I. IA-""""~'~ Mr Brooker Mr Cooke O/R 'L

P.02

FROM.: TONY BEETON TPU 15 SEPTEMBER 1993

cc WPUS (~~fl+ . .,,.E Mr-Fe¥· 1.f Thomas o/r Mr Steele Mr Williams Mr Shannon I. IA-""""~'~ Mr Brooker Mr Cooke o/r 'l. . L C'l..~-"' (JI../ Mrs Collins Mr Leach ~ Mr Marsh J..t>.~ Mr Archer, RID

MR BELL

SPANISH HANDLING IN ETA I have recently received copies of a number of the papers which were presented to the Law, Society and Terrorism Conference held in Ofiati in Spain from 5-7 May this year. Although I have not yet had a chance to read through all of these I thought colleagues might be interested in the attached contribution from Adrian Guelke and Steven Greer comparing the RUC and the Basque Ertzaintza.

2. If you and other recipients are interested I will circulate other relevant papers from the Conference when I have sorted them. Perhaps I might also take this opportunity to welcome the notion floated by John Steele in his 20 August minute to Graham Archer of a programme for Ivor Roberts which would enable interested parties to explore these matters further. I should like very much to be involved in anything that takes place.

(SIGNED)

I TONY BEETON . TPU 15 SEPTEMBER 1993 OAB . EXT 6564 RESTRICTED SC/SIL/21902

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THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY AND THE AUTONOMOUS BASQUE POLICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Adrian. Guelke, University of Wirwarersrand, Suwh .1frica & Steven Grur, University of Bristol, Engiand

This paper will compare the Royal Ulster Constabula.rv (RUC) and the Autonomous Basque: Police (Errzai,zr...a) in the following respects: ·' . .

History Origins and Jnstituiionai Foundarion.r Kei Characrerisrics Counter-turorisr Function Key Issues in Currem Debarr! ahout Each Force

CONCLUSION

The succ~ uf lht: rcfur111 of policing in the .Basque country stands in marked conm.1st to ics relative failure in Northem Ireland. It may seem unfair to apply che cerm "failur~" to lhc: ri:::ionned RUC, e5pcciaUy in light of its survival of the onslaught from. Loyalists foUowing the signing uf 1.1.c: Anglo-Irish Agreement in November I 98~. lt can aJso bt: argut:d Lhal Lhe RUC has played a crucial role in sustaining the viability ot" l)irect Rule from London. However. fairly or unfairly, the RUC remains a focus oi t.:umruvcrsy and continues -:o be regard~ by narionafut opinion in Northern Ireland wirh a considt:mbk mc::asurc of suspicion~ though the inrensity of the suspicion varies . wiudy across the na.tionalist poHticaJ spectrum. What accounts for the difference in the suc.:t.:i::ss uf Lhc: Errzainrza and the RUC and what, if any, are the: Jc:5suns lhat might be learned from it ?

The most import.am conrrast :stems from ttc: difference in the nature of the two conflicts. Ar first sight, ::TA· s war against th: Spanis·h state paraJleb the Provisional IRA' s war against the British statt:. But th.i.s superficial similarity masks Che absence t;f serious inrerc:ommunal l:u11nict bctwer:n Basques and immigrantl J\ from other pans of Spain in rl1e Basqu~ r~giun. a dc:grt:t: of ·cen:sion notwithstanding. The intensity or communal antagonisms in Northern hc:land. on the other hand, .,

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gi.vc:s the conflict there a powerful internal dynamic which limits the contribution whidr th~ British state can make towards reform of the law and order system .u part of a solution to the wider problem. This is not to say chat official British responses to the c.;uni1it.:t in Northern Ireland cannot be faulteri: Indeed, succ~.s.iv-e British governments have frequently undercut their own rer"ormi5t .agenda .on the law and order front by their responses to security crises occasioned by atrocities. Dut even if such mi.stakes had been avoided, the differences in political conte,:t would have militated against. the RU C achieving the same level of public acceptance D hD the Enzainrza.

The absence of devoi ved institution::; m Nurl.11ern Irdand ·1s another importam dit't~rence between rhe rwa regions. The e:cistc:nce of an autonomous government in the Basque country to which the Enzai,uuz is responsible has been a vital factor in the force's legitimacy. The same cannot ::,e said of the experience of devolved institution~ in Northern lreland in the 1922-72 period. However, it can still be argued that the ere.anon of a Iegirimate regional government remains a necessary condition fur the: uJlimaLe success of reformed policing there.

The view that the full legitimisation of the RUC, (or whatt:vc:r name is given t0 a Northern Ire!and police service in thi:s wnt1!xL), is contingent upon the achievemenr of a politic.:al seLLlerm::nL is um: Lhat has be:n consistently. a.dvana:d by the Social Democratic and Labour Pany (SDLP) in No:thern Ireland. The problem wirh · rhis approach is Lhal the prospecrs for a political seLtkment remain poor. It also begs the yu~:sliun uf what ·can be done in the intc::im to improve the security situation, not least so as Lu c::nha110:: the prospect.-; for a ·Nider solution. The creation of local police forces in Nonhern Ireland h~ been suggested by Dc5mond Fennell and has been recently support!!d by Sc::amus Mallon of -:he SDLP as a possible way forward. Unfommatc::Iy. tht: suc.:cc:ss uf the! Eru.aimz.a c:i.5ts doubt on these proposals. There has been a long rradirion of munc.:ipal policing throughout Spain and the Basque country. But tht:: c.:realiun uf the Errz.ainrza. whilst decentralising policing t'rorn Spain cu., the region has tendt:d alsu LU <.:enLrali:;e it with provincial forces abolished and municipal fon.:i::s inc.:rcasiugly marginalised. A tradition of local polidng has never existt::t.i in Nurtilern Ireland, nor is there much sen:sc in trying to manufacture it artificially. Howevt:r, tht:: <.:rca(iun of loc::al poiice forces responsible to local aurhoriries, but subject to supervision by thi: British and· Irish states. might ~nhance the acc.:~t.abiliry of the police in many parts of Northern Ireland. And given the supporr which Sea.mus Mallon has given tht:: iuC"~. such· forces might al.so have

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rather more succe:ss than the R UC has had in attract.in&; recruits from the Catholic -community.

Tht: problem is if local forces were to be created for Northern lrcland it would probably be desira.bk in the context of the deep communal divi.sion.s ·therc, to limit their 1.:oumc:r-terrorist role so as to prevent their militarfaation. The experience with the Basque Autunumuu.s Pulice :;hould help to allay fears that local police sc:rvicc:.s mi~hL lhemsel ves become the captive of paramilitary organilation.s. That . predictably was ~he objection from U nionist.s to Mallon' 3 :suggc:stion and an initial, fear with respect to ETA penetration of the: Ertzaina.a. Such · but largely groundless, ~- . all initiative in Northern Ireland might 'usefully draw on the, success of power- sharing at the district council level to buttress police: legitimacy. It would also provide a way of implementing in pan the. recommendation of the Hunt Committee for the civiliani~tiun uf pufo.:in~ in Northern rreland. The existence of civilian polidng at any lc:::vd would hc:lp to narrow the gulf bcrwccn the province and other functioning liber&.1-

Another, arguably better way forward, and an important element in the joint aull1urity JJl'UJJO~ advanced by O'Leary and McG.arry, would be to extend co operation betw~ the British and Irtsh government5 in this field. As O'Lary and McGarry mRinr;iin:

i11 jwit ·ouc: 11::11:.011 wby the: UK suc.c hAA nnt effectively reform~ Northcm In:lanJ becau.sc: it is a British ~tate. A fully ~wcl Iri!ih ui111c:rmiu11 (to match a British dimension) is i.adispc:nsahlc ,o promote and implement su~witivc: rcfonm whidl would hencrit chc Irish muiun11list minu1ity i;, Northern Irc:land and ~sure it genuine ~ual ciriunship. The: pn:sc:nc; uf the lrii1h Jiuvamment aad iu so..."\.lrity forces. and II jointly ,;upcrvi,-:1 ~uncy 1tpp1tnt1us will mllitc the lcKitimacc: pulicin~ or" nacion~tist p:ir.unili1xry viulcn~c mui;h cw.,c:r tu ~ompiisb. 0cc: firm Jc:5500 or Irish llis,ory is that lri!.h n:uiumtlisc:. an: must suc~full:, 1.·uc:ri.:cJ by official.5 from a h:~mm:ue Irish stare::. Inde:.d hard-lind law 11.0cJ urticr zealots should note that under any sy,m:m of joint :iu1hun1y the opporrunitie, tor effectively 11uminis\Ol"CU and i.:~1..,:,pc:1acivc rcprc::ssion of pa111JJUli1.11.ric., ans v

Thus, a Northern rreland police force based on a re.formc;

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with 1rdand. Unionists reacted Republic to police Northern office:s from the Irish cross Seamu.s Mallon, that a special recenc suggestion made by hostility to another given the tackle terrorism. Furthermore, police force be created to border the border, it might be a opinion north a.nd south 1,f differ~nces between Catholic be Republic would necessarily police officers from the Irfah mistake to suppose that is with Northern CathoHcs. It able to establish close relations well received and be in Sri wh~d1 Indian troops faced they would encounter the difficulties unlikely that not to be mken for by Northern Catholics ought Lanka. BuL their easy. reception granted. make the in Nortnern Ireland society • Admittedly, the deep divisions a.n indefinite continuation However, the prospect or Basque case an inexact analogy. _n to by scandal or by hasty reactio which re!:form is undermined of the cycle in in an initiative rhe risks rhat mi~hl be entailed is even less inviting than atrocities, imlirect, from the Ba~ue to learn some lessons, howevf!r based upon an atternpr IDCicty in the by wide .scr:;Lions of Basque The confidence expressed experience. be. The best way large the benefits could Basque Police shows how Autonomous upon lhe Anglo-Irish appears to lie in b~ilding for Northern Ireland thus forward for the supervi.sion of the a joint British-Irish Commis-sil,n · agreement by creating Country, but Commission for the Basque lines of the· Joint Security RUC along the of Northern Siochana m police any part permitting officers from the Garda without Commi~sion could then of the British-Irish Police The reducrion in the role Ireland. respon:sibilicy from succc:ssful devolution oi political be made contingt!nt upon basis of power sharing. London ro &:lfasc on the:

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Archer 393/93 From: GR Dept Republic of Ireland Date.: ~3 B PSiPUS cc: Fell B PS/Mr B Mr Thomas B Mr Bell B Mr Williams B Mr Brooker B Mr Cooke B Mrs Collins B Mr Leach ¼/a..e-ru...-; ~ Mr Steele B POLICE) ERTZAINTZA (BASQUE rt::_· OF ETA: THE SPANISH HANDLING Madrid .J1.r d•Affaires in ~ t .o our Charge add to their X recently suggested the Embassy_could Basque 1. be helpful if terrorism in the that it might the fight against formation, reporting on comments on the earlier us have fuller force. I commented country and let the Basque police view and success of to have the Embassy's d deployment useful the force had it would be particularly views on whether that to be various as there seemed a success. the been copy letter from from the enclosed the local police You will see he believes that with 2. in Bilbao that have also helped Consul-General the public and is succeeded with Guard. This force~ role of the Civil to terrorism of the in which attitudes the acceptance a background out in his covering against Roberts points was local admittedly but as Ivor in which there were changing a local force changes in existence of 6ackground for letter the to establish the confidence helped attitude. to make letter his offer ETA repeats in his efforts against 3. Ivor Roberts on Spanish will contact for discussions in October. He himself available United Kingdom could arrange return to the offer up, we on his wish to take this room. Alternatively, then. If you in the VCR visit me attend a conference for him to for Ivor . to in arranging I see him. would be interested me know before if you you would let Belfast, perhaps l~,G~~ ID 4055

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never formally dissolved, it effectively ,his force was exile the Jisappeared when the Basque Government went into following year. HISTORY OF POLlCE (copy of s. Following the publication of the 1979 Royal Decree at Annex A) a Police Academy was formed outside relevant Article _e and a group of 75 officers began training. Thes vitoria Guards", provided officers, who were initially called "Security (escort duties etc) for Basque Government security services recruited from Ministers and officials. Police trainers were _foreign sources, including the British security local and the Head of the company, Argen. And the Spanish Army provided By February 1982 when the Police Academy was new force. to 140. The first inaugurated the group of 75 officers had grown then joined the Academy and of these 600 were 700 police cadets Xh.eir commissioned in October 1982 to form the ERTZAINTZA. traffic control and the security of Basque Government duties were throughout the offices. Details of their progressive deployment Basque Country are at Annex B. force was in rural 6. The early deployment of the Basque Police an average of 600 cadets passing out of the Police td areas, with no easy task. Academy each year. Their acceptance was, however, circles in Madrid and in the other security agencies In official for those there was mistrust of the force. It was difficult the Basque Police from the myth that all Spaniards to separate proved wrong Basques supported terrorism. Fortunately time has that the Ertzaintza could not be trusted in an the view of mistrust which anti-terrorist role. As well as the climate the Ertzaintza's relations with other security overshadowed rema.ined agencies, the eventual role and size of the force however the Basque force began to win the undefined. Slowly agencies, of the public. unlike officers of the other confidence origin. He the Basque policeman is on the whole of Basque his duties in the Basque Country where his family carries out increased so it bonds and friends are. As the number of officers to have a friend in the force. Which was become less strange in police new to Basques as under Franco their presence something friend was, if not forces were rare and to have a policeman as a frowned upon. ·The Basque police officer suspect, certainly more became part of the local con'lll\unity and not the therefore Their acceptance has traditional "police officer of occupation". l extent that a recent study has shown that the grown to the population is acceptance of the Basque Police among the local above 85%, apparently high for an European country. to too the Ertzaintza took on more responsibilities 7. Slowly be involved in the point that in the late 80s they began to work. Having started to win the hearts of the anti-terrorist who in 1990 or people, they posed a significant threat to ETA

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a document written by an ETA convict, Jose Javier ;.si1 produced on "how to ,abaleta Elosegui 11 WALD0°, which gave instructions Police". The approach 0 WALDO" suggest7d was a fight the Basque force in order selective one; to choose individuals within the them, run them down, ·associate them with the former to slander their families regime, - and generally make the iives of t .hem and can sap individuals morale and t~e unbearable. such campaigns a officer, unlike his Spanish force counterpart in Basque Police the Basque similar situation, cannot be transferred out of posting. Some 50 officers were targetted and country to another Interior by the newspaper EGIN (an ETA mouthpiece). The attacked by a veto on any Department of the Basque Government respQnded and an "all-doors-open" attitude to any other contact with EGIN on any newspaper or media which wished to receive information individual or on the Basque Police. was next significant date in the hi'story of the force 8. · The (which .iD.c.liuied August 1990 when the Basque Security Council to the Basque Country) signed an agreement for ·-Madrid's delegate Civil Guard and the Ertzaintza to take over more duties from the Police. The civil Guard would continuerKto police the National extra-national the coasts, frontier and airports and perform drugs and terrorism). ·~he National Police would ·- duties (eg and the restrict their activities to the major cities, approximately j Ertzanintza, whose numbers were to increase from take over the duties the other forces vacated 3000 to 7500, ' would is seen higher profile anti-terrorist role. This act including a proved to its as the coming of age of the Ertzaintza which had that it had the will to weed out early ETA --- former detractors fight to ETA. attempts to infiltrate it and then to carry .the with their acceptance by the general public and 9. Hand in hand of the Basque the evolution of their duties, grew an appreciation by their former detractors. Cooperation Police's professionalism now very strong. between them and the other security forces is high profile joint operations with the An example is their often the something which would have been unacceptable to Civil Guard, fair to say that public only a few years ago. I believe it is the Civil ·Guard and th~ National Police have stronger at present each other. links with the Ertzaintza than they have with against ETA are also mounting, the most ERTZA!NTZA successes ring. recent being the arrest on 6 3uly of the ETA extortion not to target 10. ETA has maintained a political decision as victims of their outrages. However, this Ertzaintza officers of the did not deter them from killing the first commander Army officer. In the course of their duties force, a Spanish lives, against ETA, four other officers have lost their Police officer seconded to the Ertzaintza. including a National that an ETA's "political" decision was taken in the knowledge on the life of an Ertzantza would provoke a public open attempt Government are outcry. Now that ETA is on the ropes, the Basque

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c PRONI CENT/1 /22/1 OA RESTRICTED -4- unwilling to predict that ETA will not, in some desperate attempt to attract attention, try to assassinate a misguided ~ Basque policeman. are at 11. Details of the Ertzaintza's ~tructure and duties Annexes c and D.

COMMENT is only one of the four strands of the l2. Police action 14 of the Government's strategy against terrorism (paragraph Despatch of 23 March). For the homeland of ETA's Terrorism as ·"Franco's terrorism it is, I believe, a crucial strand. Seen the Basque country to do spe.l,ls of duty men and re·cruited outside of the civil Guard had no chance of winning the hearts inside it, Franco's the Basque public. They were a poignant reminder of days _and they were ammunition for ETA's cause. The repressive wb.-e.re the home grown Ertzaintza have succeeded with the public never could. The Ertzaintza's high profile civil Guard by anti-terrorist role has also helped the civil Guard their anti-terrorist role in the eyes of the legitimizing has changed p~blic. The attitude of the public towards terrorism last five years or so. And while it is dramatically in the to difficult to judge exactly how ~uch of this is attri.batable a more normal police force than with an "army of living with Ertzantza's i occupation", there is no doubt in any mind that the contribution has been significant. was going 13. Should ETA have remained strong while this change might not be worth a row of beans. But ETA is on on, all this .therefore the wane and the reduction in their power base, and ability throughout Spain is not only due to their operational it government successes against them and to French cooperation, to the ground swell of opinion against them in is also due which in today's more open Basque society. The Ertzaintza, has grown from a fledgling, sometimes mistrusted, thirteen years and Spanish/Basque experiment to a professional community police force has played a significant- role in this anti-terrorist fight process. It is one of several success stories in the against ETA.

ALISTAIR McKENZIE

RESTRICTED P.06 ANNEX A

~RTICLE 17 OF THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY OF

THE BASQUE COUNTRY, INCLUDING TRANSITORY PROVISION FOUR ' of updating of thi~ Article 17.-1 .- By means of the process provided for in the First ~jcneral system of Traditional, Re.g ionc:31 law shall lie with Additional Pr·ovision of th'e Constitution, respon_sibility the manner set out in th is \he institutions of the Basque Country, in the Autonomous Police Statute, tor the general organization of and property and the Forces in respect of the protection of persons territory; the maintaining of public order within the autonomous in all cases responsibility State Security forces and Corps retairiing nature. such for police services of an extra- and supra-community ~~nd fror1tiers, customs, as guarding ports, airports, c·oasts territory of Soaniards controlling the entry and exit frorn national extradition i.-!l)C: and foretcJn(r:-s, w~nerai organization of u!1endge, oassports and naticni.,! c~xpulsion. emigration and immigration. protection of the State . identity cards , arms and explosives. f1scai srnugglinq dnd rax fraud involving th~: Starn. Police forces 2. Suu,cme command of the Bssoue Autonon,.cus Country, without shJll lit~ with the GovemmP.nt c~ ::-: ,:"· Basque 1"(; : ,, t11e Prov1·n •\.-,I' •,'•• .: , j 1 '7"'-~ '.' ··,:, \,' r.,s•:. ~-· j • • I, I •• .. · · ~·•t 'I,,. ... ~, ' •' • ' •' ... :,i ll(-ii cc.:, '(' ·h~ ' ')OW,,·- • s ' I I <:;.i • t'')~r I • , ·' .• ., •,; ' , ., •. ' ..... Counc:is r,nr~ !ocal Corporations,

tl~C Auwr1orr1ous Po!ici.: 4. F1.)r n1 c> :3i:lke of co-operation :)elween ,rnd Corps, tliere shall be d Forcas E:1:0 ~t~(~ State Security Fo:-ces of rci:,resenrntivr:!:-s $,3curitv Coi1'1::ii con$isting of an equ,1 : :1trn".bt:ir . of tt,c S:~;(3 ~1:1ci of the Autono11-;cws CD11,rrnwitv of th13 Basquf~ Coun:rv 5. i;;ili,i:iv :t:e Autonomous P,;!ice Forces sh,~11 C() !,1p: :s,::: i i10 w the Provi nc;al CoL: ncii uf (, ' Hrn Co.-:1s of« Mi nones), belona. •·· ., A!av;;, cu!·:-ei:tlv in existence. nepencient on the bi Th(i Cor:.,s of «Mirior,es)) and <

of the preceding numb<~rs, •,. ;\~otwithstanding the stipulations Forces may intervene in thn 7he Stotc Securi'Cy Corps and Autonomous Comn~unity ir1 the maintenance of public order in the fc)ilowing cases: the Basque Country. a) Wher:i called upon by the Governmentof request of the same. Intervention shal! cease at the they consider that the general il) On their own initiative, when .. The approval of the ot the State is gravely compromised •nter<~st article shall be referred ir1 number 3 ot this Security Council to the u:.~ency and in order to fulfil rr:qu iri~d. In cases of particular thern by the Constitution, the Siate l ut'C:!ons directly 0ntrusted to interverie directly under the sole Sc-!curitv Corps and Forces rnay which shall report to tl1e Spanish n?.sponsibiiity of the Government, r i i a rn e n t, t h r o u g h n t . Trn: S pa n i s h State Pa S t a t e Pa r ! i a me it. exercise ·the powers invested in c:onst !tutional procedures. rnay or of a state of alarm, exception 7. in the case of the declaration Basque Countrv shall come uri

' ( bPRONI CENT/1/22/10A powers 0nd into force of this Stat~ite, the On the corn1nu General ..... time been transferred to the •·ei;ources that h\,·/e, by that to have been turned over Basque Councii shall be de~med def in itiveiy. at the time ot the 3 r;ohts of any kind or natu·re held All tH.::quireri or other staff attached to state services 1ransfer by civil se·;vants and transferred shall be respected. public institutior·s due to be

made in education matters, 1. Transfers that are to be Third. State in the or staff, currently used by the whether of property in its services, shall be effected Basque . Country to perform and schedules to be est8blish.ed accordance with the programmes in the seconci Tr11nsitorv~ Committee set uo' bv. the Joint Transfer . Provision. be made to t!,e of education services shall 2. The transfer the C(,se to the Provincial Councils, as .'·, 1ionomous Community or :· V be. o f the Counc:; to be set up tJy virtue Fourth. 1 ne Security the Statute, reguiations, of anicle 17, shall decide on provisions Po 1ice F:) rces, recruitment of t:ie Autonomous staff, numbers and th(~ shaii be apooi_nted from am9nr: whose positions of command Armed _Forces and Se.curit.y CoqJs Chiefs and Officers of the State Forces, shall be in the administrative who, while serving in these . o-n the Autonomous to be established in the Law situation that the Ministries Df Po lice Forces, or in the situation Communities' in this situation Interior may decide, and while Defence and of the any law. Licences for arms shall in stlall be excluded from military the State alone. case be the responsibility of

to be established for t h e The Joint Transfers Committee Fifth. the appropr·iate of this Statute shall conclude application rnay assunie wtiereby the Autonomous Community agreements Security, whi lst economic system of the Social rnanagement of the 1n and the pr.inciple of solidarity, respecting its unified nature I time limits and arrangen1ents I accordance with the procedures, for the sake ot orderly management. contained in such agreements 19.2 in execution provided for in/article Sixth. 'The co-ordination to the in the event of the State's occor·ding . shall be applicable of a new on a concession basis, the use Autonomous Community, for the State and set up specifically television channel owned by area of the Basque Country, under broadcasts within the territorial the aforesaid concession. the terms to be laid down in +&9-

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.Annex B

BASQUE POLICE DEPLOYMENT CALANDER

of :Police Academy deployed on October 82 - First graduates traffic control duties and the custody of of Basque Government buildin~s J in the towns of Arrasate, October 84 - Officers deployed Beasain, Bergara and ourango

in Gernika-Luno, Ondarroa and August 85 - Officers deployed Tolosa

i~ Balmaseda, Getxo, Zarautz and May 86 - Officers deployed zumarraga

August 88 Officers deployed in Erandio

Galdakao, Hernani August 89 Officers deployed in Azkoitia, and Andoain

Renteria and Eibar January 91 - Officers deployed in Llodio,

September 91 - Officers deployed in Laguardia

Muskiz and sestaro September 92 - Officers deployed in

May 93 Officers deployed in Basauri

San Sebastian .December 93 - Officers to be deployed in

Early 94 Officers to be deployed in Irun

October 94 Officers to be deployed in Bilbao

Deployment August 95 Officers to be deployed in Vitoria. calender ends.

will be deployed, NotQ: By the end of the process 7,500 officers representing one officer for every 280 inhabitants.

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BASQUE POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE & DUTIES the Basque Government Security Council the forca is overseen bv 1995. reoresentatives of central Government. Until which includes headed by a the force will be fully deployed, it will be when involvement will Spanish Army Officar. Thereafter Spanish Army cease.

I. LAW & ORDER (Estimated 5 , 500 officers)

Law & Order Division comprising; Police stations Traffic police Institutional custody squad SOS rescue squad Police band - Resources allocated to the Law & Order Division: Mobile brigade Explosives deactivation unit Escort squad SWAT squad Airbourn (helicopters) unit DIVISION II. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION & JUDICIAL POLICE (Estimated 1,500 officers) - Criminal investigation & judicial police division comprising; criminal investigation unit Judicial police unit Gaming & gambling division Intelligence unit - Scientific Police Division comprising; Forensic unit Documentatior1 unit

III. SECURITY TRAINING DIVISION - Police selection & steering division - Police training division - Admin & general services division

IV. POLICE SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION - Administration sub-division - Man power sub-division - Labour relations sub-divsion - Information technology sub-division

V • / • ••

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OFFICE SUPPORT FOR SECURITY VICE I.UNISTER division - studies division division - Planning & coordination Development division - & disciplinary - Legal Secr•tary - General

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