Ideas in POLICE American FOUNDATION Number 15 Policing July 2012 Policing Terrorism Gary LaFree

lthough terrorism has past. However, some optimism This balance between being much in common is provided by the fact that the effective in counterterrorism A with ordinary crime strong connections to community efforts and maintaining the trust (LaFree and Dugan 2004), it that produce the best results of the community should not be also raises unique challenges for for policing in general may also taken lightly but in some ways policing. Perhaps the greatest be the same characteristics that resembles the challenges police challenges center on how to are most useful in preventing have long faced in responding use scarce police resources to terrorist attacks and responding to crimes that require proactive fight crimes that are relatively to those that are carried out. At rather than reactive methods. uncommon, that have national the same time, providing support I divide this essay into four and sometimes international for counterterrorism must be parts. In part one, I consider the implications, and that require done by local police in such a frequency and characteristics of intelligence that may be limited way that it does not erode their terrorist attacks on the United or altogether unavailable at the effectiveness in communities. States, especially since 9/11. In local and state levels. But despite these challenges, it is hard to Ideas in American Policing presents commentary and insight from leading crimi- imagine any effective national nologists on issues of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. The policy on preventing terrorism papers published in this series are from the Police Foundation lecture series of the same name. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not or responding to its aftermath necessarily represent the official position of the Police Foundation. The full series that does not heavily rely on the is available online at http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html. hundreds of thousands of sworn © 2012 Police Foundation. All rights reserved. police officers that serve the Gary LaFree is professor of criminology and criminal justice United States. Addressing these at the University of Maryland and the director of the National complex challenges requires a Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to level of cooperation across federal, Terrorism. Dr. LaFree is a member of the Police Foundation’s state, and local jurisdictions Research Advisory Committee. that has not been typical in the this section, I briefly examine international terrorist attacks series peak in 1991—just before global terrorist threats to the is the Global Terrorism the collapse of the Soviet Union. United States, foreign groups Database (GTD) maintained Attacks then fell off even more that target the United States, and by the National Consortium sharply so that total attacks just terrorist attacks within the United for the Study of Terrorism before 9/11 were at about the States. In the second part of the and Responses to Terrorism same level as they were in the essay, I consider how terrorism (START), headquartered at the late 1970s. Following the US-led is similar to and different from University of Maryland (LaFree invasion of Iraq in 2003, total ordinary street crime. These and Dugan 2007; LaFree 2012). attacks again rose sharply, coming similarities and differences have Terrorism in the GTD is defined close to a series high during important implications for as the threatened or actual use of the last three years of the series policing terrorism. Perhaps most illegal force and violence by non- (2008 to 2010). Fatal attacks importantly, terrorism more state actors, in order to attain a are much less common but are closely resembles crimes that have political, economic, religious, or significantly correlated with total gained prominence in the last half social goal through fear, coercion, attacks. In general, there was a century, like hate crimes, drug- or intimidation. At the time greater gap between total and related crimes, and gang violence, this essay was written, the GTD fatal attacks during the 1980s and than crimes with older, common included information on more early 1990s than there was before law roots, like homicide or than 98,000 terrorist attacks from or since. The total number of robbery. In the third part of the around the world from 1970 to fatal attacks from 2008 to 2010 is essay, I consider some of the ways 2010 (www.start.umd.edu/gtd/). at about the same level as it was that the 9/11 attacks changed In the next section, I use the in the peak year of 1992 (about policing. Because much of the GTD to indicate the nature of the 2,000 attacks per year). police work aimed at preventing global terrorist threat, the threat terrorist attacks happens at the from foreign groups that target Terrorist Organizations federal level, I will examine the United States both at home that Target the United in particular major changes in and abroad, and the threat of FBI strategies since 9/11. The terrorism within the United States. States move toward a more proactive My colleagues Sue-Ming Yang approach to terrorism after Global Terrorism Trends and Martha Crenshaw and 9/11 has important implications I recently tracked the attack for policing at all levels. And, Figure 1 shows total and fatal patterns of fifty-three terrorist finally, I conclude by taking the terrorist attacks from 1970 to organizations identified by the 1 information from the first three 2010 from the GTD. I include US Department of State as sections and considering some of a marker to distinguish attacks representing the most serious the implications for policies on before and after 9/11. Total threat to the United States policing terrorism in the twenty- attacks rose sharply during the (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw first century. 1970s and 1980s, reaching a 2009). Collectively, these foreign terrorist groups were linked to 1 The Nature of the Our data record no domestic nearly 17,000 attacks. However, attacks for 1993. The original data on we found that just 3 percent of Terrorist Threat which the GTD is based were collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence these attacks by designated anti- At present, the longest running Service, which lost the data for 1993 US groups were actually directed in an office move. We have never been terrorism event database that able to completely reconstruct these at the United States. Moreover, includes both domestic and missing data. 99 percent of attacks targeting

—— 2 —— Figure 1. Worldwide Total and Fatal Terrorist Attacks 1970–2010 domestic attacks are the rule. The fact that most terrorism is local underscores the importance of strong local policing.

Trends in Terrorism Attacks Within the United States Developing a valid data source for terrorist attacks within the United States has been challenging. Most early terrorism event databases (e.g., ITERATE, RAND) excluded domestic attacks and, as a matter of policy, the US Department of State did not publish data on domestic terrorist attacks in its Patterns of Global Source: Global Terrorism Database (www.start.umd.edu/gtd). Terrorism series. Brent Smith and his colleagues (Smith 1994; the United States did not occur National Liberation Front), and Smith, Shields, and Damphousse on US soil but were aimed at the early twenty-first century 2011a) have contributed a US targets in other countries (al-Qa’ida, the Taliban)—as great deal to our knowledge of (e.g., embassies, multinational well as a trajectory that did not domestic terrorism by codifying corporations). We also found exhibit wave-like characteristics FBI arrests and prosecutions that more than 90 percent of the but instead was characterized by for terrorism, but these data are non-US attacks were domestic irregular and infrequent attacks limited to federal cases. The GTD (i.e., nationals from one country (including the Popular Liberation includes data on both domestic attacking targets of the same Army and the Moro Islamic and international terrorism nationality in the same country). Liberation Front). going back to 1970; however, We used group-based trajectory The results of this analysis the original data provided no analysis (Nagin 2005) to examine underscore the importance of simple mechanism for separating the different developmental proximity for terrorist targeting. domestic from international trajectories of strikes that Terrorists, like ordinary criminals, cases. With funding from the targeted the United States, and are likely to choose targets US Department of Homeland concluded that four trajectories close to their operational base. Security’s Human Factors/ best captured the attack patterns. However, when attacks occur Behavioral Science Division, for As shown in Figure 2, these further from the terrorists’ home the last three years my colleagues trajectories constituted three very bases, they are more deadly. In and I in the START Consortium distinct terrorist waves—which framing counterterrorism policies, have been building a database occurred in the 1970s (including our results highlight the need to on terrorist attacks against the the Red Brigades and People’s put threats into perspective by United States, called Terrorism Liberation Forces), 1980s acknowledging that international and Extremist Violence in the (Shining Path, Farabundo Marti attacks are the exception and local United States (TEVUS).

—— 3 —— Figure 2. Trajectories of Attacks on the United States of 53 in the early 1970s, attacks Anti-US Terrorist Groups 1970–2004 reached a secondary peak of 142 in 1975. Attack rates again declined throughout the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, falling below fifty attacks per year for most years. Interestingly, the total number of domestic attacks since 9/11 has generally been lower than at any other period during the past forty years. The most active groups in the 1970s were the New World Liberation Front and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional. The most active groups in the 1980s were anti-abortion extremists and the Jewish Defense League. The most active groups in the 1990s were again anti-abortion extremists and Source: LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009). the World Church of the Creator. And the most active groups As these data have been fatalities: a small portion of since 2000 have been the Earth assembled, we have been able to metropolitan areas account for a Liberation Front and the Animal develop a more accurate picture large portion of total attacks. San Liberation Front. of trends in terrorist attacks in Francisco had the largest number It is also clear from Figure the United States over the past of fatal attacks (n 5 22, 9.9 4 that total attacks are strongly four decades. In Figure 3, we percent), followed by New York correlated with fatal attacks show a map of total terrorist City (n 5 15, 6.8 percent), Los (r 5 .72, p .01). Thus, the attacks in the United States Angeles (n 5 12, 5.4 percent), number of fatal attacks decreased from 1970 to 2010. The dots Miami (n 5 10, 4.5 percent), rapidly after the early 1970s, are proportional to the number and Washington, DC (n 5 8, from a high of twenty-five in of events taking place in specific 3.6 percent). At the same time, 1970 to a low of seventeen for areas (larger dots representing a it is interesting to observe that the first decade of the twenty- high frequency of events). Figure every single state in the United first century. However, the 3 shows the concentration of States has at least one attack most deadly groups for attacks attacks in big cities, with clearly during the past forty years. against the United States have visible clusters in New York Figure 4 shows trends in been quite different from the City, Washington, DC, Miami, US total and fatal attacks from most active groups. Thus, in the San Francisco, and Los Angeles. 1970 to 2010. Perhaps the most 1970s, the most deadly groups In fact, nearly 30 percent of all striking feature of Figure 4 is the were the Black Liberation Army attacks took place in one of these dramatic decline in US domestic and the Death Angels. The most five metropolitan areas. The same terrorism over time. Attacks were deadly groups in the 1980s general pattern holds true for most common in 1970 with over were the Posse Comitatus, the just those events that produced 450 per year. After steep declines Justice Commandos for the

—— 4 —— Armenian Genocide, and the Figure 3. Terrorist Attacks for the Contiguous United States Jewish Defense League. The 1970–2010 most deadly groups in the 1990s were various right wing extremist groups and the World Church of the Creator. And the most deadly group since 2000 has been al-Qa’ida.

Conclusions on Terrorist Threats to the United States Number of Attacks 1 Thus far, the international 10 terrorist organizations that 100 pose the greatest threat to the Source: Global Terrorism Database, 1970–2010. 0 250 500 1,000 Miles United States have rarely attacked on US soil. However, as the events of 9/11 so shockingly —how to guard against a rare but (for a review, see LaFree and demonstrated, in the increasingly potentially devastating event. Dugan 2009). Moreover, LaFree global world in which we live and Dugan (2004, 67) point out it has become a more realistic Terrorism Versus More that criminal events look much possibility. Attacks on the United the same as terrorist events in States by groups that originate Ordinary Crime that “both . . . can be counted in the United States are far Edwin Sutherland’s classic and display non-random temporal more common, although the definition of criminology as and spatial patterns that are likely largest number of these attacks the study of “. . . the breaking associated with endogenous occurred in the 1970s. While of laws and reactions to the and exogenous characteristics of terrorist attacks are concentrated breaking of laws” unambiguously offenders, targets, and situations.” in big cities, every single US encompasses terrorist attacks Because much criminological state has had at least one terrorist (Sutherland and Cressey 1978, research emphasizes the attack in the GTD since 1970. 3). Indeed, Clarke and Newman understanding of crime patterns So the challenge police face (2006, vii) have stated directly across spatial and temporal in responding to terrorism is that “terrorism is a form of dimensions, research methods that it is possible anywhere crime in all essential respects,” commonly used in criminology but likely in a relatively small and predict that terrorist attacks should be highly relevant in number of highly populated will cluster in time and space in the study of terrorism. And areas. In a way, police in most the same way as more ordinary indeed, much recent research parts of the country face the crimes. Rosenfeld (2004) argues on terrorism (e.g., Weisburd, same challenge in protecting that criminology theories are Hasisi, Jonathan, and Aviv 2010; local communities from terrorist highly relevant to terrorism, and Miller 2012) has applied methods attacks as emergency management in recent years a growing number popular in the study of crime to personnel face in protecting of researchers have begun to the study of terrorism. There are citizens from earthquakes and apply criminological theories to also obvious investigatory and other uncommon natural hazards the understanding of terrorism forensic similarities. The same

—— 5 —— Figure 4. Total and Fatal Terrorist Attacks for the United States a terrorist attack since 2000, the 1970 to 2010 116 counties that had experienced a terrorist attack also had higher Index crime rates (r 5 .251; p .001) and homicide rates (r 5 .085; p .001). In a county-level multivariate analysis, we found that counties with higher ordinary crime rates and levels of language diversity had a higher probability of experiencing terrorist attacks, while counties with more concentrated disadvantage (a composite measure including percent families below the poverty line, percent unemployed, percent female-headed households with minor children, percent low- wage unemployment, and percent receiving public assistance) and Source: Global Terrorism Database (www.start.umd.edu/gtd). more residential stability had a lower probability of experiencing forensic methods used for crime kidnapping, extortion); that, terrorist attacks. We found no scene investigation are likely to be compared to common crimes, significant relationship between useful for investigating terrorist responses to terrorism are less the likelihood of terrorist attacks attacks. likely to be local; and that most and the percentage of the However, there are clearly terrorists, unlike most common population that was foreign- differences as well as similarities criminals, view themselves as born or the racial composition between terrorism and more altruists (LaFree and Dugan of the population of the county. common types of crime. In a 2004). Although the relationship review comparing terrorism Empirical comparisons of between terrorism and crime was and crime, my colleague Laura terrorism and crime in the significant, the strength of the Dugan and I argued that major United States have so far been correlation was only moderate similarities between the two are rare. However, my colleague (r 5 .08 to .25, depending on that both are disproportionately Bianca Bersani and I recently did specific measure of crime used) committed by young men, both direct comparisons of county- (see LaFree and Bersani 2012, exhibit major differences between level homicide and total Index 24). In short, this empirical how laws governing the illegal crimes from the Uniform Crime analysis is in line with earlier behavior are written and applied, Reports and terrorist attacks from observations about similarities and both can undermine social the GTD from 2000 to 2008 between terrorism and more legitimacy of communities and (LaFree and Bersani 2012). We common types of crime: there are institutions. Some conceptual found a significant correlation substantial similarities but also differences include the fact that between terrorist attacks and important differences. terrorist attacks often constitute ordinary crime. Compared to In general, terrorism has multiple crimes (e.g., murder, counties that had not experienced fewer similarities to the traditional

—— 6 —— common law crimes that have only twenty-one terrorist attacks This large increase in the been enshrined since 1930 in the in the United States. However, number of foiled and failed Uniform Crime Report Index this number tells only part of terrorist attacks being processed than with other crimes, including the story because the GTD only in the United States reflects a several that have only gained counts an event as terrorism if the major recent shift in the strategies prominence in recent years. perpetrators have actually taken used by federal law enforcement For example, unlike the Index some specific action to initiate an against terrorism. Smith, Shields, crimes, but similar to organized, attack. Thus, the GTD does not and Damphousse (2011a) argue hate, or gang-related crime, include cases where individuals that prior to 9/11 the FBI was terrorist attacks are often linked have only planned an attack but primarily a “reactive” agency in to groups that have an ongoing not actually begun to carry it out. which preventive intelligence organizational structure. Similarly, This means that the GTD does gathering was deemphasized. terrorists, like those involved not track most foiled plots. After 9/11, policy makers and in organized, gang, and hate To get a look at terrorist the public demanded a more crime, are often part of sustained attacks against the United proactive, intelligence-driven campaigns of crime and violence States that have been planned stance on the part of federal law where groups with more or less but foiled before they could be enforcement. These shifting goals coherence may operate for years carried out, Erik Dahl (2011) were supported by major policy or even decades. One of the used open source unclassified changes, including the creation of important implications of this data to develop a database on fusion centers and the National distinction for policing is that the foiled or failed terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism Center and the kind of reactive policing that is Dahl tracked 176 terrorist plots passage of new and less restrictive common in ordinary crime cases against American targets that had investigative guidelines (Smith, like robbery or auto theft is less been thwarted or otherwise failed Shields, and Damphousse 2011a, effective in the case of terrorism. during the past twenty-five years; 10). Congress also passed, and 103 of these plots were planned the president signed, the USA How Policing Has and carried out within the United PATRIOT Act of 2001, which States and the other 73 were greatly expanded the involvement Changed Since 9/11 aimed at US targets outside the of federal law enforcement in Changes in the policing of United States (e.g., embassies domestic terrorism cases. These terrorism in the United States and military bases). According legislative changes, as well as since 9/11 have been substantial. to Dahl, 126 (71.6 percent) non-legislative administrative Perhaps the strongest evidence of the plots were inspired by changes, have had a major impact of these changes can be seen in radical Islamism and 42 (23.9 on policing terrorism. raw statistics on terrorism-related percent) by domestic right-wing Changes in the system start arrests and prosecutions. We and anti-government extremism. with investigations. Before 9/11, noted above that, overall, terrorist Dahl shows that between 1990 much of the FBI’s efforts to attacks on US soil reported in and 2000 there were a total of stop terrorism revolved around the GTD have generally declined twenty-nine failed and foiled infiltrating terrorist organizations during the past decade. In fact, terrorist attacks in the United either through undercover according to the GTD, there States. By contrast, from 2001 to operations or by convincing were more terrorist attacks on 2010 the total of foiled and failed terrorist operatives to become US soil in 2001 (thirty-six) than attacks had increased by more informants. After 9/11, the in any year since. In all of 2009 than two and one-half times, to FBI began to downplay these and 2010, the GTD recorded seventy-one attacks. strategies—which were extremely

—— 7 —— time consuming—in favor of New York Police Department providing material support to a faster, more proactive strategies. (NYPD), as well as the ATF terrorist organization. Preliminary research by Smith, and the FBI, quickly responded In fact, the steps leading Shields, and Damphousse (2011a) to the scene. While combing up to the arrest and sentencing shows that the effect of these through the rubble in the of Zazi were in no way typical changes has been profound. In underground parking area of the of the treatment of someone federal cases processed between WTC, a bomb technician found suspected of committing a more 1980 and September 11, 2001, a vehicle identification number common type of crime. Perhaps their study found that 29 percent on a piece of truck axle, which most importantly, compared involved undercover agents gave investigators a crucial lead to the 1993 WTC bombing (p. 15). For cases processed after that eventually broke the case. In case, the role of policing in the 9/11, this number fell to only March 1994, two suspects were Zazi case was extraordinarily 3 percent. At the same time, convicted in the World Trade proactive. From what we can the FBI considerably ramped up Center bombing and several tell from open sources, Zazi had the number of terrorism cases months later were sentenced to been under intense surveillance being pursued. Smith, Shields, life imprisonment. by US authorities for months and Damphousse (2011b) report Consider how different this before his arrest (Baldor 2009). that in the twenty-one years from case is from the 2009 case of It appears that the CIA initially 1980 to 2001, the government Najibullah Zazi, who admitted to learned of Zazi through sources prosecuted approximately 500 plotting to conduct a coordinated, in Pakistan and then informed individuals on terrorism-related multiple person attack on the the FBI. There is also evidence charges (p. 14). By contrast, the New York City subway system. that British intelligence provided government prosecuted about the Zazi, a permanent legal resident early information (The Telegraph same number on terrorism-related of the United States, was born 2009). When Zazi staged his charges in just the four years after in Afghanistan, grew up in cross-country drive to New York 9/11. By the end of 2009, this Pakistan, and attended high City, FBI agents were following number increased to nearly 1,000 school in Queens, New York. He him every step of the way. The prosecutions. underwent weapons and explosives trip was so well covered that local These changes in strategy training at an al-Qa’ida training law enforcement officials were have important implications for camp in Pakistan in 2008, then enlisted to help by pulling him policing at all levels. Responding returned to the United States over several times for speeding to a terrorist attack has much and settled in the Denver area. (Dahl 2011, 633). As he different implications for police In September 2009, he drove approached New York City, Zazi’s than stopping a terrorist attack from his home to New York City car was stopped and searched on before it happens. The former with a plan to detonate explosives the George Washington Bridge can be handled in large part by on the New York City subway in an operation coordinated traditional policing methods. For during rush hour. However, when between the FBI and the NYPD example, the 1993 attack on the he was warned by a local imam (p. 634). President Obama World Trade Center (WTC) was that authorities were inquiring reportedly received regular handled mostly as an ordinary about him, he abruptly returned briefings, sometimes updated crime by local police working to Denver. He was arrested days several times a day (Baldor with federal agencies. Though later, and in February 2010 2009). The same day that Zazi’s the cause of the blast was not pled guilty to conspiring to use car was stopped on the George immediately known, agents weapons of mass destruction, Washington Bridge, officials from and bomb technicians from the conspiring to commit murder, and NYPD’s intelligence division

—— 8 —— approached an imam in Queens connections to the communities the 176 plots, 128 (89 domestic about the case. Shortly after, it polices. and 39 overseas), 72.7 percent, the imam alerted both Zazi and were foiled as a result of actions Zazi’s father. Federal officials, Toward a Policy for by law enforcement, security, who had not known about the and intelligence officers. The NYPD’s actions, learned of the Policing Terrorism most common method for imam’s involvement because they Faced with growing foiling domestic plots was were monitoring Zazi’s phone responsibilities and shrinking local human intelligence (60 percent conversations. This led the federal budgets, it will be tempting for of the cases). Moreover, for authorities to move in quickly to state and local police departments the most part, this human make an arrest. to simply step away from a intelligence was not from secret Note the very different concern with policing terrorism. agents penetrating terrorist cells implications of these two cases This would be a grave mistake. (previously a favorite tool of the for local and state policing. At present, there are more than FBI in countering terrorism), but In the first case, a crime has 750,000 full-time sworn police rather from undercover agents already been committed and officers in the United States and informants and tips from police are called in to use more (Reaves 2011). Compare this the public. For example, a plot or less traditional investigative to a little more than 2,000 to attack a Bronx, New York, and forensic methods to solve FBI special agents working on synagogue and a National Guard it and bring the offenders to terrorism cases—a number likely base in Newburgh, New York, justice. In the 1993 case, local to decline as we move farther on May 20, 2009, was foiled authorities worked closely with away from 9/11. It is hard to when the plotters attempted to federal authorities. The case imagine a credible anti-terrorism recruit an undercover informant was clearly an extremely high- strategy that does not heavily rely who was operating in a mosque profile event receiving much on state and local police. The in Newburgh. In many cases, more attention than a typical police are critical both in terms informants were placed inside case; nevertheless, the procedures of preventing terrorism as well groups of plotters after authorities resembled procedures that would as calming public fears in the first received tips from the public. be followed in any high-profile wake of a terrorist attack. On the For example, this was the case in homicide. In the second case, prevention side, criminologists the 2006 plot by a group of men the role of local and state police David Bayley and David Weisburd in Miami that planned to attack and their connections to federal (2009, 92) have recently the Sears Tower in Chicago and law enforcement efforts were far observed that, “Once terrorists iconic buildings in several other more complex. This complexity are in the country, police, not the cities. After reviewing his results, was especially apparent in the FBI or the CIA, have the best Dahl (2011, 635) concludes NYPD effort to gather additional tools for detecting and preventing that “the most important step information from the imam these crimes.” In fact, these toward preventing future attacks in Queens—an action that assertions are strongly supported is to focus on local and domestic inadvertently tipped off the by Eric Dahl’s research (2011). intelligence and to figure out suspect. Moreover, it is easy to Dahl attempted to determine how to gather the necessary see how this kind of police focus why the terrorist plots in his intelligence while still maintaining on gathering intelligence from study failed and, especially, what the proper balance between civil local sources such as imams could kinds of intelligence and security liberties and security.” in the long run threaten the efforts were most successful in However, state and local police legitimacy of the NYPD and its preventing them. He finds that of are also critical in calming public

—— 9 —— fears in the aftermath of a terrorist catch phrases like community- routinely handled by police. That attack. This point is well made in oriented policing (COP) and terrorist attacks are frequently research on policing and terrorism problem-oriented policing (POP), orchestrated by groups with in Israel, a country that is all too may also be best practices for ongoing institutional support and familiar with terrorist attacks. responding to the threat of long-term organizational goals Criminologists David Weisburd, domestic terrorism. For example, is not that different from the Tal Jonathan, and Simon Perry Jack Greene (2011) points challenges police have faced for (2009, 1270) point out that out that the potential conflict decades in countering organized Israeli police have developed an between the performance of crime and criminal gangs. That established protocol for reducing traditional policing activities and terrorists often have political the fear of terrorist attacks by the more specialized activities goals and direct their attacks at communicating to the press and associated with terrorism-related specific racial, ethnic, or religious the public accurate details of the policing may be smoother in groups is not that different than attack, indicating areas that have departments that have strong what police face in countering been shut down and supplying traditions of community-oriented hate crimes. And the proactive suggestions for alternate routes. and problem-oriented policing. emphasis on stopping terrorist These efforts are specifically aimed Ultimately, this may be the best attacks before they happen at minimizing public fear and solution for the balancing act is not that different than the psychological distress. faced by local and state police proactive efforts police have had And of course the police must in terms of responding to to engage in for stopping many aid in preventing attacks and terrorist threats. To the extent other types of crime, including restoring public confidence while that building stronger police drug offenses and white collar at the same time not threatening departments through COP, POP, crimes. Interestingly, all of these civil liberties. As criminologist and related programs also leads to other types of non-terrorist crime Jack Greene has noted (2011, more effective counterterrorism continue to raise challenges for 229), when police do venture strategies, there is an opportunity police in terms of balancing into intelligence gathering, they for successfully incorporating crime fighting efforts while always risk losing public trust. police into counterterrorism maintaining public confidence. This is a critical point because efforts. However, this is likely Clearly, 9/11 and the threat of an impressive body of research to always require a good deal more attacks have produced a has demonstrated the importance of vigilance to make sure that new set of challenges for police. of public perceptions of police local police are not sacrificing But police are absolutely critical legitimacy and fairness in carrying their legitimacy in the eyes of the in fashioning effective policies to out their duties (Tyler 2001; public in order to be effective in counter these threats. Tyler and Huo 2002). However, dealing with the relatively rare Tight state and local budgets I would argue that, for at least situations where a terrorist threat pose challenges to police across two reasons, maintaining an is imminent. the nation. But despite these active role for local and state And, second, as we have challenges, an effective national police in responding to terrorist seen above, while the crime of strategy for preventing terrorism threats on American soil is terrorism is quite different in and responding to its aftermath challenging rather than hopeless. many ways from the traditional absolutely depends on the First, there is growing crimes embodied in Part I of hundreds of thousands of sworn evidence that the best practices the Uniform Crime Reports, it police officers that serve the for policing in democratic shares much in common with United States. Securing police societies, captured especially by other important crimes that are support in an era of fiscal austerity

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—— 11 —— ABOUT THE POLICE FOUNDATION The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing through its research, technical assistance, communication, and professional services programs. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation

DIVISION OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, BOARD OF DIRECTORS & PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

Karen L. Amendola David Weisburd Chairman Chief Operating Officer Senior Fellow Weldon J. Rougeau Garth den Heyer Travis Taniguchi Senior Research Fellow Senior Research Associate President Hubert Williams Edwin E. Hamilton LeRoy O’Shield Professional Services Senior Technical Assistance George H. Bohlinger III Director Advisor David D. Cole Raymond Johnston, Sr. Senior Systems Engineer Clarence Edwards Paul Helmke RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE Julie Horney David Weisburd, Chair Hebrew University and George Mason University William H. Hudnut III James M. Doyle Carney & Bassil David B. Lewis Jack R. Greene Northeastern University W. Walter Menninger Gary LaFree Elsie L. Scott University of Maryland James J. Willis Alfred A. Slocum George Mason University Andrew L. Sonner

POLICE FOUNDATION

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