the recent systemic transitions in Central Asian states of the post- communist world. In each of the five countries of Central Asia— Gregory Gleason is an associate professor of V political science and public administration at the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, University of New Mexico and a Fellow-in- political institutions of democratic government and market-oriented Residence of the J. Robert Oppenheimer Institute economies were adopted soon after these nations attained independence for Science and International Cooperation. in 1991. As these countries began the first stages of transition, the leaders of each of the Central Asian countries spoke out, at least on a rhe- torical level, in favor of the establishment of democratic institutions and secular government. Following independence, each of them adopted a constitutionally limited, representative form of government with a separation of powers and a legal and regulatory framework in accordance with international standards. For a brief period during the first stages of national consolidation, there was a widespread assumption in these countries and in the outside world that if the right democratic institutions could be transplanted to the fertile soils of post-communist reorganization, the processes of true democracy could be expected surely to follow. Today, nearly a decade after national independence, it is clear that the governments of Central Asia have indeed succeeded in adopting many of the structures of western style democracy. But they have not succeeded in the subtler yet more significant transition to the spirit and processes of true democracy. All of them have established legislatures, yet none has succeeded in establishing a true, deliberative legislature with powers of the purse. All of them have adopted judicial systems for adjudication and dispute resolution, yet none has succeeded in creating the conditions for true judicial independence. All of them have adopted constitutional and legal statutes that purport to safeguard the rights of individuals, minorities, and to protect due process of law, yet none has actually succeeded in providing functioning protections for fundamental civil and human rights, including such basic freedoms as the right to due process, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious belief. All the Central Asian countries now have “presidents.”1 But these are leaders who came from the former Soviet apparat or high rungs of the Soviet establishment. They have established what they refer to as “presidential systems,” which give the executive branch the power to rule by decree with the force of “constitutional law.” The executive branch of these governments dominates the other branches, undercut- ting the separation of powers and checks and balances. All of them have held elections, yet none of which has fully conformed to international standards for free and fair elections. Three of these governments have former communist leaders who have extended their mandate in extra-constitutional ways. Even in the most open and liberal of these countries—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the parliaments have been routed by presidential decree. In short, none of the countries can be said to have truly succeeded in making the transition from democratic structure to democratic function. As a consequence, many of the formal institutions of government have acquired a showcase quality. The formal institutions exist but it is Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 13 the informal institutions that actually guide the processes of not regard globalization and policy conformance as imply- policy decision-making. The legal and regulatory framework ing a need for internal democratic reforms, but rather view exists and purports to protect the rights of individuals and integration into the international community as requiring a legal entities, but in reality many critical public decisions are more intensified and directed role for the state in managing made on an ad hoc basis and with the interposition of indi- society and focusing the energies of the citizenry on the viduals whose interests are directly affected by the out- achievement of national goals. come. The existence of the formal institutions of democratic The Central Asians draw these conclusions not from governance creates expectations that the government can- traditions of political theory, but from the events taking place not realize, leading to disillusionment and cynicism. In such immediately around them. They point, first of all, to the con- a situation, it is, ironically, the least democratic of the lead- trast between the failed development strategy of the Rus- ers of the region who cynically take the greatest credit for sian Federation and what they see as a successful strategy in progress and reform. Turkmenistan’s president, Saparmurad China. The Russia strategy, as they understand it, was pre- Niyazov, has boasted that in Turkmenistan there are no vio- mised upon the interdependence of economic and political lations of civil liberties of the reform. The Chinese strategy as- government’s opponents because sumes that economic reform is best the government has no opponents. carried out under the watchful eye The experience of these coun- of a paternal and vigilant state. Only tries in the past decade raises im- When confronted with risk, after economic reform has created portant theoretical and urgent prac- confusion, and rapid change, Central prosperity, according to the latter, tical questions. What accounts for Asian societies, like other Asian can political reform be expected to the resilience of authoritarian prac- succeed. Central Asian leaders and tices in societies that have adopted societies, have the advantage of political strategists also point to the democratic, market oriented institu- having great historical and cultural success of the Asian Tigers in har- tions? What accounts for the yawn- depth on which to draw. nessing the capacities of the mod- ing divergence between structure ern, technological state to achieve and function? What public policy correctives are in order national objectives in ways that are consonant with their under these circumstances? What role can the good offices cultures. of outside institutions play in promoting democratic change The Central Asia states are currently experiencing a re- and reform? In addressing these questions, it is important to vival of “traditionalism,” which is visible throughout the begin by noting that, at least in the first decade of Central region in a variety of different forms. It is often expressed in Asian independence, values have played a more important public ceremonies and events designed to rekindle a sense role than institutions. of continuity with these countries’ historical achievements and glorious past. Late in 1998, Uzbekistan’s president, Is- GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM lam Karimov, was awarded the country’s newly established highest honor, the “Order of Emir Timur” in a public cer- Globalization—the transition to a single, tightly inte- emony that was designed to dramatize the cultural roots of grated, global economic and communication space—is trans- Uzbek society and to reinforce the government’s appeals forming public policy in the contemporary world. The evi- for discipline and dedication to national goals. dence is clear that globalization rewards those countries that The revival of traditionalism is also expressed in refer- practice it well, but punishes those countries that fail to con- ence to the wisdom of ancient cultural traditions and prac- form to international standards. Many countries adapting to tices. In Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan’s neighbor to the south, the challenges of globalization enjoy the rewards of pros- president Saparmurad Niyazov recently reintroduced genea- perity and technological progress, and find that their public logical descent as a criterion for public sector employment. institutions come under the influence of great forces for con- He defended this new criterion of advancement by arguing vergence and conformity. Major international institutions are that Turkministan should rely on “the experience of our an- now basing their strategies and policy prescriptions on the cestors, who chose their leaders, military commanders, and recognition that globalization requires policy harmonization judges from among the worthiest compatriots with high moral on a worldwide basis. In fact, many of the more important standards.”2 UN organizations have on an informal basis essentially adopted global policy harmonization as their institutional THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT PATH goal. But not everyone shares the view that globalization im- Central Asia’s search for traditions and values from the plies democratization, at least in the respect that it implies past invites comparisons with similar yearnings in some other the adoption of functioning western-style democratic insti- Asian societies. Anxieties created by the rapid pace of events tutions as a precondition for effective integration into the and technological change in the contemporary world some- international community. The political leadership of the times cannot be assuaged by the thin reassurances of mod- Central Asian states is clearly aware that the dominant in- ern cultural institutions. When confronted with risk, confu- ternational force at the beginning of the 21st century is glo- sion, and rapid change, Central Asian societies, like other balization. But these leaders tend to see globalization as a Asian societies, have the advantage of having great histori- state-empowering rather than state-limiting trend. They do cal and cultural depth on which to draw.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 14 Winter 2001 To many Asian thinkers, western theories born of the many Asian paths. One version that has gained a great deal rationalist ideas of the European enlightenment thinkers pro- of attention is the formula of Singapore associated with the vided a foundation for society and state that was bounded efforts of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Prime Minister from by this very rationality. The predominant western concep- 1959 – 1990 and now Senior Minister of State. In evaluat- tions of the state reflect shared assumptions of the western ing Singapore’s success, reference is often made to the fact world, rather than universal principles of human thought and that Singapore’s strategy was more than an economic model. behavior. Neoclassical economics champions the virtues of It looks to historical traditions that, in turn, provide a stable the individual and emphasizes the ideal of a relatively lim- guide to the future. The Confucian principles of filial piety ited state. The ideal state plays a restrained role in markets, that emphasize rule by persons of moral authority over the doing little more than providing a stable macroeconomic rule of law, paternalism over legalism, offer a unique ap- environment and a stable legal system that enforces private proach to the relationship between modern man and the property rights and contract law. This state operates inter- modern state. nally with reference to universalistic, rather than particular- Citing Asian values and historical experiences, East istic criteria. In order to assure that Asian leaders reject many of the government is responsive to a large conventional wisdoms of the neo- class of undifferentiated actors in classical approach. They maintained the polity, the state utilizes abstract that national development and and rule-bound, rather than discre- Asian thinkers who rejected this shared growth require executive in- tionary, methods for conducting minimalistic conception of the state tervention in the market. They break business. Precedents and rules and the individual’s role in society with conventional international prac- supplant personal preferences. Im- tice by fostering land reform, sig- personal codes provide prescrip- could refer to the more collectivist nificant investment in agriculture tions for behavior. traditions of state-led development. and rural infrastructure, conscious Asian thinkers that rejected industrial policy, encouragement of this minimalist conception of the state and the individual’s small- and medium-sized enterprises, and limits on inflation. role in society could refer to the more collectivist traditions The East Asian success stories often hold it as self-evident of state-led development. Marxist and socialist models of that subsidized and directed finance should be made avail- the state called upon societal mobilization and internal re- able to promote investment and infant industries. The suc- distribution for social benefit. But such strong-state poli- cess of the Asia’s Little Tigers provides a good empirical cies had many evident disadvantages. For instance, strong foundation for the claim that values matter in development government is often associated with populism, import sub- strategies. stitution, regulatory manipulation of markets, and unsus- The contrasts between the western and eastern models tainable redistributive goals. In many developing countries, exist in degree rather than in kind; but the differences are the paternalistic role of government in organizing and subsi- nonetheless significant in practice. The western model of dizing preferred industries could lead to direct social ben- political accommodation is based upon the assumption that efit, but it could also create avenues for rent seeking and the determination of individual rights is best played out in bribe taking. The experience of many developing countries an adversarial process of open contestation, brokered by has tended to confirm the general principle that without well- the rule of law and the near universal acceptance of the defined property rights and a rule-regulated market, importance of the process as opposed to the outcome. The clientelism, informal decision structures, and secrecy could sanctity of due process is much more important than any easily develop. single ruling or outcome. If the adversarial process is pro- The experience of many developing countries also il- tected, the defeated parties always have an opportunity— lustrates that governments often welcome state interven- and perhaps even an advantage—in returning to the con- tionist policies, which provide government leaders with ways test at a later point. The American business model relies to curry political support through constituency-building upon the preservation of impersonal, abstract legal rules to handouts and favors. Expanding the state’s economic role ensure even-handed, fair, and freewheeling competition. provide the government with resources to reward its sup- Contrast this approach to the more traditional Asian porters. Privileges can be distributed in the form of special practice. The Asian model conceives of politics as consist- interest legislation, tariff protection, price supports, and di- ing in the first instance of personal obligation and duty; busi- rect fiscal and financial transfers. But these handouts also ness relations depend in the first instance upon networks tend in the long run to create an anticipation of rent seeking and social obligations. The western model stresses laissez- and favoritism. The resulting patronage, nepotism, and cor- faire, open economics; the Asian one relies on national strat- ruption allow the state to be captured by narrow, private egies, and entails the government’s actively supervising, interest groups. Once captured, governments are unable to monitoring, and even regimenting the competitors. The cor- deliver policies that benefit the entire population nerstone of the former is individualism; that of the latter is The Asian experience developed against the back- loyalty. In the former, independence is expected and oppo- ground of these experiences and “models.” The Asian path sition is considered a challenge. In the latter, disagreement is different from other competing approaches in that it is is regarded as impolite and opposition treachery. synthetic—binding together the interests of the state, the society, the family, and the individual. There are of course

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 15 CENTRAL ASIAN TRADITIONS world’s poorest countries. The tiny economy is based largely on subsistence barter relations and foreign assistance from Are these contrasts applicable to Central Asian societ- donor organizations. ies? In addressing this question, it is important to note that The most heavily populated of these Central Asian re- there are many countries in Central Asia. The largest one is publics, Uzbekistan, quickly established itself as defiantly Kazakhstan. Its oil wealth, mixed Kazakh and Russian popu- nationalist after independence. Upon independence, lations, and the fact that it possessed over one thousand Uzbekistan’s strong-willed president, Islam Karimov, who, nuclear warheads in its territory when it gained indepen- only a few years before had been a dutiful communist, rap- dence were the defining features of its domestic political idly became an enthusiastic champion of an independent context during the initial years of independence. The political path and engineered the “Uzbek cultural renewal.” Kazakhstan communist party leader of the Soviet era, In ways reminiscent of the actions of Turkey’s Kemal Nursultan Nazarbaev—previously one of the most articu- Ataturk, Karimov sought to create a national identity forged late and progressive of the Soviet leaders—soon became a from an alchemy of history and myth, and based upon a vi- steadfast defender of an independent Kazakhstan. During sion of Uzbekistan’s playing a pivotal international role in the first years of his leadership, Nazarbaev pioneered the the 21st century. Government, economics, culture—the en- idea of Eurasian integration tire spectrum of policy arenas— based on the community of cul- was subsumed into the drive to tural and economic linkages shape the future in the image of a among the peoples of the Cen- “recovered” but largely apocry- tral Eurasian landmass. Upon independence, Uzbekistan’s phal past. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy fol- strong-willed president, Islam Karimov, The uncompromising nation- lowed a careful line, balancing who, only a few years before had been a alism of Uzbekistan, however, between China, Russia, and the pales in comparison with the west but always geared toward dutiful communist, rapidly became an policy posture of its southern Kazakhstan’s future oil and gas enthusiastic champion of an independent neighbor, Turkmenistan. development. political path and engineered the ‘Uzbek Turkmenistan is a small tribal civi- The most auspicious demo- cultural renewal.’ lization on the southern fringe of cratic reforms took place in the Central Asia. The area was largely small, remote, and mountainous country of Kyrgyzstan. undeveloped during the Soviet period. With the exception Largely thanks to the efforts of its president, Askar Akaev, of gas and oil, the minimal economic activity that existed Kyrgyzstan initially became the wunderkind of the interna- was largely maintained by Soviet government central subsi- tional donor community, attracting a disproportionately large dies. Industry unrelated to the gas and oil complex was gen- share of humanitarian and technical assistance from donor erally not commercially viable. For instance, the country’s organizations. Kyrgyzstan was the first post-Soviet state to specialization in cotton production was based upon mas- follow the advice of the international donor community and sive irrigation subsidies. When Soviet subsidies came to an withdrew from the ruble zone in 1993. It was also the first end, most of the non-subsistence agriculture and industry post-Soviet state to adopt a western style civil code, a mod- immediately became insolvent. Yet the country’s rich gas ern legal and regulatory framework, to liberalize prices, to reserves furnished support for an intense, highly personal- privatize industry, and to adopt at least the superficial trap- istic nationalism revolving around the country’s Soviet era pings of an open and competitive political system. communist party boss, Saparmurad Niyazov. Niyazov Kyrgyzstan was the first country of the Commonwealth of adopted an assertive posture of national self-reliance based Independent States (CIS) to join the World Trade Organiza- on its gas and oil wealth, which he termed the policy of tion. However, Kyrgyzstan’s limited resource endowment Turkmenistan’s “positive neutrality.” and trade dependence on the outside world—there is little International human rights organizations have been manufacturing in this small and remote mountainous state— highly critical of the Turkmenistan government for failing constrained its progress. Important political reforms took to make even minimal progress toward international stan- place, but the promised benefits of rising prosperity remained dards of policy and practice. The U.S. government and other elusive for most of the population. major world powers have been criticized for turning a blind The smallest and poorest of the Central Asian coun- eye to Turkmenistan’s record so as not to obstruct their goal tries is Tajikistan. Tajikistan would also likely have moved in of promoting the development of Turkmenistan’s immense the direction of reform if the country had not fallen prey to gas reserve. 3 However, Turkmenistan’s civil rights record an internal contest for power in the first year of indepen- has clearly had an effect upon the international community. dence. The contest plunged the country into civil war. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Tajikistan is a landlocked, mountainous country lacking good (EBRD), a highly diplomatic institution not given to grand- transportation routes. The war resulted in a blockade by its standing and histrionics, took the unusual step of suspend- neighbors, further compressing the already collapsing ing its lending programs to the Turkmenistan government in Tajikistan economy. The modest level of civil normality main- April 2000, citing its failure to make progress in governance tained in Tajikistan was largely a result of the presence of reforms.4 foreign (mainly Russian) peacekeeping forces. After a decade of independence, Tajikistan has become one of the

Harvard Asia Quarterly 16 Winter 2001 “Oriental despotism,” Karl Wittfogel argued that the necessity of managing a centralized irrigation system produced a socio-political organization which Wittfogel characterized as the “hydraulic society.”5 Wittfogel’s thesis was that unlike the individualistic political culture in many water-rich agrarian societies, semi-arid agricultural societies often required a high level of centralized decision making. The demands of the hydraulic society resulted in the formation of a “managerial state.” The economic, administrative, and political functions of the managerial state were concentrated in a ruling class consisting of land- owners, land managers, and THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN the military. The authoritarian culture is not merely a political value, Given the great variations among the Central Asian but a deeply ensconced social value. The most visible as- countries, only in superficial respects can they be described pect of the public culture of these countries is the great as having one culture. Generalizations seldom apply to all of importance associated with hurmat, the idea of “deference” them equally. Their peoples and cultures are varied, but in- or “respect.” In present day Uzbekistan, the origins of hurmat termixed. None of these countries ever existed within their are not hard to find. Hurmat begins in the family. Personal present borders prior to the Soviet period. Their statehood life is family life in Uzbekistan. Property is communal, the and borders are inventions of the Soviet regime. universally preferred Uzbek meal, palov (rice pilaf) is eaten At the heart of Central Asia lies the agricultural oases from a common bowl, elders are deferred to without ques- and irrigated farm valleys of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is the tion, and the subordinate position of women in society is largest Central Asian country in terms of population. It is reinforced through the family structure. Authority is a social the quintessential Central Asian phenomenon. country, defining the most impor- The hierarchies of political tant aspects of “Central Asian- life are merely a natural extension ness.” The Uzbeks emerged at the of the structures of the family. end of the 15th century from a het- The authoritarian culture is not merely a Public political values are diffi- erogeneous mix of inhabitants of political value, but a deeply ensconced cult to distinguish from family val- the region brought together by mili- social value. The most visible aspect of ues. The structure of authority is tary leaders. The Uzbek nation his- the public culture of these countries is emphatically patriarchal. In many torically was defined primarily by regions of Uzbekistan, the elder local, i.e. territorial and religious, the great importance associated with or most respected man is the head differences rather than what we hurmat, the idea of ‘deference’ or of the family. Grown adults often would today call ethnic differ- ‘respect’. will refrain from making important ences. During the Soviet period, professional or commercial deci- the Uzbek language was standardized around the Tashkent sions until they have had an opportunity to consult their dialect. Efforts were made to eliminate many of the tradi- parents. In the northern province of Tajikistan, the people tional clan and regional differences. refer to Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov, whom they The authoritarianism of the settled peoples of regarded as their protector in the Tajikistan civil war, as Uzbekistan has long been apparent to outsiders. Some schol- Islam-aka (Father Islam). ars have sought explanation for these cultural differences Given the importance of elders, funerals are very impor- by noting that the functions of regimentation and centraliza- tant political gatherings. When a respectable figure in the tion required by the nature of the irrigated oasis society community dies, an important social position is vacated. produced an effect on public psychology. In a famous al- Filling that position initiates a “vacancy chain” which influ- though now often dismissed interpretation of the origins of ences all positions of a lower order throughout the hierar-

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 17 chy in the community. Members of the community naturally cal—doctrine of the preeminence of individual rights. The gather at funerals to determine the reordering of the informal American beliefs in lateral management, citizen empower- authority structures. ment, horizontal authority structures, and incentives may A second aspect of Uzbekistan’s culture is personal- work in America, these Uzbek critics argue, but these beliefs ism. In Central Asia in general and in Uzbekistan in particu- cannot be expected to work a culture as accustomed to the lar, power is often vested in the person, not the post. The all- heavy hand of top-down management and hierarchical so- powerful local official, the Hakim, presides over a Hakimiat. cial structures as Uzbekistan. The terminology of European languages suggests that this practice may once have existed in European societies as well. For instance, the words we use for political structures DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS also have associated with them words for the person who fills the leadership position of that Judged by the benchmark structure. We have, for instance: criteria for measuring demo- Emperor—Empire, King—King- cratic progress used by Free- dom, Emir—Emirate, and even dom House (a U.S. based phil- Ambassador—Embassy. But the The failed transplantation of western anthropic research organization European terminology only sug- structures and institutions should lead the established in 1939), the Cen- gests the vestiges of the past. In promoters of democracy to the conclusion tral Asian societies have not re- contemporary society, we tend to that efforts to recreate the developing alized the full potential for demo- 7 think of “counties” as purely ad- world in the image of Europe and North cratic change. What does this ministrative structures, rarely lack of progress portend for bringing to mind the idea of a America is not likely to succeed, and may democracy’s future in Central “Count.” We think of the presi- provoke counterproductive repercussions. Asia? What do the features of dent, but probably few of us have Central Asian culture spell for ever contemplated the idea of attempts to promote democ- “Presidentia”, presumably an area over which a president racy? Does Uzbekistan’s personalism mean that it is futile to would preside. Steeped in liberal democratic traditions, we promote the organization of political parties? Does venera- tend to automatically distinguish between the post and the tion of traditions mean that it is inappropriate to urge the person who fills it. Some Central Asians find this distinction protection of the independence of the judiciary? Does the difficult to draw. strength of the family mean that individual civil rights are Today, Uzbekistan’s political leadership appeals to ele- not in need of legal protection? Does popular resignation in ments of Central Asian values while harkening back histori- the face of capricious use of political authority mean that cal and cultural traditions of a halcyon and glorious (and there is no need to assist the development of an indepen- largely fictitious) past. Uzbek President Karimov has be- dent deliberative assembly? No. None of these is true. What come an ardent advocate of Uzbek traditionalism. In his re- is true is that the structures and procedures of democracy cently published Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty do not constitute democracy itself. If democracy is to grow First Century, he argued:6 in Central Asia, it will grow from roots that already exist there. Our goal—as we outlined at the outset of the nine- There is growing recognition that the institutions of ties—was not to lose that which has been created democracy are not the sufficient conditions for democracy. with the labor of many generations, to keep all that The failed transplantation of western structures and institu- is best, to rearrange that which does not meet our tions should lead the promoters of democracy to the conclu- national interests and our independence and to en- sion that efforts to recreate the developing world in the im- rich the existing structures with new contents. The age of Europe and North America is not likely to succeed, rich culture of the Uzbek nation, its educational and may provoke counterproductive repercussions. Politi- system and its scientific establishment could not cians, always sensitive to the politically desired and oppor- be dismissed merely as the totalitarian heritage. The tune, are far better than scholars and analysts at recognizing course we have chosen is to reorient these systems this. President Jacques Chirac told an audience in Congo towards a new ideological platform based both on recently that “democracy is plural”, inviting them to develop the centuries old traditions, customs, culture and “in their countries and in their hearts a lively democracy in language of the Uzbek people, and on the achieve- the colors of Africa.”8 There is a growing recognition that ments of world civilization. democratic universalism is possible without institutional uniformity. Today Uzbekistan’s authoritarian leadership defends its The complexities of promoting democracy in cultures policies as being necessary to maintain social consensus so dramatically different from the European liberal traditions and political stability. It defends Uzbekistan’s neo-mercan- have convinced some people that democracy is not appro- tilism as based on indigenous Uzbek cultural traditions and priate for Central Asia. Some have observed that Central as following the successful model of the Asian Tigers. Asia is “not yet ready” for democracy, that Central Asia Uzbekistan’s spokesmen say that America values are based “will not see democracy in our lifetime.” Others have fallen on a revolutionary—that is, anti-imperial and anti-monarchi- back on more traditional arguments, maintaining that Ameri-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 18 Winter 2001 can assistance in the end should be related to American cumstances in May 1993, was the former first secretary of interests. America should help people help themselves, they the Tajikistan communist party. Among the Central Asian say, but it should do so when that also means helping presidents, only the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, America. does not belong to the former party nomenklatura although These arguments overlook a basic reality of the modern in some respects even Akaev, a physicist who was trained in world. Investment in democracy is not an investment in a Leningrad, can also be considered a member of the Soviet form of government at all. It is an investment in good gover- intellectual elite. nance. Without good government, no form of foreign assis- 2 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmen President Fires Scores of Offi- tance is likely to prove beneficial in the long run. The ratio- cials.” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (December 5, 2000). nale for promoting democracy is neither self-interest nor 3 Statement of Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commis- altruism. Malign dictators can just as easily appropriate for sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing on their own purposes the fruits of self-interested help as they Democratization and Human Rights in Turkmenistan, March can the fruits of genuine altruism. Good governance is good 21, 2000, Washington, DC. investment. 4 “EBRD Cuts Turkmen Loans, Slams Political System,” Reuters (18 April 2000). 5 Karl A.. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism New Haven: Yale ENDNOTES University Press, 1957. 6 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty 1 Nursultan Nazarbaev, now president of Kazakstan, is the First Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 112. former first secretary of the Kazakhstan republic communist 7 The Freedom House annual surveys measure progress party organization. Islam Karimov, now president of toward democratic ideals on a seven-point scale for political Uzbekistan, is the former first secretary of the Uzbekistan rights and for civil liberties (with 1 representing the most republic communist party organization. Saparmurad Niyazov, free and 7 the least free). Changes in countries’ scores from now president of Turkmenistan, is the former first secretary year to year are monitored via annual surveys. The political of the Turkmenistan republic communist party organization. rights measurement addresses the degree of free and fair Imomali Rahmonov, now president of Tajikistan, is a former elections, competitive political parties, opposition with an Kuliab region communist party official. His predecessor as important role and power, freedom from domination by a president, Rakhmon Nabiev who died under mysterious cir- powerful group (e.g. military, foreign power, totalitarian par-

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Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 19 Harvard Asia Quarterly 20 Winter 2001 THE POLITICS OF HISTORY IN TAJIKISTAN: REINVENTING THE SAMANIDS

BY KIRILL NOURZHANOV n 9 September 1999—the 8th anniversary of Tajikistan’s inde pendence—President Rahmonov opened an imposing memo Kirill Nourzhanov received his Ph.D. from the rial complex in the center of Dushanbe to commemorate the Australian National University in 1998 and is Oth 1,100 anniversary of the Samanid State. Its centerpiece is an 11-meter currently a Lecturer in the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) high statue of Amir Ismail Samanid (892 – 907), who is portrayed exit- at ANU. He has published widely on Central Asian ing a gilt arc while being guarded by two tamed lions. According to the history and politics. During 2000-2001, he acted vision of the creators of this monument, “the enlightened Amir is not as an adviser to the Government of Tajikistan on put on a high pedestal; on the contrary, he is placed as close as possible parliamentary reform. His book Tajikistan: The History of An Ethnic State will be published by to the people … His body, draped in a flying cloak, projects the idea of Hurst this year. moving forward. The noble arc … is a signpost, symbol, image of the nation”.1 The architectural composition also includes a museum-cum- pantheon of national dignitaries, fountains, a pedestrian esplanade, and three alleys: the Alley of the Presidents, the Alley of the Heroes of the State, and the Alley of the Stars of Poetry of the East. The entire ensemble is aptly called Vahdati Milli (National Unity), and, as the Mayor of Dushanbe explained, its inauguration “underscores the unity of the Tajik nation and all peoples living in Tajikistan, and is yet another testimony to the rallying of the people around the course conducted by the country’s leadership headed by the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmonov.”2 All governments use historical symbols and historiography to cultivate patriotism, explain and justify policies, and secure the acquies- cence and cooperation of the people in times of crises. Symbolic en- capsulation of the themes of regime legitimacy, common identity, and cultural revival through historical references is particularly crucial for emerging nations.3 The newly independent Central Asian countries present no exception from this pattern. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan has succintly summarized the views of the region’s leaders on the subject, “Historical memory, the restoration of an objective and truthful history of the nation and its territory is given an extremely important place in the revival and growth of national self-consciousness and national pride … The deeds and feats of great ancestors enliven historical memory, shape a new civil consciousness, and become a source of moral education and imitation.”4 However, as interpretation of the historical record invariably takes place under the patronage and vigilant control of the state, the restoration of “an objective and truthful history” across Central Asia has, with ruthless inevitability, acquired the form of a series of symbolic myths, which “must be told (compul- sively) again and afresh, and are differently gratifying and terrifying each time.”5 Moreover, historical narrative as a political phenomenon is less concerned with uncovering new or suppressed information, or providing a fresh angle on events in the bygone times based on professional scholarship, as it is with constructing a rounded, systematic, and uniform vision of the past. To paraphrase Robert William Davies, this is propaganda, as much as history.6 Because of the civil war and the ensuing fragility of the centralized state, the ruling elite of Tajikistan has been slow to develop a comprehensive ethno-historical paradigm with elaborate mythology, didactic

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 21 overlay, and a cohort of martyrs, prophets, and champions Abbasid caliphate, as a territorial empire, succumbed to cen- of the National Idea. However, the achievement of a sem- trifugal tendencies and succession disputes soon after the blance of stability and the beginning of the process of na- fabled Harun ar-Rashid died in 809. Yet it left a mighty tional reconciliation in 1997 provided an impetus and a ra- legacy, the Islamic civilization, which for centuries “was the tionale for movement in this direction. Rediscovery of the real centre of the ecumene, in contact (as Christianity was Samanids, which received official blessing by President not, until the sixteenth century) with all other major societ- Rahmonov in March 1997 and reached symbolic culmina- ies except, of course, those of America.”11 tion two and a half years later, has formed the foundation of Islam spread rapidly in Mawarannahr. The new religion the new official history in Tajikistan. was received mostly by popular acclaim, for it promised greater social mobility and created favourable conditions 1. THE SAMANIDS IN CENTRAL ASIA for trade. Islam provided the peoples of Central Asia with a spiritual and cultural bond and brought them closer to each In 1925, V.V. Bartold expressed the view that a period other as nothing had before. With Islam there came Ara- of more than one thousand years from Alexander the Great bic—not only the language of the Holy Quran and the to the advent of Islam passed almost unnoticed in terms of Abbasid court, but also the language of science and poetry state formation and political organization in Transoxiana.7 and the lingua franca of trade and diplomacy. It must also This opinion, which obviously did not fit the Marxist con- have stimulated the emergence of the Modern Persian lan- ception of linear political evolution, was severely criticized guage (Dari), in which the share of loan-words from Arabic by Soviet scholars. However, there is no doubt that at the fluctuated from ten percent in the vocabulary of Rudaki (9th time of the Arab invasion, the Central Asian lands were di- to10th centuries) to forty percent in the writings of Baihaqi vided among as many as twenty-seven petty princedoms.8 (11th century). All in all, “the volume of Arabic lexicon, its Their rulers did not enjoy absolute authority, as real power share in the vocabulary of the Dari language remained ex- lay with the members of the traditional landed aristocracy ceptionally high until the first quarter of the nineteenth cen- (the dihqans), who had fortified castles and small private tury.”12 armies at their disposal. In times of trouble, princes had lit- Based on the region’s general economic rise and the erally to grovel for help from their supposed vassals.9 The coexistence of and fruitful interaction between Arabic and whole picture bore a striking resem- Persian literatures, the newly blance to the post-Achaemenid pe- emerged ecumenical Islamic culture riod, where the political map of Cen- reached its zenith during the rule of tral Asia was changing kaleido- Historical narrative as a political the Samanid dynasty (875 - 999). scopically. phenomenon is less concerned with The Samanids, who originated from The Trans-Oxus principalities uncovering new or suppressed an old dihqan family in Khorasan, never formed a viable confederacy. information, or providing a fresh created a kingdom of their own On top of mutual mistrust and hos- angle on events in the bygone times which stretched from the Persian tility, religion and ethnicity created based on professional scholarship, as Gulf to India. The relatively stable fundamental divisions among local it is with constructing a rounded, domestic and international situa- communities. Such conditions of systematic, and uniform vision of tion allowed them to encourage disunion favoured the piecemeal the past. learning and the arts. However, cul- conquest of Transoxiana by the tural renaissance in Khorasan and Arabs. Beginning in 651 AD, the Mawarannahr commenced long be- Arabs organized periodic maraud- fore their ascendancy and contin- ing raids deep into the territory of ued after their demise until the Mawarannahr, but it was not until the appointment of Qutaiba Mongol invasion. Their centrality to this phenomenon has as Governor of Khorasan in 705 AD, during the reign of to be treated with caution: “Spiritual, intellectual and artistic Walid I, that the Caliphate adopted the policy of annexing life in the Samanid domains thrived, although it is impos- the lands beyond the Oxus. Ten years later the task of an- sible to isolate it from similar florescence in several other nexation was accomplished. parts of the Islamic world, beginning with the neighbouring The ascension of the Abbasids to rule the Caliphate (750 Khwarazm.”13 - 1258) opened a new era in the history of Central Asia. The Samanid Empire was the last time that the bulk of While their predecessors the Omaiyads (661 - 750) were Iranian lands became the domain of an Iranian ruler, in the little more than leaders of a loose confederation of Arab traditions of the Achaemenids and the Sasanians. The tribes, the Abbasids set out to build a huge multi-ethnic cen- Samanids were lucky to have carved a larger kingdom and tralized state that would emulate and perfect the Sasanian held it somewhat longer than other regional dynasties of Ira- government machine. They gave the Near East and nian extraction within the Caliphate; otherwise, they differed Transoxiana a unity, which they had been lacking since the little from the Saffarids or the Tahirids. Their base was still time of Alexander the Great. In the eighth century, “the enor- a clan, a small professional army, and a handful of big cit- mous expansion in trade brought about an explosion in the ies. Within the Samanid administration there was a discern- growth of cities and market towns everywhere ... The inter- ible ethno-religious division: an Iranian chancery, staffed nationalism of the age burst into full bloom, as commerce with recent converts par excellence, co-existed with the pre- and culture, hand-in-hand, flourished as never before.”10 The dominantly Arab ulama, while the core of the army con-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 22 Winter 2001 sisted of Turkic slaves or mercenaries. Given time, a coher- tity among Central Asian Iranians. A number of Tajik ex- ent society might have evolved behind the Samanid empire, perts adhere to a different theory which implies that the word but the attack of the Qarakhanid Turks ended its reign in ‘Tajik’ originated from the Persian ‘Taj’ (meaning ‘crown’) 999, and dominance in Mawarannahr passed on to Turkic and that as early as the eighth century, Iranians of rulers for nine centuries to come. Mawarannahr, especially in the mountainous areas, called themselves Tajiks, that is, the ‘Crown Headed’. By calling 2. THE PROBLEM OF ETHNOGENESIS OF THE TAJIKS UNDER THE themselves as such, these Iranians emphasized their supposed SAMANIDS superiority over all other local peoples.19 Another important element in the making of an ethnie Prior to independence, Tajik scholars generally sub- is an elaborate set of myths which explains the origins of a scribed to Barthold’s judgment that “The Samanids … might community in space and time, stresses the common fate of well be called the epoch of ‘enlightened absolutism’. The its members, and provides legitimation for its policies in monarchs did not carry out any drastic social reforms, but relation to other communities. Called mythomoteur by John strove to institute a firm rule and peace within their posses- Armstrong, it “sustains a polity and enables it to create an sions, to protect the lower classes from oppression, and to identity beyond that which can be imposed by force or pur- encourage the development of industry, trade and educa- chased by peace and prosperity.”20 The mythology of an tion.”14 The Samanids were treated as a quintessential ethnie finds its reflection in epic tradition. All ethnic groups ephemeral feudal empire, akin to the Saffarids or the of Aryan descent in Iran and Central Asia had practically Ghaznavids, whose track record in efficient governance was identical mythomoteurs until the late Middle Ages. The my- not impressive. Their special place in textbooks was based thologies were first codified in Avesta, then in Middle Per- on the claim that “the formation of the Tajik nation was com- sian literary monuments, for example, Yadkari Ardashir pleted during the rule of the Samanids.”15 Papakan, Ayatkar Zareran, Artavirnamak, and reached a In order to avoid the terminological quagmire associ- felicitous epitome in Ferdowsi’s Shahnama, circa 1011 A.D. ated with the usage of the value-laden concept of ‘nation’, it All major motifs and protagonists in Shahnama (as well as would be more appropriate to focus on the emergence of the in Iskandarnama, Darabnama, Jamaspnama, primary form of ethnic community—the ethnie, which, in Gushtaspnama and so on) are common for Tajiks and Irani- Anthony Smith’s characterization, is ans. There might have been local a given population, a social group deviations from the canon, such as “whose members share a sense of the autochthonal cults of Bibi common origins, claim a common Another important element in the Seshambe or White Div in the east- and distinctive history and destiny, making of an ethnie is an elaborate ern part of Tajikistan, but, gener- possess one or more distinctive set of myths which explains the ally, as late as the eleventh cen- characteristics, and feel a sense of origins of a community in space and tury, there existed a collective collective uniqueness and solidar- mythomoteur of Greater Iran, with 16 time, stresses the common fate of its ity.” In the case of the Tajiks, the members, and provides legitimation the struggle against the Turkic problem of collective cultural indi- for its policies in relation to other world (Ferdowsi’s Turan) as its piv- viduality put in historical perspec- communities. otal point. tive is twofold: (a) their distinctness The ideas of Shahnama con- from non-Iranian peoples of Central tinued to form the backbone of the Asia and (b) their dissociation with ‘state epos’ in Persia under the the peoples of Khorasan and Iran proper. Safavids. In contrast, the mythical tradition of Iranians in There can be little doubt about the existence of a potent Central Asia underwent a dramatic change by the second cleavage between Iranians and Turkic tribes at the time of half of the 16th century, as the Tajik epic poem Gurugli tes- Ismail Samani in Central Asia, complemented by religious tifies. Its very title is a replica of a cluster of Turkic folklore overtones: “The Samanids are also remembered … for the legends (Kørogly in Azerbaijan, Gørogly in Turkmenistan, jihad that they waged on the northeastern frontier of their Gorogly in Uzbekistan), as is its plot. Behind the figure of territories, in the Bilad al-Turk, the Turkestan of that pe- Avaz-khon, a fervent fighter, noble knight, and gifted com- riod.”17 The second part of the equation, i.e. the separation mander of the Iranian (forget the Turkic name!) Shah Gurugli, of the Tajiks from other Iranian peoples, poses greater prob- there is the historical character of Ayaz, a Turkic slave and lems. favourite of Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi (997 - 1030). However, The assumption of a collective, identifying name is one having acquired the plot from their Turkic neighbours, the of the most important attributes of a viable ethnic commu- Tajiks largely reiterated their own ancient epos on its basis. nity. Usage of the word ‘Tajik’ as an ethnonym was not reg- Gurugli has direct parallels with Shahnama’s Faridun and, istered before the second quarter of the 11th century.18 It unlike his Turkic counterparts, is more of a fair monarch than has been generally accepted among scholars that the term a pahlavan (a gallant and reckless warrior). Also, of course, was initially used in Mawarannahr to refer to the Arabs (it Gurugli is a poetic work and “several times as big” as the was probably derived from the Arab Tai tribal name). After- prosaic Azerbaijani original.21 wards, it became a collective name for both Arabs and local Language and religion are considered the most basic converts to Islam (predominantly Iranians), and only much traits of an ethnie’s shared culture. Under the Samanids, or- later was this term transformed into the ethnonym of an en- dinary people continued to speak local dialects (Soghdian,

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 23 Khorezmian, and so on), while Dari was primarily the lan- § the identification of historical injustices inflicted guage of official documents and court life, only beginning upon the Tajiks by extraneous forces (Arabs, Turks, to spread en masse in Bukhara, Samarkand, and Ferghana.22 Mongols, Uzbeks, Russians and the Soviets); Literary Modern Persian remained uniform in Western Iran § the justification of claims to specific territories (‘his- and Mawarannahr until the 15th or even 16th century.23 Simi- torical homeland’). larly, legal and educational systems based on shari’a stayed almost identical across pax Iranica. The sunni – shi’a di- History books made instant bestsellers. Bobojon chotomy was yet to become a watershed among different Ghafurov’s monumental work The Tajiks: Archaic, Ancient ethnic communities, and to find its reflection in Gurugli and Mediaeval History (1970), in which he claimed most of through the mediation of the Turkic text.24 the classical Persian canon for ‘Tajik culture’, was re-pub- According to Anthony Smith, “a strong sense of belong- lished in 1989 with a circulation of 60,000 copies. It quickly ing and an active solidarity, which in time of stress and dan- became the Bible of every Tajik intellectual. In 1989, 62 ger can override class, factional, or religious divisions within percent of tertiary students of the titular nationality had the the community”25 is the decisive factor for a durable ethnic book in their possession.27 Ghafurov gave rise to a whole community. This was not the case amongst Iranians in school of academics that propagated the notion of the Mawarannahr before, during and after the Samanid rule. civilizational superiority of the Tajiks and their Kulturträger Internal divisions in principalities, valley communities, or mission in Central Asia. Professor Rahim Masov, then the other territorial sub-units were more potent sources of iden- director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sci- tity than affiliation with an ethnie. Khuttal, Chaganian, ences of Tajikistan, insisted that “without the knowledge of Isfijab, Khorezm and princedoms of Badakhshan nominally the Tajik language, study of the cultural heritage of Turkic acknowledged the supremacy of the Samanids, yet in prac- peoples is impossible ... All pre-revolutionary spiritual cul- tice they “were ruled by local dynasties according to their ture of the peoples of Central Asia can be comprehended old traditions.”26 By the twelfth century, four distinct re- only with the assistance of the Tajik language.”28 gions had formed in the territory of Tajikistan that were Crucial to the formation of a new historical belief-sys- characterised by political and cultural autarchy: (1) North- tem was the direct association of modern-day Tajiks with ern Tokharistan and Khuttal; (2) the Zaravshon Valley; (3) the indigenous Aryan population of Central Asia. In some the basin of Upper and Middle Syr-Darya, including extreme cases, any new addition to the pristine Zoroastrian Ustrushana, Khujand, and Western Ferghana; and (4) the heritage of the Aryans, including Islam, was treated as un- Pamirs. With some variations, these specific cultural-geo- dermining the ethnic specificity of the Tajiks.29 However, graphic areas have survived until today. Prior to the Mongol the main source of grievances and misfortunes of the Tajik invasion, their populations never acted in unison to repel people was identified with the pernicious activities of a aggressors. Moreover, cases of mass resistance to aggres- readily recognizable ‘other’. For Masov, the history of Cen- sion were almost unheard of in Mawarannahr. tral Asia has been “the struggle of sedentary population In summary, it is difficult to single out a distinct Tajik against nomads, of the Iranian-speaking people who had ethnie in the 10th century. Central Asian Iranians remained achieved a high level of cultural development against boor- an integral part of a wider Iranian community that came into ish and ignorant Turco-Mongol tribes … [The latter] flooded being in the Achaemenid era and from which they drew their the greater part of Central Asia, pushing the indigenous popu- name, history, inspiration, and shared culture. However, the lation south and into the mountain gorges.”30 Turks in all Samanid period can be regarded as an important landmark guises—the Qarakhanids, the Chingizids, the Manghyts, in the process of the ethnogenesis of the Tajiks. It produced Uzbek Bolsheviks—were proclaimed the culprits behind the an encoded fund of myths, memories, values and symbols, Tajiks’ plight. The Russian conquerors of the 19th century the puissant core of the future ethnie in Tajikistan, which and Soviet leaders of the 20th century were denounced not showed remarkable resilience in the face of countless inva- so much for their own destructive policies, as for being aux- sions and eventually formed the backbone of the ‘Tajik So- iliary instruments in advancing the agenda of Turkicization viet nation’. in Central Asia.31 The new theorists of ethnic revival asserted that the 3. THE RISE OF NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY greatest sin committed by the Uzbeks vis-à-vis the Tajiks was to rob the latter of the heartland of their civilization— Gorbachev’s perestroika ushered in a period of unprec- Samarkand and Bukhara, and to assimilate the Tajik popu- edented nationalist mobilization in Central Asia, and with it lation remaining in Uzbekistan by force. Analysis of such came a new wave of reconsidering ‘official versions’ of the claims is beyond the scope of this work,32 but it is plausible past. As the Soviet Empire was losing its cohesion and eth- to suggest that the efforts of Tajik nationalist historians were nic conflicts were flaring one after another, professional his- at least partially inspired by the concurrent revision of historians, members of the intelligentsia, and politicians set out tory instigated by Tashkent. In 1987, an Uzbek historian went to activate and refresh the Tajik mythomoteur. Nationalist so far as to deny the Iranian presence in medieval historiography in the late 1980s and early 1990s was par- Mawarannahr altogether, maintaining that at the time of the ticularly concerned with the following issues: Samanids, the entire Central Asia, including Samarkand and Bukhara, was inhabited by Turks and that Arabic was the § the establishment of a unique Tajik identity based tongue of administration and learning, and “the ordinary, on a long and distinguished pre-history; conversational language was the language of various Turkic

Harvard Asia Quarterly 24 Winter 2001 tribes.”33 formed the core of a book with the same title, which carried a Teaching materials used in Tajikistan in the early 1990s meaningful sub-heading: “Teaching methodology for sec- suggest that a radical and comprehensive reassessment of ondary, secondary-vocational, and high schools.”40 It be- the Samanids had not yet occurred. This dynasty continued came clear that the wheels of the symbol-making factory to be treated, in a Marxist tradition, as an object, not subject were rotating again. of history. Ismail Samanid and his successors were still pic- Using simple yet powerful language, Rahmonov postu- tured as feudal overlords lated the following axioms for whose empire was con- public consumption:41 stantly weakened by the conflict between the ruler § the Tajiks were the and the ruled.34 Nonethe- Political stabilization and prospects of national original inhabitants of Central less, such leaders were be- reconciliation compelled Rahmonov’s regime to Asia, renowned for their “wis- ginning to acquire additional substantiate its legitimacy symbolically, through dom, love for freedom, export symbolic significance in the historical narratives, school textbooks, holidays, of knowledge, dignity, and mythology of restoring the dramas, and monuments that would be understood pure unblemished lifestyle,” greatness of the Tajiks and accepted if not by the bulk of the population, who shared the fruits of civi- within a particular historical then at least by the majority of the elites. lization with all the latecom- terrain. Shortly after inde- ers in the region; pendence, academician § the words ‘Tajik’ and Numan Negmatov wrote, “Ethnic-territorial nucleus of the ‘Aryan’ are synonyms. ‘Iranian’ also means ‘Aryan’, but Tajik ethnos’ formation within the boundaries of the Samanid only in the context of modernity; State … does not coincide with the territory of the present- § the Tajiks had to fight war— but those were of day Republic of Tajikistan, which is now the bearer of the purely defensive nature, reflecting the eternal struggle to ethnic name of the people and the nation. This logically protect their sublime culture and pure language from ag- necessitates the usage of the term of ‘Historical Tajikistan’ gressors (Arabs, Turks, etc.); to designate the ethno-cultural and historical habitat of the § the Tajiks had reached withering heights of sover- Tajik people in the past.”35 eign statehood prior to the Mongol invasion, from which There was but one step from ‘Historical Tajikistan’ of they never recovered; the Samanids to ‘Greater Tajikistan’ of today. However, a § the Great October Socialist Revolution gave the special reading of history based upon ethnic myths of de- Tajik statehood a second life. Soviet rule, despite the mas- scent and continuity did not result in an articulated program sive injustice of the national delimitation, was beneficial for of nation-building. In May 1992, the country slipped into the rise of Tajik culture and self-awareness; the abyss of a five-year civil conflict. Regional elites in- § the independence gained in 1991 was a precious volved in the confrontation began to develop local histo- gift that became hijacked by “power-hungry political ad- ries, justifying the cultural (and hence political) supremacy venturers, demagogues and careerists supported by external of Khujandis, Gharmis, or Hissoris over other groups of forces that detested the existence of an independent and sov- Tajiks.36 Kulobis, who had won in the civil war, were par- ereign Tajikistan.” ticularly active in glorifying ‘the pure land of Khatlon’.37 Upon the initiative of President Emomali Rahmonov, the The ethnic mythology of foundation, chosenness, home- 680th anniversary of Mir Sayyed Ali Hamadani, a Sufi writer land, trauma, and redemption received a tremendous boost; and philosopher who allegedly had been buried near Kulob, what was lacking was the all-important account of the Golden was celebrated as a national holiday in Tajikistan in Sep- Age. In the words of Anthony Smith, “the ideal of a golden tember 1994.38 age is not simply a form of escapism or consolation for Political stabilization and prospects of national recon- present tribulations. For later generations, the standards of ciliation compelled Rahmonov’s regime to substantiate its golden ages come to define the normative character of the legitimacy symbolically, through historical narratives, school evolving community. They define what is, and what is not to textbooks, holidays, dramas, and monuments that would be be admired and emulated … They define an ideal, which is understood and accepted if not by the bulk of the popula- not so much to be resurrected … as to be recreated in mod- tion, then at least by the majority of the elites. This time ern times.”42 around, the Samanids proved to be an ideal choice for a In March 1997, addressing an assembly of Tajik intelli- comprehensive ethno-historical reconstruction. gentsia, Rahmonov singled out the Samanid state as the one in which “the lofty tree of Tajik civilization flourished, 4. REINTERPRETING THE SAMANIDS bloomed and bore splendid fruit across Central Asia and the Middle East.”43 He added that the Tajik government had “Collective memory is plastic, but its reshaping is usu- asked UNESCO to proclaim 1999 as the Year of the Samanids, ally not produced by an arbitrary dictate from above.”39 and he called the literati to revitalize historical memory, par- President Rahmonov begged to disagree. On August 17, ticularly reflected in the “sagacity of statehood and spiritual 1996, he published an article headlined, “The Tajiks in the greatness of our forefathers.”44 Mirror of History,” that outlined a new philosophy of his- The message was heeded, and the next two and a half tory to undergird the nation-(re)building project. The article years witnessed a steady stream of works dedicated to the

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 25 Samanids and their relevance to polity and society today. Tajikistan; Abdulov’s usage of modern political science cli- The historicists’ task was made easier by the fact that events ches makes the resemblance most uncanny:49 during their reign are fairly well documented (not least in the works of the famous Ghaznavid chronicler Abu’l-Fazl § the Samanids “mobilized the masses using ideals al-Baihaqi, who openly admired this aristocratic dynasty45 ). of common good” and “strengthened the technical-material Had Rahmonov selected the semi-legendary Keyanids for basis of the country”; an ‘heroic age’ of the Tajiks, the blending of real figures § their success derived from a synthesis of secular and occurrences with idealization and hyperbolization in a and religious civilizational modes; they harnessed traditions convincing and palatable narrative would have been next to of many religions, particularly Islam, but pre-Islamic creeds impossible. as well; § the Samanids invested in agriculture, “on which THE SAMANIDS AS GATHERERS AND PROTECTORS OF THE TAJIK basis light and food industry progressed rapidly”; HOMELAND § the dynasty concerned itself with the advancement of education, science and technology; the court had “utmost In a break with the previous interpretation, the Samanids respect for creative people and the intelligentsia.” are now treated as being qualita- tively different from the preceding Less palatable aspects of the and succeeding dynasties of Iranian Samanid belle epoque, such as in- extraction. They are not mere re- tra-dynastic struggle, incessant gional dynasts preoccupied with It does not matter what title a ruler feudal squabbles, devastating personal survival and exploitation carries -- Amir, General Secretary, or peasant revolts, and ruthless sup- of local populations. They are im- President -- so long as this ruler is a pression of the Ismaili sect under bued with the ‘Tajik Idea’, and all true Father of the Nation, who takes Nuh ibn-Nasr Samanid (943-954) are their conquests and territorial acqui- care of his people as if they were all carefully ignored. The Tajik Golden sitions are regarded as a mission to members of one big family. Age is linked to the virtuous con- bring unity, prosperity, and security duct of the rulers, which derives to the ancient Aryan land: “The from the patrimonial nature of Tajik Samanid epoch is comparable to European Renaissance in society. Says President Emomali Rahmonov, “We can talk a its significance to the Tajik people. It was marked by a string lot about the epoch of the Samanid state and find historical of important historical and cultural processes, the most sa- parallels or note its distinctive features, but the most impor- lient of which were: the completion of the formation of the tant thing to take into account is the ancient tradition of unified Tajik people; the wide proliferation of literary Farsi- statehood, which we must recreate at full scale. The key Dari-Tajik; and the emergence of the first centralised state of concept here is ‘kadkhuda’50 … The revitalization of the the Tajik people, which assembled practically all territories state tradition of kadkhuda is topical today.”51 The implica- populated by the Tajiks.”46 tions are clear. It does not matter what title a ruler carries— The Samanids are juxtaposed with the Buyids—an Ira- Amir, General Secretary, or President—so long as this ruler nian dynasty, which successfully challenged the Abbasids at is a true Father of the Nation, who takes care of his people as the time of Nasr b Ahmad Samanid (914-944). Unlike the if they were all members of one big family. It is no coinci- Samanids, the Buyids are considered to be selfish empire- dence that neo-patrimonial historical discourse in Tajikistan builders, who, although reviving the old Iranian title of unfolds parallel to the general discussion on the importance Shahanshah, “completely succumbed to the influence of the of preserving traditional family values in Tajik society.52 Arabic language.”47 The idea of the ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’ of the Samanids, which is popularized in speeches by HEROES OF THE AGE Tajik leaders today, runs contrary to the official line of the 1996 vintage, when it was maintained that “harmonious na- The Golden Age is a time of heroes, people whose tional development has nothing to do … with the struggle thoughts and deeds can inspire admiration and hope amongst for the nation’s ‘purity’.”48 their enfeebled descendants, and whose virtuous example A special connection is established between the may show the ways to remedy contemporary decay. Heroes Samanids and the sacred Tajik sites of Bukhara and mirror “the best of the community’s traditions, its authentic Samarkand. Ismail Samanid’s apocryphic phrase ‘So long voice in the moment of its first flowering, so sadly silent as I live, I am the wall of Bukhara’ is reproduced on any today.”53 opportune occasion. The figure of Ismail Samanid had been in the focus of nationalist historians for some time before 1996, by virtue THE SAMANID STATE AS A MODEL POLITY of his being the real founder of the dynasty’s grandeur. He was singled out as a “fair, law-abiding, enlightened, clever, The Samanid Golden Age is praised as a time of social politically astute, and militarily capable”54 Amir. However, harmony, efficient governance, and dynamic development. this was not enough for the creation of an icon. President Professor Karim Abdulov has been particularly succinct in Rahmonov has taken the lead in discovering additional per- producing a schematic picture of the Samanid state that is sonal qualities of the Amir that would account for the efflo- congruent with Rahmonov’s vision for a strong independent rescence of the medieval pax Ariana, “Ismoil ibn Ahmad

Harvard Asia Quarterly 26 Winter 2001 Somoni was an outstanding, wise, and sage politician. Hav- canon after centuries of its being under the Manghyt yoke. ing studied contemporary sciences, he honed his skills of Bobojan Ghafurov, who served as the First Secretary of the running the state from childhood … The young Amir lis- Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan be- tened to the demands of the people and overcame the exist- tween 1946 and 1956, is regarded as a patriot who stood up ing difficulties through iron will and power of the mind, which to Moscow and Tashkent in the noble cause of advancing earned him love and respect of the people.”55 These charac- his republic’s culture and composed the first comprehen- teristics are general enough to be easily transposed on sive history of his people. Throughout 1999, celebrations of today’s leaders of Tajikistan. the 1100th anniversary of the Samanid state were accompa- Ismail Samanid is endowed with superhuman abilities. nied by laudations for Aini and Ghafurov. They received He is hailed as a patron-saint of Bukhara, who even after posthumous awards of the title of the Hero of Tajikistan, and death continues to look after its Tajik-speaking residents. both gained the privilege of being represented in the mu- Timur Pulatov, a famous bilingual Bukharian writer, has ex- seum underneath the statue of Ismail Samanid. plored miraculous properties of the Amir’s mausoleum in Bukhara and lamented the oppressed position of Tajiks, EXPLAINING THE DECAY “Ismail Samanid is the only entity in Bukhara which one can address in Tajik and receive a reply Academician Ghafurov has left in the same language … a succinct and devastating account Turkicisation of the beyond has not of the demise of the Samanids:59 eventuated … I shall never forget one scene: an old Bukharian was re- Any reference to social unrest that Class antagonism, as well as penting, talking to Ismail Samanid, runs contrary to the myth of class the struggle between feudal asking for forgiveness, because he, harmony under the Samanids is being lords and central government, the Tajik, had allowed the police to expunged. the quarrels between the write ‘Uzbek’ in the ‘nationality’ Samanids and their Turk gen- graph in his passport. This had been erals, endless intrigues be- done to all hereditary Tajiks by force, without exception.”56 tween representatives of the court and diwan offi- There is a whole pantheon of cultural heroes who owe cials—all these shattered the Samanid state and their existence to the fact that “the Samanids saw in the sci- led to a situation where by the end of the 10th cen- entific and creative activity an important mechanism of per- tury its might had left but a dream … The Samanids fecting society and elevating culture.”57 A tourist brochure, couldn’t fend off external aggressors. The popu- written in fractured English and distributed by Tajikistan lace of Mawarannahr which groaned under heavy Airlines in 1998, had a section ‘Great Tajik Men’, which taxation and had rebelled in the past, did not hurry informed foreigners, “There are a few places in the world, to their defence. And the Turkic guard which re- which gave birth to so many great scientists and poets, tal- mained the only pillar of the throne did not have a ented artists and architects as did the lands of Persian-Tajik proper rear and was not in a position to parry the people.” The list of ‘Great Tajik Men’ included, amongst enemy’s thrust. others, encyclopaedists and philosophers al-Khorazmi, al- Farabi, al-Razi, ibn Sina and al-Biruni, alongside poets At present, this classic viewpoint is being thoroughly Rudaki, Daqiqi and Ferdowsi. While the tussle for the pos- reconsidered and refocused. Any reference to social unrest session of the brilliant minds of the Islamicate has a long that runs contrary to the myth of class harmony under the history in Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations, the new cycle of Samanids is being expunged. All other factors are verbal- exclusionist cultural appropriation by Dushanbe has caused ized in such manner as to make them equally applicable to an angry response even in Kazakstan. Taking exception to the recent civil war in independent Tajikistan. This concerns Rahmonov’s characterisation of al-Farabi as a ‘glorious son the state of disunity in the ruling elite first and foremost: “A of the Tajik people’, one commentator wrote, “Rahmonov thousand years ago, just like during the events of 1991 and has spat on the national sentiments of the Kazaks (and not 1992, appanage (udelnye) rulers of Tajik regions, profit-seek- only them) … We don’t want to demonstrate the same arro- ing intriguers and religious demagogues rose against the gance stemming from the overflowing feeling of national central government for the sake of greater power, rank and superiority. Maybe, Farabi is a Turk. Maybe a Tajik. But, position.”60 Accusations against the treacherous role of the perhaps, he is neither Turk nor Tajik, but Arab, as it is writ- Muslim establishment form a novel development in reading ten in Western reference books. In any event, he was born the history of the Samanids. Their intensity and scope vary on the territory of today’s Kazakstan … And now his name according to the current political moment, ranging from blan- is one of the symbols of the Republic of Kazakstan.”58 ket indictments of the ‘reactionary Islamic clergy’ as a class The continuity of the great Tajik cultural tradition is (Rahim Masov) to criticisms of the “anti-national and sedi- stressed by the promotion of the ‘Ferdowsi – Aini – tious activities of some religious groupings.”61 Ghafurov’ triad as the valiant champions of Tajik literature Another new motif that contributes to the explanation and history. Abulqosim Ferdowsi is credited with codifying of the ignominious end of the Samanids is that of the loss of the entire cultural fund of pre-Samanid Aryans in the heroic traditional spiritual values, the diminished vigilance, the epic Shahnama. Sadriddin Aini (1878-1954) is celebrated as weakening of discipline, and the excessive luxury and out- the classic writer of modern Tajik literature who revived the right debauchery which enabled barbarian Turks to defeat

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 27 civilized Tajiks. “Turks and women interfered in the busi- to the nascent personality cult of President Rahmonov. ness of government, which led to the emasculation and de- Tajikistan is still at a fair distance from the full-blown cay of the Samanids.”62 sultanistic regimes of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and even Kazakstan, but there are signs of the excessive adulation 5. WILL EMOMALI RAHMONOV BECOME THE ISMAIL SAMANID and personification of power in that country.65 OF TODAY? It is hard to ascertain what effect the campaign to reinvent the Samanids has had on the people of Tajikistan. New The reconstructed history of the Samanid dynasty has myths take time to settle, and it seems that the high point of a dual didactic value for Tajik polity. First, it provides ex- symbolic output was reached in 1999, when scores of streets amples of ethnic authenticity and regeneration that are tran- were renamed, the Peak of Communism in the Pamirs became scendental in the Tajik community, the Peak of Ismail Samanid, the Or- and second, it produces concrete der of his name was established, recipes for stability and prosperity. and several high-profile confer- Unity, tolerance, cultural synthesis, ences, symposia and lavish theat- non-aggressiveness, and emphasis The reconstructed history of the rical productions were organised. on human development are touted Samanid dynasty has a dual didactic The only event of any symbolic as both innate features of the Tajik value for Tajik polity. First, it import in 2000 has been the intro- ethnie and hallmarks of successful provides examples of ethnic duction of a new currency unit government policies. When Presi- authenticity and regeneration that are called somoni. It seems that there dent Rahmonov delivers his vision transcendental in the Tajik is simply not enough money in the of the Samanids, he wants the audi- community, and second, it produces state coffers to sustain the pro- ence to build instant associations concrete recipes for stability and cess.66 At the same time, Rahim with his own regime, “In this mighty prosperity. Masov—an academic who has state representatives of many nation- turned into a politician and a close alities lived together; everybody’s rights were protected. ally of President Rahmonov, continues to argue that “who Plurality of opinion was cherished … The Samanids … wisely controls the past, controls the future”,67 which promises joined together and used in state administration spiritual new interesting developments in Tajikistan’s post-commu- norms of Islam with Aryan heritage … And today we are nist historiography. convinced that a multitude of views, and coexistence of various creeds in sovereign Tajikistan will facilitate the development of a secular democratic state and will assist the triumph ENDNOTES of peace and concord on our ancient land.”63 If an ideal construct based not so much on facts as on symbolically 1 S. Yusufdzhanov, R. Mukimov, A. Hakimov, “Drevnie i appealing and psychologically convincing myths is repeated novye pamiatniki Tadzhikistana.” Arkhitektura, stroitelstvo, with due consistency and reaches out to a sufficiently wide dizain. No. 3, 2000, p. 32. strata of the community, it may well evolve into a powerful 2 Sadoi Mardum, 10 September 1999. legitimising tool for the regime. 3 See, for example, Lisa Anderson, “Legitimacy, Identity, Objectively, Tajik society, which came close to irrepa- and the Writing of History in Lybia.” In Eric Davis and Nicolas rable fragmentation between in 1992 and 1997, is in dire Gavrielides, eds. Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Histori- need of potent national symbols. It appears that the Samanids cal Memory, and Popular Culture. Miami: Florida Interna- represent a uniquely suitable signpost in the Tajiks’ collec- tional University Press, 1991, pp. 71-91, on Libya; Andrew tive memory, and reconstruction of their history will serve Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the1990s: A Minority the cause of national reconciliation and unification. At the Faith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, on same time, this process is fraught with several possible dan- Ukraine; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian gers. Nation. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University First of all, ethnic mobilization based on historical pre- Press, 1994, on Georgia. cedent may result in the renewal of territorial claims. Presi- 4 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty- dent Rahmonov makes a special effort to refute such specu- First Century. Challenges to Stability and Progress. New lations.64 However, this did not prevent him from planting a York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 86-87. Similar pronounce- capsule with the ‘sacred soil of Bukhara’ in the innards of ments can be found in works by President Nazarbaev of Ismail Samanid’s monument in Dushanbe. Second, monopoly Kazakstan (N.A. Nazarbaev, Evraziiskii soiuz: idei, praktika, on ethno-historical ‘truth’ is conducive to monopoly on po- perspektivy, 1994-1997. Moscow: Fond sodeistviia razvitiiu litical power. Currently, the regime strictly controls the pro- sotsialnykh i politicheskikh nauk, 1997, esp. pp. 197-217), cess of rewriting history, to the extent that in October 1998 President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan (A. Akaev. Otkrovennyi a presidential decree was adopted which prohibited the us- razgovor. Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 1998), and age of unauthorised images of Ismail Samanid on the terri- Turkmenbashi (S.A. Niyazov. “Turkmenistan – tory of Tajikistan. The officially prescribed portrait of the voskhodiashchaia zvezda v sozvezdii mirovogo Amir bears certain resemblance to President Rahmonov, soobshchestva.” Turkmenskaia iskra, 7 November 1992). which contributes to fears of the third unwelcomed ramifi- 5 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture. London and cation of the drive to glorify the Samanids: it may contribute New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 77. For excellent critical analy-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 28 Winter 2001 ses of political historical projects in Kazakstan and Irfon, 1991, pp. 16-17. Uzbekistan, see Azamat Sarsembayev, “Imagined Communi- 29 Davlat Khudonazarov, a presidential candidate in 1992, ties: Kazak Nationalism and Kazakification in the 1990s.” offered the following interpretation of the advent of Islam to Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1999, pp. 319-346; John Mawarannahr: “Iranian peoples - the Tajiks’ ancestors - had Schoeberlein-Engel, “The Prospects for Uzbek National Iden- possessed the highest culture and beautiful religion prior to tity.” Central Asia Monitor, No. 2, 1996, pp. 12-20. the Islamic conquest; Islamisation led to slowing down and 6 R.W. Davies, Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era. Basingstoke: almost complete halting of social progress, destruction and Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 219. decay of culture.” (Quoted in S. Olimova, M. Olimov, 7 V.V. Bartold, Sochineniia. Vol. II, Part 1, Moscow: Izdatelstvo “Obrazovannyi klass Tadzhikistana v peripetiiakh XXv.” vostochnoi literatury, 1963, p. 117. Vostok, No. 5, 1991, p. 101.) 8 H.A.R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia. New 30 Rahim Masov, “Vvedenie.” In R.M. Masov, ed., Rossiia v York: AMS Press, 1970, p. 8. istoricheskikh sudbakh tadzhikskogo naroda. Dushanbe: 9 IU. Yakubov, Pargar v VII - VIII vekakh nashei ery. Sharqi Ozod, 1998, pp. 6-7. Dushanbe: Donish, 1979, p. 41. 31 The Program of the Union of Democratic Youth Bokhtar 10 Christopher Beckwith, “Tibet and the Early Medieval (1990) exposed a long-term ‘conspiracy’ between the Uzbeks Florissance in Eurasia. A Preliminary Note on the Economic and Moscow to tame ‘pure’ Mountain Tajiks: “Politics in History of the Tibetan Empire.” Central Asiatic Journal, vol. Tajikistan is all about the struggle between two varieties of XXI, No. 2, 1977, pp. 93-94. Tajiks - the Northern and the mountain ones ... They [North- 11 John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism. Chapel erners] are essentially Uzbeks in half-Tajik skins who have Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 56. been planting pan-Turkism in Tajikistan for 70 years, trying 12 L.N. Kiseleva, Iazyk Dari Afganistana. Moscow: Nauka, to transform Tajiks into Uzbeks ... Being at the helm, they 1985, p. 40. have cardinally changed our native Persian language, they 13 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cam- have bred hatred towards Iranians and Tajiks of Afghani- bridge University Press, 2000, p. 75. stan, they have maintained the cult of the Uzbek tongue. But 14 V.V. Barthold, Four Studies On the History of Central Asia. they have achieved nothing, only stirred the wrath and fury Vol. I, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1956, p. 70. For a concise account of of the Mountain Tajiks.” (Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Central Asian historiography under Soviet rule, see Graham Tadzhikistane. Moscow: TSIMO, 1990, pp. 64-65.) Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr and Ed- 32 See R.R. Rahimov, “K voprosu o sovremennykh ward Allworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Border- tadzhiksko-uzbekskikh mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniiakh.” lands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, Ch. 4. Sovetskaia etnografiia, No. 1, January-February 1991, pp. 15 B.G. Ghafurov, Tojikon. Ta’rikhi qadimtarin, qadim va 13-24; Richard Foltz, “Uzbekistan’s Tajiks: A Case of Re- asri miyona. Vol. 1, Dushanbe: Irfon, 1983, p. 494. pressed Identity?” Central Asia Monitor, No. 6, 1996, pp. 17- 16 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cam- 19. bridge University Press, 1981, p. 66. 33 G.A. Abdurakhmanov, “The Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek 17 Soucek, op. cit., p. 75. People and the Formation of the Uzbek Language.” In 18 Abu al-Fazl Baihaki, Istoriia Mas’uda 1030 - 1041. Bakhtiyar A. Nazarov and Denis Sinor, eds., Essays on Uzbek Tashkent: Izdatelstvo AN Uzbekskoi SSR: , 1962, p. 725. History, Culture, and Language. Bloomington: Research In- 19 For a very detailed and informative discussion, see an stitute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1993, p. article by the classic of modern Tajik literature: Sadriddin 3. Aini, “Ma’na-ye kalema-ye Tajik.” In Mirza Shukuzadeh, ed., 34 Programma fakultativnykh zaniatii po istorii Tadzhikskoi Tajikan dar masir-e ta’rikh. Tehran: Al-Hada, 1373 Y.H., pp. SSR ‘Geroicheskoe proshloe tadzhikskogo naroda’. 13-44. Dushanbe: Maorif, 1990, pp. 13-14. 20 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 293. 35 N. Negmatov, Tadzhiki. Istoricheskii Tadzhikistan. 21 H. K. Korogly, Vzaimosviazi eposa narodov Srednei Azii, Sovremennyi Tadzhikistan. [No publisher]: Gissar, 1992, p. Irana i Azerbaidzhana. Moscow: Nauka, 1983, p. 179. 23. Emphasis in the original text. 22 David Christian. A History of Russia, Central Asia and 36 Cf. a peculiar Khujandi hagiography, which claims that Mongolia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, p. 322. Khujand is the oldest surviving city on the planet, going 23 Sadriddin Aini, Vospominaniia. Moscow-Leningrad: back 8,400 years. (Orifjon Yahyozodi Khujandi, Izdatelstvo AN SSSR, 1960, p. 963. Khujandnoma, yo qissaho az ta’rikhi Khujand va 24 G.M.H. Shoolbraid, The Oral Epic of Siberia and Central khujandiyon. [No publisher]: Khujand, 1994). Hissor was Asia. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1975, hailed as the repositary of pure Tajik culture, customs, and p. 103. traditions in Sh. Abdulloev, A. Mardonova, R. Jum’aev, M. 25 Anthony D. Smith. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New Zabarova, E. Dustov, Dar justujui farhangi vodii Hisor. York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987, p. 137. Dushanbe: Manu’gohi ta’rikhi-ma’danii Hisor, 1992. 26 N.N. Negmatov, Gosudarstvo Samanidov. Dushanbe: 37 See, for example, Muzaffar Azizi, “Chun sabza umedi Donish, 1977, p. 30. bardamidan budi.” Daryo, No. 2, 1994, pp. 14-15. 27 Vuzovskaia molodezh: mirovozzrencheskie i tsennostnye 38 Rahmonov called Hamadani “one of the historical sign- orientatsii. Vypusk 1. Dushanbe: Izdatelstvo TGU, 1990, p. posts of the human civilisation” and proposed him as a role 29. model for future generations, citing his versatile knowledge, 28 Rahim Masov, Istoriia topornogo razdeleniia. Dushanbe: stoical ethics, and moral integrity. (Emomali Rahmonov.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 29 Tojikiston: chahor soli istiqloliyat va khudshinosi. 60 Rahim Masov, Tadzhiki: istoriia s grifom ‘sovershenno Dushanbe: Irfon, 1995, pp. 154-155.) Prior to Rahmonov’s sekretno’. Dushanbe: Paivand, 1995, p. 125. eulogy, Ali ibn Shihab ad-din bin Mohammad al-Hamadani 61 E.Sh. Rahmonov, “Tadzhikskaia gosudarstvennost’: ot had been primarily associated with the definitive establish- Samanidov do rubezha XXI veka.” 1999. http:// ment of Islam in Kashmir between 1372 and 1383, when he tadjembs.newmail.ru/tajgosud.htm (8 September 2000). expedited a migration of 700 Sufis fleeing from Timur to that 62 Zabeulloh Safo, “Oli Somon.” Bahori Ajam, No. 1, June territory. (J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam. 1998, p. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 57.) 63 E.Sh. Rahmonov, “Tadzhikskaia gosudarstvennost’: ot 39 Jerzy Jedlicki, “Historical Memory As a Source of Con- Samanidov do rubezha XXI veka.” 1999. http:// flicts in Eastern Europe.” Communist and Post-Communist tadjembs.newmail.ru/tajgosud.htm (8 September 2000). Studies, No. 32, 1999, p. 229. 64 “The idea of celebrating in 1999 of the 1100th anniversary 40 Emomali Rahmonov. Tojikon dar oinai ta’rikh. Dushanbe: of the creation of the Samanid state was right from the start Irfon, 1997. aimed at overcoming regional cleavages [inside Tajikistan] 41 Ibid., pp. 4-11. and does not contain any historical or political claims within 42 Anthony D. Smith. Myths and Memories of the Nation. Central Asia … Emomali Rahmonov has particularly Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 263. emphasised that political geography of the past ought not 43 Jumhuriyat, 20 March 1997. to determine the realities of today.” (An excerpt from an 44 Ibid. unsolicited article penned by Rahmonov’s advisor and pub- 45 See Marilyn Robinson Waldman, Toward a Theory of His- lished in Moscow. Segodnya, 11 November 1997.) torical Narrative. A Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Histori- 65 A high-profile politician, a member of the Commission on ography. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980. National Reconciliation, wrote in 1998 that under the stew- 46 Viktor Dubovitskii, “Gosudarstvu Samanidov – 1100 let.” ardship of Rahmonov “the new renaissance of the civilisation In Tadzhikistan – 2000. Dushanbe: Asia-Plus, 1999, p. 7. and statehood of the Tajik nation has commenced.” 47 Emomali Rahmonov. “Tysiacha let v odnu zhizn’.” (Haftganj, No. 9 (11) 1998, p. 4.) Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 August 1999. 66 The expenditure on the Vahdati Milli complex alone must 48 K.N. Abdullaev, “Etnichnost’ i prava cheloveka v have been backbreaking. The exact amount is not known, kontekste sovremennogo etapa razvitiia.” In The First Tajik but a manager of the construction site said in an interview Society Forum, Dushanbe: UNDP, 1996, p. 27. that he had to budget monthly payments of 400 – 450 million 49 Karim Abdulov, “Unsurhoi davlati dunyavi dar davlatdorii Tajik roubles a month to contractors and workers, for the Somoniyon.” Charkhi gardun, No. 31 (103), 7 August 1998, duration of a year. Put together, these figures amount to 3.5 p. 5. – 3.9% of the total government spending budgeted for 1998. 50 ‘Kadkhuda’ in modern Persian literally means ‘village head- (Adabiyot va san’at, NO. 15-16 (940) 1998, P. 3.) man’. ‘Kad’ refers to an extended family; Barthold explains 67 Vechernii Dushanbe, 7 August 1998. that “initially, the term kadkhuda was linked to the notion of power over families and offspring; in the Muslim era an ideal kadkhuda was considered to be a caring lord. In this sense, a monarch is called ‘kadkhuda of the world’.” (Bartold, op. cit., p. 209.) 51 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 August 1999. 52 Cf. an article by the First Deputy Speaker of the Tajik Parliament, Abdulmajid Dostiev, entitled ‘The Purity of So- ciety Begins with the Purity of the Family.’ (“Pokizagii jomea az pokizagii oila oghoz meshavad.” Adabiyot va san’at, No. 17-18 (942), 1998, pp. 1-2.) 53 Smith, 1999, op. cit., p. 66 54 Saidi Sa’di, Mukhtasari ta’rikhi siyosii Tojikoni Afghoniston. Dushanbe: Intishoroti Oli Somon, 1995, p. 18. 55 E.Sh. Rahmonov. “Tadzhikskaia gosudarstvennost’: ot Samanidov do rubezha XXI veka.” 1999. http:// tadjembs.newmail.ru/tajgosud.htm (8 September 2000). 56 Timur Pulatov, “Chala – sostoianie dushi.” Nash sovremennik, No. 3, 1998, pp. 286-287. 57 S. Sulaimoni, “Knigi vremen Samanidov.” Narodnaia gazeta, 7 August 1998, p. 3. 58 D. Naiman, “Amerikantsy i Tsentralnaia Aziia v inter’ere aktualnoi mirovoi politiki.” Navigator, 1 August 2000. http:/ /www.navigator.kz/articles/polit010800a.shtml (2 November 2000). 59 B.G. Gafurov, Tadzhiki: drevneishaia, drevniaia i srednevekovaia istoriia. Vol. II. Dushanbe: Irfon, 1989, p. 58.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 30 Winter 2001 FROM TAMERLANE TO TERRORISM: THE SHIFTING BASIS OF UZBEK FOREIGN POLICY

n the morning of February 16, 1999, a massive car bomb ex BY WILLIAM D. SHINGLETON & JOHN ploded less than 200 meters away from Uzbekistan’s President McCONNELL OIslam Karimov’s motorcade as it approached Independence Square in central Tashkent. Simultaneously, five other bombs detonated William D. Shingleton was a U.S. delegate to the at key points around the Uzbek capital, killing 16 people and July 1999 “Six plus Two” talks in Tashkent. He is injuring 124. currently a Senior Fellow at the National Defense Council Foundation (NDCF) in Alexandria, Virginia. Karimov quickly blamed Islamic militants for the bombings, threatening to “cut off their hands.” The bombings led to thousands of ar- John McConnell is a Research Analyst at NDCF. rests, ending a period of reform that some diplomats called the ‘Tashkent Spring’. The bombings also forced Karimov to change the focus of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy from one of ideology-based nationalism to one of combating Islamic extremism. This change in foreign policy ori- entation has profound implications for Uzbekistan’s 24 million people, and also for a Russia determined to dominate Central Asia and a West interested in the region for its rich natural resources.

IDEOLOGY

Upon attaching independence in 1991, the Karimov regime decided to build national self-awareness through nationalism. The Karimov regime promoted the veneration of figures from Uzbekistan’s past, particularly the 14th century conqueror Tamerlane. In seizing the mantle of Tamerlane’s heir, Karimov justified a resurgence of Tamerlane’s authoritarianism and aggressiveness. Claiming that “peace and stability are our most important accom- plishments”, the regime worked to create a discourse based upon the ideas of national strength and stability. When that discourse was made to look hollow by the bombings, Karimov’s foreign policy was shaken to its foundations. Uzbekistan’s relationships with three key sets of countries—“greater Uzbekistan”, other regional powers, and the West— changed radically as counter-terrorism replaced nationalism as Tashkent’s main objective.

IN SEARCH OF “GREATER UZBEKISTAN”

Ethnic Uzbeks are spread throughout Central Asia, with particularly large diaspora populations in neighboring Tajikistan and Afghani- stan. For Uzbekistan, protection of this diaspora was a critical component of nationalist ideology, which held that Uzbeks as a people were regaining their rightful place internationally. Tashkent acted to protect ethnic Uzbeks, in the process ignoring Tajikistani and Afghanistani sovereignty. Nationalist Uzbek scholars supported this outlook by claiming that the Tajiks were just Uzbeks who had forgotten their mother tongue. Even today, Uzbek diplomats claim that Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are “one nation speaking two languages”. After Tajikistan’s government was overthrown in 1992 by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Tashkent worked to put into power Immoli Rahmonov, a former Soviet bureaucrat whom it was thought would be

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 31 amenable to Uzbek interests. However, Rahmonov soon Kazakstan, and Turkey, had similar aspirations to regional turned on Tajikistan’s ethnic Uzbek population, thereby elic- leadership, Uzbekistan’s ideology was a recipe for tension. iting a second round of Uzbek interventions. Two incursions Uzbekistan moved in recent years to separate itself from from Uzbek territory in 1997 and 1998 respectively failed Russia. In 1991, Russia was Uzbekistan’s largest trading part- to oust Rahmonov. ner, the ruble was Uzbekistan’s official currency, and Rus- In Afghanistan, Uzbekistan supported the ethnic Uzbek sian troops patrolled Uzbekistan’s borders. By 2000, warlord Rashid Dustum. After the mujahedin, who ousted Uzbekistan’s new currency and import-substituting policies the Soviets, began to fight each other, Uzbekistan supplied cut trade with Russia to only 15% of total trade turnover. Dustum military and logistical as- Moreover, Uzbekistan is the only sistance. When the ethnic Pathan Central Asian nation which is not Taliban overran opposition forces host to Russian troops. In February from 1995-1997, Uzbekistan broad- 1999, Uzbekistan announced that it ened its assistance to include the Tashkent chafed at Turkish would drop out of the Common- members of the so-called Northern chauvinism, while Turkey wealth of Independent States Col- Alliance, a coalition of Uzbek and increasingly tried to portray itself as lective Security Treaty—a major Tajik militias. slap on the face of Russia, for whom But Uzbekistan’s interven- the ‘elder brother’ to the Turkish the treaty is a vehicle by which it tionism would come back to haunt peoples of Central Asia. can intervene in former Soviet Karimov. The UTO and later the states. Indeed, when Tashkent was Taliban welcomed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan bombed just days after Uzbekistan dropped out of the Treaty, (IMU), a militia dedicated to establishing an Islamic state in many speculated that Moscow was responsible. Uzbekistan. According to the Uzbek government, the perpe- Uzbekistan’s pretensions to regional leadership particu- trators of the February bombings were recruited, trained, larly grated on Kazakstan, an oil-rich state that inherited and equipped in UTO and Taliban-held territory. Since the Soviet nuclear weapons. With Central Asia’s second-larg- bombings, the prime concern of the Uzbek government has est population and more political experience than Karimov, beenRahmonov neutralizing initially these bases.resisted pressuring the UTO to give Kazak President Nazarbaev has had a tumultous relation- up IMU members. By the spring of 1999, Karimov and ship with Karimov. At times, the relationship has degener- Rahmonov apparently cut a deal whereby Uzbekistan would ated into petty conflicts, for example, Karimov’s refusal to stop supporting the insurgents in exchange for Tajikistan’s sign on to proposals made by Nazarbaev, and vice versa, expelling the IMU. Rumors of this deal sparked an aborted and if Nazarbaev wins an award, Karimov has to win the IMU invasion of Uzbekistan in mid-1999. Tajikistan report- same award, and so on. edly expelled the forces of the IMU to Afghanistan in late Many Western observers initially hoped that Turkey 1999. However, Rahmonov’s animosity toward Karimov re- would replace Russia as the region’s dominant power. How- mained. When the IMU launched another invasion in the ever, tensions between Uzbek and Turkish nationalists summer of 2000, Tashkent was incredulous when Rahmonov quickly soured the bilateral relationship. Turks aroused ten- denied involvement in the invasion. “Where did they come sions by calling the Uzbek language mispronounced Turk- from?” asked Uzbek Ambassador to Washington Sodyq ish, and undertook actions that led Uzbeks to believe that Safaev, “the moon?” Turkey simply sought to replace Russia. Tashkent chafed at Uzbekistan’s relations with the Taliban mirror those with Turkish chauvinism, while Turkey increasingly tried to por- Tajikistan. Karimov’s warm treatment of the Taliban del- tray itself as the ‘elder brother’ to the Turkic peoples of egation during the July 1999 ‘Six plus Two’ peace talks in Central Asia. When the Islamist Refah party came to power Tashkent sparked rumors that Karimov would recognize the in Turkey, it ended any hope of cooperation with the secular Taliban. In reality, Tashkent began secret contacts with the Karimov regime. Taliban, sending Foreign Minister Kamilov to visit the In the post-bombing era, Uzbek relations with the re- Taliban’s Qandahar headquarters. The rapprochement ac- gional powers increasingly depend on the willingness of these celerated in September 2000 when the Taliban captured powers to help Karimov hunt down his opponents. For ex- Taloqan, severing the Northern Alliance’s supply lines. In ample, when Putin traveled to Tashkent after becoming presi- October, Karimov publicly renounced his prior condemna- dent, Karimov commented that Uzbekistan sees “in Russia tion of the Taliban, saying that they pose no threat to the a country, a power, which together with us is capable of re- region. Later that month, Uzbekistan agreed to an exchange sisting the expansion of international terrorism and religious of high-level delegations and opened the border, re-igniting extremism.” Moscow, which claims that the perpetrators of speculations that a terrorist-for-recognition deal was in the apartment bombings in Russia are connected to the Tashkent works. attack, warmed to the Karimov regime, arresting Uzbek fu- gitives in Russia and providing Tashkent with security as- UZBEKISTAN AND REGIONAL POWERS sistance. Uzbekistan’s relations with Kazakstan also improved. According to Uzbek state ideology, Tashkent claimed The Uzbeks and Kazaks participated in a joint raid on a that the Uzbek nation was finally taking its rightful place as radical Islamic training camp in Kazakstan, and the Kazaks the heirs of Tamerlane, and as such should be the leader of donated ammunition and other supplies to a Tajik-Uzbek- Central Asia. Since neighboring states, particularly Russia, Kyrgyz effort against the IMU. However, Uzbek-Kazak re- Harvard Asia Quarterly 32 Winter 2001 lations continue to be tense. In January 2000, Uzbekistan Uzbekistan to break from the ideological underpinnings of unilaterally demarcated a disputed mutual border. Nonethe- its foreign policy — testimony to the relatively peaceful less, compared with the situation in 1998, relations are dra- security environment that initially followed the collapse of matically improved. the Soviet Union. But as the security environment has be- By contrast, Uzbekistan’s relations with Turkey dete- come less stable, and as Uzbekistan is forced to deal with riorated because of Ankara’s resistance to Tashkent’s hunt threats ranging from narcotics traffickers to terrorists, for opponents. Uzbekistan recalled its students from Turk- Tashkent had to change its world outlook to survive. ish universities and closed Turkish-run schools in The result is that the days of easy Western influence Uzbekistan. In turn, Ankara recalled over Tashkent are gone. Accusa- its ambassador from Tashkent in tions over Uzbekistan’s human mid-1999. Moreover, Turkey invited rights record are more likely to sour Muhammed Solikh, the alleged mas- the bilateral relationship than to termind of the bombings, to the 1999 In 1998, Uzbekistan’s UN delegation provide relief for dissidents. In con- Organization for Security and Co- trailed only Micronesia and Israel in trast, cooperation on counter-ter- operation in Europe (OSCE) summit voting with the United States 90.9% rorism can open doors outside the in Istanbul. Since Ankara’s support security sphere. American-Uzbek for Solikh and other dissidents is of the time. relations recently warmed because rooted in domestic Turkish politics, the Secretary of State, CIA Direc- Turkey and Uzbekistan seem to be tor, and other security officials vis- on a permanent collision course. ited Tashkent to deliver counter-terrorism assistance. The U.S. recently designated the IMU as a terrorist group. Like it UZBEKISTAN AND THE WEST or not, it is this help with counter-terrorism that must be the cornerstone of relations with Uzbekistan in the post-bomb- Recognition by the West was critical to the idea that ing era. Uzbekistan was taking its place in the first rank of sovereign nations. Uzbekistan quickly joined a series of Western organizations, including the OSCE, the United Nations, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. In 1998, Uzbekistan’s UN delegation trailed only Micronesia and Israel in voting with the United States 90.9% of the time. In a bizarre 1996 incident, Uzbekistan’s UN delegation even cast an unautho- rized vote against the UN General Assembly’s annual con- demnation of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. Uzbekistan also hosted an OSCE summit on human rights after U.S. diplomats warned that Uzbekistan’s human rights record was pre- venting a summit with President Clinton. Uzbekistan chafed at Western criticism of its post-bombing crackdown. Ambassador Safaev indirectly criticized Western pressure on human rights when he commented that “Russia supports all means of action against terrorists and does not lecture us on how to do it.” Currently, Uzbek diplomats often reply to Western criticism of its human rights records by claiming that the West ignores the rights of the bombing victims. A sharp exchange between Foreign Min- ister Kamilov and Western delegates at the OSCE in July 1999 is indicative of the current relationship. After being questioned about the beating of human rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, Kamilov not only responded that Ardzinov was lying, but assailed the OSCE Secretariat for not sending a condolence message in response to the February bombings.

CONCLUSION

Uzbekistan is not unique among nations in its attempt to downplay ideology in its foreign relations. After the Rus- sian civil war in 1919-1921, the Soviets decided to build “socialism in one country” at the expense of global revolution. The war with Iraq forced Iran to accept arms from the United States, which it had previously decried as “Great Sa- tan.” What is remarkable is that it took eight years for

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 33 ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA: A NEW BEGINNING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY?

BY DAPHNE BILIOURI he democratization process that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has transformed the existing economic order and political system within the five Central Asian republics. This Daphne Biliouri is an environmental policy T consultant and analyst for Eurasia. She is currently past decade, newly elected Central Asian heads of state have had to based in the UK and is working on a variety of deal with economic challenges, the collapse of social welfare systems, projects in the Central Asian region. She can be high levels of corruption, and, most importantly, a damaged environment contacted at [email protected]. and a non-existent environmental protection record. However, despite these daunting problems, the new aura of independence, along with the assistance of the international community has brought the hope of political stability and economic prosperity. Unfortunately, the recent elections in Kazakhstan in 1999 and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2000 have reinforced the authoritarian hold that the existing presidents have on their people and increased Western concern over undemocratic practices, including manipulated electoral processes in the region. Criticism from the west, with the US at the forefront, has intensified during the recent regional parliamentary and presidential elections. The dream pursued by the US and large international organizations, such as the OSCE, envisaged a Central Asia with a thriving free market economy, a strong civil society, and an extensive democratic regime. Many perceive that this vision can be realized with the assistance of foreign aid and the inclusion of international donor agencies in the national and regional strategy of the Central Asian states. Yet, despite these international perceptions, there is growing concern from within the region that the republics are following the wrong path of development. Furthermore, much of the Central Asian leadership believes that double standards are being set with respect to how each individual state is being dealt with by the international community. On the one hand, states like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, with an abundance of natural resources in the Caspian Basin, have attracted the business interest of the US and other western states, who have shown eagerness to ensure that democratization and modernization of the political and economic climate occurs. On the other hand, because they have little to offer in return, states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are battling to attract much- needed foreign investment. Based on this division, it can be argued that the west is ready to turn a blind eye to many of the undemocratic tendencies expressed by Kazakh President Nazarbayev, while Kyrgyz President Akayev’s re-election faced a disproportionate amount of criticism from the international community. Based on this predicament, the following sections will address the current state of national environmental policy in the Central Asian states after recent elections.

KAZAKHSTAN

While the new political regime allowed the development of political ties with states that could provide Kazakhstan with modern environmental technologies, know-how, and advanced environmental legislation and policy, the same ‘donor’ states have been prioritizing

Harvard Asia Quarterly 34 Winter 2001 their economic interests above environmental protection. In leading to below average, freezing winters and summers January 1999, Nazarbayev was re-elected president in a where temperatures can soar to well over 40ºC. All of this landslide victory. Based on the Law on the First President has subsequently taken its toll on human health. of Kazakhstan passed in June 2000, Nazarbayev has been The Caspian Sea has also attracted the attention of the granted powers for life. After the parliamentary elections in international community for over a decade partly due to its November 1999, the new government established a National large deposits of oil and gas, and partly because it is the Security Strategy effective until 2005 covering the military, breeding ground for sturgeon, the source of caviar. Oil drill- economic, political, social, environmental, and public ing and growing pollution (due to industrial and toxic waste sectors. The new government hopes to maintain balanced released from the river Volga) has led to the steady decline economic development by enhancing the reform process and of the production of sturgeon. More importantly, the dis- increasing foreign investment in the form of “solid covery of major oil deposits in the northern Caspian will investors”. Nazarbayev is an lead to heavy exploitation and de- authoritarian ruler who is not afraid velopment of the area with poten- to crack down when he feels it tially serious environmental con- necessary. His model is that of a sequences. Efforts to ensure envi- prosperous Asian state, expanding The Caspian Sea has also attracted ronmental protection of the economically while remaining the attention of the international Caspian are dependent on the le- politically stable. Nazarbayev has community for over a decade partly gal status of the Sea. As long as professed admiration for South debates continue over the division Korea and Singapore, both of which due to its large deposits of oil and of the Caspian amongst the littoral followed authoritarian styles of gas, and partly because it is the states, measures on ecological se- government. While repression is not breeding ground for sturgeon, the curity will not likely be taken any- as great as in other Central Asian source of caviar. time soon. The escalating pollution states, such as Uzbekistan and of the Caspian Sea has had a dev- Turkmenistan, it appears as though astating effect upon its ecology, Kazakhstan will remain authoritarian throughout the as reflected by the dwindling numbers of seal and fish. For foreseeable future. example, in September 2000, eight tons of dead fish were After the elections in 1999, Nazarbayev has continued retrieved from a lake near Petropavlovsk—they had been to pursue a reformist approach regarding environmental poisoned by a chemical used as a weed killer in cotton pro- legislation. Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had duction. to cope with a destructive environmental legacy left by the USSR while at the same time pursuing an economic policy UZBEKISTAN based on increased natural resource exploitation. Radioactive and toxic chemical sites associated with former defense Due to an abundance of natural resources and industries and test ranges are found throughout the country environmental issues in common with Kazakhstan, such as and pose serious health risks. The nuclear site of the Aral Sea and water distribution, Uzbekistan faces similar Semipalatinsk is one of the largest threats to the environment. problems. President Karimov’s re-election in early 2000 Over the years, it has attracted the interest of the international indicated that despite the people’s concern that he was community, and gradually, efforts have been taken to responsible for the economic crisis facing their country, he minimize the environmental threat that it poses. However, is perceived as the lesser of two evils. In an attempt to offset the issue of nuclear and toxic waste remains a problem, as a discontent, Karimov has called for the development of a growing number of radioactive materials are being sold and stronger national ideology in order to cope with internal transported to other countries. changes. He therefore prioritized areas such as the With reference to particular environmental problems, it achievement of a multiparty climate, battling of corruption is worth expanding on the situation in two areas of growing in public life, the freedom of the media, the facilitation of national and international interest: the Aral Sea and the NGO operations, and the continued integration of Uzbekistan Caspian Sea. The Aral Sea is fed by the Amu Darya and the into the international community. Meanwhile, in an effort to Syr Darya rivers, which pass desert areas that have been ensure the democratic nature of his government, Karimov turned into irrigated farmland. In the 1950s and 1960s, signed a decree on legal reform aimed at enshrining massive schemes to bring water to rice and cotton crops were individual, social, political, and economic rights. However, put in place to divert most of the fresh river waters feeding reform will be gradual without radical, immediate change. the Aral Sea. Only 10 per cent of the water that once fed the His style of governance resembles the old-guard communist Aral now reaches it, now bringing with it large amounts of approach with the government being highly centralized pesticides and other chemicals. As a result, the Aral, once around the president and a small circle of advisers and the fourth largest inland sea, has lost over half its surface officials. area since 1960 and continues to shrink. It is estimated that Regarding environmental issues, the biggest problem if immediate measures are not taken to control the drying of facing Uzbekistan has been the drying up of the Aral Sea the Aral Sea, it will disappear by 2025. Islands have formed caused by poor water management over an extended period. and the sea has split into several separate water bodies. The The large amounts of salt and dust that are blown from the loss of this body of water has also changed the climate, exposed seabed have caused health hazards for the

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 35 surrounding population, extending as far as the Pamir 1998, operating mainly in the areas of education, women’s Mountains. International efforts have commenced, but the issues, and the environment. Environmental NGOs have been implementation of concrete measures is still not evident. created with the assistance of grants from international bodies Apart from the loss of water supplies, remaining water and have demonstrated the potential for effective work, resources are also faced with increasing levels of pollution particularly in their efforts to change people’s attitude from agricultural chemicals and industrial waste carried to towards environmental problems. Needless to say, NGOs the Aral Sea via the river network. In an effort to battle the are also faced with a long list of problems, such as the lack negative effects of the disappearance of the Aral Sea, the of dissemination of information and cooperation between government has implemented and supported the Aral Sea existing interest groups, causing duplication of efforts Programme, aiming to address long term water and land use amongst NGOs and competition for external financial management problems of the region while providing, on a support. short term basis, support towards the immediate needs of In reference to specific environmental issues, the main the populations within the worst effected areas. Kyrgyz concern has been the poorly maintained water reservoirs—a legacy from the Soviet KYRGYZSTAN period—that have contaminated the water supply, spreading waterborne Kyrgyzstan, unlike the other diseases that affect the health of the Central Asia states addressed The main Kyrgyz concern has been entire population. Additionally, the above, has insignificant reserves the poorly maintained water lack of protected areas and the of natural resources and is highly reservoirs -- a legacy from the Soviet increasing levels of illegal hunting dependent on its neighbours for and trading of endangered species its energy supply. It is, however, period -- that have contaminated the along with deforestation have led an upstream country, allowing it to water supply, spreading waterborne to the loss of bio-diversity. develop its use of water resources diseases that affect the health of the However, the incident that most for the development of entire population. attracted the interest of the hydroelectricity. Currently, international community was the hydroelectricity meets one fourth of the country’s energy cyanide spill in Lake Issyk-Kul in May 1998. Caused by an needs, though estimates say more can be generated with the accident involving a truck carrying sodium cyanide for the proper infrastructure and economic assistance. Kumtor gold mine, the spill led to the poisoning of 2,500 The political climate that prevails in the country has people. Similar accidents have taken place and continue to characterized this small and fairly poor state—in comparison occur without receiving the appropriate publicity or to its neighbours—as an ‘island of democracy’ within the governmental attention. Central Asian region. Over the past decade, President Akayev has demonstrated signs of progressive leadership, and REGIONAL APPROACH although the reforms that have been implemented over the years were more on paper rather than in real terms, Akayev Overall, what these brief overviews of the Central Asian is likely to continue with these reforms. Akayev’s victory states indicates is that despite a relatively diverse economic during the course of the 2000 presidential elections conducted and political stance, they all have become increasingly aware in October was tarnished by reports of widespread election of the importance of incorporating environmental strategy violations. The OSCE, the US and the European Union were within the realm of economic development. They have all quick to criticize the undemocratic nature of the elections established, or are in the process of establishing, a National and question the liberalism that Akayev had shown so far, Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) for environmental as he himself has started to question the democratic process. protection. Kazakhstan has been in the lead with a plan for Despite this, following his electoral victory, President sustainable development introduced as a priority in the Akayev addressed the nation calling for “fundamental” government’s Development Strategy while its NEAP has reform of the state administration system to allow for further been widely publicized and integrated in the social and political and economic development. He stated that at least economic reform process. The NEAP has set four priority 30 per cent of all civil servant jobs would be cut to fight sectors: creation of a safe environment, balanced use of incompetence and corruption. Furthermore, Akayev noted natural resources, conservation of bio-diversity, and that he plans to introduce a system of local self-government environmental education. The NEAP is envisaged to develop with more power and funding going to local authorities. in four stages: 1998-2000; 2001-2010; 2011-2020; and 2021- This factor is of particular importance to the 2030. development of a plausible environmental strategy, as the Uzbekistan is also currently preparing, with the status of the existing governmental agencies for assistance of the World Bank, a NEAP. Major components environmental protection has proved inadequate and of Uzbekistan’s Action Plan will be a strategy to sustain bio- tarnished by unclear distribution of authority. An additional diversity and a focus on unified planning in the promotion positive factor in Kyrgyzstan that has been missing from the of environmental protection. The NEAP will set three tasks: existing national strategy in the other Central Asian states improvement of environmental conditions in order to ensure that were mentioned above has been the rapid increase in sufficient social and health conditions for the people, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since effective use of natural resources, and protection of

Harvard Asia Quarterly 36 Winter 2001 vulnerable ecosystems. Finally, on similar lines, a Kyrgyz of the Aral Sea and minimize the possibility of regional NEAP exists and will be reassessed in the aftermath of the conflict over the distribution of freshwater resources. Projects presidential elections to ensure coverage of natural resources initiated by USAID (United States Agency for International sustainability and the protection of bio-diversity. Development) were perceived by the US as the leading In addition to the national programs, the Central Asian component in ensuring regional co-operation and facilitating states have also invested in the development of environmental the exploration of energy resources in the Caspian Basin. It strategies at a regional level. Although the states have diverse is obvious that such interest over the regional environmental economic prospects for future development, most of the issues was predicated on the economic interests of the US. environmental issues that prevail in Central Asia are regional Eager to show its commitment to stability in Central Asia, it in nature. A regional approach regarding environmental set up projects to improve water quality and public health action is ready to be implemented alongside a country- conditions in the hardest hit regions near the Aral Sea. As specific line of action. This also shows once again the part of these efforts, the State Department opened a regional willingness of the existing leaders to cooperate in certain environmental office in Tashkent, Uzbekistan to coordinate areas that may enhance further US environmental efforts. political and economic stability. Nevertheless, no concrete Despite criticism from the improvements have been observed West, it is possible that the existing in the region. Once it was ensured government regimes will ensure the International donor agencies must that economic advancement could faster implementation of take measures to integrate proceed without the necessity for environmental strategies within the environmental considerations into environmental resolutions, concrete short and medium term. measures to address some of the Corruption, inadequate legal their lending practices and allow the most serious environmental issues structures, economic constraints, states to reach a sufficient level of were abandoned or postponed. and the limitations of economic development that will The World Bank Group has environmental government permit them to proceed safely with prepared this year a new agencies to cope with existing the repayments of any loans. environmental strategy that will problems, however, may be some integrate environmental concerns of the factors that delay further into its mainstream efforts to development. These reasons are why a regional approach alleviate poverty and ensure economic development. How has been gradually developing and has finally become a and whether this new environmental strategy will be reality this year. The realization of a regional scheme was implemented in Central Asia will have to be seen in the next seen in the formation of a Central Asian Regional few years. The strategy will try to combine advancements in Environmental Centre (CAREC). On this basis, western living and health conditions of the populations by addressing donors have committed modest funds to create the regional environmental issues, such as air pollution, toxic waste centre. However, the interest of the donor agencies has itself disposal and water management. It will also try to reduce been more based on rhetoric than action. Since 1998 when environmental risks created by natural disasters, such as the decision was reached to create the CAREC, it has taken drought and desertification. Similar approaches based on 2 years for the CAREC to the alleviation of poverty in establish its headquarters in conjunction with environmental Almaty, Kazakhstan. A board protection have been established of directors, consisting of by other international donor representatives from the five agencies. For example, the Asian states, the scientific and the Development Bank aims to NGO community and the donor complete within 2001-2002 a agencies, has been aiming to project on institutional establish and carry out its development and capacity working plan for 2000-2001 as building that will allow the soon as the legal issues assessment and restructuring of regarding its formation are existing national environmental finalized. strategies to cope with the increasing degradation of the THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL DONOR AGENCIES IN PROMOTING Central Asian natural environment. Emphasis has been given THE ENVIRONMENT to the incorporation of environmental sustainability into the economic activities of any body involved in the economic Environmental problems in the region have created an development of the region. opportunity for western states to intervene, because both the However, once again, concerns have been expressed international community and the leadership of the Central about how sincere these efforts have been particularly since Asian states recognize the need for assistance in tackling some of these international agencies have been constantly existing environmental problems. Therefore, efforts have criticized for funding projects that have negative effects on taken place over the past decade to address the desiccation the environment. Additionally, any positive results that may

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 37 arise from the implementation of aid projects are environmental stability, a concrete strategy must be overshadowed by the pressure posed to the governments developed and implemented. The fact remains, however, that of Central Asia to repay the loans that were granted to them nothing can be achieved without the support of the to facilitate economic development and modernization. international community and its financial and technical International donor agencies must take measures to integrate assistance. Pilot projects emphasizing natural resources environmental considerations into their lending practices and management will have to continue to be designed, allow the states to reach a sufficient level of economic implemented, and evaluated, while a growing need to development that will permit them to proceed safely with promote stronger public support for better management and the repayments of any loans. commitment to the environmental improvement will be an essential and integral part for any success story. CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence that has been provided over the years concerning the ruling regimes of the Central Asian states and on the results of recent elections, it is only natural to assume that regional environmental strategies will not achieve their goals in the near future. Saturated by deficiencies in education, technical implementation and policy structure and inefficiencies concerning economic resources, environmental protection is still an idea presented on paper that will slowly evolve into action. Despite their inadequacies and controversial courses of action, the existing governments will intensify their efforts to address environmental questions both on a national and regional level. The stakes are too high, and with economic development becoming increasingly dependent on

Harvard Asia Quarterly 38 Winter 2001 BANKRUPTCY LAW IN CHINA: LESSONS IN THE PAST TWELVE YEARS

BY DR. LI SHUGUANG espite the long history of the Chinese legal system and its influence on much of East Asia, the concept of “bankruptcy” was Dnot formally recognized in Chinese law until the first bankruptcy Dr. Li is an associate professor at China University law was introduced in 1906, during the late Qing Dynasty. Until that of Politics and Law and is currently a visiting time, the role of bankruptcy law was filled by the legal and ethical tradi- professor at Harvard Law School. He formerly served as an expert advisor on bankruptcy and de- tion that “the son pays for the debts of his father.” organization in China State Economic and Trade In 1906, the Qing government followed the civil law system, espe- Committee and as an expert advisor on enterprise cially the law of China’s neighbor, Japan, and enacted bankruptcy law. It merger and bankruptcy for World Bank and Asian was later annulled in 1908 by Emperor Guang Xu due to difficulties in Development Bank. Dr. Li also participated in the drafting of new bankruptcy law and a series of implementation. In 1915, during the era of the Republic of China, the governmental policies regarding the reforms of then Northern Warlords Government drafted a bankruptcy law. In 1935, state-owned enterprises. the Nationalist Government published and implemented a bankruptcy law that is still in force in Taiwan today.1 After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new government abolished all the laws the Nationalist Government had enacted. As a consequence, China did not have an insolvency law for more than 30 years. During this period, the Chinese government prac- ticed a uniform policy of centralized assumption of profits and losses of state-owned enterprises under the planned economic system. The system was characterized by centralized financial revenue and expenditures, planned coordination of supply and demand in commercial distribution, and government-controlled labor supply and placement. Enter- prise profits were turned over to the state and all losses were subsidized by the state. Enterprises with chronic and serious deficits either were “closed, suspended, consolidated or [had their] production changed” by administrative orders, or went bankrupt automatically without going through any legal procedure. The facts of bankruptcies had always been kept secret. In the early 1980s, Chinese economists, legal experts, and government officials began to realize the drawbacks in the way that the planned economic system dealt with insolvent enterprises, and advocated the promulgation of a law of enterprise insolvency. After the promotion of bankruptcy law by experts and scholars and fierce debates in the Stand- ing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (LEB) was finally promulgated by the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th NPC on December 2, 1986.

TWELVE YEARS AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW: THE LAW IN PRACTICE

It has been over twelve years since the bankruptcy law first came into effect on November 1, 1988. The Law comprises six chapters, including General Principles, Proposal and Acceptance of Bankruptcy Ap- plications, Creditor’s Meetings, Conciliation and Consolidation, Bank- ruptcy Declaration and Liquidation. There are a total of 5400 words in 43 articles. According to Article 2, the Law applies to enterprises wholly owned by the people, namely, state owned enterprises (SOEs), shatter- ing the traditional view that SOEs would not and could not go bankrupt.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 39 1. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW AS ONE OF SEVERAL BASES FOR 3. TYPES OF BANKRUPTCY ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCIES Because the only bankruptcy law in China was designed However, the Bankruptcy Law is not the only basis for for SOEs, and because of the influence of the deep-rooted bankruptcy practice in China. After the Law was promul- central control economic system on domestic perceptions, gated, the NPC issued the amended 19th chapter of the Code there is a general belief that bankruptcies are only limited to of Civil Procedure on April 9, 1991: Debt Repayment Or- SOEs. In fact, as noted above, there has been a large num- der in Legal Entity Bankruptcy. The chapter, covering 8 ar- ber of non-SOE bankruptcies in recent years. Among the 11 ticles (Articles 199 to 206), provides a direct basis for han- bankruptcies in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province in 1996, dling the bankruptcies of non-state-owned enterprises and five were sino-foreign joint ventures. Among the 5,396 bank- brought the bankruptcies of all legal entities (enterprises with ruptcy cases in the entire country in 1997, 3,735 concerned legal person status) in China into the legal system. It has SOEs, and most of the rest concerned private, collectively also promoted the market competition mechanism of sur- owned or sino-foreign joint ventures. Since 1992, there has vival of the fittest. Although the Code does not specify the been a number of bankruptcy cases involving other coun- debt repayment procedure for bankruptcies of non-state- tries. During the Asian financial crisis, difficulties in sev- owned enterprises, it provides that the repayment procedures eral Asian countries (such as Japan, South Korea, and Hong specified in the Bankruptcy Law are applicable to all legal Kong) caused their investments in China to fail. For instance, entities. Therefore, in practice, many bankruptcy cases in- the bankruptcy of the International Commercial Credit Bank volving SOEs and non-SOEs follow the procedures. (BCCI) led to the bankruptcy of its branch in Shenzhen. Judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy Law issued Nonetheless, the serious bankruptcies (in terms of scale, by the Supreme People’s Court on November 7, 1991 and a amounts of debt, numbers of unemployed workers involved series of policies and other regulations implemented by the and overall impact) have involved SOEs. The biggest case State Council also regulate and promote bankruptcy prac- to date is the closure of state-owned Shanxi Textile Dyeing tice in China. Some localities have promulgated their own Plant in September 1996. In 1993, the plant of 18,000-worker regional bankruptcy laws to promote bankruptcy work. For was one of China’s 500 largest enterprises. Three years later example, in August 1993, the Guangdong Provincial People’s it was insolvent with a total of 640 creditors and debts of Congress issued a series of regulations on company bank- RMB880 million (US$106 million).4 ruptcy. In November 1993, the Shenzhen municipal people’s congress issued Regulations on Company Bankruptcy in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.

2. A MAJOR INCREASE IN ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY CASES Because the only bankruptcy law in Many Chinese and foreign scholars as well as members China was designed for SOEs, and of the business community share the common misconcep- because of the influence of the deep- tion that there are only few enterprise bankruptcies in China. rooted central control economic In reality, since the Bankruptcy Law came into effect in No- system on domestic perceptions, vember 1988, the law has been invoked to close more than there is a general belief that 16,000 enterprises. After a slow start, the rate of bankrupt- bankruptcies are only limited to cies has accelerated rapidly, particularly in the last several SOEs. years (see table below). Bankruptcy has not been limited to ailing state firms, but rather has applied to all types of enterprises. In 1994, only 395 of the total 1,624 bankrupt enterprises were state firms. Among the 5,396 bankruptcies in 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHINESE BANKRUPTCY POLICY IN 1997, 3,060-plus were SOEs (675 in the 111 experimental RECENT YEARS cities);2 the rest were private, collectively owned or Sino- foreign joint ventures. Despite the fact that reforming SOEs has been the main focus of the Chinese economic reform in the last twenty years, Bankruptcies Per Year:3 they remain a hard nut to crack. Since 1994, the central government has changed its approach to reforming SOEs from 1989 98 attempting to revitalize every single SOE to saving only the 1990 32 viable ones and preserving the overall sector. One principal 1991 117 experiment in this area has been a policy aimed at strength- 1992 428 ening enterprises through the improvement of capital struc- 1993 710 tures by encouraging mergers, restructuring, bankruptcies, 1994 1,625 asset sales, and the spin-off of non-productive units such as 1995 2,583 schools and hospitals. This experiment was first carried out 1996 5,875 in 18 cities, subsequently expanded to 56 cities, including 1997 5,396 every provincial capital, and is currently being run in 111 cities. Together with this experiment, policies outlined in

Harvard Asia Quarterly 40 Winter 2001 two State Council documents on mergers and bankruptcies cially in light of the Asian economic crisis, is the effect wide- (No. 59 issued in 1994 and No. 10 in 1997), and other policies spread bankruptcies could have on China’s rickety financial issued by government departments, constitute a key driv- system. A multiplication of the loss of debt rights on the ing force behind the increase in bankruptcies. part of the state banks could make financial institutions, the Some progress has been made since the start of the ex- largest creditors of SOEs, technically bankrupt, and thus periment in 1994. According to the State Economic and trigger a financial crisis. In 1996, of the above-mentioned Trade Commission, some 1,192 enterprises merged and total debts of RMB43 billion, RMB26.1 billion (60%) was in 1,099 went through bankruptcy in the original 56 experi- the form of bank loans. As a result of liquidations and merg- mental cities in 1996. These enterprises employed 680,000 ers, the banks recovered only 10.1% of their loans, half in workers and amassed a combined cash and half in goods and debt capital of RMB25 billion (US$3 bil- rights.5 Of the bankruptcy cases lion) and total debts of alone, the banks wrote off RMB11.4 RMBRMB43 billion (US$5.2 bil- billion, 43% of the total RMB26.1 billion), with a debt-to-assets ratio of Aware of the problems associated lion. 172%. Altogether 5,908 non-pro- with bankruptcies, the government Aware of the problems associ- ductive units were separated from has adopted a policy of promoting ated with bankruptcies, the govern- their parent organizations, divert- mergers over bankruptcies. ment has adopted a policy of pro- ing 1.23 million people to other ar- moting mergers over bankruptcies. eas. In 1997, with the total number This new policy accounted for a of experimental cities increased to 111 cities, 1,509 enter- sharp decrease in the number of bankruptcies in the experi- prises were merged and 675 went through bankruptcy, af- mental cities in 1997 compared to 1996. While this approach fecting more than one million workers. It is estimated that may prove to be a palliative in the short term, in the long run, more than 2,000 enterprises either merged or declared bank- it raises the question of who will merge with a bankrupt SOE. ruptcy in 1998, mainly in hugely unprofitable sectors such In addition, in the area of SOE bankruptcies, there are further as textiles, machinery, light industry, defense industry, chemi- obstacles such as an imperfect legal system, excessive ad- cals and coal. ministrative intervention, disordered guarantee arrange- Despite the progress, two main obstacles have pre- ments, fraudulent bankruptcies, low benefits of liquidation, vented further increase of the bankruptcy rate. They are a shortage of bankruptcy professionals, local protection- China’s already substantial unemployment problem and the ism, and difficulties in selling assets for cash. The perplex- fragility of the financial system. Official statistics state that ing auction of the government-owned Shanxi Textile Dyeing China had 5.76 million unemployed workers in urban areas in Plant serves as a good example. In that case, the govern- 1997, giving rise to an unemployment rate of 3.1%. This ment initially attempted to force a merger by auctioning off figure, however, hides at least another 10 million urban work- the plant. But no buyer was willing to pay the RMB550 mil- ers who are xiagang—a new term used to describe people lion price set by the government. Eventually, the govern- who got laid off from their employment but are nominally ment had to set up a textile company for the sole purpose of paid (if they are lucky) a subsistence wage by their previous taking over the plant. The new government-owned company working unit. A steep rise in the number of bankruptcies bought the plant for RMB 486 million. Recognizing the inef- would exacerbate the unemployment problem, threatening ficiency of this approach, which results in mere shifting of widespread social unrest. A more immediate problem, espe- problems from one enterprise to another, I proposed in 1998

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 41 that bankruptcy be adopted as the preferred solution for has the authority to grant approval and make decisions for insolvent SOEs. Only bankruptcy, rather than merger, can an enterprise facing bankruptcy, who can apply for bank- provide a complete cure. Indeed, in 2000, the central govern- ruptcy, and who takes the economic risk and bear the losses. ment began a new policy of “more bankruptcies, less merg- Legal owners should theoretically bear all losses. Yet in ers”. reality in China, SOEs are often owned by multiple governmental entities that frequently evade their responsibilities KEY ISSUES IN CHINESE BANKRUPTCIES when a SOE is faced with bankruptcy. An effective mecha- 1. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN BANKRUPTCIES nism is needed to establish clear ownership of SOEs. Parent-subsidiary relationships add additional complex- The Chinese government plays a special role in enter- ity. When a SOE is bankrupt, should its subsidiary enterprise bankruptcies in China. The government’s role is both prise bear joint liability? Conversely, when a subsidiary en- dominant and multi-faceted in SOE terprise is bankrupt, should its par- bankruptcies. It initiates these ent enterprise bear joint liability? In bankruptcies, yet at the same time, practice, many SOEs are not inde- is the policymaker, the leader, and Absent approval by the government, pendent legal persons even though the direct operator in them. The courts are often hesitant to accept and they are powerful enterprises. It is government not only controls their hear bankruptcy cases. often the case that an SOE and its number, scale, and speed, but also subsidiaries have business relation- decides what industries and trades ships without ever establishing any are covered under the bankruptcy clear legal relationships. The ab- law. It also covers the costs of SOE bankruptcies. It should sence of clear legal relationships makes it easier for parent be noted that the central and local governments play differ- enterprises or subsidiaries to evade their financial responsi- ent roles in bankruptcies, some of which are conducted un- bilities. der, and some outside, the government’s planned program. Other hotly debated bankruptcy issues arise from the In contrast, the government has little influence in the area of current transition from a planned economy to a market non-SOE bankruptcies since it is not the legal owner of these economy. For instance, what does the bankruptcy property companies. of a bankrupt SOE encompass? Does it include land, hospi- tal, school and employees’ living quarters, as well as assets 2. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN BANKRUPTCIES of the party committee and labor union of the SOE?

The courts’ role in SOE bankruptcies is derived from 4. THE ANTI-BANKRUPTCY STANCE OF CREDITORS the power of the government and is thus limited in many aspects. Since the government appoints judges and allo- Creditors often have difficulty recovering debts from cates budgets for courts, Chinese courts are hardly inde- bankrupt SOEs. Current policy requires that money recov- pendent of the government. Chinese courts are divided into ered from a bankrupt SOE be used to settle employees first. four levels: the Supreme Court, High Court, Intermediate And bank creditors have priority over non-bank creditors Court and Local Court. Unlike the American system, in which for the remaining money, if any. As there is often little money bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bank- left after employee settlement, state-owned banks, which ruptcy cases, there is no unified provision in China specify- are the main creditors of SOEs, are often hit hard by SOE ing which court (i.e. the court of which level) has jurisdiction bankruptcies. These banks therefore often oppose SOEs’ over bankruptcy cases. Most of these cases are conducted efforts to file for bankruptcy or will only accept bankruptcy by the Economic Trial Branch of Local Courts and Interme- under the government’s planned program. Even for enter- diate Courts. Absent approval by the government, courts prises whose financial situation warrants an application for are often hesitant to accept and hear bankruptcy cases. bankruptcy, it is rare for banks or other creditors to initiate Judges are supposed to apply the existing bankruptcy law such an application. For non-bank creditors, the difficulties when handling these cases. They are, however, restrained are even more daunting. In many SOE bankruptcies, the by bankruptcy policies of governments of different levels, rights of these creditors are completely cancelled to allow which at times conflict with the bankruptcy law. Moreover, for settlement of employees. Other creditors fortunate enough the majority of Chinese judges are not experienced in deal- may recover their debt at a very low rate. Legal mechanisms ing with bankruptcy cases because Chinese courts had never to guarantee creditor’s interests are weak at best. dealt with a single bankruptcy case prior to the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law in 1988.6 5. DIFFICULTIES IN SETTLING EMPLOYEES

3. WHO’S THE REAL DEBTOR? Employee settlement is the most difficult and thorny issue in SOE bankruptcies. The problem is manifold. First, One complication in the current Chinese bankruptcy SOE employees are reluctant to accept bankruptcy because regime is that the ownership structure of SOEs is not clear, bankruptcy means that they lose their identity as state em- making it difficult to identify the real debtor. SOEs are tech- ployees. This identity is so important because there is a nically “own[ed] by the state”. However, it is unclear as to Chinese tradition that a state employee is guaranteed an who represents the state in exercising its ownership, who “Iron Rice Bowl”, or lifetime employment. Second, when an

Harvard Asia Quarterly 42 Winter 2001 enterprise is bankrupt, laid-off employees become a serious 9. CONFUSING GUARANTEE RELATIONS potential source of social instability. This is further exacer- bated by the lack of government funding for employee settle- In China, enterprises often give unsubstantiated ment and the inadequacies of the social welfare system. guarantees to each other, resulting in duplicate pledges of Third, questions remain concerning the logistics and terms the same asset. Guarantees are often given without careful of settlement. How should employees be settled? Where does documentation, creating hidden liabilities that lead to chain the money for employee settlement come from? Should the reaction bankruptcies. One reason for such confusing government be responsible for the settlement or should the guarantee relations is that governmental administrative employees find their own way out? Fourth, the legal rights agencies designate guarantees. Guarantee relations are also and interest of employees of the bankrupt enterprises are affected by the policy that any proceeds from bankruptcy not protected due to the lack of contract enforcement mecha- proceedings must be used for employee settlement first. For nisms. The government frequently example, proceeds from transferring uses boilerplate employee settle- land-use-rights, no matter whether ment plans, which place employees the right has been given out in from bankrupt SOEs into a second Twelve years of practice with pledge or not, must first be used for enterprise (either state owned or bankruptcy laws, combined with the settling employee. The mortgagors privately owned). These employ- deepening of the SOE reform and the are thus unable to enjoy their ees often are forced to enter into development of the market economy, rightful repayment priority. labor contracts that infringe upon have persuaded many Chinese of the their rights as guaranteed by the country’s need for a new 10. CREDITOR’S RIGHTS AND employee settlement plans. Such bankruptcy law. LIABILITIES ARE DIFFICULT TO arrangements are fraught with le- EVALUATE gal problems. The unsound accounting system for SOEs makes it 6. ONLY A FEW PROFESSIONAL INTERMEDIARY SERVICE ORGA- difficult to evaluate creditor’s rights and liabilities accurately. NIZATIONS ARE INVOLVED IN BANKRUPTCY CASES Because enterprises often keep two books—their own accounting books and their “official” books, it is extremely Professional services for handling bankruptcy cases are burdensome for creditors to produce concrete evidence from uncommon and rudimentary in China. The majority of Chi- accounting records to substantiate their claims. Furthermore, nese liquidation professionals lack experience in handling there is a two-year statute of limitations for asserting creditor complicated bankruptcies, resulting in low efficiency and rights in courts. Unaware of their legal rights, creditors often high cost for their work. Only a few law firms and account- either miss the two-year time limit or fail to produce evidence ing firms have been involved in bankruptcy cases. More- that tolls the statute of limitations. To complicate things over, there is no trustee system for handling bankruptcies. further, government funding to SOEs could be converted into debt upon the occurrence of certain triggering events. 7. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW AND POLICIES ARE INADEQUATE The nature of liabilities is often unclear.

The existing Bankruptcy Law is hard to implement. Much of its content does not adequately address the complex economic realities of China. SOE bankruptcy procedures are vague and those governing non-SOE bankruptcies are deficient. There is no legal basis for filing bankruptcy for a natural person, partnership, or corporation. Since there is no reorganization procedure for insolvent enterprises, it is difficult to determine where the responsibility of the managers of the bankrupt enterprises lies. In addition, there are conflicts and inconsistencies between the Bankruptcy Law and existing government policies.

8. FAKE BANKRUPTCY CASES

Some enterprises dodge their liabilities by declaring bankruptcy after dividing their businesses and changing licenses. Such practices are often supported by local protectionism. A large number of enterprises practice ill- will bankruptcy—a “disappearance act from an entangled situation”—they shift their assets and repudiate their debts by taking advantage of the bankruptcy procedure.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 43 11. T HE DIFFICULTY OF CONVERTING BANKRUPTCY twelve years of practice with bankruptcy law, combined with ASSETS TO CASH the deepening of the SOE reform and the development of the market economy, have persuaded many Chinese of the There is often a discrepancy country’s need for a new bank- between the appraisal value of ruptcy law. Bankruptcies have be- bankruptcy property and its market come an inevitable economic real- value. Property values are currently ity. Recently, many scholars and en- determined by governmental There is every reason to believe that trepreneurs, particularly creditors, assessment agencies, often at levels the future of the enforcement of have advocated the replacement of substantially higher than market bankruptcy law is bright, despite the the existing bankruptcy law with a values. It is thus difficult to sell challenges that lie ahead. new bankruptcy law that is more bankrupt property to settle suitable for the new market employee and creditor claims. To solve this problem, economy. bankruptcy property should be assessed by experts in line The original bankruptcy law is out of date with current with its real value, and sold through auctions to realize their realities. First, a large number of companies not owned by market values. the government have been established under the rules of the new market economy in the twenty years since economic 12. BANKRUPTCY CONCERNING ENTERPRISES WITH FOREIGN reforms began. These companies expect to operate within a PARTICIPATION legal framework more suited for a market economy. Clearly, the original bankruptcy law cannot apply to these compa- Myriad problems arise in the bankruptcy of Sino-foreign nies. Second, even for money-losing SOEs that still carry joint ventures. It is unclear who bears the responsibility after the inertia of the planned economic system, the inevitable the bankruptcy of such joint ventures because there is no transition to market economy has made the existing bank- adequate bankruptcy procedure for enterprises with foreign ruptcy law inadequate. investment or participation. The current bankruptcy law does not provide sufficient protections for foreign investors. This 2. GREAT ATTENTION PAID BY THE TOP CHINESE LEADERSHIP lack of protection partly stems from the fact that detailed TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM provisions regarding foreign creditors are missing from the existing bankruptcy law. The 1999 bankruptcy case of In the report of the 15th Party Congress of Autumn 1997 Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company and by the central government led by Premier Zhu Rongji, (GITIC) illustrates this problem. Foreign investors made much emphasis was placed on “well-regulated bankruptcies, loans to GITIC, on which GITIC defaulted when it declared implementation of the re-employment program and improv- bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy proceeding, it became apparent ing the work on the SOE bankruptcy experiment”. The cen- that the existing bankruptcy law provided little guidance on tral government has also decided to set aside more than these foreign creditors’ rights and how these foreign investors RMB100 billion (US$12 billion) in bad-loan deposit funds should proceed. for state banks to write off losses caused by mergers and bankruptcies from 1997 to 2000. The government has is- 13. UNFAIR PREFERENTIAL POLICIES ON BANKRUPTCY sued a series of specific bankruptcy policies in 111 pilot cities. In 2000, the application of these new bankruptcy Only SOEs in the 111 pilot cities (out of 665 cities policies has been extended to all cities. nationwide) that are covered by the government’s experimental program can benefit from preferential 3. A LEGAL SYSTEM RELEVANT TO THE BANKRUPTCY LAW IS bankruptcy policies, such as the ability to write off bad debts. GRADUALLY IMPROVING All enterprises in non-pilot cities and non-SOEs in pilot cities are denied such preferential treatment. In recent years, China has issued a number of new laws and regulations such as the Corporation Law, the Partner- FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF BANKRUPTCY ship Law, the Labor Law, the Commercial Banking Law, the LAW IN CHINA Guarantee Law, the Insurance Law, the Regulations on the Unemployment Insurance of SOE Employees and the Secu- China has encountered numerous difficulties in carry- rities Law. These laws provide new legal bases for creditors ing out SOE bankruptcies because the existing bankruptcy and debtors to file for bankruptcy. The Chinese government law is fraught with ambiguities and deficiencies. However, has also sped up reform in the social security system for after twelve years of practice and experimentation, especially unemployment, health, housing, and seniors. However, these after the establishment of a framework for market economic new laws often conflict with the existing Bankruptcy Law reform in China in 1993, a macro environment for broaden- because it was enacted earlier and lacks corresponding pro- ing bankruptcy practice has emerged. visions.

1. CHINA NEEDS A BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM Some scholars argue that bankruptcy law is not suitable for the national conditions in China. Nevertheless,

Harvard Asia Quarterly 44 Winter 2001 4. A NEW BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION HAS BEEN DRAFTED AND PLACED ON THE LEGISLATION AGENDA OF THE CHINESE LEGIS- LATURE

Drawing on the experience of developed countries and incorporating global trends in bankruptcy law, the draft of the new bankruptcy legislation is intended to adapt to the new market economy in China. It contains detailed provisions that broaden the scope of bankruptcy application, set up simple and streamlined bankruptcy procedures, improve the court’s standing in bankruptcy case hearings, better protect the creditors’ interests, establish a trustee system, recreate a reorganization mechanism, and establish a special procedure for SOE bankruptcies.6 After twelve years, a new stage in bankruptcy practice has arrived. It will have far-reaching impact on the deepening of China’s economic reforms, in particular SOE reform, and on the establishment of an improved market economy. There is every reason to believe that the future of the enforcement of bankruptcy law is bright, despite the challenges that lie ahead.

ENDNOTES

1 See Li Shuguang, et al, Bankruptcies and Mergers in Chi- nese Enterprises, at 4, People’s Daily Publisher, Sept. 1996 ed. 2 See State Economic and Trade Commission: Working Guide On the Optimization of Capital Structure in Pilot Cities, Beijing, 1998. 3 See Supreme Court Annual Work Report 4 See Selected Case Studies from Bankruptcy Conference, compiled by Yanze River Enterprise Bankruptcy Commis- sion based on the materials from the National Bankruptcy Conference held in Zhanjian City, Guangdong Province in 1997. 5 See SETC: Working Guide On the Optimization of Capital Structure in Pilot Cities, Beijing, 1998. 6 See Li Shuguang, Field Study Report on the Chinese Bank- ruptcy Law State Enterprise Insolvency Reform Project, T.A.No. 2271-P.R.C., Asian Development Bank, Beijing, 1996. 7 See The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enter- prise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation). See also Materials for the International Conference on Bank- ruptcies and Mergers, Beijing, 1996.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 45 CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON

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Harvard Asia Quarterly 46 Winter 2001 WAS WORLD BANK SUPPORT FOR THE QINGHAI ANTI-POVERTY PROJECT IN CHINA ILL-CONSIDERED?

BY PIETER BOTTELIER he Qinghai anti-poverty project is one of the most controversial projects in the 54-year history of the World Bank. In July 2000, Pieter Bottelier is a faculty member at the John F. after a detailed investigation by the Bank’s independent Inspec- Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. He T tion Panel and periods of serious tension between the Bank, its largest worked in the World Bank from 1970-98. He served in many different functions, including as Chief of client, China, and its largest shareholder, the U.S., China withdrew its Mission in Beijing (1993-97) and as Senior Advisor request for Bank financing in a stormy board meeting. The decision to in the East Asia Region (1997-98). withdraw was made by the Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji person- ally. The episode has put additional strain on the relationship between This article is based on a talk presented by Mr. Bottelier at the Harvard University Asia Center on China and the Bank. It has also left the impression that the Bank was October 20, 2000. incompetent, insensitive, or terribly naïve in undertaking this project. The purpose of this article is to correct misinformation about this project and to develop a more balanced perspective on the case. As Chief of the World Bank’s mission in Beijing (1993-1997), I knew the poverty conditions in parts of Qinghai well and was involved in early project discussions in 1997. I was not involved in actual project preparation or appraisal work. The outcome of the fascinating but sad saga that is the subject of this article left me and many of my former colleagues in the World Bank very uncomfortable at different levels. It seems to me that a potentially good anti-poverty project was killed for the wrong reasons. Although China and many senior staff members in the Bank were profoundly dissatisfied with the work of the Inspection Panel, China was, for the sake of maintaining harmonious relations with the Bank, willing to go along with recommendations by Management for further studies and consultations, as the Panel had deemed necessary. China was not prepared, however, to re-submit the Qinghai project for Board approval after completion of the extra work. China felt that a technical decision to unblock disbursements was all that was required. The U.S. and Japan were in the end the only two member countries that opposed the project. All other shareholders supported it in principle, but some (including European shareholders, Canada and Austra- lia) required that it be re-submitted for Board approval after completion of additional studies and assessments. China refused to accept this condition on the grounds that: (a) the Board had already approved the project in June 1999, before Panel investigation; and (b) Bank management had officially certified (after the protests by outside agencies, but before Panel investigation) that, contrary to allegations that had been made, Bank policies and procedures had been properly observed in the preparation of this project. The project and the unusual circumstances surrounding it were discussed in national parliaments around the world. China is proceeding with the project, but all financing will now come from domestic resources and there will be no external supervision of project implementation. Long-term implications of this unusual episode for the Bank and its Part II members1 are on balance likely to be negative. They go well beyond the project that triggered the crisis. The Bank’s capacity to help member countries reduce poverty—its main job and purpose—has been impaired. The Bank’s credibility as a non-political institution has suf-

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 47 fered. Operational costs of the Bank are likely to increase five prefectures in the province are all designated as “Ti- further as a result of additional reviews and safeguards that betan Autonomous”. The project area narrowly defined, may be required by Part I member countries. Bank opera- which includes land to be irrigated and villages to be estab- tional staff has become more risk-averse and less inclined to lished, occupies a little over 200 sq. km. exercise professional judgment without first consulting in- The project area broadly defined, which includes rural ternal lawyers. Possible positive consequences are that the roads, irrigation canals, and open space between non-con- Bank may become more sensitive to political realities and tiguous irrigation areas, occupies about 2,000 sq. km, or that in the future there will be less room for confusion over about four percent of Dulan County. At present, the area is the interpretation of environmental and social safeguard poli- poor quality grassland, and is primarily used by the Mongo- cies. lian cattle herders for winter grazing. Only 63 families pres- The project and the crisis it provoked raise questions ently live (part of the year) in the actual project settlement about the role and procedures of the Bank’s independent areas. They are semi-nomadic and all are Mongolian. Oth- Inspection Panel, the Bank’s relations with outside agencies ers use the area merely for the transit of cattle between sum- that have a political agenda, the use of resettlement in pov- mer and winter grazing. Another 248 households farm nearby erty alleviation, and the apparent unwillingness of the U.S. amidst an old dilapidated irrigation scheme. All affected local and some other shareholders to protect the Bank’s political people would be entitled to full compensation under the neutrality more forcefully. This is also an interesting case project or have to option to participate in it as direct benefi- study in how the Bank and its shareholders can inadvert- ciaries. Transit rights through the project area would be fully ently become entangled in an internal political conflict in a protected. A grievance mechanism would be introduced to member country through the actions of influential NGOs. deal with concerns and complaints of affected local people. In this case, the underlying conflict that led to the crisis A few Tibetan villages dot the project area broadly de- is the political struggle between the Tibetan “government in fined, but most local Tibetans live higher up in the moun- exile” and the government in Beijing. More precisely, the tains with their yak and their sheep, not in the project area. conflict was over alleged efforts by Beijing to “dilute” Ti- The inconvenience of the project on those mountain people betan culture in Qinghai with Bank support through resettle- would be minimal. Indirectly, they would benefit from a ment. The controversy over this project was not anticipated larger market for their products. Tibetans living near the by the Bank or by China. The Bank walked into a political project area, like other minorities, would have the option to mine field without realizing it until the explosions went off. participate in the project as direct beneficiaries or receive The international campaign against the project was led by compensation if they were negatively affected and preferred the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) in the U.S. and not to participate. The Bank’s appraisal report indicates that Tibetan support groups around the world. The opposition to Bank staff responsible for the project’s preparation and ap- the project was in my view essentially political in nature, praisal were aware of Tibetan dilution concerns and the per- but the conflict took the form of a proxy battle over compli- ceived risk that Tibetan culture in the area might weaken ance with Bank operational guidelines and safeguard poli- through the replacement of a herding lifestyle with that of cies. farming. However, since nobody would be forced to adopt a different lifestyle, while a large majority of the local people THE PROJECT seemed to be in favor of the project, the Bank’s team found that these risks were manageable. The Qinghai project is a component of the Western The ethnic composition of the 58,000 target population Poverty Reduction Project (WPRP) aimed at poverty alle- in the move-out area is about 42% Han, 36% Hui, 9% Tu, viation in Gansu, Inner Mongolia and Qinghai, three poor, 7% Salar, and 6% Tibetan. The majority is therefore non- semi-desertic provinces in West and Northwest China. Only Han. All are chronically poor and many are illiterate. Para- the Qinghai component, on which international opposition doxically, the proportion of Tibetans living in the move-out exclusively focused, involves significant resettlement and areas would increase as a result of the project, because the Tibetan interests. Under that project, some 58,000 extremely proportion of Tibetans in the target group is much smaller poor farmers living in the largely barren and overcrowded than the proportion of Tibetans in the total population of the mountains of Eastern Qinghai, without prospect of in-situ move-out areas. The relatively low (voluntary) participation economic development, would be assisted, on a voluntary rate of Tibetans in the target group was thought to be related basis, to resettle on irrigated land about 500 km to the west to the fact that the move-out areas are located in the vicinity within the same province. of the birth places of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. The resettlement site is one of the last remaining unde- These are areas to which many Tibetans are for that reason veloped areas in Qinghai that is suitable for irrigated agri- deeply attached. culture. Most other relatively flat areas with adequate water To protect the social fabric of villages in the move-out resources in this mountainous, arid, and thinly populated area, people would resettle on a village-by-village basis. The province have already been developed over the past half a Qinghai provincial government originally proposed to move century. The share of the Tibetan population in the three all 120,000 people who had applied for resettlement. How- prefectures affected by this project (in move-out and move- ever, the World Bank team persuaded the borrower to limit in areas) ranges from four to eleven percent. They are the the number to a little under 58,000 so as not to overload the “least” Tibetan prefectures in Qinghai and the only three move-in area. The government also agreed to include in the not designated solely as “Tibetan Autonomous”; the other project certain investments in the move-out area for the ben-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 48 Winter 2001 efit of those left behind. ment area, narrowly defined. Ironically, among the move-in The amount of Bank and IDA financing for the Qinghai settlers would be about 3,500 Tibetans from Eastern Qinghai. component of the WPRP would have been about $40 mil- Many of those do not speak Tibetan, however, and are re- lion. Typically, the Bank does not finance more than 50% of garded by some as non-Tibetans for that reason. total project costs in China; the rest is financed by the bor- The project would reduce the share of Han Chinese in rower. In China, projects proposed for World Bank financ- Dulan County from 53% to 48%, of Tibetans from 23% to ing are usually prepared by the bor- 14%, and of Mongolians from 14% rower before they are submitted for to 7%. Other minorities would in- the Bank’s consideration. The Chi- crease their share as follows: Hui nese typically have a high degree from 7% to 22%, Salar from 1.5% to of project “ownership” and imple- The World Bank estimates that more 4%, and Tu from 1% to 5%. mentation is well supervised. The than 60,000 people, including settlers The“dilution” of the Tibetan popu- quality of the Bank’s project port- and people who stay put in the move- lation in Dulan County would be folio in China is rated as one of the balanced by an increase of the share best in the world.2 out areas, would directly benefit from of Tibetans in the move-out areas. The proposed resettlement the project. Moreover, 3500 Tibetans would area for the Qinghai project is mostly settle in a part of Dulan Country uninhabited, semi-desert country. where no Tibetans are living at The elevation is 3000 meters and the climate is harsh, as it is present. Since all movement of people would take place within in the move-out areas. The growing season is only about Qinghai, the project has zero impact on the ethnic composi- 100 days per year. Natural vegetation and wildlife are limited. tion of the population in the province as a whole. Most of the land is leased on a long-term basis to herders for The World Bank estimates that more than 60,000 people, seasonal grazing. A few irrigated plots in the area developed including settlers and people who stay put in the move-out under some small, earlier projects are leased to sedentary areas, would directly benefit from the project. Many more families in small villages. The project provides for the reha- would benefit indirectly. Productivity of the irrigated land bilitation of an old dam and the construction of a new one to in the settlement area would increase by well over 1,000%. capture seasonal snowmelt from the nearby Kunlun Moun- Settlers would be able to triple or quadruple their income in tains. The water currently flows off in small streams into a few years, receive health care and send their children to marshes in the desert. The reservoir behind the dam will be nearby schools. The economic rate of return of the Qinghai very small, only about 1.3 sq. km (0.5 sq. mile). Nobody lives project, not including benefits resulting from improved health in the reservoir area. About 25% of the reliable water supply and education, was estimated by the Bank at about 20%, created under the project would be needed for human and which is not unusually high for this kind of project. animal needs and for the irrigation of 19,200 hectares (about To reduce the risks associated with any large-scale re- 47,000 acres) of land. The rest of the water would continue settlement, the World Bank proposed and the Chinese gov- to flow off into the desert. ernment agreed to begin the Qinghai project with the pilot The project would also provide for land and rural road settlement of only 200 families and to make design adjust- improvement, simple housing, electricity, as well as health ments, if necessary, on the basis of lessons learned. Two and education services in local languages as well as Manda- hundred families represent about the scale of a similar re- rin for all settlers. Local people who wished to take advan- settlement project in a neighboring county that was supported tage of the project, including Tibetans, would have full ac- by the World Food Programme twelve years ago and that cess to social services to be provided under the project. Local remains successful today. About 1,000 settlers from Eastern farmers and pastoralists would have the option to receive a Qinghai moved to Dulan County spontaneously about a de- piece of irrigated land under the project, like the settlers cade ago and are doing well on irrigated land. No NGOs from Eastern Qinghai. The settlement area is located in Dulan had ever protested against the WFP project or against two County, which is part of the Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Au- other large and successful World Bank-supported resettle- tonomous Prefecture. Dulan County, with about 23% of its ment projects involving minority populations in nearby population Tibetan, has a higher concentration of Tibetans Gansu and Ningxia (see footnote 2). than most areas in Haixi Prefecture. With a surface area of 52,000 sq. km, Dulan County is TIBET AND QINGHAI larger than New Hampshire and Vermont added together. Its current population is only about 60,000, many of whom are Qinghai Province is somewhat smaller in area than the nomads. The project would just about double the popula- Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), but larger than the state tion of Dulan County. The additional population would live of Texas. The history of Qinghai is relevant in light of Ti- in a relatively small section of the County and leave the vast betan opposition to the Qinghai project. Tibetans currently majority of the current population undisturbed. The settlers account for 21%, and Han Chinese for 57%, of Qinghai’s would live in small villages and not in big towns as was later total population of a little over 5 million, which is about suggested by the Inspection Panel.3 The current ethnic com- double the TAR population. The concentration of Tibetans position of the County’s population is 53% Han, 23% Ti- in Qinghai used to be much higher many years ago. Large- betan, 14% Mongolian, 7% Hui, and 3% other minorities. scale Han settlement in Qinghai started in the 1920s and There are at present no Tibetans living in the project settle- accelerated in the 1950s under Mao. Han settlement in

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 49 Qinghai is in many ways different from and much older than Bank’s role in it. The large amount of detail in the TIN re- Han settlement in what is now Tibet Autonomous Region. port about internal Bank procedures and policies suggest Some members of the local Han population in Qinghai are that the campaign against the project had been under prepa- former prisoners of the provincial Laogai prison system, or ration for some time. “left-over” exiles from China’s Cultural Revolution (1966- Bank staff members and managers dealing with the 76). Dulan County, like most of Qinghai, is regarded part of Bank’s China program were tied up for months trying to the “Tibetan Plateau” or “Greater Tibet” by the Tibetan “gov- respond to the numerous complaints, attending meetings with ernment in exile”. No foreign government recognizes Tibet protest groups and later, when the Inspection Panel (IP) had as a separate state. The U.S. Congress, however, passed a started its work, responding to requests for information from non-binding resolution recognizing Qinghai as part of Ti- the IP. The Chinese government set up a 24-hour hotline, bet. The resolution is reflected in political maps of China both in Beijing and in Qinghai, to answer questions that were used by some. raised by different parties. The last time Tibetan rulers had full control over the The protests focused mainly on the proposed resettle- area that is now Qinghai Province was more than 1,000 years ment of large number of non-Tibetans in Dulan County and ago. The areas had been conquered by Tibet during the sev- on the alleged environmental damage that the project would enth and eighth centuries A.D. Prior to that there were king- cause. The arguments used in most correspondence received doms subordinate to China. The great Tibetan empire disin- by the Bank were generally the same and the language often tegrated towards the end of the first millennium, and was identical. Most letters received were form letters. This was never fully restored. However, from time to time, Tibet ex- clearly a centrally led campaign. Some letters were highly ercised jurisdiction in certain parts of the old empire (out- emotional in tone and reflected deep suspicions of the inside TAR) until the twentieth century, and Tibetan culture in tentions of the Chinese government. Tibetan people and Ti- some of these areas remains strong.4 Though part of the betan culture were allegedly being ‘swamped by hordes of “Tibetan Plateau”, Qinghai is very different from Tibet, how- Chinese’. Many letter writers were evidently not well in- ever, historically and in many other ways. formed about the project, but nonetheless protested loudly. ICT was strongly supported by CIEL. Both agencies CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PROJECT AND REQUEST FOR INSPEC- claimed that the Bank had not followed its own operational TION procedures and guidelines in the design and appraisal of the Qinghai project. These policy violations were thought to The start of the protest campaign against this project— represent a “serious threat to the lives and the livelihoods of shortly after project negotiations between the Bank and China affected peoples in the area and will result in irreparable had been completed in April 1999—was carefully timed. It damage to the environment, causing locally affected people enhanced political impact. The campaign was led by ICT, material harm”. ICT’s formal request for inspection was which also provides guidance to other Tibetan support groups dated June 18, 1999. The request focused on compliance in the U.S. and elsewhere. ICT shares offices in Washington issues, because it was evidently well understood that the D.C. with the Special Envoy of the Dalai Lama in the U.S. Bank’s independent Inspection Panel cannot express judg- The campaign was supported by the Center for International ment on the merits of a project per se. It can only determine Environmental Law (CIEL), the Inner Mongolian People’s whether, in its judgment, the Bank has properly followed its Party (a Mongolian support group based in New Jersey), own project policies and procedures. When the ICT request several other NGOs, and by many individuals. The Presi- for inspection was first submitted to the Panel, China made dent of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, and Bank Di- it clear that it could not cooperate, because the request was, rectors were inundated by thousands of letters and emails in China’s opinion, politically motivated and as such not from all over the world, protesting the Qinghai project and eligible under Panel rules. the proposed World Bank support for it. Mr. Wolfensohn Many protesters also complained that the Bank was was also urged to drop the project by 60 members of the naively allowing itself to be used as a tool by the Chinese U.S. Congress in a joint letter, and by the U.S. Secretary of government to legitimize the dilution of Tibetan culture and the Treasury as the U.S. representative on the Bank’s Board identity. Protesters raised doubts about the Bank’s claim that of Governors. migration from the move-out area would be voluntary. It The ICT-led campaign appears to have been triggered was claimed that prison labor would be used during project by a “News Update and Special Report” on the Qinghai construction (which is contrary to Bank rules) and that the project from the London-based Tibetan Information Network project would benefit a nearby Laogai prison camp and/or (TIN), dated April 27, 1999. The 7-page TIN report cited government mining projects elsewhere in Qinghai. Gabriel Lafitte, Aid and Development Coordinator for the Australia Tibet Council, as its main source. Mr. Lafitte had THE BOARD DECISION OF JUNE 24, 1999 AND THE observed World Bank missions in Qinghai. Unfortunately, MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR INSPECTION the TIN report contained a number of errors and unsubstantiated allegations by Lafitte against the Chinese government Protests and request for inspection notwithstanding, the and against Bank staff that may have contributed to the in- Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved WPRD ternational furor over the project. The TIN report was ob- project on June 24, six days after receipt of ICT’s request jective and balanced in tone and appearance, but it nonethe- for inspection. The Board stipulated, however, that there less presented a misleading picture of the project and the would be no disbursements for the Qinghai component of

Harvard Asia Quarterly 50 Winter 2001 the project pending review of the IP report that was for- firmed the conclusions of the special high-level staff mis- mally authorized by the Board on September 9. Only the sion to Qinghai just before the Board meeting of June 24. It U.S. and Germany voted against the project at that Board conceded though, that Bank staff responsible for project ap- meeting.5 Just prior to the meeting, Bank management had praisal could have done certain things better, that some re- sent a special team of very experienced Bank staff who had finements in project design could and would be made, and not been directly involved in the Qinghai project, to the that the Bank should have provided more timely and more project areas to investigate the claims made by ICT, CIEL complete information on the project to the general public. and others. The team reported that the allegations were not Management firmly rejected the thrust of ICT’s claims, how- sufficiently robust to justify further delay in Board consid- ever. It confirmed that Bank policies and procedures had eration. It was in part on the basis of this report that Bank essentially been followed. It reaffirmed its belief that this management decided to go forward with the project, subject was a sound anti-poverty project that would bring consider- as always, to Board approval. able benefits to the poor target population while adequately In its request for inspection ICT claimed to represent protecting the interests of people in the move-in area and affected people in the project areas who could not openly that the project would not be harmful to the local environ- speak for themselves, because of China’s repressive politi- ment. cal climate. ICT had received letters from people in Qinghai The report also confirmed that resettlement was volun- who opposed the project mainly on tary, that prison labor would defi- the ground that it was perceived nitely not be used in project con- as a threat to Tibetan culture and struction, and that the project’s interests. Resentment against In its request for inspection [of “B”rating6 for environmental as- China remains strong among Ti- aspects of the Qinghai project], the sessment purposes was justified, betan people and Tibetan support International Campaign for Tibet although this was essentially groups outside China. Unfortu- thought to be a “question of judg- nately the Qinghai project, which claimed to represent affected people ment”. It also disagreed with ICT’s was otherwise a promising anti- in the project areas who could not view that a separate “Indigenous poverty project, became a light- speak for themselves.... Peoples Development Plan” should ning rod for those sentiments and have been prepared for each of the was seized upon by agents such ethnic minorities affected by the as ICT as an instrument to further perceived Tibetan as well project. Citing Bank guidelines, Bank Management argued as their own institutional and political interests. that, since the majority of project beneficiaries belong to ICT’s legal representation claim presented an awkward ethnic minorities, the project itself is the plan, making sepa- dilemma for the Bank. China was for many years the Bank’s rate plans for each minority unnecessary. Management stood largest customer and China’s reputation as a high quality by its opinion that the Qinghai anti-poverty project had been borrower with a strong commitment to poverty reduction reasonably well prepared, and that it would adequately pro- was not in doubt. Under Panel rules, the Board can only tect the interests of affected people in the move-in area. accept representation claims of the kind made by ICT if the representative produces satisfactory evidence that the af- THE INSPECTION PANEL AND ITS REPORT fected people cannot openly speak for themselves. In an effort to diffuse the crisis, Management inquired if China The World Bank’s independent Inspection Panel was would be willing to withdraw its request for Bank financing established in 1994 following the upheaval surrounding the or use the concessionary funds for another anti-poverty Narmada project in the early 1990s7 and lessons learned project. Characteristically, China refused on grounds of prin- from the Wapenhans report.8 The World Bank is the first ciple. To avoid the awkward dilemma presented by ICT’s and so far the only multilateral organization to have such a representation claim, the Board decided to ignore ICT’s re- Panel. In the original concept of the Panel it was meant to quest and to instruct the Panel on its own authority to con- serve as a kind of “ombudsman” on the quality of Bank- duct an investigation. The Board must have been sufficiently supported projects and their implementation. This concept impressed by the protest campaign to feel that an investiga- was later—but well before the Qinghai project—narrowed tion was warranted. at the insistence on Part II member countries who did not The Board’s terms of reference for the Panel fully re- want the Panel to express judgment on the quality of their flected ICT’s request for inspection, even though the origi- projects or policies. The current Panel concept is focused nal request was not mentioned. On that basis, China was exclusively on the inspection of compliance with Bank poli- able to agree with the inspection and offered full coopera- cies and guidelines. tion with the inspection team. At the same time China in- The Qinghai project was the first occasion for the Panel vited foreign journalists to come to the project areas to see to conduct a full-scale inspection. The Panel consists of three for themselves, before, during, or after the inspection. Many respected international figures appointed by the Board. The did. chairman of the panel is a well-known Canadian environ- After receipt of ICT’s inspection request, the Bank’s mental expert. The other two members are a Ghanaian bi- Management prepared a detailed report for the Board, re- ologist and a Dutch parliamentarian/community development sponding to all allegations and concerns expressed in the expert. Requests for inspection may be submitted by two or request. The report, dated 19 July, 1999, essentially con- more people affected by a World Bank-supported project or

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 51 their representative, by technical experts, or by members of agement program for the project which the staff had assured the Board. The Panel is assisted by consultants. the panel would be provided. Given the rather severe limitations imposed on the scope 6. That a broader view should have been taken “of of Panel investigations, it is not surprising that in the case of the fate of the various ecosystems” in the Qinghai-Tibetan the Qinghai project, the Panel only looked at compliance Plateau, not just in or adjacent to the project area. This im- issues. The IP report does not confirm or deny the claim by plies the need for biodiversity and wildlife studies in a large ICT and other protesters that the project would risk disaster area. With apparent endorsement, the Panel cites the opin- for the environment or Tibetan people in the move-in area. ion of the International Crane Foundation that “if the World In some sense, the narrow “legal” role of the Panel defeats Bank decides to go forward with the Dulan County project, the broader objective for which it was originally created. we believe that it is critical that a baseline study on Black- The panel’s 160-page report came out at the end of April necked Cranes be conducted.” The Foundation based this 2000. Because of its technical nature, it diffused somewhat opinion on a report that local informants to “two scientific the sensitive Tibetan issue, but the report was nonetheless expeditions that passed briefly through the area in 1979” very critical of the Bank. It essentially agreed with the alle- had told the scientists that the Black-necked Crane bred in gation that several important Bank procedures and policies the local marshes. had been violated. The panel’s main conclusions were that: 7. Bank Management’s opinion that separate Indig- enous Peoples Development Plans for each of the ethnic 1. The project area had been defined too narrowly by minorities affected by the project were not required in this the Bank and, as a result, “the Assessments fail to address case, “because the project itself is the Plan” (Management’s many significant social and environmental impacts of the opinion), is unacceptable. Project, including impacts on potentially affected members 8. Bank Management appears to have underestimated of minority nationalities.” Many additional assessments and the number of people involuntarily affected by the project studies were deemed necessary. in the move-in areas, because some pastoralists in the re- 2. Surveys used in the move-out area had not been gion who, according to the Panel, sometimes use the land strictly confidential and people in both the move-out and for grazing, had not been included. Moreover, no allowance move-in areas had been insufficiently informed and consulted had been made for the possible inconvenience to existing about the project. Moreover, expressed opinions of those local villages that might result from the 85 km of irrigation who were consulted could not necessarily be trusted, be- canals that would be constructed under the project. (The cause “full and informed consultation is impossible if those Panel report notes, however, that the latter omission was consulted even perceive that they could be adversely affected due to the fact that the exact routing of the irrigation canals for expressing their opposition to, or honest opinions about, had not been determined at the time of project appraisal by a Bank-financed project.” The Panel indicated a “need for the Bank.) far greater efforts to obtain public consultation under ad- 9. The method of compensation offered to affected equate conditions.” This conclusion was based on the Panel’s pastoralists in the move-in area—they have the option to observation of local opposition to the project. receive other pasture land or irrigated plots under the 3. Insufficient efforts had been made by the Bank to project—is inadequate. The reason for this complaint is that, study possible alternative ways of achieving project objec- unlike the settlers from East Qinghai, who are already farm- tives. For example, through alternative investment plans, ers and have the option under the project to return to their alternative sites, alternative project designs, or alternative original homes within two years if things do not work out development plans for the indigenous peoples affected on for them in the settlement areas, “converted” local pastoralists the move-in area. do not have the option to revert to their old lifestyle as herd- 4. The environmental assessment that had been made ers. The Panel also finds that the basis for compensation was inadequate in many respects and the project should have offered to affected pastoralists was insufficiently studied. been rated “A”, implying the need for supplementary envi- 10. The quality and the timeliness of public informa- ronmental studies and reviews. (For an explanation of envi- tion on the project provided during the preparatory stages ronmental ratings, see footnote 6). The Panel also found that were inadequate, as had already been admitted by the Bank there was a need for “considerably more detailed analysis management. of the social and environmental problems of the Move-out villages and how these will be addressed by the Project.” In In the introductory chapter, the Panel notes that there is the paragraphs on energy, the Panel observes that houses to considerable uncertainty and disagreement within the Bank be provided in the settlement area will have two to four light on the precise interpretation on key project policies and pro- bulbs, but no power points for heating or domestic appli- cedures. The Panel concluded, and many staff agreed, that ances. Because of the scarcity of biomass or other suitable differences in staff opinion are so significant that this “raises fuels in the area, at least until agricultural production under serious questions about the ability of the Bank Management the project comes on stream, the Panel concluded that “at a to apply them with any reasonable degree of consistency.” minimum, the potential advantages as well as the cost impli- This is indeed a problem in the Bank. Efforts to reduce the cations of electric heating should have been examined.” scope for confusion and disagreements within the Bank on 5. Bank Management is not in full compliance with the interpretation of project policies and guidelines are its policy on pest management, because the project docu- needed. Given the infinite variety of project and country cir- ments do not specify the details of the integrated pest man- cumstances, this is a major challenge. Complete black-and-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 52 Winter 2001 white certainty for all project situations cannot be achieved, The unpublished internal staff report did not form the but the Bank can do better on this score than it has in the basis for the official Management response to the IP report past. submitted to the Board on June 19, 2000. According to Bank One of the consultants engaged by the IP for this par- rules, the Panel has the last word. The Panel reports to the ticular investigation, an American political scientist, pub- Board and its conclusions are final. They cannot be appealed licly disagreed with the main thrust of the IP’s conclusions or rejected by Management. In its final recommendations to and stated that the project should go forward with Bank sup- the Board, Management stood by the project, but agreed to port. Bank staff members who had worked on the project reclassify the project as “A”. It recommended moreover felt that the IP report reflected many errors in judgment and that: fact. Most disagreed strongly with the main implication of the IP report, namely that the project had been so poorly 1. A number of supplemental and deeper environmen- prepared and was so risky that major revisions (based on tal impact studies would be conducted. additional studies) would be needed before it could proceed. 2. Additional consultations with affected people Many staff would have welcomed an opportunity to discuss would be undertaken, with special attention to be given to a draft report with the Panel and complained about Panel the confidentiality and integrity of the process. procedures which they saw as less than transparent. 3. Separate Indigenous Peoples Development Plans would be prepared for several, but not all, of the different MANAGEMENT AND STAFF RESPONSES TO THE IP REPORT ethnic groups affected. Reports on these plans would be made available to each group in their own language. Most staff members conceded that a number of small improvements in project design should be made, as had al- The Chinese government reluctantly agreed to accept ready been suggested in the Management report of 19 July these recommendations and the extra work and costs that 1999. Some agreed that the environmental assessments that acceptance by the Board would entail. Management did not had been prepared for the project were indeed rather thin propose to undertake additional studies of project alterna- and that the project should have been rated “A”. A large tives on the ground that adequate studies had already been number of experienced Bank staff, however, felt negatively conducted. Management agreed with the Panel that infor- about the IP report. An unpublished internal staff report re- mation on these studies should have been included in the sponding point-by-point to the IP report was intensely criti- project documents. The Management report also pointed out cal and identified many factual errors and misunderstand- that implementation of its recommendations to the Board ings by the Panel. Some errors and misunderstandings were would cost no less than $2,125,000 and would take 12 to 15 thought to be so serious so as to invalidate several of the months. Acceptance and implementation of all Panel rec- report’s main conclusions. ommendations would have cost over $3 million and would For example, the staff pointed out that, contrary to a have taken 15 to 18 months. For comparison, the Bank’s statement in the IP report that Mongolian pastoralists peri- original operational budget for the Western Provinces Pov- odically passing through the project area with their herds erty Reduction Project, of which the Qinghai component had not been consulted, they had in fact been consulted by accounted for about one third, was about $0.5 million. In- Bank staff, and that these people had expressed strong inter- cluding expenditures financed from supplementary Trust est in joining the project as beneficiaries. Another response Funds, the total cost of preparing and appraising the Qinghai concerns the alleged absence of studies on possible project component prior to Panel inspection had been under $0.3 alternatives. The Bank’s project team maintained that China million, which, in the World Bank, is about normal for had in fact conducted serious studies of possible project al- projects of this kind. ternatives over a period of years. The information had not been included in project documents as there seemed to be THE BOARD MEETING OF JULY 6, 2000 no purposes in that. Although staff generally agreed with the introductory Management’s recommendations were broadly accept- chapter in which the Panel complains about the confusion able to the Board, except for the U.S. and Japan who voted within the Bank on the interpretation of policies and guide- against the project. The negative Japan vote was an unpleas- lines, they found the Panel’s interpretation of its own terms ant surprise for China and was seen as a political gesture. of reference excessively narrow and legalistic. It was felt Germany had apparently modified its position and was will- that if Panel criteria used for the inspection of the Qinghai ing to go along with other European members, who sug- project were to be applied across-the-board, few if any Bank gested that Management’s recommendations should be ac- project would pass muster. Put it differently, if Panel require- cepted, but that the project should be re-submitted for Board ments were to be met, Bank operational costs would go approval after the additional studies and assessments had through the ceiling and preparation time would become so been completed. This proposal was not acceptable to China long as to make it essentially impossible for the Bank to on the ground that the project had already been approved by support this kind of anti-poverty projects anywhere. the Board a year earlier; only disbursements had been The Chinese government was extremely dissatisfied with blocked pending an investigation by the IP. In China’s view, the IP report and felt that the Panel had misjudged or misun- all that was required, upon completion of the additional stud- derstood much of the information that it had provided at ies and assessments, was a recommendation from Manage- considerable cost of time and effort. ment to the Board to lift the disbursement restriction.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 53 China and the Bank had already incurred substantial Tibetans from Eastern Qinghai would move to an area of additional expenditures responding to the protests and re- Dulan County where no Tibetans live at present. quests for supplementary information from the IP. Because 3. Bank staff should have rated the Qinghai project China did not want the Qinghai project to become a perma- “A” for environmental assessment purposes from the begin- nent target for international protests and felt that it had done ning. Also, more ex-ante studies of various minority groups more than enough to accommodate the concerns that had in the move-in areas should have been undertaken. World been expressed, it decided “enough is enough”, and with- Bank staff should have been more alert to the political di- drew its request for Bank financing. China had come to the mensions of this project. A more sensitive World Bank is a conclusion that the Bank could not be an effective partner in better World Bank, provided such sensitivity does not stand this project and simply gave up. in the way of supporting poor minorities who need help but Formally, this was the end of the story. But the episode have nowhere else to turn. left many in the Bank and in China deeply frustrated. The 4. The World Bank’s internal budget procedures should protest campaign and the IP report be modified so as to ensure that pro- had made it effectively impossible fessional judgments regarding the to support what was essentially kind and extent of environmental good anti-poverty project or could and social assessments necessary have easily been turned into a The Bank should not shy away from for project preparation and ap- good project. Some staff felt that supporting well-designed resettlement praisal purposes are budget-neu- the Bank had been naïve and projects if they are the best way to tral. That is not the case at present. should never even have contem- help target populations escape A decision to rate a project “A” plated supporting a project in such hopeless poverty, difficult and rather than “B” does not give the complex and controversial politi- project team automatic access to ad- cal circumstances. Others felt that controversial as such a policy may be. ditional resources. the Bank deserved to be put down 5. An independent inspection by the IP, because the environmental assessments had in- Panel is an important instrument for an institution like the deed been marginal at best. Almost everybody was shocked. World Bank, provided it can meaningfully inspect the qual- A thing like this had never happened before. ity and likely effectiveness or harmfulness of a project. A Panel that is only empowered to look at compliance issues is CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES too narrow in scope. Professional biases may be unavoid- able in any Panel, but such biases risk becoming stronger 1. It is hard to accept ICT’s claim that the Qinghai when the terms of reference are too narrow. In my opinion, project was “a serious threat to the lives and livelihoods of the IP gave its terms of reference in this particular case a affected people in the area and will result in irreparable dam- narrow, even legalistic interpretation. Several of the Panel’s age to the environment, causing locally affected people ma- recommendations seem unnecessary or even questionable. terial harm”. If not preposterous, the allegation is at least The studies regarding electric heating of settler houses and grossly overblown. It can in my opinion only be explained the Black-necked Crane illustrate a tendency for perfection- in terms of political motivations that contributed to the cam- ism that seems to be strangely at odds with the reality of paign. The project’s impact on the economic well-being of poverty reduction efforts in Qinghai. the relatively few Tibetans living in the project area, broadly 6. Since no Panel is infallible, a prior discussion of defined, would in all likelihood be positive, through im- Panel recommendations with senior Bank staff would be proved water supply and other infrastructure, health and advisable. Even the U.S. Supreme Court holds public hear- education services, and income growth. What is at issue here ings before deciding a case. In the case of the Qinghai project, is in my view not in the first place the project, but the broader Panel procedures have contributed greatly to tensions within issue of China-Tibet relations. The project was a lightning the Bank. rod. The campaign against it also served political interests. 7. It is strange that the IP does not have to consider Suppose the poor people from Eastern Qinghai had a for- trade-offs between the costs and benefits of additional as- eign lobby to launch a campaign on their behalf, like ICT sessments and studies it recommends. This may explain a did on behalf of the Tibetan cause….Qinghai is not Tibet. tendency towards unrealistic perfectionism in parts of the 2. It is also hard to see how the project would under- IP report. Bank staff and borrowers have to make trade-offs mine Tibetan culture in Dulan County, the main concern of continuously in the real world and they have to work within many protesters. Surely, development does not leave project a budget. It would have cost the Bank (i.e. its Part II share- areas and affected populations unchanged, but change does holders) more than ten times the original cost of project not have to be equated with cultural damage. Even if there preparation and appraisal if all panel recommendations had were to be changes in Tibetan culture as a result of the project, been implemented. why is that necessarily a bad thing? Such changes have to be 8. Bank staff and Management had good reasons to weighed against the economic benefits that the project would believe that the Qinghai project as originally approved by bring to the area and its contribution to poverty reduction in the Board on June 24, 1999 (subject to a temporary suspen- Qinghai Province. They should also be weighed against the sion of disbursements) was essentially a good anti-poverty greater concentration of Tibetans in move-out areas that project, and that it would be well implemented. There is no would result from the project and the fact that some 3500 evidence of insidious intentions behind the project. The

Harvard Asia Quarterly 54 Winter 2001 World Bank acted in accordance with its mandate and prin- large projects in China directly aimed at poverty alleviation. cipal institutional purpose. The experience gained from at Five of those are similar to the Gansu and Inner Mongolia least half a dozen similar projects elsewhere in China (often components of WPRP and 2 are virtually identical in con- involving minorities, though not Tibetans) and earlier, cept to the Qinghai project, including the resettlement of smaller projects of this kind in nearby areas in Qinghai, had minority populations, but not involving Tibetans. Most also been taken into account. Bank-supported anti-poverty projects in China have enjoyed 9. During the past six and a half years, the World Bank high success ratings, including the two that involved large- has actively pursued a policy of much greater openness. Few scale resettlement of minority and mixed minority/Han popu- multilateral agencies have done more in this regard. The lations in Gansu and Ningxia. Since China resumed member- World Bank is the first and so far the only multilateral agency ship in the World Bank in May 1980, the Bank has supported to establish an independent Inspection Panel. This was 226 projects for a total of more than $ 34 billion. needed to make the Bank more responsive and more account- 3 Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon. able. However, there is a limit to how responsive the Bank China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama. University of California can be to outside agencies with a political agenda, without Press 1997. compromising the interests of its borrowers or its own po- 4 Under the Human Rights Section of the 1977 International litical neutrality. Financial Institutions Act (as amended), as applied to China 10. Large-scale resettlement of people for development by the U.S. Administration since Tiananmen, the U.S. repre- purposes, especially minorities, is always difficult and often sentative on the World Bank’s Board must oppose or ab- controversial, even when the resettlement is voluntary, as in stain from all projects for China except those that serve ba- the case of the Qinghai project. In-situ, endogenous devel- sic human needs. Since the Qinghai project presumably opment for poverty alleviation is nearly always preferable, qualifies as a “basic human needs” project, U.S. opposition if it can be achieved. There are situations, such as the case appears to have been discretionary. Germany’s Green coali- of the desperately poor living in the overcrowded, barren tion government appears to have modified its position later; mountains of Eastern Qinghai, where resettlement is the only at the final Board meeting on July 6, 2000 it accepted the viable option. There are not many agencies in the world with project in principle subject to further studies and assess- the resources and the experience to design and support such ments and final Board approval after completion of the stud- projects. The Bank should not shy away from supporting ies and assessments. well-designed resettlement projects if they are the best way 5 The Western Poverty Reduction Project (of which the to help target population escape hopeless poverty, difficult Qinghai project is a component) was rated “B” [is this an A and controversial as such a policy may be. to F scale: describe the significance of the difference be- 11. Protecting the Bank’s statutory “political neutral- tween an A and a B rating], because staff responsible for the ity” has always been a struggle. Situations in which share- project believed that the project was unlikely to have “sig- holders - Part I and Part II countries alike- feel inclined to nificant adverse impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible take political positions on project proposals or Bank poli- and diverse”. Diverging opinions expressed in the Bank at cies cannot be avoided. The responsibility for protecting the that time did not prevail. “A” projects require much more institution’s political neutrality is shared by Management and extensive environmental assessment and review than “B” Board. It falls more heavily on big shareholders than on small projects. Even “B” projects, however, are subjected to a ones. Unfortunately, some of the Bank’s largest sharehold- substantive environmental assessment, as the Qinghai ers, including the U.S., seem to have lost interest in the prin- project was. ciple of political neutrality. Once the Bank is perceived to 6 The 1992 Narmada report by an ad-hoc independent panel be used by major shareholders as an instrument to serve their was triggered by complaints by and on behalf of poor villag- political agendas, the nature of the institution changes ers in India who did not receive adequate support for their quickly. The same happens when Management or sharehold- involuntary resettlement to accommodate a reservoir that ers permit outside agencies with a political agenda to have was part of a Bank-supported dam/irrigation/resettlement too much influence on the institution. While I recognize that project. The report was very critical of the Bank and of the the Bank has to operate in a political world, a renewed dedi- Indian government. The Bank withdrew its support from the cation to the principle of its political neutrality is in my view project, but the Indian government continued implementa- urgently needed tion. 7 This 1992 report aimed at assessing the quality of the World Bank’s project portfolio and at identifying reasons ENDNOTES and cures for systemic problems. It was produced by an expert team under the direction of a retired World Bank Vice 1 In World Bank parlance, Part II members are the poor and President, Willy Wapenhans. middle-income countries who borrow from the Bank. They cover the Bank’s administrative costs through loan charges. Part I members are the rich countries who do not borrow from the Bank and who contribute to the Bank’s concessionary credit program IDA (International Development As- sociation). 2 Over the past 20 years, the Bank has supported about 30

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 55 THE US-VIETNAM TRADE AGREEMENT

n July 13, 2000, in remarks from the South Lawn of the White BY TAI VAN TA House, President Clinton hailed the signing of a trade agree Oment between the United States and Vietnam as “another his- Tai Van Ta is a graduate from Saigon (Vietnam) Law toric step in the process of normalization, reconciliation and healing School (LL.B.), University of Virginia (M.A. and between our two nations.” In November 2000, he became the first sit- Ph.D.) and Harvard Law School (LL.M.). Since 1975, ting U.S. President to visit Vietnam since President Nixon arrived in he has been a research associate, and at times South Vietnam more than 30 years ago. By making this visit, Clinton adjunct lecturer of Vietnamese law at Harvard Law School, and in that capacity, he has published will be likely to go down in history as the U.S. president to have closed books and articles on Vietnamese law, among them the last symbolic chapter of the Vietnam War. Moreover, with the U.S.- The Vietnamese Tradition of Human Rights (1988) Vietnam trade agreement signed after the U.S.-China trade agreement, and Investment Law and Practice in Vietnam (1990) he will leave a legacy of expanding relations with two large communist (co-authored with Prof. Jerome Cohen). He has been a practicing attorney in Massachusetts since countries, facilitating China’s and Vietnam’s eventual admission into 1986. the World Trade Organization and integration into the world community. This article will illuminate: 1) how the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Agree- ment developed as a logical step in the context of American-Vietnam- ese relations; 2) how its provisions promote American interest; 3) how its provisions promote Vietnamese interest and simultaneously force Vietnam to face up to its economic weaknesses; and 4) why Vietnam was postponing its signing of the Agreement for nearly a year and the prospect for implementation of the Agreement.

I. THE TRADE AGREEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION AND RECON- CILIATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM.

The process of normalization has been accomplished in a step-by- step manner, leading to the bilateral trade agreement. During the Bush administration, the U.S. issued a so-called “road map”, according to which Vietnam had to take a number of steps for the U.S. to reciprocate in the process of normalization. One condition was Vietnam’s with- drawal from Cambodia, which was accomplished in 1989. Following that, Vietnam took another required step by seeking admission into regional organizations, showing that it intended to play a positive role in regional security and economic liberalization. Accordingly, in 1993, President Clinton began a policy of normalization with Vietnam by commencing American support of international lending to Vietnam and allowing U.S. firms to join in development projects. At the same time, the U.S. was able to secure full cooperation from Vietnam in accounting for the POW-MIAs of the War (the highest American priority in the relations between the two countries), with 39 joint field activities with Vietnam, repatriation of 288 possible sets of remains, and identification of the remains of 135 unaccounted for American servicemen. Then, in 1994, the U.S. lifted the economic embargo to allow U.S. firms to export to Vietnam and invest in business opportunities there. A year later, the U.S. normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam and later exchanged ambassadors with Hanoi. This policy of normalization has led to further progress in other fields such as resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in the U.S. (closing yet another painful chapter for Vietnamese families who were torn apart during and after the War); enhanced cooperation in combating narcotics trafficking; and promotion of human rights through

Harvard Asia Quarterly 56 Winter 2001 bility depends on democratic choices.

The President emphasized the impact of the greement on reconciliation between the two countries, stating: “This agreement is one more reminder that former adversaries can come together to find common ground in a way that benefits all their people, to let go of the past and embrace the future, to forgive and to reconcile.” Fifty American corpo- rate executives joined President Clinton during his trip to Vietnam. They participated in a business forum in Ho Chi Minh City and some signed ten business contracts involving significant capital values. dialogue that has led to the release of prisoners and addi- The President also an- tional improvements in the human rights situation in Viet- nounced a US$200 million fund for OPIC program of in- nam. vestment guarantees and loans in Vietnam. Vietnam opened its economy and moved toward integration in the world community by joining the Association II. HOW THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREE- of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and the Asia MENT PROMOTE AMERICAN INTERESTS Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1998. Fo- cusing on U.S.-Vietnam trade relations, the White House The agreement has five major sections: equal market stated that the decision to pursue the trade agreement was access for agricultural and industrial goods, intellectual prop- made after Vietnam had established a record of cooperation erty rights protection, market access for services, investment in accounting for the POW-MIAs. In 1998, the U.S. granted protection, and transparency by publishing and making avail- the first waiver of the requirement of Jackson-Vanick Amend- able laws and regulations. The preamble to the bilateral trade ment, extending U.S. export promotion and investment sup- agreement states that the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments port programs to Vietnam. Then, in the following year, the desire to develop mutually beneficial and equitable economic U.S. and Vietnam reached an agreement in principle on key and trade relations on the basis of mutual respect for their provisions of the trade agreement. Finally, in 2000, the U.S. respective independence and sovereignty; and that they ac- and Vietnam reached final agreement on the bilateral trade knowledge the adoption of international trade norms and agreement. President Clinton described both the economic standards by which the two parties will aid in the develop- and political implications of the trade agreement as follows: ment of mutually beneficial trade relations. However, the preamble also notes that Vietnam is a de- The Agreement we signed today will dramatically veloping country at a low level of development, is in the open Vietnam’s markets on everything from agri- process of economic transition, and is taking steps to inte- culture to industrial goods to telecommunications grate into the regional and world economy by joining products, while creating jobs both in Vietnam and ASEAN, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, APEC forum, and in the United States. With this agreement, Vietnam working toward membership in the World Trade Organiza- has agreed to speed its opening to the world; to tion (WTO). subject important decisions to the rule of law and Although the preamble announces the principle of mu- the international trading system; to increase the flow tually beneficial and equitable relations, the provisions in of information to its people; by inviting competi- the five major sections of the agreement mostly benefit the tion in, to accelerate the rise of a free market United States. On the one hand, Vietnam’s low level of de- economy and the private sector within Vietnam, it- velopment does not enable it to benefit much from the pro- self. We hope expanded trade will go hand in hand visions on market access for goods, intellectual property with strength and respect for human rights and la- rights protection, investment protection, and transparency bor standards. For we live in an age where wealth measures. On the other hand, because the United States al- is generated by the free exchange of ideas and sta- ready adheres to international trade norms and standards of

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 57 the World Trade Organization, one receives the impression phonograms/satellite signals respectively; or, if possible, to when reading the provisions of the agreement, especially as immediately comply with this agreement. Vietnam agrees to explained by the White House, that it mainly imposes obli- abide by the substantive economic provisions of the various gations on Vietnam to implement the provisions of the agree- international conventions, such as the 1971 Geneva Con- ment and to comply with the international trade norms and vention for the Protection of Phonograms, the 1971 Berne standards. Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, However, the Agreement does recognize Vietnam’s the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial weak economy and the country’s need to reserve the right to Property, the 1974 Convention on Program-carrying Satel- adopt and maintain many exceptions to national treatment. lite Signals, the 1989 Treaty on Intellectual Property in Re- spect of Integrated Circuits. 1. DRAMATIC NEW MARKET ACCESS FOR AGRICULTURAL AND Vietnam accords to U.S. persons and firms national treat- INDUSTRIAL GOODS FOR AMERICAN CITIZENS AND COMPANIES. ment with regard to the acquisition, protection, enjoyment, and enforcement of all intellectual property rights and any Upon the entry into force of the agreement, Vietnam benefits derived therefrom. agrees to allow all Vietnamese enterprises, and, within three As there has been rampant infringement of U.S. indus- to seven years, U.S. persons and firms, the right to import trial property rights in Vietnam in the areas of computer pro- into and export from the borders of Vietnam without restric- grams and audio-visual recordings, the agreement has paid tion. Vietnam particular attention to agrees to give these property rights most favored na- and stipulates that tion treatment computer programs and national and sound recordings treatment to U.S. are literary works citizens and firms within the meaning of in all matters re- the Berne Convention. lating to cus- As for enforce- toms duties, ment, Vietnam shall methods of pay- provide procedures in ment for import its domestic law that and export, laws, permit effective action rules and for- against infringement, malities, taxes expeditious, and not and fees. unnecessarily compli- Vietnam has cated or costly proce- agreed to lower dures to prevent viola- tariffs sharply in tions, as well as sub- three years on stantial remedies to de- the full range of ter future infringement U.S. industrial (damages, restitution and agricultural exports, and to phase out in three to seven of profits, and destruction of infringing goods, and also years all non-tariff measures (such as quantitative restric- criminal penalties for willful infringement). Decisions in judi- tions), and to adhere to the World Trade Organization stan- cial and administrative enforcement proceedings must be in dards in customs duties, import licensing, state trading, tech- writing, state the reasons and evidence therefor, and must nical standards, and sanitary measures. be made available without delay. Final administrative deci- Vietnam also gives to U.S. citizens and firms national sions must be reviewed by a judicial authority. treatment in access to competent courts and administrative The U.S. is so determined to protect its intellectual prop- bodies as well as arbitration under internationally recognized erty that it agrees to provide Vietnam with technical assis- arbitration rules, including UNCITRAL rules. tance to strengthen Vietnam’s regime for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 2. INCREASED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 3. MARKET ACCESS IN A BROAD ARRAY OF SERVICE SECTORS Intellectual property rights refer to copyrights and related rights, trademarks, patents, layout designs of integrated Vietnam accords immediately and unconditionally most circuits, encrypted program-carrying satellite signals, con- favored nation treatment to U.S. persons and firms. Viet- fidential information (trade secrets), industrial designs and nam agrees to grant national treatment to U.S. persons and rights in plant varieties. firms, and to permit them to enter within three to five years Vietnam agrees to adopt the WTO standards for intel- its markets in the full range of service industries, including lectual property rights protection within twelve months for financial services (insurance and banking), telecommunica- trademarks and patents, within eighteen months for copy- tions, distribution, audio-visual, legal, accounting, engineer- rights and trade secrets, and within thirty months for ing, computer and related services, market research, con-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 58 Winter 2001 struction, education, health and related services, and tour- ism and corruption in Vietnam, the U.S. requires that Viet- ism. nam adopt a fully transparent regime with respect to each of The agreement incorporates the Annexes to the WTO the four substantive areas mentioned above (market access General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Annex for agricultural and industrial goods, intellectual property on Financial Services, on Movement of Natural Persons, on protection, service industry market access, and investment Telecommunications and Telecommunications Reference relations), by publishing and making readily available, on a Paper. regular and prompt basis, all laws, regulations, and proce- All discriminatory measures must be eliminated and a dures pertaining to them, so that enterprises and persons party cannot apply licensing and qualification requirements engaged in business can become acquainted with them be- and technical standards that nullify or impair the specific fore they come into effect, and be given an opportunity to commitments of free trade in services. Nor shall a party adopt comment. Each publication shall include the effective date measures on limitations on the number of service providers, of the measures, the products or services affected by the on the total value of service transactions, on the total num- measures, all authorities that must be consulted in the imple- ber of natural persons that may be employed in a particular mentation, and provide a contact point within each author- service sector or that a service supplier may employ, or on ity from which relevant information can be obtained. The the type of legal entity or joint venture through which a ser- agreement provides that only laws, regulations, and admin- vice supplier may supply a service, or on the participation of istrative procedures that are published and readily available foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on for- will be enforceable and enforced, and that such enforcement eign shareholding. will occur in a uniform, impartial and Judicial, arbitral and adminis- reasonable manner. An official jour- trative tribunals or procedures shall nal or journals must be designated be established to provide prompt By implementing the Trade Agreement, for the publication of laws, regula- review of, and appropriate remedies Vietnam may be able to recapture the tions, and administrative proce- for, administrative decisions affect- confidence of foreign investors, which dures. Administrative and judicial ing trade in services. has been badly shaken in recent years. tribunals and procedures will be maintained for the prompt review 4. DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTMENT RE- and correction of administrative ac- LATIONS tion; these procedures include an opportunity to appeal, without penalty, to successive levels of appellate jurisdic- Investment has many forms: enterprise, stocks and tion. bonds, contractual rights (construction, management, or pro- Additionally, the agreement provides for business fa- duction sharing contracts), tangible property and intangible cilitation measures such as access to office and living ac- property (leases, mortgages, intellectual property rights, li- commodations, non-discriminatory pricing on government- censes, permits, etc.). provided services and products (such as utilities), freedom Vietnam, whether represented by the Vietnamese gov- to hire agents and consultants, and freedom to maintain for- ernment or a state enterprise, accords to U.S. investments eign currency accounts to make payments/transfers of cur- national treatment, most favored nation treatment, and full rencies at market rate of exchange (for profit remittance, protection and security required by customary international capital repatriation, liquidation, payment of royalty, inter- law. However, Vietnam, as well as the U.S., may adopt ex- est, management fees, loans and contract obligations, and ceptions in certain sectors, as provided in Annex H, below. compensation in investment disputes). Vietnam agrees to protect U.S. investments from expropria- tion (except for cases of public purpose, upon payment of III. THE TRADE AGREEMENT BRINGS BENEFITS TO VIETNAM BUT prompt and adequate compensation, in accordance with due FORCES IT TO FACE UP TO ITS ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES AND CARRY process of law). It will eliminate local content and export OUT REFORMS. performance requirements and phase out its investment licensing regime for many sectors. At present, Vietnam does not have any intellectual prop- Vietnam permits the entry, sojourn, and employment of erty rights or investments in the U.S. worthy of protection in alien managers, executives, and persons of specialized the American market. Vietnamese services cannot compete knowledge. in the United States, but Vietnam can benefit from export- For investment dispute settlement, the agreement pro- ing goods to the United States. At the present time, Vietnam vides for consultation and negotiation, administrative tribu- produces only a few goods that American consumers want nals and competent courts, and binding arbitration at the to buy (products such as coffee, wooden furniture, seafood, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, handicraft, footwear, and clothing—but existing and future in accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the textile agreements of the United States would not be affected UN Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of For- by this trade agreement). Nonetheless, in October 2000, eign Arbitral Award. Vietnam’s Deputy Trade Minister predicted that Vietnam- ese exports to the U.S. could balloon from $204 million in 5. TRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS AND RIGHT TO APPEAL 1996 and $504 million in 1999 to $800 million in 2001, $2.8 to 3 billion by 2005, and $11 billion by 2010. He said To alleviate concerns about bureaucratic obstruction- more than 1000 Vietnamese businesses are already apply-

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 59 ing for export permits. and companies are not yet allowed to issue bonds and shares Also, by implementing the trade agreement, Vietnam to the public in Vietnam, and shall not acquire more than may be able to recapture the confidence of foreign inves- 30% of the shares in a state enterprise; tors, which has been badly shaken in recent years to such an (4) For three years, the general director of a joint ven- extent that foreign investment slumped from U.S. $2.8 bil- ture must be Vietnamese, and decision on a limited number lion in 1997 to only $500 million in 1999. of important matters must be by unanimity; The trade agreement awakens Vietnam to address its (5) U.S. persons and companies are not allowed to own economic weaknesses and recognize the economic chal- land and residence, and can only lease, and mortgage land lenges facing the country. Vietnam has not engaged in suffi- use rights relating to the investments. cient capital formation, nor has it reached the stage of mak- The U.S., in turn, may adopt exceptions to national treat- ing investments in the United ment to Vietnamese investments in States, as China has been able to the U.S., in the sectors of atomic en- do. Accordingly, it will be some ergy, licenses for broadcast, com- time before Vietnam will be able to Vietnam has not engaged in sufficient mon carrier, subsidies or grants, crack the service market in the capital formation, nor has it reached the submarine cables, fisheries, air and United States. stage of making investments in the maritime transport, banking, insur- Even if we consider only the United States, as China has been able to ance, securities and other financial trade in goods with the United do. services, satellite transmissions and States, the quality and standards digital audio services. of Vietnamese goods must improve. The Deputy Trade Minister IV. WHY VIETNAM DRAGGED ITS FEET pointed out that only 100 export items from Vietnam have BEFORE SIGNING THE AGREEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPLE- met ISO quality codes. Many of the products of the 5,000 MENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT state-owned enterprises and 2,000 joint ventures in Vietnam continue to fail American standards. The Vietnamese government postponed the signing of Given the above situation, the most important reform is the agreement from 1999 to July 2000 due to tremendous that of state enterprises in order to make them more com- debate within the leadership about whether the signing was petitive. Inefficient, unproductive and corrupt firms that can- worthwhile. Conservatives viewed the agreement as surren- not compete on the international market must be dismantled dering their control of the economy and feared that state through sale, privatization (equitization), or bankruptcy. The enterprises could not survive competition with the Ameri- reforms are necessary not only for improving export poten- can traders and investors. Former Party General Secretary tial but also for survival within Vietnam itself in confronting Do Muoi stated that to sign the agreement is to betray the competition from the American traders and investors. fatherland. Probably to mollify the conservative elements, In the years ahead, the United States has taken into Prime Minister Phan Van Khai declared that the agreement is account the economic weaknesses of Vietnam and made con- based on principles of respect for the respective countries’ cessions by allowing Vietnam independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each (a) to phase out the trade restrictions (tariffs and non- other’s internal affairs, and a manifestation of the Vietnam- tariff restrictions) over several years and, ese Party’s foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, (b) in the areas of investment, to reserve the right to diversification, and multilateralization. There was also an adopt and maintain exceptions to national treatment with indication that the Chinese had suggested that the Vietnam- respect to broadcasting, television, production and distri- ese wait for them to sign the trade agreement with the U.S. bution of cultural products, investment in insurance, bank- first. It turns out that following that proposal was inimical to ing, brokerage in securities and currency values, mineral Vietnam’s national interest because China was able to pre- exploitation, construction and operation of telecommunica- cede Vietnam by accessing the U.S. market earlier. Indeed, tions facility, construction and operation of inland water, some liberal Vietnamese blamed the conservative leadership sea and air ports, transportation by railway, air, road, sea and for being manipulated by the Chinese. inland waterway, fishery, and real estate. Mr. Hauser, Deputy Under-Secretary For International In addition, Trade of the U.S. Department of Commerce, described (1) Vietnam may, for up to five years, require local raw Vietnam’s signing of the Trade Agreement as a “bold deci- material sources in: processing of paper, vegetable oil, milk, sion” that “proved conclusively that the significant portions cane sugar, and wood; of the Vietnamese leadership which are favorably disposed (2) Vietnam may, for up to seven years, require 80% toward a more liberal economic regime are alive and well, export performance in cement production, paints, toiletry and have won support for the Trade Agreement.” tiles and ceramics, plastics, footwear, clothing, steel, tires, However, much work remains to be done for the imple- fertilizer, alcoholic products, tobacco, and papers; mentation of the agreement. Under the Jackson-Vanick (3) Vietnam may, during the first three years of the Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, the U.S. Congress must agreement, require that U.S. persons and firms must con- ratify the trade agreement, and the President must then cer- tribute at least 30% of the legal capital of a joint venture, tify freedom of emigration from Vietnam in order for the and give the right of first refusal to the Vietnamese party for U.S. to grant Normal Trade Relations status to Vietnam. the transfer of an interest in the joint venture. U.S. nationals The ultimate result of the trade agreement implementa-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 60 Winter 2001 tion will be in the interest of the United States, since its implementation will lock Vietnam into a broad band of commitments that will strengthen its private sector and the freedom of the Vietnamese to make individual economic decisions, which will enhance their human rights in general. Until Viet- nam secures membership in the World Trade Organization, the annual renewal by the U.S. Congress of Normal Trade Relations status for Vietnam will entail a yearly battle over Vietnam’s human rights record, constituting a mechanism for pressuring Vietnam into better human rights performance.

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 61 INTERVIEW WITH DOAN VIET HOAT

On December 8, 2000, HAQ editor Michou Nguyen 1. HAQ: You’ve stated in other forums that President Clinton should conducted an interview with Vietnamese human use his trip as an opportunity to send a clear message to Vietnam con- rights observer Doan Viet Hoat. cerning political freedom and human rights. However, it seemed that the President’s focus rested instead on economic development and the future of the Vietnamese economy. Do you think that this focus on economics overshadowed issues concerning human rights and political freedom?

DVH: Before President Bill Clinton went to Vietnam his staff made some efforts to brief prominent activists of the Vietnamese community about the trip and to seek ideas and suggestions from them. The Viet- namese diaspora in the United States so far has focused their concern on the totalitarian policy of the present communist government in Vietnam and its violations of basic human rights. The Vietnamese community, at the present stage of their involvement in Vietnam, is not opposed to economic renovation and free trade. However, they do not believe that free trade and economic renovation will succeed within the framework of the present closed and monopolistic political system. I believe that the United States should adopt the policy of “balanced engagement” with such countries as Vietnam and China, in which assistance in opening up the country should embrace both a free market and a free society. I believe that today no one seriously contends that a free market alone will eventually lead to a free society. Without effective efforts to help bring about an open society, free trade and a free market system can hardly take shape, which, consequently, will lead to popular frustration and social unrest. In his visit to Vietnam, President Clinton conveyed a clear, though not strong, message of support for human rights and freedom. He touched on some non-economic and sensitive issues—the war of the past and the basic rights of the present. He also tried to add to the bright prospects of free trade and free market economic system by remarking on the “irreversible trend” of liberalization of society. He spoke openly that “guar- anteeing the right to religious worship and the right to political dissent does not threaten the stability of a society.” He also expressed his belief that it is better off for Vietnamese young people to “have a say in choos- ing their governmental leaders and having a government that is accountable to those it serves”. His positive attitude toward the war, his remarks on the important role of the Vietnamese-Americans, and finally, the unexpected enthusiastic mass gathering to welcome him both in Hanoi and Saigon—all these factors rendered his visit both historical and significant. However, it is also clear that the President believes strongly in opening Vietnam to the world as the best way to liberalize Vietnam. Therefore, his visit should be viewed as a starting point for a new stage of engagement.

2. HAQ: Assuming that President Clinton was successful in conveying a message supporting political freedom and human rights to the Viet- namese people, how successful do you think the people will be in initi- ating change in light of the authoritarian control exercised by the Polit-

Harvard Asia Quarterly 62 Winter 2001 buro? How can President Clinton or the United States facili- Clinton: “The US Secretary of State the other day asked me tate the implementation of change? whether socialism would continue to exist. I replied that socialism would not only exist but continue to develop suc- DVH: Although the President did not meet with any dis- cessfully.” And he informed the President that he made simi- sidents, Rep. Loretta Sanchez met with four prominent dis- lar statements during his visits in France, Italy, and the Eu- sidents in Hanoi and two in Saigon. I believe that the people ropean Union.3 will become more active and more vocal in their demand In short, the free market system and democracy are not for change. In fact, right after Clinton’s visit, one of the lead- in the present Politburo’s agenda, at least for the next ten ers, the Deputy Minister of Defense, warned against “peace- years. Their priority is not prosperity for the country but ful evolution”. Protests continue consolidation of their power in the and have intensified both in the name of “socialism”. Will they suc- provinces and in Saigon and Hanoi. ceed? I doubt that they will. They In the provinces, during the last few Protests continue and have intensified are facing a dilemma: In the con- weeks, hundreds of peasants trav- both in the provinces and in Saigon and temporary context of globalization, eled to provincial government head- Hanoi... More religious leaders and prosperity for the people must ac- quarters to file their complaints, followers raise protests against the company openness in society and though in vain.1 More religious transparency in the government. I leaders and followers raise protests government’s persecution; some even visualize the following scenario: against the government’s persecu- engage in hunger strikes in Hue and in Under the pressure of the time, the tion; some even engage in hunger the Mekong Delta. party leaders will have to accept strikes in Hue and in the Mekong more openness and more loosen- Delta. Political dissidents have in- ing of their control. This irrevers- tensified their activities. Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, a prominent ible process will finally lead to a critical point when the mo- dissident in Saigon, announced the forming of Get-Together nopolistic power of the party will be brought to an end. The For Democracy (Tap Hop Vi Nen Dan Chu) three days before party strategists and leaders fully understand this scenario, President Clinton’s visit. 2 The discontent of the people has and they have been seeking to avoid this fatal close of their become more open and more vocal, as people recognize that power. This is the dilemma, both for the party and for the they can receive American and international recognition and country. To avoid the end of the monopolistic political sys- support. tem means both to scale down and to slow down the pro- The next step that the American government and public cess of reformation and development. can take to promote freedom and human rights in Vietnam is to focus on helping to strengthen the people and the pri- 4. HAQ: Do you think that the President’s visit had an vate sector in all areas of activities, including economic, cul- impact on the rural population of Vietnam, considering that tural, educational, and informational realms. I think that the they have less ready access to the media and as a result less next Administration should support public as well as pri- information about the President’s visit? vate programs and activities to promote the emergence of an open civil society. At least, pressure for more openness DVH: In the rural areas some families have TVs and and changes on the part of the government should go hand many have radios. Many villagers heard about Mr. Clinton’s in hand with strengthening the people’s economic and cul- visit, and certainly this is the most important news in Viet- tural opportunities and power. nam at the present time. However, the visit will not have an immediate impact on the northern rural population, who had 3. HAQ: You suggested in your comments that free trade and economic stability cannot occur without the guarantee of basic freedoms. Do you think that the Politburo shares this view or do they believe economic prosperity can exist without basic freedoms?

DVH: There are two major differences between the Politburo and the dissenting democrats. First, the Politburo does not want to develop a free market system. Le Kha Phieu, Secretary General of the CPVN, told President Clinton: “The doi moi (renovation) goal is to achieve an independent, sovereign, socialist-oriented economy….Vietnam has private economy, but Vietnam is not privatizing the economy…the State and co-operative economic sectors play a significant role.” Second, Le Kha Phieu consistently reaffirms the ideological nature of the Vietnamese political system. He told President

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 63 no direct contact with Americans in the past. For many ENDNOTES peasants in the South, especially for older people, the visit may kindle some expectation for drastic changes and a bet- 1 Far Eastern Economic Review Online, Dec. 7. ter future. Before 1975 the South had enjoyed the beginning 2 He even registered an email address for his move of a free market economy, which was later disrupted by the ment: [email protected] communist northerners. Right before Mr. Clinton’s visit to 3 Nhan Dan (People) Online, 20.11.200, p.1. Saigon, the police disengaged about 100 peasants who had staged a demonstration in front of the Office of the Central Government for more than two months. In the Mekong Delta, where the peasants have recently suffered the most severe flood in 70 years, the government has encountered strong protests by the Hoa Hao religious group, whose leader was killed in 1946 by the communists.

5. HAQ: Would you say that the President’s visit was a success from the viewpoint of the Politburo? the Vietnam- ese people? the United States?

DVH: I think that each of the three parties benefits differently from President Clinton’s visit. The Politburo may enhance its political prestige in having Mr. Clinton visit Viet- nam while the communist party still holds power. Closer relations with the US also help to create a balance of power in the context of sensitive regional security problems. For the Vietnamese people, Mr. Clinton’s visit may give a boost both to their expectations and to popular discontent. Political and religious dissidents will become more confident of their activities and will expect stronger support from American and international circles. For the United States, President Clinton gave to his Vietnam agenda a historical ending. However, whether the visit will be a success in reality for all three parties is still unclear. From the viewpoint of the Vietnam- ese and Americans who want to see a new Vietnam emerge, the road ahead is full of expectation and uncertainty.

6. HAQ: What else do you think President Clinton should have done but did not do during his visit?

DVH: The President should have talked more directly of political and religious prisoners. He should have met some prominent dissidents. He did see Archbishop Pham Minh Man of Saigon, but only for 10 minutes. He should have met Rev. Thich Quang Do, the internationally renowned leader of the banned Unified Buddhist Church. He was rather soft in his remarks on human rights and freedom. Perhaps he is using his “carrot” more than his “stick” in his first visit to unified Vietnam under the communist regime.

7. HAQ: Do you think that the First Lady made any significant contribution during her visit?

DVH: Mrs. Hillary Clinton offered a more human, less political touch on the President’s visit. She certainly won the hearts of the people on the street and thus left a great impact on young and ordinary Vietnamese people. However, her meeting with the Vietnamese Women Association helped to promote government-controlled organizations rather than independent NGOs (non-governmental organizations), which have yet to develop in Vietnam.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 64 Winter 2001 THE MEANING OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S TRIP TO VIETNAM

BY CHAN TRAN resident Clinton visited Vietnam at last and succeeded in a very important mission: establishing diplomacy. Appealing to the Chan Tran is editor of the Vietnam Insight masses has been the President’s strong suit throughout his term publication and Internet service, which promotes P in office. But appealing to people who have persistently heard propa- human rights, freedom, and democracy for Vietnam. ganda against American “Imperialists” would not be easy. Nonethe- less, President Clinton articulated his powerful message effectively and with warmth, tact, and diplomacy. The large crowds of enthusiastic people pouring into the streets to greet President Clinton wherever he went in Vietnam were both un- precedented and unexpected, especially because the Hanoi government limited dissemination of information to the public regarding Mr. Clinton’s visit. In contrast, when Fidel Castro visited Vietnam years earlier, few people showed up for the welcoming event despite the government’s efforts to urge people onto buses and shuttle them to the gathering site. There were signs that the Hanoi leadership feared that the U.S. president’s influence could serve as a catalyst for a democratic revolution in Vietnam. Such fear was certainly well founded considering the mounting political upheaval in the past few years, which was marked by protests, labor strikes, religious demonstrations, and rising dissent from both intellectuals and high-ranking senior Communist Party members. The visit by the leader of the free world offered the people increased encouragement and momentum for their cause. By offering President Clinton a welcome warmer than any Hanoi leader has ever received, the people of Vietnam painted a stark contrast to the dry receptions they usually give to the Hanoi leaders. In- deed, the people enthusiastically tuned in to the President’s speech and reached out to shake hands along the streets of Saigon and Hanoi. What appealed to the people was the friendly way in which the President carried himself, in contrast to the manner and messages the Hanoi leaders often send. But more than that, it was the dream and hope for a life of liberty that President Clinton represents that is so compelling to all who hear his message. It is somewhat ironic that Hanoi leaders initially thought Presi- dent Clinton’s visit would enhance their trade opportunities and thus enthusiastically embraced the idea. As the visit approached, the leaders became threatened by the President’s influence on their control and aggressively returned to old rhetoric against American “Imperialists”, downplayed his visit, demanded an apology for the war, and scanned for possible revolts from the people. But revolt they did by embracing Clinton and his message of the democratic path that Vietnam must travel to fully realize its potential. Dissidents such as Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, Venerable Thich Quang Do, and Hao Hao leader Le Quang Liem also took the opportunity to call for religious freedom and respect for civil liberties. I have been following the Clinton Administration’s Vietnam policy throughout the years with keen interest, not only because I am a Viet- namese American but also because I am a human rights activist who awaits the day that Vietnam will join the rest of the world on the path toward democracy. Despite my desire to witness Vietnam join the world

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 65 community and benefit from democracy and technological toward Vietnam and the quality of a great leader to listen knowledge, and to see my native and adopted homelands that has created the opportunity for Vietnamese Americans embrace each other, I believe that the U.S. has exercised a to take part in the U.S. policy-making process. I hope fu- policy that is too passive toward the regime in Hanoi. If ture administrations and lawmakers will recognize this part- America is interested in a healthy and long-term relation- nership so that U.S. policy will effectively serve both na- ship with Vietnam, we must exercise our leverage against tions and avoid the losses and conflicts of the past. the Hanoi dictatorship in order to bring about meaningful The historic three-day visit has already passed, and the changes in Vietnam. Clinton presidency has come to an end. But its impact and Based on previous U.S. policy towards Vietnam, I did historical contribution will remain. Bill Clinton will be re- not have much hope for President Clinton’s visit. I expected membered as the President who reached out and touched it to be another public relations trip that would promote trade the people of Vietnam, whose trip has helped to highlight and help strengthen Hanoi’s legitimacy in the eyes of the the cause of human rights and Vietnamese aspirations. The world. I was surprised to learn that the President prior to his President’s last action regarding Vietnam spoke much louder trip invited 35 members of the Vietnamese American com- and more meaningfully than his earlier policies: It is the munity to advise him on the situation in Vietnam and to learn people and not the Communist dictatorship with whom the of our shared aspirations with the people in Vietnam. The U.S. wishes to cultivate relations. And in the days ahead, meeting marked the first official recognition of the Vietnam- the people of Vietnam should be able to count on American ese Americans’ role in the relations between the two na- friendship, manifested through wise policy. tions. This role is critical as long as the people of Vietnam have no effective voice within their country. When I heard the President’s speech at Hanoi Univer- sity, I felt as if he had spoken on my behalf, expressing the ideas and dreams I have always wanted to share with my people but never got the chance. Many of my friends also expressed favorable comments for the President’s remarks. Even the most traditional Vietnamese elder I know praised President Clinton’s astute appreciation of Vietnamese culture, including his reference to the two famous scholars and patriots, Ho Xuan Huong and Nguyen Trai, in a state dinner in Hanoi. I believe that the President’s success with the people of Vietnam would not have been so great without the input from Vietnamese Americans who want to serve the mutual interests of both nations. It was both the Vietnamese Ameri- cans’ efforts to contribute realistic values to the U.S. policy

Harvard Asia Quarterly 66 Winter 2001 BOOK REVIEW: “THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA”

BY PHAR KIM BENG y his own admission, Amitav Archarya, a professor at York Uni versity (Canada) is not an Asianist. Rather, his niche is “Asian Phar Kim Beng is a Senior Correspondent of The BPacific regionalism”. Two questions obviously emerge: Can an Straits Times, Singapore. He is currently based in entity as diverse as Asia-Pacific be labeled a “region” without skewing Boston, where he publishes a weekly feature on the meaning of the term? More importantly, have contemporary social Asian-Pacific affairs. sciences developed the necessary tools and lenses to examine it? “The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia” BOOK INFORMATION provides affirmative answers to both queries, albeit with the analytical Author: Amitav Archarya scope restricted to Southeast Asia alone, rather than Northeast Asia. Title: The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia Indeed, the book is Amitav Archarya’s first attempt to define, if not to Publisher: Oxford University Press defend, the “existence” of Southeast Asia, and he performed the job immensely well. For what it is worth, this book is extremely insightful, timely, and instructive. For years, political scientists have tended to look at South- east Asia either as a colonial construct—alas, a geographical space that is devoid of its own indigenous identity, political network, trade ma- trix, and common culture—or a region too diverse to be deemed a “region” in the first place. Bringing historical materials to bear, Amitav Archarya marshaled his resources and facts well to affirm categorically that prior to the onset of colonialism in Southeast Asia in the early 16th century, ancient dynasties and kingdoms had already existed. Not only did they exist, but they held various forms of ties that mirror contemporary international relations in Southeast Asia too. Dynasties such as Funan, Champa, Pagan, Srivijaya, Angkor, Majapahit and Ayutthya, just to name a few, were known as thriving centers of commerce and power from as early as 1st century A.D. History, however, is not the forte of this book. Much of the discussions on history were drawn from the works of other historians who had studied the region. Thus, there is not much use of new or primary research materials. What makes Amitav’s contribution to the regional studies of Southeast Asia an important one, however, is his foray into the region’s attempt, especially since 1967, to foster a common identity — such as through the creation of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), now comprised of 10 members that form what is collectively known as Southeast Asia. Be that as it may, Amitav’s book did not seriously ponder whether what regionalism achieved through what constructivists called identity-formation can overcome regime differences too. Myammar, for instance, has become bolder in asserting its different standard of governance after becoming a member of ASEAN. Does this imply that ASEAN has failed in drawing Myammar into accepting a minimum set of values? Indeed, if ASEAN is creating a common identity, a key thesis of this book, what is stopping Myammar, or for that matter, Viet- nam, in liberalizing their regimes further? After all, if the external environment is made safer through their membership in ASEAN, shouldn’t these countries be more receptive to suggestions and initiatives for change?

Harvard Asia Quarterly Winter 2001 67 The above questions are important because tackling them would avail us an understanding of whether regionalism, as promoted by ASEAN, is real or fictional. In other words, is Southeast Asia growing closer together because it is a region simply discovering “lost roots”—one of the key premises of the book—or is it becoming “regional- ized” due to a panoply of other causes, which include the rise of China, the advent of globalization, and the imbal- ance of power between Northeast and Southeast Asia? Any combination of the latter would of course aggravate the insecurity of certain member states in Southeast Asia, rather than to assuage it. Therefore, attempts to turn Southeast Asia into a single region, for better or for worse, are in- duced probably as a result of negative forces of fear rather than positive forces of peace. Just as it is plausible to point to the growing integration of Southeast Asia as a result of identity formation, a skilled realist scholar such as Michael Leifer of the London School of Economics, for instance, could turn the same claim on its head by looking at power- related variables. In any case, this book has done an exceptional job in getting the debate going. But for a more thorough understanding of the growing bond of Southeast Asia, other causes cannot be discounted. Realist scholarship that has dominated the study of Southeast Asia may yet live to see another day. That said, it is a testament to Amitav’s originality and scholarship that he chose to study Southeast Asia from the standpoint of identity formation, hence indirectly social- constructivism. It is a promising approach, though one that is still in need of greater analysis.

Harvard Asia Quarterly 68 Winter 2001