Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy by Michael Kenney

Law enforcement may be able to exploit terrorists’ inexperience to deter attacks.

ike other forms of criminal develop to be good at it. This begs deviance, terrorism requires an important yet little understood Lexpertise that combines knowl­ question: How do terrorists get the edge with practice. experience — and expertise — they need to carry out acts of political Terrorists with knowledge and practi­ violence? cal experience are more likely to carry out “successful” attacks than those To answer this question, I car­ lacking both of these essential quali­ ried out five months of fieldwork ties. However, some extremists are on Islamic militancy in Britain and more informed — and experienced — Spain, home to two of the most than others. devastating terrorist attacks since Sept. 11.1 I interviewed many mili­ Well-educated people do not nec­ tants, including former Guantánamo essarily make good terrorists. The Bay detainees and members of medical doctors behind the failed al-Muhajiroun. I also interviewed 2007 car bombings in London and dozens of law enforcement officials Glasgow, Scotland, lacked the bomb- and intelligence analysts from the making skills of the petty criminals Federal Bureau of Investigation, the who killed 56 people in the London London Metropolitan Police Service, Tube and bus bombings two years the Spanish Civil Guard and other before. Terrorism is a craft involv­ agencies. I complemented these ing its own particular set of skills and interviews with news reports, studies knowledge that practitioners must and court documents from criminal proceedings in Britain and Spain.

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While terrorists gain knowledge Afghanistan. The tradecraft needed proved a daunting task, requiring of their craft through formal study to succeed in urban terrorism in the the help of English-speaking res­ and practice, the method of diffusion West is not easily gained from train­ idents who knew the area. Not depends on the knowledge being ing in guerrilla warfare, even as coincidentally, those recruited to gained. Abstract technical knowl­ taught at the best al-Qaida camps. replace the duo, Mohammed Atta, edge, what the ancient Greeks called Marwan al Shehh and Ziad Jarrah, “techne,” can be codified in docu­ In fact, Islamic terrorists are often lived in Germany for years before ments and communicated in “small, short on métis; the experien­ joining al-Qaida. These “educated, explicit, logical steps.”2 Islamic tial knowledge needed to carry technical men … did not need to be terrorists gain the techne involved out attacks in local settings is far told how to live in the West;” they in bomb making and weapons han­ removed from their training sites. already knew how.4 Atta and his dling by reading manuals and other Even battle-hardened militants typi­ colleagues drew on their English- documents that provide detailed, cally develop their violent métis by speaking skills and experience from systematic instructions. Alternatively, taking part in one or more jihads living in Germany to perform satis­ they attend training camps where in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, factory, if imperfect, tradecraft in experienced practitioners teach these Iraq or Kashmir. Militants’ combat the operation. clear, logical and deadly steps as part knowledge, however useful in those of their curriculum. This technical locales, is essentially limited to Unlike the Sept. 11 hijackers, knowledge is universal; it does not Mohammed Siddique Khan and his vary across local settings. Would-be co-conspirators in the 2005 London terrorists may gain abstract knowl­ bombings grew up in the country edge for carrying out attacks at a While terrorists gain they attacked. Their knowledge of training camp in Waziristan, Pakistan; British culture and society and their a farmhouse outside Madrid, Spain; knowledge of their craft natural command of English were or from an online training manual. instrumental in carrying out their sui­ through formal study and cide bombings. Two of the bombers, Not all knowledge can be gained in Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, received this manner. Practitioners of a spe­ practice, the method of training in Pakistan. Yet any techne cific tradecraft, such as medicine, diffusion depends on the they gained there merely comple­ law enforcement or terrorism, often mented the métis they already had rely on intuitive, practical knowledge, knowledge being gained. from living in Britain for so long. The what the Greeks called “métis.” London bombers drew on their local Practitioners develop métis gradu­ knowledge and experience to move ally, by engaging in the activity itself, around the country and get the explo­ rather than by formal study. Terrorists guerrilla warfare. Such métis does sive materials they needed without may learn the techne involved in not necessarily translate into effective being disrupted by law enforcement. building bombs, shooting weap­ urban terrorism in Western countries, ons and other activities by studying where success requires local knowl­ Similarly, the Madrid train bomb­ manuals or receiving formal instruc­ edge, street smarts and a talent for ers drew on their own métis, gained tion. However, to develop hands-on clandestine operations. from living in Spain for many years, to competence they must put the book carry out their attacks in 2004. Many down and practice. Practice may not The Sept. 11 attacks provide a conspirators, such as Jamal Ahmidan make perfect, but it does build skills. striking and diagnostic case. The and Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, To become a competent terrorist, one hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid were originally from North Africa. Yet must build bombs, fire guns or survey al-Mihdhar were veteran jihad­ they settled permanently in Madrid targets, gaining the practical “know­ ists who trained in Afghanistan and and were fluent in Spanish, which how” that is essential for carrying out fought in Bosnia. For all their train­ helped them prepare for the opera­ successful attacks. Unlike techne, ing and combat experience, both tion. Other key participants, including métis is not “settled knowledge”; it militants were unprepared for their José Emilio Suárez Trashorras, the varies across local contexts.3 What original roles as pilots in the oper­ former miner who provided access works in one location may not work ation. Renting an apartment in to the explosives, were natural born in another. Street smarts in London southern California, let alone learning citizens who had lived in Spain their are different from “cave smarts” in English and completing pilot training, entire lives.

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as the counterterrorism environment related research around them becomes increasingly vigilant. The reason is simple: Lack of practice leads to a lack of métis that number of NIJ-funded studies The study examined how certain in turn leads to mistakes that alert A have contributed to our under­ opportunities and skills contrib­ law enforcement officers can detect. standing of how terrorists learn: uted to terrorists’ ability to To remain below the radar of police commit crimes. In other cases, officers and suspicious neighbors, Brian Jackson led a team of RAND events or lack of skill prevented militants have adopted security- Corp. researchers who examined planned crimes. enhancing measures. They may how several terrorist groups gather information and develop tactical Other scholars have explored innovations in their attacks.5 The how terrorists train their sup­ study suggests that counterterror­ porters in the tactics and tech­ Terrorists’ chance of ism efforts become more effective niques of guerrilla warfare and as law enforcement officers assess terrorism.7 Combined with earlier exposure grows as and anticipate terrorists’ efforts to literature on terrorism contagion8 change how they operate. and recent scholarship on suicide the counterterrorism bombings,9 these studies are Mark Hamm drew on court docu­ helping us develop more effec­ environment around them ments from the American Terrorism tive counterterrorism policies Study and criminological literature and practices, providing clues to becomes increasingly on social learning to explore how short-circuit terrorists’ learning terrorists carry out violent attacks.6 process. vigilant. Lack of practice leads to mistakes that alert law enforcement Ahmidan, Trashorras and others the London and Madrid bombings had another critical source of métis: and other incidents. In recent years, officers can detect. criminal experience in drug traffick­ law enforcement and intelligence ing. Ahmidan was a veteran hashish officers in all three countries have and Ecstasy smuggler who had created a hostile environment for previously killed a man. Rafa Zouhier Islamic terrorists, intercepting their wait until the last day of training was an experienced drug dealer communications, arresting them before allowing students to fire their who provided Ahmidan the connec­ and disrupting their plots. Unlike weapons or detonate their bombs. tion to Trashorras, who had a history techne, which can be gained from These precautions help preserve of hashish trafficking. All of these knowledge-based artifacts, métis is security, but they do not allow par­ criminals drew on their contacts learned by doing. This presents mil­ ticipants to practice what they have and practical knowledge of drug itants with a dilemma. To develop learned. Yet gaining a feel or knack trafficking and explosives to play hands-on knowledge for carrying out for terrorism comes from repeated essential roles in the bombings. attacks, they must practice building practice and direct experience, not bombs, using firearms and perform­ from abstract knowledge codified in As in the United States after Sept. ing related activities. Yet in doing so, documents, no matter how detailed 11, today in Britain and Spain it has they expose themselves to potential their instructions and accurate their become increasingly difficult for surveillance and disruption by secu­ recipes. would-be terrorists to acquire the rity officials. métis they need to carry out attacks. Terrorists are not the only ones who Counterterrorism agencies have The most important lesson is that rely on their practical knowledge of cracked down on militants following terrorists’ chance of exposure grows local areas. Law enforcement officers

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draw on their own métis, developed apartment, the gradual lightening of a these warning signs will make a valu­ from patrolling community beats, to young man’s hair color or apartment able contribution to counterterrorism identify and disrupt illicit activity. Law trash littered with empty contain­ in the months and years ahead. enforcement officers have detailed ers of hydrogen peroxide are subtle knowledge of local resources of inter­ signals. To the untrained eye these est to potential terrorists, including signs may not mean much, but to the Michael Kenney is assistant profes­ fertilizer suppliers, explosives man­ knowing observer they can provide sor of political science and public ufacturers and gun dealers. Their clues for identifying bomb-making policy in the School of Public Affairs, routine policing activities and their laboratories. Law enforcement offi­ Pennsylvania State University. contacts in the communities they cers who can recognize and act on NCJ 229887 serve also provide opportunities to note suspicious behavior among potential militants.10

For More Information Because they know when some- Terrorism studies was a topic at thing is amiss in the neighborhood, n Learn more at NIJ’s terrorism the 2009 NIJ Conference. To listen local law enforcement officers play Web page: http://www.ojp. to the panel go to: http://www.ojp. a critical role in counterterrorism. To usdoj.gov/nij/topics/crime/ usdoj.gov/nij/journals/media.htm. improve their skills, officers must be terrorism/welcome.htm. able to recognize the warning signs n Read an NIJ Journal article about Watch a short video of the author of terrorism-related surveillance and how domestic terrorists prepare other preparatory acts, such as build- discussing his findings at the annual for their attacks. See http://www. NIJ Conference: http://www.ojp.usdoj. ing explosives. Dead flowers outside ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/260/ gov/nij/journals/media.htm. the covered window of an inner-city terrorist-behavior.htm.

notes K. Cragin, J.V. Parachini, and H.R. Trujillo, 8. Heyman, E., and E. Mickolus, 1. Kenney, M., Organizational Learning and Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case “Observations on Why Violence Islamic Militancy, final report submitted Studies of Organizational Learning in Spreads,” International Studies Quarterly to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Five Terrorist Groups, Santa Monica, CA: 24 (2) (1980): 299-305; Russell, C.A., Department of Justice, Washington, DC: RAND Corp., 2005. L.J. Banker, Jr., and B.H. Miller, “Out- May 2009 (NCJ 226808), http://www. 6. Hamm, M.S., Crimes Committed by Inventing the Terrorist,” in Terrorism: ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf. Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Theory and Practice, ed. Y. Alexander, D. Carlton, and P. Wilkinson, Boulder: 2. Scott, J.C., Seeing Like a State: How Prevention, final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Westview, 1979: 3-42; R.T. Holden, “The Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Contagion of Aircraft Hijacking,” American Condition Have Failed, New Haven: Yale Department of Justice, Washington, DC: September 2005 (NCJ 211203), Journal of Sociology 91 (4) (1986): 874­ University Press, 1998: 320. See also 904; and Midlarsky, M.I., M. Crenshaw, Detienne, M., and J.P. Vernant, Cunning http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/211203.pdf. Also see Hamm, M.S., and F. Yoshida, “Why Violence Spreads: Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, The Contagion of International Terrorism,” Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978; Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond, New York: New International Studies Quarterly 24 (2) and Nussbaum, M.C., The Fragility of (1980): 262-298. Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek York University Press, 2007. Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: 7. Forest, J., ed., Teaching Terror: 9. Bloom, M., Dying to Kill: The Allure of Cambridge University Press, 1986. Knowledge Transfer in the Terrorist World, Suicide Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005; Pape, R.A., Dying 3. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 312-315, 320. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; Forest, J., ed., The Making of a Terrorist: to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 4. Wright, L., The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Terrorism, New York: Random House, and the Road to 9/11, New York: Alfred A. Volume Two: Training, Westport: Praeger 2005; Gambetta, D., ed., Making Sense Knopf, 2006: 309. Security International, 2006; Kenney, of Suicide Missions, expanded and 5. Jackson, B.A., J.C. Baker, K. Cragin, M., From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking updated edition, Oxford: Oxford University J. Parachini, H.R. Trujillo, and P. Chalk, and Terrorist Networks, Government Press, 2006. Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 1: Bureaucracies, and Competitive 10. Bayley, D.H., and D. Weisburd, “Cops Organizational Learning in Terrorist Adaptation, University Park: Pennsylvania and Spooks: The Role of the Police in Groups and Its Implications for Combating State University Press, 2007; Nesser, P., Counterterrorism,” in To Protect and to Terrorism, report prepared for the National “How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism, ed. Institute of Justice, U.S. Department Training for Their Militant Causes?” D. Weisburd, T.E. Feucht, I Hakimi, L.F. of Justice, Washington, DC: 2005 (NCJ Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (2) Mock, and S. Perry, New York: Springer, 211208), http://www.rand.org/pubs/ (2008): 234-256; and A. Stenerson, 2009: 92. monographs/2005/RAND_MG331.pdf; “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” and Jackson, B.A., J.C. Baker, P. Chalk, Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (2) (2008): 215-233.

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