Acknowledgements

The Warhington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the authors of this report wish to acknowl- edge the contribution of Montserrat Garcia who provided essential research and conducted key interviews in Guatemala. We also appreciate the invaluable assistance of Guatemalan human rights activists and organizations. In addition, we thank the Guatemalan government officials and repre- sentatives of the international community, particularly representatives of MINUGUA, ICITAP, and the Spanish Civil Guard, who consented to be interviewed for this report. WOLA also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Brian Treacy, Silivia Vkquez, Veronica Godoy, Margarita Castillo, and Fanuel Garcia in preparation of this report.

Executive Director George Vickers contributed insights on the Guatemalan peace process and democratic transitions and provided extensive editorial input. Senior Associates Rachel Neild and Geoff Thale shared their expertise on police reform processes in Central America. WOLA particu- larly wishes to recognize the invaluable assistance of Amira Armenta who translated this report. Adnana Beltrh and Susan Peacock volunteered to proofread and edit the entire document. Caroline Richard coordinated printing logistics and dmibution.

This report was researched and written jointly by Dr. Hugh Byme, Senior Associate for Guatemala of the Washington Office on Latin America, Dr. William Stanley, Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico, and Rachel Garst, formerly the Trainer for Public Security in Guatemala of WOLA's Central America Advocacy Training Program and now a consultant in Guatemala on police and intelligence reform. All of the authors contributed immense amounts of their time and energy over the past year, and th~sreport could not have been possible without their professional collaboration and personal dedication.

This report may be quoted at length if attributed. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part without the permission of the Washington Office on Latin America.

ISBN # 0-929513-45-2 0 Washington Office on Latin America January 2000 Copies of this report 'can be obtained from WOLA for $9.00 plus $1.75 shipping and handling for the fust copy and $.75 for each additional copy. Rescuing Police Reform:

A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

Written by:

Dr. Hugh Byrne Dr. William Stanley Rachel Gasst

January 2000

Washington Office on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20009 Tel: (202) 797-2171 Fax (202) 797-2172 [email protected] . http://www.wola.org Table of Contents

Executive Summary and Recommendations ...... 1

Introduction ...... 10

The Context of Guatemalan Police Reform ...... 12 The Public Security Situation in Guatemala ...... 13 Police Refonn in Other Countries ...... 15

Police Reform in the Guatemalan Peace Accords ...... 18 Police Reform Legislation Before and After the Peace Accords ...... 20 Financing Public Security Reform ...... 23

The Creation and Deployment of the PNC ...... 24 Recycling Former Police ...... 24 Civilian Recruitment and Selection ...... 25 Impediments to Applying to Join the Police ...... 27 Selection... Requirements and Processes ...... 28 Indigenous Participation ...... 30 The Police Academy ...... 31 Lackof Qualijied Instructors ...... 33 Deployment ...... 34 Joint Militaly-Police Patrols ...... 35

The Conduct and Effectiveness of the PNC ...... 37 Internal Controls ...... 37 . . . . Cnmlnal Investigations ...... 40 Police Relations with Prosecutors: The Public Minishy ...... 42 Involvement of Militaiy Intelligence in Criminal Investigations ...... 43 Conduct of the PNC ...... 45 Problem with the Special Police Forces (FEP) ...... 46 Efftiveness in Controlling Crime ...... 48

The Problem of Leadership ...... 50

External Support for the PNC ...... 53 Role of the International Community ...... 53 Role of Civil Society Organizations ...... 56

Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 58 For the New Guatemalan Government ...... 59 For the International Community ...... 61

Endnotes ...... 62

Annex: Abbreviations ...... 70 Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he creation of a new National Civilian of confidence in the police and courts is reflected Police (Policia Nacional Civil, in the popularity of private and punitive soluticm Tor PNC) is a crucial component of to crime, including a recent wave of lynchings. Guatemala's effort to move from an era of ex- clusion, repression, and conflict to the consoli- The government of President Alvaro dation of a functioning democratic society. In Arzli moved quickly to restructure and the three years since the December 1996 sign- strengthen the Guatemalan police, starting even ing of the Guatemalan peace accords, impor- before the peace accords were signed, and con- tant advances have been made in building a re- tinuing after the "Accord on the Strengthening vamped, 20,000-strong, civilian-led police. of Civil Power and the Role of the Amyin a Faced with widespread crime and violence. the Democratic Society" took effect in December Guatemalan government has placed a major 1996. The government has passed new legisla- emphasis on deploying the new force as quickly tion, doubled police salaries, retrained previ- as possible. This approach, however, has given ous National Police (Policia Nacional, or PN) rise to problems that call into question the qual- and Treasury Guard (Guardia de Hacienda) ity of the PNC and its supposedly "new" and members, recruited and trained new PNC reformed nature. agents, and purchased vehicles, weapons and communications equipment. With limited in- These efforts are taking place within an ternational fmancial support for this process, extremely difficult social, economic and politi- significant national resources have been in- cal environment. Income distribution in Gua- vested. An expanded, better paid, and better temala is highly skewed. The indigenous ma- trained National Civilian Police now has at least jority is largely marginalized. The country is aminimal presence in every one of the country's emerging from decades of violent political re- 22 departments. By October 1999, a force of pression carried out by the security forces of 17,339 members of the PNC had been deployed, military-controlled governments. Organized of whom 36.53 percent werenew recruits.' The and common crime have risen significantly over gains made by the PNC are significant, espe- the last few years, increasing pressure on the cially when compared to the corruption and in- government to move quickly to improve citi- efficiency of its predecessor, the National Po- zen security. The justice system is almost non- lice. The new force is imbued with a more functional. This authoritarian legacy and a lack service-oriented spirit and has been well re- Washington Office on Latin America ceived by the general population. Furthermore, agents and officers from previous security forces the PNC appears to be at least somewhat more infamous for their corruption, abuse and incom- effectivethan their predecessors; arrests are up, petence. Newly incorporated police will even- and violent deaths and kidnappings for ransom tually make up a majority of the force, but the are down. officer corps will consist of personnel drawn mainly from the old forces. Selection and Despite these advances, police reform screening of former police applying to recycling in Guatemala remains a deeply flawed process courses has been lax. Of PN members wishing that will require much greater attention and po- to enter thenew force, only those who fail twice litical will from the incoming Guatemalan gov- to pass the entrance exam are excluded-and ernment and closer monitoring by the interna- even then they may be able to apply to be prison tional community. The Adgovernment, in guards or be given administrative positions. its efforts to provide an immediate response to the country's serious security problems, took Recruitment and selection: Recruitment of shortcuts that may contribute to long term prob- new civilians for the PNC, despite repeated lems with discipline, corruption, brutality, and urgings by the United Nations Verification Mis- criminality within the force. The reform pro- sion in Guatemala (Misidn de Ve'enJcacidn de cess has been marked by serious deficiencies in las Nuciones Unidas en Guatemala, or recruitment, selection, training, leadership, and MINUGUA), remains extremely weak, with internal discipline. In short, rapid deployment little publicity given to Academy course open- has taken precedence over deeper measures ings. Without an adequate pool of applicants needed to ensure the long-term quality, profes- (international standards suggest at least five sionalism, and efficacy of the PNC. Problem competitors for each opening), no meaningful areas, pointed out in previous WOLA reports, selection process can take place. Indeed, when include: there have been few applicants, entry standards have been lowered to fill the available slots. Composition of the police: The first andmost critical decision made by the Guatemalan gov- The government has not taken measures ernment regarding police reform-and one ac- to ensure that the PNC reflects the country's cepted by the guerrillas at the negotiating diversity in terms of language and ethnicity, as table-was to incorporate most of the old Na- required by the accords. In contrast to El Sal- tional Police and Treasury Guard into the new vador, where deliberate efforts were made to PNC. This policy has facilitated a rapid increase ensure political balance through the incorpora- in force numbers, and avoided the need for tion of ex-guerrillas as well as recruitment cam- wholesale dismissals. On the other hand, it paigns targeted at students and other civilians, meant that all initial members of the PNC were there is almost no systematic effort in Guate- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government mala to recruit outside of traditional circles. replaced them. But despite efforts to improve Academy openings are advertisedmainly in the instruction, the overall quality and effectiveness PNC newsletter and through the offices of the of Academy training remains in doubt. departmental governors. Leadership: Initially, the entire PNC officer The selection process has now been de- corps consisted of recycled officers from the centralized and there have been limited im- former National Police and Treasury Guard, provements in logistics, but the Selection Board who received just three months retraining. Poor (Junta Evaluadora) remains understaffed and quality leadership has been one of the principal disorganized. Furthermore, entrance exams complaints of all international donors inter- currently favor recruits with less education due viewed for this report, and one of the major to the use of separate examinations for those problems facing the "new" PNC. Old-guard with different levels of education. leaders make it extremely difficult to forge a new doctrine and institutional culture and to Education and training: The peace accord weed out elements inappropriate to a profes- requirement that the members of the PNC be sional, democratic police force. given six-months basic training in a Police Academy is asignificant improvement over past The only solutions to this problem to practice, when police typically received almost date are measures to allow accelerated training no training whatsoever. Unfortunately, train- for promotions, to allow new officers to move ing requirements were pared back to speed up up more quickly through the ranks. There have the deployment process. The Arz6 government also been two attempts to recruit civilians for decided that "recycled" police from previous courses for low-ranking officers, but the Inte- security forces would only heretrained for three rior Ministry's failure to promote or publicize months and some specialized units received these offers has led to the canceling of both even shorter periods of training. Three months courses. retraining is patently insufficient to inculcate new values and adequate skills in police accus- Internal and external controls: The PNC was tomed to operating within past compt and re- created with a set of complex internal disciplin- pressive forces. ary regulations, which places all responsibility for controls with officers in the PNC chain of The poor quality and teachmg skills of command. Few officers or agents know or Academy instructors is another concern. Mem- understand the regulations. bers of the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil Espafiola, or GCE) provided most initial in- Officers can call upon the Office of Pro- struction. National instructors have now largely fessional Responsibility (Oficina de Washington OfBce on Latin America

ResponsibilidadProfesional, or ORP) to inves- cern with police abuse. Members of the PNC tigate possible corruption, administrative irregu- riot police-known as Special Police Forces larities, or crimes committed by subordinates. (Fuenas Especiales de Policia, or FEP)- (If the preliminary investigations point to crimi- mutinied in April 1999 and the unit was dis- nal conduct, the case is passed on to the Public solved. Also of grave concern, MINUGUA has Ministry, the body legally entrusted with direct- verified six cases of torture by PNC members ing all criminal investigations, but notoriously during 1999. ineffective in this role.) The ORP is not struc- tured to initiate its own investigations or to take Criminal investigations: The Criminal Inves- complaints from the public. Furthermore, it ha. tigations Service (Servicio de Znvestigacidn half the staff needed and is concentrated in the Criminal, or SIC) has primary responsibility for capital city. According to most observers, it criminal investigations, under the direction of has performed poorly. prosecutors from the Public Ministry. The SIC currently includes some 500 investigators, There are almost no other controls over roughly one-third of those needed. Of these, the PNC. There is no Inspector General, and only about a hundred have previous investiga- although Guatemala does have a Human Rights tive experience. So far, 150 have taken the new Ombudsman (Procuradorpara la Defensa de basic investigator course organized by the U.S. 10s Derechos Humanos), the role of this office International Criminal Investigative Training vis-i-vis police conduct has been negligible. Assistance Program (ICITAP). At the current MINUGUA verifies complaints of human rights rate, it will take seven years to field an ad- abuses or other accord violations, but the gov- equately trained investigations unit. Moreover, ernment has frequently been unresponsive to its the country's prosecutors are not prepared to reports and recommendations. Moreover, the adequately direct criminal investigations. With- UN Mission is a temporary one. In short, a out an overhaul of the Public Ministry, there is police force made up largely of recycled ele- little potential for the SIC to be an effective ments of dubious quality and ethics has a sys- force. tem of controls grossly inadequate to the task of preventing and punishing corrupt, abusive, The recruitment and selection problems and unlawful conduct. that plague the police as a whole are especially serious in the SIC. Personnel have not been Conduct: Early reports on the PNC focused on adequately screened, nor selected according to their positive reception in the communities and their analytical skills or investigative vocation. their new service-oriented spirit. In recent Recent denunciations of torture have focused months, however, there has been growing con- on this unit. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

Building a multiethnic police force: The peace The Constitutional reforms that would accords commit the Guatemalan government to have consolidated the separation of police and building a PNC that reflects the "multiethnic military functions were repeatedly delayed, then and pluricultural character of Guatemala in re- defeated in May 1999 in a nation-wide referen- cruitment, selection, training, and deployment dum held on 50 proposed reforms. Thus the of police personnel." With the sole exception Guatemalan military continua to have the Con- of a MJNUGUA-supported pilot project in the stitutional authority to be involved in internal Ixil region, little effort has been made in this security, and the future division ofroles remains regard. Inappropriate selection tests, discrimi- unclear. The ability of civilian authorities to natory height requirements, and high costs re- investigate and prosecute members of the mili- lated to medical tests present difficult barriers tary for human rights abuse, drug trafficking or to indigenous aspirantsto the police profession. other illegal conduct remains extremely weak. Within the Police Academy there is no special support for often-disadvantaged indigenous re- International cooperation: The international cruits, which leads to high dropout rates, and community is playing a limited role in support- credit is not given for the mastery of indigenous ing police reform in Guatemala. The cmtral languages. player is the Spanish Civil Guard which pro- vided initial advice and training, and is now The role of the military in internal security: implementing a4-year, $32 million (at late 1999 The peace accords are specific in giving the ci- rates) PNC development project funded by the vilian PNC authority for maintaining internal European Union (EU). The only other signifi- security, and limiting the role of the military to cant donors are the US, which provides train- external defense. Nonetheless, in order to con- ing-worth approximately $1 1 million over front the country's serious crime problem, the four years-in criminal investigations and sup- Arni government made ample use of military port in training instructors through the U.S. In- personnel in 'joint patrols' with the police. ternational Criminal Investigative Training As- More disturbingly, it has yet to set up a civilian sistance Program (ICITAP); and MIMJGUA, intelligence capacity (as required under the ac- which verifies compliance with the peace ac- cords), turning instead to the unregulated use cords, gives human rights courses at the Acad- of military intelligence to help investigate emy, and implements small institutional kidnappings and other high profile crimes. strengthening projects funded by bilateral do- Former military members of an infamous presi- nors. Most costs associated with force expan- dential intelligence unit (the Estado Mayor sion and deployment, salary increases, the PNC Presidential, or EMP) were also allowed to Academy, and additional vehicles and equip- enroll in a course for junior officers at the ment have come from Guatemalan government Police Academy. funds. (By way of comparison, the Guatema- WashinPion Office on Latin America lan government's costs for the project carried the government's political decision to focus on out with the European Union amount to $103 rapid deployment at the expense of other po- million.) lice reform measures.

International oversight of the police re- However, Guatemala has a small but form process has been weak, and coordination vocal grouping of civil society organizations, between the donors poor. MINUGUA has which supports the creation of an independent, brought important problems to the attention of effective, professional PNC as vital for the the government and the international commu- country's future. These groups are concerned nity, but the US and the European Union have in particular with strengthening criminal inves- not conditioned further assistance on the tigations, controlling police abuse, and limit- government's responsiveness to these concerns. ing the role of the military. Over the last few They appear to believe that-given the dismal years, a handful of organizations have moni- state of the Guatemalan police when the reform tored the creation of the PNC and have at- process began-it is too much to ask the coun- tempted to speak out on issues of concern. try to conform to international standards of However, the capacity of these groups to con- democratic policing or to fully comply with the duct effective research, advocacy and public peace accords. Moreover, without leadership education-as well as the willingness of public by international policymakers, technical assis- authorities to listen to and address their con- tance programs such as those of ICITAP and cerns-is still very limited, and their political the GCE tend to be wary of intervening in the weight less than that of organizations demand- more political aspects of police reform, leaving ing more repressive responses. the political direction of the process in the hands of national authorities. Conclusions

Role of civil society: Decades of militarization The peace accords provided a unique and repression have left a strong mark on opportunity for Guatemala to fundamentally Guatemala's social fabric. The military is redefine its policing institutions. The Arni gov- feared, but it is also respected as a strong and ernment made advances in creating and deploy- effective institution. Given the traditional weak- ing a unified National Civilian Police, far bet- ness and corruption of police, prosecutors and ter trained and paid than its predecessors. But the courts, Guatemalan citizens are used to tak- the government's approach, focusing on the ing the law into their own hands. Many sup- numbers of police trained and rapid deployment port strong-arm measures to control delin- rather than on what it will take to build a cred- quency. The public call for stronger measures ible and respected force for the long haul, un- against crime has been an important factor in dermined the future prospects of the PNC and Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government sidestepped much of the intent of the accords. The incoming government should: Continuing problems in selection, training, and controls are compromising the effectiveness, General human rights performance, internal discipline, and accountability of the PNC. The Arzu gov- Review closely and implement the recom- ernment responded to criticisms on these mendations of the Historical Clarification grounds by pointing to its success in rapidly Commission (Comisidn para el training a large number of new police and to Esclarecirniento Histdrico-XEH) regard- their effectiveness in fighting crime. However, ing the role of the armed forces (V.2) and even on the govemment's own terms, the re- public security (V.3), noting particularly sults are decidedly mixed. Government statis- Art. 78: tics show that crimes against persons are down; but robberies, burglaries, and crimes against "That, in case the [constitutional] property are up. Arrests have risen dramati- reforms proposed in the Peace Ac- cally, but it is unclear whether these arrests are cords are unsuccessful, Congress well founded and lead to successful prosecu- take the necessary legislative action tions. Only time will tell if a more active and to separate the functions of the widely deployed force is successfully tackling Army and ofthe Police, limiting the crime while respecting the rights of citizens. participation of the Army in the field of public security to an abso- Overall, the Guatemalan government lute minim~m."~ appears to have approached police reform more as a short-term political challenge-respond- Recruitment and selection ing to the strong public concerns about violent crime-rather than as a long-term, institution- Develop a massive police recruitment pro- building effort that is crucial to the consolida- gram, through the media and presentations tion of democracy in Guatemala. in schools and communities, targeted in par- ticular at qualified indigenous and women. Recommendations Revise the selection process for new recruits The new Guatemalan government faces the to include 1) the use of just one examina- major challenge of turning the PNC into an tion for all applicants regardless of educa- institution that is truly different from its prede- tion levels, 2) the elimination of discrimi- cessors, one that shows a real commitment to natory height requirements, and 3) proce- professionalism, efficacy, and respect foy dures to minimize application costs to the human- rights. aspiring recruit. Washington Office on Latin America

* Remove all current agents and officers who Reform curricula and educational materi- entered recycling courses irregularly, per- als used at the Police Academy to make mining them to apply to the PNC as new them more accessible to students, and more mmits and receive the fd six months training. adapted to the Guatemalan cultural reality.

Develop aplan for the recruitment and train- Provide supplementary tutoring and support ing of civilians for the PNC senior office to indigenous students at the Academy. corps, and make top-level positions acces- sible to highly qualified civilians. Affirm the central importance of human rights training and practice, and ensure ef- - Establish retraining and retirement pro- fective instruction in the use ofthe PNC dis- grams formembers of the oldsecurity forca ciplinary code. who areunable to meet requirements for the new PNC, and exclude their participation Internal and external controls in public security functions. Revise the disciplinary regulations to make Training them easier to understand and use, create an effective internal affairs division, and es- Provide another three months of Academy tablish easily accessible mechanisms to re- training for those already recycled, and ex- ceive complaints from the public and from tend the length of all remaining recycling within the force. courses to six months. Maintain and publish detailed records on Develop field training and continuing edu- complaints and investigations of police con- cation programs for agents and officers. duct, the fmdings thereof, and administra- tive sanctions undertaken. Improve quality and training of Academy instructors, including through the use ofin- Establish aPNC Inspector General with suf- ternational instructors; training or retrain- ficient investigative resources to evaluate ing of national instructors; and collabora- the performance of the new internal affairs tive efforts with Guatemalan public and pri- unit, the conduct of the PNC officer corps, vate universities. as well as routine disciplinary procedures conducted by the PNC command hierarchy. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

Removal of military from public security Contribute to public education efforts re- functions garding the differences between police and military functions, and support civilians and Ensure that the role of the military is lim- ited to external defense. Where exceptional government officials in learning about reform processes in other countries. circumstances necessitate military support for police, this should be for a limited and Link continued funding to full compliance specified time, clearly under civilian con- with therelevant provisions of the peace ac- trol, and not involve investigations or intel- ligence gathering. cords, particularly in relation to length of training, the "aptness" of those selected for the PNC, promotion of indigenous partici- Disband the Presidential General Staff (EMP) and any other military intelligence pation, the role of the military, and meeting minimum international standards. unit involved in investigating crime, and create a transparent civilian intelligence Donors should coordinate their programs body within the Ministry of the Interior to closely with MINUGUA and use the conduct intelligence necessary for tracking Mission's evaluation of progress in police and combating criminal activity, as laid reform as a basis for making funding deter- down in the peace accords. minations in this area. The international community should: Donors should support accelerated training programs for PNC leadershipparticularly Consider providing new or additional tech- civilian leaders-and Academy instructors nical and financial support to the PNC, par- (both current and newly recruited), includ- ticularly in the areas outlined in this report. ing through offering international training Play a more active role in monitoring and opportunities. evaluating the Guatemalan police reform process, especially in relation to interna- The US Department of State and the Euro- tional standards for transparency, account- pean Union should conduct evaluations of ability, minimum use of force, effective in- the effectiveness of their technical assistance ternal controls, andrespect for human rights. programs for the PNC, especially given on- going problems in recruitment, selection, and training. Washington Office on Latin America

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

olice reform is vitally important to the Chapter 2 places police reform in Gua- construction of democracy and the rule temala in the context of the country's recent Pof law in Guatemala. It is a central com- history and the current public security situation; ponent of the process of demilitarization, and and seeks to draw out lessons from similar po- is also necessary to ensure the effective investi- lice reform efforts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, gation and prosecution of common and orga- and Haiti. nized crime as well as human rights abuses. Internal security reform is needed to restore the Chapter 3 highlights the commitments faith of Guatemalans in their criminal justice to police reform laid out in the peace accords- system and in their government's commitment particularly the "Accord on Strengthening Civil to defending their security and basic civil and Power and on the Role of the Army in a Demo- political rights. A more effective and profes- cratic Society"-and describes and assesses the sional police is also urgently needed to help steps taken to date by the government to com- control the crime wave sweeping the country, ply with those commitments. and to ensure the arrest and conviction of those found to be involved in illegal activities. Chapter 4 examines the creation and deployment of the PNC, including the decision The United Nations, the United States to recycle members of the former forces; and government and the European Union are play- assesses advances and obstacles in recruitment ing key roles in the Guatemalan police reform and selection, indigenous participation, the work process. As contributors to this effort, they will of the Police Academy, and deployment of the be identified with the results, and more impor- PNC. tantly, their technical assistance and financial leverage can help to promote and deepen the Chapter 5 assesses the conduct and ef- still partial reform process. This report seeks fectiveness of the PNC with particular empha- to identify progress in Guatemala's police re- sis on internal control mechanisms, criminal form as well as flaws and problems so that the investigations, the activities and behavior of the incoming Guatemalan government, interna- new force and their success in tackling crime. tional donors and other supporters can take the measures necessq to advance this crucial effort. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

Chapter 6 focuses on the critical issue ciety in providing external support for police of leadership in the creation of a professional reform in Guatemala. civilian police force. Finally, conclusions and recommenda- Chapter 7 looks at the role of the inter- tions for the incoming Guatemalan government national community and Guatemalan civil so- and the international community are presented. Washington Offie on Latin America

CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT OF GUATEMALAN POLICE REFORM

uatemala is emerging from a thuty- police and the justice system. It also puts the ix-year-long armedconflict in which onus on the government to demonstrate that the Gover 200,000 people were killed or new National Civilian Police (PNC) truly rep- disappeared as a result of political violence. The resents a break from the past and that the jus- Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) tice system has the will and capacity to con- set up under the peace accords attributed 93 front the scourge of impunity. percent of rights violations to government forces and related paramilitary groups.' Guatemalan When President Alvaro Arzh took of- police forces played a significant role in state fice in January 1996 the National Police (Policia repression. The CEH report states that: National, or PN) numbered somewhat over 12,000 personnel and the Treasury Guard close [T]he National Police and the Trea- to 3,000. The numbers of the Mobile Military sury [Guard], two important state Police (Policia Militar Ambulante, or PMA)- security forces, also committed some of whose personnel were rented out to numerous and grave human rights private businesses and landowners-were never violations during the armed made public. The PN was officially a civilian confrontation. Beginning in the institution but with a high degree of military mid-1960s, these forces were sub- influence and infiltration. The force was infa- ordinated to Army control, a situa- mous for its corruption, ineptness, and viola- tion that was maintained tions of human rights. Most members of the throughout the confrontation. force had received little or no training; some agents were illiterate. Salaries were miserable. In the ten months between the publica- The number of administrative positions was tion of the CEH report and the end of the Arzu inflated and many of the agents were assigned government's term, the Guatemalan govern- to guard functionaries or particular buildings ment did little to implement the Commission's rather than patrolling or investigating crime. recommendations. Almost all the human rights Many of the agents and officers had purchased violations remain unpunished and the victims their positions and were required to provide uncompensated. Those few cases that have been monthly kickbacks to their superiors, a prac- brought before the courts remain mired in long tice that in effect obliged them to engage in proceedings or have multed in dubious acquittals. extortion to raise the necessary resources. In the This tragic recent history contributes to the ex- words of one foreign police officer with expe- tremely low levels of public confidence in the rience in Guatemala, "The National Police was Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalnn Government a total disaster. The population was terrified of The justice system is extremely weak, them and with good rea~on."~ and nearly nonfunctional. Problems include widespread incompetence and corruption; in- By the time that President Arzu came sufficient planning and coordination; the poor into office, several attempts by previous civil- professional quality of judges and prosecutors; ian governments to reform the police had al- the subversion of justice through bribery, ready failed. Particularly noteworthy was the threats, violence and intimidation; lack of ac- removal of a reform-minded Minister of the cess; poor investigations capacity; lack of co- Interior in early 1994, and his replacement by ordination between the police and the Public militmy intelligence officer Col. Mario Alfredo Ministry; case overload; and insufficient Merida, after the police began investigating and resources.' publicly arresting military officers for such crimes as car-stealing and drug traffi~king.~On A decade of foreign donor involvement the other side of the equation was a very pre- in justice reform has had many setbacks, but carious public security situation. some important successes. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sup- The Public Security Situation in Guatemala portedreforms to the Criminal Procedures Code that moved the country from an inquisitorial The social context for police reform in system to one based on open, oral trials, and Guatemala is not propitious. Income and land moved control of criminal investigations from distribution are highly skewed, and eighty per- the hands ofjudges to the Public Ministry. The cent of Guatemala's people live in poverty. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guate- country's indigenous people--who represent mala (MMUGUA) has helped to establish a about half the population but 83 percent of the public defense system. Most recently, in 1998- victims of the armed conflict-have long been 99, the World Bank and the Inter-American excluded both politically and economically and Development Bank have initiated major justice lag farbehindnon-indigenous in all health, edu- reform projects.' In mid-1 998, the Commission cation, housing, and other social indicators. The on Strengthening the Justice System, created provision of state social services is grossly de- under the peace accords, made numerous rec- ficient, in part due to the country having one of ommendations for reforms and a follow-up the lowest ratios of taxes raised (as a propor- commission is pressing for their implementa- tion of gross domestic product) in the hemi- tion.' A coordinating body-the Instancia sphere. Over 30 percent of the population are Coordinadora para la Modernizacidn del Sec- illiterate. Many indigenous persons speak no tor Justicia-is attempting to bring together the Spanish and cannot communicate with non-in- heads of the police, the Public Ministry and the digenous government employees. Judiciary to develop strategies for coordination Washington Offie on Latin America and reform.'" Nonetheless, there is general of public security. Crime rates are extremely agreement that reform of Guatemala's justice high. Police statistics for 1998 show 3,282 ho- system will be a difficult anddrawn-out process. micides, as well as 25 cases of kidnapping for ransom, in a country of approximately 10 mil- One of the most difficult problems of lion people." Guatemala's homicide rate of justice reform in Guatemala is the abysmal state 33 per 100,000 people is five times the US. of criminal investigations. According to the level.14 In a poll on attitudes of Guatemalans 1992 Criminal Procedures Code, prosecutors toward democratic institutions, some 22 percent from the Public Ministry direct the police in of respondents (47 percent in Guatemala City) the conduct of all criminal investigations. To revealed that they or a family member had been date, the Public Ministry has been singularly the victim of a violent crime in the previous ineffective in this task. The vast majority of twelve months.15 Muggings on the street or in crimes are never investigated. In those few that city buses, highway robbery, car theft, andresi- are brought to trial, prosecutors are very fre- dential burglary are common. Criminal gangs, quently unable to put together an adequate case many involving former police and military per- to convict, leading judges to order the release sonnel, are organizing car thefts, drug traffick- of the suspect. As a result, thousands of seri- ing and kidnappings. Crime control is the num- ous crimes go uninvestigated and unpunished. ber one political issue for most Guatemalans. Slow and ineffective investigations also leave Some two million arms are in the hands of the thousands of Guatemalans languishing in pre- civilian population, a situation that both reflects trial detention, sometimes for years-74 per- and contributes to the levels of violence.16 cent of prisoners have not been convicted of a crime.'l The combination of distrust in the jus- tice system and uproar over crime has led to Public confidence in the criminal jus- much finger-pointing over the state's failure to tice system is understandably low. A wide-rang- capture and convict lawbreakers. In many cases, ing 1997 survey found that 90 percent of those this frustration has led to vigilante justice. The polled believed the Guatemalan justice system country's history of violent repression, in which favored the rich and powerful. 80 percent had those considered "suspicious" were simply little or no confidence in the courts. In regards killed or disappeared by anonymous death to the police, only 26 percent believed they de- squads without any benefit of due process, has fend the rights of Guatemalans while 40 per- probably contributed to this phenomenon. The cent felt they did only "sometimes."12 lack of police presence in large areas of the country and the reduction in military presence The public is increasingly frustrated at since the end of the armed conflict are also fac- the state's inability to provide a minimal level tors contributing to vigdantism. Many com- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

munities have responded even to minor crimes In El Salvador, a stalemated civil war by taking the law into their own hands and at- laid the basis for a comprehensivepeace accord tacking and killing the alleged criminals. In that defined in detail agreements for restructur- recent years, th~spractice has reachedalarming ing and downsizing the armed forces and proportions. MINUGUA reports at least 167 reframing its role and mission, dssolving re- lynchings, with 137 people killed and many pressive security forces, and creating a new more injured, between March 27, 1996 and National Civilian Police force. The Salvadoran December 3 1, 1998.'' PNC has confronted severe challenges includ- ing a massive crime wave that developed when However, Guatemala is not the first the old security forces were partially demobi- country to cany out a public security reform lized and before the PNC was up to strength. under such difficult conditions, and those lead- Despite considerable efforts at screening and ing this current effort are in the enviable posi- selection, some criminal and corrupt elements tion of being able to learn from the successes have entered the police. The government en- and failings of similar processes in Central countered particular difficulty in establishing America and the Caribbean. adequate investigative capacity, as detective units have repeatedly been dismantled because Police Reform in Other Countries of disciplinary problems. One lesson of that experience is to avoid at all cost the transfer of In Central America and Haiti, as in other questionableunits from old security forces into post-conflict situations in recent years, police the new. The government was late to establish reform and redefining of the role of the armed an internal control regime, and the system once forces have been critical components in the in place proved cumbersome, but still has move from conflictive, repressive, and exclu- provedvital to keeping the force on track. While sive societies toward peace and reconciliation. abuses have occurred, the force is more trans- Where police forces operated under military parent than its predecessors, and police agents control, were implicatedin serious human rights and officers have been prosecuted successfully violations, and were viewed with mistrust and for wrongdoing on a number of occasions. hostility by a significant part of the population, the creation of new professional, civilian po- In spite of the problems and obstacles lice forces has been crucial to establishing so- in El Salvador, there have been important ad- cial peace and consolidating democratic insti- vances. A largely new police force was created tutions. These transformations, however, have with a distinct identity and organizational cul- been complex, time-consuming, and often po- ture. Significant efforts were made to recruit litically controver~ial.'~ broadly, and a large majority of the force is Washington Offiee on Latin America made up of civilians with no prior involvement mats, consistently observe that the Nicaraguan in the police, armed forces or guerrillas. All National Police (Policia Nacional members of the force underwent the same train- Nicaraguense, or PNN) are remarkably efficient ing period-basic training was eight months- given their resource constraints. Violent crime and have been treated roughly equally within rates are lower in Nicaragua than in either El the force, regardless of background. Civilians Salvador or Guatemala, and the police have and former guerrillas were admitted directly to generally conducted themselves in a profes- the most senior ranks of the police, along with sional manner, despite their origins as a politi- former National Police, and all undawent a full cally alignedrevolutionary police. Strong lead- year of training. Senior officials were required ership of the PNN, and an organizational cul- to have university degrees (or their equivalent), ture of service to communities, help explain the and mid-level officers needed at least three yeas relative effectiveness and limited corruption in of higher education. Admission to the "basic" the force. Also noteworthy is the strong par- ranks required a 91h grade education, later raised ticipation of women in the Nicaraguan National to 12& grade. Police.

While not as effective in fighting crime In Haiti, following the U.S.-led inter- as most Salvadorans would wish, the PNC has vention, a new police force, freshly recruited dealt courageously with an unprecedented wave and trained, was formed 'on the run' and the of crime that would have overwhelmed its pre- armed forces dissolved. Police reform in Haiti decessors. And despite some efforts by indi- has faced serious challenges arising from a wave viduals to politicize the force, the PNC has gen- of crime and drug trafficking, an abbreviated erally maintained its political neutrality. The (four-month) period of training prior to deploy- future development of the PNC remains uncer- ment, significant abuses canied out by the new tain, but at a minimum, it has the potential to be Haitian National Police, a still-dysfunctional more effective, accountable, and protective of judicial system and an overall political environ- individual rights than were its predecessors. ment of deadlock and conflict. Nonetheless, Haiti's police reform, supported substantially In Nicaragua, the absence of a compre- by the United States, is arelative success story hensive peace agreement meant that efforts to within the country's troubled restoration of de- reform and depoliticize the army and police took mocracy. In particular, good leadership by top place on an ad hoc basis and contributed to con- police commanders, the early formation of a tinued instability in the country during the relatively effective internal affairs unit 1990s. But international police specialists from (I 'inspection genhrale) and willingness by do- the United Nations Development Programme nors and Haitian authorities to revise training (UNDP) and ICITAP, as well as western diplo- and provide ongoing remedlal in-service train- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

ing have been important components of Haiti's past abuses; the need for a sufficiently long and police reform. complete period of mining to inculcate the nec- essary policing skills and values appropriate to A number of valuable lasons can be a democratic force; the importance of strong drawn from these experiences of carrying out internal control mechanisms to weed out 'bad far-reaching police reform efforts in post-con- apples' and prevent the development of corrupt flict situations. Among the most important are: and abusive practices; and the key role that the the need to recruit broadly to ensure the highest international community can play where there quality of new recruits; the crucial importance is close monitoring and support of the reform of bringing in new leadership with a commit- effort. ment to democratic policing and not linked to Washington Office on Latin America

CHAPTER3: POLICE REFORM IN THE GUATEMALAN PEA C E ACCORDS

he peace accords signed between the for bringing about long-overdue reforms to Arzli government and the Unidad Guatemalan society. The accords laid the basis TRevolucionuria Nacional Guatemalteca for ending the country's thirty-six year civil (URNG) in December 1996 provided an im- conflict andreincorporatingthe insurgents back portant framework and window of opporhmity into the political process. But they went sig- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

nificantly further in addressing key structural majority, the low level of state spending on so- problems of the country: a pattern of pervasive cial services, and finally, the militarization of human rights abuse committed by military and Guatemalan society and the very weak func- police forces, a failure to acknowledge or ad- tioning of civilian institutions in the criminal dress the consequences of past rights abuse, &s- justice system. crimination against the country's indigenous Washington Office on Latin America

An initial human rights accord opened turing of public security policies and institu- the door for the entry of a United Nations veri- tions plays a central role in this effort. The fication mission (MINUGUA) which has played agreement also lays out a new security doctrine a crucial role by providing immediate verifica- that moves beyond previous repressive ap- tion of the human rights situation in the coun- proaches to consider the complex factors in- try and, following the comprehensive peace volved in public order. The section entitled "the agreement in December 1996, in monitoring Security Agenda" states: overall compliance with the accords and con- tributing with technical assistance to their irnple- [Clitizen security and state secu- mentation. In addition, the parties agreed to rity are inseparable from the full the formation of an Historical Clarification exercise by citizens of their politi- Commission that issued its report in February cal, economic, social and cultural 1999 on acts of violence committed by both rights. Social and economic in- sides during the conflict. equality, poverty and extreme poverty, social and political dis- The socioeconomic agreement promised crimination, and corruption, among greater social spending on health, housing, edu- other things, are risk factors for and cation, and rural development, and the creation a direct threat to democratic co- of a more equitable tax system. The "Accord existence and social harmony, and on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous thus also threaten constitutional Peoples," pledged to recognize the multi-ethnic, democracy. multilingual, and pluricultural nature of the country, and bring about reforms that would end Police Reform Legislation Before and the discrimination against and exclusion of the After the Peace Accords country's indigenous majority. And finally, the "Accord on Strengthening Civil Power and on The process of legislating police reform the Role of the Army in a Democratic Soci- in Guatemala has been and continues to be tor- ety," among many other measures, commits the tuous. The Arni government actually initiated government to the creation of a single National police reforms prior to the Peace Accords. In Civilian Police and the promotion of Constitu- early 1996, Minister of the Interior Rodolfo tional amendments that would establish a clear Mendoza summarily dismissed 118 members separation between police and military roles. of the police, including many commanders. He then invited the Spanish Civil Guard police The commitments of the civil-military (Guardia Civil Espafiola, GCE) to provide ad- accord are designed to strengthen democratic vice and training, and announced that Guate- principles and the rule of law, and the restruc- mala would be adopting their policing model. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

These steps were taken well before the most of the regulations after human rights "Accord on Civil-Military Power" was negoti- groups,19 MINUGUA, and the URNG raised ated. Nevertheless, the December 1996 peace concerns. On July 24, 1997, the Commission agreement gave a major impetus to police recommended fourteen amendments to the reform in Guatemala and continues to be a President of Congress and the Ministry of the principal standard by which efforts to date must Interior to bring the law and regulations into be judged. compliance with the accord. The authorities have failed to implement these measures to date. Following the signing of the peace ac- cords, the Arz6 government moved forward In addition to the police law, a number with efforts to create the new PNC but with mea- of regulations governing the police were issued sures that had little connection with the recently very rapidly. By August 1997, the Executive signed accords. Less than two months after the had issued regulations covering PNC internal December 1996 comprehensive peace agree- discipline, organization, postings, education, ment was signed, Congress passed the law cre- administrative situations, vacations, and the ating the National Civilian Police (Decree 11- Police Academy. Despite its prompt action to 97 of February 8, 1997). The law had been establish the legal basis for forming and oper- drafted before the final negotiation and signing ating the PNC, the government frequently failed of the civil-military accord, and makes no ref- to follow the criteria and standards laid out in erence to the provisions of that agreement. The the peace accords. law is problematic in a number of areas: it fails to specify the structure of the police; it does not The rest of the legislation called for in clearly reflect the control that the Public Min- the accord has not moved forward. This in- istry legally has over police investigations; it cludes the Public Order Law, which should makes no reference at all to the Police Acad- regulate the temporary and exceptional use of emy (a key provision of the accord); and provi- the police andor military in emergency situa- sions on recruitment and selection criteria, and tions. The Arni government also failed to draft internal control mechanisms suffer serious de- other key legislation including a law to estab- ficiencies (these are dealt with in detail below). lish the Department of Civilian Intelligence and Given the Congressional majority held by the Information Analysis within the Ministry of the ruling Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), Interior; secrecy legislation to regulate classifi- Interior Minister Mendoza had little trouble cation and declassification of sensitive infor- pushingthe law quickly through Congress. The mation; and legislation to establish the congres- Accompaniment Commission (a body set up sional commission to oversee intelligence ac- under the accords to oversee and facilitate their tivities, including those of the Interior Minis- implementation) only reviewed the law and try. Nor did the president issue the decree to Washington Office on Latin America

establish the Advisory Council on Security. demobilization of military forces and deploy- Government officials explained the delay by the ment of a new civilian police force. In Guate- prior need for the Constitutional reforms, though mala, the Arni government turned to the mili- in the case of the civilian intelligence and over- tary in the face of public outcry over the sight organs, other political analysts believe country's serious crime problem. The Guate- these could move forward through ordinary malan military is both conducting joint mili- legislation. tary-police patrols and has an ongoing role in criminal investigations. (These issues are dis- In contrast to this legislative limbo, cussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.) presidential intelligence services-the Sccre- tariat of Strategic Analysis (Secreturiu de Finally, amajor setback to police reform Analisis Estratigico, or SAEFwere legalized (and more broadly to the Guatemalan peace in reforms to the Executive Law passed in No- process) came in a national referendum on May vember, 1997.20 The accords state that the p-esi- 16, 1999, when voters rejected fifty proposed dential intelligence office will be "strictly ci- reforms to the Guatemalan Constitution. These vilian", and "will have no authority to cary out included amendments to give constitutional stat- its own undercover investigations." However, ure to the PNC and to remove "internal secu- the Executive Law has a different wording, stat- rity" functions from the hands of the military. ing that the SAE "will not have the authority to Politically, those who wish to see a continuing carry-out or participate in investigations for role for the armed forces in internal security private parties, and will not act in any way to have been strengthened. Even prior to the con- limit or obstruct the exercise of political rights stitutional referendum, some were proposing a and the free emission of th~ught."~'In prac- broad interpretation of "defense of national sov- tice, this has permitted the executive branch to ereignty and territoriality" to include military continue to participate in criminal investigation involvement in combating contraband, fighting and intelligence operations, with a total lack of drug trafficking (a role pushed by the U.S. mili- transparency and oversight. tary), protection of the environment, and other police functions. Those who believe that Con- Despite the peace accords' stipulations stitutional reform is necessary are challenged endmg the military's role in internal security, to find alternative routes to reform. For the the Guatemalan armed forces have continued moment, ordinary legislation, such as that which to perform interim policing functions during the is supposed to establish the Department of Ci- process of the creation and deployment of the vilian Intelligence within the Interior Ministry, new PNC. Such transitional policing duties are can continue to contribute to a functional frequently necessary in post-conflict settings to separation of police and military roles. avoid an "interim security gap" between the Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

Financing Public Security Reform security spending by 50 percent may not be sufficient to support the larger, better-equipped The Guatemalan government has made force. And significant advances in fiscal re- significant investments in police reform. The form will be needed even to guarantee that the Ministry of the Interior's share of the National levels of spending agreed to in the accords can Budget has more than doubled, rising from be honored. $53.5 million (418 million Quetzales) in 1996, to $71.4million (Q557 million) in 1997, $101.4 Guatemala is also receiving international million (Q791 million) in 1998, and $141 mil- assistance at a significant level-though a far lion (Q1,lOO million) in 1999. Nevertheless, lower level than aid provided for police reform serious budgetary limitations remain. The dou- in El Salvador or Haiti. Original budget pro- bling of police salaries, the expansion in num- jections for a four-year period commencing in bers, costs of the Academy, infrastructure, ve- May 1998 reflected European Union assistance hicles, and other equipment associated with the of USS40.4 million, bilateral Spanish aid of deployment of large numbers of police are ex- USS2.8 million, and Guatemala government tremely expensive, both for start-up and ongo- expenditures of US$103.5 million. (See ing fmed yearly costs. In the long-term, the Chapter 6 for further discussion of interna- peace accord commitment to raise public tional assistance.) Washington Offie on Latin America

CHAPTER 4: THE CREATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE PNC

he challenge of police reform in Gua- Recycling Former Police temala is to build a new force that is Taccepted and respected in the commu- The first and most important decision nities to which it is deployed, is effective in made by the Guatemalan government about the fighting crime, and carries out its work in a restructuring of the police--which was accepted manner that respects and protects the rights of by the URNG at the negotiating table-was to citizens. This institution must have well- incorporate the bulk of the old National Police selected and trained personnel, honest and ef- and Treasury Guard into the new PNC. This fective leadership, and adequate mechanisms to policy allowed a rapid increase in force num- remove abusive and corrupt personnel and pre- bers, and avoided the need for wholesale dis- vent a return to the ways of the past. The Gua- missals. On the other hand, it meant that the temalan government has made some progress- "new" PNC was initially composed entirely of particularly in the number of police deployed- agents and officers from old police forces but in key respects the Arni government's ac- infamous for their corruption, abuse and tions or omissions undermined long-term pros- incompetence. pects for effectiveness and professionalism. This chapter examines the decision to build the Selection and screening of former po- new police on the back of the old by recycling lice applying to recycling courses has not been personnel, serious deficiencies in recruitment stringent. Human rights vetting of old police and selection, training in the new police acad- forces appears to have been minimal to non- emy, and the deployment of the PNC. existent. MUWGUA identified 13 human rights Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

violators in the initial recycling course. There the lack of quality controls. Initial Spanish Civil are also documented instances of the irregular Guard plans were for 90 percent of the previ- entry of military personnel into recycling ous police to be incorporated into the PNC. courses. Former milita~ypersonnel who wish Even with modest selection requirements, in- to join the PNC are free to do so, but as new cluding allowing all PN two attempts to pass recruits. Nevertheless, 180 ex-members of the entrance exams, this proved excessively opti- Mobile Military Police entered a recycling mistic. In October 1999, there were still 2,475 course for basic agents (these individuals were PN who had failed the exam or had not applied first transferred into the Treasury Guard in an to the Academy. Many of these individuals may effort to justify their entry to the police). Even still be incorporated into public security forces. more serious, 40 ex-members of the military Among the options under consideration are (including 22 ex-Sergeants of the notorious giving them posts as prison guards or in EMF'), were incorporated into an officers course administration. in 1998, and allowed to graduate and deploy despite vigorous MINUGUA protests. To date, International observers see improve- both these groups remain in the PNC despite ments in the work of theevaluatiowvettingbody MINUGUA's protests over this clear violation (Junta Evaluadora). The information it is now of the peace accords.23 receiving may help prevent further admissions of inappropriate personnel. Problems with the Another problem is the recycling of en- scarce resources available to the nine-person tire units, still largely intact, including the body responsible for selection appear to be Criminal Investigations Service (SIC), Special addressed through a MWUGUA support project Police Forces (FEP, which was originally re- that is aiding with information systems, more cycled and later disbanded), and the Office of computers and equipment to correct psychologi- Professional Responsibility (OW). Experience cal tests automatically .x in both El Salvador and Haiti demonstrates that such transfers can result in units that continue Civilian Recruitment and Selection to respond to their former authorities and oper- ate outside the chain of command of the new In addition to recycling personnel from police. Another risk is that they bring with them former police forces, the Guatemalan reform an institutional culture that is profoundly inimi- process is also undertaking significant recruit- cal to the principles of democratic and profes- ment from civilian sectors. Unfortunately, there sional policing sought through reform processes. have also been problems with this process that raise further concerns about the quality of The recycling process for PN agents to police agents in the new PNC. enter the new PNC raises serious concerns about Washington Of$ce on Latin America

In post-conflict situations where pre- too few applicants for the available slots, the existing police have been corrupt, repressive, government simply lowered entry standards to and feared by the population, recruitment for ensure that all slots were filled. the new civilian, professional police must en- sure that there is a sufficiently large pool of ap- Two years later, recruitment efforts re- plicants from which to select, and that entry main weak. The pay level (2,550 quetzales per standards are adequate to guarantee quality re- month-about $35&for basic agents) is re- cruits. In Haiti, following the restoration of spectable, so the main obstacle appears to be President Aristide, 45,000 people applied to join poor publicity about Police Academy openings. the new force, 8,000 were tested, and only 750 The Vice-Minister of the Interior told WOLA recruits were accepted for the first two classes. that the government has carried out "massive While this high ratio of applicants to posts may dissemination" of openings in the police through be in part a reflection of the desperate lack of departmental governors, mayors, and police employment opportunities in Haiti, it also sug- commissioners, the National Peace Fund gests the extent of efforts by the government (Fondo Nacional para la Paz, or FONAPAZ) and international donors to ensure that candi- and the Social Investment Fund (Fondo de dates selected for the police had relatively high Inversidn Social, or FIS). He also stated that levels of education and good skills. Similarly, they are engaged in a public campaign of re- in El Salvador the National Public Security cruitment through "television spots and mate- Academy was successful enough in its recruit- rials in five indigenous languages." According ing efforts to be able to raise the minimum edu- to the Vice-Minister, these efforts led to 6,032 cation required to 12Ih grade early in the cre- applications for the fourth basic cows-four ation of the new police.25 Also in El Salvador, for each place.26 innovative methods of recruitment-such as 'join a friend' (Acompanla a1 Amigo) in the WOLA was unable to verify this infor- Academy, publicity at festivals and other events, mation and international observers questioned and door-to-door publicity-have been used to its accuracy. Two locally basedresearchers who broaden recruitment. follow police issues cannot recall ever seeing Academy recruitment notices in the local press, During 1997, thefmt year of operations except for one referring to the hiring of Acad- of the PNC, there were serious problems with emy instructor^.^' In early 1999, another civil inadequate publicity for both recycling courses society monitor stated that "to date [the gov- and basic training courses for new recruits, lead- ernment] has not made any call via the mass ing to a lack of quality applicants. With less media, though in the report of activities of the than two applicants per slot on some courses or [Interior] Ministry they indicate that they have Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

produced TV ads, radio spots and posters."28 departmental governors, this approach brings Apparently, the Ministry of the Interior intended risks of partisan influence and cronyism. to place paidrecruiting advertisements, but these efforts have collapsed due to disorganization Government officials have explained the and budgetm problems. One foreign police weak publicity and recruitment efforts as re- advisor noted, "Frankly, when push comes to sulting from budgetary constraints, especially shove, they would rather use the resources to the high costs of media ads. Yet, as one inter- buy vehicles than to pay the high costs of pub- national official pointed out, the international licity." MINUGUA reported in March 1999 community would have been happy to assist that police recruitment had been affected by with recruitment expenses had they been asked." "tardy, territorially incomplete, and weak dissemination of the call for Impediments to Applying to Join the Police the basic courses for new recruits. The processes of recruitment are A further impediment to large-scale po- not sufficiently planned, either in lice recruitment is the high cost of acquiring terms of time or in content, and the the necessary documentation and materials execution of recruitment announce- needed to apply for admission to the Academy. ments is inadeq~ate.'"~ The basic requirements for admission are: to be a Guatemalan citizen, at least 1.60 meters in Furthermore, the accord requirement that height for men and 1.55 meters for women, be 'Woughtheirrepresentatives,communities will in good health and without physical impedi- participate in the promotion of a police career ments, not be pregnant, and have completed 6Ih and in suggesting candidates who meet the cor- level of primary education (in 1999 this was responding criteria" has been completely ig- raised to 9'h grade)?2 In addition to meeting nored (Art.30, e.). basic requirements, the applicant must pay to have lung, blood, urine, HIV and other tests As far as WOLA could determine, al- taken, as well as for authenticated copies of most all police recruitment is handled by post- police and crime records. A study by the ing notices in the police bulletin and through Institute de Enseiianza para el Desarrollo the departmental governors. The governors, in Sostenible (IEPADES) found that these costs turn, to the extent that they give publicize the came to 346 Quetzales (US$60) for an appli- recruitment effort, largely depend on limited cant to the basic course and an additional 150 free airtime provided by community radio sta- Quetzales (US$25) for the officers' course. The tions?" Moreover, since the president appoints study concluded that these expenses "make ac- Washington Office on Latin America cess more difficult for the population in the in- incur the expense of lodging in the capital. terior of the country" and "affect the multiethnic When more people appeared than there were andpluricultural character of the PNC."33 Con- places available in the course, the APNC took sidering that US60 represents about 10 per- the first to arrive, rather than attempting to cent of annual per capita income in the poorest choose the most qualified among the applicants. and largely indigenous department^,'^ the dis- The restsome of whom had quit jobs in order criminatory and exclusionary nature of requir- to appear at the APNC-were told to go home. ing applicants to pay for their own medical and This procedure reflects an attitude of indiffer- other tests is clear, even if that is not the inten- ence to the quality of candidates selected. It tion of government or police leaders. also discriminates against prospective recruits from departments located far from the capital. In addition, the Police Academy (Academia de la Policia Nacional Civil, or Selection Requirements and Processes APNC) is eaming a reputation for cavalier treat- Police, who must know and apply nu- ment of applicants that may dissuade some merous laws, among other duties, need a rela- qualified individuals from pursuing a career in tively high educational level. In El Salvador, the police. Under the new, decentralized sys- requirements for police recruits have been in- tem of entrance examinations, the APNC has creased from a 9Ih to a 12" grade education; in sent as few as two representatives to examine Haiti, the minimum educational level is equiva- hundreds of applicants at sites outside the capi- lent to lothgrade. New entrants to the PNC in tal, depending on local government officials and Guatemala were initially required to have gradu- agencies to provide doctors to conduct medical ated from 6Ih grade. This low educational level examinations. In some cases, only one or two may have made entry to the police easier for doctors have appeared, prepared to work only indigenous aspirants, given the typically low for a few hours, making it physically impos- level of education of most of Guatemala's in- sible to examine the 300 to 400 applicants who digenous peoples. Recycled police from the appear. The academy depends heavily on previous forces were not required to show any MINUGUA for assistance in conducting exams, particular level of educational attainment. and even with UN help, long delays are common.

After numerous problems with Police Those applicants who pass the exam are Academy students being unable to follow and instructed to appear at the APNC in Guatemala pass academy courses, the minimum educational City at a particular date and time. In early 1999, standard was raised to 9h grade in 1999. How- applicants were told to appear on a Monday ever, in Guatemala having the required educa- morning, requiring those coming from distant tional certificate does not always mean much. departments to arrive during the weekend and Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

A large proportion of the applicants, while on Another serious flaw in the selection paper having the required educational level, in process is that the APNC currently uses two practice lacked knowledge corresponding to examinations for entrance to the basic course-- their grade of edu~ation.'~ one for applicants with 6-9* grade education and another for those with 10- 12" grade edu- There have been serious criticisms of the cation. The head of the evaluation board of academic and psychological tests used in the the APNC claims this procedure is fairer.37 selection of students for the Academy. The The result, unfortunately, is to bias the selec- academic tests in Spanish, natural sciences, ge- tion in favor of those with less education, who ography, history, and general culture have been take a less stringent exam. Some candidates criticized as testing only rote learning rather than with more educational qualifications have been the analytical and judgement skills called for in turned away even though they might have out- professional policing. Similarly, the psycho- performed their less-educated competitors logical tests have been assessed as more appro- had they been allowed to take the easier priate to an urban reality rather than for people examination. living in rural and largely indigenous areas. l6 Washington Office on Latin America

Indigenous Participation According to varying estimates, indig- enous peoples represent between 40 to 60 per- The peace accords explicitly call for the cent of the overall Guatemalan population. De- PNC to reflect the ethnic, cultural and linguis- spite this however, only about one-fifth of new tic character of the country. This commitment PNC recruits are indigenous. The government is important for a number of reasons. Many has done little to raise that proportion. With people, especially in rural areas, speak only in- the sole exception of a MINUGUA-sponsored digenous languages and cannot communicate recruitment effort in the Ixil triangle, the gov- with the current police force. Many crimes and ernment has createdno special recruitment pro- abuses are committed against indigenous Gua- cess directed at indigenous communities and has temalans who, due to illiteracy, poverty and failed to involve Mayan organizations in monolinguism, are unable to seek adequate re- recruitment efforts. dress. Many Mayan communities still practice indigenous law, using community elders and One contentious issue has been height spiritual leaders to help mediate disputes and requirements for recruitment. After significant impart traditional justice. Indigenous police are struggle, a minimal concession was made to vital to construct an adequate interface and com- lower the height requirement by 2 centimeters, munication between indigenous peoples and the to 158 centimeters for men and 153 for women formal state system of justice. A multiethnic for the third round of recruitment in 1998 and police force could also help forge a greater sense to make a further incremental lowering of height of nationhood among traditionally disenfran- requirements linked to educational levels in the chised groups. It would also be an important fourth and fifth courses for basic agents.38 step towards helping to heal some of the wounds However, given the extremely short stature of left by the military's genocidal practices dur- much of the indigenous population (due in part ing the internal armed conflict. Finally, ex- to endemic childhood malnutrition) these re- panded involvement of indigenous people in the quirements would still exclude large sectors of PNC might help overcome the legacy of ex- the population-who might otherwise be well treme distrust left by the corruption of the Na- qualified-from a chance to participate in the tional Police. In some communities, such as police. The government has offered no com- the indigenous towns of the Ixil region, extreme pelling argument as to why physical height is a frustration led the inhabitants to force the PN relevant and essential qualification for partici- out of the area altogether, preferring no police pating in the PNC. at all to one that preyed on the local population. In other cases, local populations have attacked The only other advance in making the police stations following accusations that po- PNC more representative of the country's lice were taking bribes to release alleged criminals. people has been a decentralization of the recruit- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government ment process--evaluations are now taking place whole may or may not share these views, but in Zacapa, Quetzaltenango, Cobh, Flores, and even if they were interested in joining the PNC Mazatenango-which, indirectly, has helped to and had access to information about applica- increase the diversity of the indigenous groups tion opportunities, many would still face seri- represented, though not their overall proportion ous limitations in meeting height and educa- in the force. tional requirements, completing costly applica- tion procedures, and successfully completing In 1998 MINUGUA reported that the Academy courses. The onus is on the govem- Police Academy does not give any positive ment to make a serious attempt to ensure that value to indigenous identity, and that its train- the PNC reflects Guatemala's ethnic diversity, ing is inadequate and inappropriate for indig- and to convince all inhabitants that this is truly enous students due, among other reasons, to anew institution at the service of the entire citi- overly theoretical materials, unfamiliar termi- zw. nology and lack of bilingual instructors. Of the 65 Ixil and Quiche candidates who entered the The Police Academy Academy at end of 1997, 13 dropped out vol- The establishment ofthe PNC Academy untarily and another 17 proved unable to keep is amajor achievement of the Arni government. up with academic requirement^.'^ MINUGUA The Ministry of the Interior invested 1.5 mn commented that: "Simple equal treatment of all Ecus ($1.6mn) in improvement and rehabilita- students, (without recognizing their ethnic ori- tion of the buildings to enhance conditions for gin), when the language, culture, and identity study, dormitory and service areas even prior of indigenous peoples are discriminated against to the signing of an assistance agreement with in practice, contributes to inequality and forced the European Union for this purpose. The Po- cultural assimilati~n.'"~ lice Academy was expanded by remodeling the offices of the dissolved Mobile Military Police As in other countries emerging from (PMA). During the first half of 1999, the Min- conflict, there are also historical and ideologi- istry of thehterior also set up a temporary train- cal impediments to indigenous or minority par- ticipation in new security forces. Mayan indig- ing facility in a section of the Military Acad- emy in San Juan Sacatephuez. This was closed enous leaders who are actively promoting com- pliance with many aspects of the accords, have as the central Academy continued expanding its facilities during 1999. shown little or no interest in promoting a multiethnic police. A typical response of those queried is "why should we send our children to One outstanding issue with the Police serve in the repressive instrument of a domi- Academy is its legal status and budget. The nant culture?'The indigenous population as a police organic law makes no specific mention Washington Offie on Latin America of an Academy. The organizational regulations tional personnel posted at the Academy report of the PNC place it under the PNC Educational that the quality of the recycled police is in fact Department (Jefafura de Ensenanza). In prac- significantly inferior to that of thenew recruits. tice, the director of the Guatemalan Academy appears to answer to both the Minister of the Retraining for many specialized units Interior and the chief of police, and has no au- was even more abbreviated. The first and sec- tonomous budget. ond course in "security for officials" (Seguridad de Funcionarios) lasted a month and a half and The Academy now has its own medical did not include human rights training. The anti- and psychological clinic and MINUGUA is narcotics police (whom the US Embassy insisted helping establish a library. The first courses were already well trained) received a recycling began in April 1997, and, as of December 1998, course of only nine days. The US Embassy also the Academy had 2,451 students studying in dif- pushed hard for those 65 police assigned to pro- ferent courses. By mid-1999 some 11,300 of- tect the diplomatic service (for example patrol- ficers and agents had passed through the Acad- ling the neighborhood where embassy person- emy. While impressive, the large volume of nel are concentrated) to skip therecycling course students was achieved in part by numerous short altogether. cuts in recruitment, selection and training. The six-month course for new recruits A particular concern is the abbreviated is somewhat less problematic. This is on par three-month retraining period for recycled po- with U.S. police training. If the candidates were lice. This reduced training period violates the well educated and well chosen, and if academy peace accord provision that requires a 6-month training were complemented with appropriate basic training for PNC members. The argu- in-sevice training, sixmonths wouldbe sufficient. ment that three months is enough, given the previous training and experience these police For both civilian recruits and recycled have had, is patently false. With the possible police, continuing education and training is a exception of the anti-narcotics police pressing need. MINUGUA's March 1999 re- (Departamento de Operaciones Anti- port emphasized the importance of continuing Narcdticas, or DOAN), who have received spe- education and training for the PNC given the cial training and support from the US low general level of scholarship of police re- Antinarcotics Assistance Program, it cannot be cruits, the short and excessively theoretical na- assumed that previous police agents and offic- ture of the comes, the lack of qualified instruc- ers have received significant training at all. Fur- tors, and the difficulty of changing the attitudes thermore they were forged as police in an insti- and institutional values of the past in such a short tution rife with corruption and abuse. Interna- period of retraining. However, field training is Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government not currently incorporated into Guatemala's however, ICITAP trained 72 instructors through police reform program. Were such a program the instructor development unit, and all but ten established, it would need safeguards to ensure of these remained as teachers at the scho01.~' that field trainers support a human rights orien- tation rather than teaching practices associated Unfortunately, many police trainers who with the old security forces. Without a major did not receive the more complete ICITAP effort to ensure remedial traininglretraining of courses have often not been up to the challenge the police, especially recycled police, serious of teaching large classes of poorly prepared stu- problems can be foreseen in the future. dents. Some have resorted to such poor pe&- gogy as reading lengthy passages from laws and Lack of Qualified Instructors regulations, refusing to explain the material and quashing questions from the students.44A con- The shortcomings of academy training tributing factor has been lack of follow-up by are compounded by a shortage of qualified in- the Spanish Civil Guard, which gave instruc- structors. In contrast to El Salvador, where the tors little in-class supervision prior to transfer- international community provided most Acad- ring to them full responsibility for teaching emy instructors, nationals are handling most classes. 45 Guatemalan training. At the outset, the Span- ish Civil Guard either worked with national in- Other concerns in current Academy structors or provided training themselves but training include continued reports of ill-treat- increasingly they are taking a back-seat role. ment of students and arbitrary actions by in- structors and officers responsible for applying The U.S. International Criminal Inves- discipline inthe Academy; and arelatively high tigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) proportion of students (1 1.4 percent) who left has trained Guatemalan police instructors in the third basic course in the first two months of five-week courses, and more recently has de- classes. However, in 1998 and 1999, accord- veloped a more permanent 'instructor develop- ing to international advisors and instructors ment unit' at the academy. Unfortunately, many posted at the Academy, the APNC modified of the individuals who fust received ICITAP some aspects of the curriculum, greatly im- training were transferred to other non-teaching proved administration, and has been more re- PNC posts. One PNC official estimated that sponsive to student complaints about abusive only 40 percent remained on duty as teachers.42 instructors. ICITAP officials confmed that many of the fust group of instructors trained were subse- quently recycled into the PNC and assigned to posts outside the academy. In 1998 and 1999, Washington Office on Latin America

Deployment road system very poor. Even in communities that have phone service, many stations lack By end of July 1999 the total number of phone lines. There is no budget for support staff, police deployed was 13,206, distributed in 27 so police have to cook and clean for themselves. comisarias and a variety of specialized units and Holding cells for detainees are also often inad- tasks, and plans were to reach 18,000 by the equate, presenting security risks for both de- end of the ~ear.4~This falls short of the 20,000 tainees and police, and wasting police resources originally scheduled to be in place by the end on guarding inadequately secured prisoners?' of 1999, but is still a huge quantity of people to train, equip, and deploy. (According to The European Union's assistance pro- MINUGUA's latest verification report, 17,399 gram includes support for the construction of police had been deployed by the end of Octo- 325 police stations throughout Guatemala (36 ber 1999, 36.5 percent of whom were new re- in Guatemala City in 1997, 1 18 in 1998 in the cruits and only 6.5 percent were women.) In first departmental deployments, 123 in 1999 and fact, the 20,000 figure is the one commitment 48 for the year 2000). This is a very ambitious of the peace accords that the authorities have goal, given that large areas of the country have taken most seriously, and which the Adgov- had virtually no police presence at all in the past. ernment continually used to justify all the other The EU's assistance for the purchase of more short cuts in recruitment, indigenous participa- than 600 vehicles and nearly 300 motorcycles tion, selection, andtraining. By August 6, 1999, has also been very helpful. (However, mainte- the PNC had been deployed to each of the nance may be an issue in rural areas where, due country's 22 departments. to their remoteness, police are allowed to have this work handled by local mechanics. This may The major initial problem with deploy- produce inconsistent and unprofessional service, ment of the PNC was the absence of adequate leading to a more rapid degradation of rolling facilities, whch continued to be an issue through stock.) 1999. New members of the PNC have fre- quently been posted to stations still under con- The Guatemalan government has also struction or that did not exist at all. Morale has come up with an ingenious partial solution to suffered as the newly trained police have at- the problems of police station construction and tempted to work without running water, sani- rehabilitation. The Interior Minister's wife, tary facilities, garbage collection, or other ba- Laura de Mendoza-under the umbrella of a sic services. Difficult conditions are due in part First Lady initiative called "Give to Receive," to the lack of infrastructure in rural areas. Phone (Dar para Recibircled a massive campaign services are oftennonexistent or extremely lim- to establish "Pro-Construction Neighborhood ited, communities are widely dispersed, and the Committees" (Comites de Vecinos Pro- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

Constnrccion) in nearly every community to vide a forum for ongoing dialogue between the which the police are being deployed. Their local police station and the population and con- purpose is to prepare adequate facilities for the tinue to mobilize community support for the new deployments. Local mayors and even pri- police. A study of these local security commit- vate individuals (including private developers) tees carried out by Familiares y Amigos contra have often provided buildings or land, and lo- la Delincuencia y el Secuestro (FADS) points cal residents and businesses have assisted in to some improvement in the security situation fundmising, building, repairing and furnishing where the committees and the PNC have oper- the new stations. The Ministry of the interior, ated and that the JLS model with limited EU support, then provides the complementary funds needed, though often with "has shown some satisfactory many delays and deficiencies. results and presents an important potential to improve citizen secu- These community organization efforts rity, promote participation and benefit the police in two ways: they have aug- social monitoring (regarding disci- mented slim official resources with private con- pline and the application of human tributions, and have helped forge closer and rights) and to contribute to the more cordial relations with the population. For professionalization of the PNC example, the "Pro-Construction Committees" demanded in the peace accords."@ often organize special community events and celebrations to receive the new PNC into their But whde these local committees appear to communities, thus helping them overcome some have provided important initial benefits in the of the stigma earned by the old PN. According deployment of the PNC, there are also dan- to government officials, 168 ofthemunicipali- gers that these mechanisms could be used as a ties and communities to whch the PNC have means of political control or be abused at the been deployed have formed or are in the pro- local level. The potential benefits and risks cess of forming Pro-Construction Committees point to the importance of close monitoring of with a total of 1,618 committee members. A these entities in the period ahead. total of 117,337 people have attendedmeetings to receive the new PNC deployment^.^^ Joint Military-Police Patrols

This initial organizing effort has proved The military has been used extensively so successful that the Ministry of the Interior is in 'joint patrols' with the police in the capital now expanding its organizing efforts into the city and throughout the country, especially in creation of "local security committees" (Juntas those departments where the PNC was not yet Locales de Seguridad, or LS) that should pro- deployed. At first it was common to see a large Washinaon Officeon Latin America number of heavily armed soldiers accompanied Military participation in internal secu- by a single police officer, but increasingly one rity is not illegal under the current Constitu- police person and one soldier patrol in pairs. tion, and was given further sanction in Execu- Government officials say that the military sup- tive Decree 90-96 of March 7,1996. However, port in patrolling is supplied only "at the re- using the military to substitute for weak civil- quest of civilian authorities," and that these pa- ian institutions sends a womsome message and trols will end when the PNC get up to suffi- runs the risk of contributing to ongoing police cient numbers. The March 1999 MINUGUA weakness. More alarming, the long-term sepa- report states that: ration of police and military functions in Gua- temala is made more difficult. "Despite the fact that, on numer- ous occasions, the Interior Minis- If the army continues to have a role in try has stated its intention to internal security, beyond a limited and carefully suspend the combined patrols in defined transitional responsibility, the potential areas where the new PNC has been for genuine police reform and establishment of deployed, this has still not happened the rule of law will be seriously jeopardized. It . . . The Mission considers it essen- is clearly inappropriate in a democracy to give tial, as indicated in the 8" report. . . the armed forces an ongoing role in maintain- to strengthen the control of civil- ing public order and guaranteeing personal ian authorities over the combined rights and freedoms. In order for the rule of patrols, and that the planning and law to be strengthened and consolidated in Gua- operation of the patrols be com- temala, the government that takes office in Janu- pletely in the hands of the PNC." ary 2000 must make a much stronger commit- ment to separate internal and external security MINUGUA also recommends reforming functions and press for military leaders to Decree 90-96 which authorizes the joint patrols accept civilian control. to establish its transitoly character and to reaf- fm the directive role of the Ministry of the Interior and the departmental governor^.^^ Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

CHAPTER 5: THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PNC

ile the PNC was greeted warmly ranking officers are allowed to impose more by Guatemalans in many areas severe punishments - longer periods of arrest when it first deployed, there have or suspension, for example. For serious and beenw increasing reports in the Guatemalan press very serious infractions, a more complex pro- and in recent MINUGUA reports of abuses by cedure is invoked. A senior officer (sub- the new police. These reinforce concerns about comisario or higher) must initiate the process, the difficulties of creating a "new" police force appointing an officer as investigator (instruc- through recycling largenumbers of police from tor) of the case to investigate, draw up the old corrupt and repressive institutions, particu- charges, andmake a findmg. At various stages larly at the officer level. It also calls for scru- in the process, the individual charged with in- tiny of the mechanisms that are supposed to fractions can present h~sor her side of the case, detect, investigate and discipline infractions and and can appeal to the Disciplinary Regime Sec- misconduct by members of the PNC. Another tion of the General Subdirectorate for Person- concern is the ongoing weakness of the PNC in nel, or, if the disciplinary decision was made at confronting and reducing Guatemala's high higher levels, to the Director General of the PNC crime rate, particularly the serious problems in or to the Minister of Interior. Time limits are criminal investigations. established for each step in the process, and all steps involve written reports. Government fig- Internal Controls ures show that 3,668 sanctions have been ap- plied for minor infractions, 3,646 for serious, The legal basis for internal discipline of and 20 for very serious infractions. Sixteen the PNC is provided by a "Disciplinaq Regu- police personnel have been sanctioned with re- lation," (ReglamentoDiscipIinario de la Policia moval from service for very serious breaches Nacional Civil) modeled closely on that of the and 22 cases are pending. 5' Spanish Civil Guard. It identifies three catego- ries of infractions - minor, serious and very This framework suffers from several serious filtas lwes, faltus graves, faltas muy drawbacks that could be addressed through graves) -and specifies the procedures and range modification of the regulation as well as cre- of penalties associated with each. For minor ation of additional institutions to implement it. infractions, the reglamento allows an expedited The regulation depends entirely on officers (and procedure that gives police at all levels of the in the case of substations, on inspectors or sub- command hierarchy the power to charge and inspectors) to discipline their subordinates, yet punish their immediate subordinates. Higher- is too complex for most personnel to understand Washington Office on Latin America and apply effectively. According to interna- ing international police advisors, MINUGUA tional observers, few PNC officers or agents un- officials, and non-govemmental organizations derstand the code.s2 The characterization of that have monitored the ORP. It is very short- infractions is often so vague as to make it very staffed, with approximately 45 investigators, difficult to assess the severity of any given in- roughly half the number needed according to fraction. Lacking confidence in their ability to international advisors. Its personnel came out interpret the code and apply it correctly, many of the old PN, have had only a minimal re-train- officers and inspectors do not even try to do so. ing course, and have shown little willingness to investigate aggressively potential wrongdoing Moreover, the regulation provides no by colleagues. The ORP's management of in- institutional mechanisms for the investigation formation is so poor that it is impossible to ob- of police conduct by an independent office tain information on what percentage of its cases within the police. There is an "Office of Pro- are resolved, or what percentage result in disci- fessional Responsibility" (OW) that was car- plinary or legal actions. From what MINUGUA ried over from the National Police, and is de- has been able to ascertain through spot-check- signed to provide PNC line officers with assis- ing, the ORP conducts cursory investigations tance in investigating cases of possible infrac- and then, if there is any evidence of criminal tions by police personnel. Unfortunately, the wrongdoing, immediately passes the case to ORP is not even mentioned in the Disciplinary prosecutors in the Public Ministry. Since the Regulation, has no specific function within the caseloads of prosecutors run in the hundreds and procedures laid out in the Regulation, and has even thousands, action on cases involving the no autonomous investigative authority, no pow- police is slow to non-existent. If a prosecutor ers to initiate formal investigations on its own did take action on a case, he or she would have authority, andno power to bring formal charges to call on the Criminal Investigations Service or impose disciplinary sanctions. It is, in es- (SIC) of the PNC to do the investigation, since sence, a service bureau that supports line offic- the Public Ministry lacks legal authority to con- ers with investigations, and is therefore limited duct its own basic criminal investigations (see by the honesty and commitment to profession- section on criminal investigations, below). As alism of the officer corps, rather than being a the SIC depends upon cooperation from the mechanism for ensuring that such qualities pre- uniformed ranks to conduct routine investiga- vail. In sum, the institutional design of the ORP tions, it has strong disincentives to investigate falls far short of the requirements of a genuine fellow police personnel. internal affairs, control, or disciplinary unit. Meanwhile, the police agents in ques- In practice, the ORP is virtually non- tion remain on the job, since under the disci- functional, according to multiple sources includ- plinary regulation, no final disposition can be Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government made on disciplinary charges and no sanction Lacking the means to hold their superior ac- can be imposed against police personnel until a countable for these abuses, the rank and file court issues a judgement andsentence in a crimi- carried out an armed demonstration. The nal case pending against them. (Article 3, government's response to the FEP crisis was to Reglamento Diciplinario). Thus, a police agent defend the commanding officer and fault the accused of torture, rape, or murder would re- rebellious agents. While the FEP uprising was main on the job until a court ruled on the re- clearly unacceptable in any hierarchical, armed sulting criminal charges, a process likely to take organization, the incident points to an institu- years. tional problem of abusive leadership and insuf- ficient internal control mechanisms. If there In addition to these procedural problems, were an independent internal affairs unit will- there are insufficient mechanisms for the receipt ing to act on complaints from the lower ranks, of complaints. The ORP has no published pub- this problem might have been dealt with before lic access telephone numbers. Anonymous it led to an armed uprising. complaints can trigger an investigation, but no formal disciplimaq procedure can be initiated The lack of an effective internal affairs on the basis of an anonymous complaint (Ar- mechanism opens the door for organized crimi- ticle 3 1, Reglamento Diciplinario). The same nal activity to take root within the police. One challenge faces subordinates within the PNC of the main roles of internal affairs units is to who are mistreated by superiors in violation of prevent criminal activities, such as pyramid pay- PNC regulations, or who observe infractions or ment schemes, from being established within criminal activities by their superiors. No for- the regular chain of command. Alarming re- mal mechanism exists for whistle blowing; sub- ports have appeared in the press alleging that ordinates can do little more than send an anony- pyramid schemes are already functioning within mous letter to the Director General or to the the PNC, under which subordinates are expected Interior Minister. to pay a futed quota to their commander, forc- ing them to generate income through corrupt One consequence of the absence of activities. Serious patterns of abuse have also mechanisms for such complaints is evident in emerged, with a growing number of incidents the armed revolt of the Special Police Forces and complaints of torture, as well as very cred- (PEP) in April 1999. According to press ible complaints of abusive and corrupt conduct sources, the FEE' had suffered under consistently by the SIC." abusive behavior by their commanding officer, who routinely disregarded regulations with re- International technical assistance donors spect to working hours, leaves, days off, and are aware of these deficiencies, but the projects working conditions for his subordinates. '3 currently proposed will do relatively little to Washington Office on Latin America address the roots of the problem. In mid-1998, dures, and finances of police; to assist the Pub- ICITAP presented the public security ministry lic Ministry in any criminal investigations with a draft of an alternative, simpler disciplin- involving police; and to recommend adminis- ary code that would be easier for police com- trative sanctions. Personnel for such a unit manders to understand and apply. The minis- would need to be carefully selected, identify- try has not responded to this proposal, despite ing individuals who are highly motivated to do growing evidence that the current system is this difficult and dangerous work. Careful back- unworkable. MINUGUA will soon begin a pro- ground checks would be needed, supplemented gram to strengthen the OW'S information man- by polygraph checks. Revisions to the dis- agement capabilities. This will be reinforced ciplinary regulations should attempt to simplify by a project supported by the European Union the regime so that it is more easily understood to evaluate current OW personnel, retain only and applied. those who have shown themselves to be effec- tive, and recruit new investigators mainly from Other approaches would include legis- the pool of newly trained PNC agents drawn lative changes empowering the Public Minis- from civilian life. While these measures may try to conduct criminal investigations, and spe- strengthen the OW, they will not be sufficient cifically to investigate the police (see section to address the basic structural problems of the below on criminal investigations); creation of a PNC's internal disciplinary regime. civilian review board; or creation of an inspec- tor general's office outside the structure of the Several approaches could be taken to PNC but with powers, under the laws andregu- address these institutional weaknesses. The lations of the PNC to investigate internal po- Historical Clarification Commission recom- lice affairs. Whichever approach is taken, some mended that the leadership of the PNC "create very substantial reform and reinforcement of a new unit for internal control or inspection, the internal affairs regime is essential to ensure which is accessible both to the public and the that the PNC does not degenerate into a conupt Human Rights Ombudsman, and which has au- and abusive force. tonomy to investigate and sanction both indi- vidual and institutional professional miscon- Criminal Investigations A minimal approach would be to re- vise the disciplinary regulation to establish a The lack of competent criminal investi- genuine internal affairs unit, with explicit and gators in the old National Police contributed to independent authority to receive complaints the high rate of crime in Guatemala since the from the public and from within the police; to late 1980s, and to the general climate of impu- conduct investigations of the conduct, proce- nity enjoyed by some organized criminal ele- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government ments. The government is making efforts to At current rates of training, it will take at least form a new, larger, better-trained and better- seven years to field an adequately trained in- equipped Criminal Investigations Service (SIC) vestigations unit. within the PNC. Unfortunately, buildmg an investigative agency is more time consuming Unfortunately, the recruitment and se- than deploying uniformed street police. Inves- lection problems that plague the police as a tigative personnel require additional training in whole are especially serious in the SIC. Per- general investigative techniques, as well as in sonnel have not been consistently and ad- specializations related to particular types of equately screened, nor selected accordmg to crime. The SIC also needs equipment and re- their analytical skills or investigative vocation, lated training for collecting physical evidence, although the situation is improving. In an ef- and a crime laboratory for evaluating such evi- fort to improve the quality of personnel partici- dence. A disjuncture has developed between pating in the basic investigator course, the U.S. the rapid deployment of the PNC throughout ICITAP program developed an evaluation and the country, and the comparatively slow devel- screening procedure for entrants into its course. opment of the SIC. In most respects, the de- At the outset, however, it was unable to effec- lays in development of the SIC were unavoid- tively apply this procedure because the govern- able; however, a few might have been pre- ment did not present its candidates until a few vented. For example, the government delayed days before the course began. As a result, a several months in making a commitment to con- number of individuals have taken the course and stiuct a building for the crime lab, and the U.S. entered the SIC "who don't belong there," due ICITAP program has correctly refused to pro- to lack of analytical abilities, lack of work ethic, vide lab equipment until a suitable physical site mdcal problems, ethical shortcomings, or lack is available for the delicate eq~ipment?~ of interest in investigative This situa- tion has gradually improved since the first Advisors with international technical course, as the govenunent has selected candi- assistance agencies estimate that the PNC will dates more in conformity with ICITAP's rec- need between 1500 and 2000 investigator^.^' ommended profile. Timing remains a problem, The SIC currently includes some 500 investi- as candidates continue to be presented too late gators, but of these only 150 have taken to allow polygraph checks to be conducted be- ICITAP's new 14 week basic investigators' fore courses begin.59 Overall, US. trainers course. Roughly 20percent (100 investigators) point to the problems of trying to train police have prior experience as investigators in the investigators in three months. This, they argue, National Police, and most of these have taken is possible with college graduates, but not with various short courses offered earlier by ICITAP. students with a sixth-grade education.'j0 Washington Of$ce on Latin America

The problem of selection is a particu- as crimes, and as a result, the SIC has been re- larly important one for investigative police units. quired to investigate traffic accidents, even The work is demanding, and critical and ana- though its personnel are not trained in tech- lytical thinking skills are at a premium. More- niques for doing so. This has placed a signifi- over, the ethical qualities of investigators are cant workload on already over-worked investi- particularly important since they are especially gators. U.S. ICITAP advisors have suggested likely to be targeted by criminal organizations to the PNC leadership that this responsibility with corrupt offers to look the other way in ex- be shifted to the uniformed police, and the PNC change for financial or other considerations. Director General has agreed, in principle, to Recent experiences in El Salvador point to the make this change.61 Additional training for importance of careful selection: the Salvadoran uniformed police will be needed to implement PNC has twice had to essentially dismantle their such a change, and this will require coopera- investigations division (DIC) and rebuild it from tion from the European Union project support- scratch. This was necessary because of exten- ing the deployment of the uniformed police. sive internal problems, including corruption and Other problems for the SIC have included a ten- suspected involvement in criminal enterprises. dency by senior police commanders to use the The failure to select investigators carefully from SIC in other roles that are outside their the outset has contributed to a massive waste of mandate, such as routine patrolling in the international resources spent to train investiga- capital city. tors who have now been transferred or dis- missed. It has also cost the Salvadoran PNC Police Relations with Prosecutors: several years during which they couldhave con- The Public Ministry solidated an effective detective corps, solved A more intractable problem is the SIC'S many crimes, and deterred many others. The difficult working relationship with the prosecu- lack of effective investigations is a crucial con- tors from the Public Ministry (MP). Under tributing factor to the serious crime problems Guatemalan law, all investigations must be ini- affecting El Salvador. The Guatemalan public tiated by the MP, unless the police observe a security leadership would do well to learn from crime being committed or have reason to be- the experiences of their neighbor, and attempt lieve they must act immediately to avoid fur- to saeen investigative pasomel more thoroughly. ther injury or loss of life. Because the prosecu- tors of the MF are very overworked, however, In addition to the problems of training they do not respond promptly to cases brought and selection, there are anumber of operational to their attention by the police, and in practice problems, some of which can be solved fairly the police exercise more autonomy in investi- easily; others may require legislative changes. gations than the law permits. Police and inter- First. Guatemalan law treats traffic accidents Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government national advisors interviewed expressed frus- level police investigators, and providing a six- tration with the slow response time and limited month training course. This approach helped capacity of the MP. Honduras create an investigative corps that was independent of the old security forces, staffed The frustration is mutual: prosecutors by highly motivated individuals who were less and their international advisors report that the likely to be compromised by existing crimiial SIC of the PNC does not reliably conduct the and corrupt networks.63 requested investigations. The low level of edu- cation of SIC personnel, as well as outmoded The MP has contracted trainers from reporting procedures predating the new Crimi- Honduras and Costa hca, but is not at ths time nal Procedures Code (decreed in 1992 and receiving other international assistance for this implemented beginning in 1994) often impede project, in large part because the legal status of successful prosecutions. The detectives who these investigators is highly questionable. Ar- write up and sign reports are often not the de- ticle 40 of the Organic Law of the Public Min- tectives who participated directly in the actions istry allows the ministry to employ experts in described. As a result, official reports can be the forensic sciences; the MP is using this ar- challenged in court. When the lower-ranking ticle as the basis for their employment of crimi- police agents who participated in particular nal investigators. Th~sinterpretation is chal- events are questioned in court, they sometimes lenged by the leadership of the PNC, as well as do not acquit themselves by international observers and advisors.& The lack of legal standing is a major drawback of Because of frustration with the perfor- this initiative, notwithstanding the merits of the mance of the SIC, and in response to a desire to approach chosen by the Public Ministry. MP have geater in-house control over investiga- investigators may not be able to offer evidence tions, the MP formed its own goup of investi- in court, so their future usefulness in support of gators, drawn mainly from the ranks of the old prosecutions may be limited. The fact that the National Police. This was not a successful ex- MP felt it necessary to devote extensive re- periment, as there were no internal controls on sources to building a team of investigators, de- this group and criminal activities quickly took spite the legal questions, points to the depth of hold. TheMP has since dismissedmost of these distrust toward the police. individuals, and is beginning to train anew corps of 75 investigators. The new investigative staff Involvement of Militay Intelligence in is to be based on the highly successful Hondu- Criminal Investigations ran model of recruiting civilians with at least two years of university education, offering them A pervasive problem for the effort to salaries nearly twice as high as those of basic- improve criminal investigations is the role Washin~tonOffice on Latin America

played by military intelligence in investigating denying MINUGUA full access to those inves- kidnappings and organized crime. No one in tigators responsible for this capture and Inte- the government or donor community would rior Minister Mendoza claimed that the investi- admit to concrete knowledge of how such sup- gators involved had been operating under his port is actually organized, nevertheless a search authority. However, the civilian authorities have of media reports over an 18-month period found never produced the body or brought anyone to several reports of such invol~ement.~~Local trial for this serious human rights abuse. journalists and human rights advocates believe that this intelligence and investigative support There have also been repeated indica- is being handled by the notorious Presidential tions of some level of military or EMP involve- General Staff (Estado Mayor Presidential or ment in the assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi EMP). The EMP is a military body officially in April 1998, either in the murder itself andlor responsible for ensuring the security of the presi- in what appear to be numerous cover-up and dent and vice-president and their families, but disinfomation maneuvers related to this case, which in practice has a long history of illegal which still remains unsolved. At the very least espionage and death squad activities, including the EMP conducted its own investigation into the 1990 murder of Guatemalan anthropologist this murder, independently of the formal inves- Myrna Mack Chang. (The sergeant-specialist tigation conducted by the Public Ministry. Pos- who carried out the murder was finally con- sible military or EMP involvement is now un- victed and is in jail, while the family's case der investigation by the Public Ministry, and against the former heads of the EMP as the "in- the prosecutor, Celvin Galindo, resigned from tellectual authors" of the assassination contin- the case and fled the country after receiving ues to languish in the courts.) death threats and being followed by cars with license plates traced to the EMP. WOLA has heard repeated and credible allegations of military investigators employing The old PN had a close relationship with illegal practices, such as wiretapping, and in the EMP and it was common for personnel to some cases beating or killing kidnappers instead move £rom one to the other. The PN was heavily of turning them over to the courts. A particu- infiltrated by military intelligence and there was larly notorious case was the 1996 disappearance some de facto cooperation. Thus the irregular and apparent execution of a guerrilla kidnap- entry of a group of 40 military personnel-in- per, Juan Jos6 Cabrera Rodas (also known as cluding 22 ex-sergeants from the EMP-into a 'Mincho'). When this case finally came to light March 1998 officer course at the PNC Acad- months later, MINUGUA issued a statement ern^,^^ causes particular concern, especially placing responsibility for this disappearance on since MINUGUA protests of this incident found the EM.The Arni government responded by no echo with other donors or in the government. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

The government clearly needs an intel- The unit led by "Zacarias" is not contributing ligence fhction to track the operations of or- to the legal prosecution of any cases: according ganized crime, including drug trafficking, death to SIC sources, Rivera's information has led to squad activity, car-stealing rings, etc. Theprob- no arrests in Guatemala, and since his investi- lem is not the existence of intelligence units at gators lack legal standing, their information is the service of the criminal justice system, but of no direct value for criminal prosecutions. the total lack of transpxency with which this delicate area is being handled, including the lack Conduct of the PNC of civilian control and oversight, and the ap- When the new PNC were first deployed parent ongoing use of military intelligence of- in Guatemala City and in priority departments ficers in these functions. An additional prob- around the country, assessments were very posi- lem is that as long as military intelligence itself tive overall. MINUGUA observed that the de- operates without civilian oversight, these units ployment of the PNC was viewed with enthusi- can arbitrarily or evenmaliciously leak mislead- asm by the public and "has had a positive im- ing information to prosecutors, police investi- pact on the population." Compared with the gators, or the press, thus influencing the course old National Police, the new PNC in general of official investigations in a non-transparent demonstrated a better sense of mission. The fashion-a practice common in Guatemalan number of complaints of police corruption ap- political circles. peared to have decreased, and complaints of human rights violations seemed to have dimin- Even more irregular activity is being ished. However, the positive public response, carried out by a group of anti-kidnapping in- in a climate of crime and insecurity, was per- vestigators led by a Venezuelan national, named haps not surprising. (The same type of response Victor Rivera. Also known by the pseudonym was seen in Haiti and El Salvador when new "Zacarias," he operates a team financed by pri- forces were deployed.) And there were not vate businesspeople which reportedly enjoys the objective studies available to compare either support of the Ministry of Interior and has full crime rates or complaints of abuse prior to and access to police andministry records. This team following deployment of the PNC. has been operating in Guatemala since early 1997. "Zacarias" formerly did the same type In its March 1999 human rights report, of work in El Salvador. A reliable source has MINUGUA pointed to factors that had contrih- linked Rivera to leading a death squad opera- uted to the more positive perception of the PNC tion in a neighboring country inmid-1999, that on the part of the popdation. These included resulted in the torture and murder of three Sal- the greater visibility and presence of the new vadoran delinquents and the Guatemalan head force; the existence of new patterns of conduct of a kidnapping ring, Ana Lucia Arana Obregon. Washington Offie on Latin America that may inspire greater confidence on the part low in the new police force, the resurgence of of the population; and the creation of offices to cases of torture, some of them involving mem- provide attention to citizen concerns (oficinas bers of the new police force, is extremely seri- de atencidn a1 ciudadano). But the UN Mis- ous; for that reason, the Mission considers it sion went on to warn that it is fundamental from urgent that steps be taken to eradicate this pmcfice.'m the first stage of deployment that the "popula- tion perceives that the police are providing an Press reports and observations by mem- adequate level of security, accompanied by a bers of human rights and other civil society scrupulous respect for human rights." Even one groups reinforce the concerns raised by case of abuse, they argue, is "absolutely unac- MINUGUA. The Guatemalan press reported ceptable and merits a very strong reaction from that during January 1999, there were 27 com- the a~thorities."~~ plaints made against agents of the PNC to the Public Ministry involving accusations of extor- The MINUGUA report points to the dis- tion, threats, illegal detention and bribery, as proportionate use of deadly force by a senior well as abuse of authority. Complaints increased PNC official; violations by the PNC (as well as during the months of November and December theNational Police, army, and executive) of the of 1998 and in January 1999.@ Human rights right to integrity and security of the person; in- workers personally experienced an attempt to volvement by members of the PNC's Criminal solicit bribes by PNC agents in the department Investigation Service in acts of torture in of WOLA received fmt-hand reports Escuintla; arbitrary arrests by PNC agents; de- of PNC harassment of homosexuals in Zone 1 nial of the right to due process by PNC mem- of Guatemala City that were brought to the at- bers; and violations of the State's commitment tention of MINUGUA. Wethese reports raise against impunity involving PNC members. The very serious concerns about the behavior of the Mission's report concludes that "there has been new PNC, it is still difficult to make a defini- no progress in the development and implemen- tive judgement about changes in the overall tation of effective measures to prevent or pun- public security situation or the behavior of the ish abuses and excesses committed by police PNC until more complete data are available both officers. This fact, added to the many viola- on crimes and on complaints against the PNC. tions committed by members of both the Na- tional Police and the PNC, makes it difficult Problems with the Special Police Forces for them to gain the population's trust and co- (mp) operation. While the increase in numbers of the new National Civil Police and the exten- The major problems to date have arisen sion of its area of operation make it possible to with the FEP which was formed fkomthe Quinto say that the incidence of violations is relatively Cueipo de la Policia Nacional and the Fuerzas Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government de Reaccidn Inmediata (FRI). The role of the But there have been problems in recruiting the FEP is to help other police units to maintain or next batch of trainees-given the unhappy re- restore public order, to protect public figures, cent history of the FEP, there were only 80 vol- monitor public places when exceptional circum- unteers for the 200 places in the upcoming train- stances arise, and to collaborate with other gov- ing." In future months, the government intends ernment institutions in situations of grave risk, to train additional tactical units which will be catastrophe, or calamity ." Some 337 FEP organizationally part of the FEP, but will re- members went through retraining courses in spond only to orders from the Director General 1996, prior to the creation of the PNC. of the police, or from the Mimster of Interior. MINUGUA's 9&human rights report stated that "Up to this time, their actions have not demon- The FEP mutiny has some important strated significant advances in control and pro- lessons for police reform in Guatemala. It is portionality in the use of force."72 clear that the grievances of the FEP agents were real and shared by many other police agents. On April 5, 1999, the Guatemalan gov- But the response to those grievances-break- ernment dissolvedthe FEP after elements seized ing the law and threatening public safety-was control of their own headquarters in Guatemala obviously unacceptable. In view of the prob- City to protest what they claimed were man- lems experienced in El Salvador and Haiti with agement abuses. Interior Minister Mendoza special police units that had strong corporate called the six-hour action "a clear act of sedi- identities, transferred as units from the old po- tion" after more than 300 agents, wearing ski lice, and underwent minimal training, this type masks over their faces seized their offices and of concerted action should perhaps not come as fired AK-47 rifles and tear gas in the air. The a surprise. The illegal actions of the FEP should protesters were demanding removal of two top send a message to Guatemalan authorities of officers for alleged abuse of power, and also the urgency of addressing police working con- complained about working conditions, asked for ditions and leadership weaknesses, as well as back payment of special bonuses, better equip- the need to ensure retraining and reconfiguration ment, and more holidays. About 40 members of special units that were incorporated intact of the DOAN counter-narcotics unit also took into the PNC with limited or inadequate training. part in the protest." The Guatemalan government should A new FEP is being formed-to be also consider whether it is wise to combine riot 1,000-strong by the year 2000 and drawn ex- control and tactical police into the same force-- clusively from PNC agents recruited from ci- an approach that is at odds with accepted prac- vilian life. The first contingent of 180 has been tice in the U.S. and most Western European trained and will be based in Guatemala City. countries. Riot police train to use minimal force Washington Office on Latin America

to control potentially violent crowds; tactical ment figures were immediately disputed by op- police train to use overwhelming force in situa- position politicians and by officials of the Vol- tions where the clear threat to civilian lives untary Fire Service who claimed that there had mandates the isolated application of military in fact been a 10 to 15 percent increase in crime weapons and methods. Combining these func- between 1997 and 1998.76 tions in one force increases the risk of exces- sive use of force. The Arz6 government's response to criticism of the kind detailed in this report was Effectiveness in Controlling Crime to point to what has been achieved-in num- bers of police trained or retrained, and particu- Government statistics on major crimes, larly to the success of the new police in fight- published in January 1999, claimed a signifi- ing crime as the 'proof of the pudding.' Recent cant decline in homicides, kidnappings, and government crime figures, however, paint a carjackings, leading government officials to decidedly mixed picture of success to date. assert that their public security policy is work- Homicides committed with firearms fell from ing: "We believe that all the efforts to combat 1,600 to 1,340 (or by 16.25 percent) between crime produced the desired results during the the fmt semester of 1998 and the same period past year," said Interior Minister Rodolfo of 1999 while woundings with a firearm were Mendoza, "which allows us to say with certainty down 3 percent-from 2,282 to 2,208. At the that we are on the right track." According to same time, crimes against property rose by 38 Mendoza, "Much of the credit for the reduction percent (from 1,913 to 2,636) and vehicles and in crime must go to . . . PNC agents, . . . as well arms stolen rose by 9 percent (from 4,238 to as to the remaining elements of the National 4,623) between the fust half of 1998 and the Police and Treasury Guard who are still par- fust half of 1999. There was a decline in the ticipating in joint operation^."^^ The govern- number of peoplekidnapped, according to PNC Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government figures (13 compared with 17 a year earlier) These figures on arrests show a much and a 10 percent increase in vehicles recovered more active police force with a much broader and arms conf~cated,but sexual crimes reported reach throughout the country-with the recent rose from 93 to 135. 77 deployments of the PNC. But arrests in them- selves arenot proof of success in fighting crime A major difference between 1998 and (and if many arrests are arbitrary they may un- 1999 is in the much greater number of people dermine the credibility and effectiveness of the arrested in the latter year. Almost twice the police) though an increase in arrests may have number of people were arrested nationwide in the political effect of showing that the govern- the first half of 1999 compared to a year earlier ment and police are 'doing something' about (32,407 persons vs. 17,077) The increase in ar- crime and violence. For now, government rests was much more dramatic in the depart- figures show amore active police force that has ments outside of the capital (which tripled in hadmixed results in fighting crime. Until more number from 5,454 to 16,963) than in Guate- information is available-for example, mala City (where arrests rose from 11,623 to victimization surveys showing real crime lev- 14,134.) Figures for a slighter longer time pe- els versus reported crimes and comparative data riod (September 1997 to August 1998 vs. Sep- on crimes successfully resolved-the jury re- tember 1998 to August 1999) show arrests al- mains out on the 'effectiveness' of the Ad most doubled from 34,389 to 64,919.78 government's strategy (even putting aside long- term problems that may be created by the government's approach.) Washington Offlce on Latin America

CHAPTER 6: THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP

fforts at police reform in other nations edge required to direct a truly professional po- emerging from internal conflicts dem- lice force. This is particularly alarming as cur- Eonstrate the cmcial importance of en- rent disciplinary regulations place all responsi- suring high-quality, professional and commit- bility for controls and oversight in the chain of ted civilian leadership to the new or reformed command. force. In Guatemala, the lack of new, quality leadership is one of the most serious problems In addition, an "old-guard" officer corps facing the National Civilian Police. Initially, makes any process of cleaning up the current all officials of the police were former officers ranks almost impossible. In the words of one of the National Police or the Treasury Guard, international observer interviewed for this re- who went through a 3-month recycling course port, "bad does not throw out bad." Several in- at the APNC. The previous head of the Na- formants mentioned that poorly performing or tional Police, Angel Conte Cojulun, simply problematic officers are not generally removed changed uniforms when he assumed director- from the force, but simply transferred to an- ship of the PNC. One recycling course is clearly other post. Procedures for removal have been insufficient to change the norms, attitudes, prac- designed but not implemented. Currently, the tices, and institutional identity of officers who main screening mechanisms for the officer corps previously led institutions infamous for their are the police academy exams, which should corruption, abusiveness, ineffectiveness and prevent those who fail them from rising further lack of professionalism. It also does little to in the force, and the application of disciplinary demonstrate a significant change from the old measures by a superior officer in those cases to the new police both with the police rank-and- where an officer is derelict in his duties or en- file and the population at large. gages in illegal activities. [As reported at the beginning of Chapter Five, sixteen police per- Every donor interviewed for this report sonnel have been sanctioned with removal kom pointed to the poor quality of police leadership service for very serious breaches and 22 cases as one of the most serious problems of the Min- are pending.] ister of the Interior and the PNC. In particular, WOLA heard complaints of arbitrary behavior, The problem of police leadership could unwillingness to follow institutional plans and have been addressed, at least partially, through policies, lack of knowledge of basic norms and more extensive re-training, or by introducing a legislation, and even more serious, lack of in- substantial number of newly recruited, well- terest in acquiring the needed skills and knowl- educated civilians through lateral entry into se- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government nior positions. Currently, there are no plans to seminated and only nine individuals (about half provide additional training for current officers, of whom were from the PNC itself) presented and the government has not wanted to bring themselves for a course that was intended to civilians straight into senior officer ranks, fear- number sixty. As a result, the planned training ing problems with internal discipline and morale. was suspended. A second recruitment notice was issued in late-June, 1999, for an applica- The Ministry of the Interior has sought tion process that was to take place September other solutions to the problem. One is a decree 6-10. On this occasion, besides posting the that allows new officials to be trained and pro- notice in the PNC newsletter, the Minishy of moted more quickly than the official police law the Interior passed the recruitment posting to a allows. Promotions within ranks are achieved non-governmental organization @GO) that had by examination; promotions to more senior been active in police reform debates and asked ranks (for example, to move from first officer for their assistance in disseminating notice of to subcommisioner) require an exam followed this opportunity. This appears to have been the by additional training, as well as service full scope of the outreach and publicity effort. periods included between these different steps. The NGO did not prove particularly useful to Currently, however, it is possible to move this effort. As of September 9, as far as WOLA straight from agent to officer through taking a was able to determine, only one civilian had series of back-to-back courses and exams. In applied for the course. theory, a person could move from being a po- lice agent to commissioner in approximately a Civilians cannot apply for job opportu- year-and-half. However, while this approach nities when they are unaware of their existence. might speed up the process of developing new In addition, the negative image of police still in leadership, it is unclear whether this proposal the minds of most of the Guatemalan popula- addresses issues of developing more effective tion is unlikely to help matters. In particular, leadership any better than the options outlined those sectors committed to human rights and above given that they would have no hand?-on the rule of law might be particularly hesitant to leadership experience or proven capabilities. sign onto a force they do not believe to be truly reform minded. Furthermore, for the civilian The government is also allowing civil- recruits to have a positive impact on the PNC, ians to apply for a 10-month Academy course they would need to be highly qualified and ca- that would allow them to come into the low- pable individuals, with the professional and end of the officer ranks (as third officers). In personal skills needed to make their way in what December 1998, thegovernment tried to recruit could well be a difficult institutional environ- civilians for this "subaltern officer course." The ment. It is thus crucial that the government recruitment announcements were poorly dis- broadly publicize and promote the opportunity Washington Offie on Latin America for civilians to join the PNC as officials, in or- lateral entry to senior ranks which could rein- der to obtain a strong pool of applicants from force the civilian character of the PNC and in- which to choose. troduce new skills and values. Such an approach was used in El Salvador with considerable suc- It is worth noting that in contrast to the cess. It is to be hopedthat the new government PNC's failure to recruit new officers, the Pub- coming into office in January 2000 will give lic Ministry (MP) has recruited 75 investiga- serious consideration of th~soption. tors, all of whom have at least two years of university education or equivalent. The MP The importance of high-quality leader- directedtheir recruitment efforts at universities. ship to building a credible, professional police So the effort to recruit civilian officers for the force cannot be overstressed. In the Guatema- PNC might well be viable, if the Interior lan case, professional, democratic leadership is Ministry were able to mount a true recruitment doubly important to imprint a new institutional campaign. culture and practice on a force made up largely of recycled elements. In other countries, where Even if the PNC does succeed in recruit- progressive leadership has been present, signifi- ing civilians as subaltern officers, however, the cant advances have been seen in a relatively decision to let them come in only at the bottom short period. The negative impact of poor lead- means it will still be some time before these ership, particularly at the mid-level, has also could reach the superior ranks. Normally thrs been clear in El Salvador and Haiti. For police would be three to four years, although with the reform in Guatemala to have a chance at suc- accelerated process it could perhaps be done in cess, a more aggressive solution to the officer less than two. A better method would be a problem is imperative. program to train highly educated civilians for Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

CHAPTER 7: EXTERNAL SUPPORT FORTHE PNC

he Guatemalan government and other the mixed messages they said came from this actors have clear commitments to ful- approach. In Guatemala, there has been rela- Tfill related to police reform under the tively little public and international debate about 1996 peace accords. Their compliance with the police reform and this preemptive measure ap- agreement is monitored by MINUGUA, which pears to have had the unfortunate impact of lim- is the body with overall responsibility for moni- iting the technical and fmancial involvement of toring implementation of the accords. Interna- other potential donors. A number of observers tional donors to the police reform effort also have also questioned whether the militarized have important leverage to encourage the imple- policing model of the Guardia Civil is the most mentation of commitments. And Guatemalan appropriate to Guatemala's effort to move from domestic actors, particularly civil society orga- militarized to civilian policing. nizations, have a significant potential to press the govemment to cany out its commitments The Spanish Civil Guard assisted in the fully. Yet, in the three years since the signing establishment of the Academy and helped with of the peace accords, the impact of these do- initial training, through a $0.9 million techni- mestic and international actors has been lim- cal assistance program running from Septem- ited in moving the government towards a more ber 1, 1996 to December 3 1, 1997. Starting in effective and comprehensive effort to build a May 1998, the Spanish Civil Guard is the des- truly new civilian police force. ignated technical assistance component of a major PNC development project funded by the Role of the International Community European Union. The EU project will provide The international community is playing some 3 1.73 million ECUS (approximately $32 a limited but potentially important role in po- million at late- 1999 rates) between 1998 and lice reform in Guatemala. In mid-1996, before 2003 for training, administration, vehicles, con- the civil-military accord was signed, the Min- struction or rehabilitation of Academy or po- istry of the Interior announced that Guatemala lice station installations, and other needs. (Pur- would be adopting the Spanish Civil Guard chases must be made in countries of the Euro- model. While it is unclear why the govemment pean Union or in Guatemala.) This package chose the GCE to be the primary donor to makes the Spanish Civil Guard the most in- Guatemala's police reform, Guatemalan gov- fluential external actor in the process of ernment leaders claimed they wanted to avoid Guatemalan police reform. the Salvadoran model of multiple donors and Washington Office on Latin America

The only other ongoing bilateral donor Guatemala. But they address an area of prior- is the US Department of Justice program, ity concern to the government, and thus repre- ICITAP, which provides training in criminal sent an important opportunity to influence gov- investigation, and technical assistance in areas ernment policies on such issues as recruitment, such as computerization of police and court selection, quality of training andinternal controls. records. The ICITAP program received $3 mil- lionper yearin fiscal years 1997 and 1998, $2.4 Unfortunately, the key donors and million for fiscal 1999, and will request $2.5 implementers, especially the EUIGCE, have million for FY 2000, bringing its four-year to- largely accepted and supported the tal to approximately US$ll million. government's priorities even when these con- flict with the peace accords. This is the case Other bilateral programs include U.S. with the government's failure to actively pro- DEANAS programs to develop the Department mote indigenous participation in the police and of Antinarcotics Operations (DOAN), the size the irregular admission of a number of militaq of which could not be determined for this re- perso~elinto the police, two serious accord port; and a donation of around $3 million by violations that have repeatedly been raised by the Taiwanese government to purchase a radio MINUGUA. International donors should sup- communications system for the PNC.79 port the UN mission on such issues and condi- tion assistance programs on compliance with MWUGUA provides overall verifica- the accords. tion of the peace accords, conducts human rights training, and implements small institutional While it is the government of Guatemala strengthening projects funded by bilateral do- that has the primary responsibility for imple- nors. MINUGUA's institutional development menting the peace accords, the international projects have included a $1,069,300institutional donors could do more to promote international development project funded by Sweden and standards and a deeper reform process. In par- Norway for the PNC (1997-1999); a $398,839 ticular, they could serve more effectively as a project in the Police Academy funded by Swe- counterweight to expedient choices on such is- den and Norway; a project to promote sues as personnel selection. ICITAP, for in- multiculturalism ($306,880 for 1999-2000) stance, has provided investigative training to funded by Sweden and Norway; and a small personnel in the SIC who havenot been selected project in criminal investigations funded by according to appropriate standards. While it is

Norway ($668,933 for 1999-2000).8O understandable that ICITAP went ahead with the courses, given that personnel had already These donations are relatively small in been contracted to provide the training, it may the context of overan post-war assistance to have missed an opportunity to insist on appro- Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government priate selection criteria from the outset. Past sight of the overall direction of the project and experience in El Salvador and elsewhere sug- its conhibution to police reform in G~aternala.~' gests that providing technical training to inap- propriate and poorly screened personnel leads, In practice, the project agreement del- at best, to poor performance, and at worst to egates all responsibility for project implemen- more insidious problems such as corruption or tation to two co-directors: a Guatemalan co-di- organized criminality within the police. How- rector, Jorge Paiz Prem, and a Spanish Civil ever difficult it might be to insist on a proper Guard colonel. The agreement does allow other selection process for applicants to special units EU member nations to participate in a tempo- such as the SIC. failure to do so is a waste of rary technical assistance team, but stipulates that resources and a disservice to the long-term de- the composition of this team "must reflect the velopment of the PNC. Similarly, the GCE at principle of 'homogeneity' of the interven- several points has acceded to training person- tion"-a clause that makes it more difficult to nel who did not meet the standards originally exercise effective oversight of the project.83 envisioned. The absence of conktionality associated European Union authorities appear to with this project contrasts sharply with the EU's have created only very limited oversight mecha- very stringent use of conditionality on projects nisms. The Guatemalan and Spanish Civil in other areas, such as judicial reform. Greater Guard co-directors are required to prepare a political attention to this project, and greater Global Operational Plan, trimestral implemen- willingness to apply more rigorous conditions tation reports, and an internal reporting and to the delivery of aid, could produce signifi- evaluation system. In addition, the Project cant improvements in the development of the Agreement states, "the [European] Commission PNC, especially given the relatively large size foresees carrying out external, detailed super- of the EU project and resulting leverage. vision-evaluation missions of the Project, its methods and results. . . . The Commission re- Coordination among the international serves the right to modify the project based on actors has also been poor. Despite occasional these results."" There is also an Interinstitu- meetings between ICITAP and the GCE, dif- tional Consultative Committee, presided over ferences of opinion frequently arise on issues by a Guatemalan authority, which is to include such as the proper role of police investigators the President of the Group of the Ambassadors and the number of investigators who should be of the Union, interested member states, and a deployed to different police stations. In separate representative of the Commission office in Gua- interviews with GCE, ICITAP, and MINUGUA temala. However, beyond technical and finan- officials, WOLA found that the agencies were cial supervision, there appears to be little over- not well informed regardmg the activities of the Washington Offie on Latin America others. The result has often been conflicting to the Arni government's decision to focus on advice delivered to the government, and con- rapid deployment. tradictory positions that make it difficult for international actors to serve as a counterweight Another key aspect of police reform in to the domestic political pressures on the gov- Guatemala is the growing involvement of civil ernment. Neither ICITAF' nor the GCE have society organizations (CSOs) in monitoring consistently coordinated their positions with progress of public security reforms, and pro- MINUGUA. ICITAF' and MINUGUA got into viding input to attempt to influence the direc- an ugly dispute over the presence of two tion of reforms in this area. When the peace MINUGUA trainers in the SIC. The GCE has accords were signed, Guatemalan CSOs had consistently favored expediency in selection and little interest or capacity to become involved in rapid training of recycled personnel, while police reform. Over the past three years, this MINUGUA has taken principled and largely situation has changed in important respects. ineffective stands in support of high admissions There are a small number of groups increas- standards, exclusion of military personnel, and ingly involved in and knowledgeable about po- recruitment of indigenous applicants. As a re- lice reform though their influence with the gov- sult of this lack of coordination, the govern- ernment is counter-balanced and probably out- ment has felt little pressure to respond when weighed by demands of conservative groups MINUGUA has identified and objected to clear wanting more repressive responses. violations of the accords involving the police. To date, civil society organizations have Role of Civil Society Organizations made most progress in deepening their under- standing of progress in police reform, identify- Decades of militarization and repression ing major problems, and proposing possible have left a strong mark on Guatemala's social solutions. Their capacity to bring about changes fabric. The military is feared, but it is also re- to laws or directly affect government actions in spected as a strong and effective institution. the area of police reform is as yet limited for a Given the traditional weakness and corruption number of reasons. Fist, it has taken signifi- of police, public prosecutors and the courts, the cant time and resources for groups to develop a rule of law is still largely an abstract concept. broad understanding of a complex-and until In this context, it is all too easy for citizens to quite recently unfamiliar-area. For a handful take the law into their own hands, or to call for of groups a significant level of expertise has strong-arm measures to control delinquency. now been developed. Second, differences of Widespread lynchings and the public outcry focus and priorities as well as a degree of com- about crime, have been important contributors petition have made it difficult to coalesce around Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government specific, achievable advocacy objectives. Third, be made up of a range of individuals from dif- and perhaps most important, the Guatemalan ferent sectors of society to advise the president government has demonstratedlittle openness to on public security issues. This body could including CSOs in discussions of objectives and (given appropriate political will on the part of priorities in internal security policies. As an the president and government) play a crucial example, the government has not yet formed role in broadening discussions about priorities the Advisory Council on Security which is to and challenges in the area of public security. Washington Office on Latin America

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

he extent, importance and consistency existing personnel retained), and foreshortened of the problems &scussed in this re- training periods (to accelerate recycling and Tport lead to the conclusions that the deployment). Unfortunately, both of these ap- government of President Alvaro Arni did not proaches risk undercutting the central goals of take police reform seriously as a long-term in- the civilian power accord to limit the role of stitutional challenge. Instead, it focused on the military to external defense and create a quantitative and largely tactical measures of professional civilian police force that is protec- success-laws passed, number of police trained tive of individual rights. As WOLA noted in and deployed and, of course, impact on crime an earlier report,84deploying the military in a (which is still unclear). As a result, there is a transitional role might be considered the lesser grave danger that the new PNC will reproduce of these two evils, since hopefully this support the problems that long existed in Guatemala's will be temporary. Taking shortcuts in con- previous police forces-ineffectiveness, lack of structing the new PNC is more likely to have accountability, poor human rights performance, lasting, negative effects. If the new police be- corruption, and lack of internal controls, among come institutionalized along lines all too simi- others. lar to those of the old National Police, it will be more difficult to reform in the future. It is clear that the Guatemalan govem- ment has operated under extremely difficult The 1996 peace accords are explicit in conditions and felt considerable political pres- giving the PNC the responsibility for internal sure to quickly increase police or other security security and public order within the country; in force presence to address public concerns and establishing that the PNC be anew kind of force fears of violent crime. To respond to these pres- in Guatemala-respectful of human rights and sures for quick action to increase public secu- democracy, and obedient to the law; in defm- rity, the government pursued two simultaneous ing the Police Academy as the institution re- options: (1) the extensive use of the milita~yin sponsible for education and training of the new joint patrols and the case-by-case use of mili- force; and in requiring that the PNC reflect the tary intelligence officers in the investigation of multilingual and pluricultural character of the high-profile crimes, (2) shortcuts in develop- country. The Guatemalan government has ful- ing the PNC such as extensive recycling of filled many of its formal requirements under former personnel, minimal screening, lowered the peace accords, but has fallen short in major educational standards (to increase numbers of respects in ensuring the quality and diversity of Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefir the New Guatemalan Government

candidates needed to build atruly new andcred- The incoming government should: ible force, and in providing them the education and training needed to exercise their responsi- General bilities effectively. Review closely and implement the recom- The peace accords provided a unique mendations of the Historical Clarification opportunity for Guatemala to redefine funda- Commission (Comisidn para el mentally its policing institutions. The Arzk gov- Esclarecimiento Histdrico--CEH) regard- ernment made advances in creating and deploy- ing the role of the armed forces (V.2) and ing a unified National Civilian Police, far bet- public security (V.3), noting particularly ter trained and paid than its predecessors. But Art. 78: the government's approach, focusing on quan- tity of police trained and rapid deployment "That, in case the [constitutional] rather than on what it will take to build a cred- reforms proposed in the Peace ible and respected force for the long haul, un- Accords are unsuccessful, Congress damined the future prospects of the PNC and take the necessary legislative action sidestepped much of the intent of the accords. to separate the functions of the Continuing problems in selection, training, and Army and of the Police, limiting the controls are compromising the effectiveness, hu- participation of the Army in the man rights performance, internal discipl'me, and field of public security to an abso- accountability of the PNC. Overall, the Guate- lute minim~m.'"~ malan government appears to have approached police reform more as a short-term political Recruitment and selection challenge-responding to the strong public con- cans about violent crime--rather than as along- Develop a massive police recruitment pro- term, institution-building effort that has a cru- gram, through the media and presentations cial connection to the consolidation of democ- in schools and communities, targeted in par- racy in Guatemala. ticular at qualified indigenous and women.

Recommendations Revise the selection process for new recruits to include 1) the use of just one examina- The new Guatemalan government faces the tion for all applicants regardless of major challenge of turning the PNC into an insti- education levels, 2) the elimination of dis- tution that is truly different from its predecessors, criminatory height requirements, and 3)pro- one that shows a real commitment toprofession- cedures to minimize application costs to the alism, efficacy, and respect for human rights. aspiring recruit. Washington Office on Latin America

Remove all current agents and officers who Reform curricula and educational materi- entered recycling courses irregularly, als used at the Police Academy to make permitting them to apply to the PNC as new them more accessible to students, and more recruits and receive the full six months adapted to the Guatemalan cultural reality. training. Provide supplementary tutoring and support Develop aplan for the recruitment and train- to indigenous students at the Academy. ing of civilians for the PNC senior office corps, and make top-level positions acces- - Affirm the central importance of human sible to highly qualified civilians. rights training and practice, and ensure effective instruction in the use of the PNC Establish retraining and retirement pro- disciplinary code. grams for members of the old security forces who areunable to meet requirements for the Internal and external controls new PNC, and exclude their participation in public security functions. Revise the disciplinary regulations to make them easier to understand and use, create Training an effective internal affairs division, and es- tablish easily accessible mechanisms to re- Provide another three months of Academy ceive complaints from the public and from training for those already recycled, and ex- within the force. tend the length of all remaining recycling courses to six months. - Maintain and publish detailed records on complaints and investigations of police con- Develop field training and continuing edu- duct, the findings thereof, and administra- cation programs for agents and officers. tive sanctions undertaken.

Improve quality and training of Academy Establish a PNC Inspector General with suf- instructors, including through the use of ficient investigative resources to evaluate international instructors; training or retrain- the performance of the new internal affairs ing of national instructors; and collabora- unit, the conduct of the PNC officer corps, tive efforts with Guatemalan public and as well as routine disciplinary procedures private universities. conducted by the PNC command hierarchy. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

Removal of military from public securig Contribute to public education efforts functions regarding the differences between police and military functions, and support civil- ians and government officials in learning Ensure that the role of the military is about reform processes in other countries. limited to external defense. Where excep- tional circumstances necessitate military support for police, this should be for a lim- Link continued funding to full compliance ited and specified time, clearly under with the relevant provisions of the peace civilian control, and not involve investi- accords, particularly in relation to length of gations or intelligence gathering. training, the "apmess" of those selected for the PNC, promotion of indigenous partici- pation, the role of the military, and meeting Disband the Presidential General Staff minimum international standards. (EstadoMayor Presidenciao and any other military intelligence unit involved in inves- * tigating crime, and create a transparent ci- Donors should coordinate their programs vilian intelligence body with the Minis- closely with MINUGUA and use the try of the Interior to conduct intelligence Mission's evaluation of progress in police necessary for tracking and combating crimi- reform as a basis for making funding deter- minations in this area. nal activity, as laid down in the peace accords.

The international community should: Donors should support accelerated training programs for PNC leadershipparticularly civilian leaders-and Academy instructors Consider providing new or additional tech- nical and financial support to the PNC, par- (both current and newly recruited), includ- ticularly in the areas outlined in this report. ing through offering international training opportunities. Play a more active role in monitoring and evaluating the Guatemalan police reform - The US Department of State and the Euro- process, especially in relation to interna- pean Union should conduct evaluations of tional standards for transparency, account- the effectiveness of their technical assistance ability, minimum use of force, effective in- programs for the PNC, especially given ternal controls, andrespect for human rights. ongoing problems in recruitment, selection, and training. Washington Office on Latin America

ENDNOTES

I United Nations General Assembly. "Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Verifica- tion Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA): Fourth Report on Verification of the Guatemalan Peace Accords (August 1, 1998 to October 31, 1999)". Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, November 1999 (hereinafter, MINUGUA, "Fourth Verification Report"), para. 67.

Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH). Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Tz'inil Na'tab'al: Conclusions and Recommendations. Guatemala: Commission for Historical Clarifica- tion, February 1999, p. 62-67.

' Ibid, p. 20.

Ibid, p. 26.

Interview with international aid official, October 1999.

Human Rights WatcWAmericas. Human Rights in Guatemala during President De Le6n Carpio's First Year. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 4-5.

' Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). "La reforma judicial en Guatemala, 1997- 1998: Una guia bbsica sobre losproblemas, procesos y actores." Guatemala: Central America Advocacy Training Program, May 1998.

Ibid, p. 32-34.

Comisi6n de Fortalecimiento de la Justicia. Una nueva justicia para la paz. Informe Final. Guatemala: Magna Terra Editores, April 1998.

'O See, for example, Instancia Coordinadorapara la Modernizacidn del Sector Justicia, "Plan depolitica del estado contra el crimen. " Guatemala: July 1998, photocopy; and "Plan estrati5gico sectorial: 1998-2002," Guatemala: no date, photocopy. But officials of international organizations, civil society leaders, and even government officials view the ICMSJ as little more than a 'talking shop' that is not taken seriously by the main actors involved in justice sector reform. l1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Guatemala: Los contrastes del desarrollo humano (Edicidn 1998). United Nations System in Guatemala: Guatemala, 1998, p. 161. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government

l2Development Associates, University of Pittsburgh, and Asociacibn de Investigacidn y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), La cultura democrcitica de 10s guatemaltecos: Tercer estudio. Guatemala, January 1998, p. 3,78, and 87.

l3 Policia Nacional Civil (PNC). "Obsewaciones a1 Informe de Desarrollo Humano del PNUD, 1998," photocopy, 1999; and "Cuadro Estadktico Comparativo de Hechos Delictivos Registrados a Nivel Repcblica. Afios 1998 y 1999," photocopy, 1999.

l4 FBI crime figures reported 6.3 homicides per 100,000 residents in the US. for 1998, CNN Nightly News, 17 October 1999.

l5 Development Associates, et al, La cultura democrcitica de 10s guatemaltecos, p. 10.

l6 UNDP, Guatemala: Los contrastes del desarrollo humano, p. 148.

For the lynchings between 27 March 1996 and 1 April 1998, see, United Nations General Assembly. "Report of the Human Rights Area of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (covering the period 1 July 1997 to 31 March 1998)" Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, 15 June 1998. (hereinafter, MINUGUA, "Eighth Human Rights report") para. 21-22; and for 1998 figures, MINUGUA, "Suplemento al noveno informe sobre derechos humanos de la Misibn de Verificacibn de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil". Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, March 1999, para. 66. [For MINUGUA reports and information, also see www.minugua.guate.net]

Because of the high level of international engagement, these processes are well documented. See, for example, the following reports of the Washington Office on Latin America: Demilitarising Public Order; the Internationul Community, Police Reform and Human Rights in Central America and Haiti (1 995), Policing Haiti: Preliminary Assessment of the New Civilian Security Force (1995); The Human Rights Record ofthe Haitian National Police, (a joint report of WOLA, Human Rights WatcldAmericas and the National Coalition for Haitian Rights, 1997); Can Haiti S Police Refom Be Sustained? (a joint report of WOLA and National Coalition for Haitian Rights,1998); Themes and Debates in Public Securify Reform: A Manual for Civil Society (1998); Risking Failure: The Problems andpromises of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador (1993); Protectors or Perpetrators:? The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran Civilian Police (a joint report of WOLA and Hemisphere Initiatives, 1996). Please refer to the complete listing of WOLA publications on police reform processes in Latin America at the end of this report; also George R. Vickers "Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Central America," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America. Ed. Cynthia J. Amson. Washing- ton, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999; and Chuck Call "Police Reform, Human Rights, and Democratization in Post-Conflict Settings: Lessons from El Salvador", in AJter the War is Over ... What Comes Next; Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Reintegration in Washington ODce on Latin America

Post-Conflict Societies, (US. Agency for International Development Conference, October 30- 3 1, 1997). See also reports of United Nations peacekeeping and human rights missions in El Salvador, Haiti and Guatemala, many of these can be found on the UN's web page, at www.un.org.

19"Propuestade reformas a la Ley de la Policia Nacional Civil." Unpublished document prepared and promoted by IEPADES, Fundacih Myrna Mack, IECCP, and others, 14 April 1997.

20 Since 1994, the Executive has made three attempts to legalize this body, twice through pro- posed legislation and once by Executive decree. These were strongly questioned by WOLA and the Myrna Mack Foundation for lack of adequate guarantees, civilian control, and transparency. The previous Executive Decree was declared unconstitutional.

Government of Guatemala. Decreto Numero 114-97, Ley del Organisrno Ejecutivo, Articulo 13.

22 See Rachel Neild. "Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for civil society-1. Police Recruitment." Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, November 1998, p. 12-15.

2' See United Nations General Assembly. "Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA): First Report on Verification of the Guatema- lan Peace Accords (15 January 1997 to 15 April 1997)." Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, 30 June 1997 (hereinafter, MINUGUA, "First Verification Report"), para. 46; and, United Nations General Assembly. "Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Verifica- tion Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA): Third Report on Verification of the Guatemalan Peace Accords (January to July 1998)." Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, 28 September 1998 (hereinafter, MINUGUA, "Third Verification Report"), para. 79.

24 Interview with civil society monitor of police reform process, December 1999.

For a discussion of comparative approaches to recruitment and selection in post-conflict societies, see Neild, "Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for civil soci- ety-1. Police Recruitment."

26 Interview with Deputy Interior Minister Salvador Gandara Gaitiin, 2 February 1999.

27 Interview with Margarita Castillo and Monserrat Garcia, 2 October 1999; another civil society monitor of police reform efforts reported having seen 'a few' advertisements on television, Interview, December 1999. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemahn Government

28 Rodolfo Zelada. "Restringido acceso a la Academia de la Policia Nacional Civil," El Periddico, citing Carmen Rosa de Le6n of IEPADES, 5 February 1999.

29MINUGUA,"Suplemento al noveno informe: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil," p. 9.

'OInterview with PNC official, May 1999,

Interview with international aid official, May 1999.

32 While the requirement was raised to the equivalent of 91h grade in 1999, entrants during that year were only required to have a sixth grade education.

" Znstituto de Enseiianzapara el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES), "Informe sobre costos de acceso a exhen de ingreso a la APNC," p. 1, photocopy, February 10, 1999.

34 LJNDP, Guatemala: Los contrastes del desarrollo humano, p. 209.

" MINUGUA. Equipo de Segwidad Publica, Academia de la Policia Nacional Civil. "Informe de Verificaci6n, Febrero-Abril de 1998." Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, May 1998, p. 9.

Ibid.

371nterviewwith Claudia Rodriguez, May 1999.

38 In the call for recruits for the fourth and fifth courses for basic agents in December 1998 and January 1999 exceptions to the general height requirement for the western departments and Pet& permitted entry to male applicants of 1.58 meters and female applicants of 1.53 meters, and with a higher education (4Ih grade &versified, 4 grado diversificado) to males of 1S6 meters and females of 1.52 meters. In the rest of the country, men with a 4" fourth level education had the height requirement lowered to 1.57 meters and women to 1.53 meters.

39 MINUGUA, "Informe de Verification, Febrero-Abril de 1998," p. 23.

40 Ibid, p. 21.

41Fora discussion of key comparative issues in police training in post-conflict societies, see Rachel Neild, "Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for civil society-2, Police Training," Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, November 1998. Washington Offie on Latin America

42 Interview with PNC official, May 1999,

43 Interview with ICITAP officials, August 1999.

44 Interviews with PNC officials, MINUGUA officials, May 1999.

4' The members of the Spanish Civil Guard (GCE), known also as the Technical Support Team of the European Union (Equipo de Ase.wia Tbcnica de la Unidn Europea) say they are provid- ing supervision of instructors and bringing complaints to the Director of the APNC where they detect anomalies. Interview with international police aid official, December 1999.

46PNC,"Estado de fuerza general de la Policia Nacional Civil por comisarias, dependencias, especialidades y servicios especiales," Photocopy, 1999, p. 12-16.

47 See, MINUGUA, "Suplemento al noveno informe: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil," p. 4-5; and interviews with international aid officials, May and June 1999.

48 "El Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil en Cumplimiento al Acuerdo de Paz, 'Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil y Funcion del Ejercito en una Sociedad Democratica.' " spon- sored by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Project GUA-98-027-UNDP. Presented in the National Encounter for Peace, Guatemala, October 12, 1999.

49 Familiares y Amigos contra la Delincuencia y el Secuestro (FADS). Draft document on National Civilian Police. Photocopy, 1999.

MINUGUA, "Suplemento al noveno informe: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil," para. 9.

" Internal PNC document.

52 Interviews with ICITAP, UN, and GCE officials, May 1999.

53 Donald GonzAlez Diaz and Julie Lbpez, "Disuelvan las FEP," Siglo Veintiuno, 6 April 1999. See side bar entitled "Las peticiones que murieron recih nacidas."

54 See United Nations General Assembly, "Ninth Report of the Human Rights Area of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (covering period from 1 April to 3 1 December 1998). Guatemala: United Nations System in Guatemala, 10 March 1999. (hereinafter, MINUGUA, "Ninth report on human rights"); also "Carta Abierta" by Jose Vitaliio Gonzhlez Godoy to President Arzh, published as a paid aid in Prensa Libre, April 21, 1999. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

55 Commission for Historical Clarification. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, p. 64-65

561nterviewwith Ray Campos and German Zuiiiga, ICITAP, May 1999.

57 Interviews with ICITAP and GCE advisors, May 1999.

58 Interview with international aid official, May 1999.

59 AS of August 1999, ICITAP was teaching its seventh group of investigators. With each successive class, the government has done better in selecting personnel according to the stan- dards proposed by ICITAP. Because of delays in screening and polygraph checks, however, ICITAP continues to experience some attrition from classes once these checks are completed. Interviews with Joe Gannon and Ray Campos, August 1999.

601nterviewswith ICITAP Ray Campos and Gm&n Zuiiiga, May 1999.

6' Interviews with Ray Campos of ICITAP and PNC Director General Angel Conte Cojulun, May 1999.

62 Interview with prosecutor, May 1999.

In the Honduran model, the criminal investigation unit was first attached to the Public Minis- try and later-in 1998-transferred to the Mnistry of Public Security, which helped cooperation between the Public Ministry and police investigators.

"Interview with PNC Director General, Angel Conte Cojulun, May 1999; interviews with UN and US officials, May 1999.

Between January 1998 and May 1999 there were 153 media reports dealing with the involve- ment of military intelligence in criminal investigations. These included references to the murder of Bishop Gerardi, reports of military intelligence involvement in telephone surveillance, and involvement in operations against suspected kidnappers. (Survey of thirteen Guatemalan radio, television and print media outlets between January 1998 and May 1999 carried out for WOLA by Centro de Analisis Politico: Guatemala, 1999.)

66 MINUGUA, "Third Verification Report," para. 79.

" MINUGUA, "Suplemento al noveno informe: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil," p. 5, Washington Oflce on Latin America

MINUGUA, "Ninth report on human rights", pp. 5-8, and 20.

69 Siglo Ventiuno, 3 February 1999, p.6.

70 Interview with leader of human rights organization, February 1999.

71 "Reglamento de Organizacidn de la Policia Nacional Civil. " Acuerdo Gubernativo Numero 585-97, Art. 19.

72 MINUGUA, "Suplemento al noveno informe: Despliegue de la Policia Nacional Civil," p. 5.

7' "Guatemala disbands its crack police unit," Washington Times, 7 April 1999.

74 Interview with international aid official, June 1999.

75 Siglo Veintiuno, 13 January 1999.

76 Siglo Vientiuno, 15 January 1999, p. 10.

77 PNC, "Cuadro estadistico comparativo de hechos delictivos registrados a nivel Republica durante el primer sernestre de 10s afios 1998 y 1999," p. 1-12. While the numbers used here are taken from this PNC report, the percentages in the text of this report differ from those of the PNC since the PNC figures contain a consistent error (both for increases and decreases in crime rates) in computing the percentages.

78 PNC, "Resumen por mes de detenidos y comparci6n con el aiio anterior, period0 1997-981 1998-99." Photocopy.

79 ICITAP Interview, August 1999

8"UNDP, "Programas de cooperacion internacional para el fortalecimiento del sector justicia" Printed tables. Guatemala, May 1999.

81 Convenio de Finaciacion entre la Comunidad Europea y la Republica de Guatemala. Convenio No. GTMIB7-3 10/IB/97/421, "Programa de apoyo a la politica nacional de seguridad cuidadana," Article 17 and Annex 2, section 6.9. Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

82 Ibid, p. 21. Project oversight and supervision includes trimestral reports delivered to the EU delegation in Guatemala; a financial audit once a year by an independent company; periodic discussions with the EU delegation in Guatemala; and visits from the project director in Brussels (three in sixteen months.) A formal evaluation by the EU is planned for the mid-point of the program in August 2000. As argued in this report, there is no evidence that these mechanisms have led to any serious political questioning of the EU project and its overall relationship to a seriously flawed police reform process in Guatemala.

Ibid, p. 20.

&1 Rachel Garst. "The New Guatemalan National Civilian Police: A Problematic Beginning," in WOLA, Briefing Series: The Guatemalan Peace Process. Washington, D.C.: WOLA, Novem- ber 1997, p. 1.

Commission for Historical Clarification. Guatemala: Memory of Silence, p. 62-67. Washington Office on Latin America

Abbreviations

APNC Academia de la Policia Nacional Civil National Civilian Police Academy

CEH Comisidnpara el Esclarecimiento Histdrico Historical Clarification Commission

DOAN Departamento de Operaciones Anti-Narcdticas Department of Anti-Narcotic Operations

GCE Guardia Espaiiol Civil Spanish Civil Guard

EMF' Estado Mayor Presidential Presidential General Staff

FADS Familiares y Amigos Contra la Delincuencia y el Secuestro Family Members and Friends Against Crime and Kidnapping

FEP Fuerzas Especiales de Policia Special Police Forces

FIS Fondo de Inversidn Social Social Investment Fund

FONAPAZ Fondo Nacionalpara la Paz National Peace Fund

FRI Fuerzas de Reaccidn Inmediata Forces of Immediate Reaction

ICITAP US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

IEPADES Institute de Enserlaza para el Daarrollo Sostenible Institute for the Study of Sustainable Development

JLS Juntas Locales de Seguridad Local Security Committees

MINUGU A Mision de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government

MP Ministerio Publico Public Ministry

OW Ofcina de Responsibilidad Profsional Office of Professional Responsibility

PAN Partido de Avanzada Nacional National Advancement Party

PMA Policia Militar Ambulante Mobile Military Police

Policia Nacional National Police

PNC Policia Nacional Civil National Civilian Police

Policia Nacional Nicaraguense Nicaraguan National Police

SAE Secretaria de Analisis Estrat4gico Secretary of Strategic Analysis

SIC Sewicio de Investigacidn Criminal Criminal Investigations Service

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

US AID US Agency for International Development WOLA Publications on Police Reform Processes in Latin America

COMPARATIVE STUDIES Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society/ Temas y Debates en la Reforma de la Seguridad Pliblica: Una guia para la sociedad civil. Sections cover: (1) Police Recruitment and Selection; (2) Police Training; (3) Internal Controls andDisciphaq Units; (4) Community Policing; (5) Criminal Investigations;* (6) External Controls;** (7) International Police Assistance.** 1998 - 2000. $3.00 for each brief; $18.00 for the full set of seven briefs. * Only available in Spanish, **Forthcoming in 2000.

Demilitarizing Public Order: The International Community, Police Reform and Human Rights in Central America andHaiti. November 1995. $8.00.

Desmilitizar el Orden Pliblico: La ComunidadInternacional,la Reforma Policialy 10s Derechos Humanos en Centroamirica y Haiti. septiembre 1996. $8.00.

Elusive Justice: The U.S. Administration of Justice Program in Latin America. May 1990. $5.00.1Justicia Inasequible. Mayo 1990. $4.00.

Police Aid and Political Will: U.S. Policy in El Salvador and Honduras. 1987. $3.50.

HAITI Can Haiti S Police Reform Be Sustained? (a j oint report of WOLA and the National Coalition for Haitian Rights). January 1998. $3.50.

The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police (a joint report of WOLA, Human Rights WatchiAmericas andtheNational Coalition for Haitian Rights). January 1997. $2.50.

Police Reform in Haiti: The Challenge ofDemilitarizing Public Order andEstablishing the Rule oflaw. November 1996. $1.50.

The Haitian National Police. March 1996. $2.50.1La Police Nationale Haitienne. Mars 1996. $2.50

Policing Haiti: Preliminaiy Assessment of the New Civilian Security Force. September 1995. $7.00.

EL SALVADOR Protectors or Perpetrators? The Institutional Crisis of the Salvadoran Civilian Police (a joint report of WOLA and Hemisphere Initiatives). January 1996. $4.50. El Salvador Peace Plan Update #3: Recent Setbacks in the Police Transition. February 1994. $1SO. (Note: WOLA has a series of reports on the peace process, all of which include sections on police issues.)

El Salvador Peace Plan Update #I: Setback in Crucial Police Reform. May 1992. $1 SO

Risking Failure: The Problems and Promises of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador. (a joint report of WOLA andHemisphere Initiatives) September 1993. $4.50.

(WOLA wiU publish another report on the progress of El Salvador's police reform in mid-2000)

GUATEM.4J.A Rescuing Police Reform: A Challengefor the New Guatemalan Government. January 2000. $9.00

The New Guatemalan National Civilian Police: A Problematic Beginning. November 1997. $1.50.

Militaly Intelligence and Human Rights in Guatemala: The Archivo and the Casefor Intelli- gence Reform. March 1995. $2.50.

THE ANDES The Colombian National Police, Human Rights and US.Drug Policy. May 1993. $7.00

Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S.Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. October 1991. $lO.OO./PeligroIminente. Octubre 1991. $10.00.

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ISBN # 0-929513-45-2