Afghanistan 2004 -Security with a Human Face

Home , Barnett Rubin, Masoud Khalili, Nancy Dupree, Omar Zakhilwal, Paghman District, Talibanization

NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004

Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities

U N D P Afghanistan Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ©United Nations Development Programme 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of UNDP.

The analysis and policy recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNDP nor those of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The report is a publication commissioned by UNDP and authored by an independent team.

Cover designed by the Afghan artist Sharif Ahmad Haidari, from Herat, winner of the UNDP competition for the National Human Development Report cover.

Design and Printing: Army Press, Plot # 1, Street 40, I & T Center, G-10/4, Islamabad, Pakistan The Preparatory Team

National Coordinator of the Project Background Paper Authors Abdullah Mojaddedi Mohammad Najeeb Azizi, Homira Nassery, Daud S. Saba, Lutfullah Safi, Naqibullah Safi, Said Mubin Editor-in-Chief Shah and Nasrullah Stanikzai Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh Thematic Paper Authors Principal Authors Abdul Baqi Banwal, Ramazan Bashar Dost, Nancy Daud S. Saba and Omar Zakhilwal Dupree, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Abdullah Haqaiqi, Mir Ahmad Joyenda, Partaw Nadiri, Ahmad Zia Neikbin, Contributing Authors Daud Rawish, Asadullah Walwalji and Seddiq Weera Abi Masefield and Michael Schoiswohl Statistician National Advisory Panel R. N. Pandey Minister Haneef Atmar (Chair), Abdul Baqi Banwal, Data Analyst Abdul Rashid Fakhri, Hafizullah Haddad, Abdullah Haqiq Rahmani Haqaiqi, Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, Daud Administrative and Research Assistant Rawish, Safia Siddiqi and Asadullah Walwalji Sadeq Wardak International Expert Committee Research Assistants Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch Dupree, Carol Abdul Latif Bari and Khial M. Sahebi le-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, Omar Noman, Barnett Rubin UNDP Focal Points and Andrew Wilder Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl

Foreword

Afghanistan has come a long way since development, as an alternative December 2001 when the Transitional development paradigm that emphasizes Islamic State of Afghanistan came into people as both the agents of change and existence. The Government has moved objects of development, is highly towards consolidating its power, bringing appropriate for post-conflict Afghanistan. security and national unity. Today, we With the country now engaged in a have a new Constitution, have made transition from relief to development, from progress in our state-building activities emergency projects to sustainable policies, and have improved our ability to provide from short-term contingency planning to good governance. For the first time in long-term perspectives, human history, Afghanistan has an elected development can be an ideal framework President. The economy has picked up and for the development vision of Afghanistan. so has the reconstruction of the I am optimistic that the preparation of infrastructure. Since 2002, we have seen NHDRs in Afghanistan will help us vet a record high school enrolment of about different policy options and design better 4 million students, and several people-oriented policies and programs. accomplishments in the health sector, particularly in the vaccination campaigns. The preparation of the first NHDR in As the high levels of voting in the Afghanistan enjoyed strong Government Presidential elections attested, the Afghan support, since we believe in its contribution people now have high expectations for the to current efforts to develop a coherent new Government to deliver on security development strategy for the upcoming and reconstruction, and to do it on the years based on reliable data and objective basis of the rule of law and a commitment analysis. to transparency and accountability. As was expected, the report has painted a Afghanistan has once again restored its gloomy picture of the status of human status in the international community, development in the country after two which in turn has reaffirmed its support decades of war and destruction. The for the reconstruction efforts through Human Development Index (HDI) value generous pledges committed at the donor calculated nationally puts Afghanistan at Conference in Berlin. We now look the dismal ranking of 173 out of 178 forward to the preparation for the countries worldwide. Yet the HDI also Parliamentary elections in April 2005. presents us with a benchmark against The Government recognizes the challenges which progress can be measured in the future. ahead, including those of providing security and at the same time livelihoods The Government of Afghanistan may not for all Afghans. Curbing corruption, agree with all the contents of this NHDR, bringing reconstruction gains to all regions which has been prepared by a team of of Afghanistan, drawing in foreign independent authors, but we are confident investment in a secure involvement, and that the recommendations and conclusions opening up the political process to of the report will contribute to the participation remain the top priorities of multiplicity of debates for shaping the the new Government. As the country now future of Afghanistan. turns a new leaf, our ambition is to give hope to each and every Afghan. At this crucial juncture in our history, I am very pleased that the first National Human Development Report (NHDR) of Afghanistan has been prepared for the year Hamid Karzai 2004 with the relevant theme of human President of the Islamic security. The concept of human Republic of Afghanistan

FOREWORD V Preface

It is my pleasure to introduce the first human rights abuses, but also the ability NHDR for Afghanistan. Since 1990, the of the Afghan people to access basic needs United Nations Development Programme (education, health, food, shelter, incomes, (UNDP) has produced annual globallivelihoods, etc.) and strategic needs Human Development Reports as analytical (participation, dignity, empowerment, etc.). and policy tools designed to promote the The report argues that while many gains concept of human development. Each year, have been made in the past two years, the these reports calculate the Human country could still fall into a cycle of Development Index and rank about 175 conflict and instability unless the genuine participating countries; unfortunately, grievances of people – the lack of jobs, Afghanistan has not been included since health, education, income, dignity, 1996 due to the unavailability of data. We opportunities for participation, etc. – are are especially proud this year to be able dealt with adequately. The report analyses to put Afghanistan back in the global the local roots of insecurity today, and ranking, which assesses progress made makes recommendations for policies and towards the well-being of all people. actions required from the new Afghan Government, civil society and the Since 1992, UNDP has also sponsored international community. NHDRs prepared as well as owned by independent national teams. So far, more This first NHDR for Afghanistan provides than 479 national and sub-national reports three out of four human development have been produced by 135 countries, in indices: the Human Development Index addition to 24 regional reports. (HDI), the Gender Development Index Afghanistan’s first NHDR, commissioned (GDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). by UNDP but compiled by an independent At this stage, the HDI, GDI and HPI could team of authors, joins this family in 2004. only be calculated at the national level, given that statistics on income After 23 years of war, Afghanistan has disaggregated by district or even province now entered a period of stabilization were not available. I am confident that an conducive to the design and expanding and increasingly reliable pool implementation of a new development of data will allow subsequent NHDR teams vision. As the new Government sets out to prepare more thorough analyses in the to devise long-term, sustainable policies, next few years. the first NHDR for Afghanistan proposes an ambitious vision: putting all Afghan With this report, UNDP is also launching people equally at the forefront of all new a long-term commitment to support the policies, both as the ends and the means production of biannual NHDRs in of democracy and development. Afghanistan. These will contribute to the calculation of progress in human The report uses a human security lens to development indicators. While the current look at the linkages between safety, dignity report presents a broad overview of and livelihoods. For too long, the problems numerous interlinked challenges for of Afghanistan were seen as being the Afghanistan today, future editions will be result of a political conflict that required devoted to particular topics. The military solutions. The NHDR expands recommendations in this NHDR are broad; the notion of “security” in Afghanistan to subsequent in-depth studies will evaluate cover not only freedom from violence and concrete policy options.

VI PREFACE The preparation of this report laid the especially grateful for the support of foundations for extensive sharing of Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani, and information and advocacy on human Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and development through trainings, the Development Haneef Atmar, a human commissioning of studies, lectures and development champion. nationwide consultations. It also led to I hope that this and future NHDRs for capacity building for the systematic Afghanistan will become important tools collection, verification and analysis of data for the promotion of people-centred to produce the HDI. The NHDR team approaches to policy making. I also hope made every effort to carry out a national that the information offered here will prove process under the guidance of a National useful for the planning and programming Advisory Panel. Workshops, consultations purposes of the new Government, as well and dialogues were held with Afghans in as for those national and international Kabul and four other provinces regarding organizations working on behalf of the the theme, the process and the findings of Afghan people. the report. A large team of national and international experts contributed to the preparation of this NHDR, and I am grateful for all their efforts, as well as for the support provided Ercan Murat by the Transitional Islamic State of Country Director Afghanistan during all stages. I am UNDP Afghanistan

PREFACE VII Preface from the NHDR Team

Based on the recommendations of the Panel, the International Expert NHDR Corporate Policy, the preparation Committee, UNDP staff and “Friends of the first NHDR for Afghanistan was of the NHDR”. initiated by the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP in line with the principles of • Stage 5 covered the preparation for national ownership, objectivity and the dissemination of the report, independence in April 2003. The NHDR including the creation of press kits and production team made every effort to a communication strategy involving involve Afghans in the identification of a number of workshops with the problems and solutions for the country. media. Sensitizing representatives of Preparation included five stages during a the media through inviting them to year and a half of activities: workshops and press conferences took place throughout the NHDR process. • Stage 1 included capacity building through two trainings, three seminars The Human Development Resource and four thematic lectures in Kabul, Office The Human and four workshops in Jalalabad, The nerve centre of the production of the Development Reports Bamyan, Balkh and Herat. This stage NHDR for Afghanistan was the Human of Afghanistan should also involved the creation of a National Development Resource Office, headed by be an instrument for Advisory Panel and an International National Coordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi, accountability. They Expert Committee, consultations and staffed by an administrative and should be used by the through workshops with the media, research officer, an international people of Afghanistan and parallel statistical capacity building statistician, a data analyst and a translator. to monitor how we with the Central Statistical Office The office was supported by UNDP in (CSO) of Afghanistan. have performed with Afghanistan, especially by Country regard to their needs • Stage 2 consisted of commissioning Director Ercan Murat, and NHDR focal and aspirations. seven sectoral background papers and points Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael 18 thematic papers from national Schoiswohl. Haneef Atmar, Minister of Rural researchers. Consultations were also Under the management of Mr. Mojaddedi, Rehabilitation and Development, held in Kabul and in some regions to a human development champion the resource centre was equipped with prepare boxes for the report on computers connected to the Internet, a people’s views about their photocopier, a library of books and development and security needs. resources on human development, and a • Stage 3 saw the compilation of the meeting room. It was located first in the findings into the various chapters by offices of the UNDP Programme the national and contributing authors Implementation Unit, and then moved under the guidance of the editor-in- within the compound of the Afghanistan chief. Information Management Service (AIMS) Office in Kabul. • Stage 4 involved consultation on the final draft with national and The Human Development Resource Office international advisors. Two rounds of worked in close cooperation with peer review on the summary and draft governmental agencies, research and chapters solicited written and oral academic institutions, and international comments from key ministers of the agencies involved in gathering data and Government, the National Advisory research. It also organized NHDR seminars

VIII PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM and human development lectures on a • Environment: Daud S. Saba, regular basis. independent researcher, writer and former lecturer at the Kabul The Authors Polytechnic University. The NHDR involved a large number of • Education: Lutfullah Safi, Education authors, contributors and background paper Coordinator, UNESCO. writers. These included: • Health: Naqibullah Safi, Senior Editor-in-chief: Advisor, Primary Health • Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh: Adjunct Care/Preventive Affairs to the Ministry Lecturer, Columbia University; Guest of Health. Professor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques • Economy: Said Mubin Shah, (Sciences-Po), Paris; and former economist, Da Afghanistan Bank. NHDR Policy Advisor, Human Development Report Office, UNDP • Governance: Nasrullah Stanikzai, New York. Director, Foreign Relations, President’s Secretariat; and Lecturer Authors: at the Faculty of Law and Political • Daud S. Saba: independent researcher, Science, Kabul University. writer and former lecturer at the Kabul Thematic papers authors: Polytechnic University. • Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer of • Omar Zakhilwal: Senior Advisor to Economics, Kabul University; and the Minister, Ministry of Rural Project Coordinator, Konrad- Rehabilitation and Development; and Adenauer-Stiftung. Professor of Development Economics, Kabul University. • Ramazan Bashar Dost: Minister of Planning. Contributing authors: • Nancy Dupree: Senior consultant, • Abi Masefield: poverty specialist, ACBAR Research and Information consultant and former advisor to the Center (ARIC) and the Agency Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief Development in Kabul. (ACBAR). • Michael Schoiswohl: lawyer, UNDP • Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director of Programme Officer, Kabul. Demography, Central Statistics Office. The NHDR office commissioned seven • Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor of sectoral background papers and 18 brief Economics, Kabul University. thematic papers or theoretical think-pieces. • Mir Ahmad Joyenda: Deputy Director Background papers authors: for Communication and Advocacy, • Poverty: Mohammad Najeeb Azizi, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). former macroeconomist, Ministry of Finance. • Partaw Nadiri: Media Manager, Afghan Civil Society Forum. • Gender: Homira Nassery, Advisor to Senior Women in Management, • Ahmad Zia Neikbin: Head of the UNDP and the Ministry of Rural Department of Philosophy and Rehabilitation and Development. Sociology, Kabul University.

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM IX • Daud Rawish: Dean of the Pedagogical development indices for provinces proved University and former Chair of the an impossible task due to the lack of data. Department of Social Sciences, Kabul The NHDR National Advisory Panel University. The ten-member NHDR National Advisory • Asadullah Walwalji: writer. Panel constituted itself on 2 September • Seddiq Weera: advisor, Ministry of 2003, and served as the steering committee Education. overseeing the drafting of the report and providing substantive guidance. The Data Collection composition of the panel reflected various Collecting data and statistics in a post- professional fields relevant to human conflict country like Afghanistan was not development. The panel was chaired by an easy task. In the absence of a national Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and census for 25 years, a nationwide Development Haneef Atmar. Other demographic survey and a household members included many of the drafters of income survey, and with a low capacity the thematic papers: to gather and analyse administrative data • Abdul Baqi Banwal: Lecturer of from different ministries, the NHDR faced Economics, Kabul University; and a daunting challenge in correctly estimating Project Coordinator, Konrad- many of the main human development Adenauer-Stiftung. indicators. The project worked closely • Abdul Rashid Fakhri: Director of with the CSO and the national and Demography, CSO international agencies that have conducted surveys up to now. The NHDR also used • Hafizullah Haddad: Head of Planning, the services of Mr. R. N. Pandey, Director Academy of Sciences. of the Department of Industrial Policy and • Abdullah Haqaiqi: Professor of Promotion at the Ministry of Commerce Economics, Kabul University. and Industry of the Government of India. During three months in Kabul, he helped • Helena Malikyar: researcher, New compile the human development indicators York University. used in this report. • Nilab Mobarez: medical doctor and In addition to the CSO data and Statistical representative of the NGO Enfants Year Book 2003, the NHDR heavily relied Afghans. on the UNICEF/CSO Multiple Indicator • Daud Rawish: Dean of the Pedagogical Cluster Survey (MICS) of 2003, which University and former Chair of covered the entire country, and the 2003 Department of Social Sciences, Kabul National Risk and Vulnerability University. Assessment (NRVA) survey, which provided data on poverty in rural • Safia Siddiqi: Advisor, Ministry of Afghanistan. For provincial data, collection Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Spokesperson of the Constitutional was hampered by lack of sufficient centre- Loya Jirgah, December–January 2004; periphery communication, infrastructure and Deputy Chair of the Constitutional and networking problems, and the overall Loya Jirgah. lack of access to provinces, especially remote ones. Disaggregating the human • Asadullah Walwalji: writer.

X PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM The International Expert Committee the report and laid out a plan for tasks related to preparation. An International Expert Committee, consisting of international researchers • A second workshop on statistics was working on Afghanistan, provided the held on 5–11 April 2004 for 20 NHDR Team with relevant expertise on representatives of the CSO and various thematic areas. The members included: ministries. Participants were given exercises on the calculation of the • Katarina Ammitzboell: former human development indices and Assistant Country Director, received a final certificate. Governance, UNDP Afghanistan. • As part of a regional outreach strategy, • Nancy Hatch Dupree: senior a series of workshops and lectures on consultant, ARIC Resource and human development, human security Information Center and ACBAR. and the NHDRs were held at the • Carol le-Duc: Senior Social Scientist following academic institutions in (Gender), World Bank (WB), Kabul. Kabul. Each lecture was followed by discussions and consultations, and • Ishaq Nadiri: J. Gold Professor of questionnaires were circulated to Economics, New York University, and collect the views of participants: senior member of the National Bureau Kabul University: Around 300 of Economic Research. students attended and actively • Omar Noman: Senior Advisor to the participated in a discussion led by Director, Regional Bureau for Asia National Advisory Panel members Pacific, UNDP New York. Abdul Baqi Banwal and Asadullah Walwalji on 9 May 2004. • Barnett Rubin: Director of Studies, Center of International Cooperation, Academy of Sciences: Around 30 New York University. scholars of various disciplines attended a discussion led by National Advisory • Andrew Wilder: Director of AREU, Panel member Hafizullah Haddad on Kabul. 10 May 2004. Workshops, Lectures and Consultations Pedagogical University: One hundred As part of the strategy to build the and fifty students and teachers from necessary capacity for the drafting of the Pedagogical University and the Afghanistan’s first NHDR, workshops Polytechnic Institute attended a were held in Kabul and four other workshop led by National Advisory Panel members Abdullah Haqaiqi and provinces. These also raised public Daud Rawish on 16 May 2004. awareness of human development and the NHDR process. • Similar workshops and lectures were held at universities in four major • The first workshop was held in Kabul provincial capitals. National Advisory on 8–9 December 2003 for 43 national Panel members presented lectures, and international participants. It was answered questions from 1,000 meant as a first opportunity to train students and instructors, and collected the National Advisory Panel members Voices of People. These events on the concept of human development included: and calculation of the human development indices. Participants Jalalabad: discussions led by Safia brainstormed on possible themes for Siddiqi

PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM XI Bamyan: discussions led by Abdul • “The Gender Issue in Afghanistan” Rashid Fakhri and Helena Malikyar by Homira Nassery Balkh: discussions led by Asadullah • “The Health Situation” by Naqibullah Walwalji Safi Herat: panel member Abdullah • “The Status of Education in Haqaiqi and NHDR author Daud Saba Afghanistan” by Lutfullah Safi held a gathering in the District of Adraskan’s Grand Mosque that • “Environment in Afghanistan” by brought together religious scholars Daud S. Saba and representatives of various tribes. Advocacy They also spoke with the Board of Directors of the Association of • Articles were published on human Professionals in Herat, and held a town development, human security and the hall meeting in the municipality and NHDR in local newspapers and a workshop at the University of Herat. journals by panel members Abdullah The NHDR team had also planned to visit Haqaiqi and Daud Rawish, and by Khost, Takhar and Kandahar, but those NHDR Research and Administrative trips did not materialize due to a shortage Assistant Sadeq Wardak. of time, and logistics and security problems. • On 10 February 2004, the NHDR Office and panel members Nilab A Lecture Series Mobarez and Asadullah Walwalji Starting in April 2004, the NHDR office announced the preparation of the first organized monthly lectures on topics NHDR in Afghanistan to the media, related to human development. These and discussed the human development included: concept.

XII PREFACE FROM THE NHDR TEAM A few words about the report

Afghanistan’s first NHDR was the product viewpoint of human security and of a multidisciplinary team. This allowed human development. the report to incorporate multiple perspectives, which was particularly • Lessons learned from the role of aid appropriate given the kaleidoscopic nature in post-conflict situations. of Afghanistan today. The authors tried to • A set of both broad and more specific go beyond a simple presentation and recommendations. analysis of human development indicators. Instead, the intention was to contextualize The report has a number of intended them in a broader framework, and to audiences in mind. The authors sought to analyse possible causes, consequences and provide some knowledge of Afghanistan impacts. Given that the report is an as well as conceptual thinking on introductory NHDR, the authors also tried development, an important element for to present theories and baselines upon strategic consideration of long-term needs. which the upcoming cycle of biannual Both aspects will prove useful for: analyses could be based. Future reports will provide more detailed analyses of • Policy makers, who may draw ideas particular topics as well as concrete from the report’s conclusions. recommendations. • International aid workers, whose To this end, the structure of the report contribution to the stabilization of moves the reader gradually through various Afghanistan could benefit from lessons steps culminating in the conclusions and learned in other conflict and post- recommendations presented in the last conflict situations. The historical chapter. These building blocks, each of overviews may also help development which could stand on their own, were practitioners and members of the intended to have a cumulative impact. international community to better They include: understand the complicated context in which they work. • A conceptual framework that explains why the authors are taking a particular • Members of civil society in view on the current problems in Afghanistan and outside, who could Afghanistan. use parts of the report for advocacy. • A presentation of indicators as they • Students, who may learn and discuss stand today, using sources from the the report’s various theories. CSO, the most comprehensive surveys available (NRVA and MICS), and The different forms of expertise that shaped published statistics from international the report are reflected in the various and national agencies. Most data are chapters. Social scientists contributed to footnoted to show their source. the theoretical framework of Chapter 1, and the greed and grievance analysis of • An analysis of the causes and Chapter 4; statisticians calculated the consequences of these indicators from indicators presented in Chapters 2 and 3; the point of view of greed and lawyers and constitutional experts helped grievances, fears and wants. The form the analysis of governance in Chapter analysis presented in the report builds 5; development specialists and economists on the latest global discussions on the contributed to the analysis of strategies in relationships between democracy, Chapter 6; development practitioners with development and conflict. international experience reviewed the role • Where applicable, historical facts that of aid presented in Chapter 7; and social offer lessons from the past. historians provided input on Afghan history. The conclusions were vetted with • An examination of governance and the authors as well as with members of the development processes from the National Advisory Panel.

A FEW WORDS XIII Acknowledgements

The preparation of this report was made Dupree, Carol le-Duc, Ishaq Nadiri, Omar possible due to the contributions and Noman, Barnett Rubin, Andrew Wilder) support of many organizations and provided guidance throughout the process individuals, who generously gave the and gave invaluable comments on the draft. NHDR team their valuable time and ideas. Acknowledgements go to all the authors The NHDR benefited greatly from the of the background and thematic papers advice and guidance of the prominent named above. Authors Daud Saba and experts on the National Advisory Panel, Omar Zakhilwal did an outstanding job including Minister of Rural Rehabilitation compiling the findings from the papers, and Development Haneef Atmar, Abdul and conducting additional research to Baqi Banwal, Abdul Rashid Fakhri, produce the first draft. Along with Abi Hafizullah Haddad, Abdullah Haqaiqi, Masefield and Michael Schoiswohl, they Helena Malikyar, Nilab Mobarez, Daud contributed countless hours to writing the Rawish, Safia Siddiqi and Asadullah different chapters and commenting on the Walwalji. overall report. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh’s dedicated support to the Afghanistan The valuable feedback provided by NHDR included designing the project, Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani and conducting trainings in Dari, contributing Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and to the writing of chapters and editing the Development Haneef Atmar is deeply final report during various missions to appreciated. Kabul and electronically at other times. The team is grateful for the constant Students from her spring 2004 Human support of UNDP Afghanistan Country Security Class at Sciences-Po, Paris, Director Ercan Murat, Senior Deputy especially Hanna Schmitt, Jeanette Kroes Country Director Karen Jorgenson, and and Chowra Makaremi, contributed papers former Assistant Country Director Katarina as well. Ammitzboell. UNDP focal points The international statistician R. N. Pandey Fakhruddin Azizi and Michael Schoiswohl worked for three months with the NHDR constantly provided assistance. A readers team to calculate the human development group made up of UNDP Afghanistan indices and compile the statistical annexes officials provided very useful comments, for the report. inputs and suggestions on the draft of the report. Zahira Virani’s comments and edits Abdul Qayum Qawim and Mohammad are especially appreciated, as are Emilia Hussain Yamin edited the Dari version of Mugnai’s contributions to Chapter 5, and the report, which was translated by Sadeq Gretchen Luchsinger Sidhu copyediting. Wardak and his team. The design, layout Omar Noman, Senior Advisor to the and printing were done by Army Press, UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia Pacific, Islamabad. We are grateful to Zanbel-e- provided constant support. Eliana Gham magazine’s staff and cartoonists for Escobedo Gonzàles, UNDP Media allowing us to use their cartoons. Consultant, designed the communication Acknowledgements also go to Research strategy for the launch and outreach of the and Administrative Officer Sadeq Wardak, report. Data Analyst Haqiq Rahmani, Research The International Expert Committee Assistants Abdul Latif Bari and Khial M. (Katarina Ammitzboell, Nancy Hatch Sahebi, and Translator Talib Rahman

XIV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Rahmani. The entire project came together valuable support of Andrew Pinney under the able management of National (NRVA) is also highly appreciated. The Coordinator Abdullah Mojaddedi. list of officials mentioned in the above organizations is not comprehensive, but Several national and international gratitude goes to all those who provided institutions shared their knowledge, assistance. research materials, surveys and data with the NHDR team. We benefited in many Provincial authorities and universities in ways from the following institutions in Herat, Jalalabad, Balkh and Bamyan were Afghanistan and their officials: UNICEF very helpful in organizing the regional (Jonathan Cauldwell and Nadia Behboodi), workshops and public consultations. the CSO (Director Mohammad Ali Authorities of the University of Kabul, the Watanyar, and Asmatullah Ramzi and Pedagogical University of Kabul and the Abdul Rashid Fakhri), the AIMS (David Academy of Sciences in Kabul also helped Saunders, Golam Monowar Kamal, Joe in facilitating workshops and consultations Crowley and Ahmad Sear Rifahy), the on their premises. Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, Financial support for the NHDR was the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of provided by UNDP, the Canadian Higher Education, the United Nations International Development Agency Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (CIDA) and the WB. Without their support, (UNAMA), AREU (Andrew Wilder, it would not have been possible to sustain Thomas Muller and Royce Wiles), this comprehensive project. UNHCR (Pablo Mateu and Anna Bendall), UNODC (Ziauddin Zaki and Nazir Ahmad Last but not least, we are grateful to all Shah), UNMACA (Abdul Ghafar the “Friends of the NHDR” for their Mohibzada), the WFP, UNEP and Da support of the process, as well as their Afghanistan Bank (Asadullah Mojaddidi contributions to and participation in our and Said Mubin Shah). The continued workshops and lectures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV Abbreviations

AACA Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission AIMS Afghanistan Information Management Service ANA Afghan National Army ANBP Afghan New Beginnings Program ANP Afghan National Police AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit ARTF Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund CSO Central Statistical Office DAB Da Afghanistan Bank DAD Donor Assistance Database DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product HRW Human Rights Watch IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission ICG International Crisis Group ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration IRC International Rescue Committee ISAF International Security Assistance Forces ITAP Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body LCG Local Consultative Group MDGs Millennium Development Goals MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NDB National Development Budget NDF National Development Framework NEEP National Emergency Employment Programme NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment NSP National Solidarity Programme PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PPP Purchasing Power Parity PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team SF Strategic Framework TISA Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan UXO Unexploded Ordnance WB World Bank UNAMA The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

XVI ABBREVIATIONS Glossary of Afghan expressions

Bank-i Milli National Bank Chaddari Veil Hejrat Migration Kareez Underground canals connecting wells Kuchi Nomad Loya Jirgah Grand Council, “Grand Assembly of Elders” Maharam Man from the women’s family Maulawi Religious Scholar Meshrano Jirgah Senate Mujahideen Freedom Fighters Shariat or sharia Islamic Law Sharwali Municipality Shura Council Ulama Religious Scholars Walayat Province Wolesi Jirgah National Assembly Woleswali District

GLOSSARY XVII Map 0.1: Afghanistan with Provincial Borders

XVIII MAP OF AFGHANISTAN Table of Contents

Photo: Anthony Fitzherbert

Contents

The Preparatory Team Foreword V Preface VI Preface from the NHDR Team VIII A Few Words about the Report XIII Acknowledgements XIV Abbreviations XVI Glossary of Afghan Expressions XVII Overview XXV

Chapter 1 Concepts and Implications

1.1. Human Development and Human Security as an Analytical Framework 3 1.2. Relevance of a Human Security Framework for Afghanistan 6 1.3. The Responsibility for Human Security 10

Chapter 2 The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction 17 2.2. The Status of Composite Human Development Indicators in Afghanistan 18 2.3. Components of the Human Development Indices 26 2.4. Some Human Insecurity Indicators for Afghanistan 33 2.5. Conclusions 45

Chapter 3 A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

3.1. Why a Threat-based Analysis? 49 3.2. Threats to Human Security in Afghanistan Today 51 3.3. Conclusions 89

Chapter 4 Causes and consequences of insecurities

4.1. Introduction 93 4.2. A Framework of Motives and Opportunities 96 4.3. Causes of the Conflict: Grievances and Greed 98 4.4. Impacts and Coping Strategies 113 4.5. Conclusions 119

CONTENTS XXI Chapter 5 Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

5.1. The Current Reconstruction Process from a Human Security Perspective 123 5.2. The Path to State-building 124 5.3. Rule of Law and Human Rights 143 5.4. Security Sector Reform 152 5.5. Role of Civil Society Institutions 155 5.6. Conclusions: Building a State for Good Governance 160

Chapter 6 What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

6.1. Introduction 165 6.2. History 165 6.3. The Present: Setting National Development Priorities 168 6.4. A Future of Human Security 182 6.5. Conclusions 198

Chapter 7 The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

7.1. Accountability and Legitimacy 201 7.2. Analytical Framework: The Conspicuous Role of Aid in Conflicts 202 7.3. Lessons from a History of Politicized Aid 205 7.4. A Promise to Keep and a Responsibility towards Human Security 208 7.5. Challenges to Needs Identification and Aid Distribution in Afghanistan 211 7.6. Conclusions 219

Chapter 8 Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

8.1. The Dilemma of Afghanistan 223 8.2. Recommendations and Elements of a Human Security Vision for Afghanistan 228 8.3. Human Security as Public Good for Afghanistan 236 8.4. Summary: Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan 243

Bibliography 247 Annexures A.1. Building Statistical Capacity and Infrastructure: An Urgent Need 263 A.2. Technical Appendix on Statistics 269 A.3. Statistical Indicators Template 275 A.4. Definitions of Statistical Terms 285

XXII CONTENTS MAPS

0.1 Map of Afghanistan with Provincial Borders XVIII 2.1 Percentage of Children 7-13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province, 2003 30 2.2 Percentage of Girls 7-13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province, 2003 31 3.1 Calorie Gap Rate by Province, 2003 54 3.2 Distribution of Doctors per 10,000 People by Province 64 3.3 Distribution of Hospital Beds per 10,000 People by Province 65 3.4 Number of Students per Teacher by Province 67 3.5 Distribution of Schools per 10,000 People by Province 68 3.6 Percentage of Households with No Drinking Water by Province, 2003 73 3.7 Percentage of Households Not Using a Flush or Pit Toilet by Province 74 3.8 Percentage of Villages per District in which Landmines Affect Access to Schools, Markets, Agricultural Land, Water or Homes, 2003 87 3.9 Mined Area Situation in Afghanistan as of May 2004 88 3.10 Total Area Cleared of Landmines as of March 2004 88 4.1 Deforestation in Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar Provinces (1977-2002) 105 4.2 Afghanistan Poppy Production by Province 2003-2003 108 4.3 Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation by Province, 2002-2003 109 BOXES

1.1 A Human Security Framework for Post-conflict Peace-building 7 2.1 Health-related Statistics 27 2.2 Findings of the NRVA 36 3.1 Study on “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003” 50 4.1 The Different Phases of the Afghan Conflict since 1979 94 4.2 Daulat Versus Yaghestan: An Afghan Tragedy of Representative Government 96 5.1 The State According to the 1382 (2004) Constitution 130 5.2 The Afghan Constitution and Educational Rights 131 5.3 Main Administrative Constraints 133 5.4 The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission 134 5.5 State-periphery Relations in Post-conflict Situations 136 5.6 Access to Justice in Post-conflict Situations 145 5.7 Treaties to Which Afghanistan is a Party 149 5.8 Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration 154 5.9 Defining Civil Society and its Significance in the Afghan Context 156 5.10 Examples of Civil Society Involvement in Afghanistan 159 5.11 Good Governance – For What? 160 6.1 National Priority Programmes 169 6.2 Financing Development 181 6.3 Debt in Afghanistan 190 7.1 What is the Rationale for Aid? 210 8.1 What Afghanistan Needs - What People Need 224 8.2 What kind of Democracy does Afghanistan Need? 226 8.3 Why is Culture Important to Human Development? 232 A.1 The Government and UNDP set the Standards 266 CHARTS

2.1 HDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002 19 2.2 Comparison of PPP-Adjusted GDP per Capita, 2002 19 2.3 Comparison of Literacy Rates 20

CONTENTS XXIII 2.4 GDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002 20 2.5 Comparison of Male/Female Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002 21 2.6 Comparison of Male/Female Adult Literacy Rate (Age 15 and Above) 21 2.7 Comparison of Male/Female (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) Gross Enrolment Ratios, 2002 22 2.8 Comparison of Male/Female PPP-Adjusted Per Capita GDP, 2002 22 2.9 Comparison of HPI Values, 2002 24 2.10 Probability at Birth of Not Surviving to Age 40, 2002 24 2.11 Household with No Safe Drinking Water from Pumps or Protected Springs 25 2.12 Children Underweight for Age (% under age 5), 2001 25 2.13 Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002 26 2.14 Distribution of Food Expenditure by Income Groups 35 2.15 Reported Poverty Shocks 37 2.16 Correlation between Population without Sanitation (%) and Child Mortality Rate 39 2.17 Reason for Not Returning to Place of Origin 43 2.18 Reason for Displacement 43 3.1 Regional Disparities in the Distribution of School Students, 2002 69 3.2 Gender Disparities in Distribution of School Students, 2002 69 3.3 Landmine Victims in 2003 89 3.4 Landmine Victims by Gender 2003 89 6.1 Sectoral Components of the Development Budget 1383 (2004) – 1389 (2010) 182 TABLES 2.1 Human Development Indices, 2002 18 2.2 Selected Indicators for Poverty, Vulnerability and Risk in Afghanistan 26 2.3 Literacy and Gross Enrolment Ratios 28 2.4 Education Related Statistics 29 2.5 Gross Domestic Product by Sector 32 2.6 Investment Record in Million US$ 32 2.7 Trade Records during 1381 (2002) in Million US$ 33 2.8 Distribution of Income and Consumption 34 2.9 School Non-attendance Reasons by Wealth Group and Gender 40 3.1 Distinctive Characteristics of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Afghanistan 56 3.2 Percentage of Rural Afghans who cannot Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003 59 3.3 Percentage of Rural Afghans who can Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003 63 3.4 Percentage of Rural Afghans Living Among Landmines and UXOs by Province, 2003 87 4.1 Afghanistan Opium Production from 1999 to 2003 107 5.1 Rural Afghans’ Opinions of the New Constitution 128 6.1 Operating Budget Expenditures 1381 (2002) - 1382 (2003) 183-184 6.2 MDG Targets for Afghanistan 185 6.3 Debts incurred by Previous Administrations 1380 (2001) and Before 190 7.1 Donor Disbursement Table 213 7.2 Total Assistance to Afghanistan 1380 (2001) - 1382 (2003) 214 FIGURES 5.1 Structure of Administration 130 5.2 Structure of the Government 133 5.3 Public Employment in Afghanistan 135 5.4 NSP: Breakdown of Responsibilities 138 5.5 National Initiatives in Security Sector 153 6.1 Consultative Group Mechanism 170 6.2 Growth Scenarios of Afghanistan 188

XXIV CONTENTS Overview Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities

Security is not just the end of war, but the The NHDR team that prepared this report ability to go about one’s business safely, gathered a variety of voices from their to go to work or home, to travel outside meetings at universities and town halls. knowing that one’s family will not suffer The overwhelming majority of people harm. It is the assurance that development expressed their sense of pessimism and gains made today will not be taken away fear that reconstruction has bypassed the tomorrow. For Afghans, human security ordinary Afghan. is not only the ability to survive, but also Centring a discussion about security on the chance to live a life of dignity and have all the people of Afghanistan entails the adequate livelihoods. Bringing an end to idea that human security is a public good insecurity should not therefore be sought to which everyone is equally entitled. It is solely through short-term military not the privilege of those defending their solutions, but with a long-term, interests through war. This approach leads comprehensive strategy that abides by the to two messages for state-building in promises of development and the Afghanistan: promotion of human rights. 1) First, a positive message of new For too long, the security problem in responsibilities for the new Afghan Afghanistan has been interpreted narrowly democracy: Human security as a as the security of the “state” from internal public good entails state responsibility, and external aggression, or as the protection as well as a corresponding duty of of the interests of fragmented groups engagement by the people. The state claiming political legitimacy, or from the draws its meaning and moral perspective of global and regional interests. legitimacy from its response to the Often neglected have been the human people. With the ultimate aims of security needs of the population at large. ensuring survival, livelihoods and Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of dignity, the obligations of those in ordinary people who sought safety and positions of power – the state and the dignity in their daily lives. international community – consist of This NHDR ventures beyond the protecting, providing and empowering. traditional narrative of the “security Those in a position to receive – people problem” in Afghanistan. It proposes that and communities – must assume, the real security challenge is for the demand and defend their rights. reconstruction process to generate the 2) Second, a warning to prevent a new means to provide services and jobs, and cycle of further instability and renewed protect human rights, especially in rural conflict: The existence of “horizontal areas. Insecurity in Afghanistan is not only inequalities”, defined in this report as a problem of physical safety, but also of differentiated access to socio-economic deprivation and restricted access to health opportunities, resources and power- and education facilities, legal and political sharing among various groups, could rights, and social opportunities. create a reality of multiple experiences

OVERVIEW XXV within Afghanistan. Horizontal reconstruction and development in inequalities could renew deep-rooted Afghanistan, and provide a baseline conflicts when they combine identity for measuring future progress. with inequality in a historically or • Chapter 3 provides a threat-based emotionally charged situation. Power analysis of the human development inequalities and asymmetries in and human security indicators for Afghanistan today include sources of Afghanistan, categorizing them in long-term as well as short-term terms of “fears” (safety as well as grievances, ranging from economic strategic needs such as human rights) inequality to imbalances stemming and “wants” (the basic needs of from gender, geography, religion, development). ethnicity, etc. Because these grievances have been manipulated to fuel conflict • Chapter 4 employs a framework of in the past, their continued existence “greed” and “grievances” to analyse is not only unfair, but also potentially the causes of 23 years of conflict. dangerous. Political, social and economic processes that have led to or resulted In the future, preventing conflicts will from the Afghan wars are discussed require targeting and responding to root from their relationship to people’s causes, both internal and external. With “wants” and “fears”. The chapter then the renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan, considers the impact of conflict on a window of opportunities has opened to Afghans and the institutions that affect build a sustainable peace based on popular their lives. aspirations and participation. The human • Chapter 5 evaluates Afghanistan’s security challenge in Afghanistan today is state-building process from a human for a devolution of power to take place at security perspective, and examines the the same time that power is consolidated challenges of political transition, at the centre. Striking the right balance participation and centre-periphery will call for the state to provide human relations. security as a public good, while at the same time incorporating public • Chapter 6 builds on the national participation in the peace-building process. development strategies as they have been designed in the past two years to These messages are elaborated within make recommendations on what type Afghanistan’s first NHDR in eight of economic growth and development chapters. vision are needed for a “humanly • Chapter 1 presents the conceptual secure” Afghanistan. framework of human development and • Chapter 7 examines the role of the human security, and introduces their international community in providing application to the situation in incentives and disincentives through Afghanistan today. aid for peace-building in Afghanistan. • Chapter 2 assesses the status of • Chapter 8 presents the report’s human development indicators for conclusions and main Afghanistan: the Human Development recommendations. It outlines the seven Index (HDI), Gender Development ingredients necessary for development Index (GDI) and Human Poverty Index and democracy in Afghanistan, and (HPI) are calculated for the first time. for providing human security as a These highlight the challenges of public good for all Afghans.

XXVI OVERVIEW Chapter 1

Concepts and Implications

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 1 Concepts and Implications

1.1. Human Development and By the 1970s the growth-only agenda was Human Security as an being challenged, with development Analytical Framework: theories criticizing money income, questioning the Gross National Product Concepts do Matter (GNP) as the measure of development, and putting as objectives employment and Chapter 1 presents the analytical and redistribution with growth. The end of that normative framework on which the decade witnessed the emergence of the following analysis of the situation in basic needs approach, which emphasized Afghanistan is based. As this is a first a group of basic goods and services NHDR for Afghanistan, this introductory required for the poor to live decently. chapter presents the definitions and However, the approach was criticized for implications of the concepts of human its paternalistic view, its utilitarianism and development and human security in order its commodity fetishism. The 1980s then to lay a foundation for analysis in this and saw the debt crisis, as well as a rising subsequent cycles of biannual NHDRs. emphasis on poverty. Adjustment and Human Development: stabilization programs, which had called A People-centered Approach for shrinking the role and size of states and increasing the role of markets, led to As argued first in the UNDP global Human increased inequalities and poverty, The obvious is the most Development Report of 1990, the concept prompting thinking around “adjustment difficult to see: The true of “human development” has been with a human face”. wealth of a country is conceived first and foremost as an The human development paradigm, its people. alternative vision to the prevailing established in 1990 by Mahbub ul Haq, Mahbub ul Haq, founder of the development paradigms of the time. Amartya Sen, Frances Stewart, Paul Human Development Reports Since the 1950s, the subject of Streeten and others, set itself apart from “development” has seen an evolution that previous development theories by arguing has responded to the theoretical and that economic growth does not practical needs of various decades. automatically trickle down to improve Throughout the developing world, the people’s well-being, while approaches colonial legacy had led to low incomes, such as basic needs do not hand over low savings and investments, appalling decision-making to beneficiaries health, low literacy, and primary themselves. The human development production with little manufacturing and concept thus advocates putting people back total dependency. The 1950s and 1960s at centre stage, both as the means and ends brought an emphasis on economic growth of development. It distinguishes between based on industrialization and investments. two sides: One is the formation of human The ensuing rapid growth, however, did capabilities, the other is the use that people make of their acquired capabilities for not produce sustained development. work or leisure. Dependency remained and distribution problems resulted in unemployment, This approach includes both an “evaluative underemployment and poverty, as the aspect” and an “agency aspect”. The human dimension was neglected, and the evaluative aspect means improving human trickle-down theory proved not to be lives as an explicit development objective automatic. and understanding how these

NHDR 04 3 improvements can be made; it emphasizes • Sustainability: concern for not only equity as a policy objective. The agency present generations but future ones as aspect is what people can do to improve well. their lives through individual, social and political processes. This second aspect, • Empowerment/participation: which has gained increased attention in enabling people to attain a level of the past decade, has introduced individual individual development that allows as well as collective agency, added social them to make choices close to their movements and political reforms to hearts. economic development policies, and, The human development concept avoids ultimately, considers human rights an prescriptions and concentrates more on intrinsic as well as instrumental value of destinations, which should be the ultimate development. vision of development. Focusing on the By emphasizing the diversity of human destination, however, does not mean that needs, human development was thus the path to get there is open-ended and conceived as an alternative to pure erratic. And while the paths taken can lead economic development and straightjacket to different destinations, human policy prescriptions – such as the neo- development suggests a simultaneous, not liberal Washington Consensus, which sequential achievement of the four dictated a set of standard reforms and their principles above. sequencing, often regardless of national The equal weight of these values has led realities. Human development argues that critics to highlight the various conflicts economic growth centres exclusively on and trade-offs that exist among them, as the expansion of only one choice – income well as the difficulties of adapting these – while a holistic development approach utopian ideals to public policies at the must embrace other choices that people national level. These conflicts and trade- value: greater access to knowledge, better off should be subject to a much more nutrition and health services, more secure extensive discussion and analysis than is livelihoods, security against crime and possible within this report. Laying the physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, foundations is intended to at least offer a political and cultural freedoms, a sense of point of departure for debates on participation in community activities, and Afghanistan’s human development future. self-respect and dignity. Economic growth therefore is only a means to better human Human Development in Conflict welfare, not an end in itself. The causal Situations link between economic growth and While the objective of economic growth improved well-being does not arise and development should be human automatically, but rather has to be created development, for countries emerging from consciously through public policies. conflict, such as Afghanistan, sustainable The essential elements of the human peace requires a guarantee that gains made development concept are: today will not be taken away tomorrow. This idea is embodied in the concept of • Efficiency/productivity: the optimal “human security”. On the one hand, it use of existing resources through entails the notion of “safety”, which goes investment in the education, health, beyond security in the traditional sense, aspirations and skills of people. and on the other hand, it includes the • Equity: distributive justice, and the guarantees and assurances that underpin fair distribution of incomes and assets the concept of “social security”. Human through equal access to opportunities. security, therefore, becomes both the

4 Chapter 1 People need security so as to enjoy the greatest possible degree of freedom and dignity in their lives.

Amartya Sen, 2000 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002. prerequisite for human development as of new global trends, the rise of non-state well as a guarantee of its sustainability. actors, and new types of non-military While human development is a process of threats to the internal stability of states widening the range of people’s choices, and people within them, the traditional human security means that people can concept of “security” as a realist pact exercise these safely and freely while being between nations became obsolete at the relatively confident that the opportunities beginning of the 21st Century. If, in the they have today are not lost tomorrow. As past, existential threats were assumed to such, it is a particularly relevant lens through which the challenges of emanate from external sources, and security Afghanistan can be examined. mainly focused on protecting the state and its sovereign territory from external attacks, Expanding the Notion of Security new non-military threats such as poverty, – the Human Security Concept infectious diseases, environmental disasters, massive population movements In the same way that traditional economic and drugs – all of which travel without a development paradigms had failed to passport – have now become part of the address the broader concerns of people, “security” agenda. traditional “security” discourses are no longer adaptable enough to address the The demise of the Cold War between the new threats to the safety and well-being two super-powers, the United States and of people within states. With a combination the Soviet Union, with their proxy

NHDR 04 5 confrontations in countries such as that together give people the building Afghanistan, meant that threats to national blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”4 borders became a diminishing security Human security is concerned with concern. Intra-state unrests and conflicts, reducing, and if possible, removing the often fueled by the socio-economic and insecurities that threaten human lives. It political marginalization of certain is a dramatic shift from the traditional view segments of society, became new threats of “state security”, according to which the to be dealt with instead. People were We must also broaden state would monopolize the rights and increasingly identified as the victims of means to safeguard the integrity and our view of what is violence on the one hand, and the cause robustness of the state vis-à-vis other states meant by peace and of new threats to the stability of states on as its first priority. Too many examples security. Peace means the other. Weak states became identified have demonstrated how states can become much more than the as those unable or unwilling to respond to perpetuators of insecurities themselves, absence of war. the welfare of their people, and failed states not only failing to fulfill their obligations Human security can no became a threat to the stability of the towards their citizens, but also becoming longer be understood international system in addition to that of a source of threats. The human security in purely military terms. their own people. approach calls instead for a multi-pronged Rather, it must strategy: identifying threats, seeking to According to the global Human prevent them from materializing, encompass economic Development Report of 1994, humanmitigating harmful effects for those that development, social security is broadly defined as "safety from occur, and helping victims cope with the justice, environmental chronic threats such as hunger, disease, consequences of widespread “insecurities” protection, and repression as well as protection from such as conflict, human rights violations democratization, sudden and harmful disruptions in the and massive underdevelopment. disarmament, and patterns of daily life – whether in homes, 1.2. Relevance of a Human respect for human 2 in jobs or in communities.” Human Security Framework for rights and the rule of security is referred to as freedom from fear law. and freedom from want. Seven threats are Afghanistan identified: economic security, food UN Secretary-General Kofi The Traditional “Security” Narrative Annan.1 security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community For too long, Afghanistan’s security security and political security. As problem has been interpreted narrowly as elaborated by the Commission on Human the security of the “state” from internal Security, “the objective of human security and external aggression, or as the protection is to safeguard the vital core of all human of the interests of fragmented groups lives from critical (severe) and pervasive claiming political legitimacy in the absence of a state, or from the position of global (widespread) threats, in a way that is and regional interests. Often neglected consistent with long-term human have been the human security needs of the 3 fulfillment.” As a normative concept, it people in Afghanistan. Forgotten were the “means using processes that build on legitimate concerns of ordinary people people’s strengths and aspirations. It means who sought security and dignity in their creating political, social, environmental, daily lives. Yet, security should be first economic, military and cultural systems and foremost a public good, not the

1 Kofi Annan 2001. 2 UNDP 1994 3 The independent global Commission on Human Security was established in 2001 by the Japanese Government and was co-chaired by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and former UNHCR High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. It included Lakhtar Brahimi, the former UN Secretary General’s Envoy for Afghanistan. 4 Commission on Human Security 2003.

6 Chapter 1 Box 1.1. A Human Security Framework for Post-conflict Peace-building

Ensuring public safety security, low social provisions for the as many people as possible. A minimal unemployed, and so on – factors that level of trust and confidence must be In the aftermath of a conflict, national intensify inequalities and poverty. In promoted between the people in a war- authorities usually face the challenge of order to build a sustainable peace, it is torn society in order to make ensuring personal security, one of the important to relaunch economic activity reintegration and coexistence possible. most vital and immediate aspects of and growth, and transform the war This might be achieved through fostering human security. Public safety may economy into a normal economy. dialogue between communities and disintegrate in the wake of increased Rehabilitation and physical encouraging joint activities. crime rates, looting, revenge killings and reconstruction, which can be a major Promoting governance and reverse ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, incentive for peace, should begin at the empowerment interpersonal violence will likely earliest possible time. Relief and increase, especially gender-based development activities should ideally violence, as a consequence of the Another crucial aspect of human security work in parallel, and people should is political security, which means the disruption of social structures such as become increasingly independent of families and communities. Other critical enjoyment of civil and political rights, humanitarian relief. Post-conflict and freedom from political oppression. questions that may need to be solved are reconstruction programmes should the disarmament, demobilization and According to the UN Secretary-General, include providing key services, “Good governance at the local, national reintegration (DDR) into society of rebuilding basic infrastructure, former combatants and their dependents, and international levels is perhaps the reintegrating displaced people, single most important factor in promoting along with the creation of economic demobilizing combatants and opportunities to prevent them from development and advancing the cause reintegrating them into the economy, of peace.”5 The Commission for Human rejoining rebel armies. Moreover, it is and establishing a social safety net and important to remove small arms and light Security identifies the following key macroeconomic framework. governance issues that need to be weapons and landmines from conflict addressed following conflict: areas. Emphasizing reconciliation and coexistence democratization; participation in Meeting immediate humanitarian decision-making; accountability of needs One important consequence of violent decision makers; respect for the rule of conflict is that it erodes trust, namely in law and human rights; and inclusive, After the fighting has stopped, it is crucial people, communities and existing equitable and fair rules and institutions. to provide the earliest possible life-saving government institutions, and thus These institutions will allow for the humanitarian assistance, in the form of undermines social cohesion. In other effective empowerment of people and food, basic health services, shelter, water words, it endangers community security, communities, which in turn is essential and sanitation. Moreover, special which is focused on the protection of for effective governance. One central attention should be given to address groups that are threatened by other aspect is the rule of law, which is key to traumatic experiences through entities. If these questions are ignored, the functioning of institutions and the psychological care and counselling as they can lead to a radicalization of protection of the population. Establishing well as the reunification of families. It identity politics, and new violence may this, however, goes beyond the drafting is crucial to address the entire population, erupt. Thus, there is an urgent need for of a constitution and laws, the creation including internally displaced persons the provision of justice by establishing of courts, etc. It requires the inclusion (IDPs), refugees, children and youth. the truth and punishing perpetrators, but of norms, principles and practices that Launching rehabilitation and also for reconciliation programs that establish relations among people, and reconstruction focus on establishing the rule of law as between people and the state. Moreover, well as strengthening the judicial system it is important to strengthen civil society Economic insecurities are a common and the respect for human rights. In terms in post-conflict environments, as it feature of societies emerging from of human security, it is important to provides a mechanism for people to conflict. They find expression in complement this strategy with a participate, express their views and hold unemployment, low wages, low job community-centered approach involving decision makers accountable.

Adapted by Hanna Schmitt, from “Recovering from Violent Conflict”, Chapter 4 in Human Security Now (the Report of the Commission on Human Security), 2003.

5 Kofi Annan, United Nations General Assembly, 2002.

NHDR 04 7 privilege of those defending their interests progress and stability. All of these factors through war. diminish support for state-building. There is much talk of insecurity in Only when instability in Afghanistan began Afghanistan today. Its impact on political to bleed into insecurities for the Western processes, on the work of the international world did the global community, led by community, and on Afghanistan’s potential the United States, respond through military for drawing in foreign direct investment force by removing the Taliban regime. is hammered home daily in the While the initial focus was on eliminating international press. The international the remnants of the Taliban, it soon became narrative on Afghanistan sees bombings, apparent that Afghanistan needs a stable terrorism, kidnapping and physical state, that is at peace with itself and no insecurity as undermining the peace danger to the world community. The state- process, hindering democratic processes, building process started with the December and forcing the withdrawal of international 2001 Bonn Agreement, which provided aid organizations from the southern and for the creation of first an interim and eastern regions of the county. Populations subsequently a transitional government. vulnerable to “terrorist” attacks are aid Consultative processes led to a new workers, Government officials, troops, and, in the summer of 2004, election Constitution in January 2004, national officials. Traditional insecurity is further presidential elections in October 2004 and the return of over 3.5 million refugees so Security, security, exacerbated by a system of incentives for far. Billions of dollars for the economic security – the mantra armed regional militia to remain loyal to individuals instead of institutions, as well reconstruction of the destroyed country has been repeated were pledged first at the Afghanistan almost daily in as criminal opportunists, especially narco- criminals. Reconstruction Conference in January Afghanistan since the 2002 in Tokyo and then in March 2004 in fall of the Taliban two The answers to this security dilemma have Berlin. years ago. been sought in the expansion of the International Security Assistance Forces However, despite all of this, the real BBC Report, 8 January 2004 (ISAF) troops led by NATO outside of challenge of another type of “insecurity”, Kabul, the demobilization of former remains that stemming from the lack of militias, the bolstering of the Afghan livelihoods, access to water, health, National Army (ANA) and Afghan education and other public goods for all National Police (ANP), and an enhanced Afghan citizens. For too long, the people fight against Al-Qaida by Coalition Forces. of Afghanistan have been subjected to the The main problems are seen as the lack of consequences arising from an approach to police training, and a limited commitment security based on the interests of a state, to security forces by the international of groups, of clans and tribes or of the community. international community. Fanning the insecurity is the lack of law • For 23 years, they experienced some and order, as well as negotiating spaces of the worst violations of their human between competing power-holders in different regions. The story of Afghanistan rights, ranging from political killings is that of a crisis of legitimacy: to systematic impoverishment. Foreign disappointment in government in the interventions fueled a series of brutal periphery, competition with rival power wars that entrenched the power of structures, warlords and their private unaccountable power-holders, divided armies, intimidation by extremists, slow the country along ethnic lines, and progress on the disarmament of former destroyed its already limited militia, and poor delivery on promises of infrastructure and economic base.

8 Chapter 1 • Some of the excesses were committed there was no longer an internal concern during this time by successive of the Afghans alone, but of the world irresponsible governments in the name community as well. of “state security”. Gross violations The investment programmes presented by of human rights by the Soviet-backed the Transitional Islamic State of Communist regime, the Mujahideen Afghanistan (TISA) for accessing bilateral self-styled government and the and multilateral funds were consequently repressive Taliban were all done in built on the logic of presenting an the name of national security. ultimatum for a “failed” or “narco-state” • During years of a state vacuum, that represents a danger to the international political power shifted from traditional community. Although the pledges have community-based systems that been part of a noble and empathetic allowed for popular participation to engagement by the international ethnically and religiously based community, and their generous amounts military factions who ruled through will help development in Afghanistan, they force. have been first and foremost an indication of concerns for global and regional • The Western world was more insecurity. interested in curbing the expansion of The Broader “Security” Vision the Soviet Union than in the consequences of heavily arming Today, security continues to be seen in its resistance groups. It then abandoned traditional sense: regional stability, Afghanistan, and its people, after the territorial security for the nation-state, pull-out of the Soviet Army. small arms, and even security of political and economic systems as identified by • Regional players continued to meddle threats to democracy, market stability, in the affairs of Afghanistan by investments, etc. The unit of consideration backing various ethnic or language continues to be the state, the market, the groups against each other. Power region and the international system. struggles in Afghanistan became a matter of regional security. In contrast to this definition, this report proposes that the real security challenge • Up until 11 September 2001, the plight in Afghanistan is for the reconstruction of Afghans passed largely unnoticed process to generate the means to provide by the outside world. While services and jobs, and protect human rights, humanitarian agencies struggled to especially in rural areas. Security is not cope with the catastrophe with limited just the end of war, but also the ability to resources, the international community go about one’s business safely, in a safe imposed economic sanctions on environment; to have a job; to participate Afghanistan that harmed ordinary in political processes; to have choices for civilians perhaps more than the Taliban the education of one’s children; to lead a regime. healthy life; and to do all this with the • September 11th directed the knowledge that these gains will not be overwhelming attention of the taken away tomorrow. Insecurity in international community towards Afghanistan is not only a problem of Afghanistan because it was believed physical safety, but also of deprivation and that those who carried out this act of restricted access to health and education terror on US soil were hiding and facilities, legal and political rights, and training in Afghanistan. Instability social opportunities. Dealing with

NHDR 04 9 insecurity should not be sought (solely) targeting and responding to root causes, through short-term military solutions, but both internal and external. As the country through a long-term comprehensive moves beyond presidential and strategy that abides by promises of parliamentary elections, and as the development and the promotion of human optimistic pledges of the international rights. community after the Berlin Conference trickle in, this is a window of opportunity This report seeks to dispel the belief that that should not be missed. the only way to provide security and build lasting peace is through military action, in 1.3. The Responsibility for the form of the expansion of international Human Security peacekeeping forces throughout the country or victory over Al-Qaida by the Because human security is a public good Coalition Forces. Rather, there is a moral that belongs to all and cannot be exclusive, and ethical imperative to promote public it entails a responsibility for the state to policy reforms and state-building efforts provide guarantees that people will not that allow for participation, and to reduce fall below an acceptable threshold, but the local incentives that trigger conflict in also a corresponding duty among people the first place. To minimize chances for to remain engaged. It is in its response to renewed conflict while improving its citizens that the state finds its meaning livelihoods and the prospects for dignified and moral legitimacy. As the Human lives for all Afghans, state-building Security Now report puts it, “achieving strategies need to expand the notion of Human Security includes not just “security” to cover not only territorial protecting people but also empowering security, or freedom from violence and people to fend for themselves.”6 Human human rights abuses, but also basic human security is thus not a mere challenge of needs (education, health, food, shelter, “protection” and “provision”, but one of incomes and livelihoods, etc.) as well as empowerment and participation. If the strategic “needs” (such as participation, state is to be entrusted with the dignity, empowerment, etc.). responsibility to provide public goods, Because human security threats continue people have to be able to engage it in order to exist in Afghanistan even after the to hold it accountable. People are not only imposition of peace in 2001, the situation passive recipients of “security”, or even today can be considered as a potentially mere victims of its absence, but active dangerous one, where threats could lead subjects who can contribute directly to to instability and to the further identifying and implementing solutions to impoverishment of people and their quality the dilemma of insecurity. Security is not of life. an objective good that can be delivered from the outside, but ultimately a public In a country where security and good and a subjective feeling that requires development are interdependent, it makes a conscious willingness to be “provided” little sense to insist on one as a condition by the state and the capacity to be requested for another. Recognizing the co- by the people. conditionality requires commitments to improving people’s lives and addressing This shift in focus, however, is neither inequalities while involving ordinary simple nor politically easy, as it would citizens as stakeholders of their future. require a re-examination of priorities and Preventing future conflicts calls for the responsibilities of the state and the

6 Commission on Human Security 2003.

10 Chapter 1 international system. The shift is also extreme underdevelopment and human particularly difficult in Afghanistan, where rights abuses, and to empower them. individual identity is deeply embedded in This is not a responsibility to be taken collective units (tribe, clan, family, etc.). lightly. Agents of the state are These reinforce accepted norms of responsible for their actions; that is to behaviour and function as economic, say, they are accountable for their acts political and cultural units that act on behalf of commission and omission.7 of those who comprise them. The raison d’être of any actor or institution With an expanded notion of security come rests with their contribution to the well- new types of responsibilities: being of the very people who brought them into being in the first place. State-building • First and foremost, those of the state: hence becomes a means, not an end by If sovereignty once meant monopoly itself. The end is the safety, welfare and over the use of violence and protection dignity of the people of Afghanistan. of territory from external threats, it now has to incorporate the idea of The notion of human security does not responsibility to protect people from replace but ultimately supplements that of

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002.

7 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

NHDR 04 11 state security. Human security requires new opportunities for wealth through their strong and stable institutions, while state aspirations and address many problems security provides an environment locally. And they can mobilize for the conducive to the birth, growth and strength security of others, for example, by of such institutions. The focus on human publicizing food shortages early, security, therefore, does not mean an end preventing famines or protesting human to the role of the state in the management rights violations. Mistrusted and of development or security issues. The mistrusting people, by contrast, cannot absence of a state or its lack of contribute to the overall well-being of their effectiveness can be detrimental to human society. security. Indeed, “order requires rules, rules require authority, and authority is Supporting people’s ability to act on their exercised on behalf of people by states.”8 own behalf means providing education For this order to be socially, economically and information so that they can take and environmentally sustainable, people collective action. It means building a public need a state to mediate distribution.9 space that tolerates opposition, encourages local leadership and cultivates public The responsibility of a viable state should discussion. It also means creating a larger therefore be stability, enabling equitable environment of support, one that provides economic growth, ensuring essential social freedom of speech, the press, information, services, regulating markets to prevent conscience and belief, along with the negative externalities such as inequalities, freedom to organize. and allowing the participation of all stakeholders in decision-making processes. • Third, the paradigm shift on security also involves the residual responsibility • Second, an expanded notion of of the international community in cases security calls for growing recognition when the state is unable – or unwilling of the role of people, of individuals – to fulfill its responsibility to protect, and communities, in ensuring their provide and empower its citizens. own security. Measures for empowerment and education become key goods As the Commission on State Sovereignty that the state and international and International Intervention noted in its community can provide. Individuals 2001 report, the responsibility of the and communities must in turn assume international community has expanded responsibility for demanding what is from a “right to intervene”, as written in owed to them. the UN Charter, to a “responsibility to protect”. This requires that in some People can contribute directly to identifying circumstances, action must be taken by and implementing solutions to the the broader community of states to support quagmire of insecurity. In Afghanistan, populations in jeopardy or under serious bringing diverse constituents together to threat.”10 It comprises not only the rebuild their communities can solve “responsibility to react”, but also the security problems while involving them “responsibility to prevent” and the in the reconstruction process, and “responsibility to rebuild”. ultimately foster the ability to be engaged. This argument should not be interpreted Empowered people can stand up for their as an excuse for ad-hoc military dignity when it is violated. They can create interventions for “humanitarian” reasons.

8 R. O. Koehane and J. S. Nye 1998. 9 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh 2004. 10 International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty 2001.

12 Chapter 1 Rather, it encourages the global community precarious security situation, is a formidable to assume responsibility for fair rules of challenge for all actors – the state, the people engagement in preventing not only conflict, and the international community. However, but also mass underdevelopment, hunger, making this commitment, and building on disease, environmental degradation, etc. Preventing and mitigating the impact of existing and new models of the participation violent conflicts through military means of people and communities is a first is not enough. Pledging and delivering imperative that would unleash trust, sufficient funds, providing humanitarian aspirations and potentials. aid, pursuing inclusive and equitable development, establishing a level playing While this initial chapter provided a field with respect to trade regimes, and normative conceptual framework for upholding norms of human rights through looking at human development challenges respecting dignity and diversity are some through a human security lens, the of the essentials. following chapters will examine each of Upholding all three forms of responsibility these responsibilities in detail in the context listed above in the Afghan context, with its of Afghanistan.

NHDR 04 13 Chapter 2

The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

Photo: Raphy Favre

Chapter 2 The Status of Human Underdevelopment and People’s Insecurities in Afghanistan

2.1. Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with regions and the migration of people to an area of 647,500 sq. kms., bordering safer places. Years of conflict and neglect Pakistan to the east and south, Iran to the have taken a devastating toll, as measured west, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and by dramatic drops in human, social and Uzbekistan to the north, and China to the economic indicators.4 By early 1992, the north east.1 Exact population figures for global Human Development Report Afghanistan are not available because a recorded a per capita income of US$819 census has not taken place since 1979. (in purchasing power parity, or PPP terms), However, a nationwide 2003 a life expectancy at birth of 44.5 years, UNICEF/CSO MICS estimate puts the and an average adult literacy rate of 28.7 total population figure at 23.85 million, per cent. Women’s literacy rate was only with 28.8 per cent living in urban areas 12.7 per cent. Only 29 per cent of the and 71.2 per cent in rural regions, and a population had access to health services, population growth rate of 2.5 per cent per which were clearly more available in urban year.2 Overall, the population is scattered areas (80 per cent) than in rural ones (17 at a rate of 40 people per sq. km., while per cent). Only 23 per cent had access to the distribution is very uneven – ranging safe water – again predominantly in urban from 489 persons per sq. km. in Kabul areas, where 40 per cent of households province to 0.7 persons per sq. km. in had access versus 19 per cent in rural Nimruz. Administratively, Afghanistan is areas).5 divided into 34 provinces (Welayat), each By the beginning of the new century, further divided into smaller administrative human development estimates as recorded units (districts) called Woleswali.3 The in this NHDR had become even more boundaries of two new provinces have not alarming: Life expectancy today is yet been defined. approximately 44.5 years, with healthy The county has hardly seen any significant life expectancy at birth estimated at 33.4 span of stability during the past two years. One out of five children dies before decades. Areas have changed hands the age of five, and one woman dies frequently between warring parties, approximately every 30 minutes from resulting in frequent destabilization of pregnancy-related causes.

1 CIA Factbook. 2 The CSO demographic figures put the current population at 22.2 million; the urban and rural shares and the annual population growth rate at 22.2 per cent, 77.8 per cent and 1.92 per cent respectively. However, this NHDR utilizes the figures derived by the UNICEF/CSO MICS. 3 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004. 4 Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004. 5 UNDP global Human Development Report 1995 (indicators for 1992-1993).

NHDR 04 17 2.2. The Status of Composite measured by a weighted average of adult Human Development literacy (two-thirds), and combined gross Indicators in Afghanistan enrolment in school (one-third) and standard of living as measured by real per The Human Development Index capita income adjusted for a county’s PPP. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum The lack of basic things The evaluative aspect of human such as drinking water, for each dimension and then shows where development as discussed in Chapter 1 is each country stands in relation to them schools, health facilities measured by three of the most important (See Annexure 2, technical appendix on and so on has been the basic and universal capabilities: The ability statistics for calculations and biggest impediment to to lead a long and healthy life, to have methodology). human development. access to and make use of knowledge, and These basic needs need to earn a decent standard of living. Other Afghanistan’s HDI value of 0.346 falls at to be pursued capabilities such as the ability to participate the bottom of the list of low human aggressively in order to in the community, and to achieve security development countries, just above Burundi, make any progress on and even happiness are as important as the Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra human development in other capabilities. However, because they Leone (See Table 2.1). Afghanistan also Afghanistan. are not objective factors – i.e., have has the lowest HDI indicator among its different meanings for different people – neighbours (See Chart 2.1). With the Nazar Mohmmad Joya, from and because data is not always available exception of Pakistan, all of its neighbours Logar on them, they have not been included in fall in the category of medium human the basic Human Development Index development. (HDI), the standard for measuring progress Because information on income is not in human development. available, the HDI could not be The HDI combines longevity as measured disaggregated by province or by urban and by life expectancy at birth, knowledge as rural areas for this NHDR.

Table 2.1: Human Development Indices (2002) Literacy Gross Life Per HDI HDI GDI GDI HPI HPI Rate Enrolment Expectancy Capital Ranking Ranking Ranking at Birth GDP (PPP adjusted) Niger 17.1 19 46 800 0.292 176 0.278 144 61.4 94 Burkina Faso 12.8 22 45.8 1100 0.302 175 0.291 143 65.5 95 Sierra Leone 36 45 34.3 520 0.273 177 - - - - Guinea-Bissau 39.6 37 45.2 710 0.350 172 0.329 141 48 86 Afghanistan* 28.7 44.93 44.5 822 0.346 173 0.300 143 59.3 94 Tajikistan 99.5 73 68.6 980 0.671 116 0.668 93 - - Uzbekistan 99.3 76 69.5 1670 0.709 107 0.705 85 - - Turkmenistan 98.8 81 66.9 4300 0.752 86 0.748 67 - - Iran 77.1 69 70.1 6690 0.732 101 0.713 82 16.4 31 Pakistan 41.5 37 60.8 1940 0.497 142 0.471 120 41.9 71

* Due to the unavailability of data, Afghanistan was not included in the HDR 2004. The rank of 173 is where Afghanistan would have placed had it been included in the global report.. Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

18 Chapter 2 Chart 2.1: HDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004; authors’ calculation

The values of HDI follow closely the higher HDI values. The only exception is differences in per capita Gross Domestic Tajikistan. Its Purchasing Power Parity Products (GDPs) (See Chart 2.2). Countries (PPP)-adjusted per capita GDP of US$980 such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone is not significantly different than the and Guinea-Bissau that have HDI values US$822 of Afghanistan, but its HDI value close to that of Afghanistan also have is almost twice as high. This is due similar per capita GDP values. Moreover, primarily to its education indicators, given the per capita GDP values are significantly that the reported literacy rate is close to higher in neighbouring countries with 100 per cent (See Chart 2.3).

Chart 2.2: Comparison of PPP-Adjusted GDP per Capita, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

NHDR 04 19 Chart 2.3: Comparison of Literacy Rates Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003. %

Niger Burkina Sierra Guinea-Bissau Afghanistan Tajikistan Uzbakistan Turkmenistan Iran Pakistan Faso Leone

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

The Gender Development Index indicators – life expectancy at birth, educational achievements, and standard The Gender Development Index (GDI) of living as measured by GDP. The GDI reflects the level of discrepancies between value for Afghanistan places the country men and women in terms of the HDI further down on the scale of low human

Chart 2.4: GDI Comparison with Neighbouring Countries, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’calculations.

20 Chapter 2 development (See Chart 2.4). With a GDI low human development countries and the value of only 0.300, Afghanistan is just rest all making it to the medium human above only Niger and Burkina Faso. development range. Components that make Afghanistan’s GDI is much below all its up the GDI are presented in Charts 2.5 to neighbours, with Pakistan at the top of the 2.8 for further comparison. Chart 2.5: Comparison of Male/Female Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.6: Comparison of Male/Female Adult Literacy Rate (Age 15 and Above) Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

NHDR 04 21 Chart 2.7: Comparison of Male/Female (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) Gross Enrolment Ratios, 2002

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

Chart 2.8: Comparison of Male/Female PPP-Adjusted Per Capita GDP, 2002

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003; authors’ calculations.

22 Chapter 2 The Gender Empowerment Measure vulnerability to death at a relatively early age and calculated through the probability The Gender Empowerment Measure at birth of not surviving to age 40. Lack (GEM) shows the participation of women of knowledge is measured as exclusion in political and economic life. It includes from the world of reading and calculated the share of women in Parliament, and in through illiteracy rates. A decent standard official positions in law and management, of living is considered in terms of access professional and technical fields, as well to overall economic provisioning, as as women’s opportunities for income measured by the average of the percentage generation. A low GEM shows that of the population without sustainable access women’s participation in political and to an improved water source and the social life is limited, and they lack percentage of moderately and severely opportunities to make use of their underweight children under five. In the capabilities. The GEM was not calculated global Human Development Reports, for Afghanistan because of the absence of developing countries are compared together data on these indicators. using an HPI-1 index, while Organisation The Human Poverty Index for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are ranked At present, when poverty has become a by the HPI-2 index, which adds to the HPI- human development priority, calculation 1 a dimension of social exclusion. of the Human Poverty Index (HPI) is of high importance. The index is designed to The HPI-1 for Afghanistan is calculated portray poverty as more than just a lack to be 59.3 (See Chart 2.9). This value is of income. It also involves limited access lower than those for Niger and Burkina to opportunities, which in turn hinders Faso, meaning that Afghanistan fares better capabilities. While the HDI measures in terms of poverty. However, its HPI average achievements, the HPI value is much higher than the calculations concentrates on deprivations. Deprivation for Iran and Pakistan (16.4 and 41.9 of a long and healthy life is defined as respectively).

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, October 2002

NHDR 04 23 Chart 2.9: Comparison of HPI Values, 2002

65.5 61.4 59.3

48 41.9

16.4

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, authors’ calculations.

Components that make up the HPI are presented in Charts 2.10 to 2.12.

Chart 2.10: Probability at Birth of Not Surviving to Age 40, 2002 %

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004. authors’ calculations.

24 Chapter 2 Chart 2.11: Households with No Safe Drinking Water from Pumps or Protected Springs Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003.

60 58

43 44 41 %

10 8

Source: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

Chart 2.12: Children Underweight for Age (% under age 5), 2001

40 38 34

27 % 25

Guinea- Bissau

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

NHDR 04 25 2.3. Components of the Human Development Indices

Table 2.2: Selected Indicators for Poverty, Vulnerability and Risk in Afghanistan

GDP per Life Infant Population capita expectancy mortality without (US$) at birth rate per sustainable (2002) (years) 1,000 live access to an (2002) births improved water (2002) source % (2000) Afghanistan 190 44.5 115* 60* Iran 1,652 70.1 35 8 Pakistan 408 60.8 83 10 Tajikistan 193 68.6 53 40 Turkmenistan 1,601 66.9 76 - Uzbekistán 314 69.5 52 15 Least developed countries 298 50.6 99 38 South Asia 516 63.2 69 15 Low human development countries 322 49.1 104 38 Low-income countries 451 59.1 80 24 World 5,174 66.9 56 18

* Figures for 2003. Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003 and CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Life Expectancy and 43 years for men. In 2002, the CSO and WB put the estimate at 44.5 years: 45 In 1990, the World Bank (WB) recorded for men and 44 for women. These last a life expectancy of 42.5 years for figures are used for the calculation of the Afghanistan. By 2000, the UN Population HDI in this report. Division put it at 43.5 years for women

Chart 2.13: Comparison of Life Expectancy at Birth, 2002

70.1 69.5 68.6 66.9 66.6 63.2 60.8

50.6 44.5

Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003 .

26 Chapter 2 Compared to all of its neighbours, life live births respectively.6 One out of five expectancy in Afghanistan is at least 20 children die before the age of five and one years short. It is about 6.1 years lower than woman dies from pregnancy related causes the averages of the Least Developed approximately every 30 minutes. Less than Countries, and 18.7 years lower than in 15 per cent of deliveries are attended by the region of South Asia (See Chart 2.13). trained health workers. About half of children under five years of age are stunted Infant and maternal mortality rates in due to chronic malnutrition, and up to 10 Afghanistan are currently among the per cent suffer from acute malnutrition. highest in the world. The two figures stand Mental health is also a major concern as at 115 per 1,000 and 1,600 per 100,000 will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.

Box 2.1 Health-related Statistics

Mother and Child Health Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 165* Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births: 257* Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births: 1,600 Provinces with obstetric care: 11 out of 31 Low birth weight: 20% Children under five with malnutrition: 10% acute, 50 % chronic Under fives dying from diarrhoea: 85,000 per year A women dies of pregnancy-related complications every 30 minutes Acute malnutrition stands at 10 % Chronic malnutrition stands at 50 % Immunization Coverage Less than 40% of Afghan children receive life-saving vaccinations Disease Burden There are an estimated 72,000 new cases of tuberculosis each year Death from tuberculosis: 15,000 per year (12-13,000 are women) Cases of measles: Estimated 35,000 a year Polio: 11 in 2001 (120 cases in 2000) Malaria: 2 to 3 million per year, with 6% p. falciparum Mental Health Over 2 million Afghans are estimated to suffer from mental health problems. Due to the ongoing war for the last 22 years, it is estimated that most Afghans are suffering some level of stress disorder. Mental disease that one would see in any population has not been attended to for years in Afghanistan. Water and Sanitation: Access to safe water: 23% (18% rural, 43% urban) Access to adequate sanitation: 12% (28% rural, 6% urban) * The Securing Afghanistan’s Future was released before the UNICEF/CSO MICS. The estimates differ between the two publications. Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

6 UNICEF/CSO MICS.

NHDR 04 27 Table 2.3: Literacy and Gross Enrolment Ratios Data for all countries 2002, except Afghanistan 2003. Literacy Rate Male Female Combined Gross Total Enrolment Ratios Niger 17.1 25.1 9.3 19 Burkina Faso 12.8 18.5 8.1 22 Sierra Leone 36 -- -- 45 Guinea-Bissau 39.6 55.2 24.7 37 Afghanistan 28.7 43.2 14.1 44.93 Tajikistan 99.5 99.7 99.3 73 Uzbekistan 99.3 99.6 98.9 76 Turkmenistan 98.8 99.3 98.3 81 Iran 77.1 83.5 70.4 69 Pakistan 41.5 53.4 28.5 37 Sources: UNDP global Human Development Report 2004, CSO Statisitcal Yearbook 2003, UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003

Education been reversed recently. In 2002, more than 3 million students were enroled in grades The literacy rate in Afghanistan today is 1–12, which was beyond the Government’s one of the lowest among developing expectations of 1.5 million. Last year’s countries, above only Niger, Burkina Faso “Back to School” campaign entailed urgent and Mali (See Table 2.3). Compared to provision of student and teacher kits, neighbouring countries, Afghanistan has including 10 million textbooks. The total Ignorance is what has the lowest literacy rate. However, in terms school enrolment is now 3.7 million of gross enrolment, its rate is higher than destroyed this country children, 30 per cent of whom are girls.8 and education would that of Pakistan by almost 8 per cent (44.93 Still, a third of the children are not in per cent as apposed to 37 per cent for rebuild it. Education is school, while the other two-thirds study Pakistan). where most of our under mainly primitive conditions.9 (See focus should go. According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS, Table 2.4 for some other important only 28.7 per cent of Afghans over age 15 education-related statistics). Salarzai, from Kunar can read and write. The current primary Despite the major achievement in enrolment ratio is estimated to be about increasing enrolment, over 61 per cent of 54.4 per cent, girls’ primary school children are not enroled in school in enrolment is still only 40.5 per cent of the provinces such as Farah, Nimruz, 7 total. So not only are the rates of literacy Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, and primary enrolment extremely low, Uruzgan, Badghis and Nuristan, while in they are also skewed towards male literacy Kabul, Balkh, Herat and Badakhshan less (See Chart 2.6 p.21 and Chart 2.7 p.22). than 30 per cent of children are not enroled. Three years ago, the enrolment figures for On girls’ enrolment, the situation is even Afghanistan stood below 30 per cent. more alarming. In provinces such as Farah, Enrolment declined throughout the 1990s, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, largely as a result of war, the destruction Khost, Paktia, Uruzgan, Ghor and Badghis, of schools, exile and the restrictive policies over 80 per cent of girls are not in school of the Taliban. However, this trend has (See Map 2.1 and Map 2.2).

7 The primary, secondary and tertiary combined enrolment ratio is estimated to be about 45 per cent, with males making about 67 per cent of the total. 8 CSO Statistical Year Book, 2003. 9 UNDP 2004b. Opening Doors to Opportunity: Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals.

28 Chapter 2 Table 2.4: Education Related Statistics Latest available Average annual teacher salary (as multiple of per capita GDP) 2.7 Spending on inputs other than teacher salaries (as US$ of primary 40 education recurrent spending) Unit (classroom) construction cost (US$) 8,000 % of primary students with textbooks N/A School hours per year – primary grades 632 School hours per year – secondary grades 728 % of public financing in higher education 99 Number of students in higher education 26,000 Number of faculty with a Ph.D. 89 Number of accredited universities (public) 17 Number of accredited universities (private) 1

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004.

Economic Indicators 10 –12 per cent GDP growth (non-drug) for the next decade or so. The GDP per capita for Afghanistan was US$190 in 2002, based on calculations of The economic recovery reflects a return an estimated non-drug GDP of around to relative peace and stability, and renewed Many of our social US$4.05 billion (while the drug-related market confidence. In addition, the GDP grievances are income was US$2.54 billion) for an growth rate of the past two years has been embedded in people’s estimated population of around 22 million.10 boosted by injections of international assistance, which are most visible in the economic deprivations. A year before the war began in 1977, services and construction sectors. These I propose that the Afghanistan’s GDP was estimated to be are rapidly expanding in cities, especially about US$3.7 billion but it had dropped government would in Kabul.13 The Afghan economy continues focus on helping by about 20 per cent to US$3.1 billion by to be predominantly based on agriculture, 11 people with their 1987. The early 1990s were a time of which amounted to 52 per cent of GDP in economic security – the stagnation, and by 2000, GDP had fallen 2002, according to the CSO. This makes rest will arrange by to US$2.7 billion. With the post-Taliban Afghanistan the country with the greatest itself. interim government, the economy share of agriculture in its GDP among the recovered significantly, with GDP rising Safir Ahmad, from Bamyan countries of the surrounding region (See to about US$4 billion, giving it a yearly Table 2.5).14 growth rate of between 25–30 per cent in 2002, and an estimated rate of some 15–20 Agricultural products, which comprise a per cent in 2003.12 The 2004 recovery or lion’s share of Afghanistan’s exports, have growth rate may achieve the same pace. also significantly contributed to GDP These figures, however, have also been growth.15 In 2002, agriculture consisted estimated to be as low as seven percent, of 52 per cent of the aggregate national and are generally calculated to fall output, with a value of about US$2.1 somewhere around 16 per cent. Overall, billion. The values for the aggregate it is expected that Afghanistan will achieve produce in the years 1977 and 2000 were

10 CSO 2003 data quoted from Securing Afghanistan’s Future. 11 Tawfiq Ghanim, The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004. 12 The economic analysis relies on the background paper by Mubin Shah 2004. 13 IMF 2003. 14 WB. World Development Indicators 2003. 15 According to the CSO (2003), the share of agriculture in total exports in the prewar period was 71 per cent in 1978. In 2003, the same figure was 84 per cent.

NHDR 04 29 Map 2.1: Percentage of Children 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)

30 Chapter 2 Map 2.2: Percentage of Girls 7–13 Years Not Enroled in School by Province (2003)

NHDR 04 31 Table 2.5: Gross Domestic Product by Sector

Country Gross Domestic Product Billions of US$ Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Value-added Value-added Value-added Value-added % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 Iran 120.0 114 24 19 29 33 12 16 48 48 India 316.9 477.3 31 25 28 28 17 16 41 48 Tajikistan 4.33 1.05 33 29 38 29 25 25 29 41 Uzbekistan 23.67 11.27 33 34 33 23 0 9 34 43 Afghanistan 4.0 52 24 24 Sources: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, World Development Indicators 2003.

US$1.8 billion and US$1.5 billion per cent and the latter fell to 21 per cent.19 respectively.16 The recovery in Inthe 2002, the industrial sector grew by a agriculture sector was made possible by remarkable 50 per cent, with improvements the return of farmers to their land, donors’ also made in its labour absorption capacity. assistance with irrigation, improved Much of this recovery has been due to cereals, mine clearance and rainfall, among robust private sector investment, which is other factors.17 Currently, over 60 per cent most visible in the cities, and which of Afghanistan’s labour force is absorbed contributed about 13 per cent to GDP in by the agriculture sector. 2002.20 The industrial sector never was a big part The total private investment during 2001 of the aggregate national output in was only about US$10 million, a figure Afghanistan. Its share of GDP was about that dramatically increased to over US$250 20 per cent before 1978, and it absorbed million in the following year.21 The figure only about 6 per cent of the Afghan labour for the first two quarters of 2003 stood at force.18 The industrial sector was severely close to US$150 million, and increased damaged during the war, which also exponentially for the remainder of the year. changed its structure. For example, before The share of foreign direct investment the war, the share of food production in (FDI) in total investment has been aggregate industrial output was only 17 significant (See Table 2.6). Nevertheless, per cent, while that of textiles was 53 per FDI has been largely focused on small- cent. In 1985, the former increased to 53 scale service provision, mostly operating

Table 2.6: Investment Record (Million US$) 2001 2002 First two quarters of 2003 Domestic 10.66 66.48 12.3 FDI 0 198.56 134.7 Total 10.66 265.05 146.9

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

16 CSO 2003. 17 FAO/WFP 2003. 18 Tawfiq Ghanim, The Afghan Economy and 12 Years of War, as quoted by Mubin Shah 2004. 19 Rosanne Klass 1987. 20 Abdul Rashid Fakhri 2004a. 21 CSO 2003.

32 Chapter 2 Table 2.7: Trade Records During 138122 (2002) in Millions of US$

Items 1381 (2002) Export of goods 2,406.9 Recorded own exports 100 Re-exports (including unofficial) 2,306.9 Imports of goods 3,734.8 Recorded imports 2,452.1 Unrecorded imports 1,188.8 Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

in Kabul, and has stemmed mainly from to 72 per cent in 1985 now stands at over minor investments from Iran and Pakistan. 94 per cent (See Table 2.7). Investment in larger sectors, which is often Exports consist of agricultural commodities long term, is severely constrained by like cotton, wool, leather and fruits. Imports general insecurity, as well as the lack of consist of consumption commodities, fuel institutional structures to protect investors and lubricant, and other durable goods and investments. Corruption, bureaucratic such as televisions, refrigerators and items red tape, and the absence of banking and related to transportation. By the end of the legal systems also raise the costs of doing third quarter of 2003, transportation-related business in Afghanistan. goods had reached 33 per cent, food items International trade is another area in which 15 per cent, industrial products 22 per cent, the Afghan economy has experienced a and consumption goods 19 per cent, with significant turnaround over the past couple consumption commodities making up 56 of years. Improvements in international per cent of total imports. These figures trade have been due both to the rise of represent only officially recorded imports aggregate national income and the global and exports, and do not include substantial opening to Afghanistan for trade and informal trade. business. Although the current national 2.4. Some Human Insecurity income is not significantly different than what it was before the war began, Indicators for Afghanistan Afghanistan’s exports and imports have There are no established “human security grown to seven times what they were at indicators” that have been recognized that time. globally for defining and measuring human In 2002, imports and exports (including security. The Afghanistan NHDR, because re-exports) accounted for almost half of of its emphasis on survival, dignity and the aggregate national income. In 1977, livelihoods, considers as part of its analysis each was about 10 per cent. The other those indicators showing discrepancies in difference between now and then has been equal opportunities and access for various the increasing share of imports in the total vulnerable groups. share of trade, and therefore a relatively Income Inequality huge trade imbalance or deficit. The share of imports was 52 per cent of the total What does Afghanistan’s expected trade volume in 1977, but this increased economic growth and recovery mean in

22 Afghanistan uses the Islamic Calendar, which is based on lunar cycles. The Calendar uses as a reference point the Hijrah or migration of the Prophet Muhammed from the city of Mecca to Medina in 622 c.e. 2003 of the Gregorian Calendar is 1424 of the Islamic Calendar.

NHDR 04 33 Table 2.8: Distribution of Income and Consumption

Percentage share of income or consumption Gini index Lowest 10% Lowest 20% 2end 20% 3rd 20% 4th 20% High 20 % Highest 10% Afghanistan 2002 35.50 2.00 7.00 13.00 19.00 26.00 35.00 20.00 Bangladesh 2000 31.80 3.90 9.00 12.50 15.90 21.20 41.30 26.70 India 1997 37.80 3.50 8.10 11.60 15.00 19.30 46.10 33.50 Iran 1998 43.00 2.00 5.10 9.40 14.10 21.50 49.90 33.70 Pakistan 1998-99 33.00 3.70 8.80 12.50 15.90 20.60 42.30 28.30 Tajikistan 1998 34.70 3.20 8.00 12.90 17.00 22.10 40.00 25.20 Uzbekistan 2000 26.80 3.60 9.20 14.10 17.90 22.60 36.30 22.00 Turkmenistan 1998 40.80 2.60 6.10 10.20 14.70 21.50 47.50 31.70 Russia 2000 45.60 1.80 4.90 9.50 14.10 20.30 51.30 36.00 Botswana 1993 63.00 0.70 2.20 4.90 8.20 14.40 70.30 56.60 Namibia 1993 70.70 0.50 1.40 3.00 5.40 11.50 78.70 64.50 Sierra Leone 1989 62.90 0.50 1.10 2.00 9.80 23.70 63.40 43.60

Sources: WB, World Development Indicators 2003 and Da Afghanistan Bank estimates 2004.

terms of the well-being and welfare of the Using food consumption as a proxy for Afghan population? The answer to this the variable in income, the 2003 National question depends in part on the distribution Rural Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) of income across the population and the data show relatively unequal distribution level of persistent inequalities. of wealth across five wealth groups, from the poorest to the richest. The poorest 20 Since 1987, the CSO has collected no data per cent of the population is spending four on the extent of inequalities – whether times more on food than the richest 20 per they are related to income, gender or cent. Although these are preliminary spatial. Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) used indicators of inequalities in assets, incomes its own estimates to calculate a Gini index and consumption, the NHDR recognizes that measures inequality.23 Comparing the the need for more data to draw out existing bank’s 35.5 value for Gini with those inequalities in quantitative as well as reported for other countries in the global qualitative ways. Human Development Report, however, Afghanistan is no worse than other Central The Most Vulnerable: the Poor Asian countries and better (lower) than most Latin American and African countries According to the NRVA, poverty is “a condition that reflects physical, economic, (See Table 2.8).24 The lowest 30 per cent of the population receives only nine per social and political deprivation, as well as cent of the aggregate national income, a lack of assets and income…. [Whereas] while the upper third absorbs 55 per cent. poverty reflects an unacceptable level of Given the unreliability of data the Gini well-being, vulnerability captures the was based on, however, one has to read exposure to uninsured risk leading to a DAB’s calculation with a note of caution. socially unacceptable level of well-being

23 The Gini coefficients are aggregate inequality measures and can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). 24 Said Mubin Shah 2004.

34 Chapter 2 Chart 2.14: Distribution of Food Expenditure by Income Groups

Source: NRVA (2003).

in the future.”25 The majority of the Afghan and nutritional status; weak social population can be classified as poor. The protection systems; vulnerability to macro NRVA, a survey of some 11,000 rural and micro-level risks (both natural and households from across Afghanistan, human-triggered); human displacement; indicated that 20.4 per cent of the rural gender inequities and political population consumes less than 2,070 marginalization.26 Low incomes and low kilocalories per person per day. levels of living standards for the poor are manifested in their poor health, nutrition Human poverty in Afghanistan is a and education, which in turn can lower multidimensional problem that includes their economic productivity, and thereby inequalities in access to productive assets lead directly and indirectly to a slower and social services; poor health, education growing economy.

25 WB 2004b. 26 Werblow 2002.

NHDR 04 35 Box 2.2 Findings of the NRVA

Who are the rural poor? to public services such as drinking water, neighbouring districts and provinces for transportation, schools, clinics and seasonal and cross-border work (by land Measuring poverty and vulnerability hospitals was extremely low among to Iran and Pakistan) were crucial to the through consumption data, the NRVA almost all households. Other disparities survival of many poor rural families. collected data on food intakes over seven included the fact that while children days, concluding that half of the rural from poorer households have lower What are some of the causes of sample (48 per cent) were poor, because school enrolment rates, the gender gap poverty? for these households, food expenditures was similar for households regardless were less than the cost of purchasing of wealth, with gender gaps even worse Eighty per cent of households said they 2,100 calories a day per person based in some provinces (e.g., Kandahar, Ghor, had been affected by some form of shock on local prices. Food insecurity was Zabul and Helmand). The survey also during 2002–2003, and the majority reported by half of the rural sample. suggested that some parts of Afghanistan identified drought as the most serious Overall, around 20 per cent appeared to may have overall poverty levels that are example. As the majority of drought- be extremely poor and chronically food higher than others, particularly the west, affected households (70 per cent) had insecure, with a further 60 per cent living north and central west, with the northeast not recovered income or asset losses, 40 either in poverty or close to poverty (and relatively better off. However, caution per cent of rural households had to reduce often suffering from a lack of dietary is expressed as to the accuracy of these food consumption to cope. diversity and ill health). Only 20 per figures in the absence of accurate cent of households were better off, population figures by province, and given Poor health among poorer households although they too face serious problems the existence of pockets of poverty in was also confirmed by the NRVA, which accessing basic services. As expected, every province. found that the poorest rural households poorer households were more likely to sampled had double the chance of having be headed by a single parent, often a How do they live? experienced a death in the family, and woman, and have a higher proportion especially a child under the age of five, of people with disabilities. By contrast, The survey demonstrated that rural than the richer households. The better-off households were more likely livelihoods were highly complex and assessment also confirmed that shocks to be literate and to own land. varied, with agriculture (including such as the death of a family member poppy) playing a major role as a coping also have a negative impact on the Alarming spatial and gender disparities: mechanism. Contrary to expectations, welfare of households, resulting in a loss The NRVA confirmed the wide the majority of the rural poor in the of human capital, incurred costs and inequalities in access and opportunities sample did not produce food or engage even early marriages. These miseries that exist in Afghanistan. Poverty, as in farm activities: 24 per cent reported fuel a vicious cycle of poverty. Contrary measured by consumption and access to they were completely landless, and to expectations, only two per cent of services, displayed wide disparities: almost half of all rural employment households reported violence as a between provinces, within provinces and involved non-farm activities (such as household-level shock, although these within households. Power, medical construction, trade, manufacturing, findings may have serious flaws given services and transport were available to transport, mining and other services). sensitivity on the issue. those who could pay for them, but access Remittances from relatives migrating to

Source: MRRD/WFP, Preliminary Findings of the NRVA (first release), 2004

The NRVA identifies drought as the main market price increases. Surprisingly, cause of rural poverty (See Chart 2.15), violence as a cause of poverty was reported affecting more than half of the rural by only five per cent of the rural population. Other causes included farm- population.27 related shocks such as the loss of animals, Other issues confront Afghans living in natural disasters such as landslides or urban areas. The Government estimates flooding, epidemic diseases such as that around 6.4 million people live in cities malaria, and economic shifts such as

27 WB 2004b.

36 Chapter 2 Chart 2.15: Reported Poverty Shocks

60 55

50 46

40 38

30 29 % 26

10 5 5 4

0 Drought Farming Natural Epidemics Food Farmgate Violence High shocks shocks price price influx of increase decrease returnees

Source: NRVA 2003 (from Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan, 2004).

– 30 per cent of the population. This figure vulnerable to poverty, or to falling deeper Children were some of will have doubled by 2015 at the current into poverty. These include children, the primary victims of rate of urbanization. Thousands of women, the disabled, IDPs, returnees, and the two and a half returnees have chosen major cities such the Kuchis, pastoralists who move from decades of conflict in as Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar and place to place. Afghanistan. The 1.5 Kabul as their residence in order to benefit Children as Victims million people killed from their facilities and social services. may have included Owing to the influx of returning refugees, Children were some of the primary victims more than 300,000 the population of Kabul alone has increased of the two and a half decades of conflict children. from 1.7 million in 2000 to around 3 in Afghanistan. The 1.5 million people million in 2003.28 A crisis of rapid and killed may have included more than uncontrollable urbanization has led to an 300,000 children.29 In addition to the loss acute shortage of housing, particularly in of lives, there have been grave physical Kabul. The majority of new urban residents and emotional scars that will affect are landless returnees and IDPs who have generations of Afghans who have known settled in unplanned and hence un-serviced nothing but war. portions of the cities. Most have little or no access to conventional services. A 1998 UNICEF study found that among the more than 300 children ages eight to While most Afghans in both rural and 18 interviewed in Kabul by mental health urban areas can be classified as poor, some workers, 72 per cent experienced the death groups and/or households are most of a family member between 1992 and

28 TISA 2004e. “Technical Annex: Urban Development.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. 29 The figure of 1.5 million is quoted in Ahman Rashid 2000. The figure of 300,000 was taken from Save the Children (US) 2002.

NHDR 04 37 1996. In 40 per cent of these cases, the washing cars or simply begging for money. child had lost a parent. Almost all of the They also search wasteland and ruins for children had witnessed acts of violence firewood, scraps of food, plastic, metal or during the fighting, while two-thirds of paper – anything that can be used in the them saw dead bodies or parts of bodies, home or sold.33 and nearly half saw many people killed at one time in rocket and artillery attacks. A 2003 survey of vulnerable children and Ninety per cent of the children interviewed their families carried out by Save the said they believed they would die during Children (US) and UNICEF verified the conflict. Almost all the children, poverty as the incubator of other human sometimes or often, felt that life was not insecurities for children. For example, worth living.30 poverty was reported to increase tensions in the home, force children to work on the Risks and shocks identified by children street, pressure parents to pull their children and their families include political out of school and encourage early marriage repression, war, displacement, poverty, for daughters – all of which had emotional family loss and separation, family tensions, and sometimes physical impacts.34 physical illness, danger from the physical environment, heavy and exploitative work. For children, threats posed by poor health These threats harm children’s overall social are even more deadly than armed conflict. and emotional well-being, affecting their According to UNICEF, Afghanistan’s social development, morality, behaviour, under-five mortality rate is at a staggering mental health and the opportunities they 17 per cent. That means that almost one are able to access. Moreover, many years in five children dies before reaching the of war, drought, hunger, disease, lack of age of five. Afghanistan has the second proper medicine, and the migration of highest maternal death rate in the world, families in search of survival, food and and the highest rates of infant and child new livelihoods have resulted in poor mortality in Asia.35 Afghan children also health and poverty that stretches the coping face health risks from infectious diseases, mechanisms of many people to the limit.31 many of which are preventable by vaccine. Measles alone is estimated to kill 35,000 The burden of poverty falls heaviest on children every year. It is followed as among children, who are frequently kept out of the leading causes of death for children by school – even at a young age – to help pneumonia and other acute respiratory 32 support the family. They work on their infections in winter, and diarrhoea diseases, families’ farms, collect water and firewood, particularly during the summer months, and scavenge for scrap metal to sell for that derive from severe water shortages, spare change. In Kabul alone, 50,000 notably in rural areas, and inadequate children – mostly aged eight to ten – work sanitation.36 on the streets polishing shoes, selling fruit for shopkeepers, burning incense for According to the UNICEF/CSO MICS, prayers, acting as porters in the markets, approximately 39 per cent of the population

30 UNICEF, as quoted by Amnesty International 1998. 31 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003. 32 In 2002, Save the Children (US), with support from UNICEF, conducted a significant consultation with children and their families living in Kabul. The aim of the research, using primarily qualitative methods, was to listen to children’s views and to access their experiences of daily life in order to guide the development of support programmes. More than 600 people participated in the group discussions. 33 Save the Children (US) 2002. 34 Save the Children (US)/UNICEF 2003. 35 Ibid. 36 Twenty-five per cent of child mortality is due to diarrhoea, 19 per cent to respiratory tract infections, 16 per cent to measles, six per cent to scurvy and the remaining 34 per cent due to other factors.

38 Chapter 2 Chart 2.16: Correlation between Population without Sanitation (%) and Child Mortality Rate

300 Afghanistan 250

200

150 Pakistan Myanmar India 100 Maldives Bhutan Nepal 50 Bangladesh Srilanka Child Mortality Rate 1000 Child Mortality 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Population without Sanitation (%) Data from WB, 2003

Source: MRRD, 2004 in urban areas and 69 per cent in rural Thousands of qualified teachers were also areas do not have access to safe water, forced out of the country. As a result, an with considerable regional disparities. entire generation of Afghan children was Waterborne diseases take the lives of half deprived of education and the opportunity the children who die under the age of five. for a better life. Taliban control from the This means that about 125 out of every mid-1990s until 2001 led to strictly 1,000 children die because of contaminated enforced bans both on girls attending water and the unhygienic situations where school and on female teachers. By the end they live. This is among the worst figures of the 1990s, only five per cent of girls in the world (See Chart 2.16). compared to 60 per cent of boys were going to school. In March 2002, the Against this background, some successes Afghanistan Interim Authority launched have been achieved with respect to the “Back to School” campaign, which children’s health. In 2002, over 11 million resulted in some three million children and children were immunized against measles 70,000 teachers returning to school. Today, (measles immunization coverage now an estimated 3.7 million children attend stands at about 80 per cent) and some 6.4 some form of learning, the vast majority million children were immunized against at the primary level. Nationally, girls make polio in five rounds of vaccinations (polio up on average 30 per cent of the student coverage now exceeds 80 per cent). There population, a massive increase even is a concern that cross-border transmission compared to the years prior to the Taliban may occur if maximum polio immunization restrictions. coverage is not achieved soon. There is still a chronic need for rebuilding Even before the war, Afghanistan’s schools, with over 60 per cent of formal resources for education were very limited. institutions having suffered some degree The war made the situation worse as school of damage. Water and sanitation facilities buildings were destroyed or neglected, and are available in only a fraction of schools, teachers received little or no training. presenting a potential barrier to girls’

NHDR 04 39 Table 2.9: School Non-attendance Reasons by Wealth Group and Gender

BOYS % GIRLS % Very poor Poor Medium Total Very poor Poor Medium Total

School not available 27 25 31 28 58 54 61 58

Family commitment/ 10 12 13 12 18 25 21 22 marriage/tradition

Expensive 27 18 8 15 14 7 3 6

Employment 16 19 16 17 3 3 5 4

Too far away 17 22 28 24 7 9 9 8

Other 4 4 4 4 1 2 1 1

Source: NRVA 2003.

the United Nations have started a attendance.37 According to the 2003 countrywide awareness-raising campaign NRVA, the lack of school availability was in a bid to sensitize government officials, the main causes of non-attendance (See local police, religious leaders and parents It seems like the Table 2.9). In 13 of 32 provinces surveyed about the existence and consequences of government has not paid (there are now 34 provinces), over 70 per the problem. Besides the drug mafia, child as much attention to cent of households identified the trafficking is proving now to be another human security as it unavailability of schools as the main reason difficult issue for fledging state institutions should. Everyday we hear for girls not attending them. to address. about children and women abducted for A relatively new but rapidly growing threat The Plight of Afghan Women to the well-being of Afghan children is inhuman purposes. abduction and trafficking. In 2003, police Years of discrimination against women, Women are used for rescued nearly 200 abducted children – coupled with poverty and insecurity, have sexual pleasures and both boys and girls – in different parts of left Afghan women with a legacy of some children for sex abuse, the country, while some 750 children were of the worst social indicators in the world drug trafficking and body trafficked to Saudi Arabia alone. today. Only 14 % are literate. Every half parts. It is the Trafficking can be attributed to many an hour a woman dies of pregnancy-related responsibility of the factors, including conflict, lack of internal problems: 1,600 out of 100,000 die during government to put a stop security, poverty and poor socio-economic childbirth, a rate 60 times higher than that to these sorts of crimes, opportunities. A recent report by the for women in industrial countries. Seventy and if it cannot do it by International Organization for Migration per cent of people affected by tuberculosis itself it should seek (IOM), stated that there were many forms are women. assistance from the of human trafficking practiced in international community. In Kabul, 50,000 Afghan women are Afghanistan, including child prostitution, Jawid Hussain from Jaghori, exploitation of prostitutes, forced labour, widows and heads of households. Sixty- Ghazni slavery and practices similar to slavery, five per cent surveyed by the organization servitude and the removal of body organs.38 Physicians for Human Rights were found to have suicidal tendencies and 16 per cent With increasing concerns about child have actually attempted suicide.39 The trafficking, local human rights bodies and feminization of poverty, serious

37 USAID 2002. 38 IOM 2004.

40 Chapter 2 malnutrition, exclusion from public life, of the men and almost all of the women gender-based violence, rape, lack of basic with disabilities were illiterate. health facilities, illiteracy, forced marriage The survey also found that while hundred and routine denial of justice are some of of thousands of Afghans were disabled the many human security concerns faced by Afghan women. The situation of women through war or landmines, many more as a manifestation of inequality and a threat have been victims of harsh nature and poor to human security will be discussed nurture. Years of drought and poverty, the thoroughly in Chapter 3. resulting malnutrition and natural disasters have left many people with impairments. The Disabled Preventable diseases such as polio, birth defects and accidents are other factors. Afghanistan is one of the world’s most Moreover, the lack of awareness on heavily mined countries. But very few disability prevention leads to many new reliable data exist on disability issues, cases that could be avoided. Poor medical including the number of people with infrastructure means that many treatable impairments. An estimate from a number cases end up as permanent impairments.42 of uncoordinated sample surveys puts the figure at around four per cent of the Years of conflict in Afghanistan have population, which means approximately touched every stratum of the society, but one million people.40 The number may be disabled people have suffered much more higher since negative stereotypes together because of their vulnerable social position. with poor infrastructure and a lack of Political and economic inequality resources to conduct proper surveys make compounded by negative social attitudes it difficult to identify all those with and stereotype that see disabled people as disabilities. Moreover, considering that dependent, inactive and non-productive disability does not only affect individuals has marginalized them to the level of but also families, it can be argued that the seclusion, leaving an overwhelming percentage of the population coping with majority of disabled Afghans and their disabilities is much higher than four per families with social and economic cent. deprivation. Poverty and unemployment An ongoing national survey by the Ministry are key factors for perpetuating this of Martyrs and Disabled in 2003 showed exclusion. A survey conducted by the that among the 13,000 disabled people Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and surveyed across the country, the majority the International Rescue Committee (IRC) (86 per cent) were physically impaired or has found very high unemployment among 43 had multiple disabilities.41 Only five per disabled people, estimated at 84 per cent. cent noted a mental disability. Men The lack of legislation to protect the rights represented 78 per cent of those with of the disabled has also led to institutional disabilities, and, as expected, 38 per cent discrimination. of them had been disabled by the war and IDPs and Returnees 16 per cent by mines. Among women, ten per cent were affected by the war followed Afghans comprise the second largest by disease or congenital disabilities. Half number of refugees and IDPs in the world,

39 UNIFEM, statement by Noeleen Heyzer at “Learning from Experience from Afghanistan: Second Lesson Learning Workshop”, UNDP 2002. 40 TISA 2003c, Comprehensive National Disability Policy. 41 Wardak and Turmusani 2003. 42 TISA 2003c. 43 Wardak and Turmusani 2003.

NHDR 04 41 after Palestinians. Not too long ago, it was The Kuchi IDPs from Registan comprise estimated that one in every three Afghan pastoralists who use the area as a key was either a refugee or an IDP, prompting resource. They can be divided between the United Nations to declare Afghanistan those who permanently stay there and those as the major site of human displacement who are seasonal users. Making up about in the world. At the beginning of 2002, 25–30 per cent of the total number of IDPs, there were approximately 6 million Afghan they are willing to return to their place of refugees in Pakistan (3.5 million) and Iran origin. Facilitating their return, however, (2.5 million). Since the fall of the Taliban, requires a substantial improvement in local over 2.5 million Afghans have returned conditions and support to restart sustainable from Pakistan (1.8 million) and Iran livelihoods. Necessary components would (600,000),44 yet an estimated 3.4 million include rehabilitation of existing water Afghans remain outside their country.45 sources, rebuilding livestock herds, community-led and capacity building The IDPs were estimated at 1 million at projects, income-generating activities, and the beginning of 2002. During the course access to social services such as education of 2003, some 70,000 IDPs returned to and health.47 their places of origin, predominantly in the northern and western provinces. Other Kuchis have been affected by However, the southern and western parts drought, and make up about 30–40 per of the country – Kandahar, Helmand, cent of IDPs. They include pastoralists Nimruz, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces – who used to migrate from the southern still host approximately 200,000 IDPs. provinces towards the central highland – They are comprised primarily of nomadic from Kandahar and Helmand to Zabul and Kuchi who lost their livelihoods during Ghazni. Drought has caused severe losses the four-year drought, and Pashtuns among their livestock, and has been uprooted by ethnic violence in the north exacerbated by the lack of access to major and west of the country. grazing areas due to conflicts over pasture rights. A majority of this category are also Most of these IDPs are willing to return willing to return to their places of origin to their places of origin in the north, and if provided with livestock. since the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, return has became an issue of political priority The non-Kuchi IDPs affected by drought for the Government. Some progress has are estimated to comprise some five per been made towards that end, including cent of IDPs, and are scattered in all IDP settlements. They are composed mostly of securing pledges of support or at least no landless and economically vulnerable rural interference from the military strong men inhabitants who have lost their source of in the north. However, the preconditions livelihood due to the drought. Many for their return also include the removal consequently opted to settle in IDP camps or control of local commanders, in order to benefit from their humanitarian disarmament and the establishment of the assistance. The lack of land and assets are rule of law through police training, stated as obstacles for their return to their improved district administration and the places of origin. creation of a mechanism for the resolution of land disputes. These steps have not yet Much of the media analysis on the IDPs been achieved.46 and returnees highlights the problem with

44 IDPs include those who have been internally displaced as result of a combination of environmental, political, tribal and economic factors. 45 TISA 2004f. “Technical Annex on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. 46 TISA 2003. Consultative Group on IDPs, IDP Strategy for Afghanistan. 47 Global IDP 2003.

42 Chapter 2 Chart 2.17: Reasons for Not Returning to Place of Origin

Source: UNHCR, IDP Profiling Survey, April 2004.

Chart 2.18: Reasons for Displacement

Source: UNHCR, IDP Profiling Survey, April 2004.

respect to security, war-lordism, ethnic willingness to return to their places of tensions and factional conflicts. Yet from origin. However, in answer to the question the perspective of the IDPs themselves, it “What prevents you from returning?” a is the gloomy prospect of limited vast majority identified human security livelihoods in their areas of their origin concerns.48 Forty-six per cent mentioned that is preventing them from returning. the lack of drinking water, only about 14 In a recent UNHCR survey of some 20,000 per cent identified security-related issues, IDP households, a majority (61 per cent) and the remaining 40 per cent pointed to of the respondents expressed their livelihood concerns (See Chart 2.17).

48 UNHCR 2004b.

NHDR 04 43 Similarly, in response to a question about census. The nomads then were registered “reasons for displacement” a vast majority as 1,074,000 individuals, or nine per cent of the respondents identified human of the total population. Currently, the CSO security issues as primary factors. A estimates there are 1.5 million Kuchis, or staggering 49 per cent were forced to move about 6.3 per cent of the total population. because they lost their livestock due to drought, followed by 19 per cent and ten The livestock owned by Kuchis used to make important contributions to the per cent respectively who reported a lack Shamir, who lost all of drinking water and loss of daily labour national economy in terms of meat, skins 200 of his sheep and (See Chart 2.18). Armed conflict came as and wool. In the 1970s, livestock was said a distant fourth, with only nine per cent of to make up 18 per cent of Afghanistan’s goats in the drought, the respondents identifying it as a reason domestic product and was an important says "...we used to sing for displacement. component of national exports. The Kuchis about everything. owned about 30 per cent of all sheep and Women would dance, Clearly, livelihood security is a pressing goats and most camels. At a village level, especially at concern for the majority of the IDPs, who they provided tea, sugar, matches, weddings...but all that struggle to scrap together the most basic kerosene, guns, etc., in exchange for wheat, has gradually elements of survival and dignity. For vegetables, fruits and other foodstuffs. disappeared. Poor promoting a return to the communities of They also acted as moneylenders and people cannot afford origin, there is a need for balancing the offered services in transportation along drums and music. This focus of assistance between the areas of with additional labour at harvest time. war and now this displacement and the areas of return. Any Their flocks fertilized the fields after the area of return needs to be a place that is harvest, when the farmers allowed the drought have swept secure and that offers opportunities for animals to graze the fields. Relations everything away.” vulnerable community members to regain between the settled people and the Kuchis Mark Herold, 2003. and enhance their livelihoods. were, therefore, largely based on exchanges The Kuchis of goods and services. The Kuchis’ lifestyle initially came under The Kuchis constitute a significant part of threat due to changes associated with Afghanistan’s cultural tradition. For “modernization”. For example, the centuries, they have migrated across parts development of road systems in the 1950s of the country semi-annually with their and 1960s led to severe competition between caravans of goats, sheep, donkeys and truckers and the Kuchi’s traditional camel camels. Their motivation for constant caravans. Driven out of business, some migration is twofold: to search for seasonal Kuchis began operating trucking businesses pastures for their livestock and to benefit combined with land ownership. Others from milder climates, since the tents in purchased or hired trucks to assist in moving which they live do not provide adequate between pastures. However, the slow decline protection from either heat or cold. The of the Kuchis accelerated after the war pattern of migration is, therefore, began and during the droughts of 1971–1972 predictable, determined by the availability and 1998–2002. Bombing campaigns by of pasture and the climate.49 the US-led coalition starting in 2002 as well Given incomplete demographic data, as the spread of land mines during 23 years accurate population figures for the Kuchis of conflict decimated the Kuchis’ animal are non-existent. The last official figures herds – their major economic asset. Fighting on their number stem from the 1979 also often blocked migratory routes.50

49 AFSU/Vulnerability and Analysis Mapping (VAM), WFP 2002. 50 Marc Herold 2003.

44 Chapter 2 The drought of 1998–2002 is said to be service delivery and intervention responsible for the death of 75 per cent of programmes provided by the government the Kuchi animals. Consequently, many and the aid community do not of the once independent, self-sufficient accommodate their mobility. Kuchis have been reduced to destitute Kuchis currently make up over 70 per cent farmers, IDPs, casual labourers and of Afghan IDPs. Conditions in the IDP beggars. settlements are arguably better than those Constraints on grazing areas have in the areas of origin, with potable drinking exacerbated their vulnerability. Access is water and access to education and health impaired for most due to historical and care. Pull factors to the areas of origin socio-territorial factors. In the past, disputes have to be created, complemented by over land use, and competition over projects aiming for longer-term resources between permanently settled reintegration. These include improved Afghans and the Kuchis have reached access to water, support for livestock, violent levels, today, there is no overall access to pastures, skills training in animal policy regarding land tenure and pasture husbandry, livestock products processing Haji Khan used to have rights, and access is determined by the and veterinary services, and access to 300 sheeps, two horses local authorities and the specific attitudes markets and social services. The Kuchis and nine camels. He of the people involved. The traditional return to their inherited livelihood will now has only one system of pasture rights seems to have only be sustained through area integration camel and lives in a eroded been replaced by the power of the projects that benefit not only those who four metre by two gun. Many Kuchis still hold documents – are returning but also the neighbouring metre UNHCR tent in some as old as a 100 years – giving them communities. Project activities should the sprawling refugee rights to pastures in different areas, but therefore be directed towards including camp of Spin Boldak. their current value is undetermined. both populations; promoting coexistence, particularly in areas of potential ethnic He recalls other times The Kuchis’ current relations with settled tension; and establishing the view that before the rains populations vary across the different Kuchis are assets rather than a form of regions, depending on past relations, the stopped. Life was good, competition to the settled population. we never used to let our extent of ethnic polarization of, ethnic daughters marry composition and other factors. The type 2.5. Conclusions people from the city of relationship the Kuchis hold with the Even before its long conflict, Afghanistan because if they settled settled people in the areas in which they live is crucial for understanding their was already one of the poorest countries they would be like a in the world, with low levels of access to bird in a cage. Now we vulnerability. For example, the Kuchis of the south and of central Hazarajat have a health care, education, potable drinking are like a bird in a cage. relatively low community coping capacity water and opportunities for income Marc Herold, 21 September 2003 due to their weak links with the settled generation. The years of war and population. instability, along with the ravages of nature, have only made the situation worse by any Although the National Development measure of human development and Framework (NDF) states quite strongly human security. that the living conditions of Kuchis shall be improved, with an emphasis on the need Today, whereas education indicators have to revive the livestock production sector, improved and are expected to continue to current governmental policies and do so, the health situation has not changed programmes are largely focused on settled much. Moreover, the remarkable GDP populations. The Kuchis are often excluded recovery of the past couple of years and from government services and the projected robust growth over the next development opportunities because most few years may certainly improve

NHDR 04 45 Afghanistan’s HDI ranking, but may not These figures and evidence highlight the help the overall human security situation. severity of the challenges of reconstruction One reason is the unequal distribution of and development in Afghanistan, but they wealth and poverty. While reliable data is also provide direction and meaning for not available, anecdotal evidence points movement forward, as well as benchmarks to the facts that the growth has done little for progress. to alleviate poverty and has worsened inequality.

46 Chapter 2 Chapter 3

A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 3 A Threat-based Analysis of Wants and Fears

3.1. Why a Threat-based Ultimately, a threat-based analysis allows Analysis? the recognition of the causes and consequences of vulnerability to a wide Chapter 3 reexamines the indicators array of threats. The persistence of these presented in Chapter 2 according to threats has to be addressed by appropriate to “wants” (basic needs related to preventive and corrective state policies, development) and “fears” (deficiencies since they endanger the human security related to human rights and strategic of the Afghan people, as well as the needs). The rationale behind an approach stability of the state. is based on a number of assumptions: First, a word of caution. References to “the • Fears and wants, as symptoms of people” can be problematic. Cultural, violence, abuse and under- gender, generational, ethnic and other development, are inter-related. This differences change the way individuals interdependence means one cannot be perceive themselves from place to place, prioritized over the over; but also in time. While one can assume a • Threats include both objective, certain minimum of universal needs, wants, tangible elements, such as insufficient rights and feelings, human security income, chronic unemployment, challenges differ from region to region, dismal access to adequate health care province to province, household to and quality education, etc., as well as household, and individual to individual. subjective perceptions of threat, such Settled people do not suffer from the same the inability to control one’s destiny, vulnerabilities as IDPs. Women face indignity, fear of crime and violent different challenges than men. Rural and conflict, etc; urban populations, ethnic groups, the disabled, and young and elderly people all • Threats can be both direct (those that perceive the complexities of human are deliberately orchestrated, such as systematic persecutions, or drug- security in different ways. related crimes) and indirect (those that A complete threat analysis in Afghanistan arise inadvertently or structurally, e.g., would require data disaggregated by underinvestment in key social and gender, profession, province, ethnicity, economic sectors such as education language group, settlement, income, etc., and health care); which at the moment is not available. It • Fears and wants include human rights would also require an opinion poll and and dignity as underlying factors. perception study to allow for the Human rights for this NHDR are not subjectivity of the threats. In the absence confined to the first generation of civil of perfect data, the NHDR analyses and political rights (i.e., freedom from available objective and quantitative data violence, rights abuses, freedom of as well as the findings from various surveys expression and participation, etc.) but and assessments. The report team also held also second-generation social, consultations with students, instructors economic and cultural rights (including and researchers in Kabul, Jalalabad, Balkh, the right to development and freedom Herat and Bamyan. Some government from wants). officials, aid workers and ordinary people

NHDR 04 49 were also consulted. Disparities are way as existence with dignity. Among the chronicled in the report to the extent various threats to dignity, the chapter possible, although generalities are made discusses the series below, in no particular and the picture may be incomplete for order, as they all seem to be important now. priorities. While the indicators have been presented in Chapter 2, here the report Beyond survival, this chapter looks as well analyses the factors that contribute to the at the quality of life, defined in a broad appalling numbers.

Box 3.1 Study on “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”

A report by the Feinstein International of security than those of the 3. Countrywide, the almost complete Famine Center at Tufts University in the international community and the lack of participation of rural women United States, funded by the US Agency Afghan Government. A vast in political and civil affairs is a direct for International Development (USAID), majority of areas that are a “high obstacle to their human security and documented and analysed recent trends risk/hostile environment” or to their political rights, as well as in the relationship between human “medium risk/uncertain to the nation-building process. security and livelihoods throughout rural environment” for the United Nations Afghanistan from 2002–2003. The study and international NGOs are often 4. Formal and traditional justice was based on the analysis of NRVA experienced as secure, with few systems play a direct role in survey data, and analyses of six provinces reported conflicts by the local rural undermining the human rights of based on primary research by the Tufts populations. In contrast, regions that women and girls. University team in Badghis, Balkh, show up as “low risk/permission On access to education and Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar. environment” on UN security maps health care: are areas where local populations The report emphasizes the important often report high levels of conflict 5. There are almost no rural, school- links among four key aspects of human and are experiencing insecurity at age girls attending school in the security in the livelihoods of rural the hands of armed political groups, south and south central regions of Afghans, and the prospects for peace warlords, commanders and their Afghanistan. The primary reasons and development in the country in the that both boys and girls in rural areas longer term. The four aspects of human associates, including district are not in school countrywide are security are: authorities and police forces. the lack and distance of facilities. On political participation and the 1) Human rights and personal security legal process: 6. In 38 per cent of rural districts, the 2) Societal and community security majority of rural Afghans have no 3) Economic and resource security 2. The majority of rural Afghans in access to any form of health care, 4) Governance and political security Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and in 62%, the majority have access The report also examines the formal, and Nangarhar provinces had no to only basic health care, including traditional and customary mechanisms knowledge of the constitutional health posts, basic health care that are in place to address injustice and process. Rural women were four centres and traditional healers. These mitigate security and livelihood threats times less likely to be aware of it basic facilities often lack well- for rural Afghans. than rural men. After learning about trained personnel and adequate the new Constitution from the Tufts medical supplies or medicines. Policy recommendations are made based team, rural women primarily on these findings, which include the stressed the importance of education 7. Between 43–78 per cent of rural following: for boys and girls, health care, and Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul, On human security and physical equal rights for men and women, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces security: boys and girls. Rural men primarily have no access to reproductive stressed the need for a re- health care. When they are able to 1. Countrywide, rural Afghans have enforcement of Sharia law and access care, the majority report that very different views and experiences economic opportunities. the quality is poor.

50 Chapter 3 On rural livelihoods: On formal and traditional justice 13. Armed political groups, systems: commanders and warlords have 8. Countrywide, the majority of rural strategically targeted traditional and Afghans use surface water (rivers, 11. The Afghan judiciary suffers from customary justice systems (Jirgahs lakes and irrigation ditches) as their a severe lack of human capacity and and shuras) throughout rural primary sources of drinking water. material resources. Many judges Afghanistan in an attempt to control Countrywide, 48 per cent report that lack adequate legal training. Public local populations. their primary water source is legal advocates and defense 14. Very few police officers in rural contaminated or polluted. attorneys do not exist within the Afghan legal system. Of those areas of Badghis, Balkh, Herat, 9. Many Afghans in rural areas are not judges who are trained, the judicial Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar engaged strictly in agriculture, but leadership is divided between provinces have had any official rely on diversified livelihood graduates of the Sharia School and police training. Many are still loyal strategies to generate household those of the Law School at Kabul to their former commanders, who income. The type of non-agricultural University. These groups are often often serve as the chief of police, Army officers, or district or employment differs by region. at ideological loggerheads with each provincial authorities. Police stations Women make contributions to other. The three organs of the are extremely dilapidated, and police household income in nearly all judiciary – the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Office officers go without essential provinces, but usually perform resources. income-generating work and are of the Attorney General – lack effective coordination and paid significantly less than rural 15. The detention centres visited by the communication and are often men for the same tasks. Children Tufts team in Balkh, Badghis, Herat, ideologically opposed. also contribute to household income Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar in most areas of the country. 12. The judiciary is highly susceptible provinces were in very poor condition and lacked basic to military and political influences necessities such as secure structures, 10. The effects of the drought continue at both the urban and rural levels. sanitation facilities, and blankets to have a negative impact on Formal courts, including family for detainees. Signs of mistreatment livelihoods in much of rural courts, are either non-existent or were common; juvenile offenders Afghanistan. Environmental barely functional in most rural areas. were mixed with adults in a number degradation caused by conflict, There are few women lawyers and of centres. drought, population movement and judges in the urban areas and none deforestation exacerbates the in the rural areas, and rural women 16. Prisoners were occasionally held in problems of limited access to natural have great difficulty accessing the metal shipping containers or in resources for many rural Afghans. formal court system. private detention centres.

3.2. Threats to Human Security As researchers have pointed out, the many in Afghanistan Today causes of insecurity in Afghanistan can be classified under five categories: Threats to Survival and a Renewed warlordism, the narco-trade, groups that Look at the “Security Dilemma” threaten the peace process, regional interference and crime.1 Beyond security Traditional security threats to the people sector reform and the DDR process, the of Afghanistan are both direct (violence, “security dilemma” is complicated by the killings, etc.) and indirect. The latter distribution of responsibilities of different emerge from a weakened state capacity components of the security sector to the and challenges to the legitimacy of various lead donor countries involved, institutions outside the capital, or from the resulting in difficulties in coordination and withdrawal of international aid agencies disjointed processes. Other problems from dangerous but needy zones. include donor fatigue, a lack of reforms

1 Mark Sedra, ed. 2003.

NHDR 04 51 within power ministries, and limited and these militias on the rise, the recent international commitment to election itself had to be “insured” through peacekeeping.2 The police force has been expensive private security companies entrusted with the maintenance of order, contracted by the UN, the US-led Coalition but as an institution, it is still weak. NATO Forces and NATO.4 The president is has assumed command of ISAF, with guarded by American Special Forces; responsibility for the security of Kabul. In ministers and other key government October 2003, the UN Security Council officials are also heavily guarded. The extended the force’s mandate for another only people who have no security are poor year and authorized its expansion to other civilians. For them, the security dilemma parts of the country, but the deployment means feeling fearful, powerless and has been slow. defenceless.

We think the human From a human security point of view, While the international peacekeepers and Coalition Forces are tackling remnants of security cannot be however, the NHDR postulates that the “security dilemma” for people in peace-spoilers, their presence throughout ensured if the Afghanistan consists of the privatization the country could give rise to an insecure disarmament and of security and a pervasive military feeling among the ordinary population. demilitarization is not mentality in the country, both of which Such a climate gives rise to vigilantes, done and the are detrimental to peace-building. Afghan or international, which makes it constitution articles difficult to know who genuinely is involved not enforced. The As the state is unable to hold a monopoly in working for security through the Government should on power in Afghanistan, its authority is Government and who is not. The use of challenged by a number of competing persist and focus on private contractors by the US Government factions. Local and regional commanders, has created a challenge to the “perception” disarmament and some of whom also represent government demilitarization of the problem. Private security personnel are structures and local officials, engage in interrogating detainees, but they may not irresponsible people. regular fighting, often with heavy civilian always be accountable to standards of The current policy of casualties. Armed regional and local international human rights, a fact that has President Hamid Karzai private militia leaders, together with their been evident from investigations of prisons pertaining to the issue armed followers, establish their own rules in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and of disarmament is not for the provision of welfare and security, Afghanistan. Agents of security can satisfactory. We ask the the collection and distribution of wealth become perpetuators of insecurity president to do more. and booty, and clientelism. A slow DDR themselves when they are not accountable process continues to threaten the to international norms. Saleh Mohammad Haqyar from emergence of a truly “civil” society, where Herat disputes could be settled through words, In a militarized society, where even not arms. Out of the 60,000 armed Coalition Forces engage in reconstruction militiamen, only about 12,0003 have been and rehabilitation through Regional disarmed and demobilized, and the Provincial Teams, and the US provision programme has stalled rather than of food aid is carried out under independent accelerated in recent months. The hope military authority, the distinctions between now is to disarm 60–70 per cent of the legitimate and effective human rights and militias before the parliamentary elections humanitarian action by the UN and NGOs, in April 2005. and a military campaign is blurred. After 24 years of independent aid to the Afghan Private militias have in fact become the people, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) country’s greatest danger. With terrorism withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of

2 Ibid. 3 Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme 2004. 4 Nasrullah Stakinzai 2004.

52 Chapter 3 July 2004, following the killing of four of rural markets to allow for the sale of its staff, threats and insecurity. Among agricultural surpluses are among the one of the reasons it cited for withdrawal features of poverty in Afghanistan. was the “co-optation of humanitarian aid Traditionally in this agrarian society, large by the coalition for political and military families and a strong reliance on kin motives.” solidarity were considered viable strategies of risk control and income diversification. The fighting between Taliban and Al Qaida Today, the value of this strategy is eroding. leaders, and Coalition Forces, or factional An increase in population and the return leaders and central authorities, inevitably of millions of refugees aggravate pressure engulfs civilians. The privatization of on already limited resources. security and the spread of a military mentality, even if it has been instigated by As outlined in Chapter 2, the poverty line the pursuit of terrorists and peace-spoilers, for Afghanistan has not been established has led to a climate of fear, intimidation, yet, and incidence, extent and location of terror and lawlessness in many parts of poverty are hard to estimate. In the absence Afghanistan. Most important, such a of absolute numbers, we can deduce causes climate has given rise to a society that is and consequences of poverty, which in ruled by the power of armed individuals, Afghanistan has a very unequal Poverty is the mother of instead of vetted democratic processes. distribution. Gender, geographic location many ills. Education, Human Poverty (urban/rural, centre/periphery, etc.) and ethnicity contribute to how different people health, and social status are all affected Hunger, disease and vulnerability are the in Afghanistan experience their poverty. fate of thousands of Afghan families living by poverty. I would say, The NRVA has provided a picture of the help me get out of in absolute poverty, which for them means extent of rural poverty in Afghanistan, not having adequate access to food, shelter, poverty and I will help while efforts are underway to assess urban myself with all other clean drinking water and adequate medical poverty. Using findings from the NRVA things that you call services. Over two decades of war and and from a human development analysis internal crises caused negative rates of of the overall situation in Afghanistan, the human development. economic growth, while the positive NHDR recognizes differences in the causes Mohibullah from Jalalabad growth rate of last year has not substantially and consequences of both urban and rural trickled down to the poor. Therefore, the poverty. magnitude of poverty remains unacceptably high.5 Rural Poverty Some of the main determinants of human Factors that contribute to and exacerbate poverty in Afghanistan are poor levels of rural poverty in Afghanistan consist of: health and education among the 1. Lack of income: Household head economically active members of unemployment is one the most households, especially women; high important determinants of poverty, dependency rates in households; a lack of although family size, household head employment opportunities; low marital status and number of children productivity of family plots; poor basic are also critical factors. infrastructure; and a lack of comprehensive social policies and safety nets in the 2. Lack of access to basic necessities: country. In addition, factors such as the This includes limited access and lack isolation of communities due to inadequate of basics such as food, shelter, roads, and therefore poor integration of clothing, safe water and sanitation

5 Najeeb Azizi 2004.

NHDR 04 53 Map 3.1: Calorie Gap Rate (Calorie Deficiency) by Province

54 Chapter 3 facilities, formal education, skills price fluctuations, illness and training, health care and others. morbidity, sudden loss of breadwinners and care providers, loss 3. Social exclusion and isolation: The of employment, and other such shocks. rural poor suffer from social, economic Already living under austere and political marginalization. They circumstances and conditions, the poor lack access to basic services, markets, generally tend to be the greatest information and opportunities for victims of such shocks as they are the political participation to influence least able and prepared to deal with decision-making at the local and or to prevent them. national levels. They have minimal opportunities to participate in decision- 7. Erosion of indigenous cultures, making in the crucial areas of social values and social welfare networks: life. Thus, they are generally The breakdown of social institutions disenfranchised and powerless, in rural areas of Afghanistan, due to remaining outside mainstream social, displacement, has affected coping economic, cultural and political skills and traditional decision-making processes. structures. This has eroded values and social welfare systems, affecting the 4. Alienation and inability to interact extended family and mutually and benefit from factors that supportive community systems. contribute to productivity in life: The rural poor are alienated from All these interdependent factors can lead crucial livelihood factors such as new to chronic poverty: the emergence of a technologies and related opportunities very poor population with extremely for increased productivity. They also limited human development capacity and lack adequate marketable skills opportunities. For this population, poverty training and educational opportunities, is passed on from generation to generation. and chances for participation in Urban poverty administration, commerce and trade. More than any other group, they Urban poverty in Afghanistan is as generally lack productive assets such multidimensional as rural poverty, with as land, production tools, livestock, common features such as the lack of equipment and machinery, which are employment, adequate housing and some of the critical elements services, social protection, health care, underpinning productivity and self- education and personal security. There are, sustenance. however, some underlying factors that distinguish one from the other (See Table 5. Dependence: Most of the rural poor 3.1).6 do not enjoy property ownership rights, especially with regard to land, and The 2003 NRVA, which collected data on they do not have access to credit. Many rural areas, proposes potential similarities consequently depend on the precarious and differences between poverty in rural support of other people, including and urban Afghanistan based on the main those providing humanitarian aid. findings of existing assessments, mainly relating to Kabul. It notes:7 6. Vulnerability: The rural poor are most vulnerable to acute droughts, • Because of the dense concentration of earthquakes, crop pests, commodity people, urban households are often

6 WB forthcoming 2004b (draft on file with the authors). 7 NRVA 2003.

NHDR 04 55 Table 3.1: Distinctive Characteristics of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability in Afghanistan

Dimension of Poverty and Distinctive Aspects of Urban Poverty and Vulnerability Vulnerability

Income Greater dependence on cash and market access for consumption needs. Inherent instability of employment opportunities derived from informal sector. High ratio of dependents to able-bodied adults.

Education Insufficient service provision in rapidly growing cities. Inability to afford school expenses. Personal safety and security risks deter school attendance.

Health Pollution of air and water Injuries and deaths from traffic. Unsafe working conditions (informal sector). Overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions. Poor families struggle to meet costs of water and fuel.

Tenure Land and housing often not affordable in authorized areas – poor occupy land illegally and construct houses without official permission.

Personal Domestic violence. Family breakdown and reduced support for children – vulnerable urban populations frequently lack extended family ties, which can provide safety nets. Greater social diversity and visible income inequality can increase tensions and crime rate.

Financial Lack of access to credit and safety nets from social and informal networks.

Disempowerment Isolation of communities disconnected from jobs and services. Insufficient channels for obtaining employment, knowing legal rights, etc. Social fragmentation weakens ties of trust and collaboration in general.

Source: WB, “Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan”, 2004 (draft on file with the authors).

more dependent on complex public • Urban areas are a magnet for extremely delivery systems to meet their needs poor and destitute households and than their rural counterparts may be. individuals who may be highly Protracted conflict and instability has dependent on support for their survival. resulted in the collapse of basic However, at the same time, with a systems for urban management and higher proportion of expenditure on, investment in Afghanistan, and data for example, rent and fuel costs in on disability and diarrhoea prevalence urban areas, many poor households in children under five years suggests may face food insecurity. little difference between rural and urban areas. • For many poor households, urban Afghanistan presents a high-risk • Employment opportunities are often environment: with accidents (road, highly insecure in Afghan cities and fire, etc.), personal violence and towns, and the frequent movement of crowded unsanitary living conditions households (often living in rented widely reported. accommodations) can have a negative impact on community support • Nevertheless, an initial survey in the networks, leaving the poor extremely most vulnerable areas of Kabul vulnerable. suggested that over half of the sampled

56 Chapter 3 households reported having more to then trickles down from generation to eat now than a year ago, compared to generation. 19 per cent who reported that they were eating less. • Limited consumption and lack of use of facilities: Poor households have The consequences of both urban and rural difficulty even in providing for their poverty in Afghanistan can be classified basic food needs, and make less use as follows: of medical institutions. Expenditures • Vicious circle of poverty: Owing to on medical costs per person among a lack of resources, entitlement or the urban or rural poor is often much information, or because the less than that of a person from high infrastructure and services are simply income group. not available, the poor do not have • Risky behaviour: Poverty and access to all sorts of essential unemployment and attempts to break infrastructure and services. As a these cycles are often accompanied consequence, they usually have little by crime and vices as well as violence. or no education and are not in good health. This limits their ability to find • Lack of integration of the poor into work and earn an adequate income, the economy and state-building which in turn limits their access to processes can also lead to social infrastructure and services. The poor fragmentation, lack of trust in rarely take part in decision-making government, lack of social capital, etc. that affects their lives, and as a consequence they cannot claim a share Job insecurity of development. Afghanistan thus Dismal livelihood prospects are one of the follows patterns more broadly greatest threats to human security in observed in the developing world, Afghanistan. Despite new opportunities where income (or expenditure) is from donor investments and the return of correlated with other factors generally people to their land, unemployment associated with poverty and remains a pressing problem. Although vulnerability, such as unemployment, precise statistics are unavailable, it is low levels of schooling or gender discrimination. estimated that unemployment is as high as 2 million out of an estimated labour • Inability to make use of new force of some 8 million. While the recovery opportunities: Lack of income and reconstruction programme may result translates into limited access to in the creation of 500,000 to 600,000 jobs, services or infrastructure that are an employment gap of over a million jobs increasingly fee-based, given a vision may remain. This could have serious of development led by the private consequences for both peace-building and sector. development. Creating adequate • Limited opportunities to participate employment opportunities is critical to in decision-making on the issues reducing the high levels of poverty among related to their own lives. Human the majority of Afghans. It could help in poverty hence constrains the restoring normalcy and building a stake participation of people in the new in maintaining peace, and provide people, democratic processes of Afghanistan. particularly young men, real alternatives to fighting. • Handing down poverty: Children born in the poor strata of society have The share of the employed in a high probability of poverty, which manufacturing is almost negligible (two

NHDR 04 57 per cent), while 80 per cent are employed lack of adequate shelter and access to safe in agriculture and 18 per cent in services,8 drinking water and sanitary conditions, mainly low paying jobs. Outside limited access to health services, and agriculture, there are few opportunities for increased infant mortality contribute to secure employment. Afghanistan is a the high death rates. traditional agrarian society, in which the High infant and child mortality rates peasants, almost all of them poor, depend characterize the country’s poor health care on what they can grow, and are particularly system. The rates are estimated to be 115 vulnerable to degradation of land resources. per 1,000 and 172 per 1,000 live births, The agricultural sector is and will remain respectively, among the highest in the critical to economic growth and human world.12 Vaccine preventable diseases are development. However, in its current major killers. The main reported causes structure and capacity, this sector is of death among children under five years inefficient, and creates more environmental old are diarrhoea (25 per cent), respiratory 9 problems than it pays for. tract infections (19 per cent) and measles The importance of agricultural and rural (16 percent).13 Diarrhoeal disease is development in Afghanistan is highlighted particularly common in the summer by the fact that the rural population is the season, causing a characteristic seasonal largest share of the total population, i.e., increase in the prevalence of acute 14 71.2 per cent in 2003.10 Thus, themalnutrition. This is mainly due to poor agricultural sector, along with agricultural- access to safe drinking water and adequate based industry such as food processing, sanitation – the UNICEF/CSO MICS will remain a large and important economic findings indicate that 60 per cent of arena for providing livelihoods to the households in Afghanistan drink unsafe majority of Afghans, particularly the poor. water.15 Other factors contributing to poor In this context, rural development remains health outcomes are inadequate infant crucial for poverty reduction. feeding and caring practices, as well as the poor nutritional status of women and Health Deficit their economic constraints.16 The lack of adequate health care system The maternal mortality ratio in and the presence of widespread health Afghanistan is also one of the highest in problems are both threats undercutting the world,17 standing at 1,600 deaths per human security in Afghanistan. Life 100,000 live births. The ratio varies widely expectancy at birth is a meager 45 years across different parts of the country, as for males and 44 years for females, indicated by the Center for Disease Control according to the CSO.11 There is little data (CDC), UNICEF and Ministry of Health or analysis on the causes of these in their 2002 study. They found a range appallingly low levels. However, it is from 200 per 100,000 live births in Kabul reasonable to assume that certain to as many as 8,000 per 100,000 live births conditions such as poverty, poor nutrition, in Badakhshan, one of the highest recorded

8 CSO 2003. 9 Daud Saba 2004. 10 UNICEF/CSO 2003. 11 CSO 2002. 12 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003. 13 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003. 14 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 15 According to another survey, 75 per cent of households use unsafe water sources for drinking: Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003. 16 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 17 Ibid.

58 Chapter 3 Table 3.2: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Cannot Access Reproductive Health Care, 2002-2003

Province Cannot access Cannot access care Quality of reproductive health during pregnancy reproductive care (%) /birth (%) health care

Badghis 78 90 Poor

Herat 59 34 Poor

Kabul20 75 75 Good

Kandahar 46 29 Poor

Nangarhar 43 34 Poor

Source: “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002–2003”, Feinstein International Famine Center, Youth and Community Program, Tufts University, June 2004. This survey was conducted among rural populations in five provinces: Badghis, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar. ratios in the world.18 Over 46 women die are women.22 At the end of 2003, there every day from pregnancy-related causes.19 were 144 health facilities in 126 districts A lack of access to adequate health care offering Direct Observation Therapy for women, particularly during their System (DOTS)23 tuberculosis treatment, delivery, is an important determinant in although only an estimated 56 per cent of this threat to human security. A study by the patients are served.24 Tufts University in five provinces Malaria is another public health threat concluded that a large number of rural that is prevalent and on the rise in more women do not have access to any form of than 60 per cent of the country. The annual reproductive health care, and even where incidence is estimated to be 2–3 million, reproductive health facilities are available, with the highest intensity of transmission the quality of service is generally poor in and around rice-growing areas of the (See Table 3.2). east and northeast. Currently, of the 34 Afghanistan is one of the 22 highly provinces in the country, 14 record tuberculosis-burdened countries in the moderate and high transmission, and 14.7 world, with an estimated annual risk of million people are at risk, according to infection reaching 2.55 per cent, an the World Health Organization (WHO) incidence of sputum positive cases at 143 data on national immunization. All age patients per 100,000 people per year, and groups are equally affected, except in the all active cases at 319 per 100,000 people eastern regions, where those under 15 per year.21 There are 65,000 active TByears of age are more vulnerable, cases in the country, of whom 70 per cent suggesting more intense transmission of

18 Ibid. 19 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003. 20 Other studies indicate that women in Kabul have much greater access to reproductive care than in other provinces, as Kabul has more advanced medical care and at least one functioning maternity hospital. The Tufts study was strictly rural, and included villages close to the city in Paghman district as well as extremely remote villages in the insecure Surobi district where health care facilities were reportedly unavailable. Of course, it is also possible that this number is inflated, and that respondents may have meant that women “did not give birth in a hospital”, but in fact women were able to access reproductive care. 21 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 22 GFP, “Global Fund Proposal for the third round call for proposals to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria”, 2003. 23 The internationally-recommended TB control strategy is DOTS. DOTS combines five elements: political commitment, microscopy services, drug supplies, surveillance and monitoring systems, and use of highly efficacious regimes with direct observation of treatment. 24 WHO 2003b.

NHDR 04 59 this disease in this area. In 2002, several fact, as many as 30 per cent of Afghans outbreaks were also confirmed in the may suffer from anxiety, depression, northeastern parts of the country, indicating psychosomatic problems such as insomnia the rapid spread of malaria to places where and forms of post-traumatic stress disorder. cases had not previously been recorded.25 Although it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of mental illnesses among The increased incidence of malaria could particular groups of people, a survey among be attributed to many factors, e.g., the women in Kabul found that 35 per cent of degraded environment and unbalanced respondents reported that symptoms of ecosystem, vulnerable and malnourished mental health problems interfered with populations, lack of health infrastructure daily activities; 98 per cent met the and poor access to health care services, diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress functional illiteracy causing non-adherence syndrome, major depression or severe to treatment regimes, and the overuse of anxiety; and 40 per cent met the criteria poor quality and counterfeit medicines that for all three diagnoses.27 The mental health increase the resistance of biological agents situation in Afghanistan is complicated by to drugs. an extremely incapacitated mental health care system. Integration of mental health into basic health care services could substantially increase the effectiveness of the response to mental health problems.28 Medical conditions emanating from drug abuse also threaten the human security of Afghans, as Afghanistan becomes the major producer of narcotics in the world. In recent years, the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC), other UN organizations, NGOs and Afghan communities themselves have expressed concern about the escalation of problem drug use in communities in Afghanistan and among refugees in both Pakistan and Iran. In particular, concern has been raised about problem drug use among vulnerable at-risk groups such as the unemployed, poppy cultivators, people disabled by war, Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, and Feb.2004 ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, women and children. Mental disorders are another of Afghanistan’s war wounds, yet they have Although statistics are not available on the been largely ignored. WHO estimates overall number of drugs users nationwide, indicate that 95 per cent of the population the Drug Demand Reduction Project of in Afghanistan has been affected the UN Drug Control Programme psychologically, and one in five people (UNDCP) has carried out a number of suffers from mental health problems.26 In small-scale but telling community drug

25 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 26 Anna Badken 2004. 27 IMC 2003. 28 Peter Ventevogel, Sayed Azimi, Sayed Jalal, & Frank Kortmann 2003.

60 Chapter 3 profiles since 1999. These have included particular types of problem drug use than an initial assessment, a profile of a group others, for example, women, youth, the of Afghan women refugees, a comparative unemployed, the war-disabled, refugees, study of 300 Afghan street drug addicts and those who live in opium cultivation in Quetta and Peshawar, and a July 2003 and opium and heroin production areas.”30 assessment of drug use in Kabul city. The problems experienced by many drug Collecting reliable data about illicit drug users are compounded by their general use in Afghanistan has been problematic. lack of accurate, practical and realistic As the UNODC states, the use of all information about drugs. Misconceptions intoxicants in Islam is haram (forbidden), and misinformation about the nature of and in Afghanistan, the Taliban left a drugs and their effects are common, and legacy of severe punitive measures for there is often little understanding of the drug users caught by the Department for potentially harmful consequences of drugs the Suppression of Vice and Promotion of such as heroin, opium and Valium, Virtue. This resulted in drug use becoming particularly in terms of the risks of an increasingly hidden and secretive overdose, dependency and addiction. Many activity, compounded by a fear of arrest people who started using these drugs did by the police, and fear of being stigmatized not know that in the long term, they ran by the community.29 the risk of becoming addicted. This brings Among the 200 drug users interviewed by particular problems to an impoverished UNODC in Kabul, women constituted population with very limited access to only four per cent of heroin users and nine suitable treatment and rehabilitation per cent of hashish users. However, they services. Reliable reports from drug constituted 29 per cent of opium users and treatment centres in Kabul suggest that 35 per cent of users of pharmaceutical some drug injectors are also sharing drug, particularly the benzodiazepine needles and syringes, thus increasing the tranquillizer Valium. Key informants risk of transmission of blood-born diseases estimated that five to ten per cent of heroin such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B and C. users in their area were women. Nearly 50 At a time when the drug economy is in its per cent of heroin users interviewed had boom phase, the extremely low socio- first started to use heroin in either Iran or political and economic status of women, Pakistan, signifying the importance of drug huge population displacements, poor social abuse prevention programmes for the and public health infrastructure, drug refugee population. trafficking, use of injecting drugs and lack While in many remote rural areas of of blood safety practices make Afghanistan Afghanistan, only a few drugs, particularly a high-risk country for the spread of HIV opium, may be available, in many urban and other transmissible diseases. Indicators areas, drug-producing districts and refugee suggest that there is an increase in injecting camps there is a plethora of drugs, in in areas such as Kabul, Gardez, Farah and particular opium, heroin, hashish and Herat; in general, drug abuse is widespread pharmaceuticals. UNODC estimates that in Kabul31 and other major cities of “Drug use is not the prerogative of any Afghanistan. A community drug profile one group in Afghan society, although study conducted by the UNODC in Kabul some groups may be more at risk of revealed that there are over 7,900 heroin

29 UNODC 2003c. 30 Ibid. 31 Naqibullah Safi 2004.

NHDR 04 61 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, and October 2002

addicts there, out of whom more than 470 people registered as infected with HIV. are drug injectors.32 Research on Pakistani Although it is estimated that 200–300 and Afghan drug users at high HIV risk Afghans are affected by the virus, the real found that only 16 per cent of those number is probably far higher, because surveyed had heard of HIV/AIDS.33 The many Afghans with HIV or AIDS avoid situation is especially alarming because talking about it publicly.34 Lack of drug abusers are also less likely to know information about HIV/AIDS in a that sharing needles or having unprotected traditionally conservative society where sex could spread sexual transmitted most people are illiterate could potentially diseases (STDs) and other infectious lead to an epidemic. diseases. Although only 6.3 per cent of the respondents had reported drug The underlying causes of malnutrition in injection, 43 per cent had shared injecting Afghanistan are complex and variable, equipment, on average with four to six both spatially and temporally, and are users at one time. determined by a wide range of factors. These include diverse modes of agricultural By the summer of 2004, only a 45-year- production, access to markets, limited old father and his two children, two years assets, variation in access to health services, and six months old, had died of HIV/AIDS urban and rural disparities in terms of in one of Kabul’s hospitals, becoming the development, seasonal variations and first recorded victims of HIV/AIDS in environmental constraints, cultural taboos Afghanistan. These three were among 24 and practices regarding nutrition and

32 Ibid. 33 Steffanie Strathdee et al. 2003. 34 Ibid.

62 Chapter 3 health-seeking behaviour, and variable disparity in the distribution of health care exposure to disease through the seasons.35 facilities and staff, with most located in five big cities – Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Saving lives in Afghanistan depends, Mazar-e Sahrif and Nangarhar.38 therefore, on putting health care at the top of the government development agenda – The poor health care system in Afghanistan having health workers in the field with is revealed by the fact that throughout the sufficient medical supplies, as well as food, country, there are only 210 health facilities shelter and security. The gap in material with beds to hospitalize patients and 0.32 and human resources is great. Existing beds per 1,000 people (See Map 3.3). Compared to the average of 2.7 beds per health services only cover limited 1,000 people for other developing geographical regions, and even in the countries,39 this is a very low and districts where health services are available, worrisome number. Furthermore, the needs are only partially met. According to strong urban bias of the existing WHO (2003), in 2001, the total expenditure infrastructure is disadvantageous to 75 per in Afghanistan on health was 5.2 per cent cent of Afghanistan’s population, thus of GDP. The Government contributed 52.6 depriving the majority of fair access to per cent, while 47.4 per cent was from health care services. Even in the districts private expenditures.36 However, according where services are available, needs are to the CSO’s 2003 Statistical Yearbook, only partially met (See Table 3.3). the percentage of expenditure on health An Educational Deficit between 1997 and 2000 was only 0.5 per cent of total GDP. The number of doctors Education in Afghanistan is considered a per 1,000 people (See Map 3.2) is a mere key component in influencing awareness 0.1 against an average of 1.1 for all of life opportunities. Despite many developing countries.37 There is a huge negative impacts from longstanding

Table 3.3: Percentage of Rural Afghans Who Can Access Health Care, 2002-2003

Province Can access any Average time it Primary reason why you form of health care takes to access care cannot access health care Badghis 33% 4 or more hours No facilities No transport Herat 60% 1 or 2 hours No facilities Bad economies Kabul 87% 1 or 2 hours No facilities No No Transport Kandahar 63% 2 to 4 hours No facilities No No transport Nangarhar 43% 2 to 4 hours No facilities

35 Ibid. 36 WHO 2003a. 37 WB Group “Developing countries – health, nutrition”, 2001, as quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004. 38 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 39 Ibid.

NHDR 04 63 Map 3.2: Distribution of Doctors per 10,000 People by Province

64 Chapter 3 Map 3.3: Distribution of Hospital Beds per 10,000 People by Province

NHDR 04 65 conflict, one positive outcome has been a as girls progress through the grades. A dramatic change in attitudes towards majority of all students cope with formal school education. Not only do substandard facilities – often in the open parents now understand the importance of air or in tents with little or no furniture or education for the future of their children, learning materials. The content and quality but children themselves attach a high value of education is not satisfactory, and to going to school. These findings are infrastructure, equipment and services are reported consistently among urban as well insufficient to meet current and future as rural Afghans.40 They are alsodemands. exemplified by the improvement of the six grade retention rate, which for boys Unequal access has risen from 29 per hundred in 1993 to The unavailability of schools is among the 44 per hundred in 1999 (152 per cent), top obstacles preventing boys and girls and for girls has increased from 18 to 26 from going to school, according to the per 100 (144 per cent). Illiteracy is the source NRVA. This is more so for girls than boys. of many problems in Afghanistan introduced free and In addition, for girls, family commitments, Afghanistan. With compulsory primary schooling as far back marriage and tradition play a larger role, literacy people get as 1935. The Constitution of 1964, drawn while for boys employment is more of a access to information up by King Zahir Shah, guaranteed free restricting factor. and information is and compulsory education for all. Yet, in There are regional as well as rural and 1980, 89 per cent of people 25 years and what brings changes in urban disparities in education that are people. Positive above had no schooling and only 0.3 per cent had completed first level. By 1999, threatening human security and human changes such as development in Afghanistan (See Chart improved human 69.5 per cent of Afghans (including 85 per 41 3.1). Thirty years of development practice development and cent of women) were illiterate. Afghanistan’s long conflict left its have focused largely on urban areas, which human security are education system as one of the worst in have skewed the distribution of schools, things people can do the world. An estimated 80 percent of the students and teachers. Out of 3,705,235 for themselves but they country’s 6,870 schools were damaged, if students, 74,205 teachers and 6,870 schools need to be empowered not completely destroyed. in the country, 1,269,665 students, 29,614 with information and teachers and 2,233 schools are located in knowledge through Due to a dramatic change in societal Kabul, Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat, and attitudes towards education and with literacy. Kandahar (See Maps 3.4 and 3.5).42 There increased support from the international are 130 kindergartens in Kabul with 12,760 Shiralam Kamalzai from Jalalabad community, in 2002, Afghanistan enroled students and 2,466 teachers, with a teacher- 3.7 million students in grades 1–12, the to-student ratio of 1:5, while in the rest of largest figure in its history. Of these, 80 the country there are 106 kindergartens per cent went to primary schools, among with 11,460 students and teachers, with a which 78 per cent were in grades 1–3, and teacher-to-student ratio of 1:13.43 In the 30 per cent were girls. Nevertheless, higher education system, there are a total fundamental challenges remain: only half of 22,717 students and 1,449 teachers.44 of the school-aged children were enroled in primary schools, and significant gender Gender disparities also plague disparities persisted, especially in rural Afghanistan’s education system. Out of areas. Female cumulative enrolment drops 3,705,235 school students, 1,171,963 are

40 Sallick and Hashimi, as quoted by Lutfullah Safi 2004. 41 UNICEF 1999. 42 CSO 2003. 43 Lutfullah Safi 2004. 44 CSO 2003.

66 Chapter 3 Map 3.4: Number of Students per Teacher by Province

NHDR 04 67 Map 3.5: Distribution of Schools per 10,000 People by Province

68 Chapter 3 female (See Chart 3.2).45 According to other extreme can be found in Badghis Securing Afghanistan’s Future, among and Zabul provinces, where enrolment for over 22,000 students in the higher girls is as low as one per cent.46 education system, only 4,363 are women. In the provinces, education infrastructure There is only one female professor with a is concentrated in the provincial centers, Ph.D., out of 89. Women who choose to while some districts do not have high pursue higher education in Kabul and don’t schools. come from there face the fact that out of 11,749 dormitory students, only 121 Achievements and challenges ahead women have access to dormitories. A stark regional and gender disparity is also The enthusiastic demand for education far evident from net enrolment rates, which exceeds expectations, and this has placed are as high as 87 per cent in Kabul (boys pressure on the school system in terms of physical access, the need for classroom 92 per cent and girls 81 per cent). In three supplies and the shortage of qualified localities – the city of Herat, Badakhshan teachers. province and Herat province – girls’ net enrolment is higher than that of boys. The Chart 3.1: Regional Disparities in the Distribution of School Students, 2002

3,000,000

2,500,000 2,435,570

2,000,000 Number 1,500,000 1,269,665

1,000,000

500,000

0 Five Major Provinces Rest of the Provinces Data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003

Chart 3.2: Gender Disparities in Distribution of School Students, 2002

4,000,000 3,705,235 3,500,000

3,000,000 2,533,272 2,500,000

2,000,000

Number 1,500,000 1,171,963 1,000,000 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, April 2003

500,000

0 Total Students Female Male Data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003

45 CSO 2003. 46 TISA, “Technical Annex of Education,” in Securing Afghanistan’s Future, TISA 2004, quoted in Mohammad Najeeb Azizi 2004.

NHDR 04 69 The Government now considers education • Curriculum development; one of its top priorities, with a specific • The establishment of kindergartens; focus on: • Promoting long-distance education programmes; and • Improving the education infra- • Eliminating prevailing gender structure; disparities. • Teacher development; • Improvements in secondary education For this, the Government budget allocated such as through building science US$250 million, the second largest amount laboratories; of its 2003 development budget. However,

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, April 2003

70 Chapter 3 only US$77.47 million has been committed delivery and to guide the selection of NGOs by donors, with a gap of more than 60 per for project implementation. cent not financed.47 Much of the required By its own estimates, the Ministry of amount was not forthcoming because of Education needs at least 28,000 more a perception that the reforms lack teachers. Most do not have qualifications credibility. However, this represents a beyond grade 12 and are paid low salaries setback for the prospect of making strides – about US$43 per month. Moreover, while in education. some 74,205 teachers are currently in Shortfalls in the education system involve service, only 27 per cent are women. Kabul not only the infrastructure aspects, which is the only city where female teachers (65 should be targeted by development per cent) outnumber male teachers (35 per programmes, but also curriculum cent).48 development, gender disparity, equal There is currently no unified national access in school attendance, and the low curriculum. At present, due to the lack of salaries paid to teachers. These issues are capacity and inadequate infrastructure, less particularly important in areas where than 0.1 per cent of the population reaches traditional religious schooling is a cheap higher education, one of the lowest figures and accessible contender for the minds of in the world. This is in an era where the young. To provide equal access to a knowledge is considered to be the main basic and balanced education system, driver of growth, be it economic or in terms realistic policy goals are needed to aim for of human development.49 quality primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational education, as well as literacy Further attention also needs to be given to and teacher education. This calls for the “lost generation” – an entire population increased allocations for the education of Afghans aged 12 to 30 whose education sector, along with support for general, non- was terminated by ongoing conflict. formal, functional literacy, vocational and Although well beyond the usual school teacher education programmes, and age for Afghanistan, these people must be distance radio learning to compensate for incorporated into the educational scheme the lack of capacity in remote areas of the through vocational schools that teach basic country. skills necessary for any productive member Over the years of conflict, particularly in of society, and adult learning centres for the last decade, many NGOs filled the void those with the will to obtain a high school left by the lack of a central Government diploma. by providing services in support of Afghan Environmental Degradation and Its education. There now is an ambiguity Impact on Water, Food Insecurity about the role of NGOs as implementing and Poverty agencies. Some argue for phasing them out of the education sector, underscoring Environmental degradation and poor access the need to ensure longer term to clean and safe drinking water and sustainability and the lack of qualifications sanitation are major environmental security of some NGOs to deliver educational threats to Afghans. Man-made and natural services. The Ministry of Education needs threats to the environment have been to establish clearer criteria for service caused by erosion, felling of trees,

47 Ibid. 48 CSO 2003. 49 All figures presented here on education have been collected by the Planning Department of the Ministry of Education, and quoted in Lutfullah Safi, 2004. However, according to the NHDR team’s calculation from CSO’s Statistical Yearbook 2003, the percentage of population absorbed in higher education is only 0.1 per cent.

NHDR 04 71 destruction of watershed and found that reduced water quality and desertification. The impact on people has quantity caused a loss of income, a been considerable. reduction of assets or both. As a coping strategy, some households reduced the Safe water and adequate sanitation quality or quantity of their diet in some Observations and consultations with people districts, whereas households in other from diverse communities have revealed districts drew on investments, took loans that water scarcity is one of the key human from either friends or traders, or sold security threats in Afghanistan, as it is livestock. When wealthy groups were essential to maintaining agricultural asked about the priorities for government productivity, which is the heart of the intervention in these regions, the Afghan economy and livelihoods. There rehabilitation of irrigation systems was is already a battle in the country between most frequently cited, although this increasing water demands and limited frequency varied significantly between available water resources, as the process districts.52 of reconstruction and economic Poor access to clean and safe drinking development creates more demand.50 water and sanitation are other major threats Surface as well as groundwater resources to human security in Afghanistan. Poor in many parts of the country have been infrastructure limits access, and as a result, severely affected by the continuous years parasitic diseases such as giardiasis and of drought, as well as by uncontrolled and amoebas, are very common. Cholera breaks mismanaged extraction procedures. As out frequently during the summer season dependence on groundwater resources in different parts of the country.53 Most increases, deep wells have been drilled health insecurities are indeed water-borne without considering the long-term impacts diseases, related to poor hygiene and unsafe on regional groundwater resources, water. including traditional Kareez systems The UNICEF/CSO MICS found that at the (underground canals connecting wells), national level, only 8.5 per cent of the many of which have dried up in recent population had access to piped water in years. At the same time, the country’s 2003, which broke down as 23.8 per cent scarce wetlands are completely dry and of urban residents and two per cent of rural no longer support wildlife populations or populations. The rest of the people used provide agricultural inputs. Water-use protected and unprotected wells, springs, efficiency is very low in all sectors, rivers and pools. However, piped water particularly in irrigation, and causes loss does not necessarily mean safe and clean through evaporation of over half of the water. Overall, 32.5 per cent of Afghans water supply. There are also significant drank safe water, 61.7 per cent unsafe water losses due to outdated water supply water, and 5.8 per cent both safe and unsafe infrastructure, lack of maintenance, and water.54 The percentage of people using poor water supply management practices safe sources of water varies widely between in urban areas.51 provinces, and even in particular provinces In May 2004, a survey of households in between districts and villages (See Map the southwest of the country by the 3.6). For example, 30.3 per cent of people Afghanistan Network on Food Security in Nangarhar City were using piped water,

50 Daud Saba 2004. 51 UNEP 2003. 52 Afghanistan Monthly Food Security Bulletin 2004. 53 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 54 UNICEF/CSO MICS 2003.

72 Chapter 3 Map 3.6: Percentage of Households with No Drinking Water by Province

NHDR 04 73 Map 3.7: Percentage of Households Not Using a Flush or Pit Toilet by Province

74 Chapter 3 while in Nimruz, Uruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, of an increasing number of poor people. Zabul, Parwan, Sari-Pul and Samangan, Low salary levels do not correspond to the piped water was almost non-existent, and high price of staple food items, especially the majority of people used unprotected in the main cities, as monitored by WFP, and unsafe sources. which has maintained food prices in six Perhaps worst of all, urban drinking water regional cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar, supplies are contaminated with coliform Herat, Faizabad and Jalalabad) since 1996. bacteria, posing a considerable risk to One of the reasons for the crippling food public health. Water resources across the shortage is a radical change in the pattern country are threatened by contamination of cultivation from wheat to more profitable from waste dumps, chemicals and open poppy cultivation, which needs a small sewers. In Kabul, water samples clearly piece of land without much water. indicate that the city’s drinking water is cross-contaminated. Though the population in Afghanistan has Food insecurity characteristically demonstrated a remarkable resilience to the recurrent Food insecurity in Afghanistan is threats to their food security, the capacities manifested by poor caloric consumption and coping strategies of the most vulnerable and malnutrition among a large percentage communities have been exhausted. Family of the population. Though the situation structures and the labour force have been has recently improved throughout the disrupted by prolonged separations as country, the vast majority of people still family members have sought informal face some degree of food insecurity, both labour opportunities outside the country. in terms of quality and quantity.55 The causes are not only several years of severe Girls have been forced into arranged and continued drought since 1999, but also marriages at unusually young ages as a insufficient income to purchase necessities. means of securing income for the The limitations on population movements household.57 as a result of poor security in some parts Access to land and livestock of country, poor transportation infrastructure, seasonal and climatic Access to land is both a human security obstacles, depletion of productive assets goal by itself, and a conflict-prevention at the community and household levels, measure, as competition over land and and a lack of employment opportunities water has been showed to potentially flare continue to be some of the major ongoing into disputes and conflicts. The aggravation threats to food security.56 of tensions is conditioned by the lack of According to a study by the World Food availability of arable land (currently Programme (WFP), some 1.4 million standing at 12 per cent of total land of the Afghans are affected by continued drought country)58, the inefficient access to and use and crop failure, and US$50 million is of water and land, and related social factors, needed to tackle the severe situation facing i.e., settlement patterns, destructive coping the country today. With a renewed drought, strategies, and to a lesser extent, inter- cultivation continues to fall, while price communal prejudice and practices of inflation keeps basic foods out of the reach exclusion.

55 S. Lautze, et al. 2002. 56 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 57 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 58 Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004.

NHDR 04 75 Loss of access to land and the scarcity of Restoration of forests and other vegetation water for agricultural use, combined with cover combined with grazing management poor diets, have led to the displacement are high priorities to combat erosion, of distressed populations. A recent Ministry desertification and flood risks. Reorienting of Health/CDC/UNICEF survey indicated production in rural areas from subsistence that an estimated 37 per cent of households models to market-oriented approaches will have been displaced largely to urban also help overcome some of the centres due to food insecurity related to environmental problems that degrade land land.59 This situation is further exacerbated resources. by a sharp increase of the population in Air pollution the past 25 years, the return of rural refugees, and the recent urban development Of all the environmental concerns, the boom on agricultural lands. In major cities level of air pollution is the most obvious such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar- challenge to the health of urban e-Sharif, the expansion of urban populations. Prevailing public and media developments is eating up the most fertile ignorance, however, minimizes concerns. lands, a process that, if it is not stopped, Afghanistan’s urban dwellers are exposed will irreversibly degrade and destroy the to many of the worst toxic and carcinogenic fragile and limited agricultural lands of air pollutants known. Smog is a common Afghanistan, depriving many of their phenomenon in Kabul and other major livelihoods.60 cities, while a combination of dust and smoke particles is a common form of air Pastoralist groups of Afghans, such as the pollution in rural areas.64 Air pollution is Kuchis’, are seriously threatened by loss considered one of the leading risk factors of access to pastures, declining numbers for respiratory diseases, such as chronic of livestock due to disease or distress sales obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer, during the latest drought years, as well as pulmonary heart disease and bronchitis. limited employment opportunities. The Kuchis are facing a higher degree of Addressing air pollution requires concerted nutritional and food security risks than efforts towards sanitary waste disposal, others.61 Additionally, widespreadinspection regimes for air quality, better outbreaks of livestock diseases and the management of traffic, improvement of reduction of veterinary services and efficiency in household energy use, and vaccination programmes has negatively above all, an adequate policy for impacted livestock and livestock products, sustainable urban development. The design both in numbers and quality.62 This is at a and implementation of a national air quality time that less than one per cent of the land standard and policy could be a prerequisite is protected, and no management is taking to achieving these goals. place to safeguard biodiversity and Energy conserve the ecological integrity and wildlife of Afghanistan, as the basis and There are multiple links between energy, means of livelihoods and production for poverty and the environment that have to the poor.63 be addressed. Afghanistan is an energy-

59 Ministry of Health/CDC/UNICEF 2003, quoted in Naqibullah Safi 2004. 60 Daud Saba 2004. 61 MRRD/WFP 2003. 62 FAO/WFP 2003. 63 UNEP 2003. 64 Daud Saba 2004.

76 Chapter 3 deprived country, and per capita energy For example, women are more exposed to use is substantially low by international high levels of indoor air pollution due to standards, a problem that has to be tackled the fact that they spend more time at home, with adequate policy design and working in the kitchen. They end up doubly implementation. The production and use affected by environmental deterioration, of energy have environmental first because of poverty, and second consequences to which the poor are because of their status in their traditional especially vulnerable. This is because they patriarchal society. In such a setting, they use inefficient and more polluting energy bear a disproportionate burden that exposes systems than those who are better off. As them to a greater number of environmental well, while low energy consumption is not hazards.66 a cause of poverty, the lack of available Gender Discrimination energy services correlates closely with many poverty indicators. Increasing the Gender insecurities persist in Afghanistan level of energy services is a prerequisite despite the achievements of the past two to sustainable and adequate living years in opening schools and putting conditions.65 women back in public spaces. Improving the levels of human The context of gender relations in development in Afghanistan is directly Afghanistan must be viewed through the connected to the ability to adapt new prism of traditional Afghan culture, which technologies and innovations to satisfy the is intensely patriarchal.67 It must be needs of economic development and of recognized that the primary social unit in the people. Developing small and medium Afghanistan is the family, extending to multi-purpose hydro-electric systems on kin group and tribe. Most Afghan women the country’s many rivers will provide do not want to be marginalized from their new modes of water management and family unit, and the integrity of the family irrigation, and supply direly needed energy. must be respected, particularly when Multiple impacts on poverty targeting specific groups for assistance, especially women. Afghan culture is based Most of those who suffer from air and on the code of honor, which is largely water pollution, inadequate sanitation, and manifested in the behaviour of one’s poor solid waste management are the poor. “women”. Sewage and wastewater often spew into open gutters and canals, posing an extra The foundation of gender roles is the risk to poor children. People in poverty division of space into the public/ are also most affected by floods, erosion, community (men’s) space and the felling of trees, destruction of watershed, private/domestic (women’s) space, with desertification, earthquake disasters and corresponding roles and responsibilities 68 harvest failures. for each. Many men and women, particularly in rural areas, are satisfied Among vulnerable populations, men and with this arrangement in relation to one women are exposed to environmental another. What is not acceptable are their stresses in different ways. Their work current social conditions. Basic needs for environment often varies, a fact that may food, shelter, health and education are not have considerable health consequences. being met, and the demand for these

65 Ellen Morris and Sudhir Chella Rajan 1999. 66 WRI 1996. 67 Homaira Nassery 2004. 68 Ibid.

NHDR 04 77 necessities transcends gender roles. workforce and Government, began to Deprivation of basic human needs affects access higher education and attend –everyone – men, women and children. universities, served in Parliament and the cabinet, worked as diplomats, judges and Two important developments challenge even army generals, and helped write the traditional gender roles and will serve as Afghan Constitution of 1964, which critical catalysts for change: granted them equal rights with men. These 1. The inevitable advent of globalization, strides toward modernization and progress with the influx of large amounts of were slow but solid. In the 1980s, women aid and opening up of markets and made up 70 per cent of the country’s media, forces Afghanistan to join the teachers, 40 per cent of its doctors and half international community, so it is to be of its government workers. expected that traditional gender roles Some progressive steps were taken for will shift. women under the communist regime of 2. Decades of conflict have forced the 1980s, when Afghanistan was occupied women to take on new roles as heads by the Soviet Union. For example literacy of household, following the death, programmes for women were expanded, displacement and participation in and women were allowed to travel, go to combat of their customary male school and bring knowledge back with providers. These women have them. However, for the first time, women managed lands, properties, agricultural were sent to jails and tortured by the activities and families. To see Afghan communist government on suspicion of women only as victims grossly political ties with opposition groups. Rural underestimates their growth and women were subject to routine bombing contributions.69 together with other civilians. A disrupted progress The ensuing lawlessness that followed during the years of civil war curtailed Strides towards modernization and women’s right to full participation in social, progress for women began some 120 years economic, cultural and political life. ago and continued through the better part Women and children became victims of of the 20th Century, only to be pushed artillery attacks and armed conflict, back by the events of the last two decades. abduction and rape, all resulting in extreme In the 1880s, Amir Abdur Rahman, in line trauma.70 Millions of Afghans, a majority with Islamic teachings, forbade child and being women, became refugees in forced marriages, and supported neighboring countries. inheritance and divorce rights for women. His grandson, King Amanullah Khan, Under the Taliban, women’ rights were further improved the status of women by suppressed altogether. By closing all girls’ establishing girls’ schools, granting rights schools, women were deprived of the right for men and women to choose their own to education. They were ordered to remain marriage partners, encouraging women to in their houses, and employers were establish their own women’s associations, threatened with dire consequences for and offering women a choice with regard taking on female employees. Women lost to wearing the traditional veil. the right to travel: No woman could venture out of the house alone and unaccompanied In the 1950s, opportunities for women by a prescribed male member of the significantly increased. They entered the woman’s immediate family. They were

69 Ibid. 70 AI 1995.

78 Chapter 3 deprived of the right to health: A woman society has been Afghanistan’s new could not see a male doctor even in life- Constitution, which was ratified on 4 threatening instances. January 2004. “Any kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of A renewed promise? Afghanistan are prohibited. The citizens Afghanistan’s emergence from its long of Afghanistan – whether man or women struggle after the defeat of the Taliban in – have equal rights and duties before the November 2001 led to some notable law.”72 The Constitution also reserves 25 positive changes and progress for women. per cent and 17 per cent of the seats in the They went from complete marginalization National Assembly and the Senate for to greater freedom to participate in public women respectively. Each province will life, access to education and employment, have one woman representing it in the and participation in decision-making in Lower House of Parliament, the House of the peace process and the reconstruction the People, and the President will appoint of the country. The re-emergence of media, one third of the delegates to the upper the reopening of academic institutions and house, the House of the Elders, half of the formation of professional associations whom will be women (one-sixth of the are increasingly expanding women’s roles. total).73 In addition, the Constitution The NDF stressed the enhancement of pledges to promote educational women’s status, for it saw progress towards programmes and health care for women. gender equality as a critical issue for Although Afghanistan’s new Constitution Afghanistan. deserves acclaim for granting women equal As a result, important institutional changes rights and a greater share in the country’s have occurred. Women were guaranteed political structure, its implementation is a quota in the constitutional process in perhaps one of the most important 2003, a quota of reserved seats in challenges facing Afghanistan. A key issue Parliament (64 of 250 seats in the lower relates to women’s legal identity and access house), ministerial representation in the to legal resources, about which data are Cabinet (with a Ministry of Women’s mostly unavailable. In 2002, only one to Affairs and a State Minister for Women), two per cent of women had identity cards and a semiformal caucus in the and 98 per cent had no formal papers, proof of citizenship or legal identity.74 government–donor aid structure. Afghan women began raising their voices, whether Still fearful educated or not. Proof came in a projected participation of 11 per cent for women in The lack of security across the country not the first Emergency Loya Jirgah, which only impedes progress in the rehabilitation was exceeded by almost half. Women also of Afghanistan, but also in the made up 44 per cent of the voters registered advancement of women. Many girls, while for the presidential elections. And women’s having the legal right to education, do not publications have proliferated in spite of attend school for fear of being kidnapped the prevalence of fear and the threat of or attacked and raped on the way. But retribution against women who dare to security is not the only challenge to women’s full and equal participation in claim a public presence.71 the rebuilding of their country. The The most remarkable accomplishment with prevalence of conservative attitudes limits respect to women’s position in Afghan their role in civil, cultural, economic,

71 Homaira Nassery 2004. 72 TISA Afghanistan Constitution 2004i. 73 UNIFEM, “Update, Issue #3”, November 3, 2003. 74 WOMANKIND 2002.

NHDR 04 79 political and social life, at all levels of decision-makers and evaluators – because society. the target population of male ex- combatants will be returning to villages, Women continue to suffer from gender- cities and communities that consist of based violence, both as a consequence of women and girls. the past conflict and in the course of their domestic lives. There are incidents of early Still not free from wants and forced marriages, domestic violence, With the increase in female-headed kidnapping of young girls, and harassment households due to the war and and intimidation. In impoverished rural displacement, as well as the loss of areas, families have been reported to sell traditional kin-based coping mechanisms, their daughters to escape desperate poverty disempowers Afghan women conditions or to settle bad blood between much more insidiously than official families. An IOM report released in discrimination does. As long as women February 2004 claimed that Afghanistan are focused on meeting their own and their was an important source for human families’ basic needs for food, water and trafficking, including that of women and shelter, they are effectively blocked from children. Human rights violations related seeking real power via education, activism to trafficking take the form of forced labor, and legislation. This is where the need for forced prostitution and sexual practical gender needs sometimes conflicts exploitation.75 Incidents of self-immolation with strategic gender needs.78 by women to escape forced marriages and According to the NRVA, female-headed domestic violence are not rare. In the past households have the highest incidence of year, the Afghan Independent Human poverty of all the vulnerable categories, Rights Commission (AIHRC) recorded at and they also have a higher than average least 110 cases of self-immolation by presence of disabled members. They are women in just five parts of the country. more inclined to be landless, have lower ownership of cows, low access to According to Amnesty International, the electricity, and worse than average water criminal justice system is simply unwilling and sanitation facilities.79 or unable to address issues of violence against women. “At the moment it is more Self-employment for Afghan women has likely to violate the rights of women than been limited due to the lack of credit and to protect and uphold their rights.”76 banking facilities in the country. When women do secure external funding sources, Police reform and the integration of women as in the carpet weaving populations of into the police forces therefore holds great the north, they are usually in the form of promise for Afghan women at present. traders in the markets, who charge fairly The prisons for women are abysmal, and high levels of interest, so that the final the crimes most imprisoned women are product, when sold, provides a marginal convicted of are dubious.77 Seriousincome. Micro-credit schemes attention needs to be paid to the implemented by NGOs have had mixed improvement of judicial institutions and results, and the overall impact on the lives their implementing bodies. The DDR of women and children has not been programme must include women as measurable.80

75 IOM 2004. 76 Amnesty International 2003a. 77 Homeira Nassery 2004. 78 Ibid. 79 NRVA 2003. 80 Homeira Nassery 2004.

80 Chapter 3 The majority of Afghan women are rural. This has serious implications for how gender is mainstreamed into rural and agricultural projects, as well as local governance structures, particularly since most of the needs assessments have not sought the views of rural women (and men), and thus their voices have not been heard. The burden of labour that falls on rural women is substantial, since it can encompass agriculture, child-rearing, livestock and traditional crafts (as a source of income), in addition to care of the family. The fundamental causes of rural women’s lack of access to basic needs such as water, land, credit, training and extension services must be taken into consideration in project planning and delivery. It is also important to understand that the interconnections between women’s and men’s roles are stronger in the rural areas than in the cities due to the symbiosis of their labours.81 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 2, Feb.2002 On the health and education status of women, the indicators continue to be funding that is being directed towards staggering. The data available reflects women in the post-Taliban period. Afghan women’s lack of health care services, and inadequate food, water and Human Rights Violations shelter. Other factors influencing their As stated in Securing Afghanistan’s Future, health include early marriage, frequent “After more than two decades of war and pregnancies, little or no access to birth internecine violence, a culture of impunity control, and lack of money for health care. has become the norm rather than the According to UNFPA, the average Afghan exception in Afghanistan.”82 This sparks woman who survives until the end of her fears in the hearts of many Afghans. childbearing years will have had an average Moreover, the lack of effective mechanisms of eight live births and several more to ensure basic rights produces its first unsuccessful pregnancies. Over 80 per victim: the trust between citizens and the cent of maternal deaths are considered state that is supposed to protect them. preventable. In addition to the violations of women’s The high illiteracy levels for women and rights discussed in the previous section, girls continue to be not only a primary and the right to development, which for obstacle to their full participation in society, this NHDR are part of the larger context but also to their health and well-being. of human securities, a number of human According to this cartoon, many men seem rights violations continue to be reported to be threatened by the attention and in Afghanistan.

81 Nancy Dupree Hatch 1996. 82 TISA, “Technical Annex: Human Rights,” Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004g.

NHDR 04 81 These are exacerbated by the continuation coordinate these three tasks simultaneously of low-intensity conflict in many areas proved more challenging in outside Kabul, the weakness of law- implementation than on paper. The NHDR enforcement structures, and ineffective recognizes four of the challenges of legal and judicial processes, including mainstreaming a rights-based approach in courts in some regions. A general disregard the reconstruction process: for the rule of law persists unfortunately 1. UNAMA has a clear mandate to among not only paramilitary organizations promote human rights in Afghanistan, and independent “warlords”, but also and the UN Commission on Human agents of the state and even the Rights, based in Geneva, contributed international community. Ultimately, the to the strengthening of the AIHRC and continuation of human rights violations is to mapping human rights violations. a reflection of a lack of political will on Nonetheless, no donor (or group of one side, and the low awareness of human donors) has taken on a strong human rights issues among the population on the rights advocacy role.83 UNAMA, as other. the UN’s peacekeeping mission in A number of steps have been taken in Afghanistan, initially had a weak Human security is monitoring human rights abuses in institutional commitment, embedded in Islam Afghanistan since the Bonn Agreement, demonstrated through under-sourcing and so is democracy. not the least of which is the ratification of and marginalization of the human When we talk about a Constitution that recognizes the rights component, and lack of democracy or human fundamental rights and duties of the people. personnel devoted to this within the security or social justice A human rights oversight office has been organization in Kabul and in the or human rights, etc. established in the Ministry of Interior, and regions during the first year of its we shouldn’t present it the AIHRC was set up with a “complaints’ activities.84 The current structure for as if these are new department within the Ministry of Justice. UNAMA improves on this pattern by ideas that could not be It has registered 634 cases of violations integrating human rights into the found in our religion. since June 2003. Human rights violations mission’s political and development have also been monitored closely by pillars. However, it will require Zabihullah from Logar Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty significant political will and resources International and Physicians for Human to follow through on the major tasks Rights (PHR) among others. of establishing accountability procedures that apply to all people, Yet, a number of important challenges including current leaders, and remain, not the least of which have to do incorporating rights-based with a commitment to human rights within programming throughout all UN the state-building process. operations.85 Marginalization of human rights within 2. The reconstruction process may not the reconstruction process have adequately integrated a rights- At the Bonn Conference, the United based approach to its programming. Nations was asked to support the This has been demonstrated through Afghanistan Interim Authority, supervise the marginalization of human rights the reconstruction, lay the foundations for concerns within strategies such as a political democracy, and introduce a Securing Afghanistan’s Future, human rights regime at the same time. To perhaps as an indication that financial

83 Suhrke, 2004. 84 Ibid. 85 CESR 2002.

82 Chapter 3 institutions involved in the participation and providing a check reconstruction process generally view against corruption and waste. human rights activities outside of their mandates and mark a distinction Key human rights problems prevailing between political and economic throughout the country can be summarized processes.86 Yet addressing the human as follows: insecurities of Afghans requires not Intimidation by armed groups only rhetorical human rights commitments, but the provision of Human rights organizations have noted sufficient resources and precise tools extortion, harassment and violence against to incorporate rights-based civilians at military and police checkpoints; programming within all reconstruction the forced conscription of civilians, projects. including under age boys; abductions; arbitrary and politically motivated arrests; 3. Another shortcoming has been the lack and some extrajudicial killings by the of genuine consultation with the police and other security forces. Afghan people on the determination Intimidation and torture have not been of priorities and needs. Most of the There is no human development strategies designed in limited to the Afghan police, official security in Afghanistan the past two years have had to face security forces or warlords and their clients. for so far it is the law of the constraints of logistics, time, In March 2004, HRW reported that “today, the jungle that is ruling capacity, etc. which has resulted in on Afghan soil, the United States is our country. Warlords insufficient participation of not only maintaining a system of arrests and are the effective rulers the Afghan people, but also of many detention as part of its ongoing military almost everywhere in and intelligence operations that violates policy-makers within ministries. Lack the country. Human international human rights law and of consultation on national policies rights of ordinary could lead to a lack of trust and a international humanitarian law (the laws people are at their denial of the right to participate. of war). In doing so, the United States is endangering the lives of Afghan civilians, mercy, they violate 4. Logistical and capacity constraints undermining efforts to restore the rule of them as the wish. No aside, there has not been sufficient law in Afghanistan, and calling into one can dare to defend political will for a comprehensive question its commitment to upholding their rights. human rights needs assessment to basic rights.”88 ensure that reconstruction programmes Mohammad Ashraf from Kabul are based on priorities expressed by Access to and ownership of land Afghans themselves, to establish baselines and benchmarks, and to Some of the most common violations address root causes of deprivation and recognized by the AIHRC are the insecurities. Coupled with this is the destruction of houses, the occupation of need for enabling genuine public land and the forced selling of properties. access to information to ensure The AIHRC has investigated and registered transparency and public scrutiny of around 300 violations related to arbitrary programmes, as well as monitoring to house destruction and property occupation guarantee the progressive since June 2003. The UN Rapporteur on improvement of people’s living Housing exposed high government officials standards as called for in human rights as culprits in a case of “land grab” in Kabul treaties.87 Such assessments are a tool in September 2003. The AIHRC has called of empowerment, enabling community for the resolution of property-related

86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 HRW 2004b.

NHDR 04 83 disputes and the creation of a sustainable risk of such power-influenced and system for property allocation, distribution contradictory normative and legal codes. and registration as among the prerequisites Research in Badakhshan produced for the development of the country, and evidence that this practice has a legacy of dubbed property theft a major human rights at least 20 years and, though less violent concern, especially for disadvantaged of late, appears to plague some districts groups (minorities, returnees and refugees, with multi-ethnic or multi-faith women, etc.). communities.92 Distribution of, access to and utilization The right to movement and ethnic of land, pastures and woodlands is of key discrimination importance to the livelihoods of the vast During the war, the right to movement was majority of the population in Afghanistan. restricted by different Governments and Not surprisingly, conflicts and disputes groups. Between 1978 and 1992, over land ownership and tenure are movement from resistance-controlled areas overwhelming traditional and formal to Government-ruled ones (mainly from judiciary institutions.89 The problem with rural to urban) were very difficult for even land tenure conflicts is not an absence of common people. After 1992, the country a legal system. It is, firstly, the parallel was split into numerous fiefdoms existence of at least three types of codified controlled by different parties and ethnic rights (written and unwritten customary groups, and it was not easy for people to law, religious law and state law). Secondly, move freely, at times even within one city. no matter whether conflicts are dealt with Today, approximately 60,000 Pashtun IDPs by councils (shuras), commanders, have yet to return to their former homes administrators or traditional judges, they in northern provinces after local all have to take into account the real power commanders targeted Pashtuns following of the conflicting parties. In that sense, the fall of the Taliban for murder, looting, none of the available procedures for rape and destruction of property. Security conflict resolution are reliably shielded concerns, as well as the drought, discourage from power politics.90 Years of “commando some refugees from returning to their administration” have deeply discredited country. official institutions such as courts. Most people therefore turn to customary law Human rights of detainees and traditional conflict management institutions, including violent self-help. The AIHRC and other human rights While customary law appears to have a monitoring bodies, including the US State sound normative foundation with regard Department’s Annual Human Rights to farmland, it is much weaker and more Report, have point out the ill-treatment disputed with regard to the complex issues and torture of detainees, arbitrary of differentiated, sometimes seasonal rights detentions, prolonged pre-trial detentions of access and utilization of pastures and due to a severe lack of resources in the forests.91 judicial system, and inhumane conditions in prisons. The main concerns of the The exploitation of ethnic or religious AIHRC are cases of torture, arbitrary differences to justify deprivation of rights detentions, extrajudicial killing cases in or even violent action against opponents prisons by local authorities, and illegal in land tenure disputes is a further high detentions stemming from property

89 For land and pasture disputes, see Mir Ahmad Joyenda 2004. 90 Jan Koehler 2004. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.

84 Chapter 3 disputes. Overcrowding and limited food Afghanistan noted that intimidation, and medical supplies contribute to attacks, and killings took place during the deteriorating health and even death among 2002 Loya Jirgah process.94 HRW reported prisoners. Human rights organizations have allegations of violence and intimidation also noted the existence of private prisons against regional representatives and where torture is committed that belong to delegates in the preparation of the the commanders and warlords in provinces. Constitutional Loya Jirgah, including Some, as the international press came to during the process, where several powerful find out in the summer of 2004, are run military and party leaders threatened less by American bounty hunters, who, for powerful delegates, and agents of the instance, kept a private jail in Kabul. National Directorate of Security spied on and delivered threats to delegates. HRW The right to participation warned that vote-buying and intimidation There are lots of words had undermined the assembly during The right of citizens to participate in the but little action. One decision-making processes of a nation is December 2003. As the State Department report noted: “Human rights sources sees few deeds on the a key indicator of the health of its civil part of the society. Afghanistan’s newly ratified indicated that political intimidation and Government that Constitution has paved the road towards violence in the Constitutional Loya Jirgah national elections. The Presidential election registration process was a problem. would suggest the marked the first time Afghanistan However, other reports, including those Government’s experimented with direct and countrywide prepared by the U.N., suggest that seriousness with suffrage for the choice of a national leader. intimidation was localized and did not respect to human However, elections are only the first steps significantly impact the outcome of security; whereas, it 95 towards ensuring meaningful participation. elections.” should be the top It must be kept in mind that the purpose Perceptions of Poor Governance priority. of participatory political systems is to and Justice Nezam Gul from Laghman ensure that the rights of citizens are protected. It will be naive to assume that Many Afghans have high expectations that the elections by themselves will lead to policy-makers will take the unique this result. The subsequent Parliamentary opportunity that Afghanistan has for elections needed to overcome not only reforms following the elections. However, logistical problems but also cultural, the slow record of change up to now and political and social challenges, including lack of delivery on promises of security the lack of security, lack of a reliable and development may have gradually census, lack of experienced political eroded trust in weak state institutions and parties, and lack of general awareness in spread a fear that the existing peace may the population about the process and value only be partial or temporary. This fear of elections.93 results in the withdrawal of many from actively participating in political life. Once Political intimidation withdraw their support from the peace process, the state may become isolated Intimidation was widespread during the from society, and the window of voter registration process, leading to the opportunity may close. deaths of both male and female officials. The US State Department’s Country Political exclusion is visible in the form Reports on Human Rights Practices for of labeling and stereotyping entire ethnic,

93 Nasrullah Stanikzai 2004. 94 United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – ”, released 25 February 2004. 95 Ibid.

NHDR 04 85 linguistic or religious groups; the monopoly “war criminal” are assigned only to the of power; inadequate ethnic representation loser groups. No one is being tried the in higher ranking government positions; human rights violations or crimes against denial of the right to employment to certain humanity that have persisted for 23 years, groups such as the disabled; access to and accusers have failed to assume any higher education that is restricted to certain responsibility for their own crimes. This groups; unequal distribution of resources; political dishonesty was identified during and the monopoly of the public media by the NHDR consultations as a serious one group. obstacle to national reconciliation. Assuming responsibility and trying to learn Threats also include the perception that from mistakes would be an essential step people have about the relationship between towards mending broken relationship and the state and warlords and narco-mafia regaining lost trust, among Afghans, and bosses. In the summer of 2004, regional Afghanistan has no also between the state and the citizens. In strongmen still wielded significant policies for any of the the eyes of Afghans, an incompetent influence over scarce resources, and often things that help with government is one that is unable to set and enforced their own rules and their human security and adequately address major grievances, fails own personal or group interests. To change to enforce law and order, and cannot meet human development. the negative domination and menace of the basic needs and aspirations of the It has no education power-holders over the state-building people. policy, it has no health process in the country, it is necessary to policy, it has no implement a radical reform to address Threats to Survival: Mines economic policy, it has conflicts of interest in the structure of the no environmental state, and in doing so, to secure the national A serious threat to survival in Afghanistan policy, it has no security interests of Afghans, rather than the is the continued presence of mines. policy. It just takes interests of particular groups. Afghanistan is one of the three most mine- afflicted countries in the world, with an everything by the day Without an institution that transcends estimated 10 million scattered throughout and many of the days communalism, steps to address the threats the country. The landscape is littered with are bad. I wish I could that arise from fragmentation cannot take other unexploded ordnance (UXO) – have been more hold. A functioning state must replace the rockets, mortars, grenades and fuses that status quo, the wielding of power by local optimistic. have the potential to maim or kill. Children warlords. Otherwise, the lack of state Hamdullah from Jalalabad are especially vulnerable to injury. Many power and influence at the local level will are at risk just by performing everyday continue to be a critical deficit. To chores such as gathering wood, tending overcome this problem, connecting local livestock and collecting water for their community management capacities to local families.96 The latest estimates indicate state institutions must become a strategic that between 150 and 300 people are killed goal. So far, the central Government’s soft or injured by landmines every month, many approach has failed to provide institutional of them children. Estimates from the United cornerstones for conflict transformation, Nations Mine Action Programme for state-building, and social and economic Afghanistan (UNMACA) indicate that 860 reforms, even though people’s demand for people were killed or injured by landmines more state involvement in local governance in 2003 (See Chart 3.3). The International is high all over the country. Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) With political and militia groups still calculated that 7,097 Afghans had been focused on personal, group, or ethnic killed or wounded by landmines between interests, allegations and labels such as 1998 and 2003.97

96 Save the Children (US) 2002. 97 United States Department of State 2004.

86 Chapter 3 Table 3.4: Percentage of Rural Afghans Living Among Landmines and UXOs by Province, 2003 Province Badghis Herat Kabul Kandahar Nangarhar Landmines 13% 17% 62% 7% 24%

Map 3.8: Percentage of Villages per District in Which Landmines Affect Access to Schools, Clinics, Markets, Agricultural Land, Water or Homes (2004)

Source: UNMACA 2004.

NHDR 04 87 Map 3.9: Mined Area Situation in Afghanistan as of May 2004

Source: UNMACA, 4 August 2004, Kabul.

Map 3.10: Total Area Cleared of Landmines as of March 2004

Source: UMACA, 4 May 2004, Kabul.

88 Chapter 3 Chart 3.3: Landmine Victims in 2003 Chart 3.4: Landmine Victims by Gender 2003

Landmines Victims in 2003 (UNMACA Database) Landmine Victims by Gender 2003 (UNMACA Database)

1000 860 1000 860 800 800 676 709 600 600 Number Number 400 400 184 200 200 75 76 0 0 Injured Killed Grand Total Female Male Unknown Grand Total

Source: UNMACA database, 2004. Source: UNMACA database, 2004

3.3. Conclusions they are mutually linked in a kind of domino effect: health insecurity could An analysis of the “fears” and “wants” lead to poverty, which could lead to that characterize everyday existence in education deficits, etc. Or responses Afghanistan today leads us to make the to insecurities stemming from following conclusions about how they environmental degradation could relate to threats to human security: contribute to population movement 1. It is not constructive to prioritize into other fragile ecological settings, wants and fears: It is often noted a deteriorating health situation, hunger, that security is a pre-requisite for loss of livelihoods, and so on. Second, development. The threat analysis the various threats can spread within presented here, however, shows that the country (with impoverished areas, development concerns can create for example, threatening the stability insecurities themselves, and are just of more progressive ones); bleed into as urgent. Human security embodies other regions (through massive the notion that problems must always employment migration, export of arms, be addressed from a broader environmental degradation, etc.); and perspective that encompasses both negatively impact global security poverty and inequality. Both lead to (through breeding discontented armed insecurity and conflict, in addition to groups, drug exports, etc.). being “inhumane” by themselves. The Dysfunctionality in one part of the imperative is therefore to system structurally and sequentially simultaneously work on “freedom affects other sub-systems, and leads from fear”, which entails provision of to a vicious cycle of causes and effects. security and a violence-free day-to- These linkages increase the urgency day life for everyone in the country, of dealing with threats. and “freedom from want”, which calls 3. The answers are not just military: for providing not only the basic needs The real guarantor of national security of food, shelter and services, but also is not solely military power, or the the more strategic needs that support long-term, sustainable development. expansion of ISAF or ANA troops, but a strategic and sustainable human 2. Threats are interconnected: Threats development agenda that favours to human security in Afghanistan are social, political and economic inter-connected in two ways. First, conditions from a rights-based and

NHDR 04 89 inclusive perspective. Such an agenda showed that 81 per cent of Afghans should imply a secure livelihood, expect the Government to provide which includes sustainable services in the next three years, while employment with a decent income; group discussions revealed serious access to universal and quality health concerns about accountability and care and education; a clean and capacity. That people in Afghanistan sustainable environment; freedom continue to rely on a state that they do from fear of crime and infringement not trust poses serious questions about of civil rights; and freedom from fear the level of awareness and of violent conflict. empowerment that individuals and communities have. While public 4. The responsibility does not belong policies by the Government and to the state alone: The state seems to international community are the main have a special responsibility in the tools to achieve human development minds of the people of Afghanistan, and security goals, one cannot neglect although historical experience shows other critical components, including that the state itself at times became a advocacy by civil society, good perpetuator of insecurities. The notion practices by market forces, and of state responsibility was expressed proactive action by individuals and by people consulted by the NHDR households. team, and in a CARE survey that

90 Chapter 3 Chapter 4

Causes and Consequences of Insecurities

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 4 Causes and Consequences of Insecurities

4.1. Introduction employment and security. This in turn could eventually lead to disenfran- This chapter analyses the impact of two chisement and disillusionment. Ineffective decades of conflict on the people of and short-term policies focused on political Afghanistan and on the institutions that compromise will not prove an adequate affect their lives. It examines the “how strategy. Instead, there is a need to identify and why” of the threats discussed in the root causes that may continue to Chapter 3, and then goes on to discuss the endanger the new democracy. potential causes of the conflict using a framework of “greed and grievances”. A Historic Overview of the Afghan Political, social and economic processes Conflict that have led to or resulted from the Afghan wars are viewed in terms of their The causes and consequences of crisis, relationship to people’s wants and fears. and their implications for state-building, cannot be understood in isolation from Afghans have a A Warning Afghanistan’s historical and international historical memory of The following chapter argues that context.1 A historical perspectivetensions is over land, preventing future conflicts in Afghanistan especially important in assessing the roots failed states, requires targeting and responding to root of the country’s current situation. Afghans challenges to power causes, both internal and external. have a historical memory of tensions over structures and external land, failed states, challenges to power Although external factors such as foreign intervention. This structures and external intervention. This memory lingers long invasion and interference were the memory lingers long after the guns have predominant factors fomenting conflict in after the guns have been set down. Afghanistan, persistent and pervasive been set down. human insecurity deepened and sustained A detailed examination of Afghanistan’s the war and devastation. In the future, history of unremitting conflict and external stronger human security could be viewed domination exceeds the scope of this as a requisite mechanism for preventing report. However, to be accurate, any new eruptions. analysis of the current situation and Conflict in Afghanistan can be ascribed reconstruction efforts needs to be to both grievances (motives) and greed underpinned by an understanding of the (opportunities). This NHDR postulates causes and the impact of the conflict. that both grievances and greed still flourish, Internally, Afghan history is characterized and may not have been dealt with by tribal and ethnic rivalries, and a struggle sufficiently enough to prevent future for progress. Externally, powerful conflicts. Greed spurred by the drug neighbours and regional powers have economy and on the rise among those sought influence and imposed regimes. hungry for more power and wealth has Overall, ordinary Afghans have had little kept the Government fragile. It is unable opportunity to participate in the decision- to fulfil many of its responsibilities to meet making processes that have affected their people’s needs in terms of welfare, lives.

1 This section draws among other sources from the background paper by Hanna Schmitt 2004.

NHDR 04 93 Box 4.1 Different Phases of the Afghan Conflict Since 1979

1979–1988 – Jihad in a Cold War Government of President Najibullah and Taliban emerge, with a stated objective context: The Afghan rural resistancethe various Afghan factions ensues with of restoring stability. In September 1996, fights the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. continued support from the Soviet Union they take Kabul. The Sunni resistance parties receive and the United States. However, the 1996–2001 – Talibanization: military and financial support from collapse of the USSR and the ending of Fighting Pakistan, the United States and Saudi US aid alter the balance of power. The continues between the primarily Pashtun Arabia, and the Shia parties from Iran. Najibullah regime collapses when Taliban, backed by Pakistan and the More than 5 million Afghans become Dostum and his Uzbek militia switch United States, and the non-Pashtun refugees in Iran and Pakistan. The allegiance from the Kabul regime to the United Front (UF), backed by Iran, Geneva agreements of 1988 pave the Mujahideen, who enter the capital in Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India. way for the Soviet withdrawal. An April 1992. The Taliban control roughly 90 per cent interim Government, composed mainly of the territory, and the UF occupy the 1992–1996 – Factional war: of Sunni parties but also including some The remaining pockets of land. Both sides Shia parties such as the Hizb-e Wahdat Mujahideen Government is fractured by have access to external aid and and the Harakat-e Islami Mohsini, is set internal power battles and shifting international markets, and continue to up under the aegis of the United States, alliances among the major party leaders. pursue their objectives through military Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. As superpower influence declines, means. regional power interests reassert 2001–Present: 1989–1992 – Jihad among Afghans: themselves and the conflict assumes the US-led international After the Soviet withdrawal, an internal characteristics of both a regional proxy “war against terrorism”. war between the Soviet-supported war and a civil war. In late 1994, the

Adapted from Mohammed Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand, “The Challenge of Winning the Peace", published in: Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, 2002.

Afghanistan, a largely mountainous In 1964, under King Zahir Shah, country capped by the majestic Hindu Afghanistan adopted its first liberal Kush, has always been of strategic Constitution. It allowed for greater political importance to the colonial “great powers” freedom and provided for a two-chamber (Russia and Great Britain, and later the legislature. These changes ushered in a United States). The country’s present period of democratic experimentation, borders were established at the end of the accompanied by some freedom of the press 19th Century, when the great powers and rudimentary forms of political activity sought to establish a buffer state between by many newly formed political parties. the British and Russian empires. After the The 1970s, however, were a tumultuous decade. Shah was overthrown by his cousin Second World War, the “Great Game” Mohammad Daud in 1973, and a second, began once again, this time between an military coup in 1978 by the People’s expansionist USSR looking south, and a Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) new superpower, the United States, keen installed a pro-Soviet communist regime. to influence events in Iran, Central Asia In 1979, in response to increasing fears of and China. While Afghanistan preserved Islamic resistance both within Afghanistan its political neutrality, it received and in the newly declared Islamic Republic considerable quantities of development of Iran, the PDPA “invited” the Soviets to and military assistance from both the invade Afghanistan, marking the beginning United States and the USSR.2 of Afghanistan’s 23-year-long war.

2 From 1955 to 1978, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with US$1.27 billion in economic aid and roughly US$1.25 billion in military aid, while the United States furnished US$533 million in economic aid. See Barnett Rubin 2002b.

94 Chapter 4 The Afghan conflict mutated over time, hijacked by the divided Mujahideen passing through several distinct phases. factions, who could not agree on a power- From late 1979 until February 1989, Soviet sharing formula and instead stormed Kabul military forces occupied the country, from different directions. While fighting encountering fierce resistance from the ensued, Afghanistan was renamed the Western-backed Afghan guerilla fighters, Islamic State of Afghanistan, although known as the Mujahideen. there was no united strategy for running the Government. The resistance movement received substantial international assistance. Aid In the course of this phase of the conflict, shot up from US$30 million from the different commanders took over different United States in 1980 to US$630 million parts of the country. Front lines and in 1987, with Saudi Arabia approximately coalitions changed frequently, with the matching the US contribution.3 During this infighting fuelled by neighbouring period, about 3 million refugees settled in countries backing various Mujahideen camps along the Afghan border in Pakistan, factions and commanders willing to serve and about 2 million fled to Iran. their interests in Afghanistan.4 Once again, atrocities were committed against the Various international NGOs established Afghan population at large; many people operations in refugee camps, providing ended up internally or externally displaced. humanitarian assistance to refugees and Another important aspect of this time was also helping to channel international aid the transformation of Afghanistan’s to the Afghan areas that were under the economy. As financial assistance from the control of the Mujahideen. The Soviet superpowers declined with the end of the occupation was also characterized by large- Cold War, fighters were obliged to procure scale changes in rural Afghan society and alternative local sources of funding their its institutions, as villages emptied and activities. Consequently, Afghanistan existing hierarchies eroded in the wake of became a “transport and marketing massive displacement. Authority corridor” for drugs and contraband.5 increasingly came from local Mujahideen militia commanders, whose newly acquired The third phase of the Afghan conflict wealth and power was bolstered by an began with the arrival of the Taliban on aid–arms industry. the Afghan military scene in 1994. The Taliban, who consisted mainly of Pashtun Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, following youth, rose out of the refugee camps in the international Geneva Accords of 1988. Pakistan, from where they brought the The Accords, however, failed to address conservative values taught in the the post-occupation government setup madrassas (Quranic schools). The Taliban needed for peace-building, and war enjoyed the financial and military support continued between the Mujahideen and of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence the Soviet-installed regime of President Agency, and were also welcomed by the Najibullah. In 1992, the United Nations majority of the Afghan population, which negotiated a deal with President Najibullah was traumatized by the behaviour of local under which he would step down to Mujahideen fighters. Initially, the role of establish a broad-based transitional the Taliban was to secure the main authority. However, this attempt was transport routes, and to remove or disarm

3 Barnett Rubin 2002b. 4 In the course of the conflict, the different factions became proxies for the interests of their own regional sponsors, namely Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran, Russia, India, and the central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the other. 5 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 95 the different Mujahideen checkpoints.6 response to the September 11th terrorist Sultan Barakat 2002. In 1996, groups attacks, an international coalition led by opposed to them formed The United the United States invaded Afghanistan and National Islamic Front for the Salvation ousted the Taliban regime with the help of Afghanistan (The Northern Alliance), of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban were and open conflict broke out between the then replaced by a Government composed two camps. The Taliban, however, enjoyed of the three Mujahideen coalition groups military superiority and advanced with and the Rome group led by the former relative ease, taking control of Kabul in King, Zahir Shah. The international September 1996. In October 1997, the community negotiated this arrangement country became the Islamic Emirate of in Bonn in December 2001. Afghanistan. 4.2. A Framework of Motives The Taliban regime was based on a very and Opportunities strict interpretation of Sharia law. Television, music and photography were As the opening page of the Nobel Prize- banned, as were games and numerous winning economist Amartya Sen’s On popular leisure activities. Taliban rule Economic Inequality asserts, “The relation particularly affected the lives of urban between inequality and rebellion is indeed women and girls who had to wear the all a close one”. The poor may rebel to induce enveloping chaddari, and who wereredistribution, and the rich may mount forbidden to attend schools or university, secessionist rebellions to preempt to work, or to leave their homes without redistribution.9 From this perspective, a male relative. Men had to grow their income and asset inequality, which in beards, wear traditional Afghan clothes traditional agrarian Afghanistan mainly and attend prayers regularly in the mosque. implies land ownership and access to water, During the Taliban regime, the war could be considered as a trigger of the economy was further consolidated and conflict in 1979. It started in the aftermath Afghanistan became the world’s major of land reform policies carried out by the source of opium, with a production of Government at that time. 4,600 tons in 1999. Simultaneously, the Although the complexity of the Afghan Taliban abandoned many of the core conflicts cannot be oversimplified, for the functions of the state, such as welfare and purposes of a human security analysis one representation.7 By mid-2001, the Taliban could propose that the first phase of the controlled more than 90 per cent of the conflict (1978-1992) may have had a very territory of Afghanistan, and had different motive than the second phase established some level of security by (1992-2001). In the first phase, conflict ending factional fighting. Nevertheless, could be accounted for in terms of motives. the Taliban were never accorded official Rebellion occurred as a result of grievances international recognition, and their strict that included threats to independence, policies (especially those regarding cultural values, poverty, illiteracy, political women) earned them the condemnation repression, threats to livelihoods, and of most of the international community.8 human rights violations, all fueled by The last phase of the Afghan conflict foreign occupation. These grievances started in October 2001, when, as a prompted people to engage in violent

6 Sultan Barakat 2002. 7 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 8 Ahmed Rashid 2000. 9 This is analogous to the theory of tax exit proposed by Buchanan and Faith 1987.

96 Chapter 4 protest in defense of their motherland, resources, degraded the environment, national dignity and cultural identity. spread poverty-related diseases and hunger, Theirs was also a civil aspiration for exhausted the national budget, spiked freedom, justice and fairness, as well as inflation, depleted the national historical freedom from poverty. heritage, and, in the end, led to further dependence on international humanitarian In contrast to this phase, the post-1992 operations. conflict could be explained in terms of opportunities.10 According to this model, A human security analysis gives as much conflict as an industry generates profits weight to the objective reality of from looting in such a way that “The opportunities (greed) as to the more A human security insurgents are indistinguishable from subjective perception of the motives analysis gives as much 11 bandits or pirates”. Rebellion during (grievances). Perceptions of threat may be weight to the objective 1992-2001 in Afghanistan was mainly as significant as any objective differences reality of opportunities motivated by greed, which was sufficiently in economic wealth or political or military (greed) as to the more common that profitable opportunities for power. Fear is easily reinforced and subjective perception rebellion were not passed up.12 A manipulated by those in power, and can particularly powerful factor in this context prove as effective a means of control as of the motives was the dependence of many of the overt violence.14 (grievances). Mujahideen groups upon primary commodity exports, such as lapis lazuli, Conflict as Transformation emeralds, rubies, timber, and, in the later It is misleading to talk about “the Afghan stages, opium gum along with conflict” with a unified term. First, the archaeological and antique artefacts. All conflict in Afghanistan has had vertical of these provided income to finance ties with a conflict system that comprises the war. interconnected zones of instability and Recent studies of the causes of conflict spans the entire Central Asia region as cast economic agendas (greed) against well as southwest Asia.15 Second, the political ones (grievances) in causing and conflict itself underwent several sustaining conflicts.13 The Afghan case, transformations, which may not have however, shows that economic agendas always been about breakdowns, but also have been intertwined with social and about opportunities for beneficiaries. It is political crises. Grievances have included therefore misleading to hope for a smooth worsening poverty and inequality that can transition from “war” to “peace”, especially centre on ethnic or cultural identities. They since the distinction is blurry in the history have been fuelled by and in turn added of Afghanistan. “Wars are sites of fuel to “greed”, associated with the rise of innovation, leading to the creation of new conflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers, forms of legitimacy and protection. private militia commanders and narco- Conflict and struggle have historically mafia-style profit seekers. It is this been essential for the advancement of dimension that has led to the collapse of peoples on the margins and one could legitimate state authority and social control, argue that minorities have advanced their which has bred crime and disorder, position as a result of the conflict. Violent disturbed livelihoods, diminished resistance may ultimately have positive

10 See H.I. Grossman 1991 and H. I. Grossman 1999. 11 Grossman 1999. 12 According to the “Machiavelli Theorem” (Hirshleifer 2001) no one will pass up a profitable opportunity to exploit someone else. 13 See, for instance, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 2001. 14 Sarah Collinson 2003. 15 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

NHDR 04 97 social outcomes – the growing rebellion in Afghanistan. They have always assertiveness of historically excluded been, however, serious and widespread. groups such as the Hazaras may be one Absolute poverty, social and political example. Conversely ‘peace’ may be exclusion, acute inequality, and inequity associated with particular political agendas, in the distribution of resources and and in the interests of dominant groups – opportunities among different identity ‘national reconciliation’, promoted by the groups based on ethnicity, geography, etc. Najibullah regime for instance, or the have made Afghanistan vulnerable to ‘security’ brought by the Taliban could conflict in the past, as they may in the not bring lasting and equitable peace.”16 future. One can postulate that poverty and lack of progress on development indicators The transition from war to peace is exacerbated and sustained the conflict in therefore not a simple agenda. Recognition Afghanistan. Poverty forced people to join of conflict as a form of breakdown but militias as an alternative to employment, also of opportunities requires a subtle for example. The lack of viable and approach. Old conflicts will continue (for alternative livelihoods or opportunities example, center–regional tensions) and perpetuates the sense of frustration, creating new ones will emerge (for instance, land new tensions (such as over land and natural One can postulate that conflicts related to returnees). War has resources) or feeding into existing tensions poverty and lack of altered institutions and social structures, (e.g., inter-ethnic rivalries). While progress on such as by leading to new relationships underdevelopment may not directly cause development between the bazaar and the countryside, violent conflict, poor social, economic and between ethnic groups and their access to indicators exacerbated environmental conditions as well as weak power, etc. A nuanced approach to conflict or ineffective political institutions certainly and sustained the resolution, peace-building and conflict in Afghanistan. diminish the capacity to manage social reconstruction therefore requires tensions in a non-violent manner. Poverty forced people recognizing the underlying process of to join militias as an transformation. Policy objectives cannot The existence of “horizontal inequalities”, alternative to simply be “peace” or “ending wars”, but defined as a differentiated access to socio- employment, for must be directed towards transforming economic opportunities, resources and example. institutions, networks and incentive power-sharing, has fostered a reality of systems, regionally, nationally and multiple experiences within Afghanistan. locally.17 These inequalities can lead to deep-rooted conflicts when they combine the issue of 4.3. Causes of the Conflict: identity with that of inequality in a Grievances and Greed historically or emotionally charged situation. Power inequalities and Grievances asymmetries can include sources of long- term as well as short-term grievances, Horizontal Inequalities and Poverty ranging from economic inequality to The causes of conflict are often manifold, asymmetries stemming from gender, race, and attempt to agree on one determining religion, ethnicity, etc. It is not the mere factor are generally not successful. From existence of these inequalities, but a the onset, it is hard to pinpoint whether collective feeling of “unfairness” stemming grievances such as unusually high from a skewed distribution of development inequality and weak political and civil gains among different groups, as well as rights are the main motives that explain political opportunities for power and

16 Johnathan Goodhand 2002. 17 See B. Rubin, A. Ghani, W. Maley, A. Rashid and O. Roy 2001.

98 Chapter 4 expression, that can feed animosities. (grievance), it has also been an asset and Ignoring these factors points to the failure a means of control for power-seekers of political structures to address these (greed). Land disputes are preoccupying inequalities on the one hand, and to curb in that, if not dealt with within a reasonable the dominance of particular groups on the period of time, they can foster conflict, other. particularly if they have been exploited for political and military ends. In Afghanistan, the relative human poverty of different ethnic, gender or geographic More than 100 years of power struggles groups is hard to identify given the lack in Afghanistan have set the scene for of disaggregated statistics. If available, present day land disputes. Each region has these data could show the scope of poverty its own history of land changing hands or illiteracy by different groups, and the multiple times as one of the most precious extent of their marginalization from spoils of war.18 The multiple claims that international markets or state benefits. It stem from this history are unfortunately may be safe to assume that aggregate accompanied by few title deeds. Where statistics can hide realities. But pockets of they exist, they are often contested because poverty and inequality can prove customary, religious and state laws have detrimental to the overall situation when generated various forms of documentation they result in instability. to prove land ownership. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted, Conflict and peace in Afghanistan point “Every commander that comes starts giving to a dialectical relationship, i.e., peace out land to his people with legal makes development possible, but About 80 per cent of documents. There are multiple claims to development must also start now in order Afghans depend on land and many of these disputes involve to reinforce and consolidate peace, and what they can grow, big commanders. If they just involve provide a platform for human security and but the country ordinary people they can be solved at a human development. Obviously, if people increasingly lacks local level, usually in the form of were busy and cared for, they would not water and fertile land. compromise, but these are only the small seek out conflict. Poverty, on the other disputes. Often land is controlled by hand, which is the reality across much of commanders who have no wish to let go, south and southwest Afghanistan, in places then they threaten, they kill.”19 Two such as Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Helmand, Nimruz,and Uruzgan, could lead to decades of migration have further situations where people don’t have complicated the situation. As large anything to lose. They can therefore be numbers of refugees return to resettle easily manipulated by extremists, regions where they once made their homes, international terrorist organizations and they are finding themselves confronted narco-mafia lords. For these groups, with new conflicts and insecurities over conflict creates an opportunity to grab land rights. power, means of production, assets, and About 80 per cent of Afghans depend on so on. what they can grow, but the country Land and Water Resources increasingly lacks water and fertile land. Even in the relatively peaceful 1970s, less Land degradation has long contributed to than six per cent of the land was irrigated. tension and grievances in Afghanistan. The war almost halved that. Drought, While lack of access to land has been a which has withered the land for as many concern for the majority of Afghans as seven years in some regions, has lowered

18 Jeanette Kroes 2004. 19 International Crisis Group 2003c.

NHDR 04 99 water levels across the country. Pumps existence. The Taliban too fit seamlessly brought in to lift water to higher lands into this ethnic pattern on the basis of their often deprive those downstream, while predominantly Pashtun membership and water taken for agriculture frequently support from the south and east.20 Factions draws down the shallow wells that are the within the anti-Taliban alliance derived only source of drinking water for villagers. their military manpower from their Generally, the drought has increased respective ethnic groups: Tajiks, Uzbeks inequalities, as the wealthy have met their and Hazaras of northern and central water and land needs at the expense of the Afghanistan. All factions were extremely poor. It was also an ally of the Taliban. ethnocentric, with each having committed They could not have pushed north without excesses against the people of rival ethnic picking up farmers along the way who, groups on numerous occasions. This, in having lost their crops and herds, hoped turn, has been touted as evidence of to earn something by shouldering a gun. grievances among ethnic groups turning into bitter internal conflicts. As Afghanistan’s IDPs and refugees continue returning home, the country’s Some sources suggest that substantial land and water resources will be stretched inequality and discrimination over a long to the limit if they are expected to satisfy time may account for current ethnic the needs of all. The parched southern tensions. Before the war, Pashtuns regions in particular were suffering from dominated the Afghan state. However, the the effects of continued drought in 2004. conflict brought a new assertiveness from People in this area are increasingly non-Pashtun minorities such as the Tajiks desperate and isolated, which naturally and Hazaras, who also mounted an effective resistance to the Soviet invasion. renders them all the more receptive to the There was consequently a shift in the ethnic fruits of the one crop that is supremely balance of power during the course of the suited to both Afghanistan’s geography war. The political motives of interest and its political instability – opium. groups behind the opposition brought Ethnic Fragmentation and Domination ethnic differences to the forefront. Although few resistance parties were Internal strife in Afghanistan has often absolutely mono-ethnic, they were been characterized by outside experts as nonetheless geographically based and thus an ethnic struggle. Those who throw the dominated by a particular group. With the ethnic factor into the mix of major root fall of the Najibullah Government in 1992, causes for the Afghan crisis base their Afghanistan fractured mostly along analysis on the observation that warring regional and ethnic lines. All parties factions were formed around ethnic and committed human rights abuses, and once regional lines. In the chaos of the 1990s, atrocities began, ethnic polarization following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, increased. Clearly, it is impossible to ethnicity seemed to become the dominant separate the rise of ethnic tensions from factor in the civil war. The Jamiat-e-Islami subsequent political developments, and of President Rabbani and General Masoud, the use of ethnic identity and past the Jumbesh-e-Milli of General Dostum, grievances to serve the political and and the Hizb-e-Wahdat of Abdul Karim hegemonic ends of greedy interest groups. Khalili presented themselves as The state of overall insecurity in representative of the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Afghanistan has created an environment Hazaras, respectively. This enabled them of human vulnerability ideal for this kind to mobilize troops and justify their of manipulation.

20 Frank A. Clements 2003.

100 Chapter 4 While the observation that Afghan warring power bases along ethnic lines and factions were factionalized along ethnic continuing to manipulate ethnicity as a lines may be accurate, the analysis and pretext for political revenge and conclusions drawn from it have often been profiteering. Many expressed fear that misleading. Such analyses fail to take into ongoing ethnically targeted human rights account the fact that the Afghan conflict abuses by these factions could undermine was kicked off by a foreign invasion and the social cohesion of the country for years then kept alive by the meddling of to come. The United Nations was also neighbouring countries. They continuously criticized for taking up false ethnic pursued their various self-interests in divisions at the behest of Afghan leaders, Afghanistan though their Afghan clienteles rather than working to bring ordinary – who often belonged to the same ethnic, people together around issues of common linguistic and religious groups. The Afghan concern. The director of an international population, by and large, and regardless NGO was quoted as saying, “I conducted of their ethnic, linguistic, regional and a survey of 700 people on the importance religious background, detested their own of ethnicity in Afghan society. The only ethnic warring factions as much as those people who raised the issue as important of other ethnicities. were aid workers with the UN and NGOs.”22 Contrary to many Although some experts equate ethnic common assumptions, groups with dominant military–political Contrary to many common assumptions, the various ethnic movements and see them as uniform the various ethnic groups such as Pashtuns, groups such as bodies, many insist that there has been no Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmens, Pashtuns, Tajiks, real “ethnicization” of the Afghan conflict. Baluchs, Nuristanis and others have Uzbeks, Hazaras, In fact, it would appear “...even the evolved into a mix of Afghans with a fairly relevance of ethnicity as a factor of military common culture, psychology and ethos. Turkmens, Baluchs, and political cohesion remained limited in For example, Pashtuns from the eastern Nuristanis and others Afghanistan's civil war, with countless and western parts of Afghanistan have have evolved into a mix commanders and combat units changing more in common with Tajiks and Uzbeks of Afghans with a fairly their allegiance several times out of from the north than with the Pashtuns of common culture, political opportunism and economic Pakistan. A more accurate conclusion may psychology and ethos. incentive – independent of their ethnic be that although they are ethnically diverse, affiliation.”21 the Afghans have mingled into one distinct identity, historically, politically and In a report about human rights and socially. It is this distinction that prevented reconstruction in Afghanistan by the Center Afghanistan from disintegrating, as has for Economic and Social Rights – based been the case in ethnically divided on a countrywide survey in December countries such as the former Yugoslavia. 2001, when the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida was at its very height – As Afghanistan moves towards a new respondents largely disputed the political system, it may need to wrestle importance of ethnic-based societal with the fact that even in democracies, a outbursts as the cause of the Afghan war. small group may fear permanent exclusion Blame for ethnic tensions was attributed if political allegiance is based on ethnicity, to political interest groups and military and one ethnic group claims to be a factions, along with their foreign sponsors, majority. The incentive to exploit the who were accused of building regional minority increases with the size of the

21 Conrad Schetter 2001. 22 Center for Economic and Social Rights 2002.

NHDR 04 101 minority, since there is more to extract.23 Hence, a minority may be most vulnerable if the largest ethnic group constitutes a small majority, a situation referred to by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) as ethnic dominance. It is defined as occurring if the largest ethnic group constitutes 45-90 per cent of the population. Although this phenomenon is as common in peace as in conflict, the use of ethnicity by armed groups in Afghanistan has surfaced mainly in terms of physical force against others. The source of inter-group tension has therefore not been ethnic diversity itself, but the phenomena of polarization and dominance. It is also worth noting that historically, societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity have been Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 6, July 2002 safer than homogenous societies, as long The source of inter- as they avoid dominance. Diversity makes Greed: Conflict as an Opportunity group tension has rebellion harder because of the greater cost therefore not been of rebel cohesion, although it would be Using the notion of opportunity to explain ethnic diversity itself, difficult to argue that diversity reduces conflict in Afghanistan is consistent with but the phenomena of grievance. the economic interpretation of conflict as polarization and While the recent history of the Afghan greed-motivated, as well as the grievance dominance. society is marked by political and even motivations perceived by Afghans violent attempts for ethnic dominance, themselves. diversity in the country has positively During the conflict, many rebellions had prohibited disintegration, keeping the their roots, either directly or in general, in national integrity of the country intact. the grievances of the past. However, The danger today in Afghanistan is the opportunity also accounted for the continued manipulation of differences by existence of both for-profit and also not- dominant factions, who have wrought for-profit rebel organizations. Conflict can catastrophic consequences by targeting be both economically and politically minorities in areas under their control. functional for those who are able to retain Many ethnically and politically targeted power through violence. Although victims from the past decade feel bitterness resources in Afghanistan became both an over the neglect of justice and objective and an important means of accountability with respect to those sustaining violent conflict, it is difficult to responsible for these heinous crimes. In determine whether activities related to war the end, the problem in Afghanistan is not economies, such as smuggling, resource ethnicity, but the skewed distribution of extraction and drugs, are responses to the resources and justice across the entire stresses of war, or would have been carried population. out in normal situations.

23 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler 2001.

102 Chapter 4 Weak states, strong networks and terrain networks served rebel military needs in areas where they existed, but were less Afghan social networks have been effective in regions with ethnic and extremely resilient and have adapted to religious diversity. Other social factors, many changing conditions. Historically, mainly low population density and limited the state has both utilized and been urbanization, inhibited the central colonized through such networks.24 Government’s ability to control rebellion, Countries with interests in Afghanistan which in the end helped prolong the also have turned to these networks when conflict. channeling arms to the resistance. The Mujahideen drew upon them to mobilize War economy fighters, and more recently, they have been War transforms an economy by affecting tapped for drug smuggling and other both its workforce and its capital. Wartime criminal activities. entrepreneurs – often referred to as Conflict has also been a force for social profiteers, economic criminals and greedy change that has reworked many social warlords inspired by the prospects of identities and challenged power hierarchies. greater profits – are those who possess the The war brought intense ideological determination and often the ruthlessness struggles into the most remote valleys. It to engage in economic activity despite precipitated new leadership, the reworking increased risks. Due to their “underground” Conflict can be both of traditional patron–client relationships, nature, wartime economic activities are economically and and an adherence to larger-scale identities usually characterized by the accumulation politically functional based on religion, ethnicity and political of very specialized skills and market for those who are able 25 groupings. The Taliban victory, forconnections, particularly where illicit to retain power example, represented a “social revolution” commodities are concerned. Wartime through violence. in which the sons of poor tribes and clans capital accumulations are typically were able to overthrow a tribal obtained through brutal, primitive aristocracy.26 In a dramatic reversal ofmeasures, such as slavery, oppressive previous patterns, it was the countryside working conditions, fear and force. “Under that ruled the capital. Violence was thus conditions of primitive accumulation, the viewed as a means to restore status and distinction between ‘interests’ and power.27 ‘passions’ breaks down. Normally, successful wartime accumulation of this The collapse of the Government and the kind requires social organization and total chaos in the country in the aftermath command over means of violence as a tool of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces left of accumulation and to protect interests.”28 a weak state with weak military capability, In post–conflict situations, such social which opened another avenue for structures and interdependencies frequently opportunity and greed. Added to the remain entrenched and are difficult to institutional vacuum was the harsh deconstruct. mountainous terrain, which favoured rebel groups, such as the ones based in the forests Conflict in Afghanistan clearly has had its in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan, beneficiaries. Afghanistan became a or in the mountains in the central, and transport and marketing corridor for a northeastern regions. Cohesive social flourishing illicit economy based upon

24 Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 25 Kristian Harpviken 1999. 26 Barnett Rubin 2002b. Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand 2001a. 27 Fielden and Goodhand 2001a. 28 Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 103 opium and smuggled consumer goods, for In the first instance, the Afghan economy’s example. Economic agendas became dependence on primary commodity increasingly important and incentive production and export actually helped systems developed for vested interests to finance the war. As the years of conflict continue violent conflict. “Conflict wore on, commodity exports shifted from entrepreneurs deployed ‘top down’ items such as dry fruits and handicrafts to violence to control markets and incentive illegal trade in gemstones, archaeological systems and created a monopoly of artefacts and poppy gum. These exports predation. The poor and vulnerable, because of a lack of alternatives, were remained at high levels, even as the forced to engage in bottom up (or economic system as a whole collapsed to subaltern) violence, to secure a the point of negative growth. Collier and livelihood.”29 Hoeffler30 demonstrate the link between commodities and war: At peak danger, Greed in this context refers to seeking where primary commodity exports make opportunities by grabbing power and up 32 per cent of GDP, the risk of civil resources. A corrupt and opportunist war is about 22 per cent, while a country leadership recruits people into a low-cost infrastructure of power in an attempt to with no such exports has a risk of only one equip their institutions for grabbing ever per cent. In today’s Afghanistan, among more opportunities as they become the illegal commodity exports, poppy available. products equal 38.2 per cent of the country’s official GDP, notwithstanding In Afghanistan, quantitative indicators of that gem smuggling, lumber extraction and the levels of greed practiced by those who excavation of archaeological artefacts still took advantage of opportunities related to continue, keeping the risk of conflict conflict are many. They include three major resumption at or over the peak. funding sources for rebellion: illegal trade, extortion of natural resources and The exploitation of forests served as contributions from hostile governments. another source of revenue for war.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

29 Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 30 Ibid.

104 Chapter 4 Map 4.1: Deforestation in Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar Provinces, 1977 and 2002

Conifer forests in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Nuristan have been According to the United Nations detected by satellite instruments in Badghis reduced by over a half Environmental Program (UNEP), satellite and Takhar provinces in 2002, compared since 1977. Pistachio imagery reveals that conifer forests in the to 55 and 37 per cent land coverage in woodlands in the north provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and 1977, respectively.32 The main cause of have also been Nuristan have been reduced by over a half the deforestation is pervasive poverty and disappearing at a since 1977 (See Map 4.1). Up to 200 timber lack of access to other sources of fuel. critical rate. trucks a day, representing the loss of up Conifer forests in the east and southeast to 200 hectares of forest, ply the main road were extracted for profit only, sometimes in Kunar, according to local officials. against the will of local communities. Probably two-thirds of their cargo is Trafficking of archeological artefacts has destined for export markets in Pakistan.31 This process has resulted in local been another source of booty that has communities losing control of their propelled the war in Afghanistan. Though resources to warlords, timber barons and the share of GDP that comes from the foreign traders controlling illegal and illegal selling of archaeological artefacts highly lucrative logging operations. is not known, the flow of money from the sale of these items is quite significant. It Pistachio woodlands in the north, which is estimated that 75 per cent of the ancient could produce 35–50 kg of nuts per year, artefacts belonging to the National providing significant revenue for thousands Museum in Kabul have been smuggled of families, have also been disappearing out of the country since 1992.33 These were at a critical rate. Almost no trees could be part of the Museum's vast collection, which

31 UNEP 2003. 32 Ibid. 33 Amrollah Mas'oudi, head of the National Museum of Afghanistan, interview with IRNA (12 April 2003), as quoted by the Afghanistan Press Agency (APA).

NHDR 04 105 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

ranged from prehistoric treasures to early represents one of the most daunting Buddhist art to modern artefacts with a obstacles to state-building. monetary value in the range of hundreds This legacy comes from the years following of millions of dollars. As a noted cultural the end of the Cold War, when a decline historian of Afghanistan said, “The in superpower support led to local warlords breakdown of law and order which has becoming more dependent on local plagued Kabul ever since the arrival of resources to maintain their military fractious Mujahideen groups in April 1992 activities. During this time, Afghanistan has spelled disaster for the museum.” In became a transport and marketing corridor that case, “...all indications suggest that for drugs and contraband. Under the the looting was carried out with careful Taliban, Afghanistan emerged as the consideration”.34 As of today, almost world’s major source of opium, with 31,000 pieces of historical and cultural production peaking at 4,565 tons in 1999.36 value have been stolen and sold outside The drought was also an ally of opium the country,35 and illegal digging and traders, as herders, who used to move smuggling is continuing. livestock around the country, now moved Narco-Warlordism and The Opium Trade opium by being paid advances on the next year’s harvest. It will take serious international engagement to transform Afghanistan’s A June 2000 ban by the Taliban hiked up deeply embedded war economy, which the prices of opium gum while reducing leaves the majority of Afghans living in opium output to relatively insignificant heightened states of both fear and want. amounts in 2001 (185 tons). But the post- The legacy of the opium industry and the Taliban years have again seen a profitable drug lords that thrive from it undeniably expansion. Afghanistan produced 3,400

34 Nancy Hatch Dupree 1995. 35 Enemies of the Afghan Heritage, www.rawa.org/museum.html. 36 UNODC 2003a.

106 Chapter 4 Table 4.1: Afghanistan Opium production from 1999 to 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Tons of opium 4,565 3,276 185 3,400 3,600

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2003. tons in 2002, 3,600 tons in 2003 (See Table The growing professionalization of the 4.1 and Map 4.2), and even higher amounts poppy economy may have been caused by are predicted for 2004, allowing it to the attempts of an emerging narco-state or reclaim the title of the world’s largest international terrorist and mafia producer.37 According to a UNODC report, organizations to criminalize the poppy high prices have spurred the recruitment economy of Afghanistan in order to control of more farmers, spreading poppy political and economic processes. cultivation to all provinces of the country Indicators of this direction include the The report claimed that Afghan opium appearance of an estimate of 21 heroin farmers and traffickers took home about courtyard factories, employing “foreign” US$2.5 billion in 2003, about half of the experts, and allegedly being protected by country's legitimate GDP and almost ten regional or central political patronage. times the Government’s tax revenues.38 Another sign is the professionalization of The cultivation of marijuana is another the trade, which now involves strong ties issue, having become widespread in the with Russian and Tajik business partners north of the country. across the border.39 It was a combination of exhausted assets, Presently, drug-related activities are the accumulated debts and the sharp rise in core component of the informal and opium prices that presented opium poppy criminal economic sector. They cover production as a major opportunity for production, refining, trafficking and livelihood through wage-labour and trade. consumption of opium poppies and heroin, Consequently, the rural elite and the poorer all under the control of the warlords and stratum of indebted households embraced mafia-style organized criminal gangs, local the poppy economy, the former as a as well as regional and international. The strategy to further accumulate wealth, the risk that the drug economy and violent latter as a coping mechanism to conflict could spin into a vicious circle, compensate for the losses they have where one reinforces the other, is still suffered from drought. Drought, drugs and present. The enormous profits that the drug insecurity appear now to be feeding off industry generates have been shown to each other. Three of the country's five big corrupt state officials and undermine drug-producing provinces – Helmand, already weak state capacities. Uruzgan, and Kandahar – are both unsafe and parched. Poppy cultivation is also Revenues from trade in opium products in spreading to new areas, and with it 2003 are estimated to have reached US$2.5 insecurity. Whether they produce out of billion, more than half the country’s annual fear or financial insecurity, however, GDP. Cultivation of poppy in 2003 had Afghans living in these regions hardly increased to 80,000 hectares from 74,000 have any appealing alternatives, given that hectares in 2002 (See Map 4.3), an 8 per most individuals live in dire conditions. cent increase in one year.40 Experts predict

37 Ibid 38 Ibid. 39 Jan Koehler 2004. 40 UNODC 2003b.

NHDR 04 107 Map 4.2: Afghanistan Poppy Production by Province (2002-2003)

Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

108 Chapter 4 Map 4.3: Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation by Province (2002-2003)

Source: UNODC and Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.

NHDR 04 109 an even sharper increase with record high neighbouring and distant, all of whom cultivation rates in 2004.41 UNODC have attempted to manipulate internal estimates that the amount of land devoted Afghan affairs to benefit their own to poppy cultivation has more than doubled interests. The support provided to warring in a little over a decade, with a mere one factions in Afghanistan is a clear case of year low-level deviation in 2001. greed. It is estimated that in 2003 Afghanistan The flow of aid to Afghanistan played a Poppy, guns and produced three-quarters of the world’s significant role in the formation and the terrorism reinforce illicit opium42, supplying some 80-90 per conservation of a “prosperous” war each other. For cent of the heroin consumed in Europe43 economy. During the Soviet occupation Afghanistan to have According to the UNODC, as much as at the end of 1979, Western development peace, we have to half the quantity of the illicit drugs programmes were effectively terminated, address all three at the produced in Afghanistan are consumed in and the Soviet Union became the country’s same time. neighbouring Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, major source of foreign aid, particularly Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and other states for residents of urban areas. During the President Hamid Karzai in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.44 U.S 1980s, Western-backed humanitarian aid Seizure data suggest that at least five programmes became entangled with Cold percent of the heroin imported into the War and, later, post-Cold War political United States originates in Afghanistan.45 agendas. In the early part of the decade, In other words, the high levels of Western aid was part of a conscious production threaten the human security of strategy to undermine the pro-Soviet millions of people all over the world. communist Government. Avoiding official Officials warn that Afghanistan could structures and instead working through become a narco-terror state in the future. local commanders, mostly in eastern Drug production is no longer an obscure regions where the central Government was issue. Enough Afghan officials and weak, patterns of aid distribution tended warlords are now so heavily involved in towards preferences for political ties over the illicit trade that they threaten the state's real humanitarian need. fledgling economy. Interior Minister Ali This inevitably accentuated Ahmad Jalali told reporters, “In some parts national–regional and centre–periphery criminals are supported by those who have tensions, and legitimized Mujahideen power,” referring to regional warlords who groups in rural areas. Essentially, hold sway over large parts of the country.46 humanitarian aid was being distributed to resistance groups much in the same way International Functions: The Aid, Trade arms had been only a few years earlier. In and Arms Pipeline addition to creating a “culture of One of the major causes of conflict in dependency”, particularly on food aid, the Afghanistan can be attributed to the “aid and arms pipeline” led directly to the external interventions of states, build-up and legitimization of factional

41 Associated Press, “Afghan President Ready for Elections,” 2004 42 US State Department’s 2004 International Narcotics Strategy Report, quoted in “Poppy crop in Afghanistan at record high,” AFP, Washington, Mar 01 2004. 43 CIA, “The World Fact Book, Illicit Drugs”. Updated 18, December 2003. 44 UNODC 2003b. 45 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report -, Southwest Asia, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2003. 46 “Afghan Officials Involved in Drug Trade,” Paktribune, 14 May 2004. [http://paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=64987&PHPSESSID=706ee2ee0abecea7ea9adf44316f3f17].

110 Chapter 4 forces, and eventually to the expansion of about US$ 2.5 billion, largely through smuggling and other businesses.47 unofficial exports to Pakistan.50 During the Taliban years, Afghanistan may have During the phase of the Cold War that been the second largest trading partner of stretched between 1979 and 1989, the the United Arab Emirates (which, along Mujahideen groups received about US$7 with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, was one billion in military and economic aid from of only three states that recognized the the US and some other western countries.48 Taliban regime). Afghan traders would This kind of support was very open during the Cold War, when each great power purchase duty-free goods in Dubai and 51 supported its proxies. The opportunity for ship them onward for smuggling. As rebellion may have been exacerbated by noted by an expert on Afghanistan, the fact that conflict-specific forms of “Several networks have linked Afghanistan capital, such as military equipment, were to a wider arc of conflict, or a regional provided either for free or at an unusually conflict formation, stretching from cheap rate. Moscow to Dubai.52 Regional conflict formations are transnational conflicts that The military sponsorship of warring form mutually reinforcing linkages with factions by regional powers prompted a each other throughout a region, making HRW study in 2001 to investigate the for more protracted and obdurate discord. delivery of arms and other forms of military In South Central Asia, the regional conflict aid to both sides by Pakistan, Russia and comprises state and non-state actors in Iran (by passing the United States), and Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, the impact of this aid on human rights.49 Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and The report detailed the nature of military Kashmir. Networks of armed groups, often support provided to the warring parties, covertly aided by neighboring states ...link the major transit routes used to move arms the conflict within Afghanistan to violence and other equipment, the suppliers, the in Kashmir, Chechnya, Tajikistan, role of state and non-state actors, and the Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Networks of response of the international community. narcotics traffickers, collaborating with HRW then called for international armed groups, link Afghan poppy fields sanctions, including a comprehensive to global markets via Pakistan, Iran, and embargo on arms and other forms of Central Asia. Networks of traders, more military assistance, against all warring benignly, seek access to buy and sell their factions in Afghanistan by the international goods, even when profit requires avoidance community. Likewise, the group noted of customs regulations. Cross-border social that governments that provide military ties among the region’s various ethnic and assistance to abusive states and rebel religious groups underpin all of these groups should be held accountable for the networks. That conflict that gripped resulting abuses. Afghanistan over the past 25 years was Various forms of international trade also [therefore] much more than a local or supported Afghanistan’s instability. A WB national power struggle and must be seen study estimated that trade in 1997 was in its regional context.”53

47 Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 48 Ahmad Rashid 2001. 49 HRW 2001. 50 Zareen F. Naqvi , “Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations”, Islamabad: WB, 1999. 51 Barnett Rubin 2000. 52 Regional conflict formations are transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate discord. In South Central Asia, the regional conflict comprises state and non-state actors in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kashmir. 53 Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong 2003.

NHDR 04 111 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, December 2003.

In general, Afghanistan’s economic Hopes for an end to interference lie in a situation has had and continues to have stronger, more unified central Government. significant regional spillover effects – The renewed sovereignty of Afghanistan through unofficial trade, narcotics, opens the formidable possibility that the terrorism and extremism, financial flows reconstruction process could transform and the movement of people. These negative spillovers into possibilities for impacts tend to undermine revenue trade and economic development, not only collection and the effectiveness of in Afghanistan, but in the region as a economic policies in neighbouring whole. The common languages and countries. At the same time, and despite cultures that Afghans share with their failed policies of the past, regional actors neighbors could be used to further positive continue to seek influence within interactions. The changed political Afghanistan’s borders, potentially fueling circumstances after the Taliban provide renewed struggles and factionalism along an opportunity to improve regional ethnic lines. relations by expanding legitimate trade

112 Chapter 4 and initiating other forms of positive demonstrated that people use a variety of cooperation. A regional approach is coping strategies, which depend upon their particularly critical for the border areas location, the strength of local governance between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which structures and social networks, and access have become incubators of violence, to roads, land, markets and water. Their migration, smuggling and drug trafficking responses ranged from reducing food because of their deep and stubborn poverty. consumption and disposing of assets, to moving to Iran, Pakistan, Europe and North 4.4. Impacts and Coping America. Afghan families with members Strategies working in Europe, the Gulf, or North America were often able to profit and It is very difficult if not impossible to increase their asset base through quantitatively assess the impacts of all the remittances, while those dependent on damages produced by violent conflict on workers in Pakistan and Iran were more human security and human development likely to be using the remittances simply indices in Afghanistan. It is as difficult to survive. from the livelihoods point of view to Survival strategies, however, also had a estimate how much productivity loss can number of negative consequences. Fuel- be attributed to the continuously gathering under drought conditions resulted traumatized people, or how much has been in severe deforestation and denudation that One of the most lost in terms of foreign investment, tourism resulted in increased susceptibility to flood and incomes by the falling international and avalanches. At the same time, conflict notable outcomes of “image” of Afghanistan. Yet what is clear and migration limited the labour available the conflict has been is that at the individual level, conflict to maintain the functionality of water the extraordinary inflicted enormous misery, destroying systems, such as kareez and canals.54 Debt resilience of the Afghan confidence and mutual trust, leadership and migration resulted in shifting patterns people. People cope and entrepreneurship. of land tenure and the expansion of a class with and survive The Diversification of Livelihoods of landless labourers with limited or conflict and and Coping Strategies insecure access to natural assets. In such humanitarian crisis an atmosphere, in order to secure their first and foremost by livelihoods, most Afghans pursued such One of the most notable outcomes of the adapting and conflict has been the extraordinary strategies as holding multiple jobs, and diversifying their resilience of the Afghan people. People diversifying sources of income through cope with and survive conflict and their own production or disposition of livelihoods. humanitarian crisis first and foremost by assets and wage labour.55 adapting and diversifying their livelihoods. Afghan survival strategies also point to The transformations in the wider political the role of mutual support mechanisms. economy are therefore mirrored in varied In some communities, where social capital and often irreversible changes in people’s was destroyed, kinship systems broke lives. In Afghanistan, years of conflict saw down, particularly where there had been growing vulnerability across most of the periods of settlement by different ethnic population, with a gradual erosion of assets, group. In some others, these systems were compounded by the weakening or collapse maintained and strengthened by extended of governance institutions and a range of ties of economic interdependence and a external shocks to poor communities’ strong sense of mutual support.56 Afghan coping strategies. But Afghanistan also households as well as individuals pursued

54 Peter Marsden 1996. 55 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002. 56 Sarah Collinson 2003.

NHDR 04 113 livelihood strategies based on the The Informal Sector as Survival combination of assets they owned and the Strategy opportunities and restrictions created by their institutional environment, mainly In rural Afghanistan, the cultivation and trafficking of opium as a survival strategy informal factional and regional militia for indebted farmers that yields income, institutions. As a study on livelihoods employment and cash for food security carried out by the AREU showed, people’s has been widely studied. The other less primary objectives were and continue to studied informal economic activity, more be pursuing food security to ensure their legal than the poppy trade, is the informal survival, and an income to satisfy their sector, which existed and continues to other basic needs, i.e., clothes, shelter, boom in urban centres, primarily Kabul. energy and medicine. But beyond basic needs, households also showed inclinations A discussion of survival strategies in towards wider indicators of well-being, Afghanistan would be incomplete without such as a dignified absence of poverty and a look at this burgeoning area of economic social values such as freedom, choice and activity. The informal sector is based on The informal sector self-esteem.57 The resilience of the people the existence of a dual economy, mostly often operates as an in Afghanistan during the years of natural in urban areas: a registered and wage- “incubator economy”, and social miseries was the result of their earning sector, and an un-enumerated, where new own efforts, using their own resources. small-scale, labour-intensive, self- employed sector.59 The irregular (also entrepreneurs learn to These included subsistence farming, wage- labour migration, strategic family alliances known as black or underground) economy operate in the urban produces legal outputs, but uses illegal market economy and and negotiation with armed forces.58 Innovative coping strategies and the practices in either production or distribution develop their micro- (for example, no taxes are paid). This is resilience that shapes them will likely enterprises through distinct from the criminal sector, which continue to remain critical for stability, trial and error. relies on similar illegal practices but often economic growth, human security and produces illegal products such as drugs. sustainable human development across the The difference between quasi-legal and country. illegal enterprises resides in the fact that Livelihood security requires that policies the former are not actively sanctioned (and focus on identifying opportunities and are thus only de jure illegal), while the building strengths rather than emphasizing latter are consciously hidden from and constraints to development. The heart of actively punished by law enforcers.60 The a policy framework oriented around informal sector often operates as an livelihoods is essentially the household “incubator economy”, where new and its access to natural resources such as entrepreneurs learn to operate in the urban land and water; physical resources such market economy and develop their micro- as agricultural equipment, kareez systems enterprises through trial and error. The and irrigation canals; financial resources sector is also a phenomenon of cities where there is a higher demand for services. such as cash availability, credit and debt; human capital such as health and A 2001 study by the WB and UNDP of education; and social resources such as the impact of unofficial trade on trust, social and moral norms, and Afghanistan’s economy concluded that it community networks. continued to provide employment and

57 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002. 58 Adam Pain and Sue Lautze, AREU, 2002. 59 Timor El-Dardiry 2004. 60 Ibid.

114 Chapter 4 revenues during the Taliban regime. The underestimated. Recognizing its role will findings indicated that the cities of Herat, allow policy-makers to design development Jalalabad and the town of Weish were strategies that provide new opportunities thriving as hubs of trade. “Jobs are being for alternative livelihoods, based on created in the transport, fuel, road-building people’s proven resilience. For those and repair, wholesale and retail trade without access to regular employment, the sectors. Export markets for the indigenous informal sector acts as a safety net, offering products provide revenues for agriculture, the chance to earn a modest income as horticulture, sheep farming, carpets, semi- well as social protection normally provided precious jewelry, and handicrafts.”61 by the state. Yet the informal sector can also be a problematic safety net. It may The informal sector continues to grow in prevent people from falling through Afghanistan’s cities today. Large imports altogether, but it can be very hard for them of construction materials indicate that some to significantly improve their incomes and segments of the Afghan economy are escape poverty. Moreover, informal investing in housing, warehouses, markets alternatives are almost always imperfect and shops. This activity is fuelled by substitutes for state protection.63 massive foreign aid inflows and gross income from drug production. The income Migration as a Way of Reducing of the expatriate community, the returning Insecurities, Including Income diaspora, the nouveaux riches and state Disparities employees creates new demands for imports and local services. For the moment, Even prior to the Soviet occupation, there the extent and nature of the informal sector were migratory movements to has not been measured. In order to estimate neighbouring countries (especially Iran) its size, surveys based on questionnaires for seasonal labour. Cross-border would be one option, although people may movements from Afghanistan have been not want to disclose such information substantial and regular, and driven by through an interview. Other methodologies economic and social opportunities (and could involve measuring the demand for motives), but have not been accurately currency as proxy. Assuming that most, if quantified either by number or duration. not all, transactions in the informal The existence of transnational households economy are paid with cash, there will be with networks in both Iran and Pakistan more demand for currency than official is thought to have grown appreciably in national income figures would predict. the last 25 years. The economic However, the shortcomings of this contribution of these networks (including approach are that a large proportion of the wider Afghan diaspora) to family informal economic activity may be based budgets is believed to run into hundreds on barter.62 Despite these methodological of millions of dollars annually. difficulties, however, leaving out the Facilitated by better transport and informal sector when formulating public communication, internal and international policy based on official statistics will migration has become more circular. overlook the activities of many people. Remittances have contributed to a The growing importance of the informal substantial reduction in the income sector in providing a form of security to disparity between urban and rural areas, millions of Afghans cannot be where many households may in fact

61 WB and UNDP, “Impact of Unofficial Trade on Afghanistan’s Economy”, 2001, . 62 Timor El-Dardiry 2004. 63 Ibid.

NHDR 04 115 depend on them for much of their income. character of social interaction. New Migration should thus be viewed in terms influences, both destructive and innovative, of the free flow of labour to areas where have filtered in from the experience of it can earn at a higher rate. Within the exiles in refugee camps and towns, but country, rural–urban migration, which has also from Western societies as the diaspora been renewed since 2001, may be returns. The adoption of conservative contributing to economic growth and values, which were the experience of rural reducing income disparities. men brought up in refugee camps, changed the culture of cities in Afghanistan during Migration is not a single, decisive move the Taliban years. External influences on by the entire family that ruptures all ties attitudes and values manifested in young with the place of origin. Many families men who enlisted in militia forces, as well act according to a deliberate strategy, as in men and women going to sending different members to different neighbouring countries as migrant workers. places. Those in the city save money to The large number of Afghans based in support their families in rural areas. The Western countries could indirectly (through families may use the savings to create an contacts with relatives) or directly (if they economic base for the migrant for his or return) influence attitudes related to her return. Migrants provide information production, consumption and other aspects to the family back home about new of economic and social life in Afghanistan. Migration may also employment opportunities, and help have some negative relatives and friends settle in the urban The result of such a fluid movement of impacts, such as the area or abroad. For many, migration has people has been an unprecedented contrast loss of labour to the long-term objective of providing in terms of social behaviour and living cultivate the land. It children with a good education so that they standards, between those who remained can lead to the break- will have a better life than their parents. in the country and those who made it outside. These new influences could up of the family, or to The return of migrants to their homes can also mean the introduction of new skills, significantly change the social balance in men having two ideas and knowledge. Afghan society, including the way material families, one in an resources are generated and distributed at urban area and one in Migration may also have some negative all levels.64 a rural area. impacts, such as the loss of labour to cultivate the land. It can lead to the break- Forced Migration: The Experience up of the family, or to men having two of Displacement families, one in an urban area and one in a rural area. When men migrate, women’s Though the massive displacement of position in the rural society changes, as people is often perceived first and foremost they are forced to undertake tasks as a threat to state and even regional traditionally limited to men. A drastic security, refugees are rarely, in and of increase in the population in Kabul and themselves, the cause of conflict, but rather, 65 the growing number of unregistered one of its tragic results. States may residents expands the scope of informal encounter serious difficulties when forced employment, and with its human to cope with the influx of refugees in large insecurities. numbers. However, in such cases, it is clearly the security of the individuals that Perhaps one of the most lasting impacts is most threatened. They may have been of migration from a human security point forced from their homes, perhaps attacked of view has been changes in traditional during their flight, and have arrived at a social values and attitudes, and the destination where their basic needs may

64 Umer Daudzai 2003. 65 Discussions in this part are adapted from Chowra Makaremi 2004.

116 Chapter 4 not be met. In the event that displacement Displacements intensified as the Taliban endures over a longer period of time, there regime weighed down a population already are greater chances that conflict might weakened by dramatic droughts. This led arise depending on the degree of prosperity to a huge increase in refugee movement and integration that refugees experience in October 2000, combined with large- in their host countries. scale internal displacement. The human security of Afghan refugees deteriorated The case of Afghanistan’s human considerably after 2000, when countries displacement is complex and “unique in such as Pakistan and Tajikistan, who had the twentieth century (as Afghan refugees) previously received their neighbors in make up the greatest population of the distress, closed their borders. Food security same region ever transplanted outside their drastically decreased beginning in October own borders – an exodus from the south 2001 when aid workers, upon whom the to the south, and the poor towards other Afghan population had grown dependent Many Afghans have poor.”66 Many Afghans have forbeen their basic needs, withdrew from the been displaced up to displaced up to four times due to ongoing country in the weeks before the coalition four times due to conflict, beginning with the Soviet air strikes. ongoing conflict, invasion, then the warring Mujahideen The fourth phase of displacement began beginning with the factions, then the terror of the Taliban Soviet invasion, then regime combined with their ongoing almost immediately following the clashes with the United Front, and finally September 11th attack. Once again, the warring Afghans attempted to flee, this time in the US-led coalition air strikes.67 Mujahideen factions, anticipation of US retaliation against the then the terror of the Afghanistan’s exodus first exploded as the country that harboured Osama Bin Laden. Taliban regime war between Soviet invaders and the However, large numbers of refugees were combined with their resistance intensified. There were 3.9 stopped at the closed borders of Iran and ongoing clashes with Pakistan as they attempted to escape the million refugees fleeing the war in 1983. the United Front, and In 1988, at the height of displacement, certain warfare. With neither the option finally the US-led Afghan refugees constituted as much as of seeking security in neighboring countries 60 per cent of the entire world refugee nor in their homeland, many Afghans coalition air strikes. population. The second act played out in remained internally displaced, worsening 1989, when the Soviet forces withdrew the already precarious humanitarian and a first repatriation occurred. When the situation. Mujahideen conquered Kabul in 1992, one For 2002, the Transitional Afghan observer noticed “a huge surge of collective Government figures showed approximately optimism which resulted in no fewer than 5.6 million Afghan refugees, with 2.3 1.2 million Afghans returning from million in Iran and 3.3 million in Pakistan, Pakistan in six months – none of them 1 million people were internally displaced. assisted by an extremely stretched Since then, the Government, with the help UNHCR”.68 This phase of chaos witnessed of UNHCR, has established repatriation a dual movement of people: Despite the programmes, which brought back 1.2 insecure situation following the entry of million refugees by 2003. Despite the the Taliban, 1.7 millions refugees were considerable success in repatriation, repatriated by 2000, while a new wave however, many returning refugees face fled the obliteration of Kabul and other further displacement and thus become new areas to join over 4 million of their fellow IDPs69: the cycle of human displacement citizens in exile. has not yet been broken.

66 Micheline Centlivres-Demont 1994. 67 Susanne Schmeidl 2002. 68 Colville 1997. 69 AI 2003b.

NHDR 04 117 Despite common features, displacement women’s roles, offering greater levels of is not one single phenomenon, but changes responsibility on the one hand and exposing according to the country of asylum, the them to greater levels of vulnerability on causes of displacement, and the time when the other” noted a study on Afghan women it occurs. During the massive exodus from and international aid.73 The position of the mid-1980s to the year 2000, different women in the public and private spheres movements took place – from hejrats to evolved with the specific conditions of individual displacements – with different protracted exile in refugee camps in effects on Afghan’s societal structures. Pakistan. The absence of refugee men, The hejrat is an organized religious exodus many of whom were engaged in military in Islamic societies, is based on the belief operations inside Afghanistan and that it is the duty of every believer to leave continued to have links with their home a land that is no longer Muslim and seek villages, often involved refugee women in asylum on Muslim ground. As a response decision-making processes that would to the Soviet invasion in the1980s, tribal normally have been undertaken either chiefs organized collective hejrats which jointly with men, or by men alone.74 Many allowed groups to maintain their social women were also involved in construction structures in exile.70 In many cases, tribal work as the camps evolved towards populations moved en masse to Pakistan’s permanent establishments. It was the first frontier areas, because the host population time most had ever undertaken such tasks. is Pashtun and has similar social structures. Rural Pashtun women immigrating to Contrary to the hejrat, survival Pakistan (who comprised more than 85 displacements were individual strategies per cent of female refugees) were for facing economic or political insecurity, accustomed to relatively free movement as well as responses to social and political within their villages. For them, migration exclusion. These individual exoduses were led to a dramatic change in their lives as characterized by disorder and lack of group “they found themselves confined in vast, cohesion, each family deciding separately overcrowded refugee camps, sometimes to leave. First people found refuge in in temperatures of 45+ degrees centigrade, neighbouring valleys, and then in Kabul with no available running water, little or in a neighbouring country. A researcher shade, and no space”.75 In these conditions, noticed the destructive effect of such forced women had to face strict reactions from migrations: If families often managed to their communities, who accentuated remain together in exile, the group at a traditional ways to preserve their identity community level didn’t form again.71 This from external influences and put extreme occurs mainly because forced migration pressure on women to maintain their is a “totalizing phenomena”, involving honour, considered the guarantee of the “acute degrees of disintegration as group’s integrity. “Many women community structure, social networks and experienced harassment from young even kin groups may be dispersed to Mujahideen, while attacks on families who allowed women to work with foreigners, different resettlement sites”.72 go to school, or go shopping without a “The experience of war, displacement and maharam relative, could be extremely refugee life have led to changes in vicious.”76

70 Olivier Roy 1985. 71 Ibid. 72 Anthony Oliver-Smith 1991. 73 Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell 2002a. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.

118 Chapter 4 The harsh segregation of men and women team held with local communities. For and the loss of community boundaries and example, in Adraskan, a district or meaning in every day life became key woleswali of Herat province, people said factors behind the emergence of second- the major reason for the failure to cope generation refugee warriors.77 While the with drought was the lack of consultation first generation had grown up in and understanding of real local grievances Afghanistan, and thus “could recount their and aspirations. tribal and clan lineage, remembered their Some of the most pertinent lessons that abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia can be learned from the history of the and recounted legends and stories from interdependence between development Afghan history”, the Taliban belonged to and conflict include: a generation that never knew their homeland or peace, and who had grown 1. The root causes of fragmentation up in the manly world of the madrassas have to be addressed. At the same and in a culture of war, with hardly any time, there is a need to understand contact with women, including mothers the motivation behind violence and or sisters. According to their most noted recognize its transformatory role. historian, because of the loss of community Understanding the Afghan conflict identity produced by displacement, the means understanding what motivates Taliban had “no memories of their tribes, warring groups and the broader role their elders, their neighbors nor the of violence in society in general. In complex ethnic mix of peoples that often any conflict, there is usually a made up their villages and their homeland. continuum of different forms of These boys were what the war had thrown violence, from organized warfare and up like the sea’s surrender at the beach of systematic economic violence by the history.”78 state or other organized military actors, 4.5. Conclusions to more individualized forms linked to crime and opportunism. In History matters, and the history of the Afghanistan, economic agendas have Afghan conflict is one of greed and become intertwined with social and grievances feeding into each other and political crises, making it difficult to perpetuating social fragmentation. As the disentangle the causes and effects of Afghan case demonstrates, the link the conflict from wider processes at between conflict and development is a work. Patterns of vulnerability may complex one. Conflict can be exacerbated alter rapidly with the shifting fortunes if not caused by a breakdown in of different communities or social development, while development can also groups. Understanding what motivates be the solution for conflict resolution and violence could help policy-makers prevention. Central to any intervention recognize and anticipate these changes, strategy should be the understanding that and respond appropriately. Effective prevention cannot be orchestrated from policies are those that deal with the outside, but needs to build on local causes and the consequences of aspirations and circumstances, priorities conflict simultaneously, and make an and capacities. attempt to integrate conflict transformation and social cohesion Such a notion was explicitly expressed objectives into governance, poverty during consultation sessions the NHDR reduction and environmental

77 Ahmad Rashid 2000. 78 Ibid.

NHDR 04 119 programmes. By keeping injustice on truth, justice, forgiveness and healing, the agenda, governance processes in in order to find ways for former the new democratic Afghanistan must adversaries to coexist. It is clear that address and not exacerbate existing a mere provision of financial support power inequalities. Finally, a long- for reconstruction-oriented state term strategy for cutting the roots of building is not sufficient. Success lies Afghanistan’s instability needs to build in embedding the concept of on the positive aspects of inter-group reconciliation into the process of state- and inter-ethnic relations, such as building. respect, tolerance and the benefits of 4. Ethnic, linguistic, cultural and diversity, in order to promote joint religious diversities are problem-solving and consensus- Afghanistan’s rich legacies and building. cannot be discounted only as 2. With high levels of poverty and political factors. It cannot be unemployment, holding on to emphasized enough that a Government Kalashnikovs or engaging in poppy able to bring a lasting peace and cultivation and the narco-industry stability to Afghanistan has to represent are still considered ways to survive. all ethnic, cultural and regional groups. In many rural communities, the young The state-building process must give are increasingly dependent on income every citizen a sense of belonging to from cultivation and trade of opium the Government and to the country, poppies. Any untargeted interdiction by giving recognition to their programme would most certainly have respective cultural, religious and a very negative effect on the food linguistic values – as has been done security of a resource poor group that by Afghanistan’s new Constitution. only recently managed to upgrade their 5. There is a regional dimension to survival strategy to coping due to the many of the security problems that poppy economy. In other cases, have beset Afghanistan for many enlisting in a militia group or joining years. These include black market a criminal band may for many regional trade, narcotics, cross-border individuals still represent a livelihood arms smuggling, human trafficking, strategy. Reducing the vulnerability ethno-regional identities that compete of rural communities to predation may with national ones, etc. The changed thus depend on finding suitable political circumstances after the livelihood options for those involved Taliban provide an opportunity to in illegal industries, banditry and improve regional relations by militia violence. expanding legitimate trade and 3. The response to societal security initiating other forms of positive problems must be genuine cooperation. Regional problems reconciliation – something that so require regional solutions, an approach far Afghanistan’s state-building particularly suitable for the border process has shied away from. areas between Afghanistan and Reconciliation is a process through Pakistan, where violence thrives on which a society moves from a divided poverty, and in terms of the Central past to a shared future. It is a complex Asian republics, which offer renewed process that includes the search for opportunities for collaboration.

120 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 5 Evaluation of Afghanistan’s State-building Process from a Human Security Perspective

5.1. Introduction: The Current gain confidence and essential public Reconstruction Process from a support. Human Security Perspective To cultivate a “culture of democracy” in a post-conflict situation is an enormous A central objective of the national as well task, both with regard to generating the as international reconstruction and state- responsibility of the decision-makers to building processes in the transitional period provide “good governance”, and the has been to re-unite the country around a clearly defined and sequenced unitary responsibility of the constituency to 1 reform agenda. Hampered by the absence participate. Newly emerging governmental of fully functional state institutions and structures will often operate without a continuing security risks, reforms have well-developed system of checks and been slower than anticipated. Few would balances, including indirect accountability argue with the fact that political insecurity through public opinion and media. is the main obstacle to Afghanistan’s Moreover, political transition may give development. However, it is becoming rise to governmental structures overly Our primary focus is to increasingly apparent that a short-term dependent on key power-holders. This can revive and build the easily exacerbate the risk of corruption as focus on security objectives, in the State apparatus, a traditional sense, is insufficient to address well as the manipulation of systems for the root causes of chronic national the benefit of a few, instead of the system of democratic instability: the grip of strongmen and their community. Simultaneously, the people governance with active militia, the absence of the rule of law, often feel more concerned about their participation of the chronic poverty and widespread human immediate needs and see themselves as citizenry. suffering, the violation of basic human detached from a state structure that is not rights and pervasive political President Hamid Karzai, Tokyo, able to meet these. This will particularly 2002 marginalisation. The legitimacy of the new apply if the state structures are too remote Afghan state will depend upon its capacity because of geographic and political to address the needs both immediate and conditions. Perceptions of inequalities on strategic of its citizens, and to promote ethnic or other grounds may further enlarge the enlargement of opportunities through a growing rift between the state and its ensuring both freedom from want and constituency. freedom from fear. Against this background, the peace- Naturally, post-conflict processes have to building and state-building processes are deal with the challenge of attracting public critically dependent on: confidence in the face of prejudices that may have been caused by previous abuses • Rebuilding governance institutions. of power by the state. Yet because development and conflict prevention are • Promoting respect for human rights closely linked to democratic governance, and the rule of law. state-building processes need to be • Ensuring basic security. participatory and address inequalities, instead of exacerbating these, in order to • Fostering participatory dialogue.2

1 Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004a. 2 UNDP,“Governance in Post-Conflict Situations”, 2004d.

NHDR 04 123 This chapter analyses the current state- looking into the future, two “building building processes with regard to these blocks” namely, centre-periphery relations four broad components, against the key and elections are discussed through their elements of the human security paradigm: direct relevance to the three key elements participation, and addressing horizontal identified above (participation, horizontal inequalities and responsibilities. These inequalities and responsibilities). elements are closely interlinked, as participation enhances responsibility (of Political Transition: A Long Way the constituency as well as the state through from Bonn mechanisms of accountability) and thereby We have so far not On 5 December 2001, one month after the diminishes the dangers of horizontal fall of the Taliban regime, talks brokered played our important inequalities. role in the state- by the United Nations resulted in the building process to the It is argued that while central reforms have Agreement on Provisional Arrangements extent we could for already provided a strong de jure basis for in Afghanistan Pending the Re- three reasons: one, by the unitary institutions of a state, much establishment of Permanent Government remains to be done in order to promote and large, we have not Institutions (the Bonn Agreement). The the conducive de facto environment yet enjoyed the benefits agreement laid out a roadmap for the required to ensure lasting and complete establishment of the interim administration, of the multi-billion human security. While the state retains a and paved the way for constitutional and state-building or large measure of responsibility to become electoral targets, presenting a time-line for reconstruction project, the provider of human security as a public both electoral reform and for conducting second, we have not good, the undertaking of building a stable presidential and parliamentary elections. been made part of the state capable of satisfying the needs of the very project that is people also requires the people to assume In essence, the Bonn Agreement envisaged intended for us; third, their responsibility and participate in state- three “building blocks” for the instead of seeing those building processes. reconstruction of the state of Afghanistan: who have committed the establishment of an Interim Authority 5.2. The Path to State-building to be succeeded within six months by the excesses against us in Transitional Authority; the adoption of a the past two decades in The following sections outline and discuss new Constitution for Afghanistan within some accountability the major building blocks of the state- building endeavour upon which 18 months of the establishment of the process, we see them as Interim Authority; and finally, the creation part of the state. Afghanistan has embarked. This has essentially followed the path “agreed upon” of a fully representative Government Fazel Rahman from the eastern at the Bonn talks, held shortly after the elected through free and fair elections. city of Jalalabad regime change initiated by the US-led Since elections could not be held coalition in late 2001. immediately in view of the prevailing security vacuum, the Bonn Agreement The section commences with a brief review facilitated an instrument of national of the past two years, including an consultation that has figured prominently overview of the Bonn Agreement as well in Afghanistan’s history: the Loya Jirgah as its shortcomings, the political transition, (“Grand Assembly of Elders”).3 and the constitution-making process. Turning to the present, an analysis of the Incorporating the traditional consultative newly adopted Constitution from a human mechanism deeply rooted in Afghan security perspective is followed by a brief community affairs, the Bonn Agreement description of the current administrative called for the convening of an Emergency structure and administrative reforms. In Loya Jirgah, which was to form a

3 Barnett Rubin 2004.

124 Chapter 5 transitional Government that would remain Interim Authority, chaired by President in power until presidential and Karzai, was immediately established, and parliamentary elections. Another Loya the Security Council authorised the Jirgah was to be convened for the adoption deployment in Kabul and the surrounding of a new Constitution, modelled after the areas of the ISAF by its resolution 1386. Constitutional Loya Jirgah for In March 2002, through Resolution 1401, Afghanistan’s five previous Constitutions the Security Council established the United (1923, 1931, 1964, 1977 and 1987).4 Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Specific commissions were established (UNAMA). Headed by the UN Secretary- either to directly facilitate these political General’s Special Representative (currently processes, such as in the case of the Special Mr. Jean Arnault), UNAMA was mandated Independent Commission for the to assist the Afghanistan Transitional Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirgah Administration (ATA) with the and the Constitutional Commission, or to implementation of the Bonn Agreement. lay the “substantive” foundations for legal In June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirgah reform (the Judicial Reform Commission), met to establish the ATA under the the observance and protection of human leadership of President Karzai. The rights (AIHRC) and the future public Constitutional Loya Jirgah convened in administration (the Civil Service December 2003 and adopted a new Commission). Last but not least, the Constitution on 4 January 2004. The annexes to the Bonn Agreement addressed presidential elections were held on 9 the need to fill the security vacuum by October 2004, and parliamentary elections requesting the deployment of ISAF and are scheduled for April 2005. specify the role of the United Nations in The process envisaged in Bonn was built supporting the state-building processes. on the international community’s The Bonn Agreement and its roadmap assumption that a democratic and have proven a success: A 30-member representative state would allow Afghans

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 7, August 2002

4 Din Mohammad Jawaid and Asadullah Walwalji 2003. Barnett Rubin 2004.

NHDR 04 125 to exit the vicious cycle fuelled by a history built. In particular, the Agreement did not of internal armed conflict, natural disasters address the need for peace and and underdevelopment, as well as foster reconciliation between the warring factions stability in the region, which would cut as the foundation for a democratic state. the roots of terrorism. The international Instead of reducing inequalities in political community, encapsulated by the United participation, Bonn sanctioned them. Given Nations, was ready to provide all support the hastily organised nature of the talks necessary to make the state-building held in Bonn briefly after the Taliban- exercise outlined in the Bonn Agreement regime had been ousted, as well as the a success, despite the challenges of a tight imbalanced composition of the participants schedule and past state-building failures. in the talks, the focus remained on setting However, the Bonn Agreement remained the path and the necessary benchmarks to isolated from the daily realities of the gradually build a representative and 5 people within Afghanistan; It was a top- legitimate Government. the The Bonn down exercise, which hoped to generate Agreement itself recognized the lack of the necessary “buy-in”. The Loya Jirgah, representation, stressing in its preamble as a means to enhance the legitimacy of that the interim arrangements were the central Government as well as the intended “as a first step toward the adoption of the constitution, could only establishment of a broad-based, gender- serve as a limited substitute for sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative public participation. While representative government.”6 trust may gradually be forged through While the Bonn Agreement did indicate reforms and a visible democratisation the path towards democratization, neither process, the transition to a democratic in terms of participation nor content did it environment remains a complex process. resemble a peace agreement that would To many Afghans, democracy certainly lay the foundation for reconciliation remains appealing in principle, but still a between warring factions. The Bonn talks dream that has been born in Bonn and has were exclusively held among those who yet to come alive at home. had fought against the Taliban, remnants The pace of the roadmap further of which were continuing to fight the US- exacerbates the remoteness of the Bonn led coalition in December 2001. Lack of process from the realities of most Afghans. representation at that time naturally At first, indirect elections were held in prevented the Bonn talks from establishing early 2002 to determine the 1,500 or so a basis for reconciliation and transitional delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirgah. justice. Rather, the process of Roughly a year later, preparations democratization aimed at creating an commenced for the – again indirect – enabling environment within which the elections of the delegates to the political landscape would gradually be Constitutional Loya Jirgah, which many pacified. participants confused with the voter To many observers, the Constitutional registration programme that had been Loya Jirgah showed that such an enabling launched simultaneously. environment was in the making, given that Moreover, Bonn was more about process political and military groupings were and less about the substance with which participating in the political arena, rather a democratic state of Afghanistan is to be than opposing it by force. However, the

5 Barnett Rubin, Adib Farhadi, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard. 2004. 6 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed on 5th of December 2001, available at www.af.

126 Chapter 5 Bonn Agreement’s emphasis on process However, these attempts were perceived neglected the core issue of the as inadequate and too limited. redistribution of power, while the main For purposes of developing preliminary challenge remained: How to diminish the recommendations on the contents of the political influence of those whose legitimacy rested mainly on military and Constitution and in line with the process economic power largely fuelled by illegal stipulated in the Bonn Agreement, the sources, rather than on democratic support? President of the TISA appointed a nine- In other words, the apparent flaw and irony member Constitutional Drafting was to create a mechanism by which the Commission in October 2002. The power of various factions would be commission presented its consolidated in the form of an interim recommendations on the content as well administration, while subjecting it to a as format in March 2003. These democratization process, which effectively recommendations formed the basis of the aimed at diminishing their political role work of the Constitutional Review in the long run. Commission a 33-member body, including seven women, representing the country’s In essence, at a time when the Bonn diverse regional and ethnic composition. roadmap is approaching its end, the process President Karzai had appointed the has affirmed the position of key power- commission in April 2003; its mandate holders on both the national and local was to conduct a public consultation levels. Although the international process.7 community has successfully been able to pressure those with money and guns to At that time, a political debate on the abide by the rules through the leverages various constitutional models had fully of international aid, support and unfolded, exposing the work of the recognition, democracy has fortified their commission as well as the Government to position to such an extent that the severe criticism, particularly with regard democratic processes have become prone to the alleged secrecy of the process. The to manipulation. refusal to make any draft public combined with the lack of a formal public approval Laying The Formal Foundation for process through a nation-wide referendum a State – The Constitution-making was perceived by many as yet another Process attempt to impose a constitution fitting the needs of the Transitional Administration A major step forward in Afghanistan’s and its allies. However, the commission state-building process was the adoption of and its secretariat tirelessly emphasized a new Constitution on 4 January 2004. In that it could only speak of a draft once the context of a post-conflict situation, a public consultations had been conducted, participatory process for the drafting of a the views analysed and incorporated. constitution is as crucial as its content, for the legitimacy and sustainability of the In order to obtain guidance from the document will largely depend on its Afghan people, while simultaneously acceptance by the people. Given the educating them about the process as well challenge of mobilizing public participation as its importance, the commission distribu- and support, the process involved some ted a total of 484,450 questionnaires and attempts to facilitate broad consultations gathered over 100,000 completed question- and public participation, despite the tight naires from citizens all over Afghanistan. time-line provided in the Bonn Agreement. Its members attended about 555 “public

7 Information on the Commission, the constitution-making process, etc., is available at www.constitution-afg.com.

NHDR 04 127 But is it enough to have consultation meetings” in all provinces of “Special Category Groups” women, a constitution? Afghanistan, as well as in Iran and Pakistan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, IDPs, Certainly not! As Mr. to consult with the large refugee Kuchis, Hindus and Sikhs took place Brahimi said, a community. The views expressed by throughout the month of November. In constitution can be no people were recorded and compiled in the addition, the President appointed 52 more than a stack of Public Consultation Report, which was to delegates directly. The convention gathered papers. There has to form the basis for the preparation of the on 14 December 2003, and the 502 exist a national will draft Constitution. Despite the efforts of delegates adopted the Constitution by (irrada-i-millee) to put the commission’s secretariat, the public consensus on 4 January 2004. consultation process was somewhat principles into practice. hindered by a general lack of both While some national and international And there has to exist a understanding and a “culture of observers criticized the Constitution- national constitutionalism”, in addition to the making process as flawed, having little administration absence of comprehensive civic education public participation or transparency, and (iddara-i-millee) to campaigns. “elite-driven”,8 it proved to be a remarkable ensure the step in a shift from military confrontation implementation of the The President finally released the draft to political dialogue. Appearing on Constitution, which was to form the basis law. television throughout the nation, delegates for the deliberations by the Constitutional to the Constitutional Loya Jirgah were Address to the Closing Ceremony Loya Jirgah, to the public on 3 November generally able to express themselves freely, of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, 2003. While the draft certainly reflected Kabul, January 2004, by Hamid even though factional interests lurked Karzai, President of the the ATA’s preferences concerning the underneath the debates. Transitional Islamic State of future governmental structure for Afghanistan. Afghanistan, it was left to the Constitutionalism, however, has a poor Constitutional Loya Jirgah to adopt the record in Afghanistan’s war torn history. final Constitution. Provincial registration At best, previous constitutional models meetings were conducted in all provinces were widely accepted but have commonly to register the Emergency Loya Jirgah suffered from a lack of implementation district representatives who would elect and enforcement. Moreover, the 344 delegates to the Constitutional Loya Constitution itself stands witness to Jirgah in early December. The elections compromises that had to be brokered on for the 106 representatives of the so-called all sides to find common denominators

Table 5.1: Rural Afghans’ Opinions of the New Constitution

Province Rural women: Rural women: most important Rural men: aware of Rural men: most aware of new rights in new Constitution new Constitution important rights in new Constitution Constitution

Badghis 0% Right to health and education 0% Reinforcement of Sharia law

Herat 0% Right to education 53% Right to education

Kabul 0% Right to health and education 30% Ensure security

Kandahar 8% Right to education 39% Reinforcement of Sharia law

Nangarhar 26% Equality between males and females 67% Disarmament of armed groups

Source: Tufts University, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans: 2002–2003”, 2004.

8 See, for example, International Crisis Group 2003a and 2003b.

128 Chapter 5 among the various political interests regard, it is necessary that state officials Is this Constitution represented by the delegates. It is, therefore, are sufficiently familiar with the document perfect? Most probably crucial for the success of Afghanistan’s and abide by its terms. Usually, this is not. Will it be criticized? new Constitution that its legitimacy is safeguarded by entry exams for civil I fear it will, both inside fortified by widespread information and servants, who, depending on their and outside of awareness-raising campaigns to enhance professional level, will require varying Afghanistan. But understanding and acceptance among all degrees of constitutional knowledge. In a nevertheless, I think Afghans. According to a recent Tufts country like Afghanistan, which has had that you have every University survey, the majority of rural to cope without a legitimate constitutional reason to feel proud of Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul, framework to guide civil servants and what you have Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces had citizens alike, state officials at all no knowledge of the constitutional process. professional levels need training to become achieved and I am Rural women were found to be four times familiar with the Constitution. certain that the people less aware of the constitutional process of Afghanistan are very In any post-conflict environment, civic than rural men. No rural women happy tonight and see education assumes a fundamental role in interviewed in three of these provinces in this constitution a terms of participatory processes. This, in (Herat, Kabul and Badghis) had ever heard new source of hope. Of theory, not only requires educating all of a constitution, while only eight per cent course, we all know Afghan citizens about the meaning of of women in Kandahar and 26 per cent in democracy as enshrined in the recently that all we have Nangarhar9 were aware of it. adopted Constitution, but also focusing in tonight is a number of Ultimately, constitutional provisions need particular on community leaders. While pages on which words to be respected first and foremost by state national as well as international institutions in Dari and Pashtu are organs that derive their legitimacy as well have always identified civic education and written. It will be your as mandate and authority to act on behalf the participation of civil society as key to responsibility Mr. of the state from the Constitution. In this the long-term success of the democratic President, with your Government, with these delegates and the rest of the people of Afghanistan to translate these words on a piece of paper into a living reality.

Impromptu remarks at the Closing Ceremony of the Constitutional Loya Jirgah, Kabul, 4 January 2004, by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, December 2003

9 Tufts University, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans 2002–2003”, 2004.

NHDR 04 129 Box 5.1 The State According to the 1382 (2004) Constitution

Overall, the Constitution seeks an Judicial Branch: The judicial branch (Meshrano Jirgah) elected largely by equilibrium between building a strong consists of a Supreme Court whose provincial and district councils (66 per central executive branch to further members are appointed by the President cent) and the balance being determined strengthen national unity and rebuild the and approved by the House of the People, by the President (33 per cent). The national institutions that were destroyed, or the lower Parliament. The judges for and respecting the rights of volition of the High Courts (appeal courts) and members of the lower house, or House the provinces to exercise more authority primary courts are recommended by the of the People (Wolesi Jirgah) will be in managing local affairs by Supreme Court, but also appointed by elected in the forth coming parliamentary institutionalizing district and provincial the President. elections through free, general, secret level councils. It provides for checks and balances between a strong presidency Executive Branch: The Cabinet, whose and direct balloting. The 250 members and a two-chamber National Assembly members cannot be members of the of the lower house serve for five years with extensive powers of inquiry, which National Assembly, oversees the and are elected in proportion to the cannot be dissolved by the President. executive branch of Government. The population of each province. To insure Furthermore, it represents a careful executive is regulated by the that 25 per cent of the members are combination of respect for moderate and administrative rules and procedures traditional Afghan values, and adherence determined by the Independent women, the Constitution requires that to international human rights and Administration Reform and Civil Service two female delegates be elected from democracy. Commission (IARCSC), which apply to each of the 32 provinces of the country. both national and sub-national levels of Such a high quota for women is rare, Under the President, who is also the administration and civil service. Chief of Staff, the following political both in Islamic and non-Islamic structures have been established (See Legislative Branch: The legislative countries. The President appoints one- Figure 5.1 for an outline of the entire branch provides for a bicameral third of the senators, 50 per cent of which system): Parliament including a house of elders must be women.

Figure 5.1: Structure of Administration

President

Judicial Branch Executive Branch Legislative Branch

Supreme Court Cabinet Meshrano Jirgah • Members appointed by • President (Chair) (House of Elders) President and approved • Ministers (cannot be members • 2/3 Members elected from by Wolesi Jirgah of the National Assembly) provincial and district councils Administration (Civil Service) 1/3 members appointed High Court (Appeal • Ministries by President Courts), Primary Courts • Central Agencies • Judges recommended • Other independent bodies Wolesi Jirgah by Supreme Court, • Local administrative (House of the People) appointed by President units (Provinces) All members are elected

130 Chapter 5 process, time constraints and deteriorating prohibited: “The citizens of Afghanistan We, the People of security conditions have largely rendered whether woman or man have equal rights Afghanistan... for the efforts towards these superficial at best. and duties before the law”. Further, Article creation of a civil Moreover, the well-conceived initiative to 24 states: “Liberty is the natural right of society free of create a secure environment for elections human beings. This right has no limits oppression, atrocity, through a DDR programme to be unless affecting the rights of others and discrimination and conducted at the same time as the voter public interest, which are regulated by law. violence and based registration proved to be little more than Liberty and dignity of human beings are upon the rule of law, an idealistic goal, with the numbers of inviolable. The state has the duty to respect social justice, combatants actually disarmed, demobilised protection of human and reintegrated having little impact on and protect the liberty and dignity of human the overall –distribution of power. beings.” Article 34 states: “Freedom of rights, and dignity and expression is inviolable. Every Afghan ensuring the The 1382 (2004) Constitution and has the right to express thoughts through fundamental rights Human Security speech, writing, or illustration or other and freedoms of the means by observing the provisions of this people... have adopted The ratified Constitution provides a Constitution. Every Afghan has the right this Constitution in framework for the protection of citizens’ to print or publish topics without prior compliance with the rights as well as the responsibilities and structure of state. Of particular significance, submission to the state authorities in historical, cultural and Article 21 provides for equal rights and accordance with the law. Directives related social requirements of full participation of women by stating that to printing house, radio, television, press, the era.... any kind of discrimination and privilege and other mass media, shall be regulated Preamble, 1382 Constitution between the citizens of Afghanistan is by law.”

Box 5.2 The Afghan Constitution and Educational Rights

Article Forty-three: Education is the Article Forty-five: The state shall devise accordance with the law. The conditions right of all citizens of Afghanistan, which and implement a unified educational for admission to state higher education shall be provided up to the level of the curriculum based on the provisions of institutions and other related matters to Bachelors (lis‚ns) free of charge by the the sacred religion of Islam, national be regulated by the law. state. culture, and in accordance with academic Article Forty-seven: The state shall The state is obliged to devise and principles, and develops the curriculum devise effective programs for the implement effective programs for a of religious subjects on the basis of the promotion of science, culture, literature balanced expansion of education all over Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan. and the arts. The state guarantees the rights of authors, inventors, and Afghanistan, and to provide compulsory Article Forty-six: Establishing and discoverers and encourages and supports intermediate level education. operating of higher, general and scientific researches in all areas and vocational education are the duties of The state is also required to provide the publicizes the effective use of their opportunity to teach native languages in the state. The citizens of Afghanistan results in accordance with the law. the areas where they are spoken. also can establish higher, general, and vocational private educational institutions Article Forty-eight: Work is the right Article Forty-four: The state shall and literacy courses with the permission of every Afghan. Working hours, paid devise and implement effective programs of the state. holidays, right of employment and for balancing and promoting education employee and other related affairs are for women, improving of education of The state can also permit foreign persons regulated by law. Choice of occupation the nomads and elimination of illiteracy to set up higher, general and vocational and craft is free within the limits of law. in the country. educational private institutes in

Source: TISA 2004.

NHDR 04 131 To highlight a particular example of the the rule of law as it seeks to sequentially significance of the Constitution for bring key departments into the reform addressing threats to human security, Box agenda. However, laws related to the 5.2 outlines key articles related to national budget, procurement and educational rights. investment are still caught within the system. A significant component of new However, the example of education also laws may not be passed until the Parliament illustrates that the extent to which the is fully operational perhaps in late current administration has so far developed 2005–2006. the core capabilities in good governance required to enact constitutional However, spearheading policy and commitments remains in doubt. One of institutional reform in the early post- the main critiques of a rights-based conflict years remains a crucial pre- approach to development is that realization condition for overall investment in human of citizens’ full rights would require security. Legal reforms in the area of family resources and institutional capacities that law are also very much needed, but are are rarely feasible in practice. In likely to take many years given the Afghanistan, the co-existence of competing complicated nexus of social issues that power structures, warlords and drug lords need to be overcome all in the context of remains a major counter constraint to the Islam and international law. realization of citizens’ rights. It will take many years to resolve these tensions Afghanistan’s Current through a politically inclusive development Administrative Structure process and with unwavering international Under the Taliban, there were 24 support. In response to such issues, much governmental ministries, as well as other of the work on rights and development legal budget entities related to security and focuses on extracting key principles and the rule of law the Department of Vice objectives that should inform analysis and and Virtue being among the most notable interventions: social inclusion, from a human rights point of view. In the participation, etc.. The implication is that aftermath of the Taliban regime and after there is a variety of means for contesting the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirgah, rights and determining outcomes, and that the size of the Cabinet expanded efforts need to focus not only on the significantly to accommodate different definition of rights, but also on their political interests. Currently, 30 ministries, interpretation and implementation through 11 independent bodies and several other legal, policy and administrative processes. central government agencies provide the Reform of the legal environment has been administrative structure of state. At the slow. Few reforms have been fully adopted sub-national level, around the office of the under the law, and many are held up in provincial governor, there are ministerial the Ministry of Justice. Key legal texts departments for finance, health, education, have been approved and these relate agriculture, rural development and so on, primarily to administrative reform and to depending on the administrative division reform of the banking system.10 The legal of the parent ministry in Kabul. In spite basis for administrative reform has far- of the overly large ministerial structure, reaching consequences for governance and the basic organizational and administrative

10 The Central Bank Act, ratified by the transitional Government cabinet on September 2003, gives Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) the over-riding responsibility and full autonomy to maintain price stability and implement monetary and foreign exchange policies. Following ratification of this legislation, the DAB issued its first operating licences to foreign commercial banks, so that for the first time DAB will disengage from commercial banking and focus on its central banking role. This achievement is an important milestone in modernizing the financial sector.

132 Chapter 5 Box 5.3 Main Administrative Constraints

• Party political structures remain • Fiscal problems constrain options for fragmented, undermining the efficacy of pay reform, reducing the recruitment of central Government. qualified staff. • Administrative structures too are • There is no merit-based recruiting fragmented with overlapping mandates patronage systems are visible at every and functions. • The lack of professionally qualified staff level. within key ministerial or departmental • Administrative systems are slow and positions significantly undermines the cumbersome, with virtually no delegation efficiency and effectiveness of state of authority to lower ranks or to management capabilities. provincial departments.

Source: TISA 2004. structures, functions and political Under the new electoral laws, women are accountabilities appear broadly to be intact. to comprise a minimum of 25 per cent of parliamentary membership and 30 per cent However, the sub-national administration, of provincial and district elected at the provincial (Walayat) and district representatives. (Wolaswali) levels, is largely dysfunctional with poorly qualified staff, no autonomous In summary, there are 34 provinces and budget, and few operations and sustainable approximately 326 districts with each support for maintaining state assets province comprising between five and 20 particularly in the areas of health and districts. There are provincial education (See Figure 5.2). municipalities (Sharwali Walayat) within

Figure 5.2: Structure of the Government

Cabinet

Central Administration 2 constitutional 30 Ministries Central agencies agencies and independent bodies

34 provincial Provincial departments of municipalities overseen Ministries in 34 Elected Provincial Councils by Ministry of Interior provinces

District Municipalities District offices of overseen by Ministry of provincial departments Elected Provincial Councils Interior in 355 districts

NHDR 04 133 each province (normally one) and at least of human resources within the one rural municipality (Sharwaliadministration is at an all-time low, Woleswali) within each district. Currently, necessitating urgent reforms. Moreover, the Government is deliberating over a while parts of the administration have reform framework that would downsize survived, it should be stressed that these the Cabinet by at least 25 per cent to around functioning branches have been working 20 ministerial entities. This would enhance under various authorities, based on de facto the effectiveness of budget formulation control of military force and hence and execution procedures, and clarify economic assets and flows. However, the institutional responsibilities for security, state (as a political entity with a monopoly administrative, judicial and development in legitimate force over the national functions. territory) can be said to have collapsed. Administrative and Civil Service The new economic policy of the Reforms Government also foresees that it will move from the role of (state) provider to (state) Remarkably, the rules and procedures of enabler; this too has legislative implications national administration in Afghanistan, for both public and private sectors. For the however archaic, nevertheless appear to state apparatus to ensure the attainment of have remained intact throughout the years national social and economic objectives, of conflict. At the same time, the quality fundamental reform of the public

Box 5.4 The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

In June 2003, the Government formed staff on an elevated pay-scale while substantial effort to internalize significant the IARCSC to coordinate and manage providing funds for organizational numbers of public sector employees in the Public Administration Reform (PAR) restructuring. The Government’s PAR the PRR process; and options for Programme. It comprises: (a) a Civil programme has been developed to retrenching staff will have to be Service Management Department provide a framework to build a sound considered. According to the WB, there responsible for developing a new legal legal, administrative and physical are currently some 360,000 individuals framework (including a Code of Ethics) environment in which civil employees in public employment. Fewer than 10 for the civil service, as well as modern can function efficiently, and be held per cent of these posts will be formally human resources management policies responsible for their performance. In the retained under the PRR by the end of and procedures; (b) the Independent 2003–2004 National Development 2007 (See Figure 5.3), in order to form Appointments Board, responsible for Budget (NDB), the Government a core civil service. ensuring that appointments are based on presented a detailed short-term strategy merit; and (c) the Independent Appeals for public administration and civil service Programme Management Units have Board, responsible for hearing reform, aiming at creating a lean, capable been created in selected ministries to complaints against unfair, illegal or and motivated civil service, dedicated to enhance project ownership by ministries discriminatory behaviour in the supporting the country’s national and strengthen implementation capacity. workplace. interests. These units will improve the core The IARCSC passed the Priority Reform The PRR programme is now being financial management capacities of the and Restructuring (PRR) Programme expanded across all levels of administration. Further, so as to enhance decree in July 2003 to initiate the process administration, centrally and throughout the political reform process and of reforming the most critical functions provincial and district administration, as strengthen executive decision-making, of Government. The PRR allows part of the Afghan Stabilization a Cabinet Office Secretariat is also to administrative departments to place key Programme. Moreover, it will take be established.

Source: WB 2003.

134 Chapter 5 Figure 5.3: Public Employment in Afghanistan

Population (2003 est.) 21.8 million TOTAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT Civilian Central Govt. 360,448 as % of Population 1.3% Education 0.5%

STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES GENERAL GOVERNMENT 6,100 354,348

ARMED FORCES CIVILIAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 60,000 291,348 3,000

Based in KABUL Based in the Provinces 90,088 201,261

of which: Total Education 18,419 83,360 101,779 Education Health 9,047 10,348 19,395 Health Police 16,814 41,147 57,962 Police

Source: WB 2003.

administration is key. It should be stressed reform programme in order to revamp the that reforming and training the civil service civil service by introducing incentives such is a necessary but not a sufficient as higher salaries and training for reforming precondition for building a national ministries at the national and local levels. political authority that monopolizes the The Government has also committed to legitimate use of force. Training fighting corruption and reforming the civil administrators without measures to provide service through the establishment of the the national Government with necessary Anti-Corruption and Independent support to consolidate power and authority Administrative Reform and Civil Service can potentially serve to reinforce the Commission (IARCSC). current position of de facto power-holders. State-periphery Relations: (De- Fundamental reforms have, however, been facto) Decentralization and a very slow and complicated process in Participatory Planning Afghanistan. With no private sector to absorb redundant workers, shrinking the The difficulties entrenched in finding a public sector or paying competitive salaries proper balance between the need to build has been a challenge for the Government. a strong central Government to As a result, many skilled and competent immediately consolidate peace and employees have sought jobs with the stability, and the need for decentralisation United Nations, embassies and the aid to secure equal distribution and communities, creating a brain drain of participation in the long term, are dwindling human resources. The particularly strong in the context of post- Government has now initiated a major conflict Afghanistan.11 Based on the

11 Ramazan Bashar Dost 2004b.

NHDR 04 135 Box 5.5 State-Periphery Relations in Post-conflict Situations

Under peacetime conditions, and resource management within the In post-conflict settings, as in others, decentralized governance, carefully purview of the people. These institutions decentralized governance initiatives are planned, effectively implemented and should enable people, especially the poor not a panacea. On the one hand, the appropriately managed, can lead to and the marginalized, to exercise their implicit reallocation of power and significant improvement in the welfare choices for human development. resources that decentralization implies of people at the local level, the can generate, re-ignite or intensify power cumulative effect of which can lead to In post-conflict situations, societies are struggles, thus leading to further chaos enhanced human development. The key institutionally weak: they are socially or conflict. On the other hand, without to human development-friendly fragmented, psychologically fractured appropriate accountability mechanisms, decentralized governance is to ensure and physically devastated, requiring abuse of power, corruption, and capture that the voices and concerns of the poor, efforts to simultaneously restore people’s by elites are a risk. Conflicts may also especially women, help guide its design, confidence and satisfy their basic need arise when reforms fail to address issues implementation and monitoring. For for water, waste disposal, food, jobs, of social inclusion, particularly development and governance to be fully health services, education, income and vis-à-vis ethnic and religious minorities, responsive and representational, people security. Post-conflict situations usually and respect for local customs and and institutions must be empowered at entail weak central government, if any traditions. These challenges are added every level of society – national, at all. Service provision to the citizenry to those facing all decentralized provincial, district, city, town and village. is minimal at best. A decentralized initiatives: poor capacities, poor culture Decentralized governance entails the network of local institutions and of participation, and lack of economic empowering of sub-national levels of individuals, often linked to humanitarian viability to secure mobilization of society to ensure that local people operations, can often be an opportunity resources, among others. These and other participate in, and benefit from, their to re-establish government services, risks can be minimized if decentralized own governance institutions and, by mobilize communities, further initiatives and capacity development extension, urban/rural development, must democratic processes and demonstrate efforts fit within the overall national bring policy formulation, service delivery responsiveness of public institutions. post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction strategies. UNDP, Governance in Post-conflict Situations, 2004.

imperative that state-building in themselves after the Taliban. Attempts by Afghanistan requires the central state to the central Government to regain oversight gradually assert its authority at the local over civil servants in the regions by level, the evolving relationship between fortifying control over the payroll (registry) Kabul and the provinces has been shaped have been difficult to implement. The by three factors: control of the central state, Government’s attempts to reassert control which determines the authority of the state in provinces under the de facto authority at the local level; perceptions in the of key provincial leaders, through the provinces of the transition process; and issuance of decrees and reshuffling of the political economy of central–regional governors, similarly yielded only limited relations.12 successes; the ability of the Government to bring about change was marginal at Strikingly, the formal administration best, as long as the local power structures inherited by the Afghan Interim Authority remained intact. This applied even more was largely centralized, but in late 2001, so to the district level, where local power most civil servants were under the control structures remained largely unaffected by of local leaders who had reasserted the Government in Kabul.

12 Astri Suhrke 2004.

136 Chapter 5 Aware of the need to reach communities distributed to villages and districts, and at the village level in order to strengthen allocated to projects through inclusive and trust in the central structures, as well as to participatory processes and on the basis create a sense of popular empowerment of simple criteria.” to the detriment of the local power brokers, The objectives of the NSP are to: (a) the central administration launched the Establish a framework for village-level National Solidarity Programme (NSP), consultative decision-making and which aims at “community-driven representative local leadership as a basis development.” In essence, the NSP is based for interaction within and between on elected village councils, which communities on the one hand, and with determine the spending priorities for small the administration and aid agencies on the grants distributed directly to the villages. other; and (b) Promote local-level Another, more conventional approach reconstruction, development and capacity- adopted by the Transitional Administration building, which will lead to a decrease in has been to work with existing power poverty levels.13 The Government’s stated structures at the provincial level to identify target is to have NSP cover the country’s In order to organize projects to be centrally funded. Following estimated 20,000 rural villages over a four- activities and provide this scheme, the National Area-based year period, so as to provide a single- people the opportunity Development Programme, supported by window framework for village level to actively participate the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and reconstruction and development activities. in the local Development and UNDP, started focusing The long-term vision is to build sustainable administration, a human capital and establish a national in 2002 on helping provincial governors council shall be set up mechanism for the recurrent transfer of to establish district-level priorities over a in districts and villages two-year period. block grants to all village communities in the country. in accordance with the The NSP: Community law. Members of these Empowerment for Democracy Four key elements of the NSP approach councils shall be highlight the nature of its expected elected by the local contribution to national priorities: On 22 January 2002, at the Tokyo people through free, International Conference for 1. Facilitation: Facilitation provided at general, universal, Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, the community level to assist secret and direct President Karzai, then Chairman of the communities in establishing inclusive Afghanistan Interim Authority, proposed elections for a period of community institutions through three years. a programme initiative to enhance elections, reaching consensus on democracy, generate employment and priorities and corresponding sub- The Afghanistan Constitution rebuild productive infrastructure. project activities, developing eligible 2004: Article 140 Community development was presented sub-proposals and implementing as a centre-piece of the development approved project-sub-proposals. strategy for Afghanistan, and it was stated 2. A system of direct block grant that the transitional Government: transfers: Block grants support “...intends to implement a local empower- rehabilitation or development activities ment programme that would allow planned and implemented by elected communities to manage their own Community Development Councils resources. Such a programme would allow (CDCs). legitimate leaders to emerge and deal with issues facing their communities with 3. Capacity-building: Activities to forming a basis for consultative democracy enhance the competence of CDC in the future. Block grants would be members (both women and men) for

13 The detailed operational modalities of the programme are described in the draft NSP Operational Manual.

NHDR 04 137 financial management, procurement, Facilitating partners are expected to recruit technical skills and transparency. and deploy female field staff to enable the inclusion of women in the decision-making 4. Institutional linkage: Activities are and implementation processes. To be undertaken to strengthen links between eligible for support through the NSP, community-based institutions and communities are required to elect a CDC public administration and aid agencies as a representative community-based to enhance access to responsive services and resources. decision-making body responsible for overseeing the preparation of the Given the centrality of the unification of Community Development Plan (CDP) and ethnic, political and socio-economic the preparation and implementation of divisions to the NSP’s vision, and taking individual sub-projects. The breakdown into consideration the widespread for institutional responsibilities within the devastation and the high prevalence of NSP is presented in Figure 5.4. poverty across the country, the Government has, from the outset, decided that the NSP Afghanistan’s first CDCs were elected should not be geographically targeted.14 from August 2003 onwards, and the first However, in the first year of NSP, the block grant disbursements began in initial three districts selected from each December 2003. By March 2004, and as province were targeted on the basis of a result of improved access to many areas existing vulnerability and refugee return after the winter season, it is estimated that data. Facilitating partners (consisting of up to 2,000 village project proposals had both Afghan and international NGOs and been approved, and the first grant UN Habitat) assist in the delivery of NSP instalments disbursed to these. This is in to communities. In each province, one or line with the target for the first year of more facilitating partners deploy implementation to reach more than 4,100 community facilitators and technical village communities across the country. specialists to support target communities. During the second year, operations will

Figure 5.4: NSP: Breakdown of Responsibilities

Responsibilities of Oversight Responsibilities of Facilitating Responsibilities of Community Consultants Partners Development Council Appraisal of community project Facilitate elections of inclusive CDCs Overseeing preparation of the proposals. Community Development Plan Facilitate community project planning Management of NSP block grants for comprising CDPs and sub-project Convening community wide meetings community projects (including effecting proposals Overseeing planning and preparation fund transfers, tranche payments, of individual sub-projects financial management, accounting and Provision of technical assistance to reporting). develop sub-project proposals, either Mobilising community contributions and directly or through facilitation of access ensuring community participation during Supervision of Facilitating Partners to market based assistance (preferred all phases performance. approach) Presenting the sub-project plans at Planning and conducting training for Provision of technical assistance to appraisal staff of MRRD and FPs together with communities during implementation Managing and supervising sub-project regular experience sharing workshops. implementation Provision of training to communities (e.g. Undertaking technical and financial book-keeping, procurement, contracting) Overseeing or directly handling monitoring and producing consolidated procurement and financial management reports. Conducting monitoring and reporting at the community level Management of information and Reporting to the community and to NSP communication campaign. on project progress and use of funds

14 However, in the first year of NSP, the initial three districts selected from each province were targeted on the basis of existing vulnerability and refugee return data.

138 Chapter 5 expand to cover all remaining villages in fundamental in demonstrating that the initial districts and / or villages in new Government commitment to the NSP rests districts. Village communities that are able on the recognition that block grants and to successfully implement projects during small-scale infrastructure can only be the first year will receive a new but smaller effective in so far as local governance block grant during their second year, with systems are strengthened and empower the same formula applied in successive the marginalized rural poor. years. During the programme design phase, The NSP faces a number of competing various stakeholders initially expressed demands. On the one hand, its long-term concerns about the general acceptability goal is to strengthen local governance, of a standardized procedure for the transparency, accountability and peoples’ establishment of CDCs by communities participation in development processes. throughout the country and, specifically, On the other hand, in order to establish its the extent to which gender issues would credibility, it must quickly finance be effectively addressed in the process. approved CDC plans that provide tangible However, to date this move appears to benefits to communities. Without gaining have been greeted with great enthusiasm credibility in the short-term, the NSP is in villages as an empowering and unlikely to achieve its long-term vision. meaningful experience. Opportunities for Therefore, the strategy for linking CDCs cross-fertilization, analysis and learning and sub-national administration is based are being harnessed. Elections to the CDCs on a phased approach that recognizes that will be the first experience of local NSP has some short-term goals. (The community participation in voting and, for breakdown of responsibilities for the NSP the majority of rural Afghan women, of is provided in Figure 5.4). In addition to participation in decision-making on a par the National Emergency Employment with men with regard to matters that affect Programme (NEEP), other programmes, their lives. such as the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) and To date, and in part as a result of the Afghanistan’s Stabilization Program sensitivity of stakeholders to security issues (ASP), have been developed to strengthen and precautionary measures, all provinces sub-national administration and to improve are currently integrated into the NSP and service delivery in some key sectors such receive the combined support of as health and education.15 Government, oversight consultants and facilitating partners. However, the extent Recognizing the significance of CDCs as to which the NSP will continue to assist the building blocks for local governance, communities throughout the country the standardized and formal procedures remains critically dependent on the security for the election of CDC members have situation. been introduced based on a secret ballot. Development councils elected through a In assessing outcomes,16 the challenge will process not complying with the established be to go beyond immediate satisfaction rules will not be eligible for funding under with financed sub-projects and the the NSP. This move has proved generation of labour days to an analysis

15 The National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) managed by MRRD with UNDP support is designed to complement NSP by addressing linkages between communities and government authorities. It aims to develope the capacity of sub-national authorities, and to help establish and maintain provincial and district consultation mechanisms that bring stakeholders’ views into development planning and management. For the first time, a planning exercise has been conducted in all provinces identifying priority projects above the village level in each district. 16 It is clear that the potential political outcomes arising from the NSP will extend beyond conventional definitions of poverty. A mid-term evaluation of the NSP is planned for June 2005.

NHDR 04 139 of whether the programme has addressed administrative rule and the level of security. the greatest constraints to poverty reduction Where administrative structures are partly and disempowerment and ensured or wholly under the control of local optimum net benefits to communities. commanders and insecurity prevails, the Social mobilization can have numerous central administration is increasingly being effects on decision-making, blamed for its inability to assert order and democratization, political reform and channel reconstruction aid to local development processes at large. With its communities. On the other hand, in regions focus on empowerment, NSP seeks to where local strongmen are able to ensure expand the assets and capabilities of poor public order, thus providing an people to participate in, negotiate with and environment of relative peace conducive hold accountable the institutions that affect to trade and economic growth, support for their lives. This involves giving people the central Government is similarly low. access to information, opportunities to To many in the remote areas of voice their concerns, greater social Afghanistan, Kabul remains far away, inclusion and participation, and particularly in view of the limited impact organizational strength. Kabul-driven politics exert on the day-to- In introducing new modalities at various day life of Afghans. levels, the experience of the NSP to date The political economy of centre-province highlights the potential significance of relations remains an area of continuous civil society and the private sector as political concern for the central essential and resource rich partners. Government. While international However, in order to support the adaptation recognition and support, in particular the of these players to an increasingly prospect of reconstruction funds, certainly favourable environment, it is clear that have the potential to exert considerable sustained assistance and complementary appeal, they compete with revenues raised initiatives will be required. Ensuring and kept by local leaders throughout commitment and resources to the long- Afghanistan. The central Government term provision of services to facilitate received only about US$80 million of an community empowerment processes estimated US$500 million collected in beyond an initial block grant transfer will customs duties in 2002, despite be a challenge. The realization of national considerable efforts aiming at the collection commitment is critically dependent upon of tax revenues from various provinces. guaranteed international support for Revenues generated in connection with political reform and reconstruction. illicit crop production and trade in narcotics Moreover, many of the activities financed further undermine the central by NSP and NEEP require sustained Government’s ability to compete with local support from line ministries. Embarking warlords, who can easily attract local upon a process for the empowerment of allegiances by offering the financial basis both communities and local governments for community survival. De facto thus necessitates an assured flow of funds decentralization of this kind is most from the central Government. problematic in relation to equity issues on The perceptions from the provinces the the national level, given the absence of second factor previously identified as national redistribution, which is prone to shaping the relationship between the centre worsen existing inequalities among the and the periphery vary from region to provinces.17 There are already substantial region, depending on the nature of the national differences in revenue generation:

17 Astri Suhrke 2004.

140 Chapter 5 Kabul and Kandahar generated together made to conduct the elections within six some Afs. 3 billion in revenue in 2002, months after convening the Consitutional while the combined total revenue collected Loya Jirgah However, in view of growing in four other provinces surveyed security concerns fuelled by numerous (Badakhshan, Bamyan, Faryab and terrorist incidences and logistical Wardak) was slightly less than Afs. 12 difficulties, a decision was finally made million.18 to conduct presidential elections on 9 October 2004, while postponing On paper, the newly adopted Constitution articulates a balance between building a parliamentary elections to April 2005. strong central executive branch and In anticipation of the elections, the Political freedom and respecting the rights of volition of the Government took numerous legislative participation are part provinces to exercise more authority in measures to improve the political of human managing their local affairs by environment in which they were to take development, both as institutionalising district and provincial place. A new political party law was level councils. The key challenge will now development goals in enacted, allowing political parties to their own right and as be to translate this balance into reality, register provided that they satisfy minimum means for advancing bearing in mind the three factors that conditions, such as the absence of any human development. continue to shape the centre-periphery affiliation to military movements. In relations in practice. addition to the registration of political UNDP, HDR 2002: Deepening parties, the Government passed a new mass Democracy in a Fragmented The Next Step – Elections World. media law and initiated the establishment Presidential and parliamentary elections of a Media Monitoring Commission. Most in Afghanistan are the culmination of the importantly, a new electoral law was post-conflict state-building process outlined enacted formally, paving the way for in the Bonn Agreement. While such presidential and parliamentary elections elections mean the end of the roadmap based on a single, non-transferable and envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, they secret vote. mark the beginning of a significantly new stage in the transition to a democratic The vetting process undertaken to political environment. It offers an safeguard the barring of parties with opportunity to leave the “conditionalities” military wings, however, somewhat of Bonn behind particularly with regard complicated and delayed the registration to participation of groups based on military process. And the significance of the newly power and create truly legitimate as well emerging parties has been diminished by as representative governance. The the electoral system chosen for the transition, however, has proven a challenge parliamentary elections, which will be in itself, with the country still grappling conducted on the basis of votes for with the root causes for previous conflict, individual candidates per region rather underdevelopment and continuous threats than votes for political parties. Despite to human security. security concerns and civic education deficits, political activities are taking place Initially, both parliamentary and throughout the country, with the north presidential elections were to be convened leading with 47 active political move- simultaneously in order to remedy the ments.19 democratic deficiencies of the interim structures. The Constitution thus exhorted Uneven conditions exist for the exercise (Article 160) that every effort was to be of political rights in the regions, where the

18 AREU/WB – quoted in Astri Suhrke 2004. 19 AIHRC – UNAMA, Joint Verification of Political Rights, First Report (15 June – 7 July), 2004.

NHDR 04 141 space that exists for political rights is Applying the human security paradigm largely determined by the factional and measuring the current electoral elements in power and the extent to which processes against a framework of they tolerate political activities by other participation, eradicating inequalities and actors. Political activities are also hampered responsibilities, the success of current by prevailing misconceptions with regard efforts aiming at the establishment of fully to political parties based on decades of representative state structures through conflict in which activism was subject to national elections will depend on the reprisals by competing factions. following factors: Undoubtedly, the political environment in • The extent to which participation a post-conflict situation poses difficult of the people in the processes can challenges to the holding of elections living I am optimistic about be ensured despite growing security up to international standards. In such an threats and the tight time-frame. our future. It is because environment, elections are often conducted While security threats can certainly the people are upbeat too soon after conflict, before national hamper participation, awareness of the about a positive political issues have progressed sufficiently processes and the political rights are change. Not only do and before the routines of normal fundamental prerequisites for every they demand change peacetime politics have had time to person to be able to participate fully. but they also want to develop. Ill-timed, hurried, badly designed Compromises on civic education be part of it. It is the or poorly run elections can actually undermine the process of necessitated by the tight time-frame best time in our history, may in this regard impact public I tell you. democratization.20 At the same time, elections can provide the basis for public participation. The voter-registration Faraidoon Ahmad from Wardak support and legitimacy by enhancing figures, however, would indicate that participation.21 Particularly in a context in the public is generally aware of the which the exercise of political rights was processes and keen on exercising its previously impeded by years of conflict regained political rights.22 and unrepresentative governance, elections • The extent to which the process is may serve as valuable “entry points” for non-exclusive as opposed to public participation in the democratization exacerbating horizontal inequalities. process, provided that basic political The legitimacy of elections will largely freedoms are in place. While democracy depend on its universality, or the extent is certainly not only about elections, public participation through electoral processes to which all groups are able to may gradually furnish a culture of participate in the process. The democratic discourse by providing space deliberate or unintentional exclusion for political dialogue and mutual tolerance. of groups will naturally undermine the outcome of elections by inducing Despite the challenges, the number of excluded groups to discredit and higher-than-expected registered voters has disassociate themselves from the proved the Afghan people’s willingness process. and readiness to support peace and democracy, and their hope for a strong, • The extent to which the Government legitimate, accountable and representative assumes responsibility for enabling Government. the participation of all people.

20 UNDP 2004d, UNDP 2002. 21 Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004. 22 Overall, more than nine million of the estimated 9.5- to 9.8-million-strong electorate had registered in August 2004, with over 41 per cent of them women. UN/JEMB 2004.

142 Chapter 5 Participation will lead to people become part of daily political life in assuming “political responsibility” Afghanistan. while also enhancing the “responsibility” of the Government to 5.3. Rule of Law and Human promote accountability through public Rights participation. While the previous pages have discussed It should, in the meantime, be borne in the main building blocks of the current mind that Afghanistan has only very state-building efforts, the following section recently embarked on its quest towards addresses two cross-cutting elements that democracy. While the international determine and measure the extent to which community may be preoccupied with these blocks remain stable elements of whether Afghanistan’s recent presidential construction: the rule of law and human elections have met and whether the rights. impending national parliamentary elections will meet all international standards, the Security is a critical foundation for fact that elections allowing for direct and sustainable development. This includes secret voting are held may in itself fortify protection from systematic human peoples’ growing confidence in the rights abuses, physical threats and democratic foundations that are gradually violence, and territorial and sovereignty being built. threats. Since poverty and insecurity Three major concerns Despite all constraints, the majority of reinforce each other and are particularly of our people include a Afghans want to exercise their fundamental exacerbated when a nation’s legal return to civil war, lack right to vote in national elections and have institutions perform poorly and the rule of justice and high expectations that the process will of law is weak, the requirement for corruption, and the bring positive change to Afghanistan, in security must include the well-being usurpation of people’s particular contribute to “good governance” of persons and a strengthened justice rights. by resulting in a Government that will be system. strong, legitimate, accountable and Shah Mohammad Jawad from representative.23 Building on theWithout the protection of rights, and a Kabul momentum generated by the recent comprehensive framework of laws, no presidential elections, parliamentary equitable development is possible. elections will provide an important window Without development, justice and the of opportunity not only to conclude the rule of law remain but an academic and transitional period by establishing a truly philosophical concept with little link democratic leadership accountable to the to actual justice processes and practices. electorate, but also to generate public Building the legal framework and its ownership of the state and its institutions. implementation systems lays the At the same time, political maturity, foundation for the necessary confidence responsibility, ethics and sound motivation and credibility required for genuine are critical factors in the complexity of and dynamic economic development. creating a new Parliament, especially given The link between legal institutions and the absence of the rule of law to prevent poverty therefore is direct and and stop corruption, nepotism and illegal fundamental. acts. There is a need for considerable parliamentary support for over at least a Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Considerations on decade in order to warrant that it can Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice assume its constitutional functions and System, 2004.

23 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium 2003.

NHDR 04 143 Re-instituting the Rule of Law in inability of state structures to properly Afghanistan safeguard and enforce its implementation.

The law is the normative extension of the In general, a fair and effective legal social compact on which any democratic framework requires the following: First, state is built. It formally articulates the that a set of rules that are known in advance principles by which competing interests exist; second, that the rules are enforced; within a society are reconciled and thus third, that means exist to ensure the offers the basis for peaceful co-existence. application of the rules; fourth, that conflict The United Nations has The law, furthermore, formulates the resolution is a function of binding decisions learned that the rule of framework within which the state is to made by an independent and credible law is not a luxury and operate by authorizing organs of the state judiciary; and fifth, that procedures are in place for changing the rules when they that justice is not a side to act on behalf of society in creating an cease to serve the purpose for which they issue. We have seen environment beneficial to all. This includes were intended.24 people lose faith in the the protection of fundamental rights and peace process when freedoms by the state vis-à-vis its own The pace of the reconstruction of the justice they do not feel safe organs and non-state entities. A particularly system in Afghanistan has been criticized important aspect is the uniform application from crime. We have as being unnecessarily slow compared to of the law, where the rich or powerful are seen that without a other sectors. The blame is usually dealt with in the same way as other citizens. attributed to uncoordinated donor efforts, credible machinery to The law “rules” when the legal framework lack of sufficient resources and lack of enforce the law and is generally accepted and respected by its leadership by the international community resolve disputes people addressees both in terms of the contents and the UN.25 Justice sector processes of resorted to violence of the norms and the institutionalised reform will inevitably take a slower pace and illegal means. And processes available to resolve conflicts of where the reform requires a deep cultural we have seen that interest. The rule of law means that shift in both the justice providers and the elections held when the individuals as well as the state are held justice seekers. Donors and international rule of law is too fragile accountable against the set of applicable community interests in seeing immediate seldom lead to lasting norms by organs entrusted to determine results against their diverse political democratic whether the law has been broken and agendas, and measuring success in terms governance ... But a impose sanctions accordingly. It also of delivery and disbursement, have worked against ownership of the reform process ‘one size fits all’ does means that no other “law” rules than the one that is generated in compliance with by the justice institutions, and pose risks not work. Local actors the rule-making procedures. of fostering underlying factionalism. must be involved from the start. The aim is to Viewed from the human security angle, The process of strengthening the justice leave behind strong the provision of the rule and, by system is based on two complementary local institutions when implication, enforcement of law becomes efforts: strengthening political will, and we depart. the responsibility of the state, in the absence provision of financial and technical of which threats such as crime, denial of assistance. While financial and technical Kofi Annan, UN Secretary- property rights, and discrimination prevail. support have been provided at a faster pace General, 25 September 2003. In positive terms, the rule of law guarantees (in certain instances even too fast, given the sustainability and irreversibility of the country’s slow absorption pace), the development. While in post-conflict support of the necessary political will has situations, reaffirming the centrality of the been following more slowly. However, as rule of law is a key prerequisite for the in any post-conflict situation, the creation success of the reconstruction process, it of the necessary political will and the also remains the key challenge given the ownership of justice sector reform entails

24 UNDP 1995b. 25 See, among others, United States Institute for Peace 2004.

144 Chapter 5 Box 5.6 Access to Justice in Post-conflict Situations

Access to justice, security and human In such situations, where there is no disarmament, demobilization, rights are central to sustainable peace justice or where there is only unequal repatriation, reintegration and and stability in any context, let alone access to justice, violent conflict is likely resettlement (DDRRR) of former post-conflict settings. Conflicts, whether to re-emerge. Indeed, many conflicts are combatants, (ii) development of internal or cross-border, invariably lead rooted in the real or perceived breakdown democratic, law-abiding police services to the erosion of the civil, political, of justice where individuals and groups and armed forces, including appropriate economic, social and cultural rights of are not able to obtain a fair remedy for the populations caught in the midst. civilian oversight mechanisms, and (iii) Specific violations vary with each their grievances; where political, legal necessary linkages between the judicial conflict, but they often include violations and institutional biases marginalize system, the police service and the prison of civil rights, such as the right to life segments of the population such that service. (unjustified killings), to physical integrity they resort to violence. Even where the (physical injury, enforced justice system per se may not be theIt is of “critical importance that public disappearances, arbitrary arrest and cause of the conflict, with the faith in the justice and human rights detention and torture), and to freedom continuation and the escalation of the system is restored quickly without of movements; political rights such as conflict over time, the judicial and legal leaving room for the return to extra- freedom of speech, of association and system generally becomes less able to judicial measures such as vigilantism of assembly and the right to political cope with the injustices of war, thus and “mob-justice” or “victors – justice” participation; economic, social and compounding the perception that the or massive human rights violations. But cultural rights such as the right to at the same time, it must be a system property (through loss by destruction or judicial establishment is either unable temporary deprivation as a result of or unwilling to fulfil the demands for that is credible, effective and efficient, internal displacement), to work, to an justice. Finally, there needs to be a observing prescribed legal procedures, adequate standard of living, to a family, holistic approach to security sector dispensing justice and providing human to freedom of information, etc. reform (SSR) that ensures (i) sustainable rights protection equally and equitably.”

UNDP, Governance in Post-conflict Situations, 2004. by nature a strong cultural shift that cannot a number of English-speaking Afghans be pushed excessively, especially from called back from Europe and the United outside. Moreover, sustainability requires States. The Judicial Reform Commission that the national authorities are in charge has in many instances provided an of and own the process, not only involuntary forum for the ideological technically but mostly politically. battles of different donors, given the concentration of international attention, The international community has struggled rather than serving as an avenue for with investing in justice institutions that appear refractory to change, such as the reconciling the different interests of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s justice institutions. Its failure to convene Office, or a Ministry of Justice devoid of the justice institutions and to channel many of its usual coordinating functions reform turned the commission into an easy (for example, budget control). The scapegoat for the international community international community has preferred to when it became apparent that no real deal with the much more palatable Judicial reform or reconstruction could happen Reform Commission, set up in the Bonn without the direct involvement of the Agreement with a vague mandate to “lead” Afghan permanent justice institutions and the justice reform agenda and staffed with their political will.

NHDR 04 145 However, the progressively increasing should be coordinated to the maximum involvement of the justice institutions in extent with all other initiatives the preparation of the national budget and enhancing provincial and district the underlying policy direction framework governance and security (disarmament, indicates that the idea of consultative public administration reform, police reform is beginning to move forward reform, and the deployment, formation within the justice institutions as well. A and deployment of the national Army strategy based on consultations with all to fight against armed groups, the justice institutions has been formulated trafficking, narcotics, organized crime through the Securing Afghanistan’s Future and corruption, and to oversee areas strategy, and is reflected in the 1382 (2003) of large return and displacement). Constitution and NDB for justice. Clear identification of criteria and However, the extent to which these mechanisms for prioritization of consultative efforts reflect a real political provincial interventions and their will for reform among the justice sequencing are key. institutions is still to be established and • The process of strengthening the will be put on trial through the current justice system is still very fragile in ongoing process of choice and formulation the provinces and districts. of priority projects within the National Participation of the districts and Priority Programme for Rule of Law and provincial officials, both politically Justice and the involvement of the justice and in the identification of technical institutions in any future policy-setting problems and shortcomings, and mechanism. related future recommendations, needs The main problems encountered in to increase if the justice system is strengthening Afghanistan’s justice system really to produce services for the are of a political, structural and legal nature. population countrywide. From the political point of view, the lack The justice institutions are experiencing of control and security over the territory gross structural problems and a lack of have made it hard for the formal justice capacity of their staff. The internal administrative capacity of the justice system to have a presence outside the main institutions is so limited that they are not provincial capitals. The lack of political yet able to gather realistic data on their dialogue among the main stakeholders has functioning and challenges.26 Inadequate caused a lack of leadership and ownership salaries (currently US$36 per month on in the coordination of the reform efforts. average), lack of physical security, lack Dialogue, cooperation and engagement of of infrastructure and lack of the main justice institutions are all accommodation are the main factors that important in building the necessary prevent even deployment and appointment political will to expand the control of the of new justice personnel (judges, attorneys central Government at district level. of the Attorney General’s Office, and • It is necessary to strengthen the justice Ministry of Justice staff) in remote or institutions in their administrative difficult areas. In most cases, this means capacities, and support them for a that local high-ranking members of the meaningful participation in policy- community are appointed as magistrates, setting and prioritization of resources. independent of their skills or formal The justice system rehabilitation education, which might put at risk their

26 Some data with regards to staffing at central and provincial levels are provided in Securing Afghanistan’s Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System, 2004.

146 Chapter 5 independence and impartiality and responsibility for the correction system reinforce a general informal attitude has shifted from the Ministry of towards justice.27 Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The shift has, for the most part, left the Due to the disruption of its education sector under-resourced and the staff system and years of isolation, Afghanistan institutionally unrepresented. The is also experiencing a lack of qualified situation is aggravated by the fact that justice personnel, which puts at risk the this is an area where it is extremely integrity of judicial administration, leaves difficult to get donor support. room for corruption, and decreases However, the representatives of the people’s trust in the formal justice system prison department of the Ministry of as well as the political and development Justice have been actively participating process. A considerable number of in the NDB, highlighting the needs positions within the office of the for a nation-wide approach, enabling prosecutors or the courts are still vacant. the rehabilitation of a correction Further, of the current staff, only a third system in line with international of judges and prosecutors are educated to standards and pointing to the vast gap university standards.28 in resources.29 • Significant investments need to be • Not to be forgotten is the systemic made in the qualitative strengthening unbalance of the Afghan justice system of the university system and post- due to the almost total lack of graduate training programmes for professional lawyers, especially female justice personnel. At the same time, lawyers, participating in court training for existing judges and proceedings. While the right to defence administrative staff of the justice and legal assistance for the indigent institutions needs to be supported, has been recognized in the Constitution (Article 31), the Afghan judicial based on a thorough needs assessment system does not have a tradition of and provided in conjunction with professional lawyers assisting clients development and governance building in court cases, nor does it have a bar programmes at the provincial and association or systems of provision of district levels. Again, a key factor will legal aid. However, the work of NGOs be the participatory process on which (including the Norwegian Refugee development of new curricula will be Council, International Legal based and the factoring in of the Foundation and Medica Mondiale), complicated interlinkages of Sharia who are providing legal assistance and and secular law elements. This process legal aid to clients in both formal and needs to go hand-in-hand with the informal proceedings, shows that the application of uniform criteria for positive effects of legal representation entering the judicial professions. go beyond the immediate advantages • A critical element of the justice and for the justice seeker. Such support security sector is the functioning of also helps to highlight shortcomings the correction system in accordance in the adjudication process and provide with human rights norms. In training for judges, prosecutors and Afghanistan, governmental correctional staff. Further efforts of the international community in

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 The National Development Budget for Justice is available from the Afghan Government website: www.af.

NHDR 04 147 developing the legal professions are efforts would be better placed in supporting badly needed, although a decision on the strengthening of the capacity of the institutional framework in which technical bodies like the Ministry of Justice it will operate (what form of bar legislative department, which could either association) will require consultations directly support the future Parliament in in and outside Kabul. drafting laws or whose capacity could be transferred to the Parliament once it is in • In a broader way, the international place. Matters are even more complicated community has, to date, mainly by the lack of clarity on the relationship focused efforts on the lack of capacity between formal and informal justice. to provide justice by the Afghan Government, leaving it to human rights Surveys and studies carried out30 show that bodies like the AIHRC and a few the majority of judicial cases outside Kabul NGOs to build the capacity to seek are dealt with by informal justice justice within the Afghan population mechanisms. There is still insufficient – through legal awareness and legal knowledge of how prevalent their use is, education programmes and legal aid how effectively they work, and what their schemes. This will need to be rectified impact is. While traditional justice systems if the Afghan justice system is to provide access to established conflict provide access to justice for all, resolution mechanisms,31 they are also regardless of ethnicity, gender, and widely criticized for reinforcing traditional financial, military and political power. practices that infringe on human rights, especially those of women.32 The legal framework operating in Afghanistan is also in a transitional phase. • From a reform point of view, the While the new Constitution presents the challenge is to understand the overall framework, the work of indexing relationship between the two systems and creating a digest of the existing laws and the fact that the main point of to underpin future law reform efforts is reference of many communities is not yet to be done. The fact that there is no statutory or Islamic law, but local democratically elected legislative body traditions governing that area. How also undermines the legitimacy of the the two systems could be used existing legal framework. Current law complementarily, including in terms reform efforts are uncoordinated and are of gender, should be further aimed mostly at the swift creation of an investigated. Due to the history of the enabling environment for private sector Afghan legal tradition, formal legal development to flourish, along with foreign mechanisms are much less investment, trade and exploitation of consolidated than usually presumed. mineral resources. While a series of reforms to enact state laws was started at the beginning of However, while these might be needed in the 20th Century, reforms were only the short term to expedite economic achieved through the 1923 and 1964 development, a purely technical approach Constitutions. However, the 1973 coup to law reform risks producing laws that marked substantial changes to the are completely detached from the overall administration of justice, so that the legal context and are thus hardly applied only time the formal legal system had in practice, especially outside Kabul. Donor to consolidate was the nine years

30 International Legal Foundation 2003; Tufts University/Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004. 31 Hanef Atmar & Jonathan Goodhand 2002; Ali Wardak 2004. 32 Ali Wardak, 2004.

148 Chapter 5 between 1964 and 1973.33 Expansion ministries and other main partners will be of formal legal and judicial mechanism invited to engage in a constructive throughout the country now needs to dialogue. The HRAG will also assist the be preceded by a thorough study of AIHRC in assessing the overall efforts the interface between formal and undertaken by the Government to comply informal justice. It should involve the with its commitments in Bonn to protect participation of the recipients of justice, and promote human rights.34 in particular, those from disadvantaged groups. In view of the absence of reliable statistics or baseline studies in most areas, the Reinforcing Human Rights HRAG recommends focusing initially on As stated in the Bonn Agreement, the the national (development) budget process AIHRC is the main national institution to rather than on quantitative measures. The deal with monitoring and investigation of group has proposed that mainstreaming human rights violations, development of benchmarks should be based on a number a national programme for human rights of general criteria applicable to all Local education, promotion of women’s rights Consultative Groups (LCGs): and transitional justice. The AIHRC has assumed a leadership role within the • Non-discrimination with regard to national development and security ethnicity, gender, area of residence or programmes. The Human Rights Advisory any other criterion. Group (HRAG) assists the AIHRC by • Particular attention or focus in favour serving as a forum for principled of the vulnerable groups of the discussions on the current human rights population. situation. Eventually, it will be able to make policy recommendations intended • Full transparency, so that all concerned for the national or provincial level. One Afghan citizens should in principle be mechanism will be to organize workshops able to access information regarding focused on key sectors, where the lead development activities.

Box 5.7 Treaties to which Afghanistan is a party

• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) • Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) • Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRCOPAC) as well as the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (CRCOPSC) • Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers (CPMW).

OHCHR, Country Profile of Afghanistan and the International Human Rights System, 2004 (draft on file with the authors).

33 Securing Afghanistan’s Future - Considerations on Criteria and Actions for Strengthening the Justice System 2004. 34 Advisory Group on Human Rights, draft ADF statement, 2004.

NHDR 04 149 • Participatory approach in the design, • Address serious human rights approval and implementation of violations such as torture, extrajudicial development projects to the extent killings, forced disappearances; possible, so that potential beneficiaries arbitrary detentions and others. are consulted in all the above phases. • Encourage internal processes of The legality of the projects should be accountability in Government evaluated against current domestic institutions, particularly with respect legislation and against international human to protecting and guaranteeing human rights instruments to which Afghanistan rights (for example, requesting law is a party. The HRAG recommends that enforcement agencies to establish Afghanistan should ratify the Vienna appropriate disciplinary regulations Convention on the Law of International and procedures, and investigate Treaties to secure an adequate internally any possible allegation or interpretation of its human rights complaint on human rights abuses). obligations. • Ensure a commitment to respect The government has already undertaken human rights as a criterion in new some positive initiatives to address the appointments in the Government at human rights situation. These include: the central and provincial levels. • The independent commission • Support politically and otherwise the appointed by the President to work of the AIRC; respond to its investigate the violent incidents at queries and recommendations; and Kabul University last November acquire the technical capacity to report to appropriate treaty bodies on the presented an impartial report, and implementation of the above- measures were undertaken to prosecute mentioned international legal those responsible for human rights instruments. abuses. • Support and protect national and • A special human rights department international human rights NGOs, in has been created in the Ministry of particular, those involved in shadow Interior. reporting on the implementation of • The Government actively participated international legal instruments signed in important initiatives jointly and ratified by Afghanistan. undertaken with regional authorities • Increase the awareness of the general and the international community to public on basic human rights and address serious human rights issues fundamental freedoms, with particular such as the return of IDPs to their areas attention to the inclusion of human of origin in the north of the country. rights aspects into the educational • The Cabinet ratified the Statutes of system. the International Criminal Court. In March 2004, the Government made • The assessment of the human rights several commitments on human rights at situation has been closely linked to the UN co-sponsored international meeting the constitutional drafting process and “Afghanistan and the International the judicial reforms as well as the Community – a Partnership for the Future”. reforms within the security sector. In what has come to be known as the Berlin Declaration, it agreed to extend full Significant challenges to be addressed will cooperation to the AIHRC and to include the provision of measures to: strengthen Afghanistan’s institutional

150 Chapter 5 capacity to meet in an adequate and timely immensely to sensitizing Afghans about manner the reporting obligations of basic human rights, it cannot be forgotten international human rights instruments. A that the ultimate responsibility for unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs guaranteeing the rule of law and access to (MOFA) has now been established to justice for all rests with the state, and that support reporting. In February 2003, the only through investing in the development Office of the High Commissioner of of Government institutions mandated with Human Rights organized an initial training providing security and peaceful conflict workshop, and plans are underway to resolution will Afghanistan fulfil its provide technical assistance to the unit in obligations towards its citizens and the order for Afghanistan to produce an initial international community. report within the next year. Past human rights violations While this is a welcome development, however, it will likely overlook Another significant challenge that has yet Afghanistan’s obligations under other to receive explicit attention in Afghanistan international instruments. Nonetheless, the concerns past human rights violations. The establishment of the unit and of a database need for national reconciliation is often of human rights will support all further emphasized while the specific means to development efforts by the Government address Afghanistan’s past – entrenched and the international community in in conflict and internal strife are ignored. providing much needed baseline data for Both national and international actors are setting human rights benchmarks and hesitant to touch the issues arising from supporting human-rights-based monitoring. this past, despite initial efforts to incorporate transitional justice into the Institutionalizing human rights monitoring mandate of the AIHRC. The multi-ethnic within all branches of the Government will layers of Afghan society combined with mean that a shift will be required also by the fragility of state-building efforts, which the AIHRC, especially now that the remain dangerously exposed to polarization Constitution (Article 58) recognizes the with the potential to perpetuate conflict, commission as a permanent statutory body. necessitates a cautious approach towards The AIHRC has been providing direct revisiting the past as a means to promote assistance in many cases of human rights a process of national reconciliation. abuses, sometimes channelling them through the institutional channels of the While few would disagree that long-term governmental justice system, where these political stability in Afghanistan is closely exist, and sometimes assuming a direct tied to the resolution of past grievances – mediation role. With the expansion of the including human rights violations, war Government’s capacity and the realization crimes and crimes against humanity – what of its responsibility vis-à-vis its citizens, is yet to be determined is the sequencing the AIHRC will need to take a step back of reconciliation as well as the mechanism and ensure monitoring of these by which a process of “national healing” mechanisms, rather than offering an can unfold. Essentially, the crucial issue alternative to them. It has been said that will be whether the models of “transitional the AIHRC represents a “bright light in justice” that have been applied in other strengthening the rule of law.”35 While it post-conflict contexts can be adapted to is true that the work of the AIHRC in fit the complex history of war in human rights education and monitoring of Afghanistan.36 On the one hand, the model human rights violations has contributed of “truth and reconciliation” may be too

35 Tufts University / Feinstein International Famine Center Study 2004. 36 Rama Mani, AREU 2003; International Center for Transitional Justice 2004.

NHDR 04 151 simplistic in a context in which perpetrators Rights-based programming and victims are spread throughout society. On the other hand, the prosecutorial model, It is clear that the human rights situation which emphasizes the need for justice will be one of the main parameters by through war crimes tribunals, may which international donors and the Afghan jeopardize the peace processes by people will assess developments in threatening powerful strongmen who may Afghanistan. Sustained investments in be inclined to exploit ethnic divisions to encouraging demand from below and a escape from prosecution. Moreover, the constituency for claiming rights from above prosecutorial model would be will be crucial for the progressive preconditioned on either a strong judicial realization of human rights for all. Many system within Afghanistan or heavy challenges remain to be overcome in terms international support, similar to the of shaping appropriate processes and international war crimes tribunals outcomes within the context of an established in the past. Neither system emerging rights-based agenda. seems to be a given at present. The establishment of the AIHRC provides Less confrontational mechanisms – a key forum for the ongoing assessment involving historical accounting through of Government efforts to comply with the documentation and oral reports as well as commitments subscribed to in Bonn, and restorative justice that facilitates to protect and promote the rights of all community reconciliation using customary Afghans. Similarly, the creation of a human methods – may provide an intermediate rights database and the efforts on reporting measure of transitional justice. In order to to UN human rights treaty bodies will obtain the views of the Afghan population provide the international community with concerning past human rights violations the visible benchmarks of rights-based in relation to the building of a new state, development and assist the Government the AIHRC has conducted consultations in programming development assistance with 4,000 individuals and 200 focus through a human rights lens. The next groups. On the basis of these, challenge facing Afghanistan’s policy- recommendations on mechanisms for makers and the international community transitional justice in Afghanistan will be is to support civil society in its demand made to the President. Moreover, the for sustained development and basic rights. UNHCR is conducting a mapping exercise with regard to past human rights violations 5.4. Security Sector Reform (1978–2001). As described in Chapter 1 of this report, It is becoming increasingly apparent from the notion of security in its traditional these exercises that a majority of Afghans sense does not sufficiently grasp the needs demands that perpetrators of human rights of the individual in terms of human violations must not be allowed to hold development. Rather, the focus has to be (key) governmental positions. Although a on a broader understanding of human majority would seem to insist on judicial security as freedom from fear and freedom accountability in the long term, there from want. However, throughout the currently is a lack of public trust in national preceding sections, the need for a strong judicial institutions to perform such an central authority – and its peripheral important task for national reconciliation. requirements – has been repeatedly It is hoped that judicial reforms and strong emphasized. Such an authority should be international support will ultimately yield able to effectively address threats to an environment conducive to addressing security (in the traditional sense, that is, the past through judicial means. threats to survival) as a precondition to addressing issues of human development,

152 Chapter 5 involving the creation of an environment that it is managed and operated in a manner conducive to reconstruction and equal consistent with democratic norms and distribution. It is well known that the principles. Responsible and accountable security situation in Afghanistan is not security forces should reduce the risk of With respect to the only poor, but is constraining conflict, provide effective security for the central government’s reconstruction and development activities, citizenry and foster an environment policy on security we especially outside of Kabul, and conducive to development activities. have to say that it is a particularly in the regions most affected However, the record of security sector failure. There are by drought, past and current. The central reform in post-conflict states has been authority, in its state-building efforts, has mixed. In the Afghan experience, for currently many states faced the difficult challenge of establishing example, progress on DDR has been slow.37 within a state in a security apparatus adequately equipped different parts of While security is a fundamental precondi- to tackle the threat to survival posed by Afghanistan. For tion for effective national programme insurgent groups, criminals and warlords. example, the Islamic execution, security sector reforms in This section briefly evaluates the security State of Herat; the Afghanistan have in general been slow, sector reforms undertaken so far and Islamic Republic of with insufficient coverage. The continued highlights the lessons that could be learned. Mazar-e Sharif and, of co-existence of opposing forces threatens course, the powerful Security sector reform is the key to reconstruction altogether. In recognition Republic Panjshir. ensuring political stabilization and lasting of the centrality of security sector reform These states have security in post-conflict settings. The for other development plans, five national effectively undermined concept, first elaborated in the late 1990s, programmes have been initiated to improve refers to the transformation of a country’s security (See Figure 5.5). the central government security apparatus with the aim of ensuring and will continue to do so. But these mini states are not doing their job Figure 5.5: National Initiatives in the Security Sector with respect to security either. In Herat the National police, instead of Security Council ensuring peace and security, create National Security Advisor conflicts, as we saw one Security Sector Institutions day in Baghi Azadi when a security police Afghan National Ministry of Ministry of Constitutional Independent Army Defense Justice Commission Human Rights started beating Commission students. There are Afghan National Ministry of Ministry of Judicial Police Force Interior Border and Commission Independent thousands of other Tribal Affairs Administrative examples. Afghan Military National Defense and Civil Service Force(AMF) Commission Reform Bashir Ahmad Ibrahimi, Herat Commission

Priority National Programs

Provincial Afghan New Afghan National Priority Reform Reconstruction Beginnings Stabilization Accountability and Teams Program (DDR) Program and Rule of Law Restructuring

37 Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook 2004.

NHDR 04 153 Box 5.8 Security Sector Reform and the Berlin Declaration

The plans presented were very ambitious and included: • The demobilization of 40 per cent of the Afghan Army (using stated troop strength as the base) by June 2004, including the decommissioning of military units. • Agreement that NATO and the international military forces would continue to support the ANP and ANA. • Extend full cooperation to the AIHRC Strengthen Afghanistan’s institutional capacity to meet in an adequate and timely manner its reporting obligations under international instruments. • The Afghan Government will develop human rights monitoring, documenting and reporting mechanisms in partnership with the international community. • Establish a Supreme Court according to the Constitution with the necessary capacity to fulfil its mandate. • Strengthen the administrative and financial management capacity of justice institutions. • Accelerate the legislative reform process through adoption of key laws that would be compatible with the Constitution, including laws and procedures on the organization of judicial offices, criminal and civil codes, and a penitentiary law. • Establish a national legal training centre.

Source: Berlin Declaration, 2004.

Over the past two years, there has been a well-functioning and well-structured remarkably little progress in security sector security sector, according to the Securing reform. Forward movement has been Afghanistan’s Future report, ‘security stalled by the lack of national ownership, sector reforms, where progress has been poor donor coordination, the absence of too slow during the past two years, are an integrated political process, the lack of now afforded the highest priority. The stable governance provided in coordination overall objective of security sector reform by the centre and peripheral bodies, the is to strengthen the capability of the security slow pace of administrative reforms in the sector to provide an accountable, equitable, security sector, and the high level of off- effective, and rights respecting service. budget defence spending. As a result, two The institutions that fall under its umbrella key strategies have not been met: The are needed to provide a basic level of safety establishment of an adequate national and security for the public and facilitate a army38 and police force39 loyal to the central return to normalcy in the political, Government, and the effective economic, and social spheres. To this end, demobilization of ex-combatants. The the following steps must be taken: absence of a peace agreement and an • The establishment of democratic agreed process for political representation, oversight over all security forces. combined with the dominance of regional powerbrokers, has undermined these two • Ensuring that resources are rationally critical reform paths. and efficiently distributed within the security sector and through the budget. Given that the success of Afghanistan’s state-building enterprise depends to a • The preparation of security forces to significant degree on the establishment of meet existing threats and provide the

38 As of May 2004, there were a total of 8,000 newly trained soldiers, some who are already in service in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. 39 There are currently 5,800 fully trained police, and police academies have been established in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

154 Chapter 5 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 9, December 2003

civilian population with an adequate • Reduction in drug production and level of security. trafficking. • The clear delineation of the tasks and • Clearing landmines. responsibilities of the various security 5.5. Role of Civil Society forces and institutions to avoid overlap and redundancies.40 Institutions Future reform efforts will need to focus on: If the state is to effectively provide human security, mechanisms are required through • Expansion of military capability and which the public can meaningfully the prevention of armed conflict. participate in institutionalized dialogue with the state. Empowered civil society • Disarming, demobilizing and re- institutions are also necessary. In integrating combatants in line with the Afghanistan, there are various traditional expansion of the new national army.41 mechanisms through which the public • Law enforcement (police). engages with the –affairs of the state, such as shuras, Jirgas and religious networks. • Judicial system reforms. Moreover, civil society organizations are • Crime prevention and reduction of increasingly active in the state-building administrative corruption. efforts, engaging in civic education, awareness raising, peace-building, and • Reduction in ethnic tensions through advocacy for human rights and gender an inclusive political process. equality. The implementation of an

40 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d. 41 By 15 July 2004, a total of 10,770 officers and soldiers had turned in their weapons, while 10,460 had been demobilized. Some 9,000 of the personnel had started or are about to start their reintegration exercise. Taken from a press briefing by David Singh, Senior Media Relations Officer at UNAMA and by UN agencies in Afghanistan, 15 Jul 2004, available at www.reliefweb.int.

NHDR 04 155 Box 5.9 Defining Civil Society and its Significance in the Afghan Context

The concept of civil society refers to a The benefits civil society can bring to • Strengthening and leveraging broad range of non-governmental and development efforts include: development programmes by not-for-profit organisations that have a providing local knowledge, • Giving a voice to stakeholders presence in public life, expressing the targeting assistance and generating particularly poor and marginalized social capital at the community level interests and values of their members or populations and helping ensure that • Providing professional expertise and others, based on ethical, cultural, their views are factored into policy increasing the capacity for effective political, scientific, religious or and programme decisions service delivery, especially in philanthropic considerations. They • Promoting public sector environments with weak public include community groups, NGOs, transparency and accountability as sector capacity or in post-conflict labour unions, indigenous groups, well as contributing to an contexts environment favourable to good charitable organizations, faith-based Civil society organizations can be organizations, professional associations governance engaged through the provision of and foundations. Civil society • Promoting public consensus and resources, training, technical support, local ownership for reforms, national organizations are increasingly recognized etc. as envisaged for the process of poverty reduction and development as influential actors in public policy and formulating Afghanistan’s poverty strategies by building common reduction strategy. Dialogue and development efforts. An effective ground for understanding and consultation with civil society on key strategy for engagement with civil society encouraging public–private issues, policies and programmes (such in Afghanistan will be an integral part cooperation as by listening to their perspectives and of the strategy for poverty reduction and • Bringing innovative ideas and inviting suggestions), can strengthen the achievement of the Millennium solutions as well as participatory responsiveness and effectiveness of Development Goals (MDGs). approaches to solve local problems national policy reform processes.

effective strategy for the strengthening of to ensure human security does not, for and engagement with civil society, as example, imply that the state has to provide exemplified by the Government’s flagship free public services in all cases, but rather NSP, will be a critical component in that it is required to respect, protect and meeting the expectations of local fulfil rights, whether by direct provision communities. or by the state acting as a regulator and As highlighted in Box 5.9, civil society facilitator for other actors (such as the can play a key role in the promotion of market and civil society), who provide human security, pressing for basic and services where this is the most effective strategic entitlements to be established in and sustainable approach possible with the law and ensuring that they are effectively resources available.42 International enforced. Without group solidarity and experience confirms that networks and collective representation (community alliances at both national and international groups, social movements, unions or levels can have a powerful impact in terms national NGOs, etc.) the poor are unlikely of scaling up local voices and priorities to be granted rights, or, to the extent that into organized claims. Moreover, they are granted them, to be able to hold experience highlights that the state is not state and non-state actors accountable for monolithic and that there are organic links their realization. A national commitment between actors within the state and actors

42 Tim Conway, Caroline Moser, Andy Norton and John Farrington 2002.

156 Chapter 5 within civil society. At the same time, it an Islamic and traditional country like should be stressed that civil society is Afghanistan, a broader definition, heterogeneous and that its interests are encompassing shuras, Jirgas and religious diverse. Afghan communities, like those networks in addition to voluntary in other countries, contain powerful social associations and NGOs, is necessary.44 networks among the elites, which can often Community Councils work against the interests of the poor, while the poor themselves are often divided Afghanistan is very rich in its tribal and along ethnic, cultural or gender lines. traditional structures. Throughout the country, a variety of local councils referred The opinion of many international actors, to as shuras or Jirgas exist. These are used lamenting the absence of civil society in as tools for negotiation and dialogue. Afghanistan, builds on the assumption that Stakeholders belonging to different tribes civil society in Afghanistan is, if not non- and networks approach one another in Security in general is existent, at least very weak. Often this order to solve disputes, gain resources, the responsibility of the perception results from a narrow, culturally influence political processes or reach people themselves. In biased definition. However, Western overall consensus upon major issues. Aid Afghanistan the notions of “civil society” do not transfer agencies increasingly work with shuras Government is making easily to the Afghan context. The idea of as partners for community development. us dependent on building a broad civil-society constituency Yet these councils do not function exactly foreign security forces. for peace may only be possible in contexts along the same goals and principles of This is not good for the where civil society is composed of civil society, as the basic perspective of a country. The vertically and horizontally integrated shura is reactive rather than proactive. formal, rule-based organizations. Government has to rely Through capacity-building measures, on its own people. Moreover, research from elsewhere however, the mandate of shuras can be suggests that where the state is weak and reoriented, in order to strengthen its civil Said Rahim Rahimi from Kabul fractured, civil society will be similarly society functions. divided and lacking in voice; a strong, healthy state is usually the precondition Religious networks for a strong and healthy civil society. In Religious leaders and networks have Afghanistan, by contrast, the state has always played a prominent role in collapsed and civil society predominantly Afghanistan, especially in times of crisis, consists of a complex web of informal, when they undertake crucial functions norm-based networks based on blood, either in the form of legitimizing resistance kinship, and tribal, religious, cultural and or even forming its backbone. Due to their ethnicities.43 A comprehensiveinfluence in society, religious councils, understanding of civil society in religious scholars (Ulama), and traditional Afghanistan thus necessitates taking into Islamic leaders, including Mullahs and account the particular historical, cultural Maulawis, can serve as important elements and political context of the country. of civil society in Afghanistan. Identifying Afghan Civil Society Voluntary associations Civil society as a concept originating In urban areas especially, recent years have within modern Western democracies often seen the formation of various voluntary only includes associational forms such as associations and interest groups. These NGOs and voluntary associations. In a include women’s, professional, youth, non-Western setting, and particularly in student, social and cultural groups. A

43 Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 44 Nasrollah Stanikzai 2004; Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

NHDR 04 157 prominent example is the Professional are often strained due to intolerance and shura of Herat that was founded in early mistrust. These stem from ethnic, political 2002. It mainly consists of the local and personal conflicts, or may simply be intelligentsia (doctors, lawyers, engineers, due to a gap in understanding about the professors, etc.). role and function played by NGOs. At the provincial level, local power holders often NGOs create obstacles for civil society Even though NGOs are a relatively recent organizations to interact with communities, phenomenon in Afghanistan and have as this is perceived as a threat to their hold mainly been established from the late on the people. Moreover, since civil society 1980s onwards, there has been an appears to have only a limited influence explosion in their number in recent years. on the current dynamics of the conflict, it Today, more than 2,000 NGOs are is difficult to see it becoming a leading registered with the Ministry of Planning. edge in a peace-building process. The The majority of these, however, cannot be potential for exerting pressure "from considered as genuine civil society below" to influence the incentive systems organizations. Most are involved in of leaders and promote humanitarian emergency and reconstruction aid, and principles appears to be limited.46 their primary role is implementing projects rather than fostering popular participation However, at this critical juncture of and social organization, or advocating the Afghanistan’s state-building efforts, civil interests of the local population. society has began to raise its voice. Since Nevertheless, there are NGOs in 2001, the numbers of Afghan civil society Afghanistan that focus on civil-society- groups have not only increased sharply, related issues such as human rights, peace- they have also become much more visible building and civic education. Some play and are demanding room to influence the a significant role in facilitating and peace process. Civil society representatives encouraging constructive dialogue within were invited to attend the Bonn Conference civil society, as well as between civil in 2001, and civil society groups have society and the state. increasingly been drawn into the peace- building process as a balance to military Afghan Civil Society and the State and political organizations. They have also In order to act as a counterweight to the been involved in activities such as civic state, and influence the formulation of education, awareness-raising, peace- Government policies, civil society needs building, and advocacy for human rights to have access to the state. Given the and gender equality.47 weakness of Afghanistan’s current The Role of Civil Society in administrative structure, it is difficult for Development civil society organizations at present to assume this role in an institutionalized In general, civil society can play an manner. First of all, in the past there has important role in reconstruction, state- been a lack of a governmental “culture” building, deepening democracy, peace, to involve and strengthen civil society.45 reconciliation and stability, provided it is Presently, contacts and interactions recognized by the authorities, utilized and between the Government and civil society encouraged.48 Projects planned and

45 Assadullah Walwalji 2004. 46 Hanef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 47 Stephan Massing, UNDP Kabul, contributed to the section on civil society. 48 Assadullah Walwalji 2004.

158 Chapter 5 Box 5.10 Examples of Civil Society Involvement in Afghanistan

Even though the sphere of civil society goal of these meetings was to involve society in Afghanistan. The main activities in Afghanistan may still be a Afghan civil society in the peace and objectives of ACSF are to: far cry from an ideal – where civil society reconstruction processes in order to • Provide a platform for dialogue has a major influence on peace processes, achieve a more sustainable post-conflict within Afghan civil society; reconstruction. At the most recent political stability, economic productivity • Facilitate and ensure the conference in Berlin, 40 representatives and human well-being – there are a involvement of civil society in the from civil society presented concise number of civil society organizations or country’s peace and reconstruction recommendations to the inter- representatives from civil society that processes; are engaged in a variety of activities and governmental meeting and the • Foster an engagement with political have successfully implemented several Government of Afghanistan. The active and international actors; and interesting projects in the past years. The participation of civil society in such • Use modern civil society agents following examples intend to illustrate meetings underlines that civil society (such as NGOs) in order to reach that promising initiatives and groups have become much more visible, out to traditional members of organizations do exist and constitute increasingly demand influence, and are Afghan civil society. entry points for sustained cooperation eager to be part of the peace and ACSF’s primary activities comprise and partnership. development processes in Afghanistan. raising awareness; and conducting civic The Afghan Civil Society Forum Afghan Civil Society Conferences education campaigns, workshops and The Afghan Civil Society Forum came dialogue sessions (as for example, the Civil society conferences, with Afghan Youth Civil Society into being at the first Afghan Civil representatives of diverse civil society Conference); producing newsletters; and Society Conference in Germany and groups took place prior or parallel to the facilitating civil society networking began its activities in February 2002. Its political conferences in Bonn (2001), (including by establishing databases of mission is to support and strengthen civil Tokyo (2002) and Berlin (2004). The civil society actors).

managed by the communities themselves the Government’s core priority national typically show rates of return higher than programmes, the NSP has taken a those planned and managed by pioneering approach in the Afghan context Government agencies, as well as enhanced to building grassroots confidence in the ownership, a key factor to ensure new central administration. With sustainability. communities empowered to make decisions and control resources during all Poor people are often viewed as the targets stages of the project cycle, the programme of poverty reduction efforts, rather than is laying a national foundation for good as assets and partners in the development democratic governance. process. Experience has shown that given clear plans, access to information and The Afghan people have suffered appropriate support, poor men and women tremendously as a result of decades of can effectively organize to provide goods conflict, political instability and the and services that meet their immediate effective collapse of the nation state. The priorities. Not only do poor communities high level of community expectations that have greater capacity than is generally have accompanied the launch of the state- recognized, they also have the most to gain building and reform processes have not from making good use of resources been matched as quickly as many would targeted at poverty reduction. As one of have liked, particularly in the form of

NHDR 04 159 tangible improvements in lives and is the establishment of a governmental livelihoods.49 structure that, by providing for “good governance”, enables and promotes human The implementation of an effective strategy development. According to the for the strengthening of and engagement Commission for Human Security, the with civil society, as exemplified by the following key governance issues need to Government’s flagship NSP, will be a be addressed in the post-conflict critical component in this regard. However, environment: Democratization, block grants and small-scale infrastructure participation in decision-making, can only be effective in the furtherance of accountability of decision-makers, respect human security in so far as local for the rule of law and human rights, and governance systems are simultaneously inclusive, equitable and fair rules and strengthened and the marginalized poor institutions. These institutions will allow are empowered. In short, the challenge for for the effective empowerment of people the Government of Afghanistan will be to and communities, which in turn is essential address the major strategic needs of its If people can be of any for effective governance. people, namely participation, dignity and help in enhancing empowerment within the policy and • One central aspect in this process is human security they institutional reform processes. the rule of law, which is key to need to be taken into institutional functioning and the confidence with 5.6. Conclusions: Building a protection of people. Establishing the respect to the relevant State for Good Governance rule of law, however, goes beyond the policies. They should be The “Great Democratic Game” drafting of a constitution and laws, the provided with creation of courts, etc. It requires the information about the From this NHDR’s perspective, the inclusion of norms, principles and current policies and ultimate objective of the current practices that establish relations among asked about their reconstruction and state-building processes people and between people and the advice with respect to improving them. Box 5.11 Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni Good Governance – For What?

From the human development perspective, good governance is democratic governance. Democratic governance means that: • People’s human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, allowing them to live with dignity. • People have a say in decisions that affect their lives. • People can hold decision-makers accountable. • Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions. • Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision- making. • People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute. • The needs of future generations are reflected in current policies. • Economic and social policies are responsive to people’s needs and aspirations. • Economic and social policies aim at eradicating poverty and expanding the choices that all people have in their lives.

UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World.

49 This ‘credibility gap’ has been clearly highlighted in recent constitutional consultations. See Sedra and Middlebrook 2004.

160 Chapter 5 state. Moreover, it is important to the state. Concerning the latter, strengthen civil society in post-conflict participation helps make the people environments, ensuring a mechanism responsible and bring the state closer for people to participate, express their to its constituency, which remains views and hold decision-makers ingrained in communal structures accountable.50 given the absence of functioning public service providers. Only once • There are certainly many factors that governmental institutions feel influence the outcome of post-conflict “responsible” towards the people, and state-building exercises, but for the people feel “responsible” towards Afghanistan, one aspect of the human the state, will the state-building security approach to human exercise achieve its purpose. “It is all development seems to be particularly about what the state can do for the prevalent: the need for participation, people and what the people can do for whether active or passive. Participation the state.”51 is contingent upon two preconditions: that the state provides opportunities • The crucial question will be for the to participate (political security as a future Government to promote the public good being the responsibility social compact through participation. Corruption is eroding of the state), and that the people Providing an environment within people’s confidence in assume the responsibility to participate which political security can thrive will the government. It is so (civilian responsibility). Currently, certainly generate trust and public widespread, open and neither of the two conditions has been participation. But to a large measure common that it is now met in Afghanistan. Rather, people this will depend on the Government’s accepted as some sorts often perceived the country as a nation, ability to assert its central authority but not a state in which they can without disenfranchising the periphery. of legitimate participate. It will also depend on the manner in government fee.... which the state can satisfy the public I don’t know why the • Afghanistan needs people to translate demand for holding prominent past government is not the idea of a social compact into a and present violators of human rights paying any attention to reality. This requires, on the one hand, accountable, and address growing this social ill. that the state structures or organs concerns about corruption and operate for the people in a responsible Khan Zaman, from Kabul mismanagement. and non-exclusive manner. On the other hand, people should not perceive Having successfully passed the historic the state as an exogenous organism challenge of conducting Presidential set up for the implementation of alien elections without any major security policies serving the elite, but should incidents, the next test for the Government feel part of the larger community as will be the extent to which it can sustain contributors and controllers. With and reinvigorate the democratisation regard to the former, it is crucial that process aiming at the establishment of the state structures address the needs legitimate and accountable structures to of the people and perform their govern Afghanistan on the basis of the functions in a manner that adheres to Constitution. Apart from the requirement the axiom of “good governance”. This to ensure an enabling environment for the will gradually build the necessary trust conducting of free and secure of the people, which forms the basis Parliamentary elections scheduled for of the social compact that legitimizes spring 2005, it is called upon to build the

50 Commission on Human Security 2003. 51 Michael Schoiswhol, UNDP Programme Officer, Kabul.

NHDR 04 161 structures necessary for a functioning inspire trust among the people by ensuring Parliament, which can meaningfully that the rule of law, as observed by the represent the people and exercise control judiciary and executive organs, finally over the executive. Moreover, the replaces the rule of the gun. In passing Government is confronted with a plethora these “tests”, the government will certainly of challenges in implementing its face the difficult dilemma inherent in post- transitional duties concerning necessary conflict state-building efforts: that the structural reforms in the executive and establishment of “good governance” after judicial branches, as provided for by the years of military confrontation takes time, Constitution regarding the period until the even as the memories of the people are by establishment of the National Assembly far more short-lived than their expectations. (Article 159). Ultimately, it will need to

162 Chapter 5 Chapter 6

What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 6 What Kind of Development Vision is Needed for the New Sovereign State?

6.1. Introduction elites without the benefit of consultation with people. Third, economic development The purpose of this chapter is to analyse, consistently has been concentrated in urban from a human security perspective, the areas at the expense of the countryside. reconstruction and peace-building visions While significant gains were made at elaborated by the TISA in its first two various stages of history, these were also years, and to make recommendations to rapidly reversed through wars and neglect. be included in updated development policies of the new Government. The The modernization of Afghanistan began chapter briefly reviews the history of with the reforms introduced in 1926 by economic planning in Afghanistan in the King Amanullah (1919–1929), following past few decades before examining the a nine-month tour of Europe. The reforms current development visions and strategies were especially impressive for foreign from a human development and a human visitors, one of who described Afghanistan security point of view. Finally, it makes in 1928 thus: “It is becoming a modern The Afghan economy recommendations on types of development state. Its roads and communications have could barely walk even policies that Afghanistan should consider been transformed. There is a well-trained for a “humanly secure” future, given that, army. There are excellent schools.... In the before this all started, ultimately, post-conflict situations also centre of Asia what is almost a new country but the Soviet invasion provide opportunities to promote change, is in process of birth – or, at least, the old crippled it. The and to fundamentally recast social, political country is being metamorphosed.”2 Mujahideen then sent and economic bases of power in order to it to a coma and the However, King Amanullah’s aspirations include the excluded, heal fragmentation Taliban suffocated it to and erase inequalities. to strengthen the state through imposing heavy taxes on peasants and traders proved its ultimate demise. 6.2. History less popular with the religious rural elite Afghan Professor, CESR Report, and clerics who ended his rule in 1929. 2002 Development Planning in This was the first time – but not the last Afghanistan: A Clash of Tradition –in the modern history of Afghanistan that and Modernity rural conservatives reacted in opposition to the modernization process of urban A political history of development planning elites. in Afghanistan points to a number of trends that could be used as lessons in today’s In contrast to the fast reforms of post-conflict period.1 First, the economic Amanullah, the reign of Nadir Shah history is one of great dependency on (1929–1933) and his son Zahir Shah foreign aid and, with it, shifting economic (1933–1973) saw a slower pace of policy orientation from a state-planned to modernization, while innovations a liberal market-based economy. Second, implemented by individual entrepreneurs strategies were often designed and boosted exports to Europe, often through implemented from the top through ruling the Soviet Union. Modern academic

1 The discussions below have been taken from three authors: Omar Zakhilwal, Barnett Rubin in his response to the draft of the NHDR, and Umer Daudzai 2003. 2 S. Huddleston 1928.

NHDR 04 165 education started in Kabul in 1932, policy and its disincentives for the private although a university was not formally sector and for farmers, although they also established until 1947. In the 1930s, Abdul led to some very important changes: the Majid Zabuli founded the Bank-i Milli as rapid expansion of the system of education a private development bank and began in the provinces; the creation of a national accumulating capital through investment army, which gave the state more effective in the cultivation and processing of cotton control over the territory than ever before; in northern plains, especially around and the construction of the first national Kunduz. The state supported this effort by road system, which enabled the army to draining the malarial swamps and creating reach the major regional centres and also an irrigation system of dams on the Kunduz facilitated the growth of a trucking industry. River. It settled Pashtuns (naqilin) from When the road system was completed with other areas, as well as former nomads, in the opening of the Salang tunnel, it marked this region, where they grew rice and the first time that an all-weather road linked cotton, the latter purchased by the Spinzar the country’s north and south, a Cotton Company, a private company development that resulted in equalizing owned by Bank-i Milli. the price of wheat. The electrical grid was By the end of the Second World War, considerably expanded during this time, Afghanistan had a reserve of about US$300 and natural gas was extracted from 1967, million from external trade. A number of with 95 per cent of the total produced being industrial units were established and at exported to the Soviet Union. least two major agricultural development The gradual modernization of the economy projects, one in the north and another in was mirrored in the political arena, which the south, were launched. Starting in 1953, saw a Constitution finalized in 1964, a decade with Sardar Daud as Prime guaranteeing free elections, a free press, Minister witnessed the nationalization of and similar rights. By the end of the 1970s, private sector institutions and a number Afghanistan was considered a modern of state-guided initiatives for rapid state. economic growth. New settlement schemes and state industries as well as improved Educational opportunities and, to a lesser infrastructure were pursued, financed by degree, health services were expanded, external borrowing. Between 1956 and although limited to the relatively small 1979, the country's economic growth was urban sector, and leaving female enrolment guided by several five-year and seven- in schools and the growth of services in year plans aided by extensive foreign rural area lagging behind. Sardar Daud’s assistance, primarily from the Soviet Union investments in infrastructure created a and the United States. Roads, dams, power national market for the first time; however, plants, factories and irrigation projects his reliance on foreign aid led to were constructed, and the education system dependence on external support rather than expanded. The first five-year plan was locally generated private capital. This was launched in 1956, followed by the second not the last time in Afghanistan’s history five-year plan in 1962. Sardar Daud was that the economy came to be heavily successful in attracting foreign economic dependent on external assistance. interest, so much so that Afghanistan was The next decade saw Afghanistan’s then receiving the highest levels of foreign subsequent decision-makers vacillating technical assistance on a per capita basis between orientations towards Western of any country in the world. liberal economic policies (as in the Daud’s five-year plans were plagued by Republic proclaimed by Sardar Daud after the weaknesses of centralized economic deposing Zahir Shah in 1973), and then

166 Chapter 6 towards pro-Soviet socialist planning however, was concentrated in areas of the systems (prompted by a coup in 1978 and country taken over relatively early by the the Soviet invasion of 1979). The long Taliban, where trade barriers had been drawn-out war of Soviet occupation and removed and a certain degree of order subsequent internecine conflict severely restored. Subsequently, the deterioration damaged Afghanistan’s economy. By the in social services (particularly education) mid-1990s, most of the country’s limited was aggravated by the Taliban’s social modern infrastructure was destroyed, and policies, which excluded women from traditional irrigation systems were impaired work and girls from school. by damage and lack of maintenance. Even On the eve of the Taliban collapse, most more important was the progressive of the essential infrastructure had been breakdown of the state over time and the virtually destroyed, with none of the erosion of institutions – both modern and operational attributes of a modern state traditional. Government-provided social such as roads, electricity, services, which had never had much telecommunication, schools or transport. outreach into the rural areas, atrophied War, drought, and the resulting depletion and, to a large extent, stopped functioning. of social and human capital had made The Afghan economy – already reduced Afghanistan one of the poorest countries to a miserable state by years of conflict – in the world.3 continued its downslide during the Taliban Lessons regime, which saw not only the imposition of economic sanctions by the international Three trends stand out in the political community but also the longest and most economy of Afghanistan in the past 25 severe drought recorded in the history of years, all of which could serve as lessons Afghanistan. As the national market for the present: disintegrated, each region became more • The first lesson relates to the heavy integrated with the economy of its foreign reliance on foreign aid, and with it, neighbour, through migration, trade and the shifting in the orientation of the military alliances, while household economic policy from state planning incomes came to depend on remittances to a liberal market-based economy. from family members working abroad. Afghanistan’s strategic position during The war economy, with opium cultivation, the Cold War period made it a large foreign military subsidies and printing of recipient of foreign aid, which funded money to finance militias came into full the running of a centralized but bloom. relatively weak state without There was a modest economic recovery substantial domestic taxation. The in the mid-1990s in regions that were limited “modernization” of the Afghan largely free of conflict. Agricultural economy achieved by the end of 1970s production increased. The number of was heavily dependent on foreign assistance, while the limited domestic livestock herds rose sharply, taking revenue was used mainly for the advantage of widely available unutilized Administration and the Army. grazing lands; horticultural production also grew, based on restoration and expansion • The second lesson is that the various of orchards and vineyards. Substantial economic strategies did not create numbers of refugees returned to their home sufficient employment opportunities with international assistance. The recovery, for all members of the new class

3 Abdul Baqil Banwal 2004.

NHDR 04 167 created by the educational system. agencies of the United Nations, the WB While the education sector was used and ADB, also presented an investment for the public sector, different rulers document, Securing Afghanistan’s Future and their clients used ideologies, at the international meeting in Berlin on foreign aid and violence to eliminate “Afghanistan and the International their competitors for these niches. At Community – a Partnership for the Future”. the same time, strategies were The investment plan proposed actions systematically designed and across the major thematic areas of social implemented from the top through and human capital, physical infrastructure ruling elites, without consultations and natural resources, public administration with the people. reform and economic management, and trade, investment and the private sector • The third lesson involves the and security. The bill for these programmes systematic disinterest in rural was a sum of US$27.5 billion, required development in the country. Economic over the next seven years in the form of development consistently concentrated investments by the international on the urban areas at the expense of community in stability and peace-building the countryside. Largely as a result of in Afghanistan. The programme attracted foreign aid, the country had relatively an initial US$8 billion in assistance at the good infrastructure, including a major Berlin Conference, almost twice the road network as well as major support provided at the Tokyo Conference. irrigation and hydroelectric facilities. These agreements organized the priorities But these did not extend beyond the of the interim Government around three main arteries and urban centres. pillars of development: 6.3. The Present: Setting • Pillar 1: Human capital and social National Development protection. This was to assure Priorities conditions that allowed people to live secure lives and to ensure the The National Development formation of sustainable human Framework, National Priority capital. Programmes and Securing Afghanistan’s Future • Pillar 2: Physical infrastructure. This pillar would generate employment As Afghanistan turned a new page opportunities through public works following the removal of the Taliban, the programs such as rebuilding roads, interim Government, with remarkable and water sanitation projects. speed and with the help of the United • Pillar 3: An enabling environment for Nations and international financial development. This last pillar was institutions, was able to outline its main modified twice. Within the NDF, the “visions” for social and economic third pillar supported private-sector- development in the NDF. This was put led development as a distinct together in April 2002, shortly after the orientation of the economy. By March UN co-sponsored inter-ministerial 2004, a more realistic “enabling International Conference on environment” had come to mean the Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, rule of law and security, without held in January 2002 in Tokyo. The NDBs relinquishing commitments to the then translated the priorities of the NDF private sector. Within the budget, into concrete programmes and specific however, this did not include major projects. In March 2004, the Transitional items such as support to the new Administration, in partnership with Afghan Army and counter-narcotics

168 Chapter 6 and anti-mine action. It has shrunk programme implementation units to be led from about 10 per cent in the first by national professional programme budget projection to only a couple of managers and joint planning teams. percentage points of the total in the last projection. Afghanistan has now embarked on a phase of reforms prompted by the adoption of a The three pillars were first elaborated staff monitored programme with the through six National Priority Programmes, International Monetary Fund (IMF). These which were more than doubled by April reforms include the forthcoming 2004. preparation of a Poverty Reduction In addition to the National Priority Strategy Paper (PRSP) in cooperation with Programmes, the TISA also set up 16 the WB and other partners in the Public Investment Programmes co- international community, and a number of ordinated by a consultative group structural changes to the Administration mechanism created for each sector, with and to the macro-economic framework. the participation of key national The Ministry of Health and the Ministry institutions, donors and aid agencies of Rural Rehabilitation and Development working within that sector. Through the have entered into major purchaser-provider consultative group and budget processes, relationships for service delivery, and the the Government has moved to set the rules Ministry of Telecommunications is being by which donors, UN agencies and NGOs transformed into a regulator rather than will support its efforts. The new National continuing as a competitor with the private Priority Programmes are to be implemented sector.4 Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani through a system of steering committees also explained at the Berlin Conference consisting of a number of ministers, and that Afghanistan has completed the first

Box 6.1 National Priority Programmes

The new programmes being considered in the summer of 2004 were: • National Skills Development Priority Programme • National Rural and Urban Water (Drinking Water) Priority Programme • National Vulnerability Priority Programme • National Urban Priority Programme • National Agriculture Priority Programme • National Private Sector Priority Programme • National Justice and the Rule of Law Priority Programme These complemented the Government’s existing priority programmes listed below: • National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) • Irrigation and Power Programme • National Solidarity Programme (NSP) • Afghanistan Stabilization Programme • Transportation Programme • Feasibility Studies Programme • Education and Vocational Training • Health and Nutrition

4 Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, TISA at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

NHDR 04 169 phase of building a modern Ministry of of what he called “two internationally Finance, with reforms in the treasury, funded bureaucracies uneasily budgeting, and customs policy and cohabitating” one, a bilaterally and administration. An autonomous Central multilaterally funded national bureaucracy, Bank was established, and a new currency where Government civil servants are paid launched in 2002–2003. The Finance an average of US$60 a month, and the Ministry also reversed a long policy of other centred on the UN agencies, other overdraft financing through printing donors and NGOs, in which Afghans earn money, and has taken major steps to an average salary of over US$1,000 per 5 centralize revenue from the provinces. month. To overcome the human capital The minister added also that carrying such crisis in Afghanistan, the Government is reforms forward requires addressing “head- now proposing a lateral entry programme on the cancer of corruption and the weak of recruiting over 1,000 senior managers capacity of the Government.” The from outside Government on contracts at weakness is compounded by the problem market competitive salaries, but other short-

Figure 6.1: Consultative Group Mechanism

Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) (National Budget)

Consultative Group Standing Committee (CGSC)

Consultative Groups Advisory Groups Pillar I* Pillar II** Pillar III*** Cross Cutting Issues

1.1 Refugees and IDPs 2.1 Transport 3.1 Trade and Investment A.1 Gender

1.2 Education and Vocational 3.2 Public Admin and Economic A.2 Environment Training 2.2 Energy, Mining and Telecom Management

2.3 Natural Resources 1.3 Health and Nutrition Management 3.3 Justice A.3 Humanitarian Affairs

1.4 Livelihood and Social 2.4 Urban Management 3.4º National Police, Law A.4 Human Rights Protection Enforcement and Stabilization

1.5 Culture, Media and Sport 3.5º Afghan National Army A.5 Monitoring & Evaluation

3.6º Mine Action A.6 Counter Narcotics LEGEND 3.7º DDR * Human Capital and Social Protection ** Physical Infrastructure *** Enabling Environment for Development º National Security Programmes

5 Ibid.

170 Chapter 6 and medium-term solutions are urgently through the Transitional needed to address this discrepancy. Administration, and through A Consistent Bureaucracy increasingly strengthened ministry portfolios, provided confidence. The The rationale behind the identification of design of the programme broad priorities, programmes, budgets and implementation units promised the implementation mechanisms in the state- recruitment of competent national building exercise of Afghanistan has been professionals. the urgent need to set up a structure that • The broadening of the National responds adequately to the large amount Priority Programmes, both in scope of resources that the new Government was and quantity, was a sign of confidence promised by the international community. in the ability to deliver, as well as a The response has been the creation of a strategic intent to move away from bureaucracy familiar to international relief and rehabilitation projects to agencies and tested in other post-conflict sustainable development, especially countries, which could accelerate delivery in rural areas. As such, the through coordination mechanisms between transformation and expansion were national and international structures. In consistent with the evolution of the this rush, however, although all “adequate” state-building process in the past two structures of a strong centralized years. Government were set up on paper, an important step had to be sacrificed, given • Moving from a short-term relief problems of security, timing, capacity and project modality to longer term infrastructure: consultation with the programming expanded the necessary ultimate beneficiaries – the people and timeframe. Securing Afghanistan’s communities – especially those living Future proposed a strategy of growth outside of Kabul. and development consistent with the Government’s commitments to Consultation was systematically hampered reaching the MDGs by 2015, and the by imminent threats to disintegration of new National Priority Programmes the state, the urgency of vast amounts of were designed with five- to –15-year aid, insecurity and the Government’s lack plans and objectives, with a rolling of legitimacy outside of the capital. programme comprising annual sets of Establishing the rules of the new state was realistic objectives and budgets. the priority, given the dangerous political Although avoiding the word vacuum. Nevertheless, concerns remain “planning”, which was reminiscent of about the sustainability of top-down and the failed five-year plans of pre-war outside-led structures, which fail to Governments, long-term embrace broad participation. “programming” cast a more realistic The structures and mechanisms set up by framework for reconstruction needs. the Government were meant to answer the • Transparency and accountability were reconstruction needs of a devastated also boosted. Requirements for country: reporting on procurement, progress, • Structures and strategies were designed financial management and so on were to mobilize national capacity so that designed through a number of the Government could manage its own oversight committees at different policies and programmes in levels, including the Cabinet. partnership with the donor community. Furthermore, the Transitional Leadership, both of the overall process Administration set up a central Web

NHDR 04 171 site, an expression of its commitment in the country as well as the revenue to share information openly with its collection from the regions. international and national partners, • Partnership was among the targets of and with the Afghan people. This Web the new National Priority Programmes, site, which has complemented the sites which seek to provide points of of the Office of the President and other collaboration around national policies line ministries, contains the major between the Government, donors, the documents prepared by the private sector, NGOs and Government (such as the NDB), and communities. from the major international conferences on reconstruction. Most Afghanistan has been unique in comparison of the documents, however, are in with other post-conflict situations, where English, a reflection of the intended donors have been reluctant to finance core audience. The site also contains a budget and recurrent costs of a newly Donor Assistance Database (DAD), established Transitional Administration supported by UNDP, which provides because of the lack of control over funding a tool for tracking reconstruction and or inability to show visible results. The humanitarian projects in Afghanistan. Ministry of Finance in Afghanistan It contains information on where managed to mobilize support and trust projects are operating, who finances through creating the database on donors, them, and which organization are and by instituting a broad consultative implementing them. process for the preparation of the NDB. • Consistent with the arguments However, the two main shortcomings of presented in this NHDR that threats development strategies designed by the to human security cannot be transitional Government were the lack of prioritized, the various National broad-based participation and the scant Priority Programs were not designed attention paid to the root causes of to favour some over the other. In fact, inequalities in Afghanistan. they constituted a list of development Analysis of the Priorities from the needs identified by different ministries rather than an identification of Human Development and Human priorities. Budget allocations, donor Security Point of View interest, and the capacity of responsible Using as the framework of analysis the institutions may, on the other hand, four principles of human development lead to a sequential delivery and outlined in Chapter 1 of this report prioritization of programmes. (efficiency, equity, sustainability and • Coordination was further boosted. By empowerment), the following sections mid-2003, the Ministry of Finance analyse the transitional Government’s oversaw the coordination of donor aid, overall development vision as outlined in organized now through a budget the NDF and further elaborated in Securing process, while insisting on complete Afghanistan’s Future, as well as the information from aid organizations on National Priority Programmes, in order to the total inflow of aid. This draw lessons for future visions of the new coordination led to a coherent set of Government. long-term priorities projected for three Efficiency fiscal years (2003–2005) in the development budget. The Ministry of Strong commitments to efficiency can be Finance took an increasingly important recognized in both the priority given to lead in coordinating both the aid flows economic growth and a core emphasis on

172 Chapter 6 institutional and financial accountability. The solution to the problem of absorption Securing Afghanistan’s Future argued that capacity has been sought in the sub- although a number of key structural and contracting of private international firms systemic reforms had been carried out, for various functions, ranging from much still needed to be done. If construction to accounting. This, however, Afghanistan is to grow out of poverty, a could prove costly and unsustainable. drug-dependent economy and an Building national capacity – and not environment of insecurity, an annual “importing” it, is a long-term and difficult growth rate of at least nine per cent will task that requires adequate solutions from be required. This level of growth is planned the incoming Government. through a macro-economic framework that Equity allow for broad-based development, financial and trade reforms, and the Commitments to equity are sought through simplification of banking and investment a distribution of resources and laws, trade and customs rates among others. opportunities regionally and across All reforms are premised on commitments vulnerable populations. As the outline of to an economic policy of market the National Priority Programmes states: integration, liberal trade, the promotion of “Each NPP will be designed with the the private sector as an engine for growth, Cabinet approved principle of social equity and a key “enabling” role for the state. in mind, and should also be capable of reporting its expenditures and impact in Efficiency is also ensured through plans terms of provincial equity.” Furthermore, for core state capacity in managing fiscal various Government strategies emphasize and public administration: transparency in support for the social protection of the the management of resources; the creation poorest sections of society – those below of high-level decision-making capacity by the poverty line, the disabled, female- putting in place a core group of public headed households and the elderly, in servants, supported by international particular. advisors, while recognizing long delays in the planned broad-based civil service Yet, adhering to principles of regional or reform; the establishment of a budgetary social equity is problematic when the real process and identifiable payroll registers needs of different communities have not for the public service; and economies of been properly assessed. Strategies may not scale through large programmes rather have benefited from adequate participation than fragmented projects. in the design and implementation processes, given problems of lack of Despite these efforts, however, the capacity and insecurity, which have efficiency of the system is in question, hampered consultation, and the urgent given constraints on revenues as the need to draw up plans for attracting peripheral provinces continue to collect international investment. Furthermore, the revenues without adequate submission to existing development strategies do not the treasury single account. The efficiency have as an explicit goal or primary of the planned programmes is also objective the eradication of horizontal questioned in view of the costly strategies inequalities. Specific attention must be adopted in the short term. A market paid to the equitable distribution of existing approach to building absorptive capacity resources within the upcoming PRSP, in the public and private sector has led to which the Government will begin preparing the extensive use of foreign experts to in 2005. enhance the ministries’ capacity to channel large amounts of foreign aid to The Government seeks to integrate best implementing reconstruction programmes. practices from free market economies by

NHDR 04 173 focusing on economic growth, while also • Emphasis on infrastructure-building, ensuring social inclusion of all groups and including transportation and providing social protection for those not communication systems. able to participate in that growth. Crucial Although there are formidable challenges importance is being accorded to the forces to raising national revenues in an of a market economy in all of environment of insecurity, lack of central Afghanistan’s development strategies. Yet authority, and the presence of regional as experience shows in a number of power-holders with private armies and developing or post-conflict countries vested interests, nevertheless, the main around the world, a market approach to concerns in terms of sustainability are the reconstruction and development policies heavy dependence on external funding of may inevitably have a number of negative both the development and the operational externalities, which policy makers in budgets of the Government. At the Afghanistan must be aware of – widening moment, there is a plan to get internal inequalities, large pockets of poverty, revenues up to over US$1 billion annually limited provision of social and public in the next five years thorough customs goods, and high levels of crime. For and international transit, tolls, Afghanistan, a market approach to communications, airspace licensing and reconstruction may fail to incorporate the fuels. root causes of the conflict: unequal distribution and competition over Another fundamental challenge is to ensure resources, lack of inclusion, poor political the adequate provision of public goods accountability and legitimacy, among and services through national and sub- others. national departments. Afghanistan’s reconstruction plans are based on a model Sustainability where the state is a regulator that manages Commitments to principles of services and does not provide them. In sustainability are expressed through a many cases, services are provided via number of explicit objectives. Among NGOs and UN agencies. For example, key these, the NHDR recognises four areas: national programmes for improving livelihoods and social protection, while • Priority investments in human capital: managed by Government ministries, have The Government’s vision for involved the competitive contracting of investments in human and social implementation services by non- capital is “to create the conditions governmental agencies. These include the necessary for the people of NSP, NEEP, Protracted Relief and Afghanistan to secure sustainable Recovery Operation and Micro-finance livelihoods in the legal economy and Support Facility. Inevitably, during the to lay the foundations for the formation first two years of reconstruction, there was of long-term human development.”6 a tendency for international assistance to • Dealing with security and the rule of seek opportunities for small manageable law as fundamental pre-requisites for projects to stave off a potential political normalization, national humanitarian crisis and ensure the delivery reconciliation, social development and of immediate and visible benefits to the reconstruction. people of Afghanistan. It was increasingly recognized, however, that projects are • Emphasis on national capacity- rarely effective or their impact sustainable, building.

6 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.

174 Chapter 6 unless they are embedded in emerging problem of security; the credibility of national policy and programme state institutions outside of Kabul; the frameworks. In this way, it is hoped that rush with which strategies and National Priority Programmes will promote programmes were designed to meet better outreach, transparency and a more large funding conferences; and the accountable use of resources. emphasis on preparing documentation in English by foreign advisors, which Participation and Empowerment alienated by default the majority of With strong commitments to social and the population. The Loya Jirgah, human capital, protection of the poor and although a traditional consultative emphasis on private sector development mechanism, was consulted only for through provision of infrastructure and the overall structure of the transitional micro-credit support to the rural poor and Government and the Constitution, women, the development visions seek to while development strategies such as ensure the empowerment of the people of the NDB, NDF and Securing Afghanistan. The NDF and Securing Afghanistan’s Future were presented Afghanistan’s Future lay a strong emphasis to representatives as a fait accompli. on community participation. As the latter As the state-building process matures notes, community action, involvement, in the next few years, top-down and therefore ownership will be key to the development strategies need to be security and sustainability of reconstruction complemented with bottom-up efforts. Enhancing community participation consultation in order to be designed can promote the effectiveness and to ensure implementation among a efficiency of implementation. The partisan population. Government can best convince • Participation in the implementation: communities of its legitimate leadership Initiatives such as the NSP (involving through the provision of support to block grants to communities) and communities in ways that empower them, NEEP (comprising labour-intensive such as the NSP. emergency-oriented projects) have Three variables can be used for analysing been designed precisely in order to the national development priorities in engage communities and distribute Afghanistan from the viewpoint of opportunities throughout the country. participation and empowerment: the These programmes are key for participation in the design of the strategies; demonstrating the peace dividend to empowerment through participation in the people in a tangible and visible way. implementation process; and mechanisms Accelerating them is imperative for for checks and balances by communities engagement of communities in the and civil society. reconstruction process. • Participation in the elaboration of • Checks and balances: Modalities to strategies: This report notes that one ensure transparency, visibility and of the most significant shortcomings accountability of the National Priority of the development prioritization Programmes to the general public are exercises has been the lack of adequate provided through a system to “enable consultation with communities, community, society and press especially outside of the capital. investigations”.7 The implementation Imperfect consultation has been a of these modalities, however, requires

7 Outline of the NPP, Development Forum.

NHDR 04 175 the empowerment of civil society, and soldiers. This is significant because, for a free and responsible press. In the many combatants, soldiering is no more absence of adequate consultation and than a lucrative job opportunity, a way to information sharing, it is difficult to escape debilitating poverty. Demobilization assess how civil society can act as an plans must ensure the full involvement of effective watchdog. local communities and recognize and A Human Security Analysis of reinforce local reconciliation processes. Voluntary demobilization should be Strategic Visions encouraged, particularly focusing on how Concern for human security in Afghanistan to best reduce and/or eliminate warring takes an important place in the general incentives. Given the levels of goals and priority areas of the NDF, even impoverishment of the population, plans though the notion is not mentioned must largely be based on economic support explicitly. As the framework underlines: to communities, rather than on targeting “Our vision of security, however, is broader ex-combatants as a special group. The than the services provided by the security launching of national reconciliation sector to the citizens. Security of livelihood initiatives and peace education campaigns is critical to our endeavour, to eliminate contributes to enhancing confidence- poverty, to provide social justice, remove building. barriers to inclusion and to create a society As far as food and health security are where all citizens are provided with access concerned, the NDF recognizes the to equality of opportunity.”8 immediate need to address the questions The NDF emphasizes that ensuring public of malnutrition and health of the Afghan safety is key to the success of the population. According to the strategy “there reconstruction process: “The Afghan state is a major nutritional challenge ahead that must have a legitimate monopoly of requires urgent actions to halt deaths due violence, a corollary of which is that its to malnutrition”.11 To meet this urgent citizens will not need to pay the cost of challenge, the framework underscores the importance of “improving the basic protection as individuals.”9 Securing Afghanistan’s Future outlines a much more package provided under humanitarian detailed and integrated proposal, the so- assistance... and distributing these to called National Security Framework, which populations where the information on 12 calls for improvement in the management chronic malnutrition is up-to-date”. Future and implementation of the following development agendas may also want to elements: police forces; counter-narcotic consider the provision of trauma and actions; the national Army; justice; human mental health care to the population as part of health security. Psychological care rights; DDR and de-mining.10 In order to ensure this, future development visions and counselling are crucial to overcome must stress the question of personal the traumatic experiences of the long period security by designing an effective DDR of conflict. strategy for ex-combatants, which would The Afghan Government is well aware of include the simultaneous collection of the importance of launching rehabilitation arms, education and vocational training, and reconstruction at the earliest possible and economic opportunities for former time in order to ensure social and economic

8 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b. 9 Ibid. 10 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

176 Chapter 6 security. The NDF identifies detailed wide poverty reduction process focused investment and development strategies to on this sector. rehabilitate basic infrastructure in Securing Afghanistan’s Future also Afghanistan, such as roads, housing, power recognizes the importance of and transportation. One of the main goals comprehensive social protection policies, of the reconstruction of the infrastructure especially for the most vulnerable and is to create an efficient, affordable transport poor. As such, it highlights that the system that enables “people, commodities, Government’s Livelihoods and Social and ideas to move and connect”.13 The Protection Public Investment Programme framework includes the construction of a is “to enhance human security and promote network of roads connecting the different the reduction of poverty. It aims at parts of Afghanistan, and air transportation, empowering and supporting the poorest all of which could greatly improve job and most vulnerable people in Afghanistan, security. thereby helping individuals, households, The NDF also addresses the need for a and communities to better manage risk social protection policy to cater to people through both supporting sustainable with disabilities and vulnerable livelihood strategies and direct provision populations, particularly women and of assistance to people who are unable to orphans, as well as Government employees help themselves.”16 However, people with and pensioners.14 The document identifies disabilities suffer from consistent under- provision of employment and livelihood, funding and lack of attention by the as well as protection from abuse and Government. A specific disability and neglect, as essential elements of the social vulnerability programme could be protection policy.15 Securing Afghanistan’s developed as part of the future PRSP. Future stresses the importance of theThe NDF looks at the need for providing quality of economic growth, which should the population with shelter and housing,17 be aimed at improving social indicators but no concrete programmes have been without a significant deterioration in designed so far. As to the provision of income distribution. power, the framework emphasizes that its Securing Afghanistan’s Future aims at goal is “to provide power to households, abolishing the drug economy, and therefore enterprises and government – especially sees a crucial need to provide those for health and education – by harnessing involved in opium poppy cultivation with various sources of energy”, including viable alternatives. It has identified the natural gas, coal, petroleum and other agricultural sector as a primary option, for alternative sources such as solar and wind which alternative livelihoods policies energy. However, there is a crucial need should be shaped as part of a successful to improve the production, transmission 18 counter-narcotics strategy. Agriculture has and delivery of power to the people. been recognized as the traditional economic Finally, two very important development activity of most Afghans, who issues stressed by the framework are to consequently have the needed skills at ensure water supply for domestic use and their disposal to be included in a country- agriculture, and to create sewage systems

13 Ibid. 14 Government employees and pensioners fall within this category of vulnerable as their current incomes are below one dollar a day. See National Development Framework. 15 TISA, National Development Framework, 2002b. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

NHDR 04 177 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 11, February 2004

and improve rural sanitation. Yet the build a minimal level of trust among the proposal outlined by the NDB for these people and make peaceful coexistence services takes little account of the needs possible. Measures suggested globally by in rural areas, focusing instead on Kabul the Commission on Human Security and other main cities. While, for instance, include: the budget envisaged US$8 million for • Ending impunity through the setting supplying drinking water in Kabul for the up of tribunals and the involvement 1382 (2004) budget, a total of only US$9 of traditional justice processes. million was envisioned for six other major cities in Afghanistan. The rural areas were • Establishing truth through the creation not even mentioned.19 of truth commissions, as was done in many Latin American countries and Securing Afghanistan’s Future underlines South Africa, for instance, along with the importance of environmental the restoration of the dignity of victims, preservation and regeneration. Future especially women in the Afghan case. development visions should tackle environmental security in more detail, • Promoting coexistence by encouraging given the dangers in Afghanistan of long-term community-based drought and other natural disasters. initiatives. The question of reconciliation and • Announcing amnesties for lesser crimes community security is crucial in order to and assuring reparation for victims.

19 TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

178 Chapter 6 Yet, the NDF does not address the issue Coordination Authority (AACA) estimated of community security at all. Future that in 2002 and 2003, over 50 per cent of development visions may need to be aid had gone for humanitarian purposes considered based on analyses of the roots and aid co-ordination.21 of the conflict, in order to confront this concern. In March 2004, Securing Afghanistan’s Future attempted to remedy the flaws of Financing Human Development international funding: first, by presenting the international donor community with a An analysis of the NDB from the human figure closer to the actual needs of development point of view would require Afghanistan; and second, by making analysing the percentage of the budget international assistance more focused on devoted to social and human priorities reconstruction and development. The stated against other sectors, as well as against purpose of the report was to outline the indented outcomes and impacts. A budget analysis would enable policy-makers in public investment and associated fiscal Afghanistan to determine what they should costs required for economic growth and a allocate as a percentage of GDP for social financially viable state. It emphasizes that priorities to promote human development the figure requested “... is an investment and progress towards the MDGs. It is by the international community in stability hoped that such a budget analysis will be and peace-building at the local, regional carried out in future NHDRs for and global levels. This funding should not Afghanistan, as more information is made be viewed as charity, but as an investment available on human development designed to lower the defense and security indicators. spending of major nations, and reduce the risks of major terrorist incidents globally. An analysis of the budget in Afghanistan It should also be seen in the context of the must point to two different but related cost of existing investments in Afghanistan, areas of activity: the supply of money including over US$13 billion per year that pledged by the international community, is spent on Coalition and ISAF. It must and the demands of the Government, as also be seen in the context that more than outlined in NDB processes. US$2 billion has been spent over the last The Supply 24 months to avoid the humanitarian emergencies that a failed state has no At the first pledging conference in Tokyo capacity to address.”22 in 2002, the international community committed some US$4.5 billion for three The total external financing requirement years. Although the amount pledged in allocated over the next seven years and Tokyo was the biggest sum of foreign spent over 12 was estimated at US$27.5 assistance ever promised to Afghanistan, billion with an additional US$2.9 billion it came under criticism for its flaws and needed to support the recurrent budget, as inadequacies. The main criticism was that Afghanistan moves to self-sufficiency. the US$75 per person per year pledged to The Transitional Administration estimated Afghanistan was considerably lower than investments in physical infrastructure and the average US$250 per person pledged natural resources to be US$13.4 billion, to other post-war settings, such as Rwanda, or 54 per cent of the total; human and Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.20 social protection at just under US$7 billion, Furthermore, the Afghan Assistance or 28 per cent of the total; and in security

20 CARE / Center on International Cooperation, 2003. 21 Ibid. 22 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004d.

NHDR 04 179 and private sector development, including recovery did not amount to the most public administration, at just over US$4 appropriate and responsive answer to billion, or 18 per cent of the total. Afghanistan’s needs, and that ad hoc project design did not deliver effective Against these calculations, the Afghan results, which is what mattered the most Government managed to get a pledge of to ordinary Afghans. This led the US$8.2 billion for the next three years. Administration to take increasingly greater For the 2005 fiscal year, donors pledged control over the allocation of scarce US$4.5 billion compared to the US$4.4 resources, and the series of national billion the country was seeking, but that investment programmes with benchmarks also meant that for the subsequent two and clear indicators with which to judge years, only US$3.7 billion was promised. success was presented to the international Although short of the budget requested, community in March 2003. The level of this pledge was hailed both by the Afghan sophistication in preparing the budget Government and the international improved rapidly, with the budget being community as a great success. Many used increasingly to allocate both cash and lessons had been learned since Tokyo, not in-kind contributions to the Government’s the least of which was the organization of highest-priority tasks. Perhaps one of the the demand side of costs by the Afghans. most important achievements was to focus The Demand: The National Development on a medium-term expenditure framework, Budget (NDB) as opposed to the one-year time horizon that donors had imposed during the first Afghanistan’s new Government came a two years of reconstruction. long way in installing the budget as a central instrument of policy and resource In 2002–2003, a total of US$83 million in allocation decisions. The first NDB 1381- domestic revenue was generated against 1382 (2002-2003) suffered from limited an ordinary budget of US$350 million. experience and pressure for rapid During that time, months passed when the implementation and quick decision- Ministry of Finance had insufficient making, as a trade-off for limited resources to pay the very meagre wages – consultation processes and national around US$40 per month – of its civil ownership. The Government then foresaw servants. In the fiscal year ending March the need to establish appropriate 20, 2004, and against an ordinary budget procurement and financial systems as a of US$550 million, the Administration top priority, and hired internationally pledged to achieve revenue earnings of recognized firms such as KPMG to help US$200 million – a target it was able to ensure openness and accountability. The meet. establishment of the budget also meant While foreign assistance is vital, it is no that donor governments could now either substitute for domestic financing of directly support the general budget or their sustainable human development. In 2004, specific projects, or make contributions to external financing amounted to about US$5 trust funds in line with their priorities. billion, with more than 90 per cent of the The rationale behind creating a NDB was Government budget externally financed. that the experience of the first year of The key for the future will be domestic reconstruction showed that the international revenue mobilization, so that Afghanistan community, not the Afghans, owned the does not continue to rely on the reconstruction process. The Administration international community to pay for argued that the sum total of the various operating expenses. In 2003, Afghanistan donor- and UN-driven strategies for was able to meet its revenue target of

180 Chapter 6 US$200 million, a 50 per cent increase in For the ordinary budget, improvements collections over the previous year. For already underway during the 1383 (2004) 2004, the revenue target set by the budget include building core capacities Government was US$309 million, while within the line ministries and establishing the IMF-Government sponsored Staff greater control over staffing, particularly Monitored Programme (which monitors for security sector institutions. The ordinary external borrowings) had set a revenue budget will continue to reflect an input target of US$256 million. The challenge orientation, while ministries will be asked for Afghanistan is to expand the economy this year for information on ministry goals and strengthen the revenue collection so and objectives as a first step towards that domestic revenues could eventually programme budgeting. In the coming years, fund operating expenditures. Self- a fiscal framework will be established sustainability is the goal that Afghanistan around a macro-economic model, and has set for itself and its international expenditures levels will be allocated to partners. ministries for national programmes. In my opinion, the best possible source of Government Resources (US$ million) 1380 (2001) – 1382 (2003) financing our Domestic Revenue 348.6 reconstruction and development goals is International Assistance 1,186.9 number 5. However, Total Government Resources 1,535.5 number 12, and 14 are N.B. Domestic Revenue figures based on exchange rate of US$1= 48 Afs. a matter of discussion, Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, 24 May 2004. while the rest of the resources may not be desirable for Box 6.2 Afghanistan and therefore not feasible. Financing Development Said Mubin Shah, NHDR Possible scenarios for financing the development needs in Afghanistan: background paper on economy, 2004 1 - Only aid 2 - Domestic resources together with aid 3 - Only foreign investment 4 - Domestic resources with foreign investment 5 - Domestic resources together with foreign investment and aid 6 - Only debt 7 - Domestic resources with debt 8 - Domestic resources with debt and foreign investment 9 - Debt with foreign investment and aid 10 - Debt with foreign investment 11 - Debt with aid 12 - Domestic resources with debt, aid and foreign investment 13 - Domestic resources with the creation of new money (monetization) 14 - Cutting Government expenditure

NHDR 04 181 Investments in Human Development limited ability of the Administration in the initial years to have a significant impact. A preliminary analysis of the first NDB 1381 (2002) - 1382 (2003) concludes that The NDF gives high priority to human public spending on social priorities – resource development (education), health including basic education, health care, care and social development as important means by which Afghans could effectively nutrition, as well as water supply and participate in the rebuilding process. These sanitation is inadequate. sectors also support employment. The Currently, investments in the security relatively high priority given to education sector, infrastructure and natural resources programmes in the reconstruction agenda outweigh those in the social sectors. This is evident from the high budgetary imbalance will need to be addressed as allocation to this sector. The total budget Government capacities increase. While for 1381 (2002)–1382 (2003) amounted to approximately US$509 million. the proposed proportion of direct public However, 82 per cent of this projection spending on human and social security is was not met.24 only 28 per cent of total spending, the seven-year programme recognizes the 6.4. A Future of Human Security primacy of security sector reforms and the Consensus on the Future: Targets provision of infrastructure for growth of of the MDGs? the private sector as a precondition for human and social security. Investments in In order to move forward at this stage of health and education, as well as the state-building in Afghanistan, the question, provisions of basic services such as water now that presidential elections are over, and sanitation, focus initially on policy is: What should be a responsible agenda and institutional reforms, cognizant of the for the new Government?

Chart 6.1: Sectoral Components of the Development Budget 1383 (2004) – 1389 (2010)23

Pillar 1: Human and Social Protection 6,896 1.1 Refugee return 155 1.2 Education 2,703 1.3 Health and nutrition 1,368 US$ Million - total commitments 1.4 Rural livelihoods and social protection 2,272 28% 1.5 Culture / media / sports 400 GRAND TOTAL 24,678

54% Pillar 3: Security and the Private Sector 4,353 3.1 Trade and investment 690 18% 3.2 Public admin and eco management 1,082 3.3 Justice 93 Pillar 2: Physical Infrastr. and Natural Resources 13,429 3.4 Police, law enforcement 645 3.5 National Army 1,043 2.1 Transport 6,136 3.6 DDR 216 2.2 Energy, mining, telecommunications 3,606 3.7 Counter Narcotics 164 2.3 Natural resources 1,849 3.8 Mine action 420 2.4 Urban management 1,839

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

23 Ibid. 24 TISA, National Development Budget 1381-1382, 2002a.

182 Chapter 6 Table 6.1.1: Operating Budget Expenditures 1381 (2002) Ministry Personal Services Tools and Maintenance Land, Subsidies, Total Emoluments Materials and Repairs Structures and Grants and Equipment Pensions President's Office 41.8 29.1 111.6 41.9 31.1 65.5 321.0 Supreme Court 61.8 5.0 5.4 1.1 7.8 1.1 82.2 Ministry of Finance 119.1 8.7 20.1 18.1 14.2 45.1 226.3 Ministry of Defence 1,806.4 62.1 1,866.5 85.5 275.3 54.5 4,150.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 98.7 101.2 11.8 3.4 5.3 1.1 221.6 Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj 83.8 4.9 2.9 1.6 5.3 4.6 103.1 Ministry of Commerce 107.8 2.8 1.1 0.2 1.0 300.3 413.1 Ministry of Interior 1,067.9 121.1 1,512.0 37.2 346.9 21.2 3,106.3 Ministry of Education 1,332.0 4.8 12.2 2.9 3.6 18.9 1,374.3 Ministry of Higher Education 125.4 5.3 58.3 1.7 10.1 6.7 207.5 Ministry of Return of Refugees 9.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 10.4 Ministry of Repatriates 0.5 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.0 3.4 Ministry of Planning 11.2 1.4 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.2 15.7 Ministry of Mines and Industries 20.1 5.7 1.2 0.8 1.7 6.2 35.7 Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs 5.7 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.2 78.6 89.4 Ministry of Communication 81.0 43.2 7.2 1.3 1.6 6.7 141.0 Ministry of Reconstruction 5.8 1.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.8 9.1 Ministry of Information and Culture 99.8 32.1 16.0 4.0 18.9 0.5 171.3 Ministry of Health 321.3 34.0 318.9 10.4 53.3 0.8 738.6 Ministry of Women's Affairs 12.2 0.8 1.9 0.3 0.6 1.0 16.8 Ministry of Agriculture 92.7 4.9 60.1 10.2 25.2 7.4 200.5 Ministry of Irrigation and Water 43.1 3.0 4.6 2.4 8.5 2.1 63.6 Ministry of Water and Power 62.1 1.8 1.3 0.8 116.9 0.3 183.2 Ministry of Public Works 70.5 4.2 4.0 0.3 34.3 3.4 116.7 Ministry of Rural Development 33.2 1.1 2.9 0.7 0.0 1.7 39.7 Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled 27.2 4.1 11.1 0.2 6.7 47.9 97.3 Ministry of Transport 57.6 1.5 1.0 0.1 1.7 1.3 63.2 Ministry of Frontiers 16.7 1.8 5.0 0.8 6.9 2.2 33.5 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 76.5 6.8 30.7 0.6 21.1 24.6 160.3 Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism 49.4 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.7 55.8 Minisry of Urban Development 43.1 1.6 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.6 47.6 Ministry of Justice 18.4 2.0 4.2 4.8 3.8 2.3 35.5 Counter Narcotics 3.0 1.9 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.1 7.4 Science Academy 12.5 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 17.2 National Olympics Committee 2.8 3.5 0.4 0.0 105.7 2.5 115.0 Geodesy and Cartography 11.6 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 15.9 Central Statistics Office (CSO) 10.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7 13.0 National Security 286.0 53.4 230.4 50.0 74.2 16.3 710.3 Attorney General 73.3 3.6 23.6 1.7 12.9 1.5 116.6 Enterprise Assessment Commission (1) 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.2 3.8 0.1 5.6 Prime Minister's Office (1) 16.7 2.3 3.1 1.2 1.7 0.4 25.4 Civil Service Commission (2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 6,419.1 567.0 4,336.6 291.6 1,211.8 733.9 13,560.2 Total in US$m 133.7 11.8 90.3 6.1 25.2 15.3 282.5 1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister’s office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget. 2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382. 3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

NHDR 04 183 Table 6.1.2: Operating Budget Expenditures 1382 (2003) Ministry Personal Services Tools and Maintenance Land, Subsidies, Total Emoluments Materials and Repairs Structures & Grants & Equipment Pensions President's Office 236.2 59.0 197.8 117.0 26.8 53.4 690.2 Supreme Court 103.2 3.7 14.7 3.8 9.2 1.5 136.2 Ministry of Finance 172.8 20.3 29.2 14.7 30.1 32.1 299.2 Ministry of Defence 3,105.4 74.5 1,546.3 124.4 561.5 9.3 5,421.5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 376.5 260.1 28.4 66.3 173.0 21.9 926.2 Ministry of Religious Affairs and Haj 178.8 7.1 4.7 5.8 7.6 1.7 205.9 Ministry of Commerce 33.7 6.4 4.1 0.6 82.7 0.2 127.8 Ministry of Interior 1,816.3 50.1 1,391.5 282.6 1,038.7 256.8 4,836.0 Ministry of Education 3,275.0 25.7 73.0 28.5 40.1 3.4 3,445.8 Ministry of Higher Education 176.6 8.5 137.9 7.9 7.4 2.1 340.3 Ministry of Return of Refugees 41.3 11.9 11.2 3.0 6.6 2.1 76.2 Ministry of Repatriates 0.9 1.7 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.0 4.6 Ministry of Planning 16.3 2.5 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 21.8 Ministry of Mines and Industries 97.9 3.4 2.6 1.2 116.2 1.4 222.6 Ministry of Light Industries and Foodstuffs 16.1 4.4 1.8 3.6 2.4 118.2 146.5 Ministry of Communication 106.4 64.6 15.6 5.6 44.7 2.4 239.4 Ministry of Reconstruction 16.5 47.9 6.3 18.3 8.9 0.4 98.4 Ministry of Information and Culture 137.3 25.0 16.0 11.2 24.5 10.3 224.3 Ministry of Health 476.1 37.4 478.5 19.9 53.0 0.3 1,065.2 Ministry of Women's Affairs 24.7 2.3 2.0 0.6 0.9 0.4 30.9 Ministry of Agriculture 256.1 13.7 19.1 16.6 53.9 51.6 411.0 Ministry of Irrigation and Water 57.7 8.3 9.8 2.7 9.0 0.6 88.0 Ministry of Water and Power 21.3 4.3 4.5 2.6 125.3 1.1 159.1 Ministry of Public Works 77.3 4.1 21.6 10.4 157.3 0.6 270.3 Ministry of Rural Development 42.4 5.8 7.8 5.0 317.7 2.3 381.0 Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled 37.7 7.0 4.5 0.8 3.7 281.5 335.2 Ministry of Transport 35.6 2.4 2.4 0.5 2.9 0.2 44.0 Ministry of Frontiers 128.5 5.2 31.1 2.9 8.6 2.7 178.9 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 148.4 12.2 83.2 0.8 3.2 8.6 256.5 Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism 36.7 2.6 2.1 5.2 6.1 0.2 52.8 Minisry of Urban Development 14.5 2.1 2.5 1.9 1.1 0.6 22.8 Ministry of Justice 110.1 14.0 101.7 20.1 27.8 6.6 280.3 Counter Narcotics 3.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 4.0 0.0 9.1 Science Academy 17.1 5.2 1.0 1.8 0.9 0.0 26.0 National Olympics Committee 21.3 4.4 22.0 3.6 8.7 0.7 60.8 Geodesy and Cartography 21.3 3.5 3.0 1.5 4.0 0.1 33.4 Central Statistics Office (CSO) 21.8 2.1 1.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 26.7 National Security 314.4 8.3 238.0 10.4 11.2 0.5 582.8 Attorney General 144.1 4.9 16.9 2.9 14.5 0.1 183.4 Enterprise Assessment Commission (1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Prime Minister's Office (1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Civil Service Commission (2) 17.2 1.5 4.2 2.6 17.2 2.3 44.9 Total 11,934.9 828.7 4,539.6 808.4 3,015.1 879.2 22,006.0 Total in US$m 248.6 17.3 94.6 16.8 62.8 18.3 458.5 1. In 1382 the Enterprise Assessment Commission and the Prime Minister’s office was included in the Administrative Affairs budget. 2. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was created in 1382. 3. Figures based on exchange rate of US$ 1 equals 48 Afs. Note that this is an approximation, as the exchange rate fluctuated during both 1381 and 1382.

184 Chapter 6 In 2004, the Transitional Administration inherent relationship between the MDGs declared its intentions to achieve the and human security is like that of the MDGs, eight specific goals and a series chicken and egg conundrum.26 of related targets that emerged from a Deprivations in the basic dimensions of global agreement signed by 189 countries development also represent a deprivation in 2000. The MDGs could become a of human rights and human security, and normative framework for the formulation vice versa. Without security, the MDGs of national policies, and an opportunity cannot be achieved. for Afghanistan to engage in alternative Investigation at the regional and sub- long-term models that incorporate the most regional levels in Afghanistan, which probe fundamental issues of development. beyond the steady progress in improving Subsequent development frameworks the human development index (HDI) and should be clearly aligned with the MDGs. reducing poverty at the national level, The Millennium Declaration specifies: reveal grave disparities. Regions of high “Men and women have the right to live poverty and low HDI, (and thereby low their lives and raise their children in levels of attainments of MDG targets) are dignity, free from hunger and from fear precisely those where conflict is being of violence, oppression or injustice.”25 The fuelled. Regions with high levels of human

Table 6.2: MDG Targets for Afghanistan

MDG CURRENT LEVEL TARGET 2015 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Poverty: 53% Poverty: 26% Hunger: 48% Hunger: 24% 2. Achieve universal primary education Primary (total): 36% Primary (total): 100 Girls: 21% Girls: 100% Boys: 51% Boys: 100% 3. Promote gender equality and empower Female primary enrolment: 21% Female primary enrolment: 100% women Girls enrolment share: 30% Girls enrolment share: 50% 4. Reduce child mortality Under-five mortality rate: 260 per 1,000 Under-five mortality rate: 90 per 1000 Infant mortality rate: 165 per 1,000 Infant mortality rate: 55 per 1000 5. Improve maternal mortality Maternal mortality ratio: 1,600 per 100,000 Maternal mortality ratio: 400 per 100,000 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other Measles: 718 cases annually, Polio: 10 Measles: 0 cases diseases Malaria: 16% of population at high risk, 3 Polio: 0 million annually, Tuberculosis: 321 cases Malaria: 8% of population at high risk, per 100,000; 91 deaths per 100,000 Tuberculosis: 48 cases per 100,000; Surveys and actions to curb rise in AIDS. 7. Ensure environmental sustainability and Population without access to safe drinking Population without access to safe drinking access to safe drinking water and water: 87% water: 43% sanitation 8. Develop a global partnership for ODA (% of GDP): 48% ODA (% of GDP): 20% development GDP per capita (US$): 170 GDP per capita (US$): 500

Source: UNDP, MDG Report Afghanistan, 2004.

25 UN, The Millennium Declaration, 2000, www.un.org/millennium/summit.htm. 26 From discussions held on the UNDP MDG Network, summer 2004.

NHDR 04 185 poverty, child malnutrition and human What Kind of Growth Strategy Does underdevelopment coincide with regions Afghanistan Need? of internal insecurity. Subsequent development frameworks Instead of attaining the MDGs at the should also recognize the structural causes aggregate national level, it is vital to devise of conflict in Afghanistan, and take into targeted plans and monitor attainment of account distributional justice that will allow the goals by disadvantaged groups, such for even and balanced development as women, different ethnic groups, or in throughout the country. Following the the case of underperforming regions and Bonn Conference, the standard neo-liberal districts. The consistent failure of some paradigm for internationally supported groups to attain the MDGs, while others in the same country move towards reconstruction in post-war situations that achieving them, reflects the failure of the had developed during the 1990s was state to serve as an impartial agency. adopted in Afghanistan. This package, Restoring representative and participative based on market-driven growth, an open governance, particularly at the local level, economy and a minimalist regulatory state, where the majority of the excluded groups recognizes economic growth as the reside, may have to precede any principal strategy for development and international assistance towards reaching combating poverty, and the private sector the MDGs. The first requirement for as the main engine of such growth. achieving overall growth and human The Government’s NDF presents, for security, therefore, is to ensure that there is uniform development, without example, a vision of social and economic significant inequalities and deprivations reforms based around macroeconomic across gender, ethnic, linguistic or regional stability, private-sector-led growth, liberal groups. trade and a key ‘enabling’ role for the state. The MDGs are goals that need to be used in a manner that is flexible and addresses But neo-liberalism, although hegemonic local realities.27 For Afghanistan, broader today, has had a poor performance in the programmes focusing on governance, last quarter century in both developing and inequality, land reform, human rights post-crisis countries. Compared to the promotion, reducing domestic violence performance of post-colonial policy- and justice reform should accompany a making in developing countries, roughly nationally tailored MDG strategy. from the 1950s through the mid 1970s, neo-liberal conditionality-based policies As Chapter 4 of this report points out, lack of progress on development and poverty have performed poorly, in terms of slowing may sustain conflict. Progress towards the economic growth, greater economic MDGs could therefore contribute to the instability, rising inequality, increasing resolution of the conflict and recovery in under-employment and persistently Afghanistan, by addressing such vital pervasive poverty.28 As was well issues as land distribution, inter-ethnic documented in the late 1980s and early tensions, empowering the vulnerable (the 1990s (cf. UNICEF’s Structural poor, women and children), and Adjustment with a Human Face and strengthening governance institutions It UNDP’s Human Development Reports), may also help support people’s coping structural adjustment programmes have mechanisms. often imposed heavy social costs.

27 Ibid. 28 Terry McKinley, UNDP 2004.

186 Chapter 6 While priority is given to economic policies, but also new causes, such as the liberalisation and building institutions of uneven impact of new technologies and representative democracy, problems such trade, the threat of sharp recessions that as poverty, inequality, poor health and can arise from stabilisation and adjustment education, environmental degradation and policies, a lack of coordination between social exclusion could intensify. Too often, national and international financial Bretton Woods institutions and transitional liberalisation and regulation, and the states are concerned with establishing absence of progressive tax policies and democracy, not inclusive government, equitable labour market policies. while economic and social conditionality In other words, distribution issues need to is directed towards promoting growth and be integrated in policy advice given by the efficiency and poverty reduction, but not international financial institutions. Social reducing horizontal inequality. Yet, equity and distributive justice, both as prevailing conditionalities will not succeed in realizing the objectives of economic instruments and ends in themselves, should growth and democracy if disparities persist. be seen as an integral part of the debate They need to be better targeted to place on development, not as add-ons when the reduction of horizontal inequality at existing economic policies are inadequate. the centre of development agendas, if Inequality is associated with social exclusion, and declining confidence in the conflict is to be avoided.29 Government and the functioning of To begin with, the root causes of conflict democracy. It can impede growth, need to be factored into policies. undermine poverty alleviation and fuel social tension, and therefore should be of Any new framework for recovery in concern to policy makers.31 If large Afghanistan should be conscious of segments of the population are not conflict issues, for instance, factors such adequately considered in new laws and as urban bias, capital flight, inflation, institutions, and are not given the concentration of power in the hands of opportunity to participate in public life, different factions, corruption, security and the legitimacy of the new political systems narcotics. Adopting a strategy that ignores would be questioned. At the same time, the differences in participation in the however, equality has positive externalities. political and economic agendas could lead The empowerment of women, for to inequalities. Even if the GNP can examples, not only benefits them, but also increase within a few years, chances are children, families and the society at large. that poverty will rise along with inequality. Investment in female education increases The higher the level of inequality, the less women’s productivity, while decreasing impact economic growth has in reducing infant mortality and helping to ensure the poverty, regardless of the rate of economic education and health of future generations. growth. Inequality not only represses growth, but also has underlying political Social stress, as a result of exacerbated and social impacts on crime and political horizontal inequalities, can ultimately stability.30 Exacerbated inequality is not manifest through conflicted behaviour at inevitable, and should be mitigated through all levels, from increasing numbers of specific policies addressing not only divorces and a rise in domestic violence, traditional causes, such as disparities in to crime, migration and warfare between education, land reform and regional different groups.

29 See the work of Frances Stewart 2000 and 2002. 30 Cornia and Court 2001. 31 WB 2000.

NHDR 04 187 What Kind of Growth is Necessary Figure 6.2 presents various growth for Afghanistan? scenarios for Afghanistan based on non- drug GDP growth rates. Clearly, low levels A Broad and Fast One of growth (three to five per cent) put Even an ambitious level of growth and Afghanistan’s future at risk, undermining assistance would only deliver a per capita the visibility of growth for individuals and income of US$500 by 2015, which may narrowing the revenue base within which not enable Afghanistan to attain the MDG the Government can drive the reform targets. process. Growth rates in the order of eight to nine per cent over the medium term will Strong, broad-based growth will be critical be required to keep the reform programme to Afghanistan’s success. Securing on track, and to generate jobs and income Afghanistan’s Future outlines the range for all – including poor and vulnerable of growth required for national and human groups. security. According to its analysis, growth has been strong since 2001, with grain The US$8 billion provided by the production doubling, and estimated GDP international community in Berlin in March up by about 50 per cent in the last two 2004 is a vital input to the reconstruction years. Inflation has been contained by process, providing for enhanced security, responsible fiscal and monetary policies better access to basic services in health and has remained stable. Afghanistan is and education, and much needed putting in place the most liberal trade and infrastructure such as roads and irrigation tariff regime in the region. There has been systems. While the private sector will rapid development of telecommunications, remain the engine for growth, public sector based on private investment in mobile support will be required to create the phone technology, and a major road enabling environment needed to reach the rehabilitation programme is underway. growth rates outlined above.

Figure 6.2: Growth Scenarios for Afghanistan

Securing Afghanistan’s Future

Source: TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004

188 Chapter 6 A Sustainable Growth Scenario: barrier to poverty eradication. Debt Mobilizing Domestic Resources and Debt repayments limit the resources available Relief for investment in basic services which are essential to the poor. Debt also creates To avoid long-term aid dependence, the uncertainty for domestic and foreign Government needs to mobilize more domestic resources – boosting revenue or investors, thereby restricting growth in 32 borrowing domestically for public Afghanistan.” As the transitional investment while encouraging domestic Government began paying off pre-1979 steps towards direct lending to long-term loans owed to multi-lateral banks, new private investment. Instead of cutting debts were being accumulated (See Box expenditures, the Government should be 6.3). Although there is no doubt that the finding ways to mobilize resources. country needs all the support it can get from bi- and multi-lateral organizations, Ideally, revenue collection should boost and that the loans and grants provided growth, but the precarious security target the actual needs of the situation, the lack of a harmonious reconstruction, the experience of too many relationship between the state and countries points to a cycle of debt and periphery, the general poverty of the poverty from which it is hard to break free. population, and the lack of taxation on the largest sectors, namely cross-border illegal Sustainability depends on a domestic trade and poppy cultivation, have made revenue base and on raising additional Afghanistan heavily dependent on external public revenue. An investment-led pro- aid for both its operational and poor growth strategy requires three development budgets. financial conditions: mobilizing sufficient revenue for public investment; mobilizing Ultimately, foreign borrowing should lead sufficient private savings to finance private to a substantial increase in income per investment; and complementing domestic capita, as well as an increase in net exports, otherwise the country may not have resources with stable inflows of public and additional resources and the exchange private capital. Domestic borrowing can needed to service its debt. Yet in the long contribute to financing public investment, term, aid should not be a substitute for but only as a complement to revenue taxation and domestic revenues. mobilization.33 Before the Tokyo Conference, Oxfam had The Transitional Government counts on called for donors to cancel Afghanistan’s domestic revenue and on a dynamic private US$45 million debt to multilateral sector, both domestic and international, to institutions, including US$33 million owed sustain growth in Afghanistan. As the to the WB and the ADB, and US$8.8 Minister of Finance stated, “Aid is a million to the IMF. Oxfam noted, “The development catalyst, but never a substitute debt burden is both a major reason why for a dynamic private sector, both domestic poverty is so deep and widespread in many and international, that provides the engine countries, and why these countries find it of growth. Sustained growth transforms so difficult to find a pathway out of the people, particularly the poor, into poverty. Unsustainable debt acts as a major stakeholders in the economy and polity.”34

32 Oxfam 2002. 33 McKinley 2004. 34 Speech of Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, at Berlin Conference, March 2004.

NHDR 04 189 Box 6.3 Debt in Afghanistan

In the financial year 2003, the total debt with both organizations in 1992. A Development Fund (JSDF) grants, while outstanding and disbursed was US$2,429 number of governments cleared for 2003–2004, the WB had planned million, according to data collected by Afghanistan’s arrears (pre-1979 loans) loans of US$326.4 million in IDA credits the ADB and the IMF. An annual foreign in 2002–2003: US$26 million of the pre- and US$7.75 million in International debt service is equal to about one-tenth 1979 WB loans were paid off by Japan, Finance Cooperation (IFC) loans(private of Afghanistan’s annual GDP, non-viably Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United sector loans). Since April 2002, the WB high for a society without an economic Kingdom, and US$18 million in arrears surplus. has committed US$281.8 million in to the ADB were cleared by the United grants and an additional US$221.4 Kingdom. By 2004, Afghanistan had US$8 billion million in no-interest loans.37 in bilateral debt, mostly to Russia, and With the re-engagement of the WB in In 2002, the ADB approved a US$150- US$500 million in debt to multilateral Afghanistan since 2002, Afghanistan 35 million “post-conflict multi-sector” loan. development banks. has continued to repay its pre-1979 loan By December 2003, the bank had Between 1964 and 1979, the WB had (US$56 million had been repaid by 2004) approved 11 loans for Afghanistan provided 21 loans amounting to US$230 with the help of bilateral agreements and 38 million, of which US$147 million was through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust amounting to US$412.3 million , and cancelled. The ADB had given loans for Fund (ARTF); simultaneously, new debt at the Berlin Conference it announced US$95.1 million between 1966 and 1979, activities began. In 2003, the WB gave that it would consider assistance up to when it withdrew from Afghanistan.36 US$171.8 million in International US$800 million in the form of Asia Between 1979 and 1992, Afghanistan Development Association (IDA) grants Development Facility (ADF) loans and continued to repay the WB and ADB (no-interest loans called “credits) and grants at highly concessional interest loans until it gained a non-accrual status US$7.7 million in Japan Social rates, during 2005-2008.39

Table 6.3: Debts incurred by Previous Administrations 1380 (2001) and Before.

Lender Debt (local curr.) Debt US$m Confirmed Debts: United States Agency for Inter. Dev. (USAID) 57.4 United States Dep. of Agriculture (USDA) 25.0 (Former) German Dem. Rep. 40.0 OPEC Fund 1.8 World Bank 49.5 Asian Development Bank 9.2 Total Confirmed 182.9 Unconfirmed Debts: Bulgaria 36.0 Iraq 5.7 Kuwait Fund 3.74m Dinar 12.7 (Former) Czechoslovakia 75.0 Saudi Arabia 30.0 Total Unconfirmed 159.4

Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, 24 May 2004.

35 The World Factbook, U.S. Department of State. 36 Otherwise noted, the information here is from the Bank Information Center, 2003, http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/WB_ADB_in_Afghanistan_outline.pdf. 37 WB. Afghanistan Country Update, 2004c. 38 ADB, “A Fact Sheet on Afghanistan”, data as of 31 December 2003. 39 ADB press release, March 2004, http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2004/nr2004025.asp.

190 Chapter 6 A Secure Growth Scenario: Transforming farmers only encouraged more to plant the War Economy poppies. Essentially, opium prices, though falling, are still high, and the profits more The precarious security situation in than compensate for the risks of the crop’s Afghanistan is ultimately linked to the nominal illegality. Changing the calculation 40 perseverance of the war economy. of risk and reward would involve punishing Spoilers of peace persist because, as poppy growers and opium distillers more described in Chapter 4, the conditions that consistently, and making trafficking harder allow them to remain have not and riskier, both of which require security fundamentally changed, and because they institutions that do not yet exist. Most have strong incentives to retain power for importantly, Afghans need other ways to as long as possible. Following the make ends meet. expulsion of the Taliban, regional Lots of new high-rise One possibility for the diversification of commanders realized that a key source of buildings have been power for the central Government would livelihoods among Afghans is dried fruit. erected in Kabul lately. be international aid, something to which Afghanistan used to be the world's biggest they had no access. The lack of adequate exporter of raisins and a net exporter of Some see them as a distribution of funds to the regions led food. Various other fruits and herbs are sign of improvement in power-holders, among others, to question grown in the south and east, and business the economy. But the Government's capacity to provide basic people talk of exporting flowers and cotton. whose economy? Not public goods, and gave them the signal to The most promising licit economic mine for sure! My develop their own alternative resources opportunities are perhaps found in the biggest concern is that through illegal transit fees, smuggling and carpet trade. Many “Afghan” rugs on sale both our political and drug dealing. in the West are actually made in Pakistan, economic systems where much of the industry migrated have yielded Given the insecurity-related dependency during the decades of war. The remaining permanent presence of most Afghans on private militias and carpet-makers in Afghanistan struggle to power-holders, it would appear that human compete with their technically advantaged and roots to warlords – insecurity and economic stagnation will rivals in other countries. Providing the the very ones continue fuelling each other until either necessary technical assistance to Afghans responsible for many of an effective security system is put in place, would not represent a major obstacle; the recent human or more profitable, licit economic however, getting the carpets to market catastrophes. opportunities come into existence.41 For might. the time being, however, it will not be easy Jawad, from Kabul to persuade the legions of labourers skilled The abysmal lack of infrastructure in in opium harvesting – not to mention those Afghanistan clearly represents a hindrance who reap much of the profit – to find other to economic security. A transport system sources of income. For the drug economy is integral to economic regeneration in to be eradicated, estimates are that the Afghanistan, both in terms of trading and legal economy would need to grow at a in providing transit routes. Some believe steady nine per cent for many years to that the customs revenues being siphoned come.42 off at the various border points by regional power-holders are roughly equivalent to In general, there is little money for the entire national budget.43 If there was alternatives that would allow farmers to an adequate national road system, tolls grow viable and legal money-earning could be charged by the central crops. A recent attempt to buy out opium Government, recapturing lost revenue.

40 Section adapted from Jeanette Kroes 2004. 41 Abdul Baqi Banwal 2004b. 42 The Economist, “It’s Hard Going Straight”, 1 April 2004. 43 United States Institute of Peace 2003.

NHDR 04 191 Source: Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 5, May 2002

Foreign aid and engagement are both generated by the many, then the poor will essential for rebuilding Afghanistan, but be its principle beneficiaries, and the fruits the country will remain one of the world’s of economic growth will be shared more poorest states, and its human security will evenly.44 continue to be threatened, unless it finds If Afghanistan is to reach the target of a way out of the multiple vicious circles halving extreme income poverty by 2015, in which it seems to be trapped. Economic rapid growth is certainly essential. progress depends on security and a stable However, if growth is more equitable – so Government; however, security also that the incomes of the poor grow faster depends on economic opportunities. With than average – the country may have a neither security nor alternative economic No society can be much better chance of reaching this target. opportunities, many Afghans will continue flourishing and happy Growth has to be rapid to improve the to cultivate poppies, thus enriching peace- where the greater part absolute poverty of the poor, but also spoilers who thrive on and sustain equitable to raise the relative position of of the numbers are lawlessness. poor and miserable. the poor. If growth is to reduce poverty, An Equitable and Balanced Growth it should have a pattern that directs Adam Smith, 1776. resources disproportionately to the sectors It is obvious that poor countries should in which the poor work (such as small- focus on the question of growth versus scale agriculture), the areas in which they income distribution, and that development live (such as underdeveloped regions) or requires a higher GNP and a faster growth the factors of production that they possess rate. The basic question, however, is not (such as unskilled labour or land). only how to make GNP grow, but also who would make it grow, the few or the The trend in GDP growth in the past two many. If GNP growth is based on the rich, years in Afghanistan will not be sustainable then it will likely be appropriated for them, if longer term policies do not address and poverty and income inequality will urban–rural disparities as much as poverty continue to grow worse. But, if it is and inequality in general, as well as the

44 Mubin Shah 2004.

192 Chapter 6 inequalities between men and women. To avoid prolonging the “Kabul and the Balanced human development may not rest” perception, the new Government occur automatically with economic growth, must design a comprehensive regional while economic growth cannot be development strategy. The reconstruction sustainable if it fails to address the causes efforts of the past two years as well as of spatial and social inequality. High levels economic revival boosted by drug of inequality are, therefore, inefficient in trafficking have contributed to the booming addition to being unjust. Furthermore, even economy in Kabul and major urban centres. if there is considerable social and economic The continuation of this trend could give progress, rifts may start to appear if the rise to mass migration and marginalize country does not address fundamental people, thereby perpetuating inequalities. problems and deep inequalities (such as A balanced growth pattern also needs to land distribution, gender discrimination, tackle the unequal redistribution of national urban–rural gaps, etc.) Growth models revenues, especially taxes and local should therefore be based on inclusive revenues received by some of the provinces economic processes. As part of an (Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, Jalalabad), a investment-led strategy of growth and large portion of which does not reach the development, the Government must also central Government. The rationale behind adopt policies that promote an equitable creating a strong central state in distribution of the fruits of this Afghanistan in the first place was the sharp development. These must involve measures geographical differences in wealth in to contain and reduce the rising inequalities different provinces. For instance, Herat in incomes that characterizes the situation province in 2002 generated revenues 5,000 in Afghanistan. times greater than the poor province of Without taking these steps, there is a danger Bamiyan, and about 2,000 times the of growth that alienates the population and amount generated in the province of leads to grievances, as discussed in Chapter Wardak, just south of Kabul.45 Today, 3. Other dangers of a skewed distribution central ministries are encouraged to use pattern could be urban bias, which neglects market mechanisms for distributing rural development, as has been the case reconstruction projects and social of almost all development models in services.46 As one researcher puts it, Afghanistan’s history, as well as the however, “the competitive bidding process potential difficulties faced by urban areas will exacerbate rather than diminish present struggling to absorb surplus labour from inequalities if NGOs, firms and aid the countryside. Failed or non-existent agencies bid last on projects in backward, rural development policies push insecure or inaccessible areas, as they households out of the rural areas, while might be expected to do.”47 Balanced investment in urban areas creates the “city development requires addressing the lights” fantasy that pulls in rural formidable challenge of adequate collection households. Once in the city, without and fair distribution of revenues throughout adequate housing or employment, migrants the country. end up joining the informal sector in Growth Based on Employment squatter settlements without guarantees of satisfying basic human securities, such as In countries of the Asia Pacific region, a income, education, health, personal security UNDP study found that agricultural and and so on. rural development were crucial

45 Astri 2004. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid.

NHDR 04 193 underpinnings of a pro-poor growth accountable in meeting a number of strategy, yet such development was often requirements: environmental protection ignored in the allocation of public resources policies, social protection and equalizing and in PRSPs.48 In Afghanistan, agriculture policies, and public consultation and remains a large and important economic information disclosure requirements. sector, particularly for employment and Consultation with the public is important the livelihoods of the poor. Thus, because citizens of Afghanistan have an agricultural development, and rural active role in the development process, development more generally, remain both as beneficiaries and as agents. Their crucial for poverty reduction. participation can lead to better project design and the prevention of costly In linking growth to poverty reduction, mistakes. These mistakes, as the history strategies have to address the importance of Afghanistan has showed, can be both of generating widespread employment. economically costly as well as, more But such employment has to be at decent importantly, leading to serious human wages to actually reduce poverty. This costs. implies that self-employment and micro- enterprises (and the micro-finance services Including people in the development supporting them) cannot serve as the strategy design and implementation in foundation for a pro-poor employment Afghanistan is also a way to ease the gap strategy. Although such micro-programmes between perceptions of a “modern” state can help raise incomes, secure and with its modern elite and a “backward” We want democracy in remunerative employment cannot be tribal people. Rural tribes often understand the country but not at sustained by these interventions alone. The fast-paced urban modernization as an the expense of our emphasis has to shift to small and medium influence of the West. Perceiving this as culture and religion. enterprises, and large enterprises that are anti-Islamic, they are quick to reject it. I believe they all could employment-intensive and enhance skills.49 Finally, involving people in recovery and Poverty alleviation strategies, therefore, be reconciled and that reconstruction helps build a bridge between have to identify a critical set of public is what should happen. projects with a quick impact and longer- policies that can help achieve widespread term interventions leading to the Adam Khan from Jalalabad employment at decent wages. achievement of the MDGs. This promotes Growth Based on Adequate Participation new vested interests in sustaining peace. Public participation is also required to A Private-Sector Led Growth? develop national and local policies deemed At the core of the NDF is the vision of a both effective and just. This should be light regulative framework to promote assured through information dissemination broad-based private sector growth. to socially vulnerable groups in remote Inclusive economic growth is a areas as well as to more visible NGOs. precondition for easing livelihood strategies Participation in development strategy based on the militias. The framework design itself can be done through the accords a central role to the private sector engagement of civil society organisations as the engine of national growth, and communities in order to take their employment generation and poverty needs into consideration. At the same time, reduction in Afghanistan, hence its they can hold Government partners, centrality to overall Government policies. especially the UN agencies and Sustained economic growth is a international financial institutions,

48 McKinley, UNDP 2004. 49 Ibid.

194 Chapter 6 precondition for poverty reduction, national implemented a number of reforms, reconstruction and sustainable self- including the streamlining of customs financed service provision through the tariffs and the renewal of existing trade generation of domestic resources. agreements. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan may be disadvantaged in terms The framework asserts that overcoming of trade competitiveness. However, the the constraints to trade, investment and significance of trade for human security more general private sector development can be seen in the context of the recent can best be achieved through: drought, when commercial cereal imports • Institutional capacity-building for both played a crucial role in price stabilization public and private sectors. and ensuring that effective demand was • Improved public sector management. met, thereby averting national catastrophe. • Formulation of a sound, enabling Future reforms for the promotion of broad- regulatory framework for businesses. based private sector investment will need • Development of banking and insurance to include accelerated rehabilitation and services. construction of infrastructure, and an • Introducing standards, methodology increased emphasis on investment in testing and quality certification services. human capital, the establishment of sound • Labour market training and skill regulatory frameworks for investment, the enhancement. promotion of foreign direct investment • Land titling. and the gradual formalization of the • Infrastructure development for trade economy. and investment. • Trade, transit and transport facilitation. There is, however, despite the high • Support to private sector capacity commitments to the principles of a free building. market, a critical dilemma. There are clear risks inherent to strengthening markets as The Afghan private sector also needs to they stand, firmly rooted in existing power benefit more directly from the current relations and widespread horizontal reconstruction process, and efforts to create inequalities. By reinforcing the existing partnerships and consortia must be and mutually beneficial interests of big prioritized, as should improved information business and military power holders, flows in both directions.50 unregulated, informal and illicit markets could be undermining the agendas of The Government has already taken reconstruction and development.51 Current important initiatives to support private patterns of economic growth may also sector development, including: (1) the imply a destabilizing impact on the country enactment of the Law on Domestic and politically. The directions of economic Foreign Investment (September 2002); (2) growth are informed by power relations – the establishment of the Afghanistan in the current context, there is a serious Investment Support Agency (AISA), a risk that growth is therefore likely to be single-window clearance and advice centre neither fast nor equitable. The economy, for domestic and foreign investors (August while booming, is mainly informal and 2003); (3) opening the telecommunication highly illicit. Participation in markets is sector to private investment, and (4) the not open to all, nor are the benefits initiation of institutional restructuring equitably spread. Furthermore, the markets process in the Ministry of Commerce. To are currently having a negative effect on foster trade, the Government has political governance and state-building.

50 TISA, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, 2004. 51 AREU, “Trading in Power: The Politics of Free Markets in Afghanistan”, 2004d.

NHDR 04 195 Thus, while the appearance may be one with the curtailment or abolition of even of economic growth and dynamic market very limited welfare provision, may serve forces, in practice, informal regulatory to entrench poverty and increase institutions interacting with the market are indebtedness, as people borrow in order effectively restricting competition and to pay for healthcare and education.”53 In participation.52 In this context, the benefits line with the market approach, contracts from growth tend to be skewed towards are awarded through competitive bidding. the powerful. State intervention will be However, privatized delivery of health required to ensure accountability of market care services may not be suitable in view operators to a formal regulatory framework Our proposed of Afghanistan’s geographic diversity and in the interest of the public and to difficulty in assessing some areas. Reforms programme of effectively manage the existing threats to investment and may mean that poor and remote villages social, political and environmental security. may be even worse off. reforms will not move Without additional state intervention to us to a middle-income address market imperfections and facilitate Preparing for Afghanistan’s country, but it would the wider distribution of growth benefits, National Poverty Reduction allow us to move from social equity resulting from broad based Strategy abject poverty to and inclusive growth will be delayed and Pro-Poor, Pro-Human Security Strategies poverty with dignity. the environmental implications of growth will be disastrous. Likewise, a deliberate The Government of Afghanistan has made Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance, strategy to limit the power of those Afghanistan a commitment to sharpen the poverty focus currently in control of the informal of the NDF by outlining an interim PRSP economy will be required to accelerate by mid-2005. This will comprise an political security and to prevent the agreement with the international continued destabilization of the economy community on the adoption of specific and political environment by existing poverty reduction measures, from a market structures. national perspective. The preparatory work Informal free trade is not new to already provided under the NDF – along Afghanistan, and existed even during the with Securing Afghanistan’s Future, this years of the communist Government. NHDR and the preliminary analysis based However, experience in post-war situations on NRVA findings – will provide valuable shows that an enforcement of the private inputs. The aim will be to adopt a strategy sector may not necessarily serve the long- of broad-based growth, macro-economic term interests of the country. Multi-national stability, and targeted poverty reduction corporations may exploit national resources measures. The role of civil society in for maximizing profits without investing enhancing public policy dialogue around in a sustainable socio-economic base for the key themes will undoubtedly be the country. As noted by a researcher, essential to defining a sustainable, “The increase in disposable income for a community-led approach. tiny minority, combined with the abolition of many import controls, may lead to a As the country begins the preparation of corresponding increase in the range of the PRSP, it should bear in mind that even consumer goods available, with energies when growth occurs in some developing focused on the marketing sector. Similarly, countries, it often does not reach the poor. the introduction of cost-recovery schemes This has raised the importance in the in health care and education, combined international development community of

52 Ibid. 53 Sultan Barakat, 2002.

196 Chapter 6 identifying policies that can foster “pro- situations. PRSPs should not ignore the ...every step taken poor growth”. This is growth that not only structural roots of the problems that cause toward reducing can improve the “absolute” conditions of conflict in the first place, as discussed in poverty and achieving poor households (by raising their level of Chapter 4. broad-based economic real incomes along with the average level), growth – is a step Because of potential links between poverty but also can enhance their “relative” towards conflict conditions vis-à-vis non-poor households and insecurity, the way poverty is tackled influences analyses about its causes, prevention. All who are (by reducing inequality between the poor engaged in conflict and non-poor). evolution and post-conflict solutions. Peace in Afghanistan therefore needs to be prevention and Bearing in mind that institutional reforms understood as a dynamic process in which development, therefore and behavioural changes need long-term it is possible to think about liberties without – the United Nations, transformation, the PRSP in Afghanistan obstacles such as fear, vulnerability and the Bretton Woods should make an effort to link development the absence of human dignity. institutions, strategies with peace and security, as governments and civil conflict is one of the principal, if not Among the different proposals about the society organizations – exclusive, causes of poverty in the country. kind of economic growth that would lead must address these Poverty reduction should also be seen as to human development and security, as challenges in a more a critical dimension of a strategy for outlined above, the NHDR recommends integrated fashion. conflict resolution, peace-building and that the PRSP incorporate four elements: national reconciliation. United Nations, Millennium 1. A consultative process during the Report of the Secretary General, The PRSP needs to incorporate regional design and monitoring of the strategy New York, 2000, p. 45. and global political and economic that would ultimately provide better influences as much as national ones. It inputs for shaping a realistic strategy. may not be enough for Afghanistan to It would also improve the impact on adopt democratic governance policies or poverty of expenditures financed by fiscal reforms when external forces, external partners and the effectiveness especially regional geo-political interests of technical advice by increasing in war and stability, could destroy or country ownership and shifting policy disrupt human development goals in the to a more results-oriented approach. The system is not just. country. Many people are very 2. A complete analysis, during its The scale, type and status of the conflict poor. Many of the poor preparatory phase, of the root causes in Afghanistan as well as the degree of have developed mental of conflicts in Afghanistan, as well as violence must be appropriately factored and psychological the root structural causes of poverty, into the strategies pursued. In this sense, illnesses. How can you in order to draw potential linkages. a two-track policy is recommended. It expect them to raise should attempt short-term stabilization and 3. Emphasis on employment generation, quality children? poverty reduction, while setting a medium- especially through large-scale public Neda Mohammad from Wardak term framework for properly sequencing works that offer decent wages while development and reconciliation goals.54 providing services needed in different An integrated approach is also imperative regions. to minimize the disconnects between policy prescriptions provided in poverty 4. A comprehensive monitoring and eradication frameworks, such as the PRSP, reporting framework, correlated with which are conditioned to receive the UN and national initiatives, to concessional lending from the IMF, and collect, analyse and monitor data. the on-the-ground realities in post-conflict Closely related to this goal is the need

54 From UNDP Network discussion on PRSPs in conflict situations, Poverty Reduction Network, Summer 2004.

NHDR 04 197 to address the paucity of data, which translate this growth process into the well- requires that a database disaggregated being of the people of Afghanistan, a by gender, rural–urban habitat, sub- proper role for the state is crucial. This national disparities, ethnicity and requires state institutions to have the language groups, among other capacity to raise revenues, deliver services, categories. properly distribute the accumulated wealth and regulate the market to prevent 6.5. Conclusions discrimination. The role of the Afghan The revival of Afghanistan’s economy is state in the economy should be to ensure fundamental to future sustainability as well economic efficiency, social justice and as for providing the needed jobs of today. individual liberty, through an appropriate Economic growth is required to reduce combination of market intervention and poverty, improve disparities and provide planning. employment, and this calls for a While bilateral and multi-lateral aid is the strengthening of sources of growth through surest immediate engine of growth in the key domestic industries, not just reliance country, Afghanistan strives for self- on an infusion of capital through sufficiency in the future. International aid international aid. is estimated at five per cent of GDP per As the country now moves towards the year, while opium production provides preparation of a PRSP, a new opportunity almost 40 per cent of GDP today. is opening to review the kind of economic Afghanistan needs to explore other sources growth needed to provide human security of growth. The Government should seek as a public good. The role of civil society to improve labour and technology in key in enhancing public policy dialogues industries through training and investment, around key themes will also undoubtedly expanding markets and refurbishing the be crucial to defining a sustainable, infrastructure. This requires the community-led approach. development of the material base for other export potentials, such as animal Economic growth should be based on husbandry, mining, tourism, knowledge- principles of poverty eradication and job based industries, and traditional crafts and creation, long-term sustainability, and an fruits. The refurbishing of the industrial adequate redistribution of wealth and base will provide jobs, and eco-tourism assets. Growth models should be based on could be envisioned once security is inclusive economic processes and equitable ensured. distribution of development. This will involve measures to contain and reduce The economy can also be supported by the rising inequalities in incomes in emigrants’ remittances or by the absorption different regions, and the gaps between of expatriate skills into new opportunities urban and rural areas. In linking growth inside the country. With the development to poverty reduction, strategies have to of roads to Central Asia, and with the address the importance of generating prospects of an oil pipeline from widespread employment. Turkmenistan to Pakistan, there may be significant economic gains for the country, Economic growth can be on the basis of although these may not be anticipated in private initiatives, but in order to better the immediate future.

198 Chapter 6 Chapter 7

The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

Chapter 7: The Role of the International Community: Aid and Peace-building

Afghanistan faces no easy task in its efforts own people, despite the latter being one to ensure a speedy and smooth transition of the objectives of the Bonn Agreement. from a large-scale, short-term, externally Despite the dangers, aid is nonetheless driven military intervention, to more grass- essential for Afghanistan’s successful roots, longer term, locally driven reconstruction, and the manner in which interventions for development. While the it is administered will ultimately determine former tends to perpetuate dependency, whether or not the country and its people the latter must be focused on building self- will find long-term stability and prosperity. sufficiency in order to safeguard the gains The implementation of such an agenda in achieved through the intervention. This Afghanistan’s war-torn and devastated chapter looks at how aid in post-conflict society will ultimately require that donors, situations, as in Afghanistan, can provide agencies and NGOs ensure that Afghan incentives or disincentives for peace- institutions are owned by and accountable building. It examines the lessons that to the people of Afghanistan. should be learned from aid patterns in Afghanistan, not only over the past two- After Afghanistan was identified as a base and-a-half years, but from decades of for terrorist activities in 1998, the engagement with the country in various international community announced ways. It also presents recommendations sanctions against the Taliban. Although to the international community on how to specific studies do not exist on the subject, ensure that aid does more good than harm it is believed that the impact of the in Afghanistan. sanctions on the Taliban as non-state actors 7.1. Introduction: may not have been as punitive as their impact on the everyday lives of ordinary Accountability and Legitimacy people. Dealing with terrorist threats to “international security” was prioritized In Securing Afghanistan’s Future, the over dealing with the threats to the human Afghanistan Transitional Administration security of the people of Afghanistan. presented a case for extensive support from Indeed, the history of support from the the international community in order to international community for different prevent Afghanistan from becoming a regimes or different opposition groups “narco-mafia state”. Yet, increased money often serves to illustrate the risks associated for reconstruction by itself may not be with external assistance, which has been sufficient to sustain peace-building. More perceived as unaccountable to legitimate attention must be directed to aid spending domestic concerns. patterns, local institutional capacity, and the Government’s successes in raising Yet a government that is legitimate and internal revenue and curbing corruption. accountable to its people needs to follow The danger of Afghanistan becoming a a national process, one that the international rentier state funded through large inflows community could support, but not lead. of foreign aid must be avoided. Legitimacy should be sought through Dependency on this kind of funding would accountability to the people of Afghanistan make the Afghan Government more in a smuch as to the international accountable to foreign patrons than to its community. The provision of aid can help

NHDR 04 201 this process only if it is transparent and game by which they compete.... The consultative, and it can hamper it if it is political impacts of aid can help to decide not. Aid-supported development and whether the peace endures or war democracy should ultimately render the resumes.”3 The potential negative and Government of Afghanistan responsible positive externalities that assistance could towards its people. As Afghan civil society introduce in a conflict or post-conflict matures, it can assume the role of holding situation, based on lessons learned around both the Afghan state and the international the world, is summarized below. community accountable. Negative Incentives: Aid Could 7.2. Analytical Framework: The Harm Conspicuous Role of Aid in It is now an accepted Conflicts • Massive and sudden aid may fact that the exacerbate conflict. It may be Government cannot Debates on the role of aid in Afghanistan appropriated by military groups, as it make good on many of are staged within the context of growing was during the years of resistance, its promises it makes to global interests in the relationships between first to the Soviet invasion and then the people. However, aid and conflict, and how development to the Taliban, when aid in Afghanistan we also know the assistance can be re-conceptualized as became an integral part of the war reasons for the inability conflict prevention, what has been economy by nurturing, directly or of the Government and described as the “securitization of aid”.1 indirectly, armed groups. During the late 1990s, donors, through the we have lowered our • Aid can also increase competition if Strategic Framework (SF) process, expectations. Our the institutional mechanisms for increasingly saw aid as an instrument for concern, nevertheless, equitable distribution have not been building peace and acting as a catalyst for established, anti-corruption measures is the inability of the political agreements. Such an instrumental international approach to aid as a tool of peace-building, are not in place and the ethics of public community to bring however, was contested by those who sector management and procedures improvement in argued that this approach inevitably leads are not followed. High-profile relief people’s lives. Many to the distortion of humanitarian mandates programmes in urban areas, such as people now question and principles, particularly those of food distribution, can be prone to the seriousness of the neutrality and impartiality. Instead of being corruption, with aid feeding client international used for political objectives, humanitarian networks. community with aid should be distinct, both for ethical and • Aid that is heavily based on relief respect to Afghanistan. pragmatic reasons, as aid may not have assistance could prolong dependence sufficient leverage to tackle the political on external sources. Instead of finding Ahmad Fawad from Kapisa 2 dynamics of conflicts. large-scale alternatives – as, for In Afghanistan, because aid is introduced example, to a war economy based on in a political environment, it may have in poppy cultivation – small-scale and the past, and may continue in the future, transient project interventions funded to create incentive systems, both positive through aid may not only be and negative. “Aid affects not only the unsustainable, but even harmful. Relief size of the economic pie and how it is aid may potentially fuel corruption sliced but also the balance of power among and dependency, and supersede local the competing actors and the rules of the responsibility for welfare.

1 Mark Duffield as quoted in Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 2 Goodhand 2002. 3 J. Boyce, 2000 ‘Beyond good intentions: external assistance and peace building,’ in S. Forman and S. Patrick (eds), Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000 as quoted in Goodhand 2002.

202 Chapter 7 • The distribution of massive amounts does no harm in Afghanistan. Although of relief aid such as food can create no systematic and reliable analysis has market distortions and substitution as been conducted to assess the real impacts it generates a strong competition with of aid in Afghanistan today,4 it may be local supply. The introduction of large concluded that the positive incentives have amounts of wheat in Afghanistan in been many and have outnumbered the 2002 and 2003 by the World Food negative ones. In addition to directly Programme (WFP) led to a fall in improving livelihoods, aid can result in wheat prices to an all-time low, other welcome outcomes and externalities, undermining efforts to revive local such as: production. • Practical interventions at the local level • Assistance strategies that bypass the that integrate people from across central Government and work directly factional lines for the management of with regional administrations common resources – such as irrigation controlled by warlords risk heightening or grazing, trading networks, tensions between the centre and the rehabilitation of infrastructure and so provinces, and could potentially skew on – achieve positive outcomes of distribution of assistance in favour of peaceful and cooperative co-existence. certain regions. Aid that solely focuses • Education programmes raise not only on a centralised state also risks not the levels of literacy but also have a reaching target beneficiaries if fair host of positive externalities ranging distribution is not planned or from improved household health implemented by the Government. management, to expanded decision- • Artificial “islands of development” making capabilities, more informed could result from an intense influx of resource management and so on. These relief aid that is likely to be abruptly can significantly improve human halted as the crisis scales down. security. • Donor funds are usually bound to tight • De-mining leads to vast improvements disbursement schedules for budgetary in the agriculture sector. reasons, which can create conflict with • As one researcher noted, “It is also long-term planning. Furthermore, important not to undervalue the impact pressure on delivery can lead to wasted of aid on more intangible factors like funds. ideas, relationships, social energy and Positive Incentives: Aid Can Help individual leadership. Aid agency interventions, in addition to their The examples above are potential hazards economic effects, may promote cross- of large-scale, uncoordinated, ineffective cutting ties (or bridging social capital) aid. Aid that is well managed, evaluated between social groups, counteracting and monitored can effectively avoid the social compacting (or bonding negative or unintended outcomes. The social capital), which warlords create involvement of NGOs and community- and use to mobilize groups.”5 based organizations could increase both the efficiency of delivery and account- • Aid can also cultivate the ground for ability, helping to ensure that aid, in fact, private sector development. It can

4 For an evaluation of aid during the Taliban years, see Dabelstein Niels, OECD 2002, and Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999. For another evaluation of UNDP’s PEACE programme during the Taliban and the Habitat Community programmes that highlighted positive impacts on local governance, see Astri , and Kristian Berg Harpviken 2001. 5 Mary Anderson 1999 refers to this as building “connectors” or “constituencies for peace” quoted in Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 203 create an environment for a flourishing question to be asked is: “How does private sector by taking measures to development impact on the risk factors for improve security, the legal framework conflict, and how does conflict impact on and investment guarantees. development?” Such an approach would require first and foremost being aware of Although such activities may not always the negative externalities that misguided “bring peace”, they could play a role in or misused aid could incite. It requires: supporting the coping strategies of sensitivity to equitable benefits; flexibility communities, and providing alternatives in terms of planning and implementation; to the war economy. At best, aid agencies monitoring and evaluation (including some should be simultaneously providing a form of impact assessment of peace and mixture of humanitarian, rehabilitation conflict); and strong linkages with society and development-oriented assistance, in in order to ensure adequate “buy-in”. partnership with a range of actors, Peace-building and reconstruction need to including the central Government, regional be based upon an understanding not only authorities, local authorities and of the issues around which the conflict community-based shuras. At the very least, became politicized – particularly, ethnicity there will be a need to ensure that aid (both and religion – but also on the prior failures humanitarian and development assistance) of governance. This requires aid actors does not undercut peace-building efforts both to think historically and to plan ahead and other policy instruments attempting over the long-term, based on knowledge to build structural stability. and the willingness to learn lessons. Yet, While aid cannot be the main factor tipping it is often the case that expatriates and the scale in a peace process, it may play international aid workers, as the distributors an important role in consolidating a fragile of aid, often neither have a clear peace. But it can only do so by adopting understanding of the prevailing political new approaches. For aid not to increase contexts (background of members of the tensions or contribute to existing or new Government) nor of the historical context. conflicts, it must apply a conscious human This lack of local knowledge makes them security approach that takes into prone to follow institutional approaches consideration root causes, and a that could impede peace-building in the transformatory approach that helps long run. translate “peace-making” into “peace- 2. Recognizing transformation: building.”6 Encompassing rehabilitation, Conflict sensitivity requires not only the reconstruction and conflict prevention, these approaches assist in legitimizing restoration of infrastructure, institution- outside interventions in order to achieve building and structural reforms, but also the ultimate goal of sustainable security changing incentives that trigger or fuel and peace. They can be built on the conflict. Although many of the problems following three pillars: facing post-conflict societies existed before the outbreak of conflict, it can also radically 1. Conflict sensitivity and the search alter the political, demographic and for root causes: Helping to prevent violent economic structure of a country, requiring conflict and sustaining peace after it occurs an understanding of an often complex and requires an intensive focus on finding and rapidly changing reality. For example, the combating their “root causes”. The gender balance changes when women

6 The origin of the concept is found in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace issued by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His described peace- building as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. It encompasses rehabilitation, reconstruction and conflict prevention, and legitimizes outside intervention in order to establish the ultimate goal of sustainable security and peace.

204 Chapter 7 become household heads in the absence to appreciate the history of aid before and of men. Migration of educated classes during the conflict. As one researcher negatively impacts the remaining human noted: “Afghan responses to the political capital. Displacement creates new transition and the reconstruction ethnically polarized zones. Hence, changes programme will be conditioned by their brought about by the conflict need to be understanding of what has happened in identified and incorporated in rehabilitation the past. Many of the current dilemmas and assistance strategies. are echoed from the history of Afghanistan. 3. Mainstreaming conflict prevention: Having survived years away from the Building peace requires sound foundations spotlight of international attention, Afghans based on a commitment to righting wrongs might be forgiven for being confused at and achieving an acceptable level of social the haste with which decisions are now justice and accountability. From this being made about the future shape of their perspective, reconstruction, too, should country. They might not have much left, have a corrective dimension that promotes but Afghans have their memories.”7 The socio-economic change and not just the legacy of Afghan history must be examined restoration of the status quo, if it is to through the role that foreign aid played in secure not only the successful creating a rentier elite and a state that implementation of initial reconstruction failed to develop a social contract with its activities but, more importantly, sustain citizens. that investment into the future. Pre-war aid From the beginning of an intervention, By the middle of the 20th Century, external actors should clearly understand Afghanistan had become a rentier state, their role, the effectiveness of which will with external finance, mostly from the depend on the degree to which they manage Soviet Union and the United States, playing to support internal actors. This is especially an increasingly important role in funding important for Afghanistan, where transparency in peace-building efforts will domestic expenditure. By the 1960s, be one of the most important aspects of foreign aid accounted for more than 40 8 regained sovereignty. per cent of the state budget. State-led modernization programmes, funded 7.3. Lessons from a History of through foreign aid, contributed to a Politicized Aid bifurcation of the Afghan economy and society – which one researcher The legacy of the way that donors and aid characterized as a society split between a organizations operated in the past when rural, largely subsistence economy and an dealing both with the Mujahideen and urban economy dependent on a state that Taliban administrations points to the in turn drew most of its income from links dangers of politicizing aid: Aid to the international state system and conditionalities seem to have had market.9 contradictions at times, undermined the impartiality of the international community, Aid in the Cold War years and hampered the human security of the Following its occupation at the end of people of Afghanistan. 1979, the Soviet Union replaced Western In order to understand the contemporary development programmes in subsidising role of aid in Afghanistan, it is important the Afghan state and its mostly urban

7 Chris Johnson and Leslie Jolyon 2002. 8 Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 9 Barnett Rubin 1995.

NHDR 04 205 project of modernization. Humanitarian neighbouring countries and arms provision, aid often became tangled in the further weakened the central state apparatus militarization of refugee camps, used as and strengthened regional groupings. bases for the Mujahideen. Until 1988, the Regional power-holders invited UN and the ICRC could not provide aid humanitarian agencies and NGOs to to Soviet-held land areas because of provide basic health care, education and sovereignty issues. NGOs, therefore, relief services for their populations. played an increasingly important role as Aid in the post-Cold War years providers of cross-border relief operations, often planned from Peshawar and The end of the Soviet occupation of Islamabad in Pakistan. Afghanistan in 1989 was the beginning of At the same time, politically motivated a period of confusion about how the opposing flows of aid accentuated the split international community should respond of Afghan society and strengthened to the needs of the Afghans. This period was characterized by the fragmentation of unaccountable elites.10 As a researcher noted, the “Pattern of distribution reflected the Mujahideen factions and continued political ties and proximity rather than shifts in allegiances mirrored by absolute humanitarian need. Consequently, fragmented support from the international community. Humanitarian aid efforts urban populations controlled by the depended on commanders for cross-border government and populations in the central activities, resulting in diversification of highlands were largely bypassed in favour support and resources. of populations in the east.”11 The post-Cold War years also saw The period also marked the development increased aid from the United Nations of systematic patterns of aid manipulation, Office for the Coordination of Assistance especially of food aid, by resistance (UNOCA) to the fragmented state, both commanders, border controllers and others, to Mujahideen- and Government-held areas while humanitarian aid also led to from a variety of entry points in dependence as food production fell by half neighbouring countries. NGOs also began to two-thirds. During this period, working with district or village-based humanitarian assistance in some cases shuras in an increasingly professional way. complemented military aid, while NGOs The early 1990s witnessed the development and UN agencies were able to avoid of several NGO coordination mechanisms working with Afghan official structures. along with new programmes in the west In the 1980s and 1990s, Western and north, and by 1994, there were over emergency aid, often in the form of cash, 200 registered Afghan NGOs. was channelled through the Mujahideen, for whom there was often unconditional While the UN had a challenge in dealing sympathy. As one researcher pointed out, with the Government of the Islamic State “this pattern of interaction was above all of Afghanistan, which possessed limited a partisan and negotiable relationship.domestic legitimacy and limited control Linking diverse humanitarian actors to over the country, in 1997 it decided to their preferred Afghan counterparts, the extend support to Afghanistan for the relationship was prone to corruption and development of the SF. Its aim was to political favoritism.”12 Thus, aid in the provide “a more coherent, effective and 1990s, coupled with trade with integrated political strategy and assistance

10 Barnett Rubin 2000. 11 Jonathan Goodhand 2002. 12 Astri Suhrke 2004.

206 Chapter 7 program” through a “common conceptual framework alienated NGOs such as tool that identifies key activities... on the Mèdecins Sans Frontiëres, which objected basis of shared principles and objectives.” to the curb on their independence of action. The framework was in fact the introduction Most importantly, the SF pushed the aid of aid conditionalities alongside community into a position of de facto humanitarian concerns, and of the political opposition to the Taliban, diplomatic process as a tool for peace. It politicizing aid even further. In contrast forced a confrontation with the Taliban on to the partisan and negotiable relationship issues such as peace, human rights, gender formed with individual Mujahideen and drugs. The framework called for inter- leaders, the SF encouraged a strategic agency coordination to introduce incentives distancing from de facto national and disincentives related to aid – that is, authorities. This was accentuated by the a carrot–and-stick policy – and to make UN General Assembly denying the linkages between aid, peace and human Afghanistan's seat in the UN to the Taliban rights, based on the assumption that aid regime, and the introduction of UN can lead to significant behaviour changes sanctions against the regime in 1999. by actors in a conflict situation. Learning from History Yet the SF cannot be considered a very successful initiative. As evaluated by an The history of aid in Afghanistan provides OECD/DAC study,13 its policy of negative a number of lessons that remain pertinent incentives, which included military today. Aid may have widened gaps diplomacy, sanctions and aid between warring factions and created conditionalities, only isolated and hardened dependencies on external agencies for the position of the Taliban, pushing them basic needs, thus undermining national closer to radical Islamist groups. Aid acted and traditional institutions. Such a more as the only possible form of dependency was exacerbated by the fact international engagement than as a that aid was short-term, rather than significant lever for change. And it was sustaining long-term economic activity. unable to compete with other resource In the absence of possibilities to work with flows driving the war economy. The value a central and legitimate authority, aid was of aid to Afghanistan (roughly US$300 also concentrated in the periphery. Yet the million per annum) couldn’t stand up to periphery had increasingly become the US$2.5 billion generated in 1999 integrated into the economies of through cross-border trade between neighbouring countries through licit and 14 Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same illicit trade. It is also safe to say that time, however, aid conditionality prevented capacity-building generally received low long-term capacity-building activities by priority, and the rush of fulfilling urgent donors under the name of “principled needs prevented long-term planning and programming”, weighing down donor the engagement of Afghan counterparts in efforts to provide vital institutional support policy design, implementation and in health and education. monitoring. Most Afghan NGOs ended up Coordination and a top-down managerial as contractors for short-term emergency framework also proved a challenge for projects, often cutting corners in project diverse organizations operating in a implementation to sustain the organization complex and changing environment. The until the next contract came through.15

13 Van Brabant and Killock, OECD/DAC 1999. 14 Zareen Naqvi 1999. By 2000 it was estimated that the value of Afghanistan’s exports and re-exports to Pakistan had dropped to US$1,227 million (WB 2004a). 15 Suhrke 2002.

NHDR 04 207 On the whole, humanitarian assistance United States and its allies are interested during the past two decades may have in winning the “war against terrorism” and contributed to the reinforcement of power in a successful outcome in Afghanistan as structures, at both the regional and the designed through the Bonn process, even local levels. Aid certainly registered some if this requires the blurring of certain local development, but did not modify a humanitarian principles and codes of regionalized political economy of war that practice.17 The current pursuit of military made leaders more dependent upon – and objectives in Afghanistan, i.e. eradicating responsive to – outside forces rather than the remaining Al-Qaida and Taliban groups their own people. through arming militias in the south, runs 7.4. A Promise to Keep and a the risk of endangering peace. The international agenda for action must Responsibility Towards Human therefore go beyond a minimalist position Security of attempting to ensure that the country no longer harbours terrorists. As the international community re-engages in Afghanistan, a window of opportunity Changing the lens of security to that of opens to learn lessons from the past and the people of Afghanistan requires make good on commitments to the Afghan compromises, but these have to be based people in an ethical and transparent on a renewed ethical responsibility towards manner. their well-being. There are plenty of Why Responsibility? reasons why the international community of nations should support the reconstruction For too long, the interest of external actors of Afghanistan. For one, the “war against has been what many would consider terrorism” is costing the United States opportunistic self-interest: showing off more than US$1 billion each month, while Afghanistan as a test case for international much less than that is being spent on intervention, and benefiting from the curbing the poverty that could breed control of the drug trade while gaining extremism. Globally, overall aid is still access to Central Asian oil and gas rising, but is more conditional on traditional supplies. There is a striking contrast security. As one study by Christian Aid between the way Western countries claimed, the year 2004 saw the diversion pursued their strategic interests in of US$1 billion in aid to the war on Afghanistan during the Cold War and after terrorism at the expense of the war on September 11, and their effective poverty and the attainment of the MDGs. disengagement and the resulting political The US Congress reduced its aid package vacuum which was allowed to continue from US$1.6 billion to just US$650 million unchecked during the interim period, from globally, and the United Kingdom diverted 1992 to 200116 Too often, democraticabout £150 million of British development principles have had to be bypassed in the aid to the re-building of Iraq. Furthermore, interest of engaging with this or that “rich countries” development budgets, regime, starting with the politicization of including those of Japan and Australia, aid to overthrow the Soviet-backed regime have been re-defined to include items like during the Cold War, at the expense of counter-terrorism training, which limits working with less than acceptable human the money for poverty reduction rights standards. Similarly, today, the programmes.18

16 Sultan Barakat 2002. 17 Ibid. 18 Christian Aid 2004.

208 Chapter 7 must also be to restore long-denied human security for the people of Afghanistan. The human security argument for more investment in Afghanistan should be focused on meeting the needs of the Afghan population, and not only the potential cost to the international scene should Afghanistan become a “narco-mafia state”. UN Member States should support the peace-keeping agenda in Afghanistan as an objective in itself, and as a way to reward peace and not war. In this context, donors and other agencies have a responsibility to ensure that their work Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003 reinforces the political transition, rather than undermining it. At its best, assistance could help to promote the credibility of Further, aid can foster economic stability the Government that emerged from the and trade with other countries, while elections by improving the lives of ordinary diluting the appeal of political extremism. Afghans and giving them a stake in the But beyond these instrumentalist future. arguments lies the most important rationale What Kind of Responsibility? for responsibility and accountability. Given that Afghanistan’s human insecurities have A quantitative responsibility: engagement been the result of conflicts compounded with Afghanistan should not dwindle by foreign interference, the world now has A substantial aid package is first and a particular obligation to help resolve them. foremost necessary for Afghanistan to This responsibility also stems from having transform the war economy into a peaceful successfully driven the Taliban out of one. At the beginning of the reconstruction Afghanistan on the promise of nation- period there was talk of a Marshall Plan, building. In his “State of the Union” speech but this did not materialize. Yet at the in 2003, President Bush pledged to help Berlin Conference in March 2004, Afghans secure their country, rebuild their commitments were guaranteed for the next society and educate all their children.19 seven years. The international community pledged US$4.5 billion in the first year, Support to the renewed sovereignty of and met a substantial part of the Afghan Afghanistan cannot therefore coincide with requests for US$27.5 billion for the second donor fatigue. There is no doubt that the and third years. In late 2003, the United international community must engage itself States, Afghanistan’s most generous donor, decisively in order to prevent the country also sharply increased aid, expanded from sliding back into civil war and technical assistance and actively involved becoming a sanctuary for drug production itself in the Afghan constitutional process and terrorists – but a fundamental rationale and democratic elections. The substantial

19 President George Bush, “State of the Union Address”, January 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

NHDR 04 209 Box 7.1 What is the Rationale for Aid?

The ways in which needs are defined Aid based on threats (human operationally and for the implementation and prioritized have real implications security): Aid based on perceived threats of development programmes. The shift for the outcomes for which aid was converges the basic-needs-based to aid based on costs, prompted by the intended. The various ways in which the approaches (risks to survival) with the Minister of Finance after the first two need for aid could be computed include: rights-based approach (to entitlements, years of reconstruction, was a way for Aid based on needs: Aid could be based and to a life of “dignity”). It also Afghan institutions to take the lead role on defined basic humanitarian needs of introduces an element of urgency: in determining the amount and allocation the population, which could form, for Insecurities should be dealt with not only of resources pledged to Afghanistan. example, four related “core elements” – because they are immediate threats to Aid based on meeting long-term targets: the protection of life, health, subsistence survival and dignity, but also because For countries that have undertaken a and physical security. Basic human they could lead to renewed conflicts or costing exercise of the MDGs, aid can welfare needs in a conflict situation inefficiencies in systems of democracy be based on the assessment of what it include freedom from violence, and fear and reconstruction. from coercion and from deprivation of takes to reach the agreed upon targets the means for survival.20 Aid based on costs: Arguments for aid of development by the year 2015. Focus based on costs, which have been used on the MDGs, which began in Aid based on rights: While aid based on humanitarian needs is value-neutral, by Securing Afghanistan’s Future and Afghanistan in 2004, when President it could also be based on the more the NDB, are based on the assessed costs Hamid Karzai, expressed his willingness normative rights-based approach. The of the public investment needed for a to sign the Millennium Declaration, identification of these rights involves a politically and economically sustainable transformed the discussion of aid to moral (and perhaps a legal) claim about process. They are based on what the Afghanistan from the short-term context entitlements, with the corresponding ministries in charge of different sectors of post-war reconstruction to the longer responsibilities and duties. need in order to function, both term concern of development.

aid promised at the Berlin Conference represents a significant departure from the policies of the previous decade, in which the international response was one of disengagement and containment. First and foremost, political will is needed to continue sustained peace-building efforts in Afghanistan and in the region at large. There are fears that the current levels of international political support and commitment to the rebuilding of Afghanistan may not continue indefinitely. Evidence from other crisis-countries is that the international community may move on to other crises in the spotlight, or that as agendas and administrations change, so do political commitments to incomplete projects, such as that of Afghanistan. Source:Zanbel-e-Gham, Edition 3, March 2003

20 James Darcy and Antoine Charles-Hofmann 2005.

210 Chapter 7 7.5. Challenges to Needs However, worldwide attention to Identification and Aid Afghanistan brought a myriad of Distribution in Afghanistan international aid workers to the country, making the relief scene similar to other Needs Based on Supply: The post-war situations. Problems associated Challenge of a “Light Footprint” with heavy foreign aid, especially in Kabul, amounted to pressure on real estate prices, Needs assessment typically is subsumed which skyrocketed, and to the “white within a process of resource mobilization, vehicle syndrome”, which could foster conducted by agencies in order to popular resentment. They also include a substantiate funding proposals to donors. serious distortion of salaries, prompting One can argue that the reconstruction the flight of qualified local personnel to project in Afghanistan did not begin on the aid sector. In a country decimated by the basis of established real needs “brain drain”, aid agencies “have in a sense assessment or a carefully planned process held in ‘cold storage’ a potential source based on agreements among all parties to of leadership for the future.”25 the conflict. On the contrary, it was initiated by external actors as part of a rushed Although large amounts of money have reaction to the sequence of events that been given to Afghanistan, the danger of followed September 11th, 2001.21 The introducing these sums is in raising Afghan pledges to reconstruction in Afghanistan expectations of rapid growth and recovery have been carried out in haste and based to an unrealistic level. Large amounts of on the urgency of international pledging aid do not guarantee improved well-being, conferences, rather than on needs analysis. just as the human development approach argues that growth in itself does not Such an assessment, which is conducted necessarily trickle down to all members in the context of an appeal for funds, in of society. Talking about the quantity of fact “encourage(s) supply-driven aid does not address issues of efficiency, responses, and risk(s) distorting the scale distribution impact and overall well-being. of the threat and the importance of the Equally important is that aid be properly proposed intervention. The lack of targeted, designed, implemented and independent ‘reality checks’ makes it monitored to address the needs of the difficult for the system to ensure that Afghan people. responses are appropriate, proportionate and impartial.”22 In such circumstances, The Puzzle of Definitions and the political interests of the international Obstacles to Assessment community, or the capacity of specific An important challenge in a post-conflict agencies, national or international, to situation like Afghanistan is the lack of “market” their interests may introduce systematic definition of what the “needs” biases in the situation analysis. Hence, the rushed tendency of donors to “construct” are, and who is ultimately “at risk”, and and “solve” crises with little reference to on what basis is this decided. While this report tries to present a case for a threat- evidence could erode trust in the system.23 based human security needs analysis, other At the Bonn Conference, the United documents in the reconstruction landscape Nations promised a “light footprint”.24 in Afghanistan have assessed “needs”

21 Suhrke 2004. 22 Darcy and Charles-Hofmann 2005. 23 Ibid. 24 ITAP 2002. 25 Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 211 based on other definitions (Securing Needs assessment, at least in the formal Afghanistan’s Future on costs, the MDG sense, often plays only a marginal role in Report on goals, a Center for Economic the decision-making of agencies and and Social Rights (CESR) study on human donors. However, rapid assessments in an rights needs, a Tufts University study on insecure environment such as Afghanistan human security and livelihoods needs, the depend on assumptions, estimates and NRVA on vulnerability and so on). predictions rather than on observed facts, Improving needs assessment demands which require checking. Monitoring of greater consistency in the ways that outcomes of interventions should also be problems are framed, symptoms are based on an assessment of the external observed, and causes and acute risk factors environment and the changing nature of are approximated. A proper assessment risks, rather than the typical focus on the requires defining not only needs (based output–input equation of project on answering the question of “why aid”), management.26 As the country becomes but also thresholds, and the minimum more stable and united in the months and requirements for survival and dignity. years after the parliamentary elections, What constitutes “enough” may depend coherent data collection and assessment on the context and the level of risk that will become an imperative. people face. Coordination and Consultation Logistical, security as well as capacity As much of the information in Afghanistan problems have hampered both the comes from international NGOs, a system collection of data and the assessment of of coordinated assessment should be real needs. In Afghanistan, there is a lack established that includes the CSO, UN of crucial information available to decision- agencies, NGOs and relevant Government makers, and the kinds of needs assessment bodies. Needs assessments were initially required to generate this are conducted undertaken by individual aid agencies in only sporadically. The result is that few accordance with their mandate and funding situations are assessed as a whole, making needs, and were gradually coordinated and prioritization within and across contexts correlated by international groups such as difficult. When data is collected by various AIMS and by the Government within the agencies and by the CSO, it is not always framework of the AACA and most recently relevant data, or in a form that would allow by the Ministry of Finance. Coordination comparisons and cross-examination. For of the various analyses and data generated example, baseline and population figures by the multiplicity of agencies that have were necessary for voter registration and become involved in what is a well-funded were carried out by the CSO in the summer post-crisis situation will be one of the of 2003. Yet, data collection in an insecure major challenges of the new Government environment proved very difficult, as and its international partners. exemplified by the murder of numerous CSO officials. The NRVA and Adequate consultation has been perhaps UNICEF/CSO MICS surveys have been the most thorny question in a situation able to shed more light on the situation of where funding proposals have had to be poverty and vulnerability in Afghanistan, submitted to international conferences but these also have been conducted in less within a short time, while insecurity and than perfect circumstances and the data lack of capacity prevented consultation may not be complete. with various regions and stakeholders. But

26 Goodhand 2002.

212 Chapter 7 Table 7.1 Donor Disbursement table

Donor 4Q80 + 81 (Jan02-Mar03) 1382 (Mar03-Mar04) of which: ALL SUPPORT TOTAL TRUST FUNDS PROJECTS PLEDGE Com Disb PLEDGE Com Disb Com Disb Com Disb Aga Khan 25.0 20.3 8.2 25.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ADB 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0 58.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 58.1 2.5 Australia 33.7 20.3 20.3 13.7 3.6 3.5 2.6 2.6 1.0 0.9 Belgium 11.7 11.7 11.7 6.0 2.3 1.6 0.7 0.0 1.6 1.6 Canada 83.0 83.0 83.0 95.0 90.9 91.0 55.8 56.3 35.1 34.7 China 27.0 31.0 30.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 Denmark 28.0 28.0 16.5 28.2 44.9 19.2 5.0 5.0 39.9 14.2 EC 218.4 176.4 112.4 292.1 304.6 144.1 170.4 111.4 134.2 32.7 ECHO 73.5 73.5 64.0 63.3 42.6 42.6 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.4 Finland 13.2 13.0 13.0 11.2 5.9 4.8 2.5 2.5 3.4 2.3 France 32.0 34.2 27.8 30.2 23.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 23.0 2.1 Germany 142.0 104.6 104.6 107.5 102.1 51.8 11.4 11.4 90.7 40.4 India 40.0 101.7 101.7 60.0 213.6 42.4 0.2 0.2 213.4 42.2 Iran 50.0 68.0 68.0 50.0 19.6 48.0 1.0 1.0 18.6 47.0 Ireland 4.0 4.3 4.0 5.0 4.1 2.2 3.9 2.0 0.2 0.2 Islamic Devt Bank 10.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.3 0.0 Italy 43.0 49.5 49.5 52.8 51.9 23.7 0.0 0.0 51.9 23.7 Japan 357.8 357.8 357.8 142.2 252.3 137.3 0.0 0.0 252.3 137.3 Korea (Rep of) 10.0 22.7 8.1 15.0 25.8 13.7 2.0 2.0 23.8 11.7 Kuwait 15.0 15.0 5.0 30.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 15.0 0.0 Luxembourg 5.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 6.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 6.3 4.9 Netherlands 100.5 100.5 93.3 65.3 50.6 49.0 47.1 45.9 3.5 3.1 Norway 40.0 40.0 40.0 53.0 41.5 40.5 30.2 30.2 11.3 10.3 Oman 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Pakistan 50.0 50.0 17.7 20.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 Qatar 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Russian Fed. 30.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Saudi Arabia 35.0 35.8 35.8 35.0 36.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 31.0 1.0 Spain 25.7 6.4 6.4 62.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 2.0 0.0 Sweden 30.0 30.0 30.0 35.6 27.0 10.1 6.0 6.0 21.0 4.1 Switzerland 12.0 14.4 14.4 13.0 8.6 5.4 0.4 0.4 8.2 5.0 Turkey 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 UAE 36.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 United Kingdom 137.8 91.6 149.0 144.0 194.1 128.1 59.1 55.1 135.0 73.0 USA 836.3 836.3 836.3 1,300.0 2,190.3 836.3 96.5 20.0 2,093.8 816.3 World Bank 103.3 101.5 23.2 160.0 125.8 97.2 20.8 20.8 105.0 76.4 Total 2,712.6 2,645.4 2,417.5 3,003.1 4,075.4 1,844.8 528.4 385.7 3,508.6 1,420.9 Includes preliminary data on commitments and disbursements against pledges. Based on data provided to Ministry of Finance as 1 May 2004.

NB. This table represents the best information at this point in time that donors have provided to Government. We expect that donors will revise this information over time and that figures will change. Zero represents either no disbursements or no information provided.

NHDR 04 213 Table 7.2: Total Assistance to Afghanistan 1380 (2001) Ð 1382 (2003)

Channel US$m % of Total Assistance Not Provided to Government To United Nations Emergency Loya Jirgah 22.9 Constitutional Loya Jirgah 13.0 Elections 75.5 UN Agencies 1,845.8 United Nations Subtotal 1,957.2 45.9% To national and international NGOs 413.1 NGO Subtotal 413.1 9.7% To Private Companies examples: Louis Berger 275.1 Bearing Point 71.4 KFW 45.9 Private Companies Subtotal 705.1 16.5% Subtotal of Assistance not Provided to Government 3,075.4 72.2% Assistance Provided Directly to Government 1,186.9 27.8% Total Assistance 4,262.3 100% N.B. A significant amount of UN Agency funding is subcontracted to NGOs and private companies. Source: Ministry of Finance, Financial Report, May 24, 2004

consultation requires effective consensus- with them. It means allowing them to be building on the elaboration of anything in the driver’s seat in designing strategies. from development strategies to At the same time, while it is vital that negotiations over small projects. In Afghans take centre-stage in the decision- Afghanistan, in the meantime, there has making processes concerning their not been much consultation on many of reconstruction, it should not be assumed the agendas, beginning with the NDF and that there exists a national consensus Securing Afghanistan’s Future. While concerning a vision for the nation’s future pressure, from the international community reconstruction and development priorities. on the Transitional Administration and on There is also a danger that the country’s the aid agencies, to deliver is weak transitional structures will be understandable, the danger is that this overwhelmed and marginalized in pressure may be at the expense of proper decision-making processes, especially if consultation, both with the majority of the international community takes too Afghans, and within the different branches strong a lead and undermines the inputs of the administration itself. It risks from the people of Afghanistan. It should perpetuating the perception that aid is to instead be seen as supporting national sustain the presence of a large international institutions at the central, provincial and community. Consultation, formal and district levels, as well as local authorities informal, with civil society, and with the such as the shuras. shuras and even with the diaspora is essential for planning the path towards The Dilemma of Top-down Versus genuine and lasting democracy and Bottom-up Approaches development while ensuring “Afghan Prior to the Bonn Agreement when the ownership”. international community was unable to Afghan ownership does not only mean collaborate with a legitimate central keeping people informed or consulting authority, multiple aid agencies had taken

214 Chapter 7 on the challenge of experimenting with projects, although the DAD is now making alternative, community-based initiatives. such information available. However, Many of these continue today, built on the while data is available on a number of conviction that aid, at the individual and projects per province, an attempt to use it community level, may effectively support for a comparison is impossible due to alternatives to war by cultivating ideas, double reporting by donors and values, livelihoods, forms of governance implementing agencies, difficulty in and leadership.27 The underlying belief is differentiating between finished, ongoing that aid, administered at the individual and and planned projects, and an uncertainty community level in a “conflict sensitive” as to whether all projects were reported manner, can subdue violence, and thereby and whether those reported had actually make communities less vulnerable to the been implemented.28 interests and agendas of “conflict entrepreneurs”. The effects of these micro- The Government’s NSP, as a regional and level initiatives are likewise assumed to well-distributed community development spill over and influence macro-level initiative, is designed to bridge the gaps If people can be of any between the supply from above and the politics. Though the results of such efforts help in enhancing have yet to be measured, the importance demand from below. In the coming years, it will be necessary for all aid agencies to human security they of the work being done by these “social need to be taken into entrepreneurs”, who attempt to bridge the work together to devise an appropriate Afghan model for aid, which would ideally confidence with respect gap between civil society and top to the relevant polices. leadership, should not be underestimated. involve an optimal blend of top-down and bottom-up strategies. They should be However, lessons from the past show that provided with Quick-fixes Versus Long-term one should not assume that bottom-up information about the Interventions peace-building approaches will current policies and automatically have a cumulative effect. “Civil wars that end in a stalemate may asked about their Bottom-up approaches of the past have require rapid, re-integrative measures lest advice with respect to led agencies to avoid working with the the belligerents resume fighting. The improving them. authorities at the national level, while their situation in Afghanistan is different; the Gul Ahmad Yama from Ghazni efforts remained highly localized, not to major potential for conflict lies rather in say fragmented. Moreover, such how to divide the spoils of peace.”29 community-based approaches tend to overestimate the capacity of civil society As short-term humanitarian relief to save to influence unaccountable leadership, lives continues in many parts of which often comes to power with the gun, Afghanistan, aid agencies have also begun rather than through consent. concentrating on longer term livelihoods support and capacity-building. This has Related to a balance between top–down involved building on the foundations of (aid to the central state) versus bottom-up community coping skills to create (aid to communities) approaches, alternatives to the war economy, rebuilding addressing human insecurities in social capital and physical infrastructure, Afghanistan requires an even distribution and, most importantly, helping to ‘de- of aid and of peace dividends across militarise’ the mind”.30 regions and groupings. At the moment, data is hard to come by on the geographic The large amount of aid that has poured distribution of aid and rehabilitation into Afghanistan has made it difficult to

27 Goodhand 2002. 28 Suhrke 2004. 29 Suhrke 2004. 30 Goodhand 2002.

NHDR 04 215 resist the temptation of quick-fix projects Large amounts of aid may mean that both that demonstrate immediate results. The donors and a recipient state, like the Afghan problem is not a shortage of funds, but a Transitional Administration, become tied lack of absorption capacities and policy to a culture of financial accountability priorities. It is also very important to avoid required for the management of short, expectations of a quick recovery. Slow fixed-term budgets measured by indicators progress may spark disillusionment with of expenditures. Funding is geared to reconstruction, especially among the high financial probity and timely disbursement, percentage of unemployed youth. rather than to the more difficult task of Expectations for rapid growth and recovery measuring its effectiveness through social are particularly acute during post-conflict impact evaluations of long lasting situations, where negative changes can improvements. For a state heavily add up to popular resentment. dependent on international money, this The Danger of Dependency practice encourages accountability to international and national financial The inevitable dependence on external intuitions and tax-payers in other countries. assistance, in the short term at least, must In addition, the timeframe creates a not be allowed to render the Transitional situation wherein, even if the international Administration more accountable to donors organizations and the state are both morally than to its citizens. In the past, the ruling accountable to the beneficiaries, in practice elite was never forced to develop domestic the accountability will be more to those accountability through internally derived controlling the resources and budgetary revenue because of the strong role of calendars. external finance. In 2004, the situation Holistic Versus Sectoral may not be much different. Two-thirds of Approaches the operating budget for the year 2003–2004 and the entire first NDB were Sectoral approaches may not be the best financed by foreign aid. International way to deal with human security in technical advisors were assigned to most Afghanistan, not only because they may of the ministries in Kabul, and some in the lead to fragmentation and contradictions, provinces as well. Absorptive capacities but also because they may fail to take into for the large amounts of funding requested account the inter-connections between the at Berlin were guaranteed through hiring various threats to well-being. Instead, an large international companies to assume integrated and holistic approach is needed. responsibility for tasks such as reconstructing infrastructure and For example, if food aid (relief assistance) performing Government accounting is not correlated with food security functions. (agriculture and rural economic recovery), it could slow post-war agricultural The country has now become totally reliant recovery. Similarly, agricultural recovery on foreign aid to finance development. needs to be correlated with mine clearance Yet, too much aid can be a curse rather and the employment sector. The than a blessing. It can lead to lower reintegration of refugees and IDPs should domestic savings, and higher exchange not be dealt with separately from the rates, which lower the competitiveness of reintegration of demobilized combatants, national enterprises in domestic and foreign given that they are likely to be returning markets. While the contribution of aid to to the same rural and urban communities. long-term and sustained economic growth Similarly, although many agencies work is questionable, it can lead to serious on mainstreaming gender issues into their indebtedness.

216 Chapter 7 programmes, women are singled out as a meant that the early stages of “category” in isolation from their wider reconstruction have run ahead of Afghan social, cultural and family contexts. A preparedness, pre-empting the process of macro-economic framework based on national negotiation and decision-making. market incentives may lead to inequalities Since 2002, however, there has been a and the proliferation of needy individuals. process of building Government capacity This fragmentation extends to the way that and finding personnel that have the the United Nations, and the various competence and authority to act as genuine consultative groups and government counterparts. This recognizes that the ministries (as discussed in Chapters 5 and limited capacity within line ministries 6) adopt sectoral approaches, with separate continues to represent a major constraint programmes and budgets. Yet the list of inter-connections can go on, each time to planning, implementing and monitoring pointing to the need for a more integrated development programmes. Central approach to planning, budgeting and institutions have been weakened by the monitoring interventions across various conflict, and their relationships with the sectors and in collaboration with various periphery constrained by insecurity and agencies in order to avoid negative the lack of communications infrastructure. externalities. Capacity needs to be built at the centre and in the provinces simultaneously, in Building Capacity order to ensure that the reconstruction process is indeed piloted by the Afghans One of the most important problems of themselves. aid in Afghanistan is the pace with which it needs to proceed on the one hand, and In the meantime, given the absence or the reality of slow processes and low weakness of administrative structures, the capacity on the other. It is especially UN agencies, international financial important to recognize the importance of institutions and bilateral donors letting the Afghan political process mature, increasingly pursue a policy of direct while promoting reforms and policy intervention, including becoming involved priorities that have long-term implications. in the day-to-day administrative running of the Government through advisors, or Capacity-building cannot be rushed. It is through “technical assistance” strategically a process that develops and transforms placed in key institutions. The same trend itself with time, making it even more is seen when NGOs substitute for the state imperative not to substitute externally at the local level in providing services, imposed blueprints and template solutions with the assumption that there are no that tell Afghans what they “should do” capable state structures. Replacing the state instead of looking at what they “can do”.31 at the local or national levels, either directly Afghan people and institutions must be or indirectly, however, does not lead to given the timeframe that suits them best, long-term capacity-building or ownership. in accordance with necessary respect, and not be pressured to adhere to the constraints The lack of educational provisions for the of budget deadlines determined by Western overwhelming majority of the younger capitals. A perceived lack of capacity, the generation (men as well as women) has haste of implementing relief while left a huge gap in the general capacity of providing security, and the desire to the nation to resume control of its affairs. promote Afghanistan as a showcase for This situation is already leading the international community may have international agencies to take the

31 Nancy Hatch Dupree as quoted in Barakat 2002.

NHDR 04 217 convenient option (from a communications become part of donor conditionalities. and time-saving point of view) of relying Imposing organizational changes does not on returning, Western-educated expatriates necessarily challenge well-established as the sole interpreters of the culture and institutions, but promotes an elite engaged aspirations of the whole nation. While in a patron–client relationship with donors. these returning nationals constitute a In such circumstances, the elites become precious resource, they too must undergo less accountable to the people they are a learning process. In the meantime, the supposed to serve. Another case involves largely illiterate Afghan population, still the legitimacy sought by new governments, struggling for physical survival and coming especially those under threat from powerful to terms with its losses, is in danger of neighbours or internal conflict. In these being overridden by the usual hasty situations, association with the international solutions, before they have time to consider community provides a defence or their role in the process.32 protection. A number of other factors can The Problem of Conditionalities also lead impoverished people and their new governments down a similar path of Aid conditionalities can range from explicit accepting conditions that may be less than contractual arrangements on budgetary desirable.34 accountability to more implicit notions of While Chapter 6 discusses the pitfalls of what type of political, economic and conditionalities based on standard increasingly military conditions are economic policies, this chapter examines necessary.33 It can include positivethe need to be cautious about tying approaches that reward compliant humanitarian or development assistance countries, as was seen at the Berlin to military conditionalities. The distinction Conference, and punitive measures, such between humanitarian assistance and as suspending aid to require specific types military objectives is increasingly blurred of economic and political reforms or the in Afghanistan. This is manifested not only adoption of human rights principles. The through the implementation of latter can be imposed through sanctions, infrastructure-building carried out by the as was witnessed during the Taliban years. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Although conditionalities are necessary in of the Coalition Forces, but also through order to assure that assistance is given to misplaced and dangerous conditionalities, the “right policies” of “good governance”, such as during May 2004, when the US or that loans are returned and investments Army was distributing leaflets calling on safeguarded, the problem of people to provide information on Al-Qaida conditionalities lies in the asymmetry of and the Taliban or face losing humanitarian power and voice between the donor and aid.35 the recipient country. Conditionality in war-torn societies can seem even more Listening and Learning from Local problematic when viewed in terms of the Resilience extreme vulnerability of populations and the lack of bargaining powers of weakened The first step towards reconstruction and administrative structures. development is to recognize and value people’s existing resilience in conflict In fact, recipient stakeholder agendas are situations and to nurture their survival and not disregarded or overruled, but they often coping skills. In Afghanistan, despite

32 Mohammad Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand 2001. 33 Barakat 2002. 34 Ibid. 35 The Guardian, 6May 2004.

218 Chapter 7 decades of violent conflict, there are relying on a small set of organizations with community level structures and a civil characteristics conforming to the Western society that have not only survived but NGO model. This cultural bias may mean also continued to grow. Too often the overlooking traditional social formations international community may not recognize that are central to people’s lives, including or value such local initiatives, and insist associations based on ethnic and religious on creating new structures instead of allegiances, ad hoc and informal groupings, building on these. It is therefore important the extended family and so on. When civil that even in such politicised environments, society is viewed in terms of a space is given for civil society to mature confrontational relationship with the state, and to contribute positively to any ongoing these institutions are denied the chance of peace negotiations or processes. It is of working both constructively with the state critical importance as well that civilians and holding it accountable.39 should take centre-stage in the decision- making process in Afghanistan’s Assessing past practices, and conducting reconstruction. The dilemma facing the a political and economic analysis of aid, country is that there has not been a neutral may enable different development agencies space for debate to enable a common vision to learn from past mistakes. This need to of the future to emerge, or for intellectuals listen and learn is, however, hampered by and development professionals to gather, physical distances, high staff turnover, to think, to discuss and to plan. poor coordination and information-sharing, “Afghanistan today is a huge, shifting and the aid agencies’ concern with outputs kaleidoscope of differing expectations and rather than outcomes and impacts. But the regional aspirations, which has been shaped knowledge does exist, both in the by the collective experience of 23 years international and local communities. Now of war.”36 it must be tapped into so that aid agencies can truly make significant contributions In the meantime, while the capacity of to development and democracy in internal institutions to manage recovery Afghanistan. has been severely weakened, institutional capacity survives in Afghan society, 7.6. Conclusions although much of it is customary (“rule- based”) rather than formal (“role-based”).37 International aid has a long and As two researchers noted, “successful controversial record in Afghanistan. The programmes to develop institutional and wrong kinds of aid have at times created individual capacity should not be designed perverse incentives leading to renewed and implemented from outside, but they conflict. In the future, donors and aid should evolve and grow, because agencies must be more self-critical and sustainable and legitimate institutions can aware of these potentially negative effects. be created in direct relations to the social A continued priority should be placed on experiences of a people and created by conflict prevention. those they are to serve.”38 It is mostly through the state that people Aid agencies have often failed to recognize relate to the international system. The existing social institutions. The implication international community can forgo the has been bypassing the social formations state and cooperate directly with sub- that have emerged through history, and national societal units, but it does so at the

36 Suhrke, Strand and Harpviken 2001. 37 Goodhand and Atmar 2001. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

NHDR 04 219 risk of replacing or weakening the state. • Enhancing participatory development, This does not necessarily enhance human the rule of law, and good governance security in the long run. If aid agencies in through institutional reform aimed at Afghanistan, for example, bypass the improving representation of national central Government and work directly with groups or creating legal avenues of regional administrations controlled by redress for grievances. regional power-holders, they risk heightening tensions between the centre • Integrating a gender perspective in and the periphery. national and local planning. Human security efforts need to be locally Direct assistance for peace-building as part sustainable. They require an effective, of development is only one of the legitimate, accountable and participatory responsibilities of the international political structure capable of securing its community, and in many circumstances own resources. International interference may not be the most important. Others is unlikely to enhance local capacities in include: these directions if it does not build upon • Stemming the proliferation of weapons the pre-existing efforts and capabilities of and taking serious steps to limit the those directly affected.40 flow and diffusion of arms. Integrating a human security approach in • Combating corruption. development programmes and plans calls for reorienting them to respond to new • Encouraging macro-economic challenges and realities. Conflict stability, and open regional and prevention measures need to be included international flows of legitimate trade, at all stages, even in post-conflict and so- investment, and know-how. called “normal” development situations. These peace-building and conflict- • Enhancing regional cooperation. prevention measures could be: • Allowing for equitable global trade • Correlating programmes that span regimes. functional areas such as economic • Targeting aid in such a way as to act growth and distribution, food security, as a multiplier by facilitating an agricultural and urban livelihoods, environment for private and public governance and institution building, investments. education, health, environment and resource management. To meet the ultimate challenges of tomorrow requires thinking beyond aid, • Recognizing potential vulnerability since sustainable peace and development and threats through regular human will, in the final analysis, not be the result security assessments or early warnings of development assistance, but of home- and risk analysis. grown governance and Afghan • Building capacity for dialogue among entrepreneurship. communities. • Reducing poverty with a specific view to helping narrow and close inter- group disparities.

40 Commission on Human Security 2003.

220 Chapter 7 Chapter 8

Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Chapter 8: Recommendations: Laying the Foundations for Democracy, Development and Human Security in Afghanistan

Chapter 8 presents the main building, or destroy its very foundations. recommendations stemming from the Carefully planned reconstruction should holistic approach to human security be seen as part of the overall peace-building problems that has been taken in this first agenda, one that builds trust in institutions, NHDR for Afghanistan. Since the report promotes participation, heals wounds and has primarily analysed past and current restores dignity. issues within a particular framework of It is first important to note that there are human development and human security, no perfect solutions, no pre-determined the recommendations are presented as blueprints for post-conflict reconstruction. general directions that the new Government “The best that the actors ...can hope to do and international community could pursue. is to steer a course that does the least harm, These are meant as attempts to initiate by learning from past efforts.”1 Sultan dialogue in Afghanistan on broad and inter- Barakat 2002. Reconstruction must connected issues. Easing some of the necessarily be a continuous and prolonged barriers to progress could be sought process of negotiation between diverse through discussions and further in-depth interest groups as well as between them studies, including in future NHDRs. This and political actors. first report took a more general approach to set the scene for an integrated pursuit Sustained peace in Afghanistan is not of the goals of human development and guaranteed despite the early successes in human security. state- building that have now led to 8.1. Introduction: The Dilemma elections. Human security is still needed in Afghanistan. The breakdown of of Afghanistan institutions has left the population vulnerable to the whims of peace-spoilers In many countries emerging from war, and their private militias, which can easily overt armed conflict may come to an end raise and sustain an army from among while low-level violence continues for impoverished populations. Rebuilding many years, involving former factions, institutions constitutes the core task for demobilized combatants, bandits or protecting Afghans’ human security. This militias. Military and diplomatic measures, should be done according to an “Afghan though important, are unlikely by model” that reflects the country’s history themselves to secure a transition towards and strives not only to satisfy the a stable peace. For development and immediate needs of individuals, but also democracy to take root, the manner in to develop the capacities for self- which the reconstruction is structured sufficiency and empowerment. (needs assessed, resources allocated, partners chosen, projects implemented, The triple challenge in Afghanistan is that results monitored, etc.) can either provide an ambitious national reconstruction positive incentives that foster nation- programme has been launched at the same

1 Sultan Barakat 2002.

NHDR 04 223 time as a fragile political transition and an in Afghanistan, the sovereignty gained ongoing military campaign. after the elections also means increased responsibilities to protect the citizens • While a strong state is needed to provide human security as a public of Afghanistan, as well as those of good, an overly centralized state may other countries affected by the also exacerbate horizontal inequalities, insecurities there. which could lead to conflicts. There The goal in Afghanistan is not simply to is a need for order at the national level, create a development or democracy agenda, but at the same time, the geography but to use these tools to prevent conflict, does not facilitate central control, and on the one hand, and to provide the ultimate freedom should be bestowed on the goal of human security as a public good, independent tribes to allow for local on the other. economic development. Devolution of power, therefore, is needed at the A human security agenda is, first and same time as this power is consolidated foremost, a conflict prevention mechanism The goal in at the centre. for Afghanistan and the region. Beyond Afghanistan is not • Institutional capacity-building is conflicts and military diplomacy between simply to create a needed, but this is a long-term project. states, it addresses causes of conflict from development or In the short term, the immediate needs with in the state: hunger, disease, crime democracy agenda, of the people include human rights, and repression, and personal crisis caused but to use these tools to security and jobs, imperatives that by decades of war. These threats are easier prevent conflict, on the cannot wait for the building and – and less costly – to address through early strengthening of new institutions. prevention and detection, than after another one hand, and to full-fledged war has erupted. Resorting provide the ultimate • The ongoing military campaign against once again to military missions and the remaining Taliban fighters and goal of human security international humanitarian interventions peace-spoilers could present trade-offs as a public good, on the under pressure can be avoided, if a timely, other. that the new Government and its international partners must deal with, stratified and gradual approach is adopted. including diversion of funds to the Human Security Externalities military, concentration on rogue provinces, and so on. Although, for Focusing on people as the subjects of the moment, this has been the security is an imperative, built on the responsibility of the Coalition Forces following premises:

Box 8.1 What Afghanistan Needs What People Need

Systemic Goals Human Security Goals Peace Survival

Development Democracy Livelihoods Dignity

224 Chapter 8 • Conditionality for development: imperative for institutions and actors People must have a minimal sense of whose raison d’être is to serve those security in order to engage in who put them there in the first place. development activities, while Development and Democracy and development, in turn, contributes to Conflict Prevention the increased freedom and security of both the people and the state. Development and Conflict • Legitimacy of the state-building Recovery in war-torn societies is an process: Legitimacy, so crucial for integral part of the development challenge, the new Afghan Government, should with poverty reduction, development be based on accountability towards strategies and interventions all capable of War is not a single Afghans primarily, and not towards having positive as well as negative effects. catastrophic event but regional or international interests. In a negative scenario, development a devastating way of interventions may (inadvertently) • Stability for the state: Without the life closely associated strengthen underlying causes of conflict, fear of continued conflicts, and and the actors who are pursuing with chronic poverty anticipating a pact with citizens, the opportunities for violence. In a positive and social injustice. state should allocate its resources to scenario, development interventions may Peace is not a quick-fix productive sectors, instead of to contribute to weakening these factors, and but a development military hardware or a continued help de-escalate conflict. process that begins struggle with alienated groups. and can be nurtured In fragile transitional situations such as • Ownership: The peace-building and long before ceasefires Afghanistan, many of the causes of conflict state-building agendas should be must be addressed if the country is to avoid are brokered, and “owned” by the Afghan people, the sliding back into conflict. Greater which needs to be ultimate beneficiaries. development – economic, social and sustained through • Increased participation: Afghans political – can help build peace and reduce years of ‘post-war should play a greater role in the design the dangers of violent conflict. Yet recovery’. and implementation of new policies development itself causes change and Sultan Barakat, 2002 and projects. transformation, which can be destabilizing. Even when it is successful, • Building trust and respect: The development raises expectations and alienation of the state from its people highlights disparities, sometimes adding should diminish, leading to positive to the factors that may trigger violence. It externalities. is also important to be aware of the • Efficiency and sustainability: limitations of development interventions Projects, policies and budgets should in defusing conflict and building peace. be designed through a demand-driven Development can only complement, never process and vetted for sustainability replace, direct peace-building measures against the engagement of such as political transformation or preventive diplomacy, and other measures beneficiaries. to stop hostilities and “get back on track”. • Eradication of horizontal At the same time, while development itself inequalities: Equity between groups is not the only response, and developed of people should diminish competition societies also fall prey to major internal and conflict. or external crisis, research does show that • Morality and ethics: The shift in certain levels of achievement and focus to the security (well-being) of improvement in conditions of life – such people constitutes, ultimately, a moral as economic well-being; freedom and

NHDR 04 225 choice; social stability and social justice; process for conflict prevention or resolution trusted mechanisms of open, responsive than for actually resolving conflicts, governance; and the respect of individual per se. and minority rights – do ultimately tend Liberal democracy and a market-oriented to support peace. These public goods, in economy, because they open up national addition to being desirable in themselves, systems to a multiplicity of interests, are work together to form a solid foundation not always the answers to all types of for sustainable peace. development operations, nor the surest The Role of Democracy for Conflict foundations for peace. Democracy and Resolution and Prevention capitalism, both encouraging social competition, could in some cases worsen Democratic governance may be the most social conflicts in war-shattered states that appropriate system for conflict prevention lack the institutional structures required and resolution, assuming that democracy for conciliation. Fledgling democracies, is a system that allows, via institutional therefore, have to face political hurdles outlets such as political parties and that can hamper economic and social representative parliaments, the sustainable development. Democracies may also be management of conflicts, , rather than too dependent upon special interest groups suppressing or ignoring them. It is a system that all too often win at the expense of where accumulated resentments that arise favourable conditions for economic from perceived misallocations of resources growth. The dilemma for post-conflict can be aired – whether they relate to access countries such as Afghanistan is to to land, discrimination on the basis of reconcile competing interests and to create gender or religion, or any of the other a democracy that does not further widen myriad sources of deeply felt grievances. inequalities. Instead, it should lay the In the context of deep-rooted conflict, foundations for a democracy that is just democratic institutions are more relevant and responsible, and that is based on the for their potential ability to initiate a principles of participation and governance.

Box 8.2 What Kind of Democracy Does Afghanistan Need?

• Where the rule of law is respected to keep risk factors, such as greed and grievances, from being converted into conflict. • Where security is established and maintained not only as a reinforcement of punitive action, but as a pro-active empowerment strategy that encourages citizens to respect the rule of law. • Where there is national reconciliation and a consolidation of peace through power sharing and democratic representation of constructive elements of society. • Where there is genuine participation in all processes from design to implementation to monitoring. • Where all human rights are respected, especially those related to freedom of expression. • Which is built on local traditions and consultation mechanisms. • Which respects diversity, and can bridge ethnic, geographic and gender differences. • Which is based on respect for institutions, and not on the personalization of politics. • Which addresses asymmetries and power inequalities as a matter of injustice, whether they are related to gender, geography, ethnicity religion and so on.

226 Chapter 8 The Need for Information and 4 Political instability: This includes Conflict Analysis two components: A human security analysis should focus • Transformation of the state on the threat of inequalities within the structure: Restructuring of the context of historical changes, the dynamics state at frequent intervals signals of future trends, the degree of politicization, serious instability and the public perceptions and linkages to poverty. likelihood that violence is being In a highly fragmented society such as employed to bring about systemic Afghanistan’s, where conflicts have been changes. waged based on perceptions of exclusion, • Breakdown in law and order: a disaggregated analysis across social, When the government is not able ethnic, gender and regional groups is to maintain control or effective needed in order to: rule (in certain parts or throughout • Examine the sources and consequences the country), law and order breaks of conflict. down, and violence is likely. • Determine the factors that can be For violent conflict, these two factors addressed through policies, can occur independently or in tandem. programmes and international assistance. 5 Restricted civil and political rights: The deliberate and systematic denial • Examine the country’s resilience to of civil liberties and political rights outbreak or escalation of violent increases the likelihood that groups conflict. will express dissenting views through • Assess the ability to de-escalate violent violence, thus upping the probability conflict. of violent conflict. • Determine how resilience can be 6 Militarization: Countries may have strengthened through development a high defence spending as a ratio of assistance and policies. their GNI and large armies as a The WB uses nine indicators for a conflict proportion of their population. analysis framework that captures However, a militarized society also deterioration in a country.2 highlights the availability of arms among non-state actors. These factors 1 Violent conflict in the past ten years: suggest the likelihood of emerging or If a country has experienced violent escalating violent conflict. conflict in the past ten years, there is a high possibility of recurrence. 7 Ethnic dominance: When one ethnic group controls state institutions and/or 2 Low per capita GNI: Countries with the economy, there is an increasing low per capita GNIs face a higher risk risk of an outbreak of violent conflict. of experiencing violent conflict. 8 Active regional conflicts: Regional 3 High dependence on primary conflicts are likely to have a cascading commodities exports: Countries with effect, such that the internal stability a high dependence on primary of a country (flow of refugees, arms) commodities exports are more likely is threatened, increasing the probability to experience violent conflict. of violent conflict.

2 Conflict Analysis Framework, WB 2003, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheConflictAnalysisFramework/$FILE/CAFAugust03.pdf.

NHDR 04 227 9 High youth unemployment: Youth little wonder that the influence of the unemployment can have a critical transitional Government does not extend bearing on the probability of violent far beyond the capital. conflict. Lack of jobs and opportunities tend to create frustration, making Hence, there is a need to strengthen the unemployed youth (especially young ANA and the ANP so that they will be men) prime candidates for recruitment accountable, and have the will and capacity by militant organizations with funds to enforce the law throughout the country. and arms at their disposal. At the same time, ISAF’s current role in security may be both inadequate in terms While it is likely that each of these factors of its small numbers, and inappropriate exacerbate situations that can portend the because its current modus operandi creates outbreak, escalation, or resurgence of a sense of dependency amongst Kabul violent conflict, none of them is residents. Instead, international security individually “necessary” or “sufficient” forces should help improve the delivery for violent conflict. Still, as the number of of security by extending the influence of indicators checking positive increases, the the ANA and ANP, and not by creating importance of conflict analysis also rises. dependence on a foreign military presence. 8.2. Recommendations and Today there are 15,000 National Army soldiers and nearly 30,000 National Police Elements of a Human Security officers, and support to these institutions Vision for Afghanistan needs to be increased. This NHDR considers the following seven An immediate focus should be on the elements as necessary for long-term human remodeling and implementation of a security in Afghanistan: strengthened and accelerated DDR 1. Security and safety strategy. Disarmament, however, needs to be carried out within a context of The political scientist Max Weber once employment creation and alternative defined a state as an entity that has a livelihoods. An ill-planned DDR approach, monopoly over the legitimate use of force involving no long-term plan for the in a country. To ensure human security, employment of disarmed persons and no and to function as a capable state, the new training for security personnel to replace Afghan Government should take back its them, may be more dangerous than no monopoly, and put an end to the strategy at all. Even though the current privatisation of security that is generating private militia are largely responsible for negative competition. the insecurity threats throughout the country, they would become more lethal By the end of 2004, debates continued on if the self-assigned security responsibility how peace and security should be pursued, in the areas under their control is taken and in whose interests Afghanistan should away from them through DDR and then be made secure. The argument is that while left to ad-hoc strategies. 20,000 Coalition Forces largely pursue their own agenda, hunting down the At the same time, it needs to be recognized Taliban, Al-Qaida and anyone actively that while security is undoubtedly a and violently opposing them, there remain priority, if won through an expansion of only 5,000 Kabul-based ISAF troops and military operations, it cannot provide a 15,000 Afghanistan National Army troops permanent solution to the security dilemma to address the broader national agenda for in Afghanistan. Nor does such a narrowly stability and peace-building. With an defined security goal amount to what will inadequate and small police force, it is be required to meet the human security

228 Chapter 8 needs of Afghans, the vast majority of 2. A Responsible State and an who remain poor, highly vulnerable and Accountable State-building Process without fundamental human rights. There is no fast track to lasting human security Any debate on Afghanistan’s state-building and political stability through military process must focus on the state’s action alone. prospective role and size. PRTs exemplify the shortcomings of a A public good is characterized by non- narrow interpretation of human security excludability and by non-competition in objectives. They simultaneously seek to consumption; thus, social security, physical address military, political and humanitarian security and the rule of law, as well equal distribution and the upholding of human dimensions through an expanded role for rights are considered as vital respons- Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. The ibilities of a “strong” state. coalition-commanded PRTs are proving to be an inadequate and dangerous vehicle A number of factors contribute to the for provision of security, however, and “weak state” in Afghanistan. Geography their new “humanitarian” role is and topography are not conducive to increasingly hard to distinguish from that facilitating communication, and they assist of genuine humanitarian and development regional power bases competing with the aid workers. centre. The interference of strong regional and international powers in the internal Without peace and stability, there can be political process has also prevented a strong no sustainable human development in state from evolving, while the legitimacy Afghanistan. Beyond the call for more and power of the centre is further international forces to be deployed challenged by local tribal structures led throughout the country, the NHDR notes by powerful personalities. However, while that true security rests on a genuine national the state may be challenged, the nation is reconciliation process that adequately not. Afghanistan’s rich ethnic and religious addresses the greed and grievances existing diversity has not led to separatist in Afghanistan today. aspirations by ethnic groups, despite the Justice must be dealt with at the same time presence of warring parties and factions. as stability. While the need for national Instead, what is sought is a redistribution reconciliation is often emphasized in of the “power” of the state equally among Afghanistan, both national and the different groups to ensure that all are international actors have been reluctant to implicated in the political discourse on touch specific means to address the state-building throughout the country and country’s past. The multi-ethnic layers of not only in Kabul. Afghan society, combined with the fragility The capacity to “provide” human security of state-building efforts that remain depends upon a strong state that can dangerously exposed to polarization, generate and distribute public goods. necessitate a cautious approach towards Human security as public good requires the revisiting of the past as a means to the state to have a regulatory as well as a promoting reconciliation. Few would provisionary role; it must regulate in order disagree that long-term political stability to ensure conditions for reconstruction, in Afghanistan is closely tied to the and provide sufficient security for the resolution of past grievances – including market to function. It must also play an human rights violations, war crimes and active part in offering social services, crimes against humanity – but the quality (even if basic) health care, sequencing of reconciliation as well as the education and job security to all the mechanism to facilitate “national healing” population, not only as a matter of right, are yet to be determined. but also to diminish threats.

NHDR 04 229 The viability of a peace-building process At the same time that the state should depends ultimately on the establishment provide for its people, they should also be of a legitimate Afghan state, responsive willing and capable of contributing to the to the demands of the population, state. Checks and balances against the responsible for providing the public goods powers of the state should be set up through that comprise human security, and able to traditional negotiation structures such as resist threats from regional military groups the Loya Jirgah to ensure that the within the country as well as pressures relationship between Afghan civil society from external parties. The Government and the central state grows into one of can delegate some activities to commercial mutual engagement rather than distrust. and non-governmental organizations, but One of the crucial issues will be whether it still bears the ultimate responsibility. the models of “transitional justice” that Given the complex nature of post-war have been applied in other post-conflict society in Afghanistan, state contexts can be adapted to fit the responsibilities should increase rather than complexities of the history of war in decrease. This does not mean that the state Afghanistan. On the one hand, the model should dictate the directions of the of “truth and reconciliation” may be too economy, but that it should intervene in simplistic in a context in which perpetrators areas where the market cannot ensure an and victims are spread throughout society. efficient allocation of resources or equal The prosecutorial model, on the other hand, which pursues justice through war crimes access to assets and opportunities for all tribunals, may jeopardize the peace process people. The role of the state should be by threatening power mongers inclined to threefold: 1) to guarantee that the exploit ethnic divisions to escape sanction. reconstruction process is equitable, efficient Moreover, the prosecutorial model would and empowering; 2) to promote investment be preconditioned on either a strong judicial in human capabilities; and 3) to equally system within Afghanistan or heavy distribute resources. First and foremost, international support similar to the the role of the state should be to equalize international war crimes tribunals opportunities. established in the past, neither of which A weak state cannot deliver human security seems to be available at present. In view priorities and can breed grievances, so of the current challenges to transitional “efficient” and “fair” state building is the justice, answers to the questions of the first priority of a human security agenda. past may be “postponed” until the critical The inability to satisfy basic needs in threshold for long-term stability has been provinces can cut into the credibility of achieved. The risk remains, however, that the central Government. State-building in without measures to demonstrate Afghanistan therefore requires cooperation commitment to dealing with previous between the central Government and its injustices and grievances, public trust and local representatives, as well as with confidence in the newly established state community and tribal leaders that have structures, particularly its judiciary, may been instrumental in creating law and order further corrode, to the detriment of the state-building process itself. This may in provinces. These relationships, based particularly apply in cases where political on mutual interest, and adequately spelled interests seek to exploit past grievances to out in the Constitution, need to be garner popular support. reinforced. What needs to be avoided is the segregation of the country into semi- Making reconciliation part of state-building autonomous regions. is important for three reasons: 1) It would

230 Chapter 8 serve justice; 2) It would send a message elections will be perceived as fair and to both the victims and the culprits to secure. The intermediate test will be the relegate past violations to the past and Government’s ability to build the necessary move forward; and 3) It would help structures to allow for a functioning marginalize perpetrators of human rights Parliament, which can meaningfully violations. represent the people and exercise control 3. Inclusive and Empowering over the executive. Whether the rule of law, observed by the judiciary and Institutions and Policies executive organs, will finally replace the In Afghanistan, all development strategies rule of the gun will be the ultimate test for have to be based on addressing inequalities the Government to inspire people’s trust. between groups (gender, regions, religions In passing these “tests”, it will certainly and ethnicities). Otherwise they may fail face the difficult dilemma inherent in post- in reaching their targets, while exacerbating conflict state-building efforts: that the causes for renewed conflict. Afghanistan establishment of “good governance” after is not a normal underdeveloped country years of military confrontation takes time, that needs fast recovery growth based on keeping in mind that people’s memories market forces. It is one with deeply are more short-lived than their imbedded inequalities that must be eased. expectations. 4. Genuine Participation The implementation of a human security vision requires policies that allow all A shift to a human security vision requires groups an adequate voice and the involvement of people as agents of representation in decision-making change and opportunities. It moves beyond processes. This would mean addressing viewing people as vulnerable groups for disparities and inequalities in opportunities whom projects are designed, and views based on gender (men and women), participation and consultation as key to geography (urban/rural or regions), the shift to long-term development. generation and age, ethnicity, and whether or not people are settled, be they IDPs, There is no denying that democracy and returnees or nomads. Policies based on respect for human rights build security in principles of equitable access to society. A representative democracy, where opportunities create social cohesion and all social groups have access to political an integrated, peaceful society, which is decision-making process and benefit from what Afghanistan needs first and foremost equal representation, satisfies the goals of today. equity and justice. In a post-conflict situation like Afghanistan, the principles If the differences and disparities are a result of democracy can shape the best of objective factors, then efforts should be environment for securing political and made, through specific policies, to diminish social freedoms. Empowering and these. If, however, these are a result of inclusive governance systems can provide policy decisions, then they must be security better than military defence eradicated. The very real constraints of measures. Civil society can be involved the new Government, in terms of resources, in the promotion of human security by geography and history need to be dealt helping in early detection, providing with first and foremost through political feedback into policy-making, partnering will. with the state to offer protection and assistance, and informing public opinion. The immediate test for the Government will be the extent to which the political All policies, development policies and environment of upcoming parliamentary plans in particular, need to involve public

NHDR 04 231 participation and voices in order for them are information and forms of consultation to be meaningful, supported and that allow people to voice grievances and sustainable. People-based institutions such discontent. Participatory planning raises as the district and provincial level shuras the level of people’s commitment, enables and the National Assembly need to be a human development focus, and about more than vetting political regimes; encourages people to contribute their own they should be primarily involved in human and financial resources. Sharing consulting the Government with respect power and responsibility, since they to economic and development distribute the work required for programmes. This will enable the development, can end up accelerating it. Government to engage local resources for Community action, involvement and help with the development work, while at ownership will be key to future security the same time drawing the shuras and the and the sustainability of reconstruction. Assembly’s attention away from negative The role of communities as monitors and politics to positive participation in champions of infrastructure development, development. and in the management of health and Participation is to a large extent the education services, will need to be responsibility of individuals. It means vigorously promoted. Given the extent to people taking responsibility for their own which community participation is pivotal future, which in turn creates accountability. to successful reconstruction, investments The new Government must take steps to such as the NSP (establishing community- empower people to take on this based development committees across all responsibility. The first prerequisite is an 20,000 villages) and NEEP will necessitate informed and mature civil society capable appropriate and sustained levels of donor of making choices. For this, the elements support.

Box 8.3 Why is Culture Important to Human Development?

The present critical state of Afghanistan’s stimulated by innovative thinking and Although a number of ethnic groups cultural traditions and properties is un-submerged by economic and political straddle the nation’s boundaries and nothing new. Similar upheavals have interests, can make major contributions similarities with adjacent populations occurred during the course of its long to the human development process. can be noted, Afghans are noticeably history. One need only recall the horrid distinct from their neighbours and take Culture establishes a nation’s decimation of the luxurious Ghaznavid pride in their uniqueness. It was their integrity and fortifies a sense of capital in the 12th Century, followed by determination to remain true to the national identity among its citizens the onslaughts of Genghis Khan in the essence of their cultural ethos that enabled the Afghans to endure years of 13th Century. Nonetheless, although A nation’s integrity is assured when its conflict often inflicts irredeemable economic and social hardships with members hold fast to cultural values that forbearance and courage. The nation was physical damage, the massive fortify their sense of national identity. displacements accompanying such utterly traumatized, but the culture Afghanistan sits at the hub of an destruction can also strengthen a people’s survived. intercommunicating zone between four determination to preserve cultural Culture reinforces national great civilizations. The mingling of a traditions that affirm their national cohesiveness and development wide diversity of peoples who came at identity in the midst of disruption. This various times for various reasons forms is the case with Afghanistan. The principle that there is strength in a rich cultural mosaic. The vigour of diversity aptly characterizes this nation The challenges that Afghanistan faces Afghan society resides in this vibrant comprised of peoples with so many today are daunting, but now is the time medley of peoples, and the nation derives different backgrounds. Variations in for new beginnings. It is time to its strength from the interchanges of one cultural expression exist not only recognize that the full potential of culture, with the other. between its disparate groups, but within

232 Chapter 8 groups of common origin as well, young. It embodies individual and overlooked, there are serious depending on the geography of their community aspirations. It influences deficiencies and large gaps in the settlement areas. Differences also decision-making. Having a strong sense cultural information that is available. distinguish rural and urban populations, of one’s own culture permits individuals within which members of various social to develop an inner strength that inspires Because available data are classes cherish their own customs and them to reach out for more fulfilling insufficient, it is difficult to conduct value systems. Yet there is also an lives for themselves, their families and adequate quantitative assessments overriding belief in a wide range of their communities. that can be used to establish common cultural values that function as meaningful benchmarks and evaluate cohesive bonds to keep the nation united Culture, community and human around its own recognizable identity. development are thus inextricably progress. The complexities that will intertwined because each focuses on accompany the process of Afghan history abounds with episodes people as agents of change in their search establishing viable, comprehensive to improve themselves and the of clashes between its separate groups, cultural indicators that can be but it also reveals periods of tranquility. environment around them. Yet, the It was during these periods of tolerance pervasive role culture plays in the lives measured and monitored should not and unity that the peoples living in the of people and their development is rarely obscure the fact that the issue cannot Afghan area utilized their ingenuity to acknowledged. Development rhetoric at be reduced to a single dimension. introduce cultural innovations that times may allude to culture as something enabled them to achieve economic, vaguely desirable, but specifics are It would be unwise to leave the political and artistic heights from which seldom provided. identification of indicators solely to they exerted influence far beyond the Instead, the encouragement, promotion outsiders. For example, a recent territory they controlled. The brilliance and development of “culture” is too often archaeological inventory conceived of these periods grew out of the coming treated as an appendage to development together and fusion of the many creative and completed abroad was so bloated strategies that focus on economic or with inconsequential factors as to be ideas flourishing with the Afghan social factors, and in which economic borders. growth, reducing poverty, and virtually unusable. Relevant Culture is intertwined with all forms minimizing education and health indicators can best be selected in of human development. disparities become ends in themselves, concert with those involved, for dominating policy planning and choices. locally generated data provide What is meant by culture? Culture These key goals are valuable, but they insights into people’s perceptions of embraces those shared ideas, beliefs, cannot be realized without considering emotions and customs that mould the society’s beliefs, emotions and what is important to them for the behaviour and place value on creative behaviour patterns. attainment of richer, more artistic expressions, such as art, music, meaningful lives. It is their concerns literature, architecture and relationships Culture’s role in human development is poorly recorded. and priorities that matter. When with the environment. It defines the way cultural data that reflect society’s people live, and the way they utilize material and non-material resources. It Not only is the examination of the basic values are factored into policy encompasses all members of society – relationship of culture to human analyses, the totality of human men, women and children, old and development a subject that is largely development is enhanced.

Nancy Hatch Dupree, 2004.

5. Balanced Development community and the Government must temper this imbalanced growth with an Building on its successes with initiatives increased focus on rural areas, including such as the NSP and NEEP, the new remote villages. Government must design a comprehensive regional development strategy. The initial Assistance to Afghanistan should not give stages of the reconstruction programme the impression of uneven re-development, concentrated most development efforts in even if for security reasons some provinces Kabul and major urban centres. As the are easier to access than others. Special drug economy contributes now to the rapid attention should be given to unstable areas; development of cities, the international otherwise these “rogue provinces” could

NHDR 04 233 threaten the stability of the entire country. especially of taxes received by some of What should be avoided is the evolution the provinces, given that a large portion of a country increasingly divided between of local revenues still does not reach the a turbulent south and east, on the one hand, central Government. and a more stable crescent stretching from the west to the north, where rehabilitation Finally, balanced development involves and development can move forward. women playing an active role in the reconstruction process. The mainstreaming An adequate regional and rural of gender concerns in all policies, budgets development strategy would enable and plans is a first step. Supporting grass- Afghanistan to make the best use of its root organizations and leadership among human capital. While the central Afghan women will help ensure that their Government requires the resources of the interests are adequately defended. In the provinces, it needs to also enter into final analysis, real democracy in appropriate relationships that empower Afghanistan will largely depend on the the local communities and their genuine, and not just nominal, representatives. By being involved in the representation of women in decision- design and implementation of projects and making. policies, people as well as political and 6. A Supportive International community leaders in different regions will share the responsibility of maintaining Community peace and stability in the area. Local Ownership, International Support As an equalizing and empowering measure, The international system should help the state should address the wide gaps in promote peace in Afghanistan by accepting opportunities between different regions, and sustaining its responsibility to support as well as between urban and rural areas. the country’s peace and conflict prevention A long-term human security vision should efforts. Cooperation and assistance should avoid islands of privileges (the cities) be scrutinized for issues related to within seas of poverty (the rural areas). ownership, impact, efficiency, Wide gaps exist today in income coordination, political agendas, etc.. opportunities, as well as in the provision Afghan ownership, leadership and capacity of jobs, and basic services and development should be seen as the most infrastructure. A high concentration of important objectives of the aid community. jobs in Kabul is the result of the presence of public sector institutions, the A supportive international community also international community and an informal implies a responsibility for the global sector boosted by revenues from drugs. economic powers to promote growth through principles of fair trade. Since the The rapid urbanization of Kabul, which transnationality of human security threats has attracted people from rural areas for provides opportunities for nation-states, its better services and employment other countries should be prepared to prospects, is a worrying phenomenon. The subsidize certain services that Afghanistan population has soared from 800,000 to 2.9 lacks the resources to provide, but which million people, and the ratio of rural to are of interest to countries outside of the urban people risen from 20:80 to 30:70. region. These include supporting fair trade Balanced development also means curbing regimes, establishing environmental corruption and correcting a situation where controls and protection, halting drug those in power have access to funds and trafficking and production, preventing money. It means a more balanced communicable diseases, stopping the redistribution of national revenue, spread of terrorism and so on. Global and

234 Chapter 8 regional commitments to stem the spread to help the country modernize, develop of arms are another aspect of the and democratize. For the countries of the responsibility of the international region, both positions are crucial and community towards human security in mutually dependent, because investments Afghanistan. in Afghanistan are an investment in the region. The development of physical Human security is an interdisciplinary infrastructure and internal stability in problem and, as such, requires an Afghanistan will help the country to re- interdisciplinary and integrated solution assume its historic role of a land bridge that can be best reached through integrated linking Central Asia to South Asia, a step programming and efficient coordination that will strongly boost regional economic among the various international development and trade. Neighbouring organizations working in Afghanistan. countries should see the reconstruction of Improved coordination mechanisms are Afghanistan as an opportunity to change needed between the various UN agencies, past conflict relationships into renewed between the international financial Today Afghanistan opportunities for regional development institutions and other agencies, and represents a unique and mutual benefit. between the international community and example of the Government. Afghanistan has been isolated from the international relations: world and regional markets for many years. Long-term commitment from donor a multilateral Closer integration with neighbours as well countries is needed to make Afghanistan partnership that is as increased access to regional and a viable state. The international community working well, with very international markets is essential to its must know what Afghanistan has the promising prospects. future. The emergence of a stable potential to become if they ignore it. The The goal of this Government and the reconstruction efforts must also understand that investment here partnership is to create being undertaken are already opening new is not just in the Afghan people, but in an Afghanistan that is possibilities for regional trade and their security as well. While developments economic cooperation, as well as politically stable and over the past two and a half years have enterprises in neighbouring countries. democratic, and been encouraging, much remains to be Ongoing humanitarian and reconstruction economically done, and progress could be lost if attention activities represent an opportunity for the prosperous – an turns away from Afghanistan at this crucial private sector in the region to expand its Afghanistan that turning point. The price the international business with international partners, contributes to Regional community would pay to protect itself increasing the exposure to international from Afghanistan would be far greater and Global Security. markets and procurement. In addition, than what it will pay to help develop the President Hamid Karzai, Berlin better regional cooperation will eventually country. Conference, March 2004 improve the overall climate for business, 7. Peaceful and Cooperative build greater intra- and inter-regional Regional Agendas relations, and attract larger scale foreign direct investment. The international community’s general interest in promoting peace and stability Afghanistan’s regional economic in Afghanistan covers two, quite different cooperation with Central Asia, Iran and positions a minimalist concern to support Pakistan could be intensified through the just sufficient change in the country to active engagement of the private sector in ensure that it will not harbour militant the reconstruction efforts.3 Many movements that pose a threat to other businesses in the region have the proven states, and a more ambitious commitment capacity to provide cheaper goods and

3 See proceedings from a 2004 UNDP organized conference in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on “Afghanistan’s Regional Economic Cooperation: Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan”.

NHDR 04 235 services, while meeting the required fuelled hostilities with arms, ammunitions international quality standards. and support, while the conflict had spill Cooperation will reinforce the overall over impacts on the region. These regional interdependence and contribute especially affected the countries of Central to peace in the region. Asia, which were the first to call for a political resolution to the problems in Sustainable growth in Afghanistan will Afghanistan. Its instability and have a major impact on all its neighbours. unpredictability had direct implications Once the road network is ready, the travel for Tajikistan, for example, which shares time to a warm-water port will be more than 500 kilometres of border and dramatically reduced – every Central Asian fell into its own civil war in 1992-1995. capital will be a maximum of 32 hours Afghanistan’s conflict has also led to the: from the Gulf. Central Asia’s natural resources, such as cotton, can be sent to • Spread of fears about extremism Pakistan and India for processing and through transparent and uncontrolled manufacturing. Oil and gas pipelines and borders. energy power grids crossing Afghanistan • Proliferation of arms. can also help integrate the region. In sum, economic interdependence is a win-win • Spread of drugs both in transit and for proposition, and it will turn all the consumption. stakeholders into advocates of stability. A UNDP Conference held in Bishkek in May • Large-scale refugee flows with 2004 on the economic cooperation between additional stress on host communities Central Asia and Afghanistan drew a and countries. roadmap both for the critical role of • The militarization of the region. neighbours in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, and the role of Afghanistan • Creation of networks of mafia as the land bridge and missing link in structures and organized trafficking regional development. The implementation in arms and drugs. of such a plan should attract the full support • Destabilization of trade and economic of donors. security for markets in the region. Human security in Afghanistan cannot be 8.3. Human Securty as Public achieved in isolation. The region’s involvement in reconstruction will Good for Afghanistan contribute both to getting Afghanistan Beyond these seven general and directional back on its feet, and to ensuring sustainable recommendations, a summary of the human security solution in a number of analysis presented in the NHDR leads to neighbouring states, despite all the a number of recommendations for the state complications created by the decades of and the international community. These conflict. A multilateral forum to be built address six components of human security on the Bishkek Action Plan will ease in Afghanistan, based on the definitions mutual suspicion and create a structure for outlined in the UNDP 1994 global Human sustained positive involvement. Development Report. The failure to build on a strategy of Economic Security cooperation involves great risks for the region. The instability in Afghanistan has Investments in physical infrastructure had both an “outside–inside” influence as (especially roads, water and electricity), well as an “inside–outside” ones. agricultural markets, skills development, Interference from far and near countries financial services, good governance and

236 Chapter 8 education are all expected to play a key (thereby enhancing economic, political role in laying the foundation for sustained and environmental security). Socially and broad-based economic growth. equitable growth implies some However, freedom from economic redistribution of social and economic insecurity and hunger requires the benefits – and a public concern with the translation of growth into an assured basic quality as well as quantity of growth.5 income, either from waged employment, Addressing non-competitive behaviour self-employment or social transfers (formal caused by powerful institutions outside a or informal). The challenge remains to legal framework presents an enormous ensure that inclusion in a dynamic challenge. It is important to underscore economy results in the needs of that reform of the private sector in support economically vulnerable people being of enhanced economic security rests addressed through self-reliance or effective heavily on the effectiveness of broader public action. political reforms. Nevertheless, the Can Growth Lead to Human Security? Government can potentially play a key role in strengthening the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s economy, while booming, market mechanisms in support of is mainly informally regulated and highly democratic state-building and poverty illicit. To the degree that economic growth reduction. is informed by power relations (the business elite have strong connections with Existing tax and tariff regimes (red tape) the sub-national political power base, and should be greatly simplified to minimize the operation of informal markets is closely opportunities for corruption. The linked to broader insecurity), growth is promotion of effective and efficient likely to be neither free nor equitable. The financial service markets can play a key way markets are currently functioning may role in enabling smaller enterprises to also negatively affect political governance compete. Other constraints to economic and state-building. Benefits from economic security at the macro level include poor growth strengthen existing power bases. infrastructure, insecurity and lawlessness Reinforcement of the mutually beneficial (a significant disincentive to would-be investors), and the lack of a regulatory interests of big business, and political and framework for upholding standards for military power holders, is spawning exports. The shortage of human resources unregulated, informal and illicit markets (expertise and professional skills) and the that are undermining the agendas of break-down of education systems also reconstruction and development.4 If these present significant stumbling blocks. patterns continue, they could further depress the already bleakhuman security Can Poverty and Hunger be Eradicated indices. in Afghanistan? Economic growth in Afghanistan is widely In Securing Afghanistan’s Future, the recognized as a necessary precondition for Government makes the case that sustained state-building and poverty reduction. international assistance and growth could However, state intervention will be result in meeting a number of the MDGs required to ensure improved accountability by 2015. Indeed, economic growth can of market operators, and to promote have a profound impact at the household opportunities to participate in markets level in terms of employment opportunities

4 AREU 2004d. 5 An example of economic insecurity arises in relation to the production of carpets, mainly by women, who remain almost without exception excluded from the market place and for whom the wage levels remain alarmingly low.

NHDR 04 237 and asset accumulation. However, without stability, an increasing proportion of public investment in human capital (health, Afghans depend on daily wage labour as education and social protection), the access agricultural workers in poppy fields or as of poor households to the potential benefits processors of opium.7 arising from a growing economy will be The challenge to design and deliver a severely restricted. coherent national strategic framework for The prospect of a large proportion of poor social protection lies in effectively reaching Afghans remaining trapped in poverty, the poorest and most at-risk segments of regardless of macro-economic growth, the population, while supporting the ability appears likely without an intensification of communities in general to secure basic of efforts to support self-reliance through entitlements and develop the capacities public interventions. Since 2002, the required for reducing insecurity over time. Government has emphasized the need for In the short term, existing programmes international assistance to be channelled should be strengthened to ensure effective through coherent national programmes implementation and meaningful rather than as stand alone projects. monitoring and evaluation, which can then Nowhere has this been more significant inform the design and innovation of new than in the area of social protection, where initiatives. there is a strong case that resources can • In relation to land resources and be used more efficiently and productively agriculture, the Ministry of Rural through employment-based safety nets and Rehabilitation and Development and community-driven social fund Ministry of Agriculture and Animal mechanisms. Husbandry must target the well-being Despite widespread economic insecurity of the rural poor by improving the among the majority of Afghans, they quality, quantity, productivity and remain remarkably resilient, having value of the natural resources essential developed strong community support to their livelihoods. The Ministry of networks during decades of conflict and Irrigation, Water Resources and in the almost total absence of service Environmental Protection must target delivery. While some coping strategies improving the environmental have adverse implications (reduced externalities associated with resource consumption, pulling children out of use and management. All policies and school, under-age child marriage, etc.), it implementations must be participatory. is crucial that policies and programmes • The Ministry of Labour and Social support positive existing strategies Affairs should adopt medium- and wherever possible (including livelihood long-term policies to increase 6 diversification and migration). However, capacities and opportunities for the the challenges associated with poor. implementing the National Drug Control Strategy highlight the need to ensure that The new Government must be supported alternative income-generating opportunities in its efforts to produce a Poverty are promoted prior to eradication of poppy Reduction Strategy Paper as a development production. While the opium economy is strategy based on policies aimed at creating antagonistic to national prosperity and a favourable climate for stimulating

6 At least in principle, this appears to have been recognized in the recently launched National Vulnerability Programme, which has been accorded priority status by the Government. 7 Evidence suggests that opium poppy cultivation involves as many as 2 million people and provides an economic safety net. In many cases, it has played a key role in helping poor rural households recover from asset losses.

238 Chapter 8 investment and productivity, and designed • For sustainability, the ministry should with the inclusive participation of accelerate the process of the beneficiaries. Partnership Performance-Based Health Security Agreement, and work towards an exit strategy for the agreement in the Lack of an adequate health care system provinces. Certain criteria should be and the presence of widespread health developed to avoid bias re-assignment problems are threatening the human of staff to rural and remote areas. security of Afghans, as exemplified by the Rationalization of hospital staff is life expectancy at birth – 45 for males and critical, and it is essential to bring 44 for females. The country’s poor gender balance among medical healthcare system is characterized by high students. Attention is required to train infant and child mortality rates,8 while the allied health professionals. maternal mortality rate is one of the highest • To safeguard the public from ill in the world.9 There is a huge disparity in treatment and abuse, the quality of the distribution of health care facilities and services in private clinics and staff.10 According to WHO (2003), in 2001, dispensaries have to be regulated by the total expenditure on health care in the ministry, and abusers penalized. Afghanistan as a proportion of GDP was 5.2 per cent, of which 52.6 per cent was • Mental health units need to be contributed by the Government and 47.4 established by the ministry at the per cent was private expenditure.11 The national level, which should design CSO figures for 2002 present a more community intervention programmes dismal picture, reporting that just 0.5 per on mental health and coordinate all cent of public expenditure goes towards efforts nationwide. health care. The number of doctors (MDs) per 1,000 people is a mere 0.167 against Environmental Security 1.1 on average for all developing countries. As far as health and environmental security With this background, many competing are concerned, the Government should priorities in the health sector are both improve access to basic public challenging the human security agenda. infrastructures such as sanitation and clean The poor infrastructure, lack of capacity water, and aim for some basic universal and insufficient financial resources make health care protection for all, especially the situation complicated. To address these the poor, since they cannot afford private problems, important policy documents and health care. A variety of community-based strategies have been designed by the health insurance schemes exist to assure Ministry of Health, but have not been individuals of continued income in case implemented. The following issues of illness. Financed out of a common pool, urgently need to be addressed: they are an option the new Government should look into. It could help by • The Government must increase the subsidizing these initiatives and promoting development budget in the health care the link between them and formal health sector to enable the Ministry of Health care institutions. and other actors to contend with the shortfalls of the system in a sustainable Environmental insecurity is already a major way. concern, given the critically poor quality

8 Naqibullah Safi 2004. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 WHO 2003a.

NHDR 04 239 of water and air. Many rivers have gone communities in the design and dry, as groundwater stocks sink to new implementation of policies, and draw on depths each year. Likewise, forms of local wisdom, experience and traditions natural capital, such as land, forests and for the sustainable management of natural biodiversity, are undergoing long-term resources. To achieve this goal: decline. They increasingly constrain economic prospects and growth, and so • The state must establish a national pose a serious threat to Afghanistan’s mid environmental protection, management and long-term stability, and sustainable and information agency to design and human development. implement environmental policy. The health of the public depends to a great • Relevant ministries, such as the extent on the quantity and quality of Ministry of Irrigation, Water drinking water. The UNICEF/CSO MICS Resources and Environmental estimates that 39 per cent of households Protection, must adopt a clean and in urban areas and 69 per cent of green technology policy and conduct households in rural areas do not have environmental impact assessments on access to safe water. The problem of all reconstruction and modernization inadequate sanitation also deserves projects. immediate attention and ingenuity. In • Groundwater resources and watersheds Afghanistan’s circumstances, it is must be managed by empowering self- necessary to think of sanitation without regulated community associations. water, and not to consider water improvements without sanitation.12 Personal Security Another issue involves integrating Personal security rests upon safety from environmental protection and energy physical violence and various threats. In policies. The Government’s capacity to Afghanistan, people are increasingly drive sustainable energy development is threatened by sudden and unpredictable crucial, given its central role in society forms of violence, such torture inflicted and that it needs to be centrally by the security forces and police, coordinated. Priority should be given to international or cross-border terrorism the development of the hydropower sector, advocated by the Taliban, violent attacks and the Ministry of Water Resources and on civilians, threats from individuals or Environmental Protection should gangs against other individuals, street implement projects that have already been violence, hostage-taking, domestic designed to develop small and medium violence, child abuse or rape, child multi-purpose hydroelectric dams. abduction, neglected child labour, child prostitution, and rising drug use. To achieve these goals and the MDGs, the establishment of frameworks for While the policies adopted in the NDF, development is not sufficient. Action is the NDB and Securing Afghanistan’s needed, and this requires a major effort Future show serious concern for the and commitment by many actors. National restoration of human security in post- priorities for spending should be redirected conflict Afghanistan, nevertheless, they to the most basic environmental needs and do not provide an integrated and coherent capabilities of the citizens. Successful human security approach that would sustainable development programmes will guarantee the personal safety of Afghans. ensure the participation of local It is not clear who will address personal

12 Ibid.

240 Chapter 8 insecurities and how. The objective should the utmost importance in putting an end focus clearly on people as individuals and to the spiral of ethnic violence in the north. their personal security needs and This might include seeking a legal aspirations. Relative personal security framework for solving present cases, and could be achieved once the Government monitoring human rights related to IDP fulfils its obligations to the Bonn movements in areas where violations Agreement with regard to disarmament continue to generate displacement. and establishment of the rule of law. Meanwhile, confidence-building measures between communities can be designed and It is suggested that the Government promoted, including discussions between seriously reconsider the DDR measures the local authorities and the IDP and adopt a feasible strategy to tackle the representatives to seek guarantees upon lack of viable livelihoods as an incentive return. to disarm. Labour-intensive and long-term public and private projects such as Although disputes over land use and hydroelectric and road constructions should competition over resources between be created in order to prevent the poor, sedentary peoples and the Kuchis have and demobilized soldiers, from engaging reached violent levels in the past, there is in illicit economic activities or crime. presently no overall policy regarding land Community Security tenure and pasture rights. The local formal and informal authorities and the specific One of the greatest impacts of the Afghan attitudes of the people involved determine conflict has been the breakdown of access. The traditional system of pasture community social structures and the rights seems to have been eroded and propagation of mistrust between different replaced by the power of the gun, however. Afghan sub-communities at clan, tribe and Development programmes for pastoralists, ethnic levels. Societal grievances have not and in particular those aimed at setting up been the root causes of the Afghan conflict, infrastructure on land used by the nomads, but they certainly are one of the unfortunate can impact the existing relations and outcomes of it, which in turn can serve as understanding between the communities. hindrance to societal security. There are If development programmes for Kuchis many issues pertaining to communal are designed such that they also benefit security, but the ones that demand greater the sedentary population, the relationship policy attention include the following: between the two communities may turn to that of friendship and cooperation. Pastoral and land disputes: Land and Otherwise, development on land which pasture disagreements have always been has been used seasonally by nomads can one of the main reasons for societal create a perception among the sedentary disputes, and explain the ability of warring people that they will in the future claim factions to raise ethnic-based backing, this land, or the Kuchis will encroach upon particularly in the central and northern the lands traditionally used by the villagers regions. This is largely due to past or – hence conflict will result. present unresolved land and pasture disputes between communities. Two Community participation in political societal groups that are largely affected and development processes: The success by this are the Kuchis and IDPs from the of any development and political process north and northwest. The IDPs, mostly lies in the buy-in by Afghan communities. ethnic Pashtuns, have been driven from This can be ensured through the their homes by powerful military community’s full participation not only in commanders out to grab their lands. the implementation of such processes, but Intervention to resolve this problem is of also in their design and monitoring.

NHDR 04 241 Therefore, the development of local security is not ensured could fall into the capacities is imperative for human danger of imposing a Government and development and state-building to succeed. Parliament that legitimize proponents of As the Government seeks to build force, who so far have denied the accountability and legitimacy in the fragile population the option to actively participate post-conflict period, transparency in policy- in policy formulation and decision-making. making and programming, open debate The political power of the warlords vis-à-vis and critical review are essential. that of reformist politicians is reinforced Restoration of traditional social order by the financial resources (both internal and/or social capital: Afghanistan has and external) at their command. Many always had a weak Government and a warlords still receive financial support strong traditional society, with from countries whose interest they served understandable rules and conduct for in the past or still serve. In addition, many societal order and security. The two, of the benefits of robust economic growth however, complemented each other. No are skewed towards the powerful. size of military force and no degree of Institutions of the market and informal central control will be able to restore the regulation controlled by the people in sense of communal security that is possible power ensure that competition and under traditional social structures. This participation are restricted to their suggests that successful political and advantage. State intervention will, security policies and measures are ones therefore, be critical to unleash markets that revere the strength of the traditional and allow wider distribution of the benefits community, and embed this in its of growth. The extent to which existing principles. market structures reinforce instability is a Political Security major concern, and it necessitates a strategy to limit the power of those who control Political exclusion is visible in many forms: markets. Another factor is the involvement labelling and stereotyping entire ethnic, of the warlords in the narcotics trade, and linguistic or religious groups; monopolies their control over Afghanistan’s precious over power; inadequate ethnic underground resources, namely lapis lazuli representation in higher ranking and emeralds. Government positions; the denial of the To a large extent, political security is right to employment and access to higher centred around the issue of the warlords’ education to certain groups; an unequal sphere of influence. This continues to be distribution of resources; and the imposed on the people of Afghanistan, dominance over the media of a section backed by weapons, market control, the within the Government. These practices narcotics trade and control over precious must be reversed, because they have stones. The response to the first issue lies disenfranchised many Afghans, who have in an unwavering commitment to the DDR responded with non-cooperation in all process; to the second in market and public matters of state-building, including the service reforms, to the third in law provision of security. enforcement with respect to the demand Afghanistan is fast-tracking its transition side of narcotics; and to the fourth in the to democratic governance. However, strengthening of the central Government’s democracy in a situation where political capacity and extension of its authority.

242 Chapter 8 8.4. Summary: Dimensions of Human Security in Afghanistan

Dimensions of Key findings What needs to be done How should it be done security

1. Economic security High level of Reliable multi-year commitments Simplification of existing regulations and indebtedness. from donors crucial for long-term implementation of appropriate laws. development investments. Opium economy Asset creation for the poor. equals 38.2% of the Strengthen legal and regulatory country’s official framework for private sector. Targeted interventions to promote outreach GDP. for different categories of the vulnerable. Social policy to meet the needs of vulnerable groups. Objective of effective and representative poverty reduction strategy can provide Prepare a PRSP. opportunity for extensive consultations and focus on gender challenge.

2. Health security The collapse of the Increase the development budget in Ministry of Health and other actors address state resulted in an health care sector. the shortfalls of the system in a sustainable inadequate health way. care system, further Regulate the quality of services in restricting access to private clinics and dispensaries, as For sustainability, the Ministry of Health health care services, well as pharmaceutical services. should accelerate the process of the particularly for the Partnership Performance-based Agreement poor. Establish national-level mental health (PPA), and work towards an exit strategy units. for PPA in provinces. It is essential to bring gender balance among medical students.

3. Environmental security Environmental Need to install sound environmental Design and implementation of policy through insecurity is a major management practices. a participatory process. concern. Water and air quality is equally poor. Access to safe drinking water is dismal. Natural capital, i.e., water, land, forest and biodiversity is under a long-term decline.

4. Personal security Physical violence by Strengthen Afghanistan’s institutional Strengthen human rights monitoring, armed militia; torture capacity to meet in an adequate and reporting mechanisms, Government by the security timely manner its national and accountability and the rule of law. forces; violent international obligations. attacks by Taliban, street gangs; Separate civilian and military hostage-taking; functions. domestic violence against women, abuse or rape; violence against children such as child abuse, child abduction, child labour, child prostitution; and drug abuse are the main personal insecurities.

NHDR 04 243 Dimensions of Key findings What needs to be done How should it be done security

5. Community security Land insecurity Establish systems for management Policy and law enforcement. pervasive. and reform of land tenure.

6. Political security Failure to implement Enhance security and the rule of law Complete the formation of National Police security related – top priority must be given to and National Army (only armed forces). provisions of the security sector reforms. Bonn Agreement. Implement National Drug Control Strategy State-building depends on political (alternative livelihoods, strengthening Little progress with entity with monopoly of legitimate security, anti-trafficking and demand DDR efforts. force and hence economic assets reduction) – avoid short term and poorly and flows – reforming and training conceived interventions against drugs. Illicit economies play civil service without consolidation of a key role in power and authority is insufficient. Accelerate legal reform process to maintaining political strengthen Constitution. insecurity and in fact Issuing instructions to civil servants create significant and military personnel concerning Imperative to ensure that addressing returns to the their duty of political impartiality and political, military and humanitarian objectives maintenance of protection of political freedoms – simultaneously does not result in the blurring insecurity. appropriate sanctions must be taken of institutional mandates and functions in against those who fail to fulfill the process. Military operations should not Need for externally obligations. be presented as developmental and the supplied security impartiality of humanitarian actors must be during the transition Ensuring freedom of expression and supported. – upon which state- freedom of the press. building is dependent. Channel resources from central Government Political normalization – full support to sub-national level to accelerate reform Collapsed state – to emerging political institutions of public administration beyond Kabul and functioning parts of (Cabinet, legislative bodies, judiciary, reduce corruption. sub-national etc.) to enhance effectiveness. administration are controlled by local militia commanders.

244 Chapter 8 Bibliography

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Bibliography

Background Papers Azizi, Mohammad Najeeb. 2004. “Poverty in Afghanistan.” Nassery, Homira. 2004. “Gender Disparities as a Challenge to Human Development.” Saba, Daud. 2004. “Environment and Human Development in Afghanistan.” Safi, Lutfullah. 2004. “Education.” Safi, Naqibullah. 2004. “Health and Nutrition.” Shah, Said Mubin. 2004. “The Afghan Economy Pre to Post-War Period.” Stanikzai, Nasrullah. 2004. “Governance in Afghanistan.” (Dari) Thematic Papers Banwal, Abdul Baqi. 2004a. “Sustainable Livelihood.” (Dari) 2004b. “Impacts of War in Afghanistan.” (Dari) 2004c. “Economic Infrastructure and Human Development.” Bashar Dost, Ramazan. 2004a. “Good Governance.” (Dari) 2004b. “Proposals: New Relations between the Central Government and the Local Governments.” (Dari) Dupree, Nancy Hatch. 2004. “Culture: a Fundamental Dimension of Human Development.” Fakhri, Abdul Rashid. 2004a. “Information in Afghanistan: HD Indicators for Policy Purposes.” (Dari) 2004b. “Rural-Urban Disparities.” (Dari) Haqaiqi, Abdullah. 2004a. “Economic Growth and Human Development.” (Dari) 2004b. “Development Assistance for Afghanistan.” (Dari) Joyenda, Mir Ahmad. 2004. “Land in Afghanistan.” (Dari) Nadiri, Partaw. 2004 “The Press and its Impact on Human Development.” (Dari) Nikbeen, Ahmad Zia. 2004. “Poppy Cultivation and its Alternatives as an Issue of Economics and Security.” (Dari) Rawish, Daud. 2004a. “Causes of Conflict in Afghanistan from an HD Perspective.” (Dari) 2004b. “Refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan.” (Dari) Walwalji, Asadullah. 2004a. “Civil Society in Afghanistan.” (Dari) 2004b. “Role Of Civil Society In Decision Making.” (Dari) 2004c. “Concept of Democracy in Afghanistan.” (Dari) Weera, Seddiq. 2004. “Role of Identity in Peace and in War.”

NHDR 04 247 Other Sources Consulted Abad, MC Jr. 2000. “The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security.” Paper presented at the 9th Harvard Project for Asian and International Affairs Conference, Beijing, August 27-30, 2000. [http://www.aseansec.org/14259.htm]. August 2004. Abou El Fadl, Khaled, Said Arjomand, Nathan Brown, Jerrold Green, Donald Horowitz, Michael Rich, Barnett Rubin, Birol Yesilada in Cheryl Benard and Nina Hachigian, Editors. 2003. Democracy and Islam in the New Constitution of Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: Center for Asia Pacific Policy, RAND. [http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF186/CF186.pdf]. August 2004. Adamec, Ludwig. 1992. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press. ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2003. “Afghanistan Country Strategy and Program Update 2003-2005.” [http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/AFG/2003/CSP_AFG_2003.pdf]. September 2004. Joint Inter-Agency Mission, 2003. Afghanistan: A Statistical Master Plan. Kabul. 2003. A Fact Sheet Afghanistan and ADB, data as of 31 December 2003. [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/afg.asp]. August 2004. 2004. “ADB Plans US$1 Billion in Assistance to Afghanistan, President Chino Tells International Conference in Berlin”, ADB press release, March 2004. AI (Amnesty International). 1995. “Women in Afghanistan: A Human Rights Catastrophe.” [http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/afgan/afgtoc.htm]. August 2004. 1998. “Afghanistan: Children Traumatized by Civil War.” [http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/childasia/appeals.htm]. May 2004. 2003a. “Afghanistan: Re-establishing the Rule of Law.” [http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa110212003]. September 2004. 2003b. “Afghanistan: Exil et retour: les afghans oubliÈs.” [http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/fraasa110142003]. September 2004. ANBP (Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme), UNDP. 2004. Weekly Summary Report, 18 July – 24 July 2004. [http://www.undpanbp.org/]. September 2004. ANFS (Afghanistan Network on Food Security). May 2004. Monthly Food Security Bulletin. Kabul. Anderson, Mary B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Annan, Kofi. “Towards a Culture of Peace.” 2001. [http://www.unesco.org/opi2/lettres/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html]. September 2004. AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit). 2003. “Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan.” Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/]. 2004a. “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan.” Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/]. 2004b. “Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan.” Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/]. 2004c. “Sub-National Administration: Assessment and Recommendations for Action.” Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/]. 2004d. “Trading in Power: The Politics of Free Markets in Afghanistan.” Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/]. 2004e. “National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2003: A Stakeholder-Generated Methodology.” Atmar, Mohammad Haneef, Sultan Barakat and Arne Strand. 1998. “From Rhetoric to Reality. The Role of Aid in Local Peace- building in Afghanistan.” Workshop Report. The University of York, York, Canada.

248 Bibliography Atmar, Mohammad Haneef and Jonathan Goodhand. 2001 “Coherence or Cooption?” Politics, Aid, and Peace-building in Afghanistan.” Journal of Humanitarian Affairs. [http://www.jha.ac/articles/a069.htm]. August 2004. 2002. “Afghanistan: The Challenge of "Winning the Peace.” in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen editors. Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Badken, Anna. 2004. “Afghanistan's Invisible War Wounds: Mental Illness Rife In Land Ravaged By Decades Of Fighting.” San Francisco Chronicle. Tuesday, April 20. [http://www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?f=/chronicle/a/2004/04/20/MNGMT67QPP1.DTL]. September 2004. Bain, William. 2000. “National Security, Human Security and the Practice of Statecraft in International Society.” Paper presented at the Conference on Global Governance and Failed States. Florence, Italy. Ball, Nicole. 2001. “Human Security and Human Development: Linkages and Opportunities.” [http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/report_may2001_3-e.php]. September 2004. Bank Information Center. 2003. “The World Bank and Asian Development Bank in Afghanistan 1964 – 1979 and 2002 – 2004 (March).” [http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/WB_ADB_in_Afghanistan_outline.pdf]. September 2004. Barakat, Sultan. 2002. “Setting the Scene for Afghanistan’s Reconstruction: the Challenges and Critical Dilemmas.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 5: 797-816. Barakat, Sultan, Margaret Chard, Tim Jacoby and William Lume. 2002. “The Composite Approach: Research Design in the Context of War and Armed Conflict.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 991–1003. Barakat, Sultan and Margaret Chard. 2002. “Theories, Rhetoric and Practice: Recovering the Capacities of War-torn Societies.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 817–835. Barakat, Sultan and Gareth Wardell. 2002a. “Capitalizing on Capacities of Afghan Women: Women’s Role in Afghanistan’s Reconstruction and development.” Focus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction. Working Paper 4, Geneva: International Labor Office. 2002b. “Exploited by Whom? An Alternative Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghan Women.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 909–930. Barry, Michael. 2002. Le Royaume de l'Insolence, l'Afghanistan. 1504-2001. Paris: Flammarion. Bashar Dost (Bachardoust), Ramazan. 2003. Afghanistan – droit constitutionnel, histoire, régimes politiques et relations diplomatiques depuis 1747. Paris, L’Harmattan. Biddle, Stephen. 2002. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy. PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College. Bigombe, B., P. Collier P. and N. Sambanis. 2000. “Policies for Building Post-conflict Peace.” Journal of African Economies, 9 (3). Bonboure, Philippe. 2003. “Health System Building.” Afghanistan Monitor (3), Afghan Media and Cultural Centre, Kabul. Brinkerhoff, DW & AA Goldsmith. 1992. “Promoting the Sustainability of Development Institutions: a Framework for Strategy.” World Development, 20 (3): 369–383. Brodsky, Lauren, 2003. “Congressional Hearing Outlines Challenges to Afghan Reconstruction”. State Department News Item, June 23, 2003. [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text2003/0623hearing.htm]. September 2004. Brown, Michael E. (ed.). 1996. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bruderlein, Claude. 2001. “People’s Security as a New Measure of Global Security,” International Review of the Red Cross, 83 (842). [http://www.icrc.org/WEBGRAPH.NSF/Graphics/353-366_Bruderlein.pdf/$FILE/353-366_Bruderlein.pdf]. September 2004. Buchanan, J. M., and R. L. Faith.1987. “Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Towards a Theory of Internal Exit.” American Economic Review, 77(5): 1023-1031.

NHDR 04 249 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Byrd, William. 2001. “Aid Management During Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from International Experience.” Speech delivered at the Conference on Preparing for Afghanistan's Reconstruction, November 27 - 29, 2001. [http://www.pcpafg.org/reconstruction/Keynotes/Aid_Management_During_Post_Conflict_Reconstruction_Lessons_from_In ternational_Experience_by_William_Byrd.htm]. September 2004. CARE / Center on International Cooperation. 2003. “Good Intentions Will Not Pave The Road to Peace.” Policy Brief. [www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/ afghanistan/09152003_afghanistanbrief.pdf]. August 2004. CARE International 2002. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: a Little Less Talk, A Lot More Action.” Policy Brief. [http://www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/09302002_policybrief.pdf]. August 2004. 2003. “A New Year’s Resolution to Keep: Secure a Lasting Peace in Afghanistan.” Policy Brief. [http://www.careusa.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2003/sep/09162003_afghanistanpolicybrief.asp]. August 2004. Centlivres-Demont, Micheline. 1994. “Les réfugiés Afghans au Pakistan : gestion, enjeux, perspectives.” in Ricardo Bocco and Mohammad-Reza Djalili (eds.). Moyen-Orient : migrations, démocratisation, mediations. Genève: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales & Paris, P.U.F, 33-40. CESR (Center for Economic and Social Rights). 2002. “Human Rights and Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” [http://www.institute- for-afghan-studies.org/HUMAN%20RIGHTS/cesr_report.pdf]. August 2004. Chambers, Robert and Conway G. 1992. “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century.” IDS Discussion Paper 296, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Christian Aid. 2004. “The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War.” April 2004. [http://www.christian- aid.org.uk/indepth/404caweek/]. September 2004. Clements, Frank A. 2003. Conflict in Afghanistan: An Encyclopedia. Oxford: ABC-Clio. Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom. 2001. “On the Duration of Civil War.” Washington: World Bank. [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/CHS_Duration.pdf]. August 2004. Collier, Paul. & Anke Hoeffler. 2001. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. Washington: World Bank. [http://econ.worldbank.org/files/12205_greedgrievance_23oct.pdf]. September 2004. Collinson, Sarah. 2003. “Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action.” Humanitarian Policy Group Report 13. Overseas Development Institute. February 2003. [http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport13.pdf]. September 2004 Colson, E. 2003. “Forced Migration and the Anthropological Response.” Journal of Refugee Studies. March 2003, 16 (1): 1-18. Colville, R. 1997. “The Biggest Caseload in the World.” Refugees, 108 (2): 5-6. Commission on Global Governance. 1995. Our global Neighborhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford University Press, New York. [http://www.libertymatters.org/globalgovernance.htm]. August 2004. Commission on Human Security. 2003. Human Security Now. Report of the Commission on Human Security. New York. [http://www.humansecurity-chs.org]. August 2004. Conway, Tim, Caroline Moser, Andy Norton and John Farrington. 2002. “Rights and Livelihood Approaches: Exploring Policy Dimensions.” Natural Resource Perspectives No.78, ODI. [http://www.odi.org.uk/nrp/78.pdf]. September 2004. Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Julius Court. 2001. “Inequality, Growth and Poverty in the Era of Liberalization and Globalization.” Policy Brief No. 4. Geneva: UNU/WIDER Cramer, Christopher and Jonathan Goodhand. 2002. “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan.” Development and Change, 33 (5): 885-909. DAB (Da Afghanistan Bank). 2004. Unpublished Communications: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education. Kabul: Afghanistan. Dareh, Aminullah. 2000. “Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century.” Danish Media Association. Peshawar: Pakistan. (Dari).

250 Bibliography Darcy, James, Antoine Charles-Hofmann. 2005. “According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector,” Humanitarian Policy Group 15, Overseas Development Institute, September 2003. [http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport15.pdf]. September 2004. Daudelin, Jean. 1999. “Human Security and Development Policy.” A concept paper prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency Policy Branch, Strategic Planning Division. [http://www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/pdf/human_security.pdf]. August 2004. Daudzai, Umer. “Afghanistan: The Peace Process. How Will it Work?” Unpublished Paper. 2003. Donini, Antonio, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester. 2004. Nation-building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Duffield, Mark. 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars – the Merging of Development and Security. London and New York: Zed Books. Duffield, Mark, Patricia Gossman and Nick Leader. 2001. “Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Islamabad: Strategic Monitoring Unit. [http://www.aims.org.af/advisory_services/developing_an_information_management_strategy/strategic_framework.pdf]. September 2004. Dupree, Nancy Hatch. 1995. “Preserving Afghan Heritage.” Lecture delivered at the German Embassy Auditorium. Islamabad, April 25, 1995. 1996. “The Women of Afghanistan”. Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. 2002. “Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (59): 977–98. Eade, Deborah. 1997. Capacity-Building: An Approach to People-Centered Development. Oxford: An Oxfam Publication. Economist, “Passing the Hat around for Rebuilders.” April 1, 2004. Economist Intelligence Unit. 2003. Afghanistan Country Report. August. Edwards, DB. 1986. “Marginality and Migration: Cultural Dimensions of the Afghan Refugee Problem.” International Migration Review, 20 (2): 313-325. El-Dardiry, Timor. 2004. “Shoeshine Policies: Analyzing the Informal Sector in Developing Countries from a Human Security Perspective.” Unpublished Paper for Spring 2004 Human Security Course. Paris: Institut d’Etudes Politiques. Etienne, Gilbert. 2002. Imprévisible Afghanistan. Paris: Presse de Sciences Po. Ewans, Martin. 2001. Afghanistan: a New History. Richmond: Curzon. FAO (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation)/WFP. 2003. “Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Afghanistan.” Special Report. [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/fao-afg-13aug.pdf]. September 2004. Farahi, Abdul Ghafar. 2002. Afghanistan in the Era of Democracy. Peshawar: Danish Library. (Dari) Feinstein International Famine Center. June 2004. “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003” A report for USAID. Boston: Tufts University. Fielden, Matthew and Jonathan Goodhand. 2001a. “Peace-Making in the New World Disorder: A study of the Afghan Conflict and Attempts to Resolve it.” Peacebuilding and Complex Political Emergencies, Working Paper 7, Institute for Development Policy and Management, Manchester and Oxford: (IDPM)/INTRAC. 2001b. "Beyond the Taliban?: The Afghan Conflict and United Nations Peacemaking." Conflict, Security and Development, 1(3). Global IDP. 2003. “Regional Operation Plan for IDPs in the South.” [http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/7687DDDE5478C031C1256E1D003686A3]. September 2004. Goodhand, Jonathan. 2002. “Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 837–859.

NHDR 04 251 Goodson, Larry P. 2001. Afghanistan’s Endless War : State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. University of Washington Press. Grace, Jo. 2003. “One Hundred Households in Kabul: a Study of Winter Vulnerability, Coping Strategies and the Impact of Cash for Work Programs on the Lives of the Vulnerable.” AREU. Kabul. [http://www.livelihoods.org/static/jgrace_NN225.htm]. September 2004. Grossman, H. I. 1999. “Kleptocracy and Revolutions.” Oxford Economic Papers. 51:267- 283. 1991. “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections.” American Economic Review, 81, 912-21 Hampson, Olser. 2001. Madness in the Multitude – Human Security and World Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hampson, Osler and Jon Hay. 2002. “Human Security: A Review of the Scholarly Literature.” The Human Security Bulletin, 1 (2). Harpviken, Kristian. 1999. "War and Change in Afghanistan: Reflections on Research Priorities." in Mira Juntunen and Birgit Schlyter (eds.). Return to Silk Routes: Current Scandinavian Research on Central Asia. London: Kegan Paul. Hasanyar, Amir Shah. 2000. “The Effects of 1999 Drought on the Food Production in Hazarajat.” Zarnegar, 73. Toronto. Helton, Arthur. 2002. The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2000. Herold, Marc. 2003. “War and Modernity: Hard Times for Afghanistan's Kuchi Nomads.” Departments of Economics and Women's Studies, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire. [http://www.cursor.org/stories/kuchi.html]. August 2004. 21 September 2003 “Roads (modernity), Landmines (war) and Drought (weather) Immiserate Afghanistan's Kuchi Nomads”. [http://traprockpeace.org/kuchi_nomads_marc_herold.pdf]. September 2003. Hewitt de Alcántra, Cynthia. 1998. “Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance.” International Social Science Journal, 50 (1): 105–113. Hirshleifer, J. 2001. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. HRW (Human Rights Watch). July 2001. “Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity - The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War.” [http://www.hwr.org/reports/2001/afghan2/]. September 2004. 2004 a. “Afghanistan: Aid Workers Under Fire.” [http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/04/afghan8731.htm]. August 2004. 2004 b. “Enduring Freedom: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.” March 2004. [http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/]. September 2004. Huddleston, S. 1928. “Europe and Afghanistan.” The New Statesman. 28 January 1928: 485-86. Islamabad: Pakistan. Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium. 2003. “Speaking Out: Afghan Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities.” November 2003. [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/care-afg-19nov.pdf]. September 2004. ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002. “Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International Action.” March. [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1819&l=6]. August 2004. 2003 a. “Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process” Asia Report N°56. June. [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1639&l=1]. September 2004.

252 Bibliography 2003 b. “Afghanistan: the Constitutional Loya Jirga.” December [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2417&l=1]. August 2004. 2003 c. “Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” Asia Report N°64, Kabul/Brussels. [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1266&l=1]. August 2004. 2003 d. Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice Asia, Report N°45. January. [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1631&l=1]. September 2004. 2004. “Elections and Security in Afghanistan.” Asia Briefing, Kabul/Brussels. March. [http://www.crisisweb.org/home/ index.cfm?id=1266&l=1]. August 2004. International Center for Transitional Justice. 2004. Summary of Discussions. Workshop on “Transitional Justice for Senior Managers of the United Nations.” International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty. 2001. “The Responsibility to Protect.” Ottawa: International Development Research Center. [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp]. September 2004. International Legal Foundation. August 2003. “Customary Laws of Afghanistan - Part One: Customary Laws of the Pashtun Areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan.” [http://www.theilf.org/customary.htm] and [http://www.theilf.org/ILFCustomlawfeb.doc]. September 2004. IMC (International Medical Corps). 2003. “International Medical Corps in Afghanistan”. [http://www.imc- la.com/programs/afghanistan.html]. September 2004. IMF (International Monetary Fund). September 2003. “Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macroeconomic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth.” IMF Country Report No. 03/299. [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03299.pdf]. August 2004. IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2004. “Trafficking in Persons: An Analysis of Afghanistan.” [http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/Afghan_trafficking.pdf]. September 2004. Jawaid, Din Mohammad & Asadullah Walwalji. 2003. Emergency Loya Jirgah, 1, Kabul. Johnson, Chris and Leslie Jolyon. 2002. “Afghans Have Their Memories: a Reflection on the Recent Experience of Assistance in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 861–874.

Khan, Mohammad, Ted Paterson, Qadeem Tariz and Bill Van Ree. 2001. “Report on the Review of UNOCHA’s Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan.” Canadian International Development Agency, Department of International Development (DFID) & Government of Japan, Islamabad.

Khan, Riaz Mohammad. 1991. Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal. Durham: Duke University Press.

Klass, Rosanne. 1987. Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited. New York: Freedom House.

Koehane, R. O. and J. S. Nye. 1998. “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age.” Foreign Affairs, 77.

Koehler, Jan. 2004. “Assessing Peace and Conflict Potentials in the Target Region of the GTZ Central Asia and Northern Afghanistan Programme to Foster Food Security, Regional Cooperation and Stability.” Berlin: ARC.

Korten, DC. 1980. “Community Organization and Rural Development: a Learning Process Approach.” Public Administration Review, 40: 480–511.

Kroes, Jeanette. 2004. “Human Security in Afghanistan.” Unpublished Paper for Spring 2004 Human Security Course. Paris: Institut d’Etudes Politiques.

Lafargue, François. 2003. Opium, pétrol, et islam: la triade du crime en Afghanistan. Paris: Ellipes.

Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild (eds.). 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

NHDR 04 253 Lautze, Sue, Elizabeth Stites, Neamat Nojumi and Fazalkarim Najimi. 2002. “Qaht-e-Pool ‘A Cash Famine’: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan 1999-2002.” Tufts/USAID. [http://Famine.Tufts.Edu/Pdf/Cash_Famine_Summary.Pdf]. September 2004. Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. 2003. “Humanitarian Aid is Not a Military Business.” Christian Science Monitor, April 15. Ludwig, Adamec. 1992. Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc. Makaremi, Chowra. 2004. “Norms and Limits of a Humanitarian Paradigm of Security in Managing Afghan Displacement.” Unpublished Paper for Spring 2004 Human Security Course. Paris: Institut d’Etudes Politiques. Malley, William. 2002. “Terrorism, Freedom and Institutions: Reconstructing the State in Afghanistan.” Aakrosh 5(15). [http://www.ccsindia.org/maley.doc]. September 2004. Mani, Rama. December 2003. “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan.” AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit). [http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/AREU%20Afghanistan%20Justice%20Report.pdf]. September 2004. Marsden, Peter. 1996. “Exile and Return: Report on a Study on Coping Strategies Among Afghan Refugees in Iran and Returnees to Afghanistan.” British Agencies Afghanistan Group and The Refugee Council. London: Mimeo. 2003. “Afghanistan: the Reconstruction Process.” International Affairs, 79 (1): 91-105. McKinley, Terry. 2003. “The Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction.” Initial Findings of the UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Programme. Bureau for Development Policy. New York: UNDP. 2004. “Pro-Poor Policies in Transition Economies: The Macroeconomics of Transition: The Comparative Experience of Seven Transition Economies.” UNDP Study, New York: UNDP. MSF (Médecins, Sans Frontières). 2004 “Press Release: MSF Withdraws from Afghanistan Following Killing, Threats and Insecurity.” Thursday, 29 July. Kabul: Afghanistan. [http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=8851DF09-F62D-47D4- A8D3EB1E876A1E0D]. September 2004. MoH (Ministry of Health)/CDC/UNICEF. 2003. “Injury Disability, Immunization Coverage, and Mortality Among Children in Afghanistan. Preliminary Results”. MRRD (Ministry of Rural Development and Rehabilitation) and MoRR (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation). 2003. Towards Definite Solutions for IDPs in the South: A Regional Operation Plan. Kabul, Afghanistan. MRRD/WFP. 2003. “Rapid Assessment Among Kuchis in Afghanistan.” Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004. “Preliminary Findings of the NRVA – 1st Release.” Memo. Kabul. Afghanistan. MRRD/WB (World Bank). 2004 a. “Emergency Empowerment and Employment in Afghanistan: Case Study of National Solidarity Program and National Emergency Employment Program.” Prepared for Scaling Up Poverty Reduction Shanghai Conference 2004. Forthcoming 2004 b. “Rural Poverty in Afghanistan: Initial Insights From the National Rural Vulnerability Assessment.” Report on file with authors. Kabul, Afghanistan. Mojaddedi, Abdullah. 2000. “Civil War & the Taleban in Afghanistan,” in Hugh Johnston, Reeta C. Tremblay & John R. Wood (eds.) South Asia: Between Turmoil & Hope. Canada: South Asia Council of Canadian Asian Studies Association & Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute. Morris, Ellen, and Sudhir Chella Rajan. 1999. “Energy as it Relates to Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Protection.” Paper prepared for the UNDP-EC Poverty and the Environment Initiative. September 1999. Mousavi, Seyed Rasoul. 1998. “Existing and Potential Economic Resources in Central Asia and Caucasus.” Amu Darya. 1 (1): 104-162. Naqvi, Zareen F. 1999. "Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations." Islamabad: World Bank.

254 Bibliography National Geographic. 2002. “Afghanistan: Land in Crises.” [http://www.nationalgeographic.com/landincrisis/refugee.html]. August 2004. Nef, Jorge. 1999. Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (2nd edition). Otawa: International Development Research Center. Newburg, Paula. 1999. "Politics at the Heart. Organizing International Assistance to Afghanistan." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper 2. Washington D.C. [http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/wp2.asp?p=6&from=pubdate]. August 2004. Niels, Dabelstein. 2002. “Aid Responses to Afghanistan: Lessons from Previous Evaluations.” Background paper prepared for the OECD/DAC Experts’ Meeting on “Afghanistan Reconstruction and Recovery: Seeing Round the Corner.” Paris, May 2002. Oates, Lauryn & Isabelle Solon Helal. 2004. At the Cross-Roads of Conflict and Democracy: Women and Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya Jirga. [http://ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/consLoyaJirgaE.pdf]. September 2004. Ogata, Sadako. 2002. “From State Security to Human Security.” Brown University. Ogden Lecture. [http://www.humansecurity-hs.org/activities/outreach/ogata_ogden.html]. August 2004. Oliver-Smith, Anthony. 1991. “Involuntary Resettlement: Resistance and Political Empowerment.” Journal Of Refugee Studies, 4(2): 132-149 Ottaway, Marina and Anatol Lieven. January 2002. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy Versus Reality.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy, Brief N° 12, Washington, D.C. [http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief12.pdf]. August 2004. OXFAM. 2002. “Afghanistan- Reconstruction and the Debt Burden.” Urgent Response N° 25. January 2002. [http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/urgent/afghanistan_debt.html]. September 2004. Ozerdem, Alpaslan. 2002. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective." Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 961-975. Pain, Adam and Sue Lautze. 2002. “Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Issues Paper Series. Kabul, Afghanistan. Posen, Barry. 1993. ‘The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict", Survival, 35 (1): 27-47. Rais, Rasul Baksh. 1994. War without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition after the Cold War. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. Taliban : Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers. 2001: “Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire.” Journal of International Affairs, 54 (2): 395-410. Roe, Paul. 2002. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as Tragedy." Journal of Peace Research, 36 (2):183-202. Roy, Olivier. 1985. L’Afghanistan, Islam et modernité politique. Paris : Seuil/Esprit. 1990. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. 1995. Afghanistan, From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton: Darwin Press. 2002. L’Afghanistan, Islam et Modernité Politique. Paris: Seuil/Esprit. 2003. Afghanistan: Internal Politics and Socio-Economic Dynamics and Groupings. UNHCR Emergency & Security Service. WRITENET Paper No. 14/2002. [http://www.ecoi.net/pub/16013_rsddocview.pdf]. August 2004. Rubin, Barnett. 1998. "Afghanistan Under the Taliban." Current History, 98 (625): 79–91. 2000. “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” World Development, 28 (10): 1789-1803. 2002a. “A Blueprint for Afghanistan.” Current History, 101: 153-158.

NHDR 04 255 2002b. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. 2nd Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2004. “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy, 15. Rubin, Barnett and Armstrong Andrea. 2003 “Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.” World Policy Journal, 20 (1). Rubin, Barnett R., Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, and Olivier Roy. 2001. Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in a Regional Framework. Koff Peacebuilding Report 1/2001. Bern, Switzerland: Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF), Swiss Peace Foundation (SPF). [http://www.swisspeace.org/uploads/ACSF/Publications/KOFF%20Report_Afghanistan.pdf]. September 2004. Rubin, Barnett, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard. 2003. “Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.” Paying For Essentials. A Policy Paper Series. Center on International Cooperation. New York University. [http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/THROUGH%20THE%20FOG2.pdf]. August 2004. Rubin, Barnett, Adib Farhadi, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard. 2004. “Building a New Afghanistan: the Value of Success, the Cost of Failure.” Center on International Cooperation. New York University. [http://www.cic.nyu.edu/pdf/Building.pdf]. August 2004. Salama, P, J. Learning and A. Borrel. 2003. “Public Responding to the Public Health Crisis in Afghanistan,” in Levy, B.S. and Sidel, V.W. (eds.). Terrorism and Public Health. New York. Save the Children (US). 2002. “Afghanistan: Children in Crisis.” [http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/afghanistan_children.pdf]. August 2004. Save the Children (US)/UNICEF. 2003. “The Children of Kabul: Discussion with Afghan Families.” [http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/children_of_kabul.pdf]. August 2004. Schetter, Conrad. 2001. “The Chimera of Ethnicity in Afghanistan.” NZZ Online. October 31, 2001. [http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/10/31_afghanistan.html]. September 2004. Schmeidl, Susanne. 2002. “Human Security Dilemmas: Long Term Implications of the Afghan Refugee Crisis.” Third-World Quarterly, 23(1): 7-29. Schmitt, Hanna. 2004. “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Role of Human Security in the Peacebuilding Process of Afghanistan.” Unpublished Paper for Spring 2004 Human Security Course. Pairs: Institut d’Etudes Politiques. Sedra, Mark. 2002. “Afghanistan: It Is Time for a Change in the Nation-Building Strategy.” Global Affairs Commentary, Foreign Policy in Focus. [http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/OUS0211afghanistan.pdf]. September 2004. 2003 a. “Afghanistan: in Search of Security.” FPIF Special Report. Bonn International Center for Conversion. Sedra, Mark, ed. 2003 b. “Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma.” Bonn International Center for Conversion Brief N° 28. September 2003. [http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief28/brief28.pdf]. September 2004. Sedra, Mark, and Peter Middlebrook. 2004. “Afghanistan, the Problematic Path to Peace: Lessons in State Building in Post September 11th Era.” Foreign Policy in Focus. [http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afgh-stbuild.html]. September 2004. Sen, Amartya. 2000. “Why Human Security?” Presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo. 2003. “Development as Capability Expansion,” in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar (eds.). Readings in Human Development. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Sestani, Mohammad Azam. 2000. Preparing for Sawr/April Coup and its consequences for Afghanistan. Second Edition. Peshawar: Afghanistan Publishing Institute. (Dari) Shahrani, Nazif. 2001. “Not Who? but How?: Governing Afghanistan after the Conflict.” Federations: Special Issue on Afghanistan, Forum of Federations, Ottawa. [http://www.forumfed.org/publications/pdfs/special_issue_afghanistan_oct_2001.pdf]. September 2004.

256 Bibliography Short, Clare. 2000. “Making Government Work For Poor People.” [http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2000/march/pg5.htm]. August 2004. Starr, Frederick. 2001. "A Federated Afghanistan?" Central Asia Caucasus Biweekly Briefing, 7. Stewart, Frances. 2000. “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities.” Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper. 2002. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development” Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper. Strand, Arne, Kristian Harpviken and Abdul Wasay Najimi. 2001. “Afghanistan: Current Humanitarian Challenges.” CMI Report N° 5. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Strathdee, Steffanie et al. 2003. “HIV Knowledge And Risk Behaviors Among Pakistani and Afghani Drugs Users in Quetta, Pakistan.” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes. 32(4):394-398 Suhrke, Astri. 1999. “Human Security and the Interest of States.” Security Dialogue, 30 (3). Suhrke, Astri, and Kristian Berg Harpviken. 2001. Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. [http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=928]. September 2004. 2002. “Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan. Part One, Lessons from Past Experience in Afghanistan.” Chr. Michelson Institute, Commissioned Report prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 2002. 2004. “Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn.” CMI Report, 4. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Suhrke, Astri, Kristian Harpviken, Are Knudsen, Arne Strand and Arve Ofstad. 2004. “Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan?” CMI Report, 9. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. [http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=831]. September 2004. Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2002. “Transition and Human Security in Central Asia.”, Rapporteur’s Paper, Workshop organized by the Commission on Human Security, Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, April 2002. [http://www.humansecurity- chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabat_report.pdf]. September 2004. 2004. “A Human Security Agenda for Central Asia.” In Farian Sabahi and Danier Warner (eds.). The OSCE and the Multiple Challenges of Transition: The Caucasus and Central Asia. Ashgate. TISA (Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan). 2002a. “National Development Budget 1381-1382”. Kabul, Afghanistan. 2002b. “National Development Framework.” Kabul, Afghanistan. 2003a. Statistical Yearbook, 2003. Kabul, Afghanistan: CSO. 2003b. Estimated Population of Afghanistan: 2003-2004. Kabul, Afghanistan: CSO. 2003c. “The Comprehensive National Disability Policy in Afghanistan (CNDP).” Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled. [http://www.disabilityafghanistan.org/finalpolicy.htm]. September 2004. 2004a. “The National Development Budget for Justice.” Draft ADF Statement. [http://www.af]. 2004b. “Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs – An Overview.” Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004c. “Afghanistan Stabilization Programme: Abridged National Priority Program Strategy Accomplishment and the Strategic Path Forward.” Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004d. Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishment and the Strategic Path Forward. Kabul. [http://www.af]. September 2004. 2004e. “Technical Annex: Urban Development.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004f. “Technical Annex on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Kabul, Afghanistan.

NHDR 04 257 2004g. “Technical Annex: Human Rights.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004h. “Technical Annex: Afghanistan’s Drug Economy: A Preliminary Overview and Analysis.” Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Kabul, Afghanistan. 2004i. “Afghanistan Constitution.” Kabul, Afghanistan. UN (United Nations). 2002. “Discrimination Against Women and Girls in Afghanistan.” Report of the Secretary-General. Economic and Social Council. E/CN.6/2002/54. Commission on the Status of Women Forty-sixth session 15 March 2002. [http://www.pcpafg.org/organizations/Human_rights/hrweb/Class2/Women_and_Girls/economic_and_social_council.pdf]. September 2004. 1998. “Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. Towards a Principled Approach to Peace and Reconstruction.” 2001a. “The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security.” Report of the Secretary- General, A/55/1028-S/2001/789. UN Security Council [http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/839B9FDE94E8F83E85256C62007C5FFA?OpenDocument]. September 2004. 2001b. “Resolution on the Situation in Afghanistan.” S/RES/1386. UN Security Council. [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7267.doc.htm]. September 2004. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 1990. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 1994. Human Development Report 1994 – New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995a. Human Development Report-Gender in Development. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995b. “Challenges and Cornerstones, in Public Sector Management, Governance, and Sustainable Human Development.” Sustainable Human Development: Discussion Paper. New York: UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report - Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented world. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004a. Human Development Report- Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. Oxford University Press. New York 2004b. “Opening Doors to Opportunity: Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals.” [http://www.undp.org/mdg/afghanistan/afghanistan_mdg.pdf]. September 2004. 2004c. “Some Basic Facts.” [http://mirror.undp.org/afghanistan/some_basicfacts.html]. September 2004. 2004d. “Governance in Post-Conflict Situations”. Norway: UNDP and the Chr. Michelsen Institute, [http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs04/Programme%20Bergen.pdf]. September 2004. 2004e. Human Development Report 2004 – Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York: Oxford University Press. UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2003. Afghanistan: Post-conflict Environmental Assessment. [http://www.unep.org/Evaluation/PDF/afghanistanpcajanuary2003.pdf]. September 2004. UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific). 2003. Statistical Indicators for Asia and the Pacific. Volume XXXIII(2). Bangkok. UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Statistical Yearbook, 1977 and 1988 UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees). 2003a. “Towards a Comprehensive Solution for Displacement from Afghanistan.” Discussion Paper. Geneva. 2003b. “Refugees by Numbers.” [http://www.unhcr.org.uk/info/briefings/statistics/documents/numb2003.pdf]. September 2004. 2004a. Bulletin on IDPs and Refugees. Kabul. 2004b. IDP Profiling Survey. April 2004.

258 Bibliography UNICEF (United Nations Childrens’ Fund). 1999 “Education for All Report: Afghanistan” 2003. Moving Beyond Two Decades of War: Progress of Provinces-Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003. Kabul, Afghanistan. UNICEF/CSO. 2003. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2003. Kabul, Afghanistan. UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2001. “Needs Assessment for Afghanistan.” Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan. Mine Action Thematic Sector. Islamabad. (Draft). UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes). 2003a. The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem. Second Edition. New York: United Nations. [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/unodc-afg-31jan.pdf]. September 2004. 2003b. “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.” [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2003.pdf]. September 2004. 2003c. “Community Drug Profile #5: An Assessment of Problem Drug Use in Kabul City, Afghanistan.” July 2003. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2002. “Rebuilding Afghanistan.” Washington, DC. [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/rebuilding_afghanistan.pdf]. September 2004. United States Department of State. 2000. “Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian Aid to the Afghan People.” [http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/pk1/wwwh00120801.html]. September 2004. 2003. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report -, Southwest Asia.” Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. United States Institute of Peace. 2003. “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism, Reconstruction and Ethnic Harmony.” Special Report 105. [http://www.usip.org/pubs/ specialreports/sr105.html]. September 2004. 2004. “Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan” USIP Special Report 117. [http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.html]. September 2004. Van Brabant K and T. Killock. 1999. The Limits & Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives & Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations: Case Study 56: Afghanistan. Paris: OECD. Ventevogel, Peter, Sayed Azimi, Sayed Jalal, & Frank Kortmann. 2003 “Mental Health Care Reform In Afghanistan.” A HealthNet International electronic publication. [http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/ca6a6618bbfdc586c1256d4f00444001?OpenDocument]. August 2004. Walter, Barbara and Jack Snyder (eds.) 1999. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press. Walter, Jonathan. 2003. “Children of War.” Afghanistan Monitor (3), Afghan Media and Cultural Centre. Kabul, Afghanistan. Wardak, A, MI Faiz, M. Turmusani. 2003. “Disability Policy Development in Afghanistan: Towards Barrier Press Society.” Kabul: Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled. Wardak, Ali. 2004. “Building A Post-War Justice System In Afghanistan.” Crime Law and Social Change, 41 (4) 319-341. [http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN016659.pdf]. September 2004. Warikhoo, Kuldhushan. 2002. The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives. New Delhi: Bhavana Books and Prints. WB (World Bank). 2000. Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia. Washington DC: World Bank. 2001. “Brief Overview of Afghan Economy.” Islamabad. [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/96/$File/afOvervw.pdf]. September 2004.

NHDR 04 259 2003a. “World Development Indicators 2003.” Washington D.C. 2003b. World Development Report, 2003: Sustainable Development in Dynamic World-Transforming Institution, Growth and Quality of Life. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003c. Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice. [http://www.worldbank.org/gender/prr]. September 2004. 2004a. “Trade and Regional Cooperation Between Afghanistan and Its Neighbors.” Report No 26769. Poverty Reduction and Economics Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region. [http://www.countryanalyticwork.net/caw/cawdoclib.nsf/ 0/494610B4EE88AFBE85256E94006A012C/$file/267690AFP083455.pdf]. August 2004. Forthcoming. 2004b. “Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan.” Draft on file with the author. 2004c. Afghanistan Country Update, June. [http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0conte ntMDK:20143800~pagePK:141137~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305985,00.html]. August 2004. WB Group. 2001. “Developing countries- Health, Nutrition” [http://genderstats.worldbank.org/external/dgsector.asp?W=0&RMDK=110&SMDK=473886]. Weera, Seddiq. 2002. “Analysis of the Afghan Conflict: A Field Guide to Applied Conflict Analysis in Afghanistan.” Unpublished paper. Werblow, U. 2002. “Rural Development: Forging the Links Between Economic, Social and Environmental Development”. The ACP-EU Courier, (195): 32-33. [http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/courier195/en/en_032_ni.pdf]. September 2004. WFP (World Food Program). 2002. “Pastoralist Vulnerability Study.” AFSU / VAM Unit. [http://www.aims.org.af/sectoral_activities/agriculture/food_security/wfp/fsu_vam_unit_of_wfp_pastoralist_vulnerability_st udy_28_08_02.pdf]. September 2004. WHO (World Health Organization). 2003a. The World Health Report: Shaping the Future. [http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/]. September 2004. 2003b. “WHO draft outline of TB program in Afghanistan”. Kabul, Afghanistan. WOMANKIND Worldwide 2002. “Taking Stock: Afghan Women and Girls Six Months On” July 2002. [http://www.womankind.org.uk/documents/balance.htm]. May 2004. Zakhilwal, Omar. 2001a. “The Afghan Economy, Past, Present and Future.” Institute for Afghan Studies. [www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org]. August 2004. 2001b. “Federalism in Afghanistan A Recipe for Disintegration.” Federations: Special Issue on Afghanistan. Forum of Federations, Ottawa. [http://www.forumfed.org/publications/pdfs/special_issue_afghanistan_oct_2001.pdf]. August 2004. 2002a. “Reconstructing Peace in Afghanistan.” Human Rights Tribune, 8 (3). [http://www.hri.ca/tribune/viewArticle.asp?ID=2642]. August 2004. 2002b. “Stifled in the Loya Jirga.” Washington Post. June 16, Page B07. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp- dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A54511-2002Jun14¬Found=true]. August 2004.

260 Bibliography Annexure 1

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 1 Building Statistical Capacity and Infrastructure : An Urgent Need

“I gather, young man, that you wish to be a Member of Parliament. The first lesson that you must learn is, when I call for statistics about the rate of infant mortality, what I want is proof that fewer babies died when I was Prime Minister than when anyone else was Prime Minister. That is political statistics.”

Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

“To call the statistician after the experiment is done may be no more than asking him to perform a postmortem examination: he may be able to say what the experiment died of.”

Prof. R. A. Fisher, Indian Statistical Congress, 1938

Relevant, reliable and timely statistics are well recognized term external needs that do not always contribute as essential for setting policies, holding decision makers adequately to a stronger statistical infrastructure. accountable, monitoring progress and evaluating results. Exceptions include the United Nations Population Fund Yet despite considerable recent improvements in gathering (UNFPA) support to the CSO to prepare the national and analysing statistics in some countries, meeting the Population Census, and a new project by the WB that demand for basic data on human development remains targets capacity building. The last census was held in a major global challenge. The problem is even more Afghanistan in 1979, and even then not all the results acute in Afghanistan, which has not featured in the annual were analysed thoroughly. compilations of statistics in UNDP’s global HDRs since 1996. Hence, there were formidable challenges in securing The CSO is currently involved in a pre-census, which statistical inputs for the NHDR. provided preliminary population figures for the election, although the activities were hampered by the grave A Demand for Statistics and a Statistical System security situation in some provinces. The main Population As in most post-conflict situations, a high demand for Census is scheduled for 2005, and will be conducted with updated information in Afghanistan coincides with a UNFPA’s assistance. It will face complexities in collecting low capacity to properly collect and analyse data. More and verifying data. Given the mobility of the population, than two decades of war have devastated the statistical it will have to be completed quickly and assessed infrastructure of the country, and a large number of adequately. statistical personnel have migrated to other places. The Ultimately, a fair amount of statistical information is lack of systematic knowledge of statistical procedures available, but it is fragmented, and often recycled from is compounded by the fact that salaries paid to statisticians second-hand sources. Much secondary data can be working for the CSO are too low to retain specialists. extracted from the various existing surveys – such as the Most of the current data in Afghanistan has been collected WFP VAM, the UNICEF/CSO MICS, the NRVA, etc. either by international organizations or in cooperation – although for capacity building to take place, the wealth with them. Though such information has been able to of information derived from these surveys needs to be meet many of the data requirements of the country, properly analysed and evaluated with the help of Afghan collection exercises have often been driven by short- trained specialists.

NHDR 04 263 With policy making focused on emergency and rapid Some Key Data Problems for the NHDR responses rather than being based on adequate situation analyses, the national demand for statistics in Afghanistan In order to properly measure progress in human is not very strong. Consequently, the resources available development in Afghanistan, including trends in the rise for various statistical activities are meager. The CSO or fall of poverty and inequality, data need to be suffers from serious underfunding and low capacity, sufficiently disaggregated by gender, province, rural and lacking even a conference room equipped with computers urban areas, ethnicity, etc. With respect to these criteria, and presentation equipment. the statistical system of Afghanistan does not fare well. Some of the problems encountered during data collection The statistical system in Afghanistan is centralized, with and analysis for this report were as follows: the CSO charged as the main agency for coordinating statistical activities across the country. Data is currently 1. Most data was for only one year, making a trend provided to the central office through regional offices, analysis impossible. which are in dire need of capacity building as they are 2. Data was not disaggregated by provinces, making now mostly run by one person with no computers; regional analysis difficult. ministries and their local branches; and international organizations. Contributions from the last category are 3. The country lacks proper recording of births and first vetted against the CSO’s own methodology, and deaths after 1979, making demographic parameters the office plays an important role in verifying, “owning” inadequate. and promoting these statistics. However, it confronts 4. The reliability of available data was another problem. difficulties in coordinating reporting on human A large number of surveys have been conducted development indicators because of a heavy workload. without a proper sampling frame, with no efforts This stems from its concentration on conducting the made to update the 1979 census frame. There were national census and surveys, and producing national disagreements between the national CSO and some economic figures, along with its low level of resources. international organizations about the number of Other obstacles include the lack of human resources and villages and even districts in the country, which legal authority. Provincial statistical offices need to be highlighted the problem of the reliability of data strengthened, and the possibility of district or regional collected in the absence of an up-to-date sampling offices considered. frame. Afghanistan has also lacked a regular survey Most ministries in the meantime have access to their agency, and many surveys have been carried out by own sets of sectoral data gathered from their NGOs without properly trained statistical personnel. representatives in the districts. Some ministries, 5. Different figures were quoted for the total population particularly those receiving foreign assistance, such as of the country, even by international agencies. These the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development included estimates ranging from 21.4 million (ADB) and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, have small to 27.2 million (WB). The CSO estimates the total statistical cells under the supervision of international population by assuming an annual natural growth advisors. Their information is fed into the CSO, and also rate of 1.92 per cent during the period 1979 to 2003, used for their own monitoring and evaluation. Here although this number was unlikely with high infant again, however, data collection suffers from poor mortality rates and migration. The MICS conducted connectivity to the regions. by UNICEF and the CSO, which was the most reliable assessment, estimated population growth rates of The ministries and the CSO both recognize the logistical 2.50 per cent and a total population of 23.85 million. difficulties in gathering data from provinces and villages. Communication and reporting is constrained by the 6. The GDP rate had to be calculated separately to absence of roads, networks, knowledge, know-how on include poppy cultivation, which, according to the surveying, etc. Representatives of these national document Securing Afghanistan’s Future, was institutions in the provinces have very limited human estimated at US $2.5 billion in 2003. Proper estimates resources and access to technology, and cannot properly of employment and unemployment as well as wage communicate and align data collection with the centre. rates are not available.

264 Annexure 1 7. The NRVA survey, used for poverty estimates, was 2. A sampling frame created on the basis of the conducted only in rural areas. With approximately Population Census and updated at regular intervals 22 per cent of the population living in urban areas, is required for conducting any large-scale survey in its results may not be representative for the country. the country for any purpose. This frame may be maintained in the CSO and should be supplied to 8. Though collecting information on the maternal any agency wanting to conduct a large-scale survey. mortality ratio is much more difficult than for infant or child mortality rates, maternal mortality estimates As the Population Census is conducted only every ranging from 300 in Kabul to 2,200 in Badakshan ten years, some alternative sources of demographic are often quoted in international documents. Yet the and economic data have to be identified. As in many reliable UNICEF/CSO MICS was not able to provide other countries, a plan may be prepared to conduct estimates of infant and child mortality for the a large demographic and health survey during the provinces because of small samples. It is therefore mid-census period, bearing in mind the difficulties questionable as to how the estimates of maternal of establishing and improving the registration of mortality at province level were obtained. births and deaths in the near future. 9. Some sources quote the number of people with 3. There is an urgent need to conduct a labor force HIV/AIDS in the country to be 200 to 300. However, survey in order to find out the employment, the 2003 WB Indicators note a 0.01 per cent unemployment and wage rates, with specific reference prevalence rate of HIV among 15-24 year olds. This to the informal sector. indicates a large discrepancy. 4. Once data is made available from the 2005 census, 10. Though the main theme of this NHDR is human a life table for Afghanistan should be prepared to security, detailed data were not available on various calculate proper values for life expectancy. At present, indicators pertaining to personal security, such as various agencies provide different estimates. Some the total number of crimes, sexual crimes, ethnic sources maintain that female life expectancy at birth differences, economic security such as employment is lower than that of males, whereas other sources opportunities in the private sector, skill availability, claim the reverse. In view of the prevailing health environmental security, etc. and nutritional situation in the country, female life Some Suggestions for Meeting the Data expectancy is likely to be lower than that of males. Requirements of Future NHDRs Figures contradicting this could create confusion.

The monitoring of the MDGs and the production of 5. The possibility of using administrative data is very subsequent NHDRs in Afghanistan will require time limited, given the poor state of statistical set-ups in series data. This will be possible only when systemic ministries and provinces. In the meantime, different plans are prepared in consultation with national and ministries have to collect numerous administrative international agencies for the collection of requisite data for monitoring and planning various programmes statistics at regular intervals. under their jurisdiction, and sometimes these are the only data that provide annual figures. For example, Some of the specific suggestions for meeting the data enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary levels requirements of the NHDR are as follows: of education can be provided every year by the 1. The Population Census is likely to be conducted in Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher June 2005. This will be the most important source Education, based on data received from schools, of data for the NHDR. At the time of the preparation colleges and universities. Similarly, data on financial of the questionnaire for the census, questions to assistance, and expenditures on education and health, calculate various human development indicators etc. can be provided by the relevant ministries based must be included in both the questionnaire and the on their administrative records. Therefore, there is tabulation plan. Raw data can be analysed by an urgent need to develop a system for analysis of subsequent NHDR teams while the census data is administrative data in different ministries, with regular being processed. publication of the analysis, preferably annually.

NHDR 04 265 Box A.1 The Government and UNDP Set the Standards

It is widely recognized that transparent capacity. Involving the joint cooperation These include the adoption of MDG and shared information has a significant and commitment of major donors and indicators, international classifications impact on efficiency, accountability and key Government ministries, AIMS is for both functions of government and the alignment of resources with priorities. creating a unique window of opportunity. project and sector typology, and standard This in turn improves the effectiveness activity tracking metrics. Common In order for the new Government to plan, metrics of achievement will facilitate of reconstruction and development. Yet coordinate and manage development, it information management in Afghanistan the identification of successful activities, needs to make completed, ongoing, and while higher level indicators will help is limited, often relying on complex or planned reconstruction and development Afghanistan track progress on the MDGs. inappropriate processes, and rarely activities visible and accessible. Working geared towards promoting transparency closely with the Ministry of Finance, the UNDP Afghanistan is promoting or sharing data. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and information transparency in government Development, USAID and the European and other organizations, with profound The Government is now leading efforts COmmission, AIMS is facilitating the implications for improved tracking, to address these issues, in part through development and implementation of planning and coordination of the AIMS project, which is one of a standards for sharing information development and in the process providing number of UNDP initiatives focused on between ministries and other one more foundation stone for rebuilding information management organizations. sustainable government.

Some general suggestions for the improvement of the agencies are collecting data either on their own or statistical system in the country are as follows: through NGOs, with little cross-agency information sharing. Since this may result in duplicated efforts 1 Since statistical capacity is very low, a programme has to be developed for training existing statistical absorbing scarce resources, a coordination role should personnel on a regular basis in various statistical be assigned to the CSO. A detailed data collection fields. plan for the next five to ten years can be prepared on the basis of information received from various 2 At present, statistics are not taught as a separate discipline in universities. Though students trained agencies about their own plans. The CSO could also in mathematics, economics, commerce, etc. can meet examine the sampling design, data collection method, the requirements to some extent, those educated etc. to be adopted by the different agencies to ensure exclusively in statistics may be required in order to minimum statistical standards. continuously understand and implement developments in the field of official statistics. One 4 The ADB is in the process of implementing a consideration could be support for the new Statistical Master Plan. All the agencies in Government in introducing the teaching of statistics Afghanistan, national and international, may in universities. contribute to and participate in its successful 3 There is an urgent need for strong statistical implementation. It will go a long way towards coordination. Presently, a number of international improving the data situation.

266 Annexure 1 Annexure 2

Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

ANNEXURE 2 Technical Appendix on Statistics

Gross Enrolment Ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary

From the Statistical Yearbook 2003 brought out by the CSO of the TISA, the total number of students in primary, secondary and tertiary for the year 2002 was taken. The proportion of females in primary, secondary and tertiary education was 33 per cent, 25 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. By taking the simple average, the proportion of female in the total primary, secondary and tertiary students would be 27 per cent. Total number of students was bifurcated in male and females by using this ratio.

The relevant age group for the primary, secondary and tertiary education is 7 to 21 years in Afghanistan. The population in this age group was derived by using the age distribution for the year 2002 given in the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Per Capita GDP (PPP US$)

In the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, the per capita income for Afghanistan in US$ for the year 2002 is given. However, for the computation of the indices per capita GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP US$) is required, which was not available from any source. In the UNDP’s HDR per capita income in both US$ and PPP US$ are given for most of the countries. The ratio between the per capita GDP (PPP US$) and per capita GDP (US$) was worked out and applied to the per capita GDP (US$) to find out the per capita GDP (PPP US$) for Afghanistan. The ration of 4.327 used for 11 land-locked and neighbouring countries used in the Securing Afghanistan’s Future was used for the computation of indices.

Deriving the Male and Female Share of Income

For computation of the GDI for Afghanistan, the methodology prescribed by the HDR was used. However, as information on the male and female share of income was not available, approximations were made as follows:

• Female and Male Share of Economically Active Population

In the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, the proportion of workers in agriculture, industry and services were estimated at 80 per cent, 2 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. It was also stated that 30 per cent of the workers in the agriculture sector were women. Using this information it was assumed that the proportion of women and men in the economically active population is 30 per cent and 70 per cent respectively.

• Ratio of Female Non-agricultural Wage to Male Non-agricultural Wage

Similar to information on economically active population, no data is available on the wage rate for men and women. The NHDR used the suggestion from the UNDP’s HDR which stated that for countries lacking data on non-agricultural wage rate, the ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage could be assumed to be 0.75.

NHDR 04 269 Probability at Birth of not surviving to age 40 (per cent of Cohort)

Though the life expectancy at birth for Afghanistan for the year 2002 was mentioned in the CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003, information about the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 was not available. In the HDR, the values of life expectancy at birth and the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 are given for large number of countries, indicating a strong correlation. Coefficient of -0.92. The value of correlation coefficient was -0.96 when countries with low human development index were considered. In view of the strong correlation between these two indicators, the value for the probability of not surviving to age 40 was obtained for the given value of life expectancy at birth using the regression analysis with least square method. Methodology for Construction of Composite Indices

The methodology used for the computation of composite indices was the one used in the UNDP’s HDR 2003. The methodology is reproduced below. HDI and GDI

For constructing these two indices, human well-being was accessed for the following three dimensions. • Longevity: The ability to live long and healthy life-Measured by indicator life expectancy at birth • Education: The ability to read, write and acquire knowledge-Measured by adult literacy rate and combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level • Command over resources: The ability to enjoy a decent standard of living measured by per capita GDP (PPP US$).

Indicator Maximum Minimum Male Female Combined Male Female Combined Life expectancy at birth (Years) 82.5 87.5 85 22.5 27.5 25 Adult literacy rate (%) 100 100 100 0 0 0 Gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level (%) 100 100 100 0 0 0 GDP per capita (PPP US$) 40,000 40,000 40,000 100 100 100

The actual values used for these indicators for year 2002 were as follows:

Indicator Value Male Female Combined Life expectancy at birth (Years) 45 44 44.5 Adult literacy rate (%)* 43.2 14.1 28.7 Gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level (%) 59.34 29.57 44.93 GDP per capita (PPP US$) 1182 402 822

* Pertains to year 2003

270 Annexure 2 For computing these indices minimum and maximum values for different indicators were as follows: Calculating the HDI for Afghanistan

3 1 X1: Life expectancy at birth HDI = 3 Ii X2: 2/3 X21 + 1/3 X22 i=1 X21: Adult literacy rate Xi – Min(Xi) X22: Combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary level Ii = Max(Xi)-Min(Xi) X3: Per capita GDP (PPP US$) Calculating the GDI for Afghanistan While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average achievement to reflect the inequalities between men and women in all the three dimensions of HDI. The methodology adopted for the adjustment is same as used in the HDR and is reproduced below.

First, Female and Male indices were calculated according to the general formula

Xi – Min (Xi) Ii = Max(Xi)-Min(Xi) Second, the Female and Male indices in each dimension were combined by taking the harmonic mean of the Female and Male indices as given below to find out the equally distributed index in each dimension.

–1 Female Population share Male Population share Equally distributed index = ------+ ------Female index Male index Third, the GDI was calculated by combining the three equally distributed indices in an unweighted average. For getting Male and Female share of income was estimated as:

(Sf*Y) Wf/Wm: Ratio of Female to Male non-agricultural wage Estimated Female earned income (PPP US$) (Yf) = ------EAf: Female % share of economically active population. Nf EAm: Male % share of economically active population. Y: Total GDP (PPP US$) (Y-(Sf*Y)) Nf: Female Population Estimated Male earned income (PPP US$) (Ym) = ------Nm Nm: Male Population

(Wf/Wm) * EAf Female share of wage bill (Sf) = ------{(Wf/Wm) * EAf } + EAm

Calculating the HPI for Afghanistan

The methodology adopted for the HPI was also the same as that for developing countries in the HDR. Indicators chosen for computing HPI were as follows: P1: Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (times 100) equals 45.99 per cent P2: Adult illiteracy rate equals 71 per cent P3: Combined per cent of people not using improved water source (i.e. X1= 60%) and children under five who are underweight (i.e. 1 X2=49%). Combined value for P3 was obtained as unweighted average of X1 and X2 (i.e. P3 = /2 (X1 + X2) Calculating the GEM for Afghanistan

As neither the requisite data was available nor it could be generated through statistical exercise, this index could not be calculated for Afghanistan.

NHDR 04 271

Annexure 3

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 3 Statistical Indicators Template (August 2004)

HDI Indicators Value Year Source Life expectancy at birth (years) 44.5a 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Adult literacy rate (% of age 15 and above) 28.7 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross 44.93 2002 Estimated using students and population data from the enrolment ratio (% ) CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. GDP per capita (US$) 190 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. GDP per capita (PPP US$) 822 2002 Estimated using ratio of 4.327 based on the average of GDP per capita (PPP US$) to GDP per capita (US$) for 11 countries (land-locked and neighbouring) - Quoted in Securing Afghanistan's Future Life expectancy index 0.342 2002 Education index 0.343 2002 GDP index 0.352 2002 HDI index 0.346 2002 HDI rank 173 2002 Only five countries below Afghanistan.

GDI Indicators Value Year Source Life expectancy at birth (years) Male 45 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female 44 2002 Adult literacy rate (% of age15 and above) Male 43.2 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Female 14.1 2003 Combined primary, secondary, tertiary gross enrolment ratio (% ) Male 59.34 2002 Estimated using students and population Female 29.57 2002 data from CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Total 44.93 2002 Share in economic active population Male 70 2002 Using the ratio in agriculture given in Female 30 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male 0.75 .. As per HDR 2003. non-agricultural wage Estimated earned income (PPP US$) 2002 .. Male 1182 2002 Female 402 2002 GDI index 0.300 2002 .. GDI rank 143 .. Just above Burkina Faso with rank 143 and value 0.291. Only two countries below Afghanistan. a Average of male and female

NHDR 04 275 HPI and Income Poverty Indicators Value Year Source Probability at birth of not surviving 45.99 2002 Estimated using regression of probability at birth of to age 40 (% of Cohort) not surviving to age 40 and life expectancy at birth for low HDI countries Adult illiteracy Rate (% age 15 and above) 71 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Population without sustainable access to an 60 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. improved water sources (%) Per cent of children under five who are underweight 49 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Calorie deficient rate (%) 20.4b 2003 NRVA 2003. Population below US$2 a day (%) 70 2001 WB's estimates quoted in Securing Afghanistan’s Future. HPI index (%) 59.30 2002 .. HPI rank 94 .. Just above Niger with value 61.4 and rank 94 as per HDR 2004. Only two countries below Afghanistan.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Indicators Value Year Source Total population (millions) 23.85 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Annual population growth rate (%) 2.50 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Urban population (as % of total) 28.80 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Population under age 15 (as % of total) 50.16 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Population aged 65 and above (as % of total) 2.61 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Total fertility rate (per woman) 6.30 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

COMMITMENT TO HEALTH: ACCESS SERVICES AND RESOURCES Indicators Value Year Source Households using adequate sanitation 67 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. facilities - flush or pit toilet (%) Population with sustainable access to an 40 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. improved water sources (%) Population with sustainable access to 50-79 1999 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. affordable essential drugs (%) Quoted in HDR 2004. One-year-olds fully immunized against tuberculosis (%) 60 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. One-year-olds fully immunized against measles (%) 76 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Oral rehydration therapy use rate (%) 40 1994-2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004. Contraceptive prevalence rate (%) 28 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Births attended by skilled health staff (%) 11,5 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Physicians (per 100,000 people) 10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Public health expenditure (as % of GDP) 0.50 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Private health expenditure (as % of GDP) 2.50 2001 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004. Public health expenditure per capita (US$) 1 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

b Using the NRVA 2003 data, the WB estimated that 52.8 per cent of Afghans live below poverty line (Afs. 8,450/person/year). This figure quoted in Securing Afghanistan’s Future. It was later observed that the calculation had some methodological problems and it has been now estimated by NRVA that calorie deficient rate for Afghanistan is only 20.4 per cent, meaning that 20.4 per cent of rural population do not have 2,070 kilocalories/person/ day. The monetary value corresponding to this min. calorie requirement is Afs. 3,775/capita/year.

276 Annexure 3 LEADING GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS AND CHALLENGES Indicators Value Year Source

Under nourished people (as % of total population) 70 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Children under weight for age (% under age five) 49 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Children under height for age (% under age five) 48 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Infants with low birth-weight (%) 20 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Adult living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) 0.01 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Women living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) ......

Children living with HIV/AIDS (% of 15-24 population) ......

Malaria cases (per 100,000 people) 937 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Tuberculosis cases (per 100,000 people) 321 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Cigarette consumption per adult (annual average) ......

SURVIVAL: PROGRESS AND SETBACKS Indicators Value Year Source

Life expectancy at birth (years) 45 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 115 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Under five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 172 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003.

Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) 1,600 2003 Securing Afghanistan’s Future.

Probability at birth of female surviving 38.20 2000-2005 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. to age 65 (% of Cohort) - Quoted in HDR 2004.

Probability at birth of male surviving 35.40 2000-2005 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. to age 65(% of Cohort) - Quoted in HDR 2004.

COMMITMENT TO EDUCATION: PUBLIC SPENDING Indicators Value Year Source

Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP) 1.60 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

Public expenditure on education 6 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. (as % of total Government expenditure)

Public expenditure on pre-primary and primary 87.60 1990 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. education (as % of all levels) Quoted in HDR 2004.

Public expenditure on secondary education ...... (as % of all levels)

Public expenditure on tertiary education 12.40 1990 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. (as % of all levels) Quoted in HDR 2004.

Government expenditure per student (US$) 12.10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003.

NHDR 04 277 LITERACY AND ENROLMENT Indicators Value Year Source Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 28.7 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Youth literacy rate (%age 15-24 ) ...... Net primary enrolment ratio (%) 27 1990-1991 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004. Gross primary enrolment ratio (%) 54.4 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Net secondary enrolment ratio (%) ...... Children reaching grade 5 (%) ...... Tertiary students in science, math and engineering 19.37c 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. (as % of all tertiary students) TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND CREATION Indicators Value Year Source Telephone mainlines Total Number 29000 2001 Ministry of Communications (unpublished). 33050 2002 36700 2003 Mainline (per 1,000 people) 1.36 2001 Population - 21.4 million - 2001. 1.52 2002 Population - 21.8million - 2002. 1.54 2003 Population - 23.85million - 2003. Cellular mobile subscribers (per 1,000 people) 5.67 2003 Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Internet users .. .. Ministry of Communications (unpublished). Total Number 700 2003 Internet users (per 1,000 people) 0.029 2003 Calculated as population 23.85 million. Patents granted to residents (per million people) 0.00 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished). Research and development expenditures (as % of GDP) ...... Scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people) ......

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Indicators Value Year Source GDP (US$ billion) 4.05 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. GDP (US$ billion) 6.55 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future (including the value of US$2.5 billion of poppy cultivation in the country). GDP (PPP US$ billion) 17.52 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future. PPP ratio 4.327 See indicator GDP percapita. (PPP US$). GDP per capita (US$) 190 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. GDP per capita (PPP US$) 822 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003 and Securing Afghanistan’s Future. GDP growth rate (%) (-)9.4 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. 28.6 2002 GDP per capita highest value (PPP US$) .. 1975-2001 .. GDP per capita year of highest value ...... Average annual change in consumer (-)15.1 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Price index (%) 4.6 2002

c Number (4400) of students studying sciences, mathematics and engineering. Compiled from the faculty-wise details of the universities.

278 Annexure 3 INEQUALITY IN INCOME OR CONSUMPTION Indicators Value Year Source Share of income and consumption Poorest 10% ...... Poorest 20% 6 2003 NRVA 2003. Richest 10% ...... Richest 20% 43 2003 NRVA 2003. Inequality measures Richest 10% to poorest 10% ...... Richest 20 % to poorest 20% 7.17 2003 NRVA 2003. Gini index 35.50 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished).

THE STRUCTURE OF TRADE Indicators Value Year Source Value of import of goods and services 2,531.10 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. (US$ million) estimated. Imports of goods and services (as % of GDP). 86 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Value of export of goods and services 1,657.40 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. (US$ million) estimated. Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP). 57 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Primary (fresh and ripe fruits, medicine botani, 72 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. spices and seeds) exports (as % of merchandiseexports). Manufactured (skins, wool, sausages and carpets) 18 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. exports (as % of merchandise exports). High-technology exports (as % of manufactured exports)...... Terms of Trade (1980 equals100)......

FLOWS OF AID, PRIVATE CAPITAL AND DEBT Indicators Value Year Source Official development assistance (ODA) 1,813.125 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished). received (US$ million) estimated. 1834.7 2003 Official development assistance (ODA) ...... received (as % of GNI). ODA received per capita (US$). 83.17 2002 DAB estimates (unpublished). 83.40 2003 ODA received per capita (as % of GDP). 37.10 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. 39.00 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished). Foreign direct investment inflows 1.06 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished). (as % of GDP). Other private flows (as % of GDP). 0.00 2003 Total debt service (as % of GDP)...... Total debt service (as % of exports of goods and services)......

NHDR 04 279 PRIORITIES IN PUBLIC SPENDING Indicators Value Year Source Public Expenditure on Education (as % of GDP) 1.60 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book Public Expenditure on Health (as % of GDP) 0.50 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book Military Expenditure (as % of GDP) 0.12 2003 DAB estimates (unpublished) Total Debt Service (as % of GDP) .. ..

ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT Indicators Value Year Source Traditional fuel consumption (% of total energy use) 97 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book Electricity consumption per capita (kwh.) 2 2002 CSO Statistical Year Book GDP per unit of energy use ...... (PPP US$ per kg. of oil equivalent) Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (1000 tons) 1037 1998 World Development Report 2003, WB Total electricity produced (million kwh.) 502.67 21/3/00-20/3/01 CSO Statistical Year Book 489.71 21/3/01-20/3/02 557.31 21/3/02-20/3/03 Ratification of environmental treaties: Cartagena protocol on biosafety ...... Framework convention on climate change ...... Kyoto Protocol on the Framework Convention ...... on Climate Change Convention on Biological Diversity ......

REFUGEES AND ARMAMENTS Indicators Value Year Source Internally displaced people (thousands)d 1,000 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Refugees returned by country of asylum 2,500 2002 Securing Afghanistan’s Future. (thousands)e Refugees by country of origin (thousands) ...... Conventional arms transfers DAB estimates (unpublished). Imports (US$ million) 12 2003 Exports (US$ million) 0.00 2003 Exports Share (%) 0.00 2003 Total armed forces 50 2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Quoted in HDR 2004.

d Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously. e The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

280 Annexure 3 VICTIMS OF CRIMEf Indicators Value Year Source Total Crime 5,084 2002 Ministry of Interior Affairs (unpublished). 6,586 2003 Property Crime 53 2002 31 2003 Robbery 1,521 2002 1,644 2003 Sexual Assault 185 2002 257 2003 Bribery (corruption) 11 2002 9 2003 Assault ...... People victimized by crime (as % of total population) Computed using the data on crime supplied by Total crime 0.03 2003 Ministry of Interior Affairs and total population Robbery 0.007 2003 for 2003 available from MICS/UNICEF 2003. Property crime Negligible 2003 Bribery (corruption) Negligible 2003 Sexual assault Negligible 2003

GENDER INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION Indicators Value Year Source Adult Female Literacy Female rate (% 15 and above) 14.1 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Female rate (as of % of male rate) 33 2003 MICS/UNICEF 2003. Net primary enrolment ...... Gross primary enrolment 556,426 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female ratio 0 2001 Ratio of female to male 0 2001 Gross primary enrolment 3,083,434 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female ratio 0.331 2002 Ratio of female to male 0.494 2002 Net secondary enrolment ...... Gross secondary enrolment 247,535 2001 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female ratio 0 2001 Ratio of female to male 0 2001 Gross secondary enrolment 621,801 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female ratio 0.245 2002 Ratio of female to male 0.324 2002 Gross tertiary enrolment 22,717 2002 CSO Statistical Yearbook 2003. Female ratio ...... Ratio of female to male ...... Gross tertiary enrolment 29,342 2003 Ministry of Higher Educations. Female ratio 0.22 2003 Ratio of female to male 0.278 2003

f Data are based on police records and its coverage may not be complete. In view of this data on this indicator may be interpreted cautiously.

NHDR 04 281 GENDER INEQUALITY IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY Indicators Value Year Source Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above) Rate 48.1 2002 UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2001. Index 103 2002 Quoted in HDR 2004. As per cent of male rate 57 2002 Contributing family workers Female (as % of total) ...... Male (as % of total) ...... Employment by economic activity Agriculture (%) CSO Statistical Yeabook 2003. Male 70 2002 Female 30 2002 Total 80 2002 Industry Male .. .. Female .. .. Total 2 2002 Services Male .. .. Female .. .. Total 18 2002

GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE Indicators Value Year Source Seats in Parliament held by women (as % of total)g ...... Female legislators, senior officials and managers ...... (as % of total) Female professional and technical workers ...... (as % of total) Ratio of estimated female to male earned income 0.34 2002 Calculation based on the data of the GDI table.

STATUS OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS Indicators Status Source/Remarks International Convention on the Elimination of All Ratified HDR 2003 Forms of Racial Discrimination International Covenant on Civil and Political Ratified HDR 2003 Rights (1966) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Ratified HDR 2003 Cultural Rights (1966) Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Ratified HDR 2003 Discrimination Against Women (1979) Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Ratified HDR 2003 Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Ratified HDR 2003

g The Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 2005. Data on this indicator may become available after that.

282 Annexure 3 Annexure 4

Photo: Golam Monowar Kamal

ANNEXURE 4 Definitions of Statistical terms

Armed transfers, conventional: Refers to the voluntary Earned income, ratio of estimated female to male: transfer by the supplier (and thus excludes captured The ratio of estimated female earned income to estimated weapons and weapons obtained through defectors) of male earned income. See earned income (PPP US$), weapons with a military purpose destined for the armed estimated (female and male). forces, paramilitary forces or intelligence agencies of another country. These include major conventional Education expenditure, public: Including both capital weapons or systems in six categories: ships aircrafts, expenditures (spending on construction, renovation, major missiles, artillery, armoured vehicles and guidance and repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) radar systems (excluded are trucks, services, ammunition, and current expenditures (spending on goods and services small arms, support items, components and component that are consumed within the current year and would technology and towed or naval artillery under 100- need to be renewed the following year). It covers such millimeter calibre). expenditures as staff salaries and benefits, contracted or purchased services, books and teaching materials, welfare Births attended by skilled health personnel: The services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, percentage of deliveries attended by personnel (included insurance, rents, telecommunications and travel. doctors, nurses and midwives) trained to give the necessary care, supervision and advice to women during Education Index: One of the three indices on which the pregnancy, labour and postpartum period, to conduct human development index is built. It is based on the adult deliveries on their own and to care for newborns. literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary and Carbon dioxide emissions: Anthropogenic (human- tertiary gross enrolment ratio. For details on how the originated) carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix. burning of fossil fuels, gas flaring and the production of Education levels: Categorized as primary, secondary cement, Emissions are calculated from data on the and tertiary in accordance with the Educational System consumption of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, gas prevalent in Afghanistan. Generally the age group flaring and the production of cement. corresponding these levels of educations in Afghanistan Cellular subscribers: (also referred to as cellular mobile is 7-21 years. subscribers) Subscribers to an automatic public mobile Electricity consumption per capita: Refers to gross telephone service that provides access to the public production, in per capita terms, which includes switched telephone network using cellular technology. consumption by station auxiliaries and any losses in the Systems can be analogue or digital. transformers that are considered integral parts of the Consumer price index: Reflects changes in the cost to station. the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or may change at specified Employment by economic activity: Employment in intervals. industry, agriculture or services as defined according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Crime, people victimized by: The percentage of Crime system (revision 2 and 3) and used in CSO Statistical to the population of the country in the given year Year Book. Industry refers to mining and quarrying, Earned income (PPP US$), estimated (female and manufacturing, construction and public utilities (gas, male): Roughly derived on the basis of the ratio of the water and electricity). Agriculture refers to activities in female non-agricultural wage to the male non-agricultural agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. Services refer wage, the female and male shares of the economically to wholesale and retail trade; restaurants and hotels; active population, total female and male population and transport, storage and communications; finance, insurance, GDP per capita (PPPUS$). For details on this estimation, real estate and business services; and community, social see Technical Appendix. and personal services.

NHDR 04 285 Enrolment ratio, gross: The number of students enrolled (PPPUS$). For details on how the index is calculated, in a level of education, regardless of age, as a percentage see Technical Appendix. of the population of official school age for that level. GDP per capita (PPP US$): See GDP (gross domestic The gross enrolment ratio can be greater than 100% as product) and PPP (Purchasing power parity). a result of grade repetition and entry at ages younger or older than typical age at that grade level. GDP per capita (US$): GDP (US$) divided by midyear population. Exports of goods and services: The value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the GDP annual growth rate: annual growth rate, calculated world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, from constant price GDP in local currency units. insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees and Gender-related development index (GDI): A composite other services. Excluded are labour and property income index measuring average achievement in the three basic and transfer payments. dimensions captured in the human development index- Export, primary: Include export of Fresh and Ripe a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard fruits, Medicine Botani, Spices and Seeds, etc. of living-adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women. For details on how the index is Fertility rate, total: The number of children that would calculated, see Technical Appendix. be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in Health expenditure per capita (US$): The sum of accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. public and private expenditure (in US$), divided by the population. Health expenditures includes the provision Foreign direct investment, inflows of: Inflows of of health services (preventive and curative), family investment to acquire a lasting management interest planning activities, nutrition activities and emergency (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating aid designated for health, but excludes the provision of in an economy other than that of the investor, It is the water and sanitation. sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital. Health expenditure, public: Current and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external Food consumption, national, share of poorest 20% borrowings and grants (including donations from in: The share of food consumption accruing to the poorest international agencies and non-governmental 20% of the population. Data on household food organizations) and social (or compulsory) health insurance consumption has been taken from National Risk & funds. Together with private health expenditure, it makes Vulnerability Assessment Survey up total health expenditure. Fuel consumption, traditional: Estimated consumption HIV/AIDS, people living with: The estimated number of fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane waste) and of people living with HIV/AIDS at the end of the year animal and vegetable wastes. Total energy use comprises specified. commercial energy use and traditional fuel use. Human development index (HDI): A composite index GDP (gross domestic product): The sum of value added measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions by all resident producers in the economy plus any product of human development-a long and healthy life, knowledge taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of and a decent standard of living. For details on how the output. It is calculated without making deductions for index is calculated, see Technical Appendix. depreciation of fabricated capital assts or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Value added is the Human poverty index (HPI) for developing countries: net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and A composite index measuring deprivations in the three subtracting intermediate inputs. basic dimensions captured in the human development index-a long and health life, knowledge and a decent GDP (US$): GDP converted to US dollars using the standard of living. For details on how the index is average official exchange rate. calculated, see Technical Appendix. GDP index: One of the three indices on which the human Illiteracy rate, adult: Calculated as 100 minus the adult development index is built. It is based on GDP per capita literacy rate. See literacy rate, adult.

286 Annexure 4 Immunization, one-year-olds fully immunized against of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by measles or tuberculosis: One-year-olds injected with multilateral institutions and by non-DAC countries. an antigen or a serum containing specific antibodies against measles or tuberculosis. PPP (purchasing power parity): A rate of exchange that accounts for price differences across countries, Imports of goods and services: The value of all goods allowing international comparisons of real output and and other market services received from the rest of the incomes. At the PPP US$ rate, PPP US$1 has the same world. Included are the value of merchandise, freight, purchasing power in the domestic economy as $1 has in insurance, transport, travel, royalties, licence fees and the United States. other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal and government Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40: services. Excluded are labour and property income and Calculated as 1 minus the probability of surviving to age transfer payments. 40 for a given cohort. See probability at birth of surviving to age 40. Income poverty line, population below: The percentage of the population living below the specified poverty line Probability at birth of surviving to age 40: The i.e. US$2 a day-at 1985 international prices (equivalent probability of a newborn infant surviving to age 40 if to US$2.15 at 1993 international prices), adjusted for subject to prevailing patterns of age specific mortality purchasing power parity. rates. Infant mortality rate: The probability of dying between Refugees Returnee: People who have fled their country birth and exactly one year of age, expressed per 1000 because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons live births. of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or Internally displaced people: People who were displaced membership in a particular social group and who cannot within Afghanistan and to whom the United Nation High or do not want to return. The returnee refugee figure in Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have extended this report is based on the assistance provided by UNHCR assistance. to the persons returning to Afghanistan. Internet users: People with access to the worldwide Sanitation facilities, population with access to network. improved: The percentage of the population with access Life expectancy at birth: The number of years a newborn to adequate excreta disposal facilities, such as a connection infant would live if prevailing patterns of age-specific to a sewer or septic tank system, a pour flush latrine, a mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same simple pit latrine or a ventilated improved pit latrine. throughout the child’s life. Science, math and engineering, tertiary students in: Life expectancy index: One of the three indices on The share of tertiary students enrolled in natural sciences; which the human development index is built. For details engineering; mathematics and computer science; on how the index is calculated, see Technical Appendix. architecture and agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Literacy rate, Adult: The percentage of people aged 15 Telephone Mainlines: Telephone lines connecting a and above who can, with understanding, both read and customer’s equipment to the public switched telephone write. network. Malaria cases: The total number of people suffering Traditional fuels, population using: The share of the from malaria in a specified year. population using solid fuels, which include traditional Maternal mortality ratio: The annual number of deaths fuels such as fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 waste) and animal and vegetable wastes. live births. Tuberculosis cases: The total number of tuberculosis Official development assistance (ODA): Disbursements cases reported. A tuberculosis case is defined as a patient of loans made on concessional terms (repayments of in whom tuberculosis has been bacteriologically principal) and grants by official agencies of the members confirmed or diagnosed by a clinician.

NHDR 04 287 Under-five mortality rate: The probability of dying Urban population: The midyear population of areas between birth and exactly five years of age, expressed classified as urban. It includes population of national per 1,000 live births. metro cities and 26 provincial towns. Under height for age, children under age five: Includes Water source, improved, population without moderate and severe stunting, defined as more than two sustainable access to: Calculated as 100 minus the percentage of the population with sustainable access to standard deviations below the median height for age of an improved water source. Unimproved sources include the reference population. unprotected wells/springs/ponds, river/canal/stream or Undernourished people: People whose food intake is other unprotected sources. chronically insufficient to meet their energy requirements. Water source, improved, population with sustainable access to: The share of the population with reasonable Under weight for age, children under age five: Includes access to any of the following types of water supply for moderate underweight, defined as more than two standard drinking: household connections, public standpipes, deviations below the median weight for age of the boreholes, protected dug well, protected springs and reference population, and severe underweight, defined rainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined as the as more than three standard deviations below the median availability of at least 20 litres a person per day from weight. source within one kilometer of the user’s dwelling.

288 Annexure 4 Photo: Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh UNDP Afghanistan Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul Tel: (+93) 20 2101682-87 Fax: (+873) 763 4638 836 e-mail: [email protected] www.undp.org.af