[PEACEW RKS [ STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN LESSONS LEARNED, 2001–14 Edited by Scott Smith and Colin Cookman ABOUT THE REPORT In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford University held a two-day conference on “State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform the Future.” This report comprises a selection of papers presented at the conference. The papers look back critically at thirteen years of international intervention in Afghanistan, focusing on the impact of state- strengthening exercises on security, democratization, governance, the economy, rule of law, infrastructure, civil society participation, youth development, and women’s empowerment. They describe, from the perspective of Afghan and international policy makers and experts, the immense and often unforseen challenges in rebuilding the Afghan state. Cover photo: An Afghan village elder talks to International Security Assistance Forces from atop his home. Nate Derrick/Shutterstock.com. The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 116. First published 2016. ISBN: 978-1-60127-602-5 © 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace CONTENTS PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 116 Foreword ...3 Summary ...5 Introduction ...7 Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism: Complementary or Contradictory Strategies Thomas Barfield ...9 Military and Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan: An Incoherent Approach Barbara J. Stapleton ...19 Elections and Democratization in Afghanistan Scott Seward Smith ...35 Subnational Governance in Afghanistan: Back to the Future Jennifer Murtazashvili ...53 Rule of Law and Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Testing Theory with Practice Erica Gaston and Erik Jensen ...69 Macroeconomic and Public Financial Management in Afghanistan William A. Byrd ...81 Support to Afghan Private Sector Development Paul Fishstein and Murtaza Edries Amiryar ...99 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan: State Strengthening Through Infrastructure Building Jodi Smith, John Drake, M. Annette Evans, and Scott C. Farquhar ...111 Role of the Media in Nation Forming James Deane and Shirazuddin Siddiqi ...125 Afghan Youth and the Effects of Hybrid Politics Mujib Mashal ...133 Women’s Empowerment: Challenging the Notion of Victimization Orzala Ashraf Nemat ...139 Recommendations ...149 About the Authors ...151 STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN Foreword In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford University held a two-day “Conference on State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform the Future.” Hosted at the Institute’s headquarters in Washington, DC, participants included Afghan and international policymakers, academics, journalists, and representatives of the military, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations. This Peaceworks comprises a selection of papers presented at the conference during various panel discussions. The authors have revised the papers in light of these discussions, as well as subsequent developments in Afghanistan. Preceding the papers is a summary that outlines the main conclusions of the conference. At least two presumptions underlaid the decision to organize a lessons-learned exercise. The first is that lessons could indeed be learned. While the conference participants were asked to think about both positive and negative lessons, it was perhaps inevitable that most of the discussion focused on what could have been done better. The timing of the conference was surely a factor, being held in the first months of the new “National Unity Government” of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. This was a moment of some hope for improved governance, but the memories of the 2014 presidential election crisis were still fresh. Even if the creation of the National Unity Government had successfully prevented the country from descending into a full-blown political crisis, the election was still a reminder of the fragility of Afghanistan’s transition and the unmet expectations that were set a decade before. The second presumption was that these lessons might indeed be applied. Participants were asked to think about the implications of the lessons for Afghanistan’s future, as well as possible “state-strengthening” projects. State collapse appears to be a defining phenomenon of our time, and each day our headlines are filled with the increasingly frightening consequences. It is therefore urgent that we learn as much as possible from recent attempts to strengthen state institutions. Afghanistan has become an unwitting laboratory for ongoing efforts to create political institutions that can foster stability, development, and respect for basic human rights; we now need to collate and internalize the lessons learned, effectively apply them, and monitor the outcomes. Preparations for the conference reminded us of the immense complexity of the Afghanistan situation. Our long discussions over how to break down the topics mirrored the policy debates of the previous decade. Fault will inevitably be found with this breakdown. We had to ignore some important topics, such as counternarcotics. We could have focused more on women, youth, and civil society. Different priorities revealed different analytical biases and “theories of change.” These differing perspectives were further amplified during the conference deliberations but did not prevent consensus on a number of key issues, as the summary denotes. We are especially grateful to the authors of the enclosed papers for developing and revising such informative, evidence-based studies on their respective topics. All the authors are experts in their field and gave their time freely, demonstrating a sincere desire to learn and share knowledge for the sake of a better future for Afghanistan and other fragile states. Particular gratitude goes to Scott Smith, who oversaw the project; and Colin Cookman, who kept the editorial production effort on track and edited each paper. Karl Eikenberry Michael Keating Andrew Wilder Stanford University Chatham House United States Institute of Peace USIP.ORG 3 STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN Summary ■ State-strengthening interventions in Afghanistan have contributed to remarkable changes in the country’s physical, political, economic, and social landscapes; however, success has been limited by myriad approaches taken by multiple actors with multiple objectives— some of which have been conflicting or too short-term in nature. ■ International counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies aimed at dismantling the Taliban and increasing security have proven at times to be at odds with state- building objectives. ■ Lack of unity of effort and priority setting among military and civilian actors have severly hampered the nationbuilding process, allowing power brokers to maintain their strongholds; creating more opportunity for corruption; and preventing the establishment of sustainable, national instutitions. ■ The contentious second round of the 2014 presidential election that resulted in Ashraf Ghani’s inauguration was a clear indicator of the complexity of a political environment set within a civil conflict. The need for a negotiated solution to the electoral crisis undermined Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. National and local power dynamics hindered efforts to make the power-sharing government work. ■ The Afghan state remains highly centralized in theory and highly fragmented in practice. Instead of strengthening formal structures, parallel structures have been created, often leaving the Afghan people to rely on informal or illegitimate structures of power. The lack of formal decentralization has left subnational goverance hostage to informal actors. ■ Rule of law strategies were developed in tandem to rather than as part of political and security strategies and were underfunded given the expectations surrounding establishing a justice system and reducing corruption. Moreover, while international assistance provided Afghans access to courts, they tended not to use them given rampant corruption and lack of perceived legitimacy and fairness. However, the subsequent hybrid approach that employed informal, community-based mechanisms as well as formal mechanisms had the unintended consequence of increasing corruption. ■ Macroeconomic and public finance management performance has improved substantially, but income and wealth inequality persist, and the current fiscal crisis and decline in international funding is already having a negative impact on economic growth. Further, the lack of early attention to incentives and preventive measures to avoid corruption has led to fraud and theft in the banking system and customs facilities. ■ Significant investments in private sector development projects and economic activity more generally have had mixed results due to the duplication of efforts, misaligned incentives and corruption, short duration of projects, and lack of support for successful implementation (logisitics, human capital, political frameworks). Many argue that Afghanistan’s institutions were not ready for the abrupt transition to a market-driven economy. ■ Billions of dollars spent on rebuilding Afghanistan’s