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VOLUME 4 U FALL 2016 However, here we are. We did it! And what I’ve realized is that this journal is not about the what. Letter From Sure, what we do is great. We publish amazing, student-written articles. This issue’s articles ex- plore everything from an analyzation of the Is- raeli targeted killing policy, to Iran’s hegemonic the Editor expansion, to German and Japanese brutality during WWII, and all the way to research on the refugee resettlement process in the United Dear Reader, States. However, I argue that our, “why” is much more important. Why does our journal exist? Welcome to the Fall 2016 Issue of the GATE Why do we do what we do? Journal. This is a particularly special issue for me, as it is my premier publication as Editor The GATE Journal exists to provide the ASU in Chief. I inherited the position from the two community with an academic platform for pub- individuals that founded the journal in 2014. lishing scholarly pieces on global affairs, and, in Even with the trust and guidance of the past turn, establish the ASU community as a thought editors, this publication season was difficult for leader on issues across the globe; To bridge the me. When I took over as Editor in Chief, I tru- gap between the theoretical approaches of aca- ly had no idea what I was getting into. I had demia and real-world, empirical implications in worked for GATE for a year as a copy editor but relation to global affairs; To promote the critical had limited experience with content editing. I analysis and understanding of global issues that had no clue how to work our layout and graph- span across national boundaries and various ic design software. I was not prepared to enter sectors of research; To provide students the op- the mind numbing bureaucracy of the student portunity to participate in the academic process government, as I navigated the system and de- of substantive peer-review. This is what I kept signed a budget for our organization. in mind in the moments when I thought that we would not make it. Because, ultimately, if we Coming into the semester, my goal was to do keep our “why” in mind, we cannot fail. exactly what the past editors had done the pre- vious semester. If I could seamlessly weave one So as you read, know that this journal is much semester into the next, I would count the tran- more than the articles it publishes. It is a compi- sition as a success. But, I’ll admit, there were lation of the incredible GATE staff’s hard work many moments where I thought this was not and passion. We are honored to share our “why” going to happen. I struggled to find a full staff with you today. for the editorial board. Scrambled to receive enough submissions to start the publication Chloe Miracle Rutledge process. Spent many nights staying up late and Editor in Chief writing email after email, keeping up with all our editors and authors. Had a minor break- down when I thought we were losing our web- site and our funding. And watched, anxiously, as I pushed the deadlines back more and more. GATE Network: Global Affairs Organizations and Centers at ASU

Model United Nations Center on Religion and Conflict MUN is an academic competition in which students The center is a research hub that promotes can learn about diplomacy international relations, interdisciplinary research and education on the and the United Nations. For more information, email dynamics of religion and conflict with the aim of [email protected] or visit http://munasu.org. advancing knowledge, seeking solutions and informing policy. For more information, email [email protected] or Students Supporting Israel visit https:/csrc.asu.edu. Students Supporting Israel is a Pro-Israel international campus movement that is committed to promoting United Students Against Sweatshops a better understanding of Israel throughout North United Students Against Sweatshops is a national America as a member of the family of nations, with grassroots organization that woirks in solidarity with a fundamental right to exist as a Jewish, democratic working people’s struggles locally and globally. For more state, within secure borders. For more information, information, visit https://www.facebook.com/asuSEED/ contact their FaceBook page at Students Supporting or https://usas.org. Israel at Arizona State University or visit http://www. ssimovement.org. ASU Council for Arab and Islamic Studies CAIS is an organization that works to acknowledge J Street U the significant contributions of Arabic Studies and J Street U is the organizing arm of JStreet, the political Islamic civilization and cultures to the world at large home for pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans. For more both historically and in the modern age. For more information, email [email protected] or visit https:// information, email [email protected] or visit https://cais. www.facebook.com/jstreetasu. asu.edu.

Students for Justice in Palestine Oxfam SJP is an anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian college student Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 activism organization. For more information, email organizations working in approximately 94 countries [email protected] or visit http://sjpalestine.com. worldwide to find solutions to poverty and what it considers injustice around the world. For more Alexander Hamilton Society information, visit https://www.facebook.com/ The AHS is an independent, non-partisan, not for oxfamclubasu. profit organization dedicated to promoting constructive debate on basic principles and contemporary issues in Model African Union foreign, economic, and national security policy. For Model African Union is a simulation of the African more information, email [email protected] or visit Union, providing a platform for young leaders to https://www.facebook.com/AHSatASU explore the inner workings of the African Union, and to practice international diplomacy by assuming the Students Organize for Syria roles of African leaders. For more information, email Students Organize for Syria is a student led movement [email protected] or visit https://www.facebook. on a mission to assist the Syrian people. For more com/Model-African-Union-at-ASU-1471761963133353. information, email [email protected] or visit http://organize4syria.com/asu. 2B1United 2B1 is a camnpaign aimed at countering the recruiting Center for the Future of War success of violent extremism, as well as dismantling the The center explores the social, political, economic, and ‘War on Islam’ narrative. For more information, visit cultural implications of the changing nature of war and https://www.instagram.com/2B1United. conflict. For more information, email futureofwar@asu. edu or visit https://futureofwar.asu.edu.

STAFF

Chloe Miracle Rutledge Editor-in-chief Carolina Marques de Mesquita Managing Editor Sam Cooper Review Board Editor Destine Sior Review Board Editor Aron Erickson Review Board Editor Fernanda Quiroz Review Board Editor Maggie Tucker Review Board Editor Graham Paul Review Board Editor Alexandra Blythe Review Board Editor Nadira Kahn Copy Editor Megan Kelly Copy Editor Oren Depp Copy Editor Lily Sedigh Copy Editor Bartia Cooper Copy Editor Justin Tran Outreach Coordinator Maxana Goettl Outreach Coordinator Ana Santaella Layout Coordinator Joseph Bianchi Layout Coordinator Hal Danesh Layout Coordinator Adrian Ramirez Layout Coordinator Rhiannon Nabours Cover Designer Design Consultant Amit Tallapragada Web Developer Dr. Daniel Rothenberg Faculty Advisor Table of Contents Local Profiles

Confronting Compulsory Victimhood: Has Journalism Caught up with the WPS Agenda? Carolina Marques de Mesquita...... 4

Painting Arizona Blue: A Look at the Arizona Democratic Party & Its Role in Maricopa County’s 2016 Election Cycle Hal Danesh...... 7 Peer Reviewed Articles

The Persian Game:Iran’s Quest for Hegemony Wesley J. Jeffries...... 16

German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality: The Erosion of Ethics by Ordinary People During World War II Janna Tobin...... 29

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy: A Multidimensional Study of Efficacy Yonit Upart...... 35

Community Development & Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement: The Case of Phoenix Arizona Robert Davis...... 57 CONFRONTING COMPULSORY VICTIMHOOD Has Journalism Caught Up With the WPS Agenda? Carolina Marques de Mesquita

Confronting Compulsory Victimhood GATE Journal Page 6 n August, I began a student research and Syria. By reviewing the search results for fellowship with New America, a DC- terms such as “Iraq + women” or “Afghanistan based think tank partnered with ASU’s + women + peace”, I’ve sought to find patterns Center on the Future of War. What in these representations and evaluate whether interested me about the project I was journalism has caught up with the Women, assigned to was its emphasis on making gender Peace, and Security agenda. Ia central consideration in national security, as Unfortunately, many of my findings indicate opposed to a secondary one - hence the project that gender certainly remains a secondary title, “Not Secondary, But Central”. consideration in reporting on international The project follows up on the Women, conflict. Women and their unique challenges Peace, and Security agenda, which was during conflict often remain parenthetical to the introduced in October of 2000 when the “real” conflict at hand. Consider, for example, a United Nations signed Resolution 1325. The May 2016 article in my sampling published by agenda expresses a particular need for the UN The Wall Street Journal. The headline reads: to recognize how conflict adversely affects “Series of Bombs in Syria Hit Assad Stronghold, women and children, and at the time of its Killing Dozens”. As details unfold, the piece signing, was widely recognized as a major step includes mention of an incident earlier in the forward for women in foreign policy. Gender month, when “a maternity ward in the regime- mainstreaming, which emphasizes a need to held side of Aleppo city was attacked with consider how policy impacts men and women rockets, killing several women and children.”2 differently, had finally been recognized as Unfortunately, the insignificant inclusion fundamental to successful peace and security of women in the above example is not isolated, policy. Even more notable was the agenda’s and represents the extent of women’s inclusion recognition of “the importance of [women’s] across many of the other publications I equal participation and full involvement in all examined as well. Further, throughout my efforts for the maintenance and promotion of research, my most troubling discovery was peace and security, and the need to increase that women are most frequently represented as their role in decision-making with regard to casualty victims or victims of sexual violence. conflict prevention and resolution”.1 For example, as many as 34% of the articles in 16 years later, many scholars in the fields my sampling of the New York Times featured of women’s studies, development studies, and women as victims of sexual violence, while only political science are concerned with evaluating 17% featured women as political actors. the success of this agenda. This is also the Considering sexual violence is, of course, concern of Not Secondary, But Central, which critical to any analysis of the gendered impacts hopes to release a toolkit on the topic in early of war and conflict. In South Sudan, for 2017. One component of this toolkit will be a example, where a brutal civil war rages, the mass media analysis I’ve developed over the course rape of civilian women is often rationalized by of the last several months. Since September, ethnic divisions and used as a weapon of war. I’ve examined how journalists in The New York Nonetheless, I was surprised to find that across Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall all publications in my analysis, South Sudanese Street Journal represent women in conflict women were represented almost exclusively zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, in relation to sexual violence, and that little

1U.N. Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000), available from undocs. org/S/RES/1325.

Page 7 GATE Journal Carolina Marques de Mesquita consideration was given to the other challenges contexts during the next four years. Given this these women might face: illiteracy, difficulty possibility, making gender mainstreaming a accessing critical resources, etc. Furthermore, reality is now more critical than ever. Moreover, what might these women’s thoughts be on the need to better integrate women in foreign the ethnic violence sweeping this recently policy and global politics remains essential to emancipated country? What singular insights creating policy that is effective and inclusive. could they provide on the conflict given their Journalism plays an essential role in the creation unique positions within this violent context? It of that reality. Should we fail in this respect, we was certainly difficult to tell, as these women risk not only turning a blind eye to women’s rarely spoke for themselves when featured in valuable insights, but also creating security the articles I examined: generally, journalists, policy that makes us all less safe. politicians, and UN personnel spoke for them instead, offering their own input on the effects of violence against women in the country. These findings certainly made me ask myself whether the WPS agenda has truly reframed women’s roles in foreign policy. Women’s notable absence as political actors and peacebuilders across the media that I examined further pushed this question. Women are often barred from political processes in the regions that I examined. Nonetheless, women’s informal participation in politics is critical and pervasive around the world, yet these efforts were also unrecognized throughout the publications that I examined. My sampling of The Washington Post, for example, featured no instances of women as peacebuilders, while also featuring only two instances of women in roles of political leadership. This included formal and informal roles as politicians, peacekeepers, activists, union members, protesters, and members of women’s advocacy groups. Women manage to find ways to remain politically engaged even in contexts that are hostile to their civic contributions - yet they were snubbed and excluded from much of the journalism that I sampled in my research. What are the consequences of such biased reporting? Many policymakers speculate that women may be sidelined in foreign policy

2Raja Abdulrahim and Dana Ballout, “Series of Bombs in Syria Hit Assad Strongholds, Killing Dozens,” The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016, http://www.wsj. com/articles/series-of-bombs-in-syria-hit-assad-strongholds-1463998056.

Confronting Compulsory Victimhood GATE Journal Page 8 PAINTING ARIZONA BLUE A look at the Arizona Democratic Party and its role in Maricopa County’s 2016 election cycle HAL DANESH PAINTING ARIZONA BLUE A look at the Arizona Democratic Party and its role in Maricopa County’s 2016 election cycle Hal Danesh

On November 8, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump battled for control over the United States’ future. To the surprise of the nation, one of the places the battle was fought most fiercely was right here in Arizona. Hal Danesh, a former intern for the Arizona Democratic Party and member of the GATE Editorial Board, recently sat down with Arcelio Reybol, who was a Field Organizer of the Arizona Democratic Party during the election, to discuss the results and implications of the past election cycle and the Arizona Democratic Party’s role.

What was your role in the Arizona Democratic Party (ADP)? Do you feel that you did a partic- ularly good job in your role? Do you feel that you brought anything special or unique to your role? When I was with the Arizona Democratic Party during the 2016 election cycle, I was first a Demo- cratic Fellow, and then I was promoted to a Field Organizer in early September. In regards to being a Field Organizer with the ADP, what I brought that was special was we branched out to precincts that were never before touched by the Arizona Democratic Party such as East and West Mesa as well as dominantly Native American demographic areas such as Fort McDowell and the Honda precinct. With that in mind, you can see that the Arizona Democratic Party, specifically with pre- cincts under my leadership, that was something unique that we brought to the table.

What do you think was different about this election cycle versus past election cycles for the ADP, and what has changed? Just like I stated, we branched out to demographic areas that have never been touched before by the Arizona Democratic Party. However, this was my first election cycle with the Arizona Democratic Party, and I have only been in Arizona for now what is about to be three and a half years due to my

Painting Arizona Blue GATE Journal Page 10 DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER

Page 11 GATE Journal Hal Danesh predominant role as a student at Arizona State University. The conclusion that I’m coming to in Arizona right now, and through data from the Maricopa County Recorder’s office, is that you can see that, democratically, this state is changing. One thing that is huge is that, compared to previous election cycles, this election cycle had Arizona marked as a battleground state. So comparing that statement to previous election cycles, this election cycle really solidified the work that the Arizona Democratic Party has been doing and is doing currently.

Do you feel that Maricopa County itself has been going more blue? Why so? To answer your first question, yes, Maricopa County is going more blue, the reason being that you have one of the largest public universities in the nation in Maricopa County. Just speaking, when you do have a high influx of individuals that are coming from out of state places such as California and New York and Chicago and other places in general, they are going to bring not only themselves here but also their ideas and political ideologies. These people are getting registered to vote, as you can also see in the percentages, and [these out of state college students] are voting in Arizona elec- tions. To show the evidence of that, you can look at proposals that are being proposed in Arizona areas such as Prop 205, the legalization of marijuana. Now, it did not pass. However, it was on the ballot, and that within itself shows that not only are individuals changing because they are coming to college, but the locals in Maricopa County, because you have to get that petitioned to get that on the ballots, [the locals are] agreeing with such ideas as well. So, demographically, it’s changing, and that’s part of what’s causing Maricopa County to change to blue.

Do you feel that you and the strategies that the Arizona Democratic Party used had a role in this change? Oh, completely! I can say personally, since June, because that’s when I started. Going out there, be- ing able to speak with the people, whether it be on the light rail trains or going door to door, or just speaking in public areas, distributing flyers with Democratic candidates that have Democratic ide- als that turn the state blue if they do and when they do get elected to their positions. For example, Isela Blanc on the local level [who ran for and won a seat in the Arizona House of Representatives], the Arizona Democratic Party had a huge role [in helping her get elected]. They were informing the public, engaging the public, and giving the public the opportunity to become involved with the

Painting Arizona Blue GATE Journal Page 12 Maricopa County Presidential Election: by Percentage of Votes Won Year Percentage of Votes Percentage of Votes Percentage of Votes Won by Republican Won by Democratic Won by Third-Party Candidate Candidate Candidates 2004 56.86% 42.25% 0.89% 2008 54.43% 43.91% 1.66% 2012 54.3% 43.62% 2.08% 2016 48.63% 45.74% 5.63% DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER

Page 13 GATE Journal Hal Danesh democratic process itself.

Throughout the campaign, the Arizona Democratic Party has used rhetoric like “Paint Arizo- na Blue!” Many in the ADP offices were highly optimistic in the prospect of turning Arizona into a blue state. However, when polling time came, only two of our five Democratic candidates in Maricopa County won their elections, and Clinton did not come close to winning Arizona. Do you feel that the Arizona Democratic Party underestimated their Republican opponents? As you stated, two of the five did win. I say that’’s a huge victory when this state has been domi- nantly red for many decades. In regards to underestimating, no we did not. Every day, individuals were working more than the traditional eight hours of professional work. There’d be individuals going home from work at 3 AM, starting their day at 6 AM. We put in everything we had, and those efforts do show. Two of the five did win, and that shows huge progress in an Arizona,that is tradi- tionally a red state. I think, looking at the specific candidates that did win, yes, you might say that still we didn’t get half our candidates in, but still, we got two of those five in, and, more importantly, we turned Arizona into a battleground state. And the whole nation was shocked by that. We were the most watched battleground state. Arizona has been on the watch since the beginning election months with Ann Kirkpatrick when MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow stated that John McCain is going against one of his toughest reelection campaigns in years, and Ann Kirkpatrick was the great em- bodiment of that. However, she did lose, but we did not underestimate... we were the ones that got underestimated, and even though three of the five candidates lost, two of the five candidates won.

Do you feel that the Arizona Democratic Party missed an opportunity to turn Arizona blue through poor management or leadership? Is there anything the Arizona Democratic Party could have done better this election cycle? Poor management and leadership, no, just because of the evidence showing that Arizona did be- come a battleground state. Now, there is always that asterisk to say “well there’s always something that we could have done better.” But statistics talk. Voter turnout went up, Republican voting [votes for Republican candidates] went down, so the Arizona Democratic Party did do a great job. Lead- ership and management, just going off my experience, going from Arcelio Reybol the Fellow to Arcelio Reybol the Field Organizer, if you’re not ready, there are no days back. You, yourself, have to

Painting Arizona Blue GATE Journal Page 14 DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER

Votes Won in Elections for Senate 1,000,000

750,000

500,000 Votes

250,000

0 2004 2010 2016 Year McCain Democratic Candidate Other

Page 15 GATE Journal Hal Danesh train yourself. You, yourself, have to get yourself in that position where you can excel. Now, with be- ing transferred and consistently changed to different precincts, my preparation for these precincts should have been better. However, there could have been areas where a more consistent base would have developed more production, because of the familiarity and the consistent contacts for individ- uals to contact that person within the similar precinct. That could have been done a little bit better, but I think it’s more individual things, the individual worker, the individual organizer, but in total I think the organization was there because Arizona was turned into a battleground state this year.

Do you have any final thoughts, anything to add, anything you wanted to say but did not get the chance to say? Yes, I highly think that President Elect Trump, with his policies in regards to nationalism, falls un- der Mr. Dani Rodrik’s trilemma triangle. The model states that nations have two of three options: hyper-globalization, national sovereignty or the “Nation first” which President Elect Trump has clearly argued for, and democracy. Right now, with President Elect Trump, we have chosen democ- racy and national sovereignty, leaving hyper-globalization out of it. With President Elect Trump’s clear statements of “America First”, there has already been ripple effects within the globe, specif- ically with what you could call our competitor or “economic enemy”, China. China is taking on this opportunity. China has already beaten us with purchasing power. According to the Wall Street Journal, China has already conducted their visits to Latin America and already has an eleven page document stating they want to step in that globalization role and are already doing so within Latin America. Their number one investments are in Asia, but their number two is in Latin America, and because Donald Trump wants to step away from globalization, China is going to deepen their competition in the global sphere from our misstep of not staying in that leading role in globaliza- tion. I think that President Elect Trump needs to realize that his nationalist point of view needs to be broadened because when he speaks about competition with China and us getting done with our deals with China, it’s no longer just nation to nation deals, it’s the global picture, and China is, has been, and will be overtaking America in globalization and economic development.

Painting Arizona Blue GATE Journal Page 16 DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER

Page 17 GATE Journal Hal Danesh THE PERSIAN GAME Iran’s Quest for Hegemony Wesley J. Jefferies

Introduction “Iran has U.S. President Barack Obama, in an interview with The Atlantic, caricatured the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran as no more than sectarian conflicts sought a meant only to “settle scores.” The president proceeded to suggest that the best way to resolve tensions between Saudi sphere of Arabia and Iran was for the countries “to share the neigh- borhood” (Goldberg 2016). This characterization, utterly bereft of any strategic insight, cultural sensitivity, or dip- influence, lomatic tact, is unfortunate and untrue. Governments and societies across the Middle East have collapsed. Extremism which and radicalization is spreading with consequences for the world at large. Europe and the Middle East are facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. The world includes has witnessed the worst genocides of the 21st Century. The regional balance of power is dangerously fluctuating while substantial various states face imminent existential threats. There is so much more here than petty vendettas. In the chaos and cri- ses that abound, Iran has been determined to play a shap- swathes of ing role. In doing so, Iran has presented itself as the great- est threat to the Gulf states since the collapse of the Soviet Iraq, Syria, Union. Iran has sought a sphere of influence, which includes substantial swathes of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, Lebanon, that has encircled the monarchies of the Gulf. In doing so, it has pursued a model, in tune with the times, that eschews and Yemen, institutionalized arrangements providing for the establish- ment and acquiescence of satellite states in favor of auxil- iary forces and non-state actors with little to no account- that has ability to the governments of the countries in which they operate. Through unconventional means of subversion and encircled the intervention, Iran has further undermined the state system of the Middle East already weakened by the Iraq War and the Arab Spring. It has escalated and exacerbated sectarian monarchies tensions and divisions in the region. This has created fertile breeding ground for a new generation of religious radicals of the Gulf.” among Sunnis and Shiites alike with genocidal consequenc-

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 18 es in Iraq and Syria. Through disparate means olution consolidated around a leadership with yet with comparable consequences, Iran is en- little concern for such concepts and more focus gaged in an expansionist project in the Middle on solidifying their newfound power, imposing East, as was the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, ideological conformity through purges and in- by making nonsense of the alleged sovereignty doctrination and seeking to export their revolu- of the aforementioned countries. tionary model to other countries. Upon seizing power, Khomeini pronounced that all existing Historical Background forms of governance were null and void. Every The Persians are heirs to the oldest sur- ruler and potentate in Islamic world, except viving civilization in the Middle East. They are himself, “were tyrannical self-seeking rulers” also heirs to one of the world’s oldest imperi- who themselves had been creations of “impe- al traditions. Both Persian civilization and the rialists” (Kissinger 2015). In a fiery and dem- Iranian imperial project reach back thousands agogic rhetoric utterly indistinguishable from of years. At one point or another, the Persian that of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Khomeini called for Empire extended its control and influence over the overthrow of all Arab and Islamic regimes much of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and and awarded himself the title of “Leader of the Central Asia. Iran remains the most cohesive Islamic Ummah and Oppressed People” (ibid). nation-state in a region of tribal monarchies In common with Osama bin Laden and other and post-colonial partitions, and its cultural prominent figures in the contemporary jihadist legacy is strongly visible in areas where the Per- movement, Ruhollah Khomeini was deeply in- sians once dominated. fluenced by the radical Egyptian writer Sayyid Islam became the state religion upon the Qutb and wrote an admiring introduction to conquest of Iran by the Rashidun Caliphate one of his works in which he described Qutb in the 7th Century AD and has been the geo- as a “lofty and great author” who demonstrated graphical center of the Shiite sect since the that “ultimately world government shall be in rise of the Safavid dynasty in the 16th Centu- the hands of our school” (ibid). In stark con- ry. While remaining an avowedly imperialist trast to the more ambiguous relationship that regime, a program of secularism and modern- is perceived between the Gulf monarchies and ization was implemented under the short-lived what is suspected to be the more radical ele- Pahlavi dynasty in the 20th Century. Its collapse ments among the local clergy, the regime in during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, during Iran is avowedly supportive of ideology that which radical elements of the Shiite clergy, led advocates for the use of political violence for by Ruhollah Khomeini, seized power and es- religious ends. tablished the quasi-totalitarian clerical regime Aside from the evident similarities be- that rules contemporary Iran. While it signaled tween the revolutionist ideology of the Iranian the end of the world’s last empire, it signaled Revolution and the clerical fascism favored by not so much Iran’s renunciation of expansionist Al-Qaeda and ISIS, world revolution has always tendencies as its transmogrification in a radi- held a central place in the regime’s propaganda. cal and revolutionary context. In common with It is in a manner reminiscent of the transnation- how many revolutions throughout history are al aspirations found in Jacobin and Bolshevik portrayed, the grievances of the revolutionaries ideologies that propelled the French and Rus- in Iran were presented as concerning democra- sian Revolutions. Just as the French and Rus- cy, human rights, and social justice. In common sian revolutionaries had decided for themselves with how revolutions manifested themselves in that they had discovered the will of history and practice in France and Russia, the Iranian Rev- proselytized their ideas by force in other coun-

Page 19 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies tries, so too did Ruhollah Khomeini and his the Iranian regime the scope and pretext to in- fellow travelers arrive at the same conclusion terfere, exploiting sectarian tensions and revo- concerning the regime they had established. lutionary ideology as a cover for strategic ob- The Middle East has been afflicted by the con- jectives. sequences of the pretensions and presumptions of individuals like Ruhollah Khomeini in ways Syria that go far beyond the shallow and contrived When uprisings spread throughout the distinctions made between the Sunni and Shiite Middle East against governments that were for sects by Western scholars and analysts. the most part aligned with or cooperative with The Arab Spring returned these fundamen- the West, the narrative propagated by Iran’s Ali tals of Iranian state ideology to the fore. Ali Khamenei that the Arab Spring was an “Islam- Khamenei, who succeeded Ruhollah Khomei- ic Awakening” inspired by its own revolution ni as “supreme leader” in Iran, described the was compromised when mass demonstrations uprisings that occurred throughout the Arab in Syria were immediately met with massive countries as a reaction against the “failure of use of lethal force. Syria has been a long-stand- communism and liberalism” and “bitter and ing ally of the revolutionist regime in Iran and horrifying experience of following the West in has subordinately cooperated with Iran on a politics, behavior and lifestyle” (ibid). The col- broad range of issues. Syria’s would-be presi- lapse of regimes across the Middle East would dent-for-life Bashar al-Assad had previously herald the beginning of a world revolution that made various clumsy and stilted attempts at would just so happen to be aligned with the rapprochement with Israel and the West while ideals of the Iranian Revolution. Khamenei demonstrating a certain degree of resentment further declared that Iran would be the “focal over being treated as a client by Iran. While the point of the awakening movement of nations” rhetoric this involved may have embarrassed and claimed that “the slogans of Egyptians and the regime in Iran, at no point did this involve Tunisians are being repeated in New York and a scaling down of the relationship between Iran California” (ibid). While this presumptuous and Syria. Syria continued to rely on Iran for narrative was put into question when the Irani- developing defense technology that included an-aligned Assad regime in Syria was engulfed ballistic missiles and nuclear reactors, and the by the uprisings, it reveals the enduring princi- military continued to look to Iran for training ple of world revolution as a fundamental part and guidance (Kagan, Majidyar, Pletka, & Sulli- of the clerical regime’s propaganda. The Arab van 2012). Iran has been the primary sponsor of Spring, for all the hopes that it would herald Shiite seminaries in Syria while Iranian invest- a new era for Arab liberalism and nationalism, ment in Syria has disproportionately outpaced has been followed by the greatest degree of Ira- any substantial or productive trade between nian interference and undue influence in Arab the countries (Kagan, et al. 2012). Despite As- countries since the regime was founded. Per- sad’s failed attempts at detente with Israel and haps the greatest impact of the Iranian Revo- the West, the relationship between Syria and lution and the Arab Spring on the Middle East Iran up until the Arab Spring has been mostly has been, as Henry Kissinger predicted, the in Iran’s favor. These circumstances have only “combining of the Persian imperial tradition been exacerbated beyond expectation by the with contemporary Islamic fervor”(Kissinger Syrian civil war. 2006). The chaos of the uprisings, especially as As if to further highlight the imbalances in observed in the onslaught of Al-Qaeda in Ye- the relationship between Iran and Syria, Iran has men and the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, has given not simply provided conventional ground forc-

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 20 es in support of the Assad regime but has made ISIL and Iran has since become a vicious cir- organized and sponsored sundry militias with cle wherein the atrocities and aggression of the varying levels of brutality and extremism that other has only further reinforced their narra- have proved themselves more responsive to Ira- tives and legitimized their crimes among their nian command than to the Assad regime (Ful- respective constituents and sympathizers. ton, Holliday, & Wyer 2013). Should the Assad regime finally collapse, under no circumstances Iraq should it be assumed that Iranian proxy militias Iranian interference and influence in Syria will simply lose their relevance. Indeed, the fi- has been geopolitically coterminous with its nal overthrow of Assad might simply presage a presence in Iraq. After the overthrow of Sadd- power vacuum that Iran would be all too will- am Hussein in the Iraq War in 2003, Iran played ing to exploit to deepen its own presence and a leading role in sponsoring and coordinating influence in the country. So extensive has been insurgent elements in Iraq against the US mil- Iranian interference in Syria that former Syrian itary occupation. During negotiations on sta- prime minister Riad Hijab declared that “Syria tus-of-forces agreements between the US and is occupied by the Iranian regime. The person the new Iraqi government, Iranian agents made who runs the country is not Bashar al-Assad extensive use of propaganda in Iraq to encour- but by [Iranian special forces commander] Qa- age public anger against Iraqi parliamentarians ssem Suleimani” (Fulton, et al. 2013). who supported a continued US presence and Iranian military intervention in Syria, sup- even attempted to bribe Iraqi negotiators into ported by the Russian air force, has manifested scuttling any agreement that provide any ex- itself as one of the greatest threats to world order tensions to the agreements (Kagan, et. al. 2012). since the end of the Cold War. The crude tactics After the formal withdrawal of US troops from and terrorist atrocities committed in support Iraq in 2011, Iran’s presence and influence in of the Assad regime, whether by local Syrian Iraq has increased exponentially. Iran exercised forces or the Iranian military units and Irani- considerable pressure on its clients within Iraq an-aligned militias fighting alongside them, has to support the reelection of Nouri al-Maliki, the precipitated the most catastrophic refugee crisis autocratic Iraqi prime minister who had openly the world has ever seen since the Second World aligned his country with Iran, declared support War. The stability and unity of the European for the Assad regime in Syria, and institutional- Union project has been threatened by divisions ized widespread discrimination and disenfran- and disorganization in regards to the handling chisement of the Sunni Arab minority. This was, the refugee flows. Ultranationalist and neo-Na- of course, followed by the near collapse of the zi movements in Europe, once marginalized reconstituted Iraqi military in face of not only and ignored by mainstream political discourse, the advances by ISIS, which were staged from have risen on a tide of public anger concern- Syria, but also from the staggering corruption ing the crisis. The greatest tragedy of all to have and ineptitude that characterized the officer arisen from the Syrian civil war has been the corps appointed by the Maliki government. rise of Daesh or ISIL. Daesh has exploited sec- The resignation of Nouri al-Maliki under tarian divisions resulting from Iranian interfer- U.S. and local pressure and his replacement ence and Assad’s brutality by seizing significant by Haider al-Abadi has not diminished Irani- swathes of territory in Syria that were then used an influence. It has simply transmogrified into as a base for expanding into Iraq where it pro- far more unconventional means. Former US ceeded to commit the largest genocide thus far military occupation official Douglas Ollivant of the 21st Century. The relationship between argued recently that “Baghdad is not currently

Page 21 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies under Tehran’s orbit - and that in fact the cur- than citizen-led counter-insurgency units em- rent government is pushing back against such ployed by the Abadi an outcome. Washington is therefore deeply government. vested in the success of the Abadi government Aside from presenting themselves as he- and should do whatever it can to help it” (Ol- roic resistance to ISIL terrorists, the Hashid livant 2016). While Ollivant is correct when al-Shaabi engages in kidnappings, extortion, describing that the US has a significant stake mob-style revenge killings, pillaging, looting, in bolstering the authority of prime minister and even repeated acts of ethnic cleansing. Haider al-Abadi against the various pro-Irani- The United Nations Human Rights Commis- an factors in the country, the claim that Iraq is sion (2015) observed that the Hashid al-Shaabi not within Iran’s sphere of influence overesti- “seem to operate with total impunity, leaving mates the degree of authority the Abadi gov- a trail of death and destruction in their wake” ernment has in Iraq. The idea that Iran’s control (4). Amnesty International (2014) reports that and influence in Iraq is no absolute or complete both Sunni Arabs and Assyrian Christians, as and is in direct competition with US influence well as the occasional Shiite Turkmen, have does not render the tremendous imbalances been targeted for kidnappings while their fam- in the Iran-Iraq relationship as demonstrated ilies had been contacted by representatives of by continued Iranian interference irrelevant. Hashid al-Shaabi to demand extravagant ran- The Abadi government has struggled to con- soms for their release. Once the families have solidate any meaningful degree of authority in paid ransoms, often by borrowing substantial Iraq. Figures sympathetic to the Iranian regime, sums, the hostages are murdered anyway. The such as former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki victims are usually young men who provide and radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, continue to the bulk of financial support to their families, exercise considerable influence in Iraqi politics and once the men are murdered, even after ran- and remain popular with their relatively wide soms have been paid, these families descend constituencies. Most consequential for the Iraqi into extreme poverty. One bereaved mother government has been the rise of the Hashid reported “I begged friends and acquaintances al-Shaabi, the militias organized and sponsored to lend me the ransom money to save my son, by the Iranian regime that played a substan- but after I paid they killed him and now I have tial role in attacks on US troops and diplomats no way to pay back the money I borrowed, as during the anti-American insurgency cam- my son was the only one working in my fami- paigns. These same militias have now been be- ly” (4). Another family reported being extorted latedly claimed to be an extension of the Iraqi by Hashid al-Shaabi and being told “we know state and have been used in resisting the ad- you are Christian...and we don’t want to kill vance of Daesh or ISIL in the north. They have you but you must pay and don’t think you can nevertheless remained virtually unresponsive avoid paying by moving; we know everything to Iraqi civilian leadership in most circum- about your family and we’ll find you wherever stances and are becoming themselves more you go and will kill you” (9). This family, who heavily armed and better coordinated than were Assyrian Christians rather than Sunni Ar- Iraq’s own state security forces and armed ser- abs, became refugees fleeing Iraq not from ISIL vices (Mardini 2015). This is best demonstrated but from Hashid al-Shaabi. Amnesty Interna- by the impunity with which Hashid al-Shaabi tional further reported that Hashid al-Shaabi has committed a series of sectarian atrocities engaged in unabated spate of revenge killings and war crimes. The militias appear more like ostensibly for the atrocities committed by ISIL. criminal enterprises or terrorist organizations Whenever Hashid al-Shaabi has pushed ISIL

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 22 out of the villages and swathes of countrysides, dered by Hashid al-Shaabi. A resident of one of it has regularly and indiscriminately targeted the villages reported to Human Rights Watch young men among the Sunni Arab tribes living that his children and another relative of his had there for supposedly collaborating with ISIL. been captured and tortured by Hashid al-Shaa- Along with Sunni Arabs and Assyrian Chris- bi, with his relative reporting on his return that tians, the Hashid al-Shaabi have targeted indi- “they kept the boys in an empty room’ After a viduals who, while identifying with the Shiite short while I heard screaming and the sounds sect, are not ethnic Arabs. One young man, a of the two boys being tortured in the room next Shiite and Turkmen, reported to Human Rights to me” (32). Watch that he had been kidnapped by Hashid In March 2015, U.S. General Martin al-Shaabi militants and, once in their custody, Dempsey, who was Chairman of the Joint “they were beating me randomly on my face, Chiefs of Staff at the time, reported to Con- head, shoulders using water pipes and the butts gress that “we are watching carefully whether of their weapons...they went to lunch and then the militias...when they recapture lots territo- came back and beat us for an hour and half... ry, whether they engage in acts of retribution they kept me for nine days” (33). The basis for and ethnic cleansing” (Weiss & Pregent 2015). being suspected by Hashid al-Shaabi was that The Hashid al-Shaabi have proceeded to do just despite being a Shiite, he had been living peace- that. fully with his Sunni neighbors for years and did The Abadi government has utterly failed to not assent to the same degree of sectarian ha- hold the Hashid al-Shaabi accountable for their tred espoused by the militias. He explained to abuses and atrocities. The militias themselves the Human Rights Watch that “even though I are sponsored and indoctrinated by the Iranian am Shia, since I lived with Sunnis for so long... regime through its special forces commander they thought I may be associated with [ISIL]” Qassem Suleimani. Through Suleimani, the Ira- (34). In these regions where Hashid al-Shaa- nian regime has not only supported the Hashid bi has pushed out ISIL, “its residents, notably al-Shaabi and its crimes but has also corrupted young men, tend to be suspected, wholesale, Iraq’s parliament and subsidized pro-Iranian of support for groups like [ISIL] for the mere and Shiite extremist propaganda in Iraqi news- fact of living there, and as such have often been papers and television stations (Filkins 2013). targeted by both government forces and Shia In terms familiar to those echoed by former militias” (6). Syrian prime minister Riad Hijab, former Iraqi Human Rights Watch (2015) reports that diplomat and parliament member Mowaffak al- these same villages are regularly looted and Rubaei, a Shiite himself, complained that Qa- destroyed by Hashid al-Shaabi once they seize ssem Suleimani was “the most powerful man control. Despite protests of by Iraqi prime in Iraq without question...nothing gets done minister Haider al-Abadi and radical cleric without him” (Chulov 2011). Former Iraqi Muqtada al-Sadr, civilian properties in Sunni prime minister Ayad Allawi, who is also a Shi- Arab and Assyrian Christian villages, including ite, concurred, observing that “I have yet to see homes and farms, are painstakingly ransacked one Shia political party not taking money from of all items of value and subsequently burned Qassem Suleimani” and claimed that ever since to the ground. Human Rights Watch further the US withdrawal “Iraq is a failed state now, an reports that the residents of these villages, al- Iranian colony” (ibid). ready having had their homes and livelihoods Ollivant (2016) asserts that Iraq is “one of destroyed, are themselves either driven from the few outposts of democratic institutions in their area or captured, tortured, and often mur- the Middle East, and it is this democracy - not

Page 23 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies any collection of kingdoms, emirates, or sul- Lebanon tanates - that is the natural ally of the United Nowhere else besides Iraq is Iranian influ- States in region.” One may reasonably sug- ence both as deepened and as disputed as it is in gest that Qassem Suleimani and the Hashid Lebanon. Similar circumstances face Lebanon al-Shaabi, through their wholesale robbery, at the moment including corruption and inepti- ethnic cleansing, staggering corruption of Iraqi tude in a nominal democracy that has made the parliamentarians, and propaganda machine’s state unable to confront or curb the influence of intrusion into Iraqi media has an inevitably non-state actors and their state sponsors. What corrosive effect on Iraqi’s democracy and com- is different from the case of Iraq is that Lebanon promises anything resembling free elections. has historically far more diverse and pluralistic Even should an Iraqi parliamentarian or civ- than Iraq ever has been while at the same time il servant acquire their office through fair and has had a much longer experience with state honest means within the context of democracy, authority being challenged or surpassed by lo- being bribed or purchased openly and outright cal militias and foreign interference. by Iranian agents severely compromises the Since the Arab Spring, this is changing in representative character of Iraqi government. that Lebanon is becoming less pluralistic as a Further, while the Hashid al-Shaabi acts with society, and the challenges to state authority total impunity in Iraq despite the disapproval are increasing. Iran, through Hezbollah, have of a smattering of Iraqi politicians and clerics, emerged as a dominant players in Lebanon the Abadi government relies heavily on the where government and voter intimidation is clerical establishment in Iraq. Ramzy Mardini now the rule rather than the exception. Hezbol- (2016) describes Iraq as a “soft theocracy” and lah is one of Iran’s oldest proxies in the Middle argues that “although political decision-making East and the ideology, equipment, and funding may not be concentrated in the hands of clerics, of the group derives largely from Iran. Hezbol- there are direct and indirect consequences of lah has a declared allegiance to Iranian revo- attaining or exercising power without their tac- lutionary leaders Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali it support.” One might observe the numerous Khameini, whose advocacy of clerical fascism fatwas issued by Iraq’s clerical establishment and world revolution the group has wholeheart- that just so happen to be followed by those few edly adopted since its inception (Harik 2007). Iraqi government initiatives that actually suc- Armaments and other material is provided to ceed in parliament. One might also observe the Hezbollah by Iran via cargo planes traveling numerous failed attempts by the Abadi govern- through Iraqi airspace and freight trucks tra- ment at reforms that would curb the influence versing on Syrian roads to Bekaa Valley in Leb- of Iranian agents or the abuses and impunity anon (Levitt 2007). Hezbollah has been esti- of the Hashid al-Shaabi. Meanwhile, the sem- mated to receive over $100 million from Iran a inaries run by Iraq’s clerical establishment are year (ibid). With the Iran nuclear deal releasing sponsored chiefly by the Iranian regime where an estimated $150 billion in frozen regime as- young clerics are groomed to adopt the tenets sets, it would appear to make little sense to dis- of fundamentalist elements of the Shiite sectas miss any speculation or expectation that those well as the ideology espoused by Ruhollah Kho- amounts will not remain static, especially con- meini concerning the role of the clergy in the sidering heightening tensions and spreading state (Kagan et al 2012). conflict across the region. Recruits have been flown to Iran where they receive training and indoctrination (ibid). Christopher Hitchens once remarked that

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 24 Hezbollah “manages to be both the party of the sy in Iran was attacked by arsonists in January downtrodden and the puppet of two of the ar- 2016 (Kullab 2016). This was followed by the ea’s most retrograde dictatorships” (Hitchens resignation of Lebanese justice minister Ashraf 2015). A report by the Atlantic Council and the Rifi who complained about the “domination” Brookings Institution (Byman & Saab 2014) of Hezbollah (ibid). Lebanese interior minister states that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Nouhad Machnouk demurred on following the Hezbollah become Lebanon’s “most powerful U.S, EU, and the Gulf states in acknowledging and most complex actor” and that the group’s that Hezbollah was a terrorist organization, client relationship with the Iranian regime has about “government solidarity” (ibid). endured and continues to receive “ideological and strategic guidance” from the Iranian re- Yemen gime. After repeated obtuse and obstinate denials Hezbollah has engaged in numerous assas- to the contrary by Western analysts and com- sinations and assassination attempts against mentators, mounting evidence has accumulat- Lebanese political figures perceived as being ed of Iranian support for the 2014 coup d’etat critical of Syrian or Iranian influence in the against the Yemeni government by Houthi mi- country. The most prominent of these was the litias that subsequently plunged the country assassination of prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri into civil war. The Houthi militias, so-called in 2005 in which Hezbollah has been implicated because its leadership, is concentrated with- (Norton 2013). Al-Hariri, an Arab nationalist in the al-Houthi clan. They are Shiite radicals and Sunni Muslim, sought to make peace with that have loosely modeled themselves on Hez- Israel, had long-standing ties to the Saudi royal bollah and make frequent use of such familiar, family, and worked tirelessly on developing in- boiler-plate slogans such as “death to Ameri- frastructure and public works (Blanford 2006). ca!” and “death to the Jews!” in their rallies and This would have presumably left less scope and demonstrations (Mudallali 2014). U.N. officials less pretexts for Hezbollah to legitimize itself have reported that Yemen has become a major as a bulwark against foreign invasion and as destination and conduit for Iranian arms traf- a crucial provider of social welfare and public ficking while the former U.S. ambassador to services.This in turn would have diminished Yemen, Gerald Feierstein, stated explicitly that Hezbollah’s political influence and by extension “we believe that [the Iranians] are providing Iranian influence in Lebanon. military support and training to radical ele- Aside from government intimidation, Hez- ments in diverse groups, especially the Houth- bollah has played a role in the government it- is” (Terrill 2014). This was followed by reports self since its successful campaign to represent from U.S. intelligence sources that Iran was eight constituencies in the 1992 parliamentary the primary source of funding for the Houthi elections. It has had virtual veto power against militias (Cloud 2011) and that Iranian special the Lebanese government since 2008. Hezbol- forces, led by Qassem Suleimani, have been lah played the primary role in the collapse of engaged in an extensive operation to smuggles the government of Saad Hariri, the late Rafiq caches of weapons (Schmitt & Worth 2012) al-Hariri’s son, who himself was perceived as and even uniforms (Reuters 2013) into Yemen. not sympathetic enough to the Iranian and Syri- An interception by the U.S. Navy and Yemeni an regimes (Shadid 2011). Under pressure from Coast Guard of a ship coming from Iran, incon- Hezbollah, Lebanese foreign minister Gebran gruously flying the Panamanian flag, led to the Bassil refused to condemn the clear violation of discovery of troves of Iranian-manufactured diplomatic immunity when the Saudi embas- arms, ammunition, anti-aircraft missiles, rock-

Page 25 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies ets, bombs, and bomb-making equipment (Ter- just that and fired rockets into those very same rill 2014). In response to being confronted with villages. Assaults on nearby Saudi military fa- the evidence, Iran’s UN Ambassador argued cilities followed in which the Houthis made use that “even if some of these items were made in of more sophisticated Iranian-manufactured Iran, this does not provide any evidence that missiles. The strategy has not thus far lured in Iran was involved in the shipment of arms to Saudi ground forces and Saudi-backed govern- Yemen” (Terrill 2014). Finally, U.S. Secretary of ment loyalists have continued to make piece- State John Kerry stated bluntly that “obviously meal territorial advances in the containment supplies have been coming from Iran. There are and rollback of the Houthi militias. With the a number of flights every single week that have momentum of the Houthis having been threat- been flying in. Iran needs to recognise that the ened, one of Iran’s top military officers threat- US is not going to stand by while the region is ened that Iran would expand its intervention destabilised” (Kirkpatrick 2015). in Yemen, stating that “the Islamic Republic ... What bears relevance now is that comple- feels its duty to help the people of Yemen in any menting Iran’s material support for the Houthis way it can, and to any level necessary” (Gho- is the strategic and ideological connections be- bari & Sharafedin 2016). Anticipating the op- tween Hezbollah and the Houthis. After assert- portunity for peace negotiations and informal ing that the Houthis were in no way proxies of talks with Yemeni and Saudi officials, senior Iran or Hezbollah, Hezbollah commanders re- Houthi leader Yousef al-Feshi complained of ported to the Financial Times “we exchange ex- Iran’s “exploitation” of the Yemeni civil war and perience and ideology” and that “they trained requested that Iran cease interfering in the con- with us in Iran, then we trained them here and flict (Al-Arabiya 2016). These remarks should in Yemen” (Solomon 2015). In response to the not be understood to indicate that the Houthis 2015 Saudi intervention in Yemen to contain are not proxies of the Iranians. On the contrary, and rollback the Houthi advance, the militants should seniors leaders among the Houthi ranks have made use of a modus operandi provided express frustration over being regarded as by Hezbollah which had been developed in proxies by the Iranians, this would indicate that the aftermath of the 2006 Israel intervention such a relationship has existed in the first place. in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s so-called “resistance model” of guerrilla warfare depends on an or- Saudi Arabia and Iran ganization’s ability to avoid air strikes from a In January 2016, Saudi Arabia announced neighboring country while making use of rock- execution of Nimr al-Nimr, a dissident Shi- et artillery to destroy both military facilities ite cleric that had called for the overthrow of and civilian property so as to either intimidate the Saudi royal family. Al-Nimr was almost a government into scaling down its military immediately portrayed as a martyr in Iranian campaign or provoke them into sending into propaganda, and syrupy narratives in various ground forces and engage in a protracted and Western media outlets depicted him as an icon asymmetrical war of attrition. of civil disobedience and human rights ac- While Saudi air strikes sought to destroy tivism. This belies ther reality. Nimr al-Nimr Houthi positions, Hezbollah leader Hassan had long-standing ties to Hezbollah al-Hijaz Nasrallah called for the Houthis to assault ci- (Braude 2016), a terrorist organization that re- vilian targets in the Saudi villages and coun- mains operational in Saudi Arabia and borrows trysides of Najran, Jizan, and Asir close to the an Iranian-style revolutionist ideology from its Yemeni border, stating “now is their chance namesake, Hezbollah in Lebanon. Founded by (Sobelman 2015). The Houthis proceeded to do Shiite seminarians that studied the ideology of

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 26 Ruhollah Khomeini, the group espoused the figured he would be able to orchestrate a gran- Iranian concept of “guardianship of the Islam- diose repeat of Iran’s 1979 revolution by encour- ic jurists” wherein clerics would hold supreme aging young men to become petty criminals, he power in a pseudo-republican regime (Mat- was eventually detained by Saudi authorities. thiesen 2010). Far from proceeding to systematically perse- Hezbollah al-Hijaz, was supplied and co- cute his family, they were sent to a comfortable ordinated by the Iranian regime. Investigating exile in the US where his wife’s hospital visits Hezbollah al-Hijaz’s terrorist attacks within the and his sons’ enrollment at university were all kingdom, the CIA reported that Iran had sup- subsidized by the Saudi state (ibid). plied the group through “smuggled explosives His execution was followed by a response in into Saudi Arabia” and used them to conduct Iran where mobs ransacked and set fire to the “sabotage and terrorism as an important op- Saudi embassy, Ali Khamenei warned of “divine tion in [their] confrontation with the United vengeance” on the kingdom, and Iran’s Revolu- States in the Persian Gulf” (Levitt 2015). The tionary Guard threatened “tough revenge in the group was implicated or claimed responsibility not-too-distant future” that would “trigger the for attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, assassi- collapse” of Saudi Arabia (Bozorgmehr & Kerr nations of Saudi diplomats and spies, and the 2016). Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies severed 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers. When Ali diplomatic relations with Iran in response. Khamenei was installed as Khomeini’s succes- sor, the group declared allegiance to Khamenei Conclusion and announced for the benefit of Iran, there All of this should place into context the would no difference between the Hezbollah off- rising tensions between revolutionist Iran and shoots “in Hijaz, Kuwait, Lebanon, or any other the Gulf Arab states. Iran has been seeking and place” (Matthiesen 2010). building a sphere of influence centered on Teh- While Hezbollah al-Hijaz likely went into ran that has penetrated into Iraq, Syria, Leba- perpetual decline after the backlash resulting non, and Yemen. It has done so using the various from the Khobar bombings, one should still phases enumerated by Hoffman in his model consider that many of its former leaders and of the ‘spectrum of conflict,’ shifting from one constituents, as well as the grievances they ex- mode to another depending on the countries ploit, have remained. In 2009, Nimr al-Nimr and circumstances involved. Certainly, Iran’s called for an Iranian-style revolution in Saudi presence in all of these countries is constantly Arabia that would see the secession of the East- in flux, contested by rival social and political ern Province and its reconstitution as a state forces that are both local and external and at governed by a Shiite version of clerical fascism. no point is total and absolute. It would be ab- He explicitly used Khomenei’s term “wilayat surd to suggest that this in itself makes Iranian al-Faqih” or “guardianship of the Islamic ju- interference negligible or irrelevant. To suggest rists” in describing the ideological roots of his or argue that Iran has not been engaged in carv- program for revolution in which radical clerics ing out a sphere of influence in the Middle East would seize control (Alnogaidan 2016). Build- that encircles the Gulf monarchies on this basis ing on the support from what was left of Hez- fails to appreciate and understand the nuanc- bollah al-Hijaz, al-Nimr sought out disaffected es of power in the emerging post-Westphalian and alienated young men and encouraged them world. Expansionism by either an imperialist or to seize weapons, commit arson against public revolutionist power no longer relies on the use property, and commit the occasional murder of massive interventions and extended occupa- (ibid). While it is not certain just how al-Nimr tions by conventional forces as was the norm

Page 27 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies in eastern Europe in its client-patron relation- explanation for today’s regional war. This is a ship with the Soviet Union. Nor do great pow- naked struggle for power.” Regional rivalries in ers or aspiring regional powers need demand the post-Ottoman Middle East have occurred and acquire unquestioning ideological ortho- on a similar scope before, albeit with less de- doxy or unconditional policy alignments from structive consequences, in tensions between those entities they wish to utilize as proxies or the Gulf states and the regimes of Gamal Abdel clients as the Soviet Union aspired and attempt- Nasser in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, ed to do either in eastern Europe and or in the and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Those involved developing world. Further, prior to the emer- were all Arabs and nominal Sunnis and yet gence of the Soviet Union and the partitions of those convenient labels and identifiers were the Cold War, spheres of influences in the age never invoked as at no point did it highlight the of colonialism thrived on the complexities and contrived differences between the parties. The ambiguities of control and influence and rarely real substantive differences between the two relied on so rigid arrangements as materialized were in that one side was composed of postcolo- in the Cold War. Yet it is almost invariably an nial monarchies aligned with the West and the ahistorical and absolutist model that critics and others revolutionary regimes aligned with the skeptics will most likely refer to as a standard Soviet Union. There are similar yet not identi- of measure, either implicitly or explicitly, by cal circumstances surrounding the Saudi-Iran which to dismiss or diminish claims that Iran rivalry. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies remain has engaged in developing a sphere of influence monarchies aligned with the West and in par- in the Middle East. ticular with the United States and the United What is necessary is that those proxies and Kingdom. clients fulfill the primary strategic and ideo- Iran and its allies and clients are revolu- logical objectives of their patrons in a clearly tionists that are aligned with Russia. In these subordinate role. That is precisely what Iran has multi-layered rivalries, ideology and sectarian sought to accomplish. Iran’s sphere of influence rhetoric certainly plays a role but at no point has been achieved through complexity and am- is it the fundamental cause. There are no more biguity rather than in spite of it because of the grounds for arguing that disputes over the flexibilities inherent in such fluctuating and im- succession to the Rashidun caliphate are fun- perfect circumstances. It would have bemused damentally the root cause of the Saudi-Iran British and Russian strategists navigating the rivalry any more than there are to argue that geopolitical dilemmas of the Great Game in the diverging social attitudes towards sexuality are 19th Century that their flexible and ambiguous the root cause of contemporary Russo-Ameri- use of interchanging proxies and clients did not can rivalry. constitute control and influence by one or the What can be observed instead is classic bal- other empire. Ultimately, further disputes over ance-of-power politics being conducted with whether or not Iran has established a network contemporary means. The balance-of-power of proxies and a sphere of influence in the Mid- politics are manifested in the geopolitical com- dle East may end up being more semantic than petition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and substantive. their respective allies and proxies. The contem- Having understood this, it bears mention- porary means are manifested in the exploita- ing that Iranian grand strategy and Saudi Ara- tion of failed states and the engagement of and bia’s plans to counter it are primarily strategic with non-state actors in their stead. We would rather than sectarian. As Cambanis (2015) ar- do well here to return to Clausewitz’s judgment gues, “Sunni-Shiite enmity is the not the best that “very few of the new manifestations in war

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 28 can be ascribed to new inventions or new de- Cambanis, T. (2015, April 14). Iran is Winning partures in ideas. They result mainly from the the War for Dominance in the Middle East. transformation of society and new social con- Foreign Policy. ditions” (On War, Ch. 30). The ‘state of nature’ Chulov, M. (2011, July 28). Qassem Suleimani: described by Hobbes, where he observes that The Iranian general ‘secretly running’ Iraq. “during the time men live without a common The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www. power to keep them all in awe, they are in that theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/28/qas- condition which is called warre; and such a sem-suleimani-iran-iraq-influence warre as is of every man against every man,” Filkins, D. (2013, September 30). The Shadow has force and salience (Leviathan, Ch. 13). Commander. The New Yorker. Herein lies a fundamental maxim from which Fulton, W., Holliday, J., & Wyer, S. (2013). to understand the relationship between classi- Iranian Strategy in Syria (Rep.). American cal ends and contemporary means. It it through Enterprise Institute and the Institute for Clausewitz and Hobbes that we must under- the Study of War. stand Hoffman’s spectrum of conflict. The- de Ghobari, M., & Sharafedin, B. (2016, March 8). cisions and events that have been described in Houthis, Saudis discuss ending Yemen war, this paper have occurred within the context of sources say. Reuters. the failure of governments and the collapse of Goldberg, J. (2016, April). The Obama borders with no single actor yet maintaining a Doctrine. Retrieved March 21, 2016, sustainable monopoly on force. These same ac- from http://www.theatlantic.com/mag- tors, despite the novel circumstances, have not azine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doc- wavered in the pursuit of the perennial strategic trine/471525/ objective: power. Harik, J. P. (2007). Hezbollah: Changing face of terrorism. London: Tauris. References Hitchens, C. (2015). And yet: Essays. New Absolute impunity: Militia rule in Iraq (Rep.). York: Simon & Schuster. (2014). Amnesty International. Houthis request Iran to stay out of Yemen cri- After Liberation Came Destruction: Iraqi Mi- sis. (2016, March 9). Al-Arabiya. litias and the Aftermath of Amerli (Rep.). Kagan, F. W., Majidyar, A. K., Pletka, D., & (2015). Human Rights Watch. Sullivan, M. C. (2012). Iranian influence in Alnogaidan, M. (2016, January 6). Nimr al- the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan Nimr, Political Violence, and the Future of (Rep.). American Enterprise Institute and Saudi Shi’a. The American Interest. the Institute for the Study of War. Blanford, N. (2006). Killing Mr Lebanon: The Kissinger, H. (2015). World order: Reflections assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact on the character of nations and the course on the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris. of history. London: Penguin Books. Braude, J. (2016, January 2). On the execution Kissinger, H. (2006, July 31). The Next Steps of Saudi Shi’ite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Geo- with Iran. The Washington Post. Retrieved politics: The FPRI Blog. from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ Bozorgmehr, N., & Kerr, S. (2016, January 3). wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/30/ Saudis sever diplomatic ties with Iran over AR2006073000546.html executed cleric. Financial Times Kirkpatrick, D. (2015, April 9). Kerry Says Byman, D., & Saab, B. (2014). Hezbollah in U.S. Knew of Iran’s Military Aid to Houthi a time of transition (Rep.). The Atlantic Rebels. The New York Times. Council and the Brookings Institution. Kullab, S. (2016, March 14). Punitive Saudi

Page 29 GATE Journal Wesley J. Jefferies Moves in Lebanon Isolate Sunnis, Benefit- ing Hezbollah. World Politics Review. Levitt, M. (2015, May 19). Iranian and Hezbol- lah to Saudi Arabia: Past Precedents (Rep.). Matthiesen, T. (2010). Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group. The Middle East Jour- nal Middle East J, 64(2), 179-197. Mardini, R. (2015, December 8). No Author- ity: Shiite Militarization in a Fragmented Iraq. World Politics Review. Mudallali, A. (2014, October 8). Iranian Sphere of Influence Expands Into Yemen. Foreign Policy. Norton, A. R. (2013). Hezbollah: A short his- tory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ollivant, D. (2016, January 11). Sunnis vs. Shi- ites, Abadi vs. Maliki, Kurds vs. Everyone. Foreign Policy. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups (Rep.). (2015). United Nations Human Rights Council. Shadid, A. (2011, January 25). Ousted Leba- nese Leader Swallows Rivals’ Bitter Pill. The New York Times. Sobelman, D. (2015, June 11). Hezbollah’s Friends in Yemen Are Trying to Lure the Saudis Into a Ground War. Foreign Policy. Solomon, E. (2015, May 8). Lebanon’s Hizbol- lah and Yemen’s Houthis open up on links. Financial Times. Terrill, W. A. (2014). Iranian Involvement in Yemen. Orbis, 58(3), 429-440. Retrieved from http://www.fpri.org/ Weiss, M., & Pregent, M. (2015, March 28). The U.S. is Providing Air Cover for Ethnic- Cleansing in Iraq. Foreign Policy.

The Persian Game GATE Journal Page 30 German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality The Erosion of Ethics by Ordinary People During World War II Janna Tobin

“Ultimately, This essay explores the motivations of ordinary German and Japanese soldiers to commit acts of brutality on enemy combatants and civilians alike during World War II. Both this ethical German and Japanese soldiers shared a common motivation fueled by their indoctrination of a racial hierarchy that their disregard respective states culturally and politically constructed. Yet, due to the priorities and structures of these respective gov- was exhibited ernments, the groups of soldiers also experienced differing motivations fueled by the construction and prioritization of different cultures. For the Japanese, a stressed importance on by ordinary military culture and the ethical and nationalistic codes that followed offered reasoning to brutalize others. On the con- combatants, trary, for the Germans, a carefully constructed political cul- ture comprised of propaganda and legislation that supported not solely anti-Semitism and racism provided motivation for these sol- diers to commit crimes against humanity. This essay also dis- cusses the different primary sources, such as wiretaps and di- elites, and ary entries, and how they offer differing insight into displays of “autotelic violence” (purposeless violence at the benefit of these horrid the perpetrator), indoctrination, and doubt. Ultimately, this ethical disregard was exhibited by ordinary combatants, not actions can solely elites, and these horrid actions can serve as a warning to what future war may entail. serve as a warning to what future war may entail.”

Page 31 GATE Journal Janna Tobin fter the first World War, citizens, the Western and Eastern fronts. German sol- soldiers, and political figures diers were more apt to commend the bravery alike thought they had witnessed and persistence of French, British, and Amer- the epitome of human sadism ican soldiers, and regarded them as enemies and war brutality. Yet, less than but closer culturally--thus more sophisticated. twenty years later, World War II immediate- Propaganda reinforced the opposite ideas in Aly countered this notion. World War II was a regards to Eastern Europe, as primarily Sovi- transnational conflict that epitomized total et soldiers were portrayed as the enemy, and war, which directly engaged civilians in the thus these soldiers experienced more brutality conflict. The world experienced a crisis of mo- because Germans thought of them as a lesser dernity in the twentieth century due to events race. One German soldier described that “you such as the senseless rape and slaughter of wouldn’t believe how fantastically the devils thousands of Chinese during the Rape of Nan- fought” and that “[w]hen we capture any of jing, the systematic murder of 6 million Jews them, we make an end to them at once,” show- during the Holocaust, and everyday actions of ing the starkly different view Germans held of German and Japanese soldiers that seemed to Russian soldiers. Another German soldier in counter the progress of humanity. While both a British prisoner-of-war camp expressed how German and Japanese soldiers were similarly he felt the Russians were treated too humane- motivated by varying forms of racial ideology ly, stating that “one must simply smash their and hierarchy that led to the brutal treatment legs with a club…now I think it’s quite right”. of civilians and opposing soldiers alike, Japa- Yet, this mentality was not existent in regards nese soldiers experienced greater motivations to the Western front, and this caused soldiers from military culture, while German soldiers not to commit as many needless acts of violence were fueled more heavily by political culture. against these enemy soldiers. Contrary to the There is no doubt that racism was a lead- view of succumbing to the Soviets, “it was not ing motivation for soldiers to commit war considered dishonorable to surrender to the crimes against civilians and enemy soldiers. Allies.” Hitler’s idea of Lebensraum, or more German soldiers’ racism was fueled primarily “living space” for the German people, further by propaganda issued by the Third Reich that affirms this idea as the expansion of Germany caused Germans to fight the war differently on was directed toward areas that Hitler consid-

German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality GATE Journal Page 32 “The Japanese 20th century desire to join the Western powers naturally produced an admirable quality to the condemnation and mistrust of the Americans.” ered German (such as Austria). Eastern nations of war and ultimately racist thought indoctri- that he deemed racially inferior were thus justi- nation. Former Japanese peasant farmers were fiable in conquering for the greater good of his often the most empathetic towards the Chinese, fabricated Aryan race. Similarly, propaganda but even this empathy was ultimately skewed as fueled German racist ideology towards the Jews it was accompanied by a superior attitude of by portraying them as subhuman infiltrations fighting, what they felt was, a defeated nation. into Aryan society, helping to legitimize actions The White Man’s Burden argument, adapted of abuse against this group. Soldiers became ac- from Kipling’s poem during the era of imperi- customed to robbing, randomly arresting, and alism, suggests it is the duty of the white man maliciously executing Jews in established ghet- to “civilize” people of states that they view as tos and concentration camps. Even soldiers who primitive. Japanese soldiers saw justification for were struck by the harshness of these actions events such as the Manchurian incident, which would often describe their abhorrence, but end was a staged precursor conflict for invasion by their narrative with “even though they were the Japanese, and the subsequent creation of Jews,” reaffirming the stark prevalence of this Manchukuo. These were sparked by the idea established anti-Semitism. Lieutenant General that the Chinese were “backwards” and Japan Heinrich Kittel, observed via wiretaps of the was meant to civilize the people under this United States, though seemingly abhorred by Pan-Asianism ideal (the symbolic unity of all the crimes committed against this group, admit- Asian states and their people) with Japan as ted he felt that “[i]f one were to destroy all the the leader. The raping of Chinese women, bay- Jews of the world simultaneously there wouldn’t oneting of civilians, and ransacking of towns remain a single accuser.” Thus, the soldier was became the norm as Japanese soldiers equated truly bothered by the reputation Germany their negatively skewed views of their enemy was sure to receive in response to committing soldiers to the innocent civilians and thus en- genocide, and not the genocide itself, still con- acted violence against them as well. One sol- necting Germany’s problems to the Jews and dier epitomized these normalized conceptions confirming the superiority complex, as Jewish by stating that “I am all the more confident of genocide became a nuisance, and racial hierar- our superiority…it will be easy for [the Impe- chy established by the Nazi regime motivated rial army] to overcome the animal-like prow- soldiers towards acts of unimaginable brutality. ess, the physical robustness, and the existential Similarly, racism towards the Chinese in- deep-rootedness of the Chinese Masses.” By creased Japanese soldiers’ willingness to par- associating the Chinese with subhuman quali- take in brutality during World War II. When ties and a supposed backwards culture that has recounting the experiences of Japanese sol- impeded the progress of their nation, it elim- diers, there is a general transition from pity to inated the moral dilemma that should come hardened brutality that is fostered by the nature with war, and instead soldiers acted with blank

Page 33 GATE Journal Janna Tobin checks to commit any crime without question. incidents with China, such as the Manchurian It is also important to consider the similar incident, for economic and political gain. Thus, juxtaposition between German tactics in Rus- while still feeling the ABCD encirclement (em- sia versus in the West, as this was also pres- bargoes against Japan engaged by America, ent between the war in China and the war in Britain, China, and the Dutch that fostered re- the Pacific for the Japanese. The Japanese 20th sentment towards the West), Japan had a degree century desire to join the Western powers nat- of respect for American might, technology, and urally produced an admirable quality to the culture that wasn’t present in thought towards condemnation and mistrust of the Americans. the Chinese due to racist thought indoctrination. In Japanese propaganda Americans were typi- Yet, while Japanese soldiers experienced a cally portrayed as demons, showing that they similar motivation to German soldiers based were viewed as malicious but still powerful on upon racist dispositions, there was a much the world stage. This can be connected back to greater emphasis on military culture that nor- Japanese resentment of the Washington Treaty malized and placed pressure on individuals to system, in which Japan developed a victimized forgo moral standards during the war on China narrative after the treaties limited Japanese na- and in the Pacific. The idea that surrendering val power (a 5:5:3 ratio comparative with Britain was unthinkable and disrespectful to the em- and the United States), established cooperative peror and the nation caused soldiers to brutally imperialism in Southeastern Asia, and affirmed lash out, specifically in the War in the Pacific, the Open Door Policy in China. Compromise even when it was clear Japan had lost. This prin- was always considered between Japan and the ciple was not only verbally reinforced but phys- Western powers, while the same could not be ically documented, as military doctrines such said between Japan and China. For example, as “The Japanese Field Service Code,” required the Meiji Constitution, adopted after the sign- soldiers to commit suicide before surrendering ing of various Washington treaties that were and emphasized the concept of bushido (way of deemed unfair by the Japanese, was a product the warrior) that dictated the ethical code for of external pressures by the West that meant to Japanese soldiers. Kamikaze pilots are an ex- demonstrate that Japan was an imperial power ample of the brutal extremes of these policies with a rational system of laws and protections. in action, as the pilots were used as last ditch On the contrary, Japan intentionally provoked efforts to cause as much destruction as possi-

German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality GATE Journal Page 34 “Military culture was still prevalent in Nazi Germany, but political culture was the ultimate driving force of motivation for soldier brutality.” ble in the Pacific. Thus, supposed and actual ed punishment of a Nazi soldier who refused punishment was a rationale for committing to shoot someone or commit another atrocity, crimes, and the Japanese military complex was even though soldiers expressed that “[they] so strict that “[o]fficers who made mistakes in would have had to do it, if they had ordered [us] reciting the code would see themselves as hav- to.” Nazi propaganda was a primary tool in po- ing committed a shameful act and commit ritu- litical dissemination and unity, not only meant al suicide.” The importance of being a member to keep citizens in line with Nazi ideology, but of the Imperial Army was emphasized by the also direct how soldiers fought the war. For ex- need to serve the emperor, the figurehead of ample, the portrayal of the Red Army as beastly, the empire and military alike, and was often a amoral men made “[t]he urge to fight until the reason for committing violent acts even if the bitter end…even stronger on the Eastern front” perpetrator expressed discontent. A member of because soldiers did not want to become pris- Unit 731, the infamous biological and chemical oners-of-war at the hands of Russian soldiers. warfare experimentation unit, described how Thus, because surrender was scarce due to fear, he and his fellow soldiers would complete as soldiers were willing to do whatever it took to many “strict disposals” (murders of innocent eliminate the Red Army because of the strong- Chinese civilians) as they could because it was ly portrayed negative image that was presented an honor to serve the emperor and it would to them in the form of propaganda. While it is improve their ranking in the Imperial Army. important to recognize that not all propaganda Soldiers thus experienced peer pressure from was thoroughly believed, as soldiers were able other soldiers that made them more willing to to make a mockery of Hitler and his cabinet’s commit heinous crimes, such as decapitating flaws that contrasted the supposed Aryan ide- civilians, because it was normalized by these al, they subconsciously picked out information principles and other soldiers’ applications of it. to believe. At home, the stripping of rights and The importance of the military infected civilian subsequent annihilation of groups such as gyp- life as well, as newly drafted soldiers were often sies, disabled civilians, and Jews became a part given send-off parties by friends and relatives of political doctrine, through policies such as who were proud of the soldier’s future dedi- the T4 program that designed for the system- cation to the empire. Thus, the military com- atic murder of the disabled and the Nuremberg plex became an important aspect of Japanese laws which stripped Jews of numerous rights, life in the 20th century, and the undying ded- including German citizenship. The innate ication of soldiers to fulfill these expectations harshness of organized events, such as book led to unprecedented brutality during the war. burnings and political speeches also allowed Military culture was still prevalent in Nazi this brutality to burgeon into normalcy, and the Germany, but political culture was the ultimate prevalence of these ideals in the political system driving force of motivation for soldier brutali- made soldiers truly believe these ideals and thus ty. While Japanese soldiers experienced a harsh translate the harshness that politics had against militaristic code of conduct, there is no record- Communists and Jews onto the battlefield.

Page 35 GATE Journal Janna Tobin “World War II exhibited some of the most horren- dous instances of human disregard for ethics and morality that the world had ever seen[...]” When comparing the motivations of Ger- elites, but by ordinary German and Japanese man and Japanese soldiers in committing hei- soldiers as well. German and Japanese sol- nous crimes against enemies and civilians alike, diers were motivated by racist conceptions and it is important to recognize the different prima- sought to justify the horrid treatment of pri- ry sources that are available for each side as they marily the Jews and Chinese, respectively. Yet, offer varying degrees of intimacy in regards the nature of each of these societies produced to the thoughts and experiences of soldiers. other motivations for brutality as well. Japan Wiretaps of German POWs under American focused heavily on establishing a strict milita- surveillance are a unique source in that they ristic society based on a code of serving the em- present completely unfiltered conversations be- peror that was not to be broken, while Germany tween soldiers in which they share experiences. functioned as an efficient political machine of These wiretaps perfectly display the phenome- ideological unity. Ultimately, regardless of these non of “autotelic violence,” or violence commit- motivations, ordinary men were able to com- ted for no larger purpose but for the sole benefit mit crimes against humanity that are abhorred of the perpetrator and how the political system today, nearly 75 years later, and hopefully these normalized this brutality. On the other hand, false justifications for brutality serve as a warn- the primary sources from Japanese soldiers are ing to present and future governments that eth- primarily diaries and interviews. Thus, there is ics are essential in maintaining our humanity. more room for censorship based on who the letter is intended for, as a soldier may relay the crimes he committed during battle differently to a father versus a younger sibling. Also, in in- terviews, soldiers may be prone to tell a narra- tive that they believe is true, but can be skewed simply by time and possibly a lack of resolution or acceptance of the past. Yet, this is not to say that there is not valuable information in dia- ries and interviews regarding the motivations of Japanese soldiers, as clear prejudices against the Chinese and willingness to murder civilians in the name of the emperor are clearly present. Instead, other aspects, such as the period of ac- culturation to murder may be slightly blurred. World War II exhibited some of the most horrendous instances of human disregard for ethics and morality that the world had ever seen, and the terrifying aspect is that this bru- tality was not simply exhibited by leaders and

German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality GATE Journal Page 36 References

Johnson, Eric A. and Reuband, Karl-Heinz, What We Knew. Terror Mass Murder, and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany, 226-259. Cambridge: Basic Books, 2005.

Matsui, Minoru. Japanese Devils. 160 min, Japan 2001.

Neitzel, Sonke and Welzer, Harald, “On fighting, Killing, and Dying. The Secret WWII Transcripts of German POWs”, in: Soldaten, 44-65, 74-120, 229-273. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2012).

Tanaka, Yuki, “Conclusion: Understanding Japanese Brutality in the Asia-Pacific War”, in: Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, 197-216. (Boulder: Westview Press 1996).

Yoshiaki, Yoshimi, “On the Battlefields of China”, in: Grassroots Fascism, 64-87. (New York: Columbia University Press 2015).

Page 37 GATE Journal Janna Tobin THE ISRAELI TARGETED KILLING POLICY A MULTIDIMENSIONAL STUDY OF EFFICACY by Yonit Upart

APPROVED: Dr. Devorah Manekin...Director Dr. Thorin Wright...Second Committee Member Abstract Conflict in Israel is ongoing and permeates through international borders by stimulating discussion world- wide. Whether or not diplomatic relations have been successful, counterterrorism policies have developed and been adopted by other countries like the United States. The targeting and elimination of militant terrorist figures is one of the policies that have stirred much controversy. The effectiveness of it, however, continues to be in question. This research paper aims to take a rounded approach to analyze the efficacy of targeted killings for national security. I employ a three-dimensional method by measuring the influence of targeted killings on violence, public opinion, and economy. Statistical analysis is conducted through Paired-Sample T-tests with data derived from the period of the al-Aqsa Intifada. There is suggestive evi- dence that targeted killings have a significant negative effect on Palestinian violence.

he continuing conflict in Israel of indivisible territory, Israel’s hardline policies, is a popular topic among not and the continuing violence by state and non- only academics and politicians, state actors are a few components and catalysts but the general public as well. of the conflict. Although diplomatic channels Since the mid-20th century, remain open, violence continues sporadically numerous attempts have been made by both and in periods of war. TIsraelis and Palestinians to resolve the conflict Israel’s targeted killing policy originated and create peace, although none truly prevailed during the time of the al-Aqsa Intifada, also in creating lasting order. Diplomatic help was known as the Second Intifada, and is a form of even supplemented by international involve- fatal violence that continues to be implement- ment through shuttle diplomacy. Up until the ed and supported legally. While useful in the- al-Aqsa Intifada, peacemaking attempts were ory, its utility and efficacy is barely evidenced numerous; one of the most notable and ad- through conclusive empirical research. Target- vanced of these mediation efforts was the Camp ed killing, as employed by the Israeli military, David Accords in 1978. Since the Intifada, at- “is the intentional slaying of a specific individ- tempts continued and are ongoing to this day, ual or group of individuals undertaken with including the most recent 2013-2014 diplo- explicit governmental approval” (David, p. 2). matic conversations involving American Secre- Those employing the targeted killing policy ar- tary of State John Kerry. It is astounding that gue that its effectiveness lies in deterring, dis- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains violent rupting, and incapacitating the enemy, thus se- after such a long period of war, international curing the state. The other side of the argument involvement, and academic research. The issue states that Israeli military force in response to

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 39 Palestinian terrorist activity can be thought to In the past, the policy was mostly challenged bring about more retaliatory violence via the through petitions and judicial hearings to the backlash effect, thus decreasing the likelihood High Court of Justice by parliament members of peace through this continuous cycle, radical- and human rights organizations. Most petitions izing the population, hence increasing the com- were dismissed while others awaited the High plexity of the conflict through added violence Court’s decision on the legality of targeted kill- (Seale 2008). Muchdiscussion exists on the ing. On the legal dimension, it was decided that merits and morality of the targeted killing pol- each case is circumstantial and must be exam- icy that originated within the Israeli environ- ined retrospectively to determine legality; the ment (Blum, Heymann). Opinions vary and are High Court did not change the policy except to fueled by how one-sided and finite the resulting alter the verbiage to make it more clear (Hajjar). actions of this policy are; everyone from parlia- With the legal dimension reaching an impasse, ment members to Palestinian committee presi- an empirical argument based on objective evi- dents are voicing their opinions for and against dence can round out what we know about this targeted killing (Barghouthi; Richburg). An ex- policy in terms of effectiveness. Existing re- amination of the legality of the targeted killing search has had narrow focus and has led to con- policy by the Israeli High Court in 2006 justi- trasting results. In order to understand whether fies enemy combatants, civilian and militant, as targeting and eliminating enemies of the state is being legitimate objects of attack under the in- justified through policy, it is imperative that an ternational law of armed conflict (Rogers, Mc- empirical research design focuses on the pol- Goldrick, p. 782). In addition to this, the High icy’s influence on national security. This utili- Court created a set of conditions that must be tarian approach can create strong evidence, met in order to justify a targeted killing accord- decreasing controversy, and has the power to ing to customary international law, Israeli do- influence policy and international relations. mestic law, and human rights law. They argued Justifying the policy for targeted killings empir- that by taking part in terrorist attacks against ically could explain the motive for violence in the state and its people, enemy combatants re- the Israeli perspective and clarify the argument linquished their right to protection from attack. by understanding how national security goals Proponents of including the targeted kill- are being met by employing this policy. This ing policy as a part of counterterror operations could open and stimulate discussion that could focus on the positive outcomes rather than the eventually lead to progress in the peace process negative consequences pertaining to national and create precedent for other countries cur- security. Opponents of this policy focus more rently implementing this policy. on the undemocratic angle the policy seems to take; that is, the administration’s omnipo- tent decision to kill is considered unethical.

Page 40 GATE Journal Yonit Upart Effectiveness of Targeted Killings target and the circumstances of the attack upon Israel’s actions against terrorism are ground- the target is to be carried out, 4. Any collateral ed in its responsibility to maintain national se- harm must withstand the proportionality test.” curity to its citizenry in an environment of con- (Rogers, McGoldrick, p. 782) These conditions stant strife. The definition of national security act as legal safeguards to ensure that the killing ranges from general understanding, to evolved is not arbitrary and perfunctory but meaning- theory, to government-designated definitions. ful and intentional. In order to have a clear understanding I have The assumed relationship and the basis for chosen common elements of national security using targeted killings as counterterrorism ef- from various sources. The basic-human-needs forts is that the killing of a terrorist leader will perspective maintains that security includes sustain national security by deterring, disrupt- elements of economic, personal, and political ing, or incapacitating the terrorist organization. protection, as the UN Development program There is also speculation that it possibly creates traditionally defined (Newman, p. 243). A a backlash effect and negatively influences the more modern interpretation of security by the security of the acting state by provoking retal- United Nations Office for the Coordination of iation. Hafez and Hatfield continued this dis- Humanitarian Affairs defines elements of se- cussion in a study that tested whether violence curity to include not only military protection, levels of suicide bombings, non-suicide bomb- but also economic measures like employment, ings, rocket attacks, sporadic shootings, and personal measures against physical violence, organized armed infiltrations were affected by crime, and terrorism, and political measures targeted killings. They found no apparent rela- against repression (“National Security versus tionship between the variables but their design Global Security”). In measuring whether Isra- included foiled attacks and measured violence el is effectively achieving its intended desire to in many different forms, not necessarily lethal maintain national security, this research will attacks (Hafez, Hatfield, p. 21). Further re- test and analyze these basic elements of secu- search on targeted killings that focuses on the rity as they are influenced by targeted killing. leadership decapitation of terrorist organiza- The previously mentioned conditions outlined tions shows that it increases the chance of war by the Israeli Supreme Court that must be met termination and the probability of government for a legal targeted killing are as follows: “1. victory while reducing the intensity of mili- The evidence of participation had to be ‘well tary violence and the frequency of insurgency based’, 2.Attacks should not be carried out if attacks in the long term (Johnston,p. 69). This less harmful means can be employed. The court research creates evidence for the use of targeted had in mind the alternative of arrest, investiga- killings and supports the deterrence, disrup- tion and trial, 3. After such an operation a thor- tion, and incapacitation theory. A similarity ough investigation of the identification of the between these research designs is not distin-

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 41 guishing between successful and foiled killings of subsequent violence; the event of a targeted in the independent variable; this is something killing will decrease subsequent violence (H1). that I would like to acknowledge because I con- I speculate that successful, or not foiled, target- sider it significant and influential on the -en ed killings strongly influence the violence levels vironment. Johnston admits that it is possible enacted by militant terrorists if violence is mea- that his results are biased by consequences of sured by Israeli fatalities. Although Hatfield failed attacks. A failed attack might incite a very and Hafez’s hypotheses were not confirmed, I powerful reaction and have an undesired effect argue that the deterrence, disruption and inca- on national security. Additionally, differences pacitation theories stand on strong merit and in the research designs exist in short-term ver- could be supported with a different design. sus long-term analysis and the status of target- When a militant terrorist leader is eliminated, ed militants. The conflicting results may be in- such an offensive operation on the organiza- fluenced by the dissimilar timeline analysis and tion could intimidate the group into going on the variable esteem of the killed militant. Ad- the defensive and choosing to lay low in order ditional research by Jaeger and Paserman sup- to minimize further loss. In addition to this, a ports the deterrence and incapacitation theory loss of leadership could disrupt its mission and by concluding that there is a short-term deter- cause it to temporarily cease operations while rence effect after a targeted killing on realized it recovers and reorganizes. A targeted killing Palestinian violence (Jaeger, Paserman, p. 339). can distract the community by causing it to be My paper utilizes a different design and aims emotionally affected and react to the loss by to understand similar effects of Israeli targeted taking time to mourn. Finally, by denying mili- killings during the al-Aqsa Intifada, which oc- tant groups the human resources that they need curred from September 28, 2000 through Feb- in their leadership, targeted killings can inca- ruary 8th, 2005. It analyzes whether the desired pacitate organizations through loss of technical effects are achieved by breaking down three skill, communication channels, and organiza- dimensions of national security and measuring tional infrastructure. The deterrence, disrup- their immediate level after a targeted killing. tion, and incapacitation effects would decrease Reduction of terrorist activity against the terrorist activity in the short-term, leading to a state of Israel would satisfy the personal safe- decrease in violence. ty goal in maintaining national security. The Citizens’ political freedom is a prominent counterterror measure of targeted killing ulti- aspect in the push for maintaining national mately aims to reduce violence against Israeli security. Attitudes in regards to their political citizens, especially fatalities. Based on John- confidence and voice can be measured in pop- ston’s research I hypothesize that there is a neg- ular opinions of the administration’s decisions, ative relationship between the targeted killing policies, and actions in regards to combatting of a militant terrorist figure and the frequency terrorism. My next hypothesis is that there is a

Page 42 GATE Journal Yonit Upart positive relationship between the targeted kill- I believe that if these killings are exposed to the ing of a militant terrorist figure and the public’s media, research will yield similar results. Ra- confidence and optimism for peace –the event tional investors would increase spending based of a targeted killing will increase the public’s on optimism in government and military lead- confidence (H2). Public confidence should in- ership, the future of the country, and political crease when known enemies of the state who strength after the targeted killing of a known are reputed to have killed innocent civilians are terrorist. prevented from inflicting further harm. Opti- These hypotheses rely on the intended con- mism in the peace process and faith in admin- sequence for which Israel employs the policy istrative decisions to promote physical safety in deterring, disrupting, or incapacitating the are crucial in maintaining a strong and secure terrorist organization and therefore prevent- democratic state because popular opinion is of- ing violence, increasing political optimism and ten referenced by those in power. faith and promoting economic activity. The first Economic stability is crucial in maintain- hypothesis (H1) analyzes the personal safety of ing a viable and secure state. Citizens react to citizens and rests on the reasonable conclusion political indicators when making financial de- that the state aims to decrease immediate vio- cisions and are influenced by their perception lence from Palestinian insurgents, thus the tar- of the strength of the government in achiev- geted killing is aiming to disorganize and elimi- ing national security. Research done by Noam nate terrorists that can harm Israeli citizens. H2 and Asaf Zussman shows that there is a posi- focuses on citizens’ opinions of their own polit- tive relationship between targeted killings and ical security –the policy should cause them to stock market performance. They claim that the be optimistic about future peace and increase elimination of a high-ranked militant terrorist faith in the administration’s decisions. H3 looks leader increases faith in investors because in- to the economic security of Israeli citizens by vestors consider it effective in combatting ter- understanding investors’ trading decisions in rorism while killing low-ranking militants does relation to their perspective on the value of fu- not have any effect (A. Zussman, N. Zussman, ture profits as influenced by a successful target- p. 204). I hypothesize that there is a positive ed killing. relationship between the targeted killing of a militant terrorist and Israel’s economic en- Data and Method In order to analyze the effects of the policy vironment; the event of a targeted killing will of targeted killing on the three continuous de- increase economic activity (H3). Based on the pendent variables that measure violence, public Zussmans’ findings, I argue that the act of a opinion, and economy I run a Paired-Sample known targeted killing will influence the Israeli T-test. In order to capture the influence of a tar- economy, however I would like to explore tar- geted killing on the three variables, the outcome geted killings regardless of organizational rank.

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 43 is compared with a baseline measure, which is Second Intifada was a significant time of tur- the average value of the same variables before moil in Israel and its surrounding territories, the event took place. The T-test compares the and therefore it is heavily studied and there is average value of two datasets, helping us under- sufficient data available. However, since this stand the difference in the averages before and period of time is characterized by frequent vio- after the event of a targeted killing. The before lence that is both sporadic and retaliatory, it is and after reference points that are chosen are possible that the variables measured in this re- exactly a week prior and a week after the target- search are influenced by other unobserved fac- ed killing took place. The week-long timeline tors. The frequency of Israeli targeted killings is not meaningful and is chosen to optimize during the al-Aqsa Intifada can be visualized in measurement of such variables in regards to Graph 1 below. militant terrorist mobilization and economic fluctuations. The variable for public opinion, in Targeted Killings during the al-Aqsa this case optimism in regards to the possibility Intifada of peace, is lessfrequently measured. The data that is available is taken monthly, thus the be- fore and after measurement occurs at the end of the month prior to the targeted killing and at the end of the month after the killing. As discussed earlier, the three dimensions I chose to measure the effectiveness of national security are the elements of personal physical Graph 1 –Sample of American-Israeli Coop- safety, political safety, and economic safety. To erative Enterprise data and B’Tselem –The Is- further empirically analyze the influence of Is- raeli Information Center for Human Rights in rael’s targeted killing policy I selected specific Occupied Territories data used in research (can variables that appropriately reflect and measure be found in Appendix A) Relevant targeted kill- the environment: violence, public opinion, and ing data is first based on a list created by the economy. The following sections describe how American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise with each variable is measured. reliable public resources and cross-referenced with targeted killing data from B’Tselem –The Targeted Killings Israeli Information Center for Human Rights Since the policy for targeted killings orig- in Occupied Territories (Israel Counter-Terror- inated and was heavily employed during the ism: Targeted Killings of Terrorists; “Palestin- Second Intifada that occurred from September ians Who Were the Object of a Targeted Killing 28, 2000 to February 8, 2005, I have chosen to in the Occupied Territories, before Operation set my timeframe within those parameters. The “Cast Lead”). I start with the compiled list first

Page 44 GATE Journal Yonit Upart in order to ensure that the targeted killings are N. Zussman, p. 204). Asaf and Noam Zussman exposed to the media and are of significant speculate that the loss of political leaders and terrorist figures. I then confirm their accuracy innocent bystanders cause the population to with the B’Tselem data. Further feel as though targeted killing is a counterpro- selection from this list follows a set of qualifi- ductive and ineffective policy. Lastly, it is crucial cations: to distinguish successful targeted killing opera- 1. Confirmed media activity tions; the impact of death rather than injury is 2. No civilian fatalities as a result of targeted more powerful in influencing the public’s reac- killing operation tion and the terrorist organizations’ decision to 3. Not politically involved militants mobilize or cease activity. There are many in- 4. Death, not injury stances that an attempted targeted killing op- These qualifications act as filters to control the eration failed, causing publicity and ridicule, or data for relevance. Confirmed media activity is simply injured the target, leading them to es- established through archived accounts of im- cape and continue operations –or even increase mediate local and international newspaper re- violent activity against the attacking state. This porting of the event. It provides the medium in list of qualifications was used to filter in only which Israeli society and Palestinian militants the most valid targeted killing data and left the observe and react to a targeted killing. It creates dataset with a sample of 49 from a total pop- the opportunity for citizens to change public ulation of 70 during that timeframe. The final opinion, act on the country’s financial environ- population data used for targeted killing analy- ment, and allow for Palestinian’s to react to the sis can be referenced in Appendix A and details killing of a militant terrorist leader. names, affiliations, and method of killing. Additionally, research has indicated that collateral damage in the form of non-com- Violence batant fatalities in targeted killing operations In order to reflect actual, realized, violence cause an unintended result by negatively influ- on Israeli society I use fatality data in this time- encing popular opinion and therefore creating line from B’Tselem –The Israeli Information bias in economic decisions (A. Zussman, N. Center for Human Rights in Occupied Terri- Zussman, p. 201). For this reason targeted kill- tories (“Palestinians Who Were the Object of ings with such fatalities are not included in the a Targeted Killing in the Occupied Territories, dataset as to not distract from the intended hy- before Operation “Cast Lead”). This data re- pothesis. Similarly, research indicates that the flects Israeli civilian and security forces killed killing of politically involved leaders of terrorist on Israeli land, not in the West Bank or Gaza, organizations creates a negative, undesired ef- by the hands of Palestinians the accumulated fect in data thus such people are omitted from week before and after the killing. This dataset the independent variable dataset (A. Zussman, is specifically exclusive to fatalities occurring

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 45 within Israeli land because it emphasizes the and random acts of unaffiliated Jihadi violence. assumed security of citizens’ homeland, where they should presumably be safe from war and Public Opinion conflict and confident in their safety. After a In regards to assessing changing political targeted killing the change in frequency of fa- attitudes by way of public opinion, an ideal talities occurring in citizens’ designated legal measure would be to analyze ongoing govern- and rightful living area should also significantly ment approval ratings after a targeted killing. impact their lives enough to influence our oth- In the absence of such data at this time, I will er dependent variables (popular opinion and use an interpretation of the public’s optimism economy). Israeli security forces are included for peace in the future as a proxy. I measure this in this dataset because the compulsory military through the first question of the Israeli Peace service policy in Israel dictates that any person, Index survey. The Israeli Peace Index is a con- off-duty or not, that is enlisted or on reserve is tinuous study aimed at understanding opinion considered a soldier. Excluding this data would patterns regarding the Israeli-Palestinian con- cause our data to exclude soldiers that are flict and is conducted on the representative killed while at home not participating in mil- sample of 600 Israeli adult men and women itary-sponsored activities. In order to increase (The Peace Index). The first question asks, “Do validity and influence on dependent variables, you believe or do not believe in the coming it is important to include this data in the data- years [that] there will be peace between Israel set. Fatalities on the day of the killing are con- and the Arabs?” (The Peace Index Archive). sidered prior to the event in the data, as they are The rationale for this question is to understand reasonably assumed to have been premeditated the public’s optimism for a peaceful future; this and carried out without public knowledge of is an indicator of whether they believe that the the killing. Thus, fatalities cannot be a result of administration is making the correct policy a violent attack motivated by the independent and strategic decisions during the conflict. A variable. The data from the week prior to the successful and public targeted killing of a vio- killing acts as a control measure while the data lent enemy of the state should restore faith in from the week after is used to further test Hafez the population’s physical security and increase and Hatfield’s research hypotheses of insurgent support for the administration. Therefore, indi- backlash and deterrence effects. It is import- rectly, citizens’ optimism for the future reflects ant to note other factors that may influence the their support for the government and its ac- number of Israeli fatalities, such as diplomacy tions. Question #1 was changed March 2003 to efforts like the emerging Road Map for Peace, “What is your position on the agreement signed Israeli military offensive operations immobiliz- between Israel and the PLO in Oslo (memo- ing militants, defensive and heightened securi- randum of understanding)?” (The Peace Index ty measures such as road and border closures, Archive). Although it is unclear why the ques-

Page 46 GATE Journal Yonit Upart tion was changed, the Memorandum of Un- weekly data. This is dependent on how close derstanding, also known as the Declaration of the targeted killing occurred to the survey date. Principles, was signed in September 1993 and took a step towards Israeli-Palestinian coopera- Economy tion by making an arrangement for immediate An accurate measure of Israeli economy Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories is the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, specifically the (“Israel-Palestinian Negotiations”). The public’s share prices of the top 25 market capitalization support for such an agreement a decade later is companies in Israel –the TA-25. It is active ev- indicative whether their faith currently lies in ery day, thus this research maximizes validity upheld agreements in this changing environ- by recording the closing index value exactly a ment. Results from both questions are equal- week prior and after the targeted killing in the ly valid and admissible because the data that dataset in order to align with the fatality time- is reflected relevantly measures Israeli Jewish frame andmeasure whether the targeted killing citizens’ confidence in the future peace of the policy influences the economy positively or country. The data gathered from this question negatively. Like the fatality variable, the closing is the combined percentage of Jewish respon- index value a week prior acts as a baseline data dents that responded: point, while the value a week after intends to re- Sure that there will be peace/Definitely flect the presumed effects of a targeted killing. support [the memorandum] As applicable to the fatality dataset, since some Think that there will be peace/Support [the targeted killings in the dataset occur in close memorandum] vicinity to each other, the subsequent measure- Data that was not included were Arab respons- ments of dependent variables a week before es and Jewish neutral and negative responses. and after could repeat. Other explanations that Neutral and negative responses were omitted could influence the stock market results include because they do not measure the public’s con- natural fluctuations in the market, the influenc- fidence –the intended dependent factor. Arab es of domestic politics, and supply, demand, respondents were not included because past re- and international trade effects during wartime. search indicates that their reaction to targeted In addition to this, since the stock exchange is killings is different and more nuanced, thus not open on Shabbat and the weekends some distracting the analysis1. Since the survey is of the dates for the data are not exactly a week taken monthly, the intended objective of mea- before and after, they are off by 1-2 days –these suring the public’s immediate reaction to the dates are referenced in Appendix B. killing could have a weaker association than

1Research has indicated that public reaction to violent terrorist attacks against the state of Israel differ between the Jewish and Arab population within the state (Romano, Dmitri, Asaf Zussman, and Noam Zussman).

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 47 Analysis Significance is indicated through the p-value Violence (Sig.) being well below the conventional two- The Paired Sample Statistics in Figure 1 tailed standard of 0.05 at 0.016. The null hy- provide insight as to the difference in average pothesis, which states that there is no differ- fatalities the accumulated week before and after ence between the averages of the samples, can a targeted killing. In order to obtain a clear un- be rejected. Although the difference in average derstanding of the relationship between target- means seems like a small decrease in fatalities, ed killings and fatalities in the first hypothesis I when considering the potential prevention of start by looking at the mean values in the Paired almost two human deaths and the strong sig- Samples Statistics. My hypothesis states that the nificance value, this data further confirms H1. event of a targeted killing will decrease subse- It suggests that targeted killings effectively pro- quent fatalities in the state of Israel, thus the mote national security through physical safety mean value should decrease in ‘Fat-Post’ when by decreasing the number of Israeli fatalities. compared to ‘Fat-Pre’. Figure 1 indicates that the accumulated week before a targeted kill- Public Opinion ing the average number of fatalities is 2.9 while In analyzing the directionality of the sec- the accumulated week after a targeted killing ond hypothesis, the expected relationship be- the average number decreases to 1.2. The di- tween targeted killings and public opinion is rection of the difference in means is behaving unrealized. In Figure 3 I expect to find that the as expected; after the treatment of a targeted event of a targeted killing will increase the pub- killing the average number of fatalities is lower. lic’s political attitudes from ‘PI-Pre’ to ‘PI-Post’. It seems as though the average mean actually slightly decreases from 26.7% to 26% in Figure 3.

Additionally, the Paired-Sample T-test for H1 in Figure 2 helps show that the relationship be- tween the accumulated fatalities of Israeli cit- izens and security personnel the week before The Paired-Samples T-Test in Figure 4 shows and after a targeted killing is significant and that this test offers no significance at the p-val- non-random. ue of 0.201. This means that there is no differ- ence in average values between the samples, the results are based on random chance, and that we accept the null-hypothesis in rejecting H2. When honing in on the mean in the Paired Dif- ferences section of Figure 4, we see that the dif-

Page 48 GATE Journal Yonit Upart ference between averages is 0.70% with a stan- conclusive and the null-hypothesis is accepted. dard deviation of almost 4%. This explains the low significance value in the dependent vari- able when treated by the targeted killing.

Conclusion Israel has been the first country to overtly employ and defend a policy of targeted kill- Economy ing in the war against terror since the al-Aq- The economic safety aspect of national se- sa Intifada and has since become a model for curity is the last to be tested with the average countries like the United States in the fight to Tel-Aviv 25 Index closing prices the accumulat- preserve national security (Blum, Heymann). ed week prior and after the treatment of a tar- This policy continues to be challenged and to geted killing. A look at the mean of each sample gain controversy because effectiveness remains in Figure 5 clearly shows us that there is hardly questioned. Using empirical data from the Sec- a difference in the average closing prices in each ond Intifada, I take an expansive, three-dimen- sample while there is still a large standard devi- sional approach to measure whether the policy ation within them. Although the average two- is effective in terms of maintaining national se- point increase between ‘TA25-Pre’ and ‘TA25 curity. The national security that a state strives -Post’ is small, it does follow the expected direc- for includes three separate dimensions: person- tionality of the third hypothesis which states that al physical safety, political safety, and economic a targeted killing will stimulate the Israeli econ- safety. The statistical comparisons provided in- omy by increasing stock market closing prices. dicate a potentially strong link between target- ed killings and decreased subsequent violence, but does not show a significant effect on public opinion and economy. The intent of examining this policy holistically caused me to draw three It seems as though the significance does not hypotheses, however only the first is confirmed; meet the expected two-tailed standard with a I recommend utilizing an alternate research de- high p-value of 0.406 as seen in Figure 6. This sign to further explore the relationships of H2 signifies that there is no difference between the and H3. average values in the paired samples, therefore it Some limitations of using secondary data is based on random chance and there is no rela- that exist in this research design could be tionship between the closing prices of the TA-25 eliminated in order to improve upon it. The Index and the event of a targeted killing. H3 is in- time period for which this research is chosen,

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 49 during the Second Intifada, is one in which popular opinion could have inaccurately reflect- Israel performed consistent and consecutive ed immediate reactions to a specific targeted targeted killings. However, it is also a period killing since they occurred sporadically during of frequent violence by unaffiliated violent Pal- any month –some may have been better reflect- estinians as well as terrorists and is character- ed in the survey data than others. The available ized by random events like suicide bombings, data for the timeframe I chose was very limited, civilian-led bombings, as well as organized ter- therefore it loosely reflected political faith. Ad- rorist activities. In addition to this, the Israeli ditionally, the week-long cut-off further proved Defense Forces’ continuous reactive measures problematic for the economic data reflected by like road and border closures, offensive raids, the TA-25 stock market closing index prices be- and heightened defensive measures could have cause it was sometimes unavailable; the stock also impeded terrorist activity that would alter market was not open on weekends, and there- the fatality figures and make the secondary data fore some of the data that was used was from a used in this research less valid. The fatality data day or two prior. Finally, it is possible that the during this time could also have been affected closing index prices reflected natural economic by political progress and diplomatic relations fluctuations from domestic politics, supply and between Palestinian Authorities. demand, and international investment, espe- In addition to the possible bias in fatality cially during war time. data, lack of available research on the mobiliza- In order to better understand the holistic tion time of Palestinian terrorist factions has led effectiveness of the targeted killing policy I rec- me to choose an arbitrary week-long reference ommend strengthening the research design by point for data measurement before and after a minimizing the previously outlined limitations. targeted killing. When evaluating the second- To increase external validity and decrease ir- ary data, the week cut-off mark excluded many relevant fatality measures in our data I would significant fatalities from the dataset that could recommend focusing the timeline away from have been associated with a decrease in terrorist periods of continuous conflict; this can be done activity after a targeted killing. Including these by choosing a different timeframe in the Israe- figures could have made the data more valid li-Palestinian conflict other than an Intifada and the results more convicting. Another flaw or moving on to a different context involving in the data is the temporally misaligned pop- other states. It is crucial that the timeframe not ular opinion variable of the Israeli Peace Index be representative of an especially idiosyncratic survey question, which was only taken at the environment so that it could be applied to other beginning of each month. Although the Israeli states and conflicts. Although conflict behavior Peace Index survey was the only consistent and does not occur in controlled environments like relevant popular opinion survey taken during labs, and there will always be external influ- this time frame, it is possible that the effect on encers, a carefully-chosen setting will ensure a

Page 50 GATE Journal Yonit Upart sustainable relevancy in this field of study. In originally intended comprehensive analysis of addition to this change to the research design, the three elements of national security is not I recommend to alter the week-long before and satisfied for holistic effectiveness to be con- after reference point for data comparison. Fur- firmed, these results can aid administrations, ther research on organizational mobilization policy- makers, and militaries in making deci- could shed light on the most indicative point in sions based on the benefits and risks associated time to assess data for a valid result; the refer- with a targeted killing. If a state’s targeted killing ence point should accurately reflect the amount policy was to be challenged by the international of time it takes for an organization to regroup community, the state could defend it through and retaliate if it is able. There is further oppor- the utilitarian perspective of maintaining the tunity to strengthen the dependent variable of personal safety element of national security. public opinion in measuring political faith in the administration by finding more accurate Appendix A –Targeted Killing Pop- and precise survey data. If a different timeframe ulation Data is chosen it is possible to find a public opinion 1. October 21, 2004 Adnan Al-Ghoul; Imad survey more reflective of political attitudes to- al-Baas wards government and taken with a greater fre- a. Hamas quency as to align with the rest of the variables. b. Israeli airstrike in Gaza Evaluation of these results leads me to con- clude that only confirmation of the first hypoth- 2. October 6, 2004 Bashir Dabash; Zarees esis satisfies a dimension of national security. Alareer The targeted killing approach of counterterror- a. Islamic Jihad -Heads of Military Arm ism efforts appears to decrease civilian fatalities in Gaza within domestic land. The other elements of na- b. IDF missile strike. tional security, political and economic security, are not confirmed through this research meth- 3. September 27, 2004 Ali al-Shaer; od, although there is reason to believe that an a. Popular Resistance Committees alternate design could provide more conclusive -Senior Member evidence. A utilitarian argument for the tar- b. Israeli helicopter fired a missile at a geted killing policy can be made with the first car east of the city of Khan Younis. hypothesis alone based on the value of human Izz Eldine Subhi Sheik Khalil lives. It seems as though this research further supports Johnston’s findings that the targeted a. Hamas killing of a militant terrorist leader is effective b. Killed when his car exploded in in deterring or disrupting an organization in Damascus. inflicting violence onto the state. Although the 4. September 21, 2004 Nabil al-Saedi; Rabah

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 51 Zaqout a. Hamas Senior Commander, West a. Hamas Bank b. Israeli airstrike in Gaza b. Shot by Israeli security forces as he approached the village of Taluza, 5. September 20, 2004 Khaled Abu Shamiyeh outside Nablus. a. Hamas 12. April 17, 2004 Abdel Aziz Rantisi b. Israeli airstrike in Gaza a. Hamas Organizational Leader 6. September 13, 2004 Mahmud Abu Khalifa b. IAF helicopter-fired missiles a. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade slammed into his car not far from his -Commander in Jenin home in central Gaza City b. Killed along with two of his 13. March 16, 2004 Nidal Salfiti assistants in an Israeli airstrike. a. Islamic Jihad 7. July 29, 2004 Amr Abu Suta; Zaki Abu b. Israeli missile strike in Gaza. Rakha 14. March 3, 2004 Tarad Jimali; Ibrahim Diri; a. Ahmed Abu Reish Brigade Omar Hassan b. A helicopter strike a. Hamas Senior Members 8. July 22, 2004 Hazem Rahim b. Israeli missile strike a. Islamic Jihad -Local Commander 15. February 28, 2004 Mahmoud Juda; Aiyman (Seized the body parts of Israeli Dahduh; Amin Dahduh soldiers killed when a roadside bomb destroyed their armored a. Islamic Jihad Senior Commanders personnel carrier on May 11) b. Israeli helicopter gunships killed b. Helicopter strike three fugitives riding in a car in Gaza. 9. June 26, 2004 Nayef Abu Sharkh; Fatah 16. December 25, 2003 Mustafa Sabah Tanzim a. Hamas Bomb maker (Mastermind of a. Nablus Commander three attacks against Merkava tanks in the Gaza Strip b. IDF ambush in Nablus b. Was killed in an IAF strike in Gaza 10. June 14, 2004 Khalil Marshud City a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade 17. September 1, 2003 Khader Houssre b. IAF helicopter gunship strike a. Hamas 11. May 5, 2004 Imad Mohammed Janajra b. Air Force helicopters fired four

Page 52 GATE Journal Yonit Upart missiles at a car in the Gaza Strip a. Hamas Second-in-Command of 18. August 30, 2003 Abdullah Akel; Farid Military Wing Mayet b. Israeli attack helicopters fired a. Hamas missiles b. Air Force helicopters fired four 25. December 23, 2002 Shaman Hassan Subah; missiles at a van in the Gaza Strip Mustafa Kash 19. August 28, 2003 Hamdi Khalaq a. Hamas a. Hamas -Military Wing Member b. Killed in an IDF ambush near Jenin. b. Air Force helicopter fired a missile 26. November 26, 2002 Alah Sabbagh; Imad Nasrti 20. August 24, 2003 Walid el Hams; Ahmed Eshtwi; Ahmed Abu Halala; Muhammad a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade Local Abu Lubda Leader; Hamas Local Leader a. Hamas Activists b. Killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Jenin refugee camp. b. IDF helicopter strike. 27. October 29, 2002 Assim Sawafta 21. June 21, 2003 Abdullah Kawasme a. Hamas Military Wing Ring Leader a. Hamas Activist b. Killed by an undercover army unit. b. Missiles fired from an air force helicopter. 28. July 23, 2002 Nasser Asida 22. April 29, 2003 Nidal Salameh a. Hamas West Bank Commander a. Popular Front for the Liberation of b. Shot and killed by IDF soldiers of the Palestine -Local Military Leader Kfir Brigade b. Four missiles fired from an air force 29. July 4, 2002 Jihad Amerin helicopter at a car in the southern a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade Leader in Gaza Strip the Gaza Strip 23. April 9, 2003 Mahmoud Zatma b. Killed in a car blast. a. Islamic Jihad -Senior Commander, 30. June 30, 2002 Muhaned Taher; Imad Bomb Maker Draoza b. Missile fired by an IAF Apache a. Hamas Master Bomber; Deputy helicopter hit the car he was driving Bomb Commander (Taher, known in Gaza City. as “Engineer 4,” was responsible for 24. March 8, 2003 Ibrahim Makdme supplying the the bombs used in a

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 53 June 2002 Jerusalem bus bombing b. Killed in Khan Yunis when an IAF that killed 19 and wounded 70 and Apache helicopter fired two missiles in the June 2001 Tel Aviv disco at his Car. attack that killed 21.) 35. January 22, 2002 Ankilled Jasser Samaro, b. Killed in a raid in Nablus by IDF Nassim Abu Rus, Yousef Suraj, Karim naval commandos. Masarja 31. April 22, 2002 Marwan Zaloum; Samir Abu a. Hamas Regional Bomb Preparation Rajoub Experts a. Fatah Tanzim -Hebron Militia b. IDF special operations unit killed the Leader; Senior Aide, Member of men who were on a list of wanted Force 17. (Zaloum was believed terrorists Israel submitted on to the to be responsible for numerous Palestinian Authority. shooting attacks and bombings, 36. January 14, 2002 Raed Mahmoud Karmi including the March 2001 killing a. Tanzim Tulkarm Commander of Shalhevet Pass, a 10-month-old infant, in a sniper attack in Hebron.) b. Killed when his car blew up. Israel had asked the PA to imprison Karmi, b. Israeli helicopter strike. but Arafat refused. Terrorists under 32. March 6, 2002 Abdel Rahman Ghadal his command murdered at least six a. Hamas Israelis. b. Missile attack on his home in Gaza 37. Nov. 23, 2001 Mahmoud Abu City. Hanoud,Ayman Hashaykah 33. March 5, 2002 Mohand Said Muniyer a. Hamas Senior Commander in West Diriya, Fawzi Hamdi Mustafa Maher, Bank, Deputy to Senior Commander Oman Kaidan b. IAF helicopter fired missiles at the a. Force 17, Tanzim car. Hanoud was convicted by the b. The IDF targeted the three in Palestinian Authority of leading Ramallah. an unauthorized military cell and sentenced to a 12-year jail term. He 34. January 25, 2002 Adli Hamdan was later released. a. Hamas -Head of Military Wing 38. Nov. 12, 2001 Mohammed Hassan Reihan (Hamdan was believed to have been involved in an attack that left four a. Hamas -Senior Leader soldiers IDF soldiers dead, and in b. Killed in a gunfight with Israeli the manufacture of mortars.) forces at his West Bank home in

Page 54 GATE Journal Yonit Upart Tel. Reihan was wanted for the 1998 Qalqilya. killing of two Israelis. 45. August 27, 2001 Abu Ali Mustafa 39. Nov. 1, 2001 Yasser Atsida, Fahmi Abu a. PFLP Commander Aisha b. Israeli helicopter fired a missile a. Hamas Military Wing Members through the window of his Ramallah b. Helicopter gunships attack a car in office. the West Bank city of Tulkarm. 46. August 20, 2001 Imad Abu Sneneh 40. October 31, 2001 Jamil Jaddala a. Tanzim -Local Commander a. Hamas b. Shot in Hebron b. Killed by Israeli security forces 47. February 13, 2001 Massoud Ayyad in Hebron in a helicopter missile a. Force 17 Lieutenant Colonel attack. b. Killed when Israeli helicopter 41. October 18, 2001 Atif Abayyat gunships fired four missiles into a. Fatah Military Wing Member his car as he drove on the outskirts b. Killed along with two other people of the Jabaliya refugee camp in the when a car exploded in Beit Sahour. Gaza Strip. This followed the assassination of 48. December 10, 2001 Mahmoud Mugrabi Israeli Cabinet Minister Rechavam a. Fatah Zeevi by the PFLP. b. Killed by IDF soldiers while 42. October 16, 2001 Iyad al Akhras reportedly planting a roadside bomb a. Hamas near Bethlehem. Mugrabi’s name b. Killed when an explosive went off was on a list of ten reputed terrorists inside his house. that the IDF had targeted for killing. 43. October 15, 2001 Ahmad Marshoud 49. Nov. 23, 2000 Ibrahim Abdel Karim Bani a. Hamas a. Hamas b. Killed in a car bomb explosion in the b. Killed when a bomb exploded in the West Bank town of Nablus. car he was driving. Israeli sources 44. October 14, 2001 Abed Rahman Hamad insinuated Bani was transporting explosives that detonated a. Hamas -Military Wing Senior prematurely, but PA security Member forces arrested Bani’s cousin, who b. Shot by snipers at his home in reportedly confessed to tipping off

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 55 the IDF. Works Cited Appendix B –Alternate Dates for Bargouthi, Mustafa. “Stop Israel From Execut- TA-25 Index Closing Prices ing the Innocent.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 02 Aug. 2001. Web. 30 Mar. 2/6/01 to 2/5/01 2015. 10/8/01 to 10/7/01 Blum, Gabriella, and Philip Heymann. “Law 10/9/01 to 10/7/01 and Policy of Targeted Killing.” Harvard National Security Journal. Harvard Law 11/16/01 to 11/15/01 School, 27 June 2010. Web. 01 Apr. 2015. 11/30/01 to 11/29/01 David, Steven R. “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy 1/18/02 to 1/17/02 of Targeted Killing.” Mideast Security and 2/1/02 to 1/31/02 Policy Studies 51 (2002): 1-28. Web. Mar. 2015. 6/29/02 to 6/27/02 Hafez, Mohammed, and Joseph M. Hatfield. 3/1/03 to 2/27/03 2006. “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? 3/15/03 to 3/13/03 A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Contro- versial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising.” 4/16/03 to 4/15/03 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (June): 5/6/03 to 5/5/03 359382.http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/ 6/14/03 to 6/12/03 (grlihf55pwnkx1yjlnjubrqb)/app/home/ 6/28/03 to 6/26/03 contribution.asp?referrer=parent&back- to=issue,4,6;journal,1,42;linkingpublicat- 8/23/03 to 8/21/03 ionresults,1:10249 2,1 9/6/03 to 9/4/03 Hajjar, Lisa. “Lawfare and Armed Conflict: 1/1/04 to 12/31/03 Comparing Israeli and US Targeted Killing Policies and Challenges Against Them.” 2/21/04 to 2/19/04 Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and 3/7/04 to 3/4/04 International Affairs American University 2/27/04 to 2/26/04 of Beirut (2013): 1-25. Web. 4 Mar. 2015. 4/10/04 to 4/8/04 “Israel Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings of Terrorists.” Israeli Targeted Killings of Ter- 4/24/04 to 4/22/04 rorists. Jewish Virtual Library, July 2004. 4/30/04 to 4/29/04 Web. 21 Mar. 2015. 9/30/04 to 9/28/04 “Israel-Palestinian Negotiations.” Israel Min- istry of Foreign Affairs. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. Web. 8 Mar. 2015.

Page 56 GATE Journal Yonit Upart Jaeger, David A., and Daniele M. Paserman. Evidence from Israel.” Economica 79.313 “The Shape of Things to Come? On the (2012): 183-98. Web.2015. Dynamics of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Seale, P. (2008). Israel’s “targeted assassina- Killings.” Quarterly Journal of Political tions” strategy. The Washington Report on Science 4.4 (2009): 315-42. Web. 10 Mar. Middle East Affairs, 27(3), 15-16. Re- 2015. trieved from http://login.ezproxy1.lib.asu. Johnston, Patrick B. “Does Decapitation Work? edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/ Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership docview/2188155 31?accountid=4485 Targeting in Counterinsurgency Cam- “The Peace Index Archive.” Peace Index. Peace paigns.” International Security 36.4 (2012): Index, 2010. Web. Mar. 2015. 47-79. Web. “The Peace Index.” The Israel Democracy Insti- “National Security versus Global Security | UN tute. The Israel Democracy Institute. Web.8 Chronicle.” National Security versus Glob- Mar. 2015. al Security | UN Chronicle. UN Chronicle, Zussman, Asaf, and Noam Zussman. “Assas- Aug. 2014. Web. 19 Mar. 2015. sinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Newman, Edward. “Human Security and Con- an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using structivism.” International Studies Perspec- Stock Market Data.” Journal of Economic tives 2.3 (2001): 239-51. Web. 9 Mar. 2015. Perspectives 20 Spring 2006: 193-206.Web. “Palestinians Who Were the Object of a Tar- Mar. 2015. geted Killing in the Occupied Territories, before Operation “Cast Lead”.” Palestinians Who Were the Object of a Targeted Killing in the Occupie Territories, before Opera- tion “Cast Lead” B’Tselem, Web. 21 Mar. 2015. Richburg, Keith B. “Israelis Confirm Assassi- nations Used as Policy; Key Palestinians Targeted.” The Washington Post. N.p., 8 Jan. 2001. Web. 30 Mar. 2015. Rogers, Apv, and Dominic Mcgoldrick. “Iii. Assassination And Targeted Killing—The Killing Of Osama Bin Laden.” Internation- al and Comparative Law Quarterly 60.03 (2011): 778-88. Web. 9 Mar. 2015. Romanov, Dmitri, Asaf Zussman, and Noam Zussman. “Does Terrorism Demoralize?

The Israeli Targeted Killing Policy GATE Journal Page 57 Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement: The Case Of Phoenix, Arizona Robert Davis

This article discusses community development within the context of refugee resettlement. Refugees face many hardships leading up to and during resettlement, which can make adjusting to life in the US quite challenging. Successful resettlement is dependent on the provision of services by resettlement agencies that empower refugees to achieve long-term self-sufficiency. It is also contingent upon a host community’s receptiveness towards refugee populations, which is challenging in states like Arizona where anti-immigrant sentiments are prevalent. Drawing on interviews with resettlement agencies based in Phoenix, Arizona, this study examines the conditions of refugee resettlement and self-suffi- ciency. The findings indicate that basic needs are met; however, the agencies are not always adequately equipped to facilitate long-term self-sufficiency for those refugees that struggle to adjust. Furthermore, the host community is generally unaware of the presence of refugee populations, but those who are aware tend to be receptive or indifferent. This study indicates that federal mandates by which resettle- ment agencies abide inhibit the development of long-term refugee self-sufficiency thus there is a need for community alliances to be fostered.

ll too often, people are forced to flee their The refugee experience is often categorized homes and nations as they fall victim into three stages: the preflight stage, the flight to the life-threatening and destructive stage, and the resettlement stage (Kirmay- Ahands of war, political instability, ethnic con- er, 2011; Pumariega & Rothe, 2005; Birman & flict, and religious intolerance. In response, the Basu, 2005). The first two stages tend to be char- United States along with just a handful of other acterized by high exposure to trauma as a result countries are committed to welcoming a select of life-threatening circumstances. Of the small number of individuals of ‘special humanitarian fraction of refugees granted permanent resettle- concern’ on an annual basis, offering them the ment, these individuals face a new set of unique opportunity to start life afresh through resettle- challenges. They must continue to cope with ment (RCUSA, 2014). According to Pumariega the residual effects of trauma as well as over- & Rothe (2005), the path of migration to the US, come post-migration stressors during resettle- for many, is often “filled with risks and stressors ment. Kirmayer’s (2011) research suggests that that are unique to immigrants, both prior and the major stressors during resettlement include after their arrival” (p.583). According to the UN social and economic strain, social alienation, Refugee Agency (UNHCR), of the 14.4 million discrimination, and status loss (p.962). These refugees around the world, less than one percent stressors are largely impacted by the receptive- are granted permanent resettlement (2016). The ness of the host community and how refugees majority reside in refugee camps indefinitely, see themselves within their new environments. and some eventually return to their home coun- Successful integration illustrates the overall re- tries if improved conditions permit it. silience and vast potential for refugees to be contributing members of society once more.

Page 58 GATE Journal Robert Davis It is important to point out that although re- and self-sufficiency. search concerning the mental health of refugees Arizona is an interesting geopolitical context is essential, this particular body of literature is from which to explore this topic given the prev- also criticized for contributing to the victim- alence of anti-immigrant sentiments in the state, ization of refugees and their portrayal as being which arguably has implications for successful needy, mentally unstable, or vulnerable. Rather, resettlement of refugee populations. Interviews some scholars argue that the connection be- were conducted with representatives from the tween trauma and self-sufficiency is not an ex- refugee resettlement agencies located in Phoe- planatory factor (Fazel, 2005). Marlowe’s (2009) nix to ascertain what existing services entailed work, for instance, stresses the importance of and what additional services were needed to distinguishing between the ordinary and ex- ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees. Repre- tra-ordinary stories of refugees so as to “[devel- sentatives from the agencies were also asked to op] a more sophisticated understanding of how share views regarding perceptions of refugees people have responded to trauma beyond the held by employers as well as the local commu- ‘event-worthy’ underpinnings of forced migra- nity at large. Questions regarding views held by tion” (p.183). Marlowe further explains that: these two stakeholder groups (employers and “A predominant focus upon the extra-ordinary the community) were included because their [e.g., traumatic experiences of refugees] privi- views and actions can impede or enhance the leges stories of forced migration over the ordi- attainment of a state of self-sufficiency amongst nary [ones] that arguably speak more to who resettled refugee populations. Ultimately, vis-à- people claiming refugee status are and what vis the examination of resettlement services of- they inherently value… [Thus, there is reason] fered by refugee resettlement agencies and the to further elevate the importance of the ordi- resulting degree of self-sufficiency amongst ref- nary, which can provide a helpful framework for ugee populations, this study contributes to di- viewing resettling refugees as peers in social life, alogue on the role of community development capable of meaningful contributions to family, approaches in facilitating refugees’ attainment community, and society” (p.189-190). of long-term self-sufficiency. Conceptualizing refugees predominantly within the context of trauma and mental in- Refugee Resettlement in Phoenix, Arizona stability influences the perceptions the host In the United States, refugees are admitted community may have of refugees as well as the through the Refugee Admissions Program (US- ways refugees regard themselves. From an in- RAP), which offers a certain number of refugees stitutional perspective, the resettlement prac- the opportunity for third-country resettlement tices adopted by refugee resettlement agencies, every year. USRAP resettled over 58,000 refu- whether they focus on the extra-ordinary or the gees in 2012, representing an “important, en- ordinary, have a profound impact on refugees during, and ongoing expression of [America’s] and the host community. Successful refugee commitment to international humanitarian resettlement can enable and empower refugees principles” (DoS, 2013). The continuous inflow to attain long-term self-sufficiency. Successful of refugee populations is dispersed amongst settlement can also foster a sense of receptive- various host communities throughout the Unit- ness amongst the host population which in turn ed States. Refugee based organizations abide by contributes to refugees’ long-term self-sufficien- a certain federally mandated process through cy. Drawing on interviews with refugee resettle- which strategic plans for US-based refugee pro- ment agencies in Phoenix, Arizona this study grams are determined. examines the conditions of refugee resettlement In the state of Arizona, the Arizona Refu-

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 59 gee Resettlement Program (RRP) is the federal- persed amongst the aforementioned VOLAGs, ly-funded program utilized to administer tran- and placement is contingent upon the organiza- sitional benefits and employment services in tional capacity of each agency. The various ser- collaboration with locally-based private refugee vices provided by these agencies include access resettlement agencies commonly referred to as to affordable housing; help with immigration ‘voluntary agencies’ (VOLAGs). They include and citizenship services; a medical case work- the International Rescue Committee (IRC); the er to ensure good health; education services to Catholic Charities Community Services (CC); get children enrolled in schools; basic English the Arizona Immigrant and Refugee Services lessons; cultural orientations; mental health ser- (AIRS); and, the Lutheran Social Services of the vices; and employment services (AZDES, 2014). Southwest (LSS). VOLAGs in Arizona resettled These agencies also host and facilitate various 2,846 refugees in 2012 and another 3,600 refu- training sessions on important topics such as gees in 2013, with the majority of the refugees familiarity with American currency, financial arriving from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Congo, management, and public transit systems. In Cuba, and Myanmar (AZDES, 2013). Although essence, VOLAGs are tasked with providing this is just a small fraction of the world’s refugee the appropriate services to integrate refugees population, it is a significant number that must into the social and economic fabric of the host be absorbed and resettled by communities with- community. By so doing, these agencies are re- in Arizona on a yearly basis. sponding to a federal mandate under which the Refugees entering the Phoenix area are dis- Refugee Resettlement Program was created, that

Page 60 GATE Journal Robert Davis aims to ensure that refugees “achieve economic nator), length of occupation (2-10+ years), and self-sufficiency as quickly as possible after arriv- gender (2 males and 9 females). All interview- al in the United States” (AZDES, 2014). Howev- ees were American; however, some were natu- er, a question of enduring interest is whether the ralized American citizens with refugee back- resettlement services provided facilitate a state grounds, having been resettled in Arizona and of self-sufficiency amongst refugee populations. granted citizenship. The range in demographics helped to ensure that responses were inclusive Methods of a wide-range of perspectives. An interpretive paradigm that draws on in- Participants’ identities remained confiden- terviews as the methodological tool of inquiry tial throughout the study, which encourages was adopted in this study so as to facilitate a them to be more open with their responses. All more meaningful and in-depth understanding of the responses were willingly audio-record- of ‘social phenomenon’ than what can be elicited ed and transcribed verbatim to provide com- via purely quantitative methods (Gill, 2008). In- plete data for accurate coding (Pontin, 2000). depth interviews were conducted with partici- The coding process involved a deep reading of pants from the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) the transcripts, analytical notes, and the iden- located in Phoenix, Arizona to understand the tification of thematic keywords or phrases. The conditions of refugee resettlement and self-suf- emergent categories were then classified by the ficiency. The interview guide entailed several questions posed and the participating VOLAG semi-structured interview questions that were (see Table 1). Approval was sought and granted strategically designed to “define the area to be from the researcher’s university research review explored, at least initially, and from which the board (IRB #00000572). interviewer or interviewee …[could] diverge to pursue an idea or response in more detail” (Brit- Findings ten, 2006, p.13). The questions posed aimed to For the purposes of organization and com- elicit in-depth responses reflective of interview- parison, a synopsis of the interview responses ees’ perspectives and experiences with reset- is provided in Table 1, which is organized hor- tlement processes (see Table 1). In cases where izontally by VOLAG and vertically by the spe- clarification was required, probing questions cific question posed (see Table 1). The tabulated were posed to elicit clear and complete respons- information is not ranked in any particular or- es (Kvale, 1996; Schwandt, 2007). der, and it is followed by a detailed description Ten representatives from the various and interpretation of the individual responses. VOLAGs were interviewed. This included Due to the similarity in emergent categories re- three participants from the International Res- lated to Questions 2 and 3, Questions 4, 5, and 6, cue Committee (IRC), four participants from as well as Questions 7 and 8, the responses per- the Catholic Charities (CC), and lastly three taining to the respective questions were com- participants from the Arizona Immigration and bined. Given space constraints and the lengthy Refugee Services (AIRS). The Lutheran Social nature of many of the responses, not all aspects Services (LSS) was not part of this study due to of the data are addressed in detail. a self-enforced policy that disallows their par- Community Perceptions ticipation in any form of research processes. The As is indicated in the first row of Table 1, duration of the interviews ranged from 20-30 participants indicated that community percep- minutes in length. The interviewees varied in tions regarding refugee resettlement vary and age (25-50), occupation (employment special- include positive, negative, and impartial per- ists, case managers, and public relations coordi- ceptions towards refugee populations (see Ta-

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 61 ble 1). Pavrticipants mentioned that individuals enced by anti-immigrant sentiment, and indi- who are accepting of refugees tend to recognize viduals espousing such views perceive refugees the positive impact refugees have on the local as needy, unable to contribute, and a drain on workforce and their contributions to diversity. social services. The neutral perceptions, which According to participants, community claims seem to be most commonplace, include indi- against resettlementTable in Arizona1: Summary tendof Findings to be influ- viduals who are generally unaware of and are

Refugee Volunteer Agencies (VOLAGs) of Phoenix, Arizona Research Question Posed to VOLAGs: IRC CC AIRS

Positive/For: Positive/For: Positive/For: ➢ Accepting of refugees ➢ Accepting of refugees ➢ Accepting to refugees ➢ Bring diversity ➢ Bring diversity ➢ Bring diversity ➢ Contribute to workforce Negative/Against: Negative/Against: Negative/Against: ➢ Anti-immigrant sentiment ➢ Anti-immigrant sentiment ➢ Anti-immigrant sentiment ➢ Needy ➢ Drain on social services Q1: What are the host Neutral/Impartial: community’s ➢ Unaware/ Ignorant perceptions? Neutral/Impartial: Neutral/Impartial: ➢ Unaware ➢ Unaware ➢ Growing awareness

➢ Communication issues ➢ Communication issues ➢ Communication issues ➢ Illegal workforce ➢ Illegal workforce ➢ Illegal workforce Q2: What are ➢ Transportation issues ➢ Safety concerns ➢ Safety concerns employer’s concerns ➢ Skills gap ➢ Consistent workforce ➢ Consistent workforce about refugees? ➢ Skills gap

➢ Hospitality/Tourism ➢ Hospitality/ Tourism ➢ Hospitality/Tourism ➢ Manufacturing ➢ Manufacturing ➢ Janitorial/Cleaning ➢ Food Industry ➢ Warehouse- Amazon ➢ Airport ➢ Airport ➢ Solar Panel Companies ➢ Landscaping Q3: What industries ➢ Farming ➢ Food Industry ➢ Food Industry partner with your organization?

➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Client motivation ➢ English competency ➢ English competency ➢ Understand business ➢ Access to resources ➢ Basic needs Q4: What is expectations ➢ Pre-employment services necessary for the self- ➢ Cultural Awareness sufficiency of ➢ Access to resources refugees?

➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Basic needs ➢ Basic needs ➢ Basic needs ➢ Behavioral Health ➢ Orientation Classes (Job, ➢ Overall care and concern ➢ Job Orientation Culture, transportation) Q5: What needs are ➢ Microenterprise being met well? ➢ Home purchase program

➢ Retention ➢ Retention ➢ Retention ➢ Follow-up with client ➢ Follow-up with client ➢ Follow-up with client ➢ Skill-match ➢ Skill-match ➢ Help with job displacement Q6: What is ➢ Job promotion ➢ Job promotion ➢ Job satisfaction necessary for long- ➢ Goals setting ➢ Job satisfaction term employment? ➢ English competency

➢ Education ➢ Education ➢ Education ➢ English proficiency ➢ Credential Recognition ➢ Culture Classes Q7: What needs are ➢ Long-term resettlement ➢ Interpretation Services ➢ English proficiency not currently being ➢ Behavioral health ➢ Transportation ➢ Behavioral health adequately met? ➢ Long-term volunteers

➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Employment ➢ Basic Needs ➢ Basic Needs ➢ Basic Needs Q8: What are ➢ Social Status ➢ Social Status ➢ Social status refugee’s greatest ➢ Healthcare ➢ Healthcare ➢ Healthcare concerns? ➢ Education ➢ Culture/language barriers ➢ Culture/language barriers ➢ Transportation

Table 1: Summary of Findings Page 62 GATE Journal Robert Davis “I think people in Phoenix accept refugees. I have never seen any American treat refugees poorly...” oblivious to the degree to which resettlement is of the community. taking place in Phoenix. Adam (IRC), Ashley (AIRS), Sarah (AIRS), Through her active involvement with the and Allison (CC) all expressed their belief that public, Nancy (IRC) recognizes the importance the local community is very open and willing to of a “welcoming community where structures accept refugees: are set up to allow folks who are on the fringes to become a part of the community.” However, “There are a good number of refugees in there tends to be “a general lack of awareness” AZ. New arrivals are placed in commu- among community members when it comes to nities where refugees are already living. the number of refugees resettling and working People in the area are realizing that, and in Phoenix, “one of the largest receiving cities they are getting more and more used to in the country,” says Macy (CC). Based on her refugees.” experiences working at the IRC, Ellen believes (Sarah, AIRS) Phoenix is generally a welcoming community but qualifies this view saying “perhaps the peo- “There is never worry that refugees are go- ple that tend to gravitate to the IRC are already ing to take ‘our’ jobs. Also, upon arrival, globally-minded and aware.” Georgia (CC) adds they automatically get legal immigration that “whether or not a person is aware of the ref- status and begin working jobs when they ugee concept,” she feels that, “there is an overall have obtained work permits.” (Allison, feeling that this population is a drain on our so- CC) cial services here.” In which case, people do not realize that VOLAGs are purposed for rapidly “I think people in Phoenix accept refugees. preparing refugees to be self-sufficient, ensuring I have never seen any American treat ref- they become contributing members of society. ugees poorly. With my clients, no one has Although the responses varied, participants reported discrimination.” with refugee backgrounds tended to be much (Ashley, AIRS) more optimistic about the host community’s perceptions of refugees. Perhaps, their positive “I truly believe the community accepts experience resettling in the U.S. has shaped refugees warmly. In this environment, I their generalizations about host communities as have not seen any negative perceptions. being accepting. Throughout the resettlement Host communities are very supportive process, refugees can be sheltered from negative in my experience working with refugees.” sentiment by the resettlement staff and volun- (Adam, IRC) teers involved in the resettlement process who actively advocate on their behalf. Although it is Certainly, VOLAGs are keen to readily provide difficult to make generalizations based on the their services to assist refugees, but does this re- limited number of interviews, it is possible that flect the willingness of the larger community to these participants have been sheltered or are in absorb refugee populations? denial of negative sentiments that might exist Some interviewees felt that many people, if within the community, so as to affirm their own aware or when made aware, tend to hold mis- identity as a naturalized citizen and a member conceptions about refugee populations, and that

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 63 refugees within the Phoenix area are particular- ensure a positive understanding of refugee pop- ly vulnerable to existing anti-immigration sen- ulations. timents. Even within a welcoming community, Employer Perceptions refugees can and tend to be stigmatized as being This section integrates Questions 2 and 3, “vulnerable” and “needy”. Although a reality in which evaluates employer’s perceptions of ref- certain cases, this is not entirely representative ugees and the industries that employ refugees of the resilience that refugees exhibit through- (see Table 1). Since misconceptions about ref- out the resettlement process. James (AIRS) be- ugees or anti-immigrant sentiment exist in the lieves that people are prone to stereotyping ref- community, employers can become overly cau- ugees, which is reinforced by mainstream media tious about the risks and legality of hiring ref- coverage: ugees. James (AIRS) explains that “Arizonans “The majority of the time people think refu- have higher walls built because of negative sen- gees are: from Africa, they live in a camp, don’t timents about immigration, [and] many people have water, they are what you see on TV. They equate refugees with illegal immigrants and be- are often portrayed [by the media] as uneducat- lieve they are taking our jobs.” Participants ex- ed, unable to contribute to the community, and plained that when a resettlement agency initially burdensome. Most people think we are stupid engages with new employers, they tend to have for bringing them here because we have enough multiple concerns including communication is- trouble with our own homeless and unem- sues, hiring illegal workers, skills gap, safety, and ployed, so why bring more?” transportation to work site (see Q1 of Table 1). James’ last statement regarding competition for Employer’s perceptions also vary depending employment sheds light on the anti-immigrant on whether they have a long-standing relation- sentiments that exist in Phoenix. Jody (CC) ship with a VOLAG. Georgia (CC) articulates states that “there is absolutely a need to increase how perceptions are influenced by an employ- awareness, but it’s a bit tricky because people er’s experience in hiring refugees: don’t understand the difference between im- “Employers that we work with have had pos- migrants and refugees.” That is, problems arise itive experiences; they will readily pick up the when refugees become confused with “illegal phone and reach out to us if they need more immigrants” due to the negative sentiment in workers. For the new ones, the results vary de- Arizona. pending on the nature of the job. One bad expe- As the responses imply, community percep- rience could deter them from partnering with tions tend to vary depending on an individual’s us later.” understanding of refugee populations. Whereas According to Adam (IRC), initiating sus- a receptive community can positively influence tainable relationships with local employers is a and support the resettlement process, negative result of “good advocacy” on the agency’s be- sentiments can complicate and deter this pro- half by “being on the front-line as a represent- cess. Considering the likeliness that the majori- ing agency of refugee populations.” There are a ty of community members tend to be somewhat number of industries in Phoenix that have inter- unaware of the extent resettlement taking place dependent relationships with VOLAGs and rely and the negative sentiment surrounding immi- on refugees to meet their staffing needs. gration in Arizona, increasing awareness about Although some of these industries overlap, incoming refugee populations could hinder the they generally encompass hospitality and tour- resettlement process. Rather, it is through the ism (including local airports), manufacturing power of advocacy that VOLAGs must work & production, dairy & farm labor, janitorial & from the bottom-up within the community to cleaning services, landscaping, as well as food

Page 64 GATE Journal Robert Davis preparation and dishwashers (see Q3 in Table is essentially a refugee’s ability to fully meet his/ 1). All of these industries depend heavily on her own needs, independent of social services. entry-level positions that necessitate a minimal A list of components necessary to achieve what skill-set and little to no English competency. agencies refer to as rapid self-sufficiency (fo- In a political environment wherein employ- cused on economic aspects) was compiled from ing undocumented immigrants is increasingly the responses: employment, English competen- problematic, legally hiring refugees presents a cy, client motivation, meeting employer expec- philanthropic and viable solution to meeting tations, pre-employment services, and ease of workforce needs. James (AIRS) describes the access to resources (see Q4 in Table 4). These employers that he works with as “willing and services aim to help refugees to overcome barri- anxious to accept more refugees because they ers to employment and are designed to alleviate are good, consistent, and dependable” workers. concerns and misconceptions commonly held Employers that have long-standing relation- by employers. ships with VOLAGs welcome their services and Each participant recognized the importance rely on refugees to meet their staffing needs. of employment with the majority identifying Hence, when reaching out to new employers, it as the most critical step a refugee can take good advocacy helps to overcome employer in becoming self-sufficient, or “economical- fears, establish long-term relationships with lo- ly self-sufficient”, as articulated by Jody (CC). cal employers, and ensure sustainable employ- Allison (CC) points out that “job placement is ment opportunities for new refugee arrivals. the most important step for the self-sufficiency plan of the U.S. Government… [whereby] ref- Refugee Self-Sufficiency ugees are expected to start working as soon as Questions 4, 5, and 6 have been combined possible.” This federal-level influence is founda- in this section (see Table 1) because the ser- tional to the structure of each VOLAG. At the vices offered by VOLAGs are oriented around most basic level, “the resettlement program is ensuring the self-sufficiency of refugees. In the essentially an employment program,” says Sar- context of refugee resettlement, self-sufficiency ah (AIRS), considering most of the services are

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 65 oriented around preparing refugees to support ugee arrivals in reality means that doctors and themselves. engineers drive taxis; previous lecturers work Ashley (AIRS) values employment because as teachers’ assistants; a sociologist works as an according to her “whenever [her] clients find a underground miner, a helicopter pilot becomes job, the obstacles start to diminish.” For the ma- a courier; economists, accountants and teach- jority of the clients, Jody agrees that “yes, em- ers work as cleaners.” (Colic-Peisker & Tibury, ployment is considered a positive step for those 2006, p.213) clients who are ‘well-adjusted’ or without many Studies by Lamba (2003) and Bruno (2011) barriers; [however], for some cases such as have found that a refugee’s human capital such those not quite ready to enter employment, is- as foreign educational credentials and pro- sues manifest [and] can turn into job hopping.” fessional skills tend to hold little value within As far as sustainable employment is concerned, their host communities in the U.S. and Canada. an unstable job history hinders a refugee’s abil- When skilled refugees are forced to accept low- ity to be self-sufficient. Therefore, pre and post skilled jobs in order to meet the demand for im- employment services offered by resettlement mediate economic self-sufficiency, this can have agencies are essential for ensuring rapid job adverse effects on their long-term self-sufficien- placement and employment retention (Halpern, cy. Constable et al., (2004) state that the profes- 2008). sional skills of refugees begin to degenerate with Access to immediate employment within time, which decreases the likeliness that they these industries is suitable for refugees who tend will reach previous levels of professionalism in to have very few skills (relevant in the U.S. labor the future. Ideally, support and services could market) due to limited work experience, educa- be better tailored to match a refugee’s particu- tion, and English proficiency (Bruno, 2011). For lar skillset, thereby ensuring their long-term these unskilled individuals, rapid-employment self-sufficiency by means of gainful employ- can be an empowering step that puts them on a ment, which will benefit the host community in path toward long-term self-sufficiency. Because the long run. VOLAGs are primarily tasked with rapidly em- According to each participant, the key to ploying refugees, available services can fall short long-term employment for skilled and unskilled of meeting additional needs such as persisting refugees is job retention, because it offers a path gaps in language acquisition, job retention, ac- to not just rapid, but long-term self-sufficiency. cess to education, professional certifications, Georgia (CC) prioritizes retention, saying “we and difficulty adjusting, which collectively can will work with them to do anything necessary to result in challenges to long-term self-sufficiency help them keep their position” in order to estab- (AZDES, 2010). lish a job history and begin building a resume Various scholars have criticized resettlement in the US. Such retention-oriented approaches practices for overlooking the skill sets that ref- include follow-up with clients and employers, ugees bring with them, particularly those who interpretation services, job-readiness training, have received a formal education. Bruno (2011) and goal setting (see Q6 in Table 1). Follow-up explains that refugees, who were professionals helps VOLAGs to evaluate the job satisfaction of in their home countries, have their own set of clients, advocate for job promotion, and ensure challenges because they are typically unable to that employee expectations are being met. find comparable jobs in the United States (p.19). Adam (IRC) firmly believes in the impor- Hence, there is a tendency in resettlement coun- tance of job retention for ensuring self-suffi- tries whereby: ciency of his clients: “The loss of occupational status among ref- “Placement is a small part of the process.

Page 66 GATE Journal Robert Davis Everybody can place, but retention is the reci- what about the lingering services that are need- pe for success. Retention guarantees long-term ed, but are not always available?” According to employment, promotion, an increase in hourly VOLAG representatives, there are various un- wage, benefits, and everything else the company met needs that inhibit or hinder self-sufficiency can give to the clients. Plus, reduces the stress amongst refugees. These unmet needs include on the employer…so it’s a win-win situation. We education, recognition of credentials, English place, they stay, we follow-up, we serve new ar- proficiency, interpretation services, transporta- rivals. Retention is number one!” tion, and behavioral health (see Q7 in Table 1). Adam speaks from his experience as a ref- Although these services are critical to the reset- ugee and his many years of experience working tlement process, funds and resources are limited with employers and refugee clients. In general, (Bruno, 2011). although VOLAGs are quite successful in ensur- Ellen (IRC), as did most participants, rec- ing rapid employment for most of their clients, ognizes that “the length of time between refu- a greater focus on job retention is the key to se- gees’ arrival in the United States and when they curing long-term self-sufficiency. There seem are expected to learn English and to be fully to be other factors that lead to job retention be- self-sufficient is not always realistic.” VOLAGs yond just rapid employment. are limited to providing support for only a pe- riod of 90-180 days following refugees’ arrival Unmet Needs and Concerns in order to accommodate the continuous inflow This section presents findings from Ques- of refugees (DoS, 2013). The reality, however, tions 7 and 8 (see Table 1), which are related to is that the resettlement program beginning at unmet needs and concerns voiced by refugees. the federal level is structured as an employment The responses to these questions are combined program with the goal of achieving rapid eco- because some concerns exhibited by refugees nomic self-sufficiency for all incoming refugees. and shared amongst VOALGs shed light on This presents a challenge for Jody (CC) who particular needs that are not being met by re- recognizes that “some clients come from more settlement agencies. The needs and concerns of difficult situations and need more time to ad- refugees go far beyond attaining immediate em- just, but don’t have that luxury” because of the ployment. In fact, their concerns, as articulated nature of the resettlement program. For some by VOLAG representatives, during resettlement clients, Sarah (AIRS) says, “it is hard for them to include language barriers, social status, educa- work because of English skills or age… Clients tion, transportation, basic needs, cultural barri- that are unable to work can get up to 8 months ers, and healthcare (See Q8 of Table 1). of cash assistance from the Department of Eco- All of these concerns vary by refugee, but nomic Security, but after that, they are on their can impact their immediate well-being and own.” The most critical cases involve individuals long-term self-sufficiency. Ellen (IRC) points with behavioral health issues: out that “the fears and concerns people have re- “I wish we could offer more behavioral ally depended on where they came from, what health and more group therapy opportunities situation they are coming from, and what type for people because working with certain refu- of life they were living.” Nancy (IRC) recogniz- gees you begin to notice cases of post-traumatic es that “we here in the US really push for em- stress disorder and depression. Part of the issue ployment, and we front load the training that is that we are only able to serve so many people we do in order to get refugees employed and through the funding that we have, and there is self-sufficient,” but remains concerned “about also the refugee’s willingness to receive that be- the long-term… what happens after 5 years and havioral health help (Nancy, IRC).

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 67 For individuals that suffer from behavioral dishwasher or a cleaner, understandably so. The health issues, it’s not just a lack of appropriate way the employment program is set up here… services that inhibits them from being helped, requires them to be willing to take the first job.” but also the fear of a stigmatizing diagnosis. James (AIRS) recognizes that “if [refugees] There are therefore a variety of circumstanc- can’t speak [English], it will hold them back es that pose challenges to self-sufficiency of from a lot,” even if they have skills. It is thus im- vulnerable refugees, making them more sus- portant that services are provided to empower ceptible to unemployment and homelessness. refugees to utilize the skills they already have as Although some refugees arrive with mini- well as enable them to master the English lan- mal skill sets, there are also those that arrive with guage so as to enable them to better embark on professional experience and foreign degrees. the road to self-sufficiency. Adam (IRC) recognizes that “some refugees ex- press concerns about education; however, this is Discussion not the primary goal for refugee resettlement.” According to the VOLAG representatives, Allison (CC) and Nancy (IRC), respectively, ar- perceptions related to refugees held by Arizo- ticulate this dilemma well: nans vary. Some community members support “...everything is being done well, except for refugee initiatives, others are against any such educational needs. Some refugees come with endeavors, and yet other groups are oblivious or educational backgrounds…doctors come with impartial in their views of refugees relocating to their credentials, some with master’s or bache- Arizona. This does not come as a surprise con- lor’s…the goal is to employ them as fast as pos- sidering that community perceptions are seldom sible. We try to have their degrees evaluated to homogeneous. VOLAG representatives were see if the credentials match US standards, but generally optimistic about the receptiveness ex- most people aren’t able to continue in their field pressed by the greater Phoenix community in of study.” relation to refugees. However, limited evidence “We do as much as possible, though it is was provided to substantiate these claims. The difficult for a former doctor or engineer. Some tendency for some interviewees to regard the folks in those positions may be unwilling to be a Phoenix community as receptive to refugees can

Page 68 GATE Journal Robert Davis be attributed to the postulation that community Southwestern communities are often concerned members who collaborate with VOLAGs gen- that immigrants, particularly undocumented erally exhibit a level of global awareness and Mexican workers, are taking locals’ jobs. In the genuine compassion towards displaced peo- case of Arizona, VOLAG representatives in- ples. Perhaps the community’s receptiveness to- terviewed in this study bemoaned the fact that wards refugees is attributable to the communi- their efforts towards resettlement and job place- ty’s recognition of the ordinary experiences that ment are often complicated by some community more accurately characterize displaced peoples members’ inability to differentiate between ref- (Marlowe, 2009). The espousal of such positive ugees and illegal immigrants. attitudes towards refugees allows community Refugee resettlement in Arizona has not members to regard them as “peers in social life, faced notable confrontation by the greater capable of meaningful contributions to family, Phoenix community in part due to a general community, and society” (p.190). Positive per- lack of awareness regarding the occurrence and ceptions, therefore, might reflect both the phil- extent of the refugee resettlement initiatives in anthropic desire among community members the region. This state of oblivion may, however, to help refugees, but also the recognition of the render refugees vulnerable to anti-immigrant contributions that new residents have to offer. sentiments, especially if the distinction between On the other hand, negative sentiments to- refugees and immigrants is unclear to the host ward refugees are generally informed by a vari- community. From a community development ety of misconceptions, fears, or ill assumptions perspective, it can be argued that the views held that portray refugees as needy, unable to con- by the community members towards resettled tribute, and/or are a drain on social services. refugees can enhance or hinder the integration Attitudes of this nature can be explained by the of refugee populations. Perceptions held by ‘narrative of trauma’, which tends to overempha- community members can create environments size the extraordinary experiences of refugees of inclusion that empower refugees to mean- (Kirmayer & Narasiah, 2011, Pumariega, 2005, ingfully contribute to their new communities. Birman & Basu, 2005). Such hardline character- Conversely, negative perceptions towards refu- izations of refugees overlook their resilience and gee populations can hinder refugee integration meaningful integration in the community and in any given community and hamper efforts to- propagate accounts that may influence the ways wards self-sufficiency. in which they view themselves. In a political environment wherein employ- The findings coincide with the spectrum of ing undocumented immigrants is increasingly views, both for and against, the enforcement of problematic, the legality of employing refugees Arizona’s immigration laws, which has certain- presents a viable solution to meeting the work- ly faced opposition but generally purports the force needs faced by many American based busi- existence of anti-immigration sentiments that nesses. For instance, a variety of industries in the are encapsulated by Arizona Senate Bill 1070. Phoenix area are dependent on an entry-level The bill aims “to discourage and deter the un- workforce and as a result, such industries are re- lawful entry and presence of illegal aliens and ceptive of refugee populations. These industries economic activity by persons”. According to Es- are suitable for unskilled refugees who have lim- ses (2012), negative attitudes towards immigra- ited work experience, education, and English tion often arise when the host community feels proficiency (Bruno, 2011). Similar industries in it must compete with immigrants for economic Australia, however, have been accused of con- resources, as is the case in Arizona. Similarly, structing low-level employment niches that lim- Martinez-Brawley and Zorita (2001) state that it upward mobility through structural and dis-

Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement GATE Journal Page 69 criminatory practices (Colic-Piesker & Tibury, nomic and cultural life.” (DoS, 2014) 2006). VOLAGs in Arizona try to mitigate In order to substantiate these federal-level employer exploitation of refugees by establish- claims about refugee resettlement, more research ing transparent and long-standing partnerships ought to be conducted to evaluate: the influence with the employers by conducting follow-up ap- of the socio-political climates, at the host com- pointments with employed refugees. munity level, on the reception of refugees as well Despite the fact that VOLAGs in Arizona as on refugees’ likelihood of attaining self-suf- are largely successful in achieving rapid employ- ficiency; the economic and social contributions ment for refugees, this focus often falls short in that refugees offer to host communities; and, the terms of achieving long-term self-sufficiency. impact of participatory research approaches to Skilled refugees are perhaps the most underuti- refugee needs assessment and creation of inter- lized and underrepresented category of refugees. ventions that facilitate self-sufficiency amongst The findings indicate that there are a numer- refugees and community integration. ous unmet needs, as articulated by VOLAGs, U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) which inhibit refugees’ attainment of long-term has expressed a commitment to adapting their self-sufficiency. From a grassroots community services to “meet the changing needs of refu- development perspective, this problem can be gees” (DoS, 2014). In light of this commitment, remedied through active engagement of refugee resettlement programs ought to look beyond populations in the further identification of un- “[achieving] economic self-sufficiency as quick- met needs and the creation of interventions that ly as possible after arrival in the United States” can address long-term and sustainable mea- (AZDES, 2014) and expand programs that en- sures to attaining refugee self-sufficiency. -Un sure independence in the long-run. As the derstandably, VOLAGs have limited resources, findings suggest, the current approach to reset- but perhaps educating the broader host com- tlement fails to recognize the varying needs of munities as to the benefits of catering to refugee refugees required to attain long-term self-suffi- populations can foster an environment in which ciency. Thus, RRP should consider implement- the host community takes ownership of the sit- ing a two-pillared approach focused on long- uation and endeavors to develop strategies that term economic self-sufficiency by the means of complement and complete the initiatives and extensive employment and educational services. programs created by VOLAGs. A restructured focus would benefit incoming refugees by empowering them to learn English Conclusion and enhance their skill set, thereby leading to The following excerpt from the 2014 Pro- gainful long-term employment. posal for Refugee Admissions provides a some- Considering federal funding for resettle- what picturesque view of refugee resettlement ment is already limited, VOLAGs should ex- in the America: plore the possibility of community resources “While starting life anew in the United States and partnerships. For instance, within the busi- presents considerable challenges, it also creates ness community, VOLAGs can work in con- unparalleled hope and provides opportunity for junction with local employers to capitalize on a new beginning for tens of thousands of per- corporate social responsibility (CSR) opportu- sons each year. The support and assistance that nities. CSR is the means by which companies average Americans provide to these newcomers work to positively impact the communities greatly helps them integrate into our country. within which they operate. Employers can con- Refugees add to America’s vitality and diversity tribute to some of the unmet needs by providing by making substantial contributions to our eco- educational incentives to their employees (e.g.

Page 70 GATE Journal Robert Davis language acquisition classes). Such opportuni- Department of State [DoS](2014). Proposed refugee ties that facilitate upward mobility would em- admissions for fiscal year 2014 report to the con- power refugees, particularly unskilled refugees. gress. Retrieved April 2, 2014 from www.state.gov. A more in-depth understanding of the needs of refugees would facilitate the identification of ap- Esses, V.M., Brochu, P.M., & Dickson, K.R. (2012). Economic costs, economic benefits, and attitudes propriate community-based resources that can toward immigrants and immigration. Analyses of be allocated towards refugees to enable them Social Issues and Public Policy, 12(1), 133-137. to attain long-term self-sufficiency. Converse- ly, host communities can also be involved in Fazel, M., Wheeler, J. & Danesh, J. (2005). Prevalence the co-construction of interventions that facil- of serious mental disorder in 7000 refugees reset- itate refugees’ attainment of self-sufficiency and tled in western countries: A systematic review. The Lancet 365.9467, 1309-1314. community integration. International Rescue Committee [IRC](2014). Re- trieved on February 27, 2014 from www.rescue.org References Arizona Department of Economic Security [AZDES] Kirmayer, L.J., et, al. (2011). Common mental health (2013). Refugee arrivals by nationality and ffy of problems in immigrants and refugees: General resettlement. Retrieved on December 28, 2013 approach in primary care. Canadian Medical As- from www.azdes.gov. sociation Journal, 183(12), E959-E967.

Arizona Department of Economic Security [AZDES]. Lamba, N.K. (2003). The Employment Experiences (2014). Refugee resettlement program. Retrieved of Canadian Refugees: Measuring the Impact of on January 1, 2014 from www.azdes.gov. Human and Social Capital on Quality of Em- ployment. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Birman, D., Basu, A. (2005) Refugees. Encyclopedia of Canadienne de Sociologie, 40(1), 45-64. applied developmental science (pp.912-915). New York: Sage. Marlowe, J.M. (2010). Beyond the discourse of trauma: Shifting the focus on Sudanese refugees. Journal of Britten, N. (2006). Qualitative interviews. Qualitative refugee studies, 23(2), 183-198. Research in Health Care, 3,12-20. Martinez-Brawley, E.E., & Zorita, P.M. (2001). Immi- Bruno, A. (2011). US refugee resettlement assistance. grants, refugees and asylum seekers: the challenge New York: Diane Publishing. of services in the Southwest. Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Social Work, 10(3), 49-67. Constable, J., Wagner, R., Childs, M., & Natoli, A. (2004). Doctors become taxi-drivers: recognizing Pumariega, A.J., Rothe, E. (2005). Mental health of skills-not as easy as it sounds. Office of Employ- immigrants and refugees. Community mental ment Equity and Diversity, Public Employment health journal, 41(5), 581-597. Office, Premier’s Department of NSW. Sydney. Refugee Council USA [RCUSA] (2014). U.S. refugee Colic-Peisker, V., & Tilbury, F. (2006). Employment resettlement program. Retrieved on March 27, niches for recent refugees: Segmented labor mar- 2014 from www.rcusa.org ket in twenty-first century Australia. Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(2), 203-229. Schwandt, T.A. (2007). The Sage dictionary of qualita- tive inquiry. New York: Sage. Department of State [DoS] (2013). Report to Con- gress: proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency (2016). Resettle- 2014. Retrieved on April 12, 2014 from www. ment. Retrieved November 28, 2016 from www. state.gov unhcr.org.

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