Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy by Michael Kenney

Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy by Michael Kenney Law enforcement may be able to exploit terrorists’ inexperience to deter attacks. ike other forms of criminal develop to be good at it. This begs deviance, terrorism requires an important yet little understood Lexpertise that combines knowl question: How do terrorists get the edge with practice. experience — and expertise — they need to carry out acts of political Terrorists with knowledge and practi violence? cal experience are more likely to carry out “successful” attacks than those To answer this question, I car lacking both of these essential quali ried out five months of fieldwork ties. However, some extremists are on Islamic militancy in Britain and more informed — and experienced — Spain, home to two of the most than others. devastating terrorist attacks since Sept. 11.1 I interviewed many mili Well-educated people do not nec tants, including former Guantánamo essarily make good terrorists. The Bay detainees and members of medical doctors behind the failed al-Muhajiroun. I also interviewed 2007 car bombings in London and dozens of law enforcement officials Glasgow, Scotland, lacked the bomb- and intelligence analysts from the making skills of the petty criminals Federal Bureau of Investigation, the who killed 56 people in the London London Metropolitan Police Service, Tube and bus bombings two years the Spanish Civil Guard and other before. Terrorism is a craft involv agencies. I complemented these ing its own particular set of skills and interviews with news reports, studies knowledge that practitioners must and court documents from criminal proceedings in Britain and Spain. 18 NIJ JOURNAL / ISSUE NO. 265 While terrorists gain knowledge Afghanistan. The tradecraft needed proved a daunting task, requiring of their craft through formal study to succeed in urban terrorism in the the help of English-speaking res and practice, the method of diffusion West is not easily gained from train idents who knew the area. Not depends on the knowledge being ing in guerrilla warfare, even as coincidentally, those recruited to gained. Abstract technical knowl taught at the best al-Qaida camps. replace the duo, Mohammed Atta, edge, what the ancient Greeks called Marwan al Shehh and Ziad Jarrah, “techne,” can be codified in docu In fact, Islamic terrorists are often lived in Germany for years before ments and communicated in “small, short on métis; the experien joining al-Qaida. These “educated, explicit, logical steps.”2 Islamic tial knowledge needed to carry technical men … did not need to be terrorists gain the techne involved out attacks in local settings is far told how to live in the West;” they in bomb making and weapons han removed from their training sites. already knew how.4 Atta and his dling by reading manuals and other Even battle-hardened militants typi colleagues drew on their English- documents that provide detailed, cally develop their violent métis by speaking skills and experience from systematic instructions. Alternatively, taking part in one or more jihads living in Germany to perform satis they attend training camps where in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, factory, if imperfect, tradecraft in experienced practitioners teach these Iraq or Kashmir. Militants’ combat the operation. clear, logical and deadly steps as part knowledge, however useful in those of their curriculum. This technical locales, is essentially limited to Unlike the Sept. 11 hijackers, knowledge is universal; it does not Mohammed Siddique Khan and his vary across local settings. Would-be co-conspirators in the 2005 London terrorists may gain abstract knowl bombings grew up in the country edge for carrying out attacks at a While terrorists gain they attacked. Their knowledge of training camp in Waziristan, Pakistan; British culture and society and their a farmhouse outside Madrid, Spain; knowledge of their craft natural command of English were or from an online training manual. instrumental in carrying out their sui through formal study and cide bombings. Two of the bombers, Not all knowledge can be gained in Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, received this manner. Practitioners of a spe practice, the method of training in Pakistan. Yet any techne cific tradecraft, such as medicine, they gained there merely comple diffusion depends on the law enforcement or terrorism, often mented the métis they already had rely on intuitive, practical knowledge, from living in Britain for so long. The knowledge being gained. what the Greeks called “métis.” London bombers drew on their local Practitioners develop métis gradu knowledge and experience to move ally, by engaging in the activity itself, around the country and get the explo rather than by formal study. Terrorists guerrilla warfare. Such métis does sive materials they needed without may learn the techne involved in not necessarily translate into effective being disrupted by law enforcement. building bombs, shooting weap urban terrorism in Western countries, ons and other activities by studying where success requires local knowl Similarly, the Madrid train bomb manuals or receiving formal instruc edge, street smarts and a talent for ers drew on their own métis, gained tion. However, to develop hands-on clandestine operations. from living in Spain for many years, to competence they must put the book carry out their attacks in 2004. Many down and practice. Practice may not The Sept. 11 attacks provide a conspirators, such as Jamal Ahmidan make perfect, but it does build skills. striking and diagnostic case. The and Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, To become a competent terrorist, one hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid were originally from North Africa. Yet must build bombs, fire guns or survey al-Mihdhar were veteran jihad they settled permanently in Madrid targets, gaining the practical “know ists who trained in Afghanistan and and were fluent in Spanish, which how” that is essential for carrying out fought in Bosnia. For all their train helped them prepare for the opera successful attacks. Unlike techne, ing and combat experience, both tion. Other key participants, including métis is not “settled knowledge”; it militants were unprepared for their José Emilio Suárez Trashorras, the varies across local contexts.3 What original roles as pilots in the oper former miner who provided access works in one location may not work ation. Renting an apartment in to the explosives, were natural born in another. Street smarts in London southern California, let alone learning citizens who had lived in Spain their are different from “cave smarts” in English and completing pilot training, entire lives. Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy | 19 NIJ JOURNAL / ISSUE NO. 265 as the counterterrorism environment Related Research around them becomes increasingly vigilant. The reason is simple: Lack of practice leads to a lack of métis that number of NIJ-funded studies The study examined how certain in turn leads to mistakes that alert A have contributed to our under opportunities and skills contrib law enforcement officers can detect. standing of how terrorists learn: uted to terrorists’ ability to To remain below the radar of police commit crimes. In other cases, officers and suspicious neighbors, Brian Jackson led a team of RAND events or lack of skill prevented militants have adopted security- Corp. researchers who examined planned crimes. enhancing measures. They may how several terrorist groups gather information and develop tactical Other scholars have explored innovations in their attacks.5 The how terrorists train their sup study suggests that counterterror porters in the tactics and tech Terrorists’ chance of ism efforts become more effective niques of guerrilla warfare and 7 as law enforcement officers assess terrorism. Combined with earlier exposure grows as and anticipate terrorists’ efforts to literature on terrorism contagion8 change how they operate. and recent scholarship on suicide the counterterrorism bombings,9 these studies are Mark Hamm drew on court docu helping us develop more effec environment around them ments from the American Terrorism tive counterterrorism policies Study and criminological literature and practices, providing clues to becomes increasingly on social learning to explore how short-circuit terrorists’ learning terrorists carry out violent attacks.6 process. vigilant. Lack of practice leads to mistakes that alert law enforcement Ahmidan, Trashorras and others the London and Madrid bombings had another critical source of métis: and other incidents. In recent years, officers can detect. criminal experience in drug traffick law enforcement and intelligence ing. Ahmidan was a veteran hashish officers in all three countries have and Ecstasy smuggler who had created a hostile environment for previously killed a man. Rafa Zouhier Islamic terrorists, intercepting their wait until the last day of training was an experienced drug dealer communications, arresting them before allowing students to fire their who provided Ahmidan the connec and disrupting their plots. Unlike weapons or detonate their bombs. tion to Trashorras, who had a history techne, which can be gained from These precautions help preserve of hashish trafficking. All of these knowledge-based artifacts, métis is security, but they do not allow par criminals drew on their contacts learned by doing. This presents mil ticipants to practice what they have and practical knowledge of drug itants with a dilemma. To develop learned. Yet gaining

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