The Limits of Neorealism: Understanding Security in Central Asia*
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Review of International Studies (1999), 25, 87–105 Copyright © British International Studies Association The limits of neorealism: understanding security in Central Asia* RAJAN MENON AND HENDRIK SPRUYT Abstract. This paper specifies the conditions for conflict in Central Asia. Given Russian preponderance this should be an easy case for neorealism. But we demonstrate that the consequences of Russia’s superior power will depend on the nature of its regime and domestic stability in Central Asia. The type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the success or failure of economic reform will be critical conditions for Central Asian stability. The paper also evaluates the prospects for conflict resolution and prevention. I. Introduction This article examines the likelihood for conflict in Central Asia. We take Russian preponderance as a given. Indeed, because of the vast difference in relative power between Russia and the Central Asian states, their relations should present an ‘easy case’ for neorealism.1 We argue, however, that the imbalance of power among states tells us little. Power imbalances do not, ipso facto, generate conflict (they seldom precipitate war among democracies, for example).2 An asymmetric balance of power is a systemic precondition for conflict but domestic variables are key in explaining whether and how conflict will occur.3 We argue that the consequences of prepon- derance depend on the nature of the regime in the stronger power and the level of domestic stability in the weaker state. We substantiate our claim through an analysis of the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. The likelihood of conflict depends on the nature of the Russian regime (democratic or authoritarian) and the level of domestic stability in Central Asia. The domestic stability of the Central Asian states in turn hinges on the type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the effects of economic reform. A democratic Russia and a stable Central Asia is the combination most conducive to peace. An authoritarian Russia will be more likely to engage in neo-imperialism, even if the Central Asian states remain stable. Instability in Central Asia will draw in * We would like to thank Alexander Motyl, Barnett Rubin, and Jack Snyder for comments. 1 For the rationale behind this testing procedure, see, for example, H. Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science,’ in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science,7 (Reading, MA, 1975), p. 119. 2 B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993); M. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151–69. 3 Even those partial to neorealism are forced to invoke domestic level variables to explain when and how conflict occurs. See, for example, S. David, ‘Explaining Third World Realignment’, World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 233–56; S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987). 87 88 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt Russia, even if it remains democratic. An authoritarian Russia and an unstable periphery will be the most dangerous situation of all. We begin by showing how late state formation influences the internal stability of the Central Asian states. The article then clarifies the interaction between Russian regime type and Central Asian instability. We conclude by suggesting mechanisms for ameliorating conflict. II. The nature of state formation in Central Asia and its consequences The particularities of state formation in the Central Asian states create problems not dissimilar from the problems faced by other developing countries (as, for example, those of sub-Saharan Africa).4 First, sovereign territoriality was imposed by an external power. The Central Asian states were formed from 1924–36 by adminis- trative diktat in the Stalinist era.5 Moscow supported elites that were favourably disposed to the Communist Party, assigned largely arbitrary borders to the republics and autonomous territories, and allotted such territories to a specific (titular) nationality. This was a deliberate strategy to weaken peripheral resistance by institutionalizing ethnic differences. Consequently, in Central Asia, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, state boundaries and ethnic composition lack correspondence. Second, the Central Asian states are late developers. Late developing states have traditionally opted for interventionist economic policies and authoritarian govern- ment to catch up to and compete with earlier developers.6. Third, because sovereign, territorial rule was imposed, rival identities, such as clan membership, Islam, ethnic, and regional affinities have not been displaced by cen- tralizing, high-capacity states. When statehood is imposed on less developed societies, governments will constantly be challenged by alternative logics of political organization.7 In Central Asia one can see how such alternative networks—kinship structures, clans, organized crime rings—permeate the state, particularly in Tajikistan.8 Fourth, Tilly’s observation that ‘war made the state, and the state made war’, does not apply to Central Asia. The absence of protracted interstate conflict means that the 4 D. Anglin, ‘Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments’, Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 431–55; S. Decalo, ‘The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa’, African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 7–36; S. Makinda, ‘Democracy and Multi- Party Politics in Africa,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996), pp. 555–73. 5 See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT, 1975); H. D’Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus. 6 The East Asian states are prime examples. For a discussion of the ‘developmental state’, see F. Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, 1987). On the broader phenomenon, see A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1962). 7 J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988). For the lack of state capacity of developing states also see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990). 8 B. Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Tajikistan’, Survival, 35 (1993), pp. 71–91. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 89 Central Asian state institutions have not been strengthened by war.9 Instead, inter- state competition, as in World War II, largely favoured expanded central government in Moscow, and legitimated the USSR as the motherland. The administrative power of the imperial centre grew at the expense of the peripheral units during war. Fifth, these states lack any experience with democratic multi-party systems. Indeed, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR many of the communist elites have recast themselves in nationalist garb and have created authoritarian regimes.10 These five conditions create cross-cutting pressures on Central Asian governments. Economic modernization might require late developing states to adopt inter- ventionist strategies. But interventionist and authoritarian rule would run counter to the need for proportional representation and consensus politics that are often seen as prerequisites for reconciling the demands of minority groups in multi-ethnic societies.11 Economic centralization is likely to be seen as favouring those ethnic groups most closely aligned with the dominant government and opposed by ethnic minorities for this reason. Moreover, international financial institutions, such as the IMF, will also oppose interventionist economic policies. Central Asian governments might therefore use other means to justify the expansion and centralization of state power. Highlighting external threats may be one such means. As Jeffrey Herbst suggests ‘states may be tempted to use war as a means of resolving their otherwise intractable problems of state consolidation’.12 III. The external and internal causes of conflict (1) The external context The balance of power in the Russia-Central Asia subsystem still overwhelmingly favours Russia, despite its many problems, and this structural condition will not change in the foreseeable future. The power imbalance is illustrated in Table 1 using some standard measures of military power, and the picture of overwhelming Russian advantage remains the same if other measures—such as GNP, population, and industrial output—are used.13 The disarray in the Russian military has made intervention in the periphery problematic for Moscow. The war in Chechnya demonstrates that the danger of Russia becoming mired in peripheral quagmires is very real.14 Yet, as Russia’s role in shaping the conflicts in Tajikistan, Moldova, and Georgia show, in peripheral states 9 C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985). 10 For the continued presence of former Communist cadres in the post-breakup USSR, see R. Suny, Revenge of the Past (Stanford, CA, 1993). 11 See, for example, the various suggestions to manage ethnic cleavages in Africa. S. Makinda, ‘Democracy and Multi-Party Politics’; R. Southall, ‘Negotiations and Social Democracy in South Africa’,