The Limits of Neorealism: Understanding Security in Central Asia*

RAJAN MENON AND HENDRIK SPRUYT

Abstract. This paper specifies the conditions for conflict in Central Asia. Given Russian preponderance this should be an easy case for neorealism. But we demonstrate that the consequences of Russia’s superior power will depend on the nature of its regime and domestic stability in Central Asia. The type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the success or failure of economic reform will be critical conditions for Central Asian stability. The paper also evaluates the prospects for conflict resolution and prevention.

I. Introduction

This article examines the likelihood for conflict in Central Asia. We take Russian preponderance as a given. Indeed, because of the vast difference in relative power between Russia and the Central Asian states, their relations should present an ‘easy case’ for neorealism.1 We argue, however, that the imbalance of power among states tells us little. Power imbalances do not, ipso facto, generate conflict (they seldom precipitate war among democracies, for example).2 An asymmetric balance of power is a systemic precondition for conflict but domestic variables are key in explaining whether and how conflict will occur.3 We argue that the consequences of preponderance depend on the nature of the regime in the stronger power and the level of domestic stability in the weaker state. We substantiate our claim through an analysis of the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. The likelihood of conflict depends on the nature of the Russian regime (democratic or authoritarian) and the level of domestic stability in Central Asia. The domestic stability of the Central Asian states in turn hinges on the type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and the effects of economic reform. A democratic Russia and a stable Central Asia is the combination most conducive to peace. An authoritarian Russia will be more likely to engage in neo-imperialism, even if the Central Asian states remain stable. Instability in Central Asia will draw in

* We would like to thank Alexander Motyl, Barnett Rubin, and Jack Snyder for comments. 1 For the rationale behind this testing procedure, see, for example, H. Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science,’ in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science,7 (Reading, MA, 1975), p. 119. 2 B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993); M. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151–69. 3 Even those partial to neorealism are forced to invoke domestic level variables to explain when and how conﬂict occurs. See, for example, S. David, ‘Explaining Third World Realignment’, World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 233–56; S. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987). 87 88 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt

Russia, even if it remains democratic. An authoritarian Russia and an unstable periphery will be the most dangerous situation of all. We begin by showing how late state formation influences the internal stability of the Central Asian states. The article then clarifies the interaction between Russian regime type and Central Asian instability. We conclude by suggesting mechanisms for ameliorating conflict.

II. The nature of state formation in Central Asia and its consequences

The particularities of state formation in the Central Asian states create problems not dissimilar from the problems faced by other developing countries (as, for example, those of sub-Saharan Africa).4 First, sovereign territoriality was imposed by an external power. The Central Asian states were formed from 1924–36 by administrative diktat in the Stalinist era.5 Moscow supported elites that were favourably disposed to the Communist Party, assigned largely arbitrary borders to the republics and autonomous territories, and allotted such territories to a specific (titular) nationality. This was a deliberate strategy to weaken peripheral resistance by institutionalizing ethnic differences. Consequently, in Central Asia, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, state boundaries and ethnic composition lack correspondence. Second, the Central Asian states are late developers. Late developing states have traditionally opted for interventionist economic policies and authoritarian government to catch up to and compete with earlier developers.6. Third, because sovereign, territorial rule was imposed, rival identities, such as clan membership, Islam, ethnic, and regional affinities have not been displaced by cen- tralizing, high-capacity states. When statehood is imposed on less developed societies, governments will constantly be challenged by alternative logics of political organization.7 In Central Asia one can see how such alternative networks—kinship structures, clans, organized crime rings—permeate the state, particularly in Tajikistan.8 Fourth, Tilly’s observation that ‘war made the state, and the state made war’, does not apply to Central Asia. The absence of protracted interstate conflict means that the

4 D. Anglin, ‘Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments’, Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 431–55; S. Decalo, ‘The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa’, African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 7–36; S. Makinda, ‘Democracy and Multi- Party Politics in Africa,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (1996), pp. 555–73. 5 See R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA, 1954); G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (Westport, CT, 1975); H. D’Encausse, The Great Challenge (New York, 1992); J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester, 1997); B. Koppiters (ed.) Spornye granitsy na Kavkaze (Disputed Borders in the Caucasus) (Moscow, 1996), for the same process in the Caucasus. 6 The East Asian states are prime examples. For a discussion of the ‘developmental state’, see F. Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, 1987). On the broader phenomenon, see A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 1962). 7 J. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988). For the lack of state capacity of developing states also see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990). 8 B. Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Tajikistan’, Survival, 35 (1993), pp. 71–91. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 89

Central Asian state institutions have not been strengthened by war.9 Instead, interstate competition, as in World War II, largely favoured expanded central government in Moscow, and legitimated the USSR as the motherland. The administrative power of the imperial centre grew at the expense of the peripheral units during war. Fifth, these states lack any experience with democratic multi-party systems. Indeed, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR many of the communist elites have recast themselves in nationalist garb and have created authoritarian regimes.10 These ﬁve conditions create cross-cutting pressures on Central Asian governments. Economic modernization might require late developing states to adopt interventionist strategies. But interventionist and authoritarian rule would run counter to the need for proportional representation and consensus politics that are often seen as prerequisites for reconciling the demands of minority groups in multi-ethnic societies.11 Economic centralization is likely to be seen as favouring those ethnic groups most closely aligned with the dominant government and opposed by ethnic minorities for this reason. Moreover, international ﬁnancial institutions, such as the IMF, will also oppose interventionist economic policies. Central Asian governments might therefore use other means to justify the expansion and centralization of state power. Highlighting external threats may be one such means. As Jeffrey Herbst suggests ‘states may be tempted to use war as a means of resolving their otherwise intractable problems of state consolidation’.12

III. The external and internal causes of conﬂict

(1) The external context

The balance of power in the Russia-Central Asia subsystem still overwhelmingly favours Russia, despite its many problems, and this structural condition will not change in the foreseeable future. The power imbalance is illustrated in Table 1 using some standard measures of military power, and the picture of overwhelming Russian advantage remains the same if other measures—such as GNP, population, and industrial output—are used.13 The disarray in the Russian military has made intervention in the periphery problematic for Moscow. The war in Chechnya demonstrates that the danger of Russia becoming mired in peripheral quagmires is very real.14 Yet, as Russia’s role in shaping the conﬂicts in Tajikistan, Moldova, and Georgia show, in peripheral states

9 C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985). 10 For the continued presence of former Communist cadres in the post-breakup USSR, see R. Suny, Revenge of the Past (Stanford, CA, 1993). 11 See, for example, the various suggestions to manage ethnic cleavages in Africa. S. Makinda, ‘Democracy and Multi-Party Politics’; R. Southall, ‘Negotiations and Social Democracy in South Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1990), pp. 487–509. 12 J. Herbst, ‘War and the State in Africa’, International Security 14 (Spring 1990), p. 119; Herbst, ‘The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa’, International Organization 43 (Autumn 1989), pp. 673–92. 13 R. Menon, ‘In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, International Security, 20 (Summer 1995), p. 151. 14 C. Gall and T. de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London, 1997). 90 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt

Table 1: Central Asia and Russia: Power indices

Population GNP Area Country (millions) (US$ billion) (1000 sq. km) Armed Forces RUSS 148 1,100 17,075 1.24 m KAZ 16 18.0 2,717 35,000 KYRG 4 2.1 199 12,200 TAJ 5 1.1 143 9,000 TURK 3 8.8 488 18,000 UZB 20 11.0 447 70,000

Sources: The First Book of Demographics for the Republics of the Former Soviet Union (Shady Side, MD: New World Demographics, 1992), p. A-3 (for population and area); International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1997–1998 (London: IISS, 1997), pp. 108, 156, 157,162, 163 (GNP and armed forces). Notes: Population ﬁgures are for 1989 and have been rounded; GNP and armed forces data are for 1996. For Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, a range was provided for the size of the armed forces, and we have used the upper limit. characterized by weak regimes, poorly-integrated societies, and minuscule militaries, the extent of Russian leverage remains considerable.15 Moreover, as the civil wars in Tajikistan and Georgia demonstrate, peripheral ruling elites may be forced to call on the forces of the erstwhile hegemon to maintain territorial integrity against internal and external foes. In Moldova, the presence of Russian forces in the trans-Dniester region increases the regime’s dependency on Russia and severely constrains its domestic and foreign policy choices. A second signiﬁcant systemic variable to monitor is the power transition under- way between Russia and China.16 Should China continue its rapid economic and military growth it may contest Russian hegemony in Central Asia. In the short run this is unlikely. While China has made considerable economic inroads into Central Asia its strategic focus and force posture is directed toward East Asia. Consequently, it plays a marginal role in alliance building, force projection, and peacekeeping in Central Asia. Indeed, for now Russia and China have a common fear of ethnic nationalism in Central Asia. China fears that Turkic nationalism and Islamist movements from Central Asia could intrude into Xinjiang and sharpen the anti-Han sentiments of the province’s Turkic-Muslim Uighurs.17 Moreover, because of its

15 R. Menon, ‘In the Shadow of the Bear’; Menon, ‘After Empire: Russia and the Southern “Near Abroad”’, in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1998). 16 On China’s growing power see A. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’; R. Betts, ‘Wealth, Power and Instability’; D. Ball, ‘Arms and Affluence’ all in International Security 18 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5–112. 17 Recent incidents pointing to ethnic tensions in Xinjiang include a 1990 rebellion near Kashgar, which was suppressed at the cost of 50 lives; bombings and the killings of establishment clerics and law enforcement personnel in Kashgar and Urumqi in 1992; and the arrest of thousands of Uighur elites and fighting between Uighurs and police in the summer of 1996. The principal factor behind the unrest, which by no means threatens Beijing’s control of the region, is resentment over migration into Xinjiang of Han Chinese, who have grown from under four per cent of the region’s population in 1949 to over half in 1996. Militant Islam, while also a factor, is of decidedly secondary importance. Details from A. Davis and S. Suh, ‘The West Gets Wilder: Separatist Violence Worries the Xinjiang Government’, Asiaweek, June 14, 1996, pp. 32–33. Also see ‘The Uighurs: China’s Muslim Rebels’, The Economist, June 13, 1996, p. 33. For a good overview of ethnic questions in China, see D. Gladney, ‘Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference’, in W. Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1994 (Boulder, CO, 1994). The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 91 eastward strategic orientation, China has conceded the role of security manager in Central Asia to Russia.18 Turkey and Iran are often mentioned as possible counters to Russian domination in Central Asia. While both states have increased their economic and cultural presence in the region, there is no compelling evidence that either has become a major player in regional security capable of negating the implications of preponderant Russian power.19 The reasons are that Iranian-Turkish rivalry makes each more suspicious of the other; each is far more economically dependent on Russia than on Central Asia; each is itself exposed to Russian power; and Iran and Russia share several common perspectives ranging from the ground rules for exploiting the energy resources of the Caspian Sea to the fear of Sunni fundamentalism in Afghanistan.

(2) The internal context

(2a) Three causes of internal instability in Central Asia Our discussion of state formation in Central Asia suggests that local governments face three principal domestic challenges: creating a national identity, building effective political institutions, and coping with late economic development. (i) The modality of nationalism. The literature on nationalism distinguishes between the ‘ethnic’ and the ‘civic’ variant. In ethnic nationalism cultural traits that cannot be acquired serve as the criteria for community membership. Civic nationalism, by contrast, confers citizenship and belonging based on attributes that can be acquired regardless of original ethnic affiliation.20 By definition, ethnic nationalism is exclusive and civic nationalism inclusive. Inter-state and intra-state conflict are most likely if ruling elites choose ethnic nationalism.21 But there is no inherent reason why they should do so. Indeed, in Central Asia, ruling elites have so far shied away from embracing ethnic nationalism for a variety of reasons, and we do not assume that its triumph is inevitable. Central Asia’s leaders are aware of the danger of alienating Russia, which remains watchful

18 This has been apparent as early as 1992. In a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, in November of that year, (then) Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, noted that Central Asia should ‘remain a CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] sphere and not a sphere of extremist forces and, in particular, of Islamic fundamentalism. And in this, I think, we can count on mutual understanding from our great neighbour’. Qian responded that Russia and China ‘have common interests in preserving stability in the Central Asian region’ and that China would expand economic relations with Central Asia taking account of the region’s close links with Russia. Itar-Tass World Service in Russian, 1300 GMT, November 25, 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV, November 27, 1992, p. 9. 19 For the limits of Turkish and Iranian influence, see E. Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London, 1995); G. Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London, 1995); S. Sayari, ‘Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia’, in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner (eds.), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994). For the argument that the influence will likely flow the other way, see D. Pipes, ‘The Event of Our Era: Former Soviet Muslim Republics Change the Middle East’, in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World (New York, 1994). 20 L. Greenfield, Nationalism :Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 1992); R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992). 21 S. Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State (London, 1995), pp. 1–3, 71–2; M. B. Olcott, V. Tishkov, and A. Malashenko (eds), Identitchnost’i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Identity and Conflict in the Post-Soviet States) (Moscow, 1997). 92 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt over the fate of ethnic Russians in the so-called ‘near abroad’. Nor do they want to accelerate the already substantial exodus of ethnic Russians, whose skills are essential to local economies. They are also mindful of the danger of promoting tensions between the titular nationality and other ethnic groups. Finally, their political socialization occurred in the Soviet era, and they (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan’s president, Askar Akaev) rose in the communist party hierarchy to head their republics’ party organization. Thus, they have been conditioned to look askance at ethnic nationalism. Radical nationalist parties are either illegal in these states or they have faced restrictions and harassment. Yet these conditions do not rule out the emergence of ethnic nationalism.22 Ruling elites may appeal to ethnic nationalism when economic crises and concomitant political instabilities make them vulnerable to challenges from counter-elites using the politics of clan, region, and religion as symbols to recruit followers. Governing elites may then embrace ethnic nationalism both to bolster their legitimacy and to de- legitimize the opposition by portraying it as divisive. This is all the more likely if the present Soviet-era ruling elite is displaced by a new generation more predisposed to invoke ethnic markers for legitimacy.23 Ethnic nationalism underscores the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and defines community membership, and hence allocates power, in ways that privilege the ‘in group’.24 It follows that the greater the degree of ethnic diversity within a state, the greater the danger that ethnic nationalism will create instability and conflict by increasing the insecurity of non-dominant groups. Ethnic nationalism will be externalized where the disjuncture between state and national boundaries creates diasporas and the potential for irredentism. The data in Table 2 should be studied with these stipulations in mind. Three conditions are particularly worth noting: the ethnic diversity of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; the existence of a ten million Russian diaspora in Central Asia (of which six million are in Kazakhstan alone); and the potential for irredentist conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. (ii) Political institutionalization and social mobilization. By political institutionalization we mean the combination of legitimacy and capacity possessed by states. Legitimacy is a function of the degree of popular support. Capacity is the ability to extract resources, maintain stability, and cope with opposition. We define social mobilization as the activism of citizens who make demands on the state as a result of dissatisfaction and exposure to (internal and external) political, cultural, economic, and religious forces. Mobilization can be based on class, region, clan, religion, or new ideologies that transcend such divisions.

22 See, for example, the discussion of Kazakh attempts to restructure northern municipal governments run by Russians in I. Bremmer, ‘Nazarbaev and the North: State-Building and Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17 (October 1994), pp. 619–35. 23 Turnover is likely given that seventy per cent of the region’s population is under 40 years of age and the average number of net births per thousand for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, far exceeds the average for the other former Soviet republics. A. Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London, 1994), p. 57; The First Book of Demographics for the Former Soviet Union (Shady Side, MD, 1992). 24 R. Bendix, Kings or People (Berkeley, CA, 1978); G. Simmel, Conﬂict and the Web of Group-Afﬁliations (New York, 1955). The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 93

Table 2: Central Asia: Ethnic Composition

(population in thousands, and as %) Russ Kaz Kyrg Taj Turk Uzb KAZ 6,228 6,535 14 26 4 332 % 38 39 negl. negl. negl. 2 KYR 917 37 2,230 34 — 550 % 22 negl. 52 negl. — 13 TAJ 338 11 64 3,172 20 1,198 % 7 negl. 1 62 negl. 24 TURK 334 88 — 3 2,537 317 % 9 2—negl.719 UZB 1,653 808 175 934 122 14,142 % 8 4 negl. 5 negl. 71

Source: Central Asia Monitor, No. 3 (1992), pp. 39–40.

Notes: (i) negl.=under 1%; —=none reported; (ii) ﬁgures are for 1991–92; (iii) percentages denote given nationality as a share of the total population; (iv) total population for each of the Central Asian states is as follows: Kazakhstan (16,464,464); Kyrgyzstan (4,257,755); Tajikistan (5,092,603); Turkmenistan (3,552,117); Uzbekistan (19,810,077).

The weaker political institutionalization in relation to social mobilization, the greater the chances that the overburdened state will experience instability.25 Our earlier discussion of late state formation implies that the imbalance between political institutionalization and social mobilization will be particularly acute in Central Asia. Under conditions of weak political institutionalization and strong social mobilization, ruling elites will either be displaced or use repression to retain power. Either response can lead to domestic disorder. Such instability creates an incentive for powerful neighbouring states to intervene to protect their ethnic kin or to safeguard security interests deemed vital. A chain reaction might result. A good example is the Tajik civil war.26 An imbalance between institutionalization and social mobilization in Tajikistan led to a breakdown of state authority: a weak regime led by communist-era holdovers faced an diverse opposition mobilized by democratic, Islamist, regional, and nationalist elites. The result- ing disorder sparked intervention by Russia and Uzbekistan, who acted to defend their interests. Russia feared that turbulence in its southern perimeter would have a domino effect. Uzbekistan’s authoritarian regime feared that the demonstration effect of an authoritarian government being overpowered by mobilized citizens could spark instability at home. Its concern was compounded by the presence of 934,000 Tajiks within Uzbekistan. Furthermore, endangered ruling elites might seek to draw in such outside powers to bolster their position by dramatizing threats posed by neighbouring states, non- regional states, and non-state actors. For example, the Tajik government has empha-

25 S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT, 1968). 26 B. Brown, ‘Tajikistan: The Conservatives Triumph’, RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (February 12, 1993), pp. 9–12; O. Roy, The Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications (Washington, DC., 1993); Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Tajikistan’; S. Tadjbakhsh, ‘The Bloody Path of Change: The Case of Post-Soviet Tajikistan’, Harriman Institute Forum, 6 (July, 1993). 94 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt sized the threat posed by Islamic elements in the opposition and the support extended to them by Afghan Islamists both to bolster its authority and to gain support from other governments (principally Russia and Uzbekistan) who fear similar dangers. State elites can also seek to co-opt social mobilization by using civic organizations, a relatively free press, elections, and parliaments to divert it from the streets into political institutions. This strategy could be combined with patronage directed at counter-elites so that mass disaffection is rendered leaderless. This approach has been followed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.27 Finally, regimes can deal with social mobilization by closing off opportunities for political participation or outright repression. This approach is starkly evident in Tajikistan where the opposition has been excluded from legitimate politics.28 It is also visible in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the opposition (Agzybirlik in the former; Birlik, Erk, and the Islamic Renaissance Party in the latter) has been subjected to harassment, intimidation, and bans.29 In Turkmenistan a one-party system exists. The former communist party structure of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic has essentially been reincarnated as the National Democratic Party, the only registered party in the country, with true power belonging to the president, Saparmurad Niazov, whose portraits, statues, and sayings are ubiquitous.30 In Uzbekistan, the cult of Islam Karimov is far less pervasive (though still apparent), but he runs the country by balancing regional and tribal interests via the National Democratic Party and by concentrating power in his hands. While the Wattan Tarakieti party contested the December 1994 elections and poses as an effective opposition, it is really a docile organization created with the approval of Karimov to defuse Western criticisms of Uzbekistan’s human rights record.31 This repressive response to social mobilization may work indefinitely, particularly if citizens remain passive, an economic crisis does not occur, and the ruling group avoids internecine conflict. But the civil war in Tajikistan illustrates that festering problems (economic deterioration, a political opposition that feels disenfranchised) can culminate in war and undermine this strategy. (iii) Economic sources of instability. The most likely context for the rise of ethnic nationalism and social mobilization that overwhelms the state is a failed post-Soviet economic transition. For Central Asian states, this transition involves the transformation of Soviet-era economies into ones based on markets and private property. There are many reasons why the old system cannot be maintained indefinitely in Central Asia. First, its counterpart in the centre (Russia) is being dismantled, and subsidies, guaranteed markets, and cheap inputs can no longer be taken for granted. Apart from the philosophical break that Russia’s leaders have made with the socialist system, they simply cannot afford to serve as provider par excellence to

27 See the chapters by M.B. Olcott and E. Huskey, in I. Bremmer and R. Taras (eds.), New States, New Politics (Cambridge, 1997). 28 The opposition could not participate in the 1994 elections and the ancien regime was thus perpetuated. 29 In January 1994 the leaders of Erk within Uzbekistan re-named the party Istaqlal Yoli (Path of Independence) without the consent of the leaders in exile and designated its goals in a way calculated to make it more acceptable to the Karimov government. M. Olcott, Central Asia’s New States (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 115. 30 In the December 1994 elections to the Mejlis, the national parliament, the candidates, virtually all of whom belonged to the Democratic Party, faced no opposition. 31 Interview with the leaders of the Wattan Tarikieti party, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, December 1994. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 95 needy neighbours. Second, acquiring aid from international agencies (the IMF and the World Bank) and attracting foreign investment will require reforms that expand the role of markets and private property. Third, Central Asian states will be operating in a global environment in which it is assumed that the model of state ownership and regulation has proven a failure: the changes afoot in China, Mongolia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, Brazil, and India attest to this. Thus economic efficiency requires a transition to market systems. True, the degree to which ruling elites in Central Asia are convinced by this logic varies: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have made significant strides towards economic reform; Uzbekistan is a late starter and a cautious and reluctant convert, but reform has begun; Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have made few changes. However, with due allowance for variations within the region and a trajectory marked by backsliding, significant economic change is occurring.32 While economists have insisted (correctly) that market reforms are essential for long-term efficiency in the post-Soviet states, they have paid little attention to the tradeoffs between economic reforms and political stability.33 Policies adopted in the name of long-run efficiency can create short-term instability: dismantling inefficient state enterprises can increase unemployment at a time when budgetary conditions preclude an increase in social welfare programs to cushion the blow; removing the subsidies on staples to curb budget deficits can cause prices to soar; market reforms can increase the opportunities for the well connected and powerful, while pushing the less fortunate to the margins of economic life. The creation of private enterprises in the long term could expand the supply of goods and employment opportunities. But for nascent states marked by weak institutionalization and legitimacy that depend heavily on the longevity of an all- powerful leader (a description that applies in varying degrees to all Central Asian states), it is precisely the political short-run that is the most dangerous. Rising inequality and unemployment could produce oppositional movements based on ethnic nationalism and Islam. The use of repression against such challenges could increase the danger of political instability, while efforts by ruling elites to steal the thunder of the opposition could push regimes in the direction of ethnic nationalism. Economic dislocations can also create struggles over relative gains in which ethnic political entrepreneurs seek to mobilize their constituencies. This was exemplified in Central Asia by the 1989 clash between Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks in the Ferghana Valley and the 1990 conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan’s Osh province.34 Reforms that restructure industries in which the non-titular ethnic groups are statistically over-represented can increase ethnic conflict. Thus defence industries in northern Kyrgyzstan and heavy and defence industries in northern Kazakhstan employ a disproportionate number of ethnic Russians, and economic reforms in these regions could entail an tradeoff between efficiency and stability—at least in the short run.

32 S. Islam, ‘Capitalism on the Silk Route?’, in Mandelbaum, Central Asia; M. Kaser, The Economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (London, 1997). 33 For a general discussion of these tradeoffs, see K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1944); and, more recently, A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, 1991). 34 I. Rotar’, ‘Mina, zalozhnnaia kremlevskimi kartografami: problema granits mozhet vzorvat’ Srdeniuiu Aziiu,’ (Mines Laid By the Kremlin’s Mapmakers: The Territorial Problem Could Enﬂame Central Asia) Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 December 1992. 96 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt

(2b) Russian domestic politics

As important as instability in the periphery is, it alone does not guarantee Russian intervention. That depends as well on the nature of domestic politics in Russia. Military intervention is least likely when a robust democratic regime exists in Russia and ultra-nationalist groups are weak. Intervention is more likely when domestic instability and economic problems increase the influence of ultranationalist groups. Logrolling by such groups and their efforts to build popular support by brandishing symbols (threats to national security, the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, the obligation to defend endangered ethnic kin), will put state elites on the defensive. Democrats inside and outside the government will become divided, leading some to tack to the right and embrace nationalist discourse for political survival. This dynamic has been evident in Russia since 1992.35 The coming to power of an authoritarian regime in Russia is even more likely to produce intervention in Central Asia. Such a government will be less concerned with Western disapproval. Indeed, it is apt to view Western aid and investment not as benefits to be sought but as forces to be kept at bay. The power base of an authoritarian government will be constituted by ultranationalist groups and national security bureaucracies (the intelligence services, the Interior Ministry, and the armed forces) for whom Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space is a first-order objective.

(3) The causal linkage

The scenarios for conﬂict in Central Asia presented in Figure 1 take Russian preponderance as a given. The consequences of Russia’s superior power will depend on its regime type and stability in the periphery. (Recall that the latter is a function of the type of nationalism, the robustness of political institutions, and economic conditions). These two dimensions generate four scenarios.

RUSSIA Democratic Authoritarian Stable Probability of Russian Increased likelihood intervention low for neo-imperialist Russia CENTRAL ASIA Unstable Increased likelihood Neo-imperial Russia of peripheral instability drawing Russia in

Figure 1. Scenarios for Conﬂict

35 Since 1992 Yeltsin has co-opted many of the foreign policy themes of Russian nationalists and removed from his government a number of foreign policy moderates. The most graphic example of the personnel change is the substitution of Andrei Kozyrev with Yevgeni Primakov as foreign minister. On the general point of post-1992 foreign policy realignment see A. Arbatov, ‘Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition’, in V. Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (New York, 1997), pp. 142, 146; Menon, ‘Shadow of the Bear’, pp. 156–61. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 97

This model explains why Tajikistan has seen more conﬂict than the other Central Asian states and Russian military involvement. Domestic upheaval in that country resulted when ruling political elites faced opponents using alternatives modes of social mobilization such as clans, regionalism, ethnic nationalism, and Islam. Already Central Asia’s poorest country, Tajikistan also faced a severe economic crisis that aggravated political instability. The domestic conﬂict ultimately drew in Russia. By contrast, elsewhere in Central Asia, the mere preponderance of Russia has not lead to intervention because analogous domestic conditions do not hold. Although we have applied this model to Central Asia, we maintain that it applies to the entire post-Soviet space. Events in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan illustrate its utility. Instability (in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh) led to Russian intervention. By contrast, in the other former Soviet republics such intervention has not occurred. This suggests that a Russia in disarray is not foreordained to play a passive role in the region. Conversely, the mere fact of Russian preponderance does not guarantee that Russia will behave in a neo-imperial fashion.

IV. Conﬂict resolution and conﬂict prevention

Our approach to conflict resolution in Central Asia follows from our model in which conflict results from the interplay of internal and external conditions. It follows that conflict resolution must have an external and internal dimension.

(1) Mitigating internal causes of conﬂict

Measures to reduce the possibility for ethnic strife are most relevant for those Central Asian states in which a signiﬁcant percentage of the population is constituted by non-titular nationalities.36 The three most diverse republics are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan has 6.2 million Russians who make up 38 per cent of the population, although the emigration of Russians, the immigration of Kazakhs (from Russia, Chinese Xinjiang, and Mongolia), and the higher rate of population growth of Kazakhs is reducing the proportion of Russians. Kazakhstan’s Russian population is concentrated in northern provinces (Qostany, North Kazakhstan, Qaraghandy, East Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, and Aqmola contain 61 per cent of Russians in the country) near Russia.37 Kyrgyzstan’s Russian population (916,558) constitutes 21.5 per cent of the total, while the 550,000 Uzbeks account for 13 per cent. In Tajikistan, the number of Russians, which stood at 338,481 in 1990, has been reduced drastically by emigration propelled by the ravages of civil

36 The following discussion of the ethnic composition of the Central Asian states is based on the data in Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1992), pp. 39–40. See also the data in Mandelbaum (ed.), Central Asia and the World,p.7. 37 The ethnic composition of Kazakhstan’s northern provinces is calculated from the data in P. Gillette, ‘Ethnic Balance and Imbalance in Kazakhstan’s Regions’, Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1993), Table 2, p. 21. 98 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt war, but the Uzbek population is large both in absolute terms (1.2 million) and as a proportion of the total population of the country (27 per cent). By contrast, Turkmenistan, where the titular nationality accounts for 71 percent of the population, and Uzbekistan, where Uzbeks make up an identical percentage of the total population, are far more homogeneous. A number of measures could be considered to reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict in the non-homogeneous Central Asian states, but each has tradeoffs. One approach is consociationalism along the lines suggested by Arend Lijphart.38 It would allocate key political posts at both the central and local levels on a propor- tionality principle that mirrors the ethnic segmentation of the country. For central positions, aggregate proportions could be used as the criteria for allocation, while, at the local level, the ethnic composition of a given region could be the standard. The objective would be to quell fears of domination by the titular nationality by giving other ethnic groups access to institutions that determine the allocation of resources and control the direction of policy so as to create a state in which all members feel represented and enfranchised. Consociationalism, however, has its critics.39 Consociationalism worked well in the Netherlands where authority was fragmented, ‘pillarized’ in Lijphart’s terms, among various religious denominations, and arguably operated quite effectively in Switzerland, Austria and Belgium as well. Through a system of compromise among powerful elites and the equal allotment of political representation and governmental revenue, ethnic conflict has been avoided. Consociationalists have suggested that a similar strategy might work in such heavily divided and contentious societies as Northern Ireland, Lebanon, India, and South Africa. But critics suggest that where consociationalism has worked, the prevailing institutional arrangements have been the effect rather than the cause of stability. Some of the preconditions for accommodation mentioned by Lijphart, for example, the tradition of elite compromise, do not explain the existence of accommodative politics, they are, rather, evidence of accommodation itself—the outcome to be explained. Consociational strategies may also reinforce, indeed institutionalize, the tendency to see politics as an arena for ethnic strife and actually retard the salience of other markers of identity and loyalty (region, class) that could emerge as cross-cutting cleavages and undermine the potentially explosive marker of ethnicity. Ethnic concerns may become permanently imbedded in politics such that public policy decisions concerning priorities, goals, and resource allocation are riven by ethnic discord driven by competition over relative gains. The net effect may be to retard the development of civic nationalism in which the ethnic origin of political elites is seen as secondary to the larger objectives of national welfare and efficiency. Finally, given that certain ethnic groups (Russians in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for example) dominate key sectors such as industry and defence in Central Asia, the move to implement proportional representation along ethnic lines may actually exacerbate ethnic conflict.

38 See A. Lijphart,Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT, 1977); Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT, 1984); and Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), pp. 33–48. 39 For good overviews of the consociationalist literature, D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conﬂict (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 569–77; I. Lustick, ‘Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism’, World Politics, 50 (October 1997), pp. 88–117. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 99

While recognizing some of the problems associated with applying the consociationalist model wholesale to a vastly different environment than the West European democracies (as Lijphart is sometimes accused of doing),40 we argue that consociationalism does provide useful suggestions for conflict regulation. We differ, however, from Lijphart in that we see such recommendations as particularly useful prior to the eruption of ethnic and religious conflicts, whereas Lijphart suggests that consociationalism might be applicable to societies that are involved in ongoing strife. First, ‘winner take all’ electoral systems, as in the English Westminster model, essentially preclude minority input in government, particularly if that minority is geographically scattered (and hence would not carry many districts). Such electoral systems are thus likely to induce ethnic strife and should be avoided. Second, proportional representation will likely yield a multiparty system and make consensus politics more likely due to the need to forge political coalitions with other parties. In other words, rather than assume that actors have preferences for compromise, we argue that particular institutional designs make compromise a rational course of action for political elites, even for those who are communist holdovers.41 The consociational approach could be supplemented by other measures. Provisions for dual citizenship could allay the fears of ethnic Russians in Central Asia.42 The recognition of Russian as having co-equal status with the language of the titular nationality would have the same effect.43 Political autonomy for regions— such as northern Kazakhstan—inhabited principally by a non-titular nationality could reduce alienation by providing a sense of empowerment. The preservation and creation of an intellectual and cultural infrastructure (newspapers, radio stations, televisions channels, schools and universities) that represent the minority cultures and utilizes the language of non-titular nationalities could offer them a sense of belonging.44 Such policies would respect ethnic differences while fostering civic nationalism. The aim would be to reduce the prospects for ethnic conflict by increasing the likelihood that all members of the political community, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, feel that the state reflects their aspirations.45 Here again, however, there are tradeoffs. Such measures of ethnic conciliation could also reinforce ethnic segmentation by accentuating religious and linguistic differences. Moreover, with the states of Central Asia only recently having become independent, expectations for empowerment on the part of the titular nationalities run high, and there is a widespread belief that local cultures and languages should

40 See Lustick, ‘Lijphart, Lakatos’. 41 Despite Horowitz’s critique of consociationalism, his suggestions for conflict resolution do share some features with Lijphart’s work. See, for example, their discussion of federalism. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups, chapter 16; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 87f. 42 Turkmenistan and Russia reached agreement on this in December 1993. ITAR-TASS in English, 1624 GMT, December 23, 1994, in FBIS–SOV, December 27, 1993, pp. 78–9. 43 President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan has been particularly sensitive to this issue. 44 Kyrgyzstan’s establishment of a Slavonic University, was, for example, a clear attempt to allay the fears of the local Russian population and to stem the emigration of skilled Russians needed to the country’s economic future. 45 A point made by Istvan Hont about European state stability is, in this respect, applicable to Central Asia as well. He observes: ‘Whether the large “nation-states” of Europe can preserve their territorial integrity . . . depends on whether their populations accept them as their own “state” or whether they see it as in their interest to secure a “state” more authentically of their own’. I. Hont, ‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: `Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State’ in Historical Perspective’, Political Studies, XLII (1994), p. 231. 100 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt be protected against erosion. Governments that are seen as appeasing the Russian minority and the Russian government may face a nationalist backlash, particularly if economic crises create opportunities for harnessing ethnic nationalism as a means to mobilize support against governments. More specifically, Central Asian governments may look askance at the concept of dual citizenship, fearing that it would be a justification for Russia to insert itself into ethnic disputes in other countries as a champion of the local Russian population. Yet, on balance, such steps are likely to reduce the sense of alienation and non- belonging. Ethnic segmentation is an existential fact in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Ethnic harmony requires arrangements that provide representation and a voice to ethnic minorities. While we realize the imperfections of consociational designs and some of our other recommendations, they at least provide for such representation and voice. In so doing they channel discord into political institutions and reduce the chances that it will be played out violently. The 1997 Tajik peace accord would not have been possible had not the United Tajik Opposition been guaranteed 30 per cent of all government posts.46 A final approach to reducing internal ethnic conflict involves managing economic restructuring in a way that minimizes strife among nationalities. We have argued that the move toward markets and private property can increase instability in general by aggravating inequality and increasing misery via inflation, unemployment, and reduced social welfare benefits. But, in societies marked by significant ethnic segmentation, these externalities are particularly apt to create ethnic mobilization and protest if the burdens of change are perceived as falling disproportionately on a non-titular ethnic group. Thus restructuring should proceed with an awareness of the sectoral distribution of ethnic groups within the economy. Sectors that employ large numbers of major non-titular nationalities should be made to move toward marketization and privatization only once the state has plans in place for com- pensation, retraining, and social welfare programs. Both bilateral and multilateral aid donors should encourage and support programs that seek to mitigate the ethnic fallout of economic reform. International financial institutions (the IMF and World Bank) can reduce the problems posed by the externalities of economic reform. External support will ease the difficult transition to the market by enabling the state to compensate those segments in society (such as ethnic groups that are over-represented in declining industries) that are likely to bear disproportionate burdens. This will lessen the prospects for ethnic strife and radical social mobilization—the very factors that could contribute to inter-state conflict.47 Financial support for the Central Asian states—whether bilateral or multilateral— is also warranted by the growing Western economic stake in the region. Since 1989,

46 M. Ochs, ‘Peace Accord Reached in Tajikistan,’ CSCE Digest 20 (July 1997), p. 76; U. Babakhanov and B. Pannier, ‘Peace in Tajikistan Or New Stage in Conﬂict?’ RFE/RL Newsline (27 June 1997), p. 6. 47 The IMF’s support for Kyrgyzstan’s policies should be seen in this regard. In addition to Kyrgyzstan, Russia itself and the Ukraine have obtained considerable IMF support. Standby agreements in 1995 gave Russia about $6.4 billion and the Ukraine $1.5 billion. See The Economist, March 11, 1995, p. 50; March 18, 1995, p. 51. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 101 western companies have invested $4.0 billion in the ﬁve states of Central Asia.48 The bulk of it has been in the oil and gas sectors of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: the former’s oil reserves and the latter’s gas reserves are among the largest in the world.49

(2) Mitigating external causes of conﬂict

Recently, international organizations have received considerable attention as mechanisms for conflict resolution and prevention.50 While international organizations can contribute to mitigating conflict, we remain sceptical about the great salutary effects sometimes ascribed to them. But there is no reason why solutions to conflict through international organizations should not be tried. A multi-layered approach involving bilateral, regional and global organizations is the most appropriate strategy. This approach is desirable for a number of reasons. First, some issues, such as accords on borders are best negotiated bilaterally by the concerned parties. Second, purely narrow regional solutions may work primarily to the advantage of would-be hegemons (Russia and Uzbekistan). Third, inasmuch as some solutions (the creation of conflict resolution centres staffed by trained personnel) presuppose funding, the involvement of non-regional actors increases the potential resource base. Fourth, the judicious involvement of extra-regional actors may offset the lack of leverage that weaker regional states suffer in bargaining. In the past Russia has favoured the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a vehicle for security cooperation between the former Soviet republics. Indeed it envisioned the CIS as the foundation of a regional collective security system. The 1992 Tashkent agreement on collective security, the agreement for the joint defence of the CIS border and the creation of a common air defence system suggested prima facie that such a cooperative approach to security was evolving.51 So did the cooperation between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on defending the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. Except for Turkmenistan, which stayed clear of participating in the security structures of the CIS, the other Central Asian states favoured multilateral security cooperation. But such a strategy is not without potential problems. If one assumes that the major threat to Central Asian states comes from a non-CIS state such as Iran, Afghanistan, or China, then the pursuit of collective security via the CIS has merit. 48 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 1997: Enterprise Performance and Growth (London: ERBD). The cumulative investment (1989–1996) was distributed as follows: Kazakhstan, $3.067 billion; Turkmenistan, $544 million, Uzbekistan, $156 million; Kyrgyzstan, $147 million; Tajikistan, $55 million. 49 On international oil and gas investment in the Caspian Sea region, see Rajan Menon, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy Development in the Caspian Sea Zone (Seattle, Washington: National Institute for Asian Research, 1998); The Economist (22 July 1995), p. 36. Also see Menon, ‘After Empire’. Iran’s influence in the region is likely to be economic rather than ideological in nature, given its attempts to provide alternative transportation routes, although the US has stifled such attempts so far. The Economist (2 December 1995), p. 42; The Economist (24 January 1998), p. 43. 50 For a range of discussions on this topic, see M. Esman and S. Telhami (eds.), International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca, 1995). 51 For a discussion of some of the Russian efforts to invigorate the CIS for some of these tasks see ‘Russia and the Near Abroad’, in The Economist, February 18, 1995, pp. 51–2. 102 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt

It is a solution to the combination of political and military weakness that charac- terizes the Central Asian states. A current example is the reliance of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on Russian personnel to patrol their borders with China. If, however, one assumes that Russia itself could become the principal security threat to Central Asia—and the historical record and geopolitical circumstances provide ample reason to make this a valid assumption—then the CIS is of limited utility. Contrary to the reasoning of Kazakstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, the CIS will not restrain Russia by entangling it in the coils of consensual, multilateral decision-making. What is far more likely is that the CIS will be a Russian- dominated organization that serves as an instrument of Moscow’s policy.52 Indeed, Russia’s enthusiasm for enlarging the CIS (which it did successfully by forcing Georgia and Azerbaijan to join the organization by using its leverage over the civil wars in both countries), and having it receive the imprimatur of the UN for exclusive peace-keeping rights within its domain, show that this is precisely the role Moscow envisages for the CIS. Thus the joint defence of borders and air space, agreed upon by all members of the CIS except Ukraine and Turkmenistan, are of little value if the origin of the threat to Central Asia is from the old imperial centre. Consequently, many of the former Union Republics have been reluctant to give the CIS the mandate originally envisioned by Moscow. Russia has thus turned towards bilateral agreements and more limited multilateral agreements (with subsets of the CIS members) to protect its economic and security interests in the region.53 Furthermore, there are really no viable means to balance Russia’s potential threat to Central Asia. The United States has no vital security interests in Central Asia and is not about to extend a security guarantee to the region—especially amidst pressures to reduce the budget and to maintain commitments to vital areas such as East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.54 Nor is it likely that the European Community or NATO will assume this role: the latter organization’s Partnership for Peace initiative encompasses Central Asia; but it is a consultative mechanism, not a prelude to alliance. Neighbouring states such as Iran, Turkey, and China have neither the means nor the inclination to offset Russian power. And, despite the conﬁdence of some scholars that the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as the CSCE has been renamed) can emerge as a viable collective security organization, this is most unlikely for a host of reasons.55

52 See A. Sheehy, ‘The CIS: A Shaky Edifice’, RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (January 1993), pp. 37–40; J. Adams, ‘CIS: The Interparliamentary Assembly and Khasbulatov’, RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (June 1993), pp. 19–23; S. Foye, ‘End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?’ RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 1993), pp. 45–9; S. Crow, ‘Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization’, RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (March 1994), pp. 33–8. 53 Thus Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev, and others, have advocated bi- and tri-lateral agreements. Liz Fuller, ‘1997 in Review: The CIS—Half Alive or Half Dead?,’ RFE/RL (22 December 1997). 54 True, the United States has initiated some limited forms of security cooperation in Central Asian: it provided $170 million to facilitate the removal of Kazakhstan’s strategic nuclear weapons to Russia and for defense conversion. Washington has also given Kazakhstan six boats for patrolling the Caspian Sea and has helped train the crews. But these instances of security cooperation are not precursors to an American policy of balancing Russian power for the benefit of the states of the former Soviet Union. 55 For an optimistic assessment of the potential of OSCE to become a robust collective security system, see C. Kupchan and C. A. Kupchan, ‘Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe’, International Security, 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 114–61. For a critique, see R. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War’, International Security 17 (Summer 1992), pp. 5–43. See also K. Huber, ‘The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East’, RFE/RL Research Report 2 (July 1993), pp. 30–36; E. Fuller, ‘The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev versus the CSCE?’ RFE/RL Research Report 3 (June 1994), pp. 13–17. The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 103

First, the OSCE operates on the basis of consensus, thus in effect giving Russia a veto on what the organization can do in the realm of Central Asian security. Second, the OSCE has no military enforcement power; nor is it likely to acquire it. Third, divisions within its members can severely constrain its activities. As an example, the OSCE did not monitor the November 1994 Tajik presidential elections or the February 1995 parliamentary elections as originally planned because of a lack of agreement between the European Union (EU) and the United States. The EU, unlike the United States, felt that it would do little good to observe an election that, given the announced ground rules, was going to be unfair. Fourth, there is little evidence that the OSCE will overcome the problems (the lack of consensus among the major powers who are members, the lack of enforcement power, the resilient stubbornness of sovereign states unwilling to yield too much power to supranational entities) that have traditionally hamstrung collective security enterprises. It is even more unlikely that the OSCE will be able to carry out some of the grandiose tasks—such as countering ultra-nationalism and promoting democracy.56 Another aspect of conflict management involves arms control and Confidence- Building Measures (CBMs). Here, the proposals generated during the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the CSCE process have potential applicability to the Russian-Central Asian subsystem as part of a broader process covering Eurasia.57 The CIS, the OSCE, and the Partnership for Peace could serve as forums for exchanging ideas among foreign policy officials, military officers, and strategic analysts to formulate arms control and CBM proposals which, while perhaps initially modest, create trust through institu- tionalized dialogue. This would lay the foundation for more ambitious follow-on initiatives. Discussions could centre on promoting regular contacts among foreign policy and defence officials from Russia and Central Asia that lead to jointly devised proposals covering advance warning for troop movements, no-weapons zones along borders, the development of defence-dominant military doctrines and force structures, the formulation of arms control agendas, and procedures for rapid communi- cation and consultation in the event of crises. The principal problem with such CBMs is that Russia’s doctrine and force structure cannot be adjusted solely with Central Asia in mind, given the wider security problems that the country has. Additionally, should an external threat to the Central Asian states emerge, Russia will require some offensive capabilities if it is to be a useful source of security.58 Emphasizing defence-dominant military doctrines and force structures might, however, be a feasible and effective way to promote peace among the Central Asian states. A third aspect of conflict management is dealing with war once it has broken out. Assuming a willingness on the part of the combatants to stop fighting, peacekeeping can be utilized to separate opposing troops, reinforce cease-fires, and create a climate conducive to negotiations. Potentially, such non-regional organizations as

56 Kupchan and Kupchan, ‘Concerts’, 157–160. 57 See R. Blackwill and F. S. Larrabee (eds.), Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security (Durham, NC., 1989) for the CSCE process of arms control and CBMs involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 58 See Sagan’s argument that defence oriented systems are double edged. They diminish the propensity of aggressive foreign policies, but on the other hand defence oriented powers cannot come to the aid of allies. S. Sagan, ‘1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability’, International Security,11 (Fall 1986), pp. 151–76. 104 Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt

NATO, the OSCE, and the UN, can play a useful role, although there are several obstacles to their involvement. Consider first the potential role of the UN. Russia has lobbied for the idea that Russian forces be authorized under Chapter Eight of the UN Charter to assume peacekeeping responsibilities in the near abroad. Moscow would have the UN subcontract peacekeeping missions to Russia under the auspices of the CIS. Yet this would merely lend UN legitimacy to the Russian hegemony that many states are eager to rid themselves of. In general, peacekeeping and the more activist approach of peace enforcement have been a source of contention within the UN.59 Such operations have vastly overstretched the resources of the UN, and the countries embroiled in conflict have often seen UN operations as other than impartial. Indeed, some experts have questioned whether peace-enforcement should even be among the missions of the UN.60 Yet delegating peacekeeping and peace-enforcement tasks to regional organizations that are the instruments of regional hegemons is not an effective solution to the problem posed by an exhausted, overcommitted UN. Russia has also been unenthusiastic about a peace-keeping role for organizations other than the CIS.61 Moscow would object less to a peace-keeping role for the UN or perhaps OSCE, but it would vehemently oppose any introduction of NATO troops to the area. OSCE and UN activities can be influenced by a Russian veto and neither organization is perceived as hostile. Both OSCE and the UN would have to operate within parameters demarcated by Russia; and the stronger the Russian stake or role in a given conflict, the narrower these parameters will be.

V. Conclusion

We do not rule out the possibility that Russia will act as a benign hegemon in Central Asia.62 Nor do we exclude the possibility that a weak or even fragmented Russia will be displaced as the dominant power in the long run. For the foreseeable future, however, Russia remains the preponderant power in the region. The question is, therefore, under what conditions Russian military intervention might occur and what forms it might take. We argue that instability in the region and the nature of the Russian regime are the two key variables. Late state formation and the lack of experience with democratic government predispose the Central Asian states to authoritarianism. Ethnic heterogeneity and weak institutionalization might also lead political elites to opt for ethnically biased, exclusivist policies, particularly given the

59 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (New York, 1992), gives the optimistic view of the UN’s abilities. 60 For discussions of some of the reasons for the UN’s problems see S. Touval, ‘Why the U.N. Fails’, Foreign Affairs, 73 (September 1994), pp. 44–57; J. Ruggie, ‘Peacekeeping and US Interests’, The Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn 1994), pp. 175–184. 61 The 134 UN observers in Georgia play a minor role compared to Russian troops that are separating Georgian and Abkhaz fighters. For a discussion of the situation in Georgia, see L. Fuller, ‘Solution to Abkhaz Conflict Continues to Prove Elusive’, RFE/RL Newsline (10 July 1997), p. 6. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) consists of only 96 members and has suffered from kidnapping and attack, see Menon, After Empire, p. 144, and fn. 116. 62 For a general discussion of Russia’s range of choice vis-à-vis the former Union Republics, see H. Spruyt, ‘The Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Nonimperial Outcomes in the Former Soviet Space’, in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), The End of Empire? (Armonk, NY, 1997). The limits of neorealism: security in Central Asia 105 hardships of economic reform. The result will be domestic instability. Such domestic instability has already led to intervention in Tajikistan. To reduce the likelihood of this pattern repeating itself elsewhere in Central Asia, we have outlined an approach to conflict resolution that increases the incentives for political elites to favour civic nationalism and that aims to reduce the hardships imposed by economic change. We have proposed consociational institutions, dual citizenship, inclusive cultural policies, and support by international financial institutions. While inducing sovereign states to implement these proposals is not easy, Western governments and international organizations are not without leverage. Diplomacy and foreign aid can be used to promote these policies and to reward states that pursue them. Similarly, aid to Russia can also be used to consolidate and promote democratic reforms there. While we suggest a variety of ways in which regional and international institutions can promote confidence-building and conflict resolution at the margins, we are ultimately sceptical about their efficacy compared to the policies we recommend.