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Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Central Governments (Top Executive Functions) and Law Enforcement Agencies

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Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Central Governments (Top Executive Functions) and Law Enforcement Agencies Adoption: 21 June 2019 Public Publication: 13 November 2019 GrecoEval5Rep(2018)5 FIFTH EVALUATION ROUND Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central Governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies EVALUATION REPORT SPAIN Adopted by GRECO at its 83rd Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 17-21 June 2019) TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................. 4 II. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 6 III. CONTEXT .................................................................................................................................................. 7 IV. CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS (TOP EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS).......................... 9 SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND TOP EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS ............................................................................................. 9 System of Government .................................................................................................................................. 9 Status and remuneration of persons with top executive functions ............................................................. 10 Anticorruption and integrity policy, regulatory and institutional framework ............................................. 14 Ethical principles and rules of conduct ........................................................................................................ 15 Awareness ................................................................................................................................................... 16 TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE ACTIVITIES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ........................................................ 17 Access to information .................................................................................................................................. 17 Transparency of the law-making process .................................................................................................... 20 Third parties and lobbyists........................................................................................................................... 21 Control mechanisms .................................................................................................................................... 21 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .......................................................................................................................................... 23 PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................... 24 Incompatibilities, outside activities and financial interests ......................................................................... 24 Contracts with state authorities .................................................................................................................. 24 Gifts ............................................................................................................................................................. 25 Misuse of public resources ........................................................................................................................... 25 Misuse of confidential information ............................................................................................................. 25 Post-employment restrictions ...................................................................................................................... 25 DECLARATION OF ASSETS, INCOME, LIABILITIES AND INTERESTS ....................................................................................... 27 ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS .................................................................................................... 29 Non-criminal accountability mechanisms .................................................................................................... 29 Criminal proceedings and immunities ......................................................................................................... 31 V. CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES .............................................................. 33 ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT/POLICE AUTHORITIES........................................................... 33 Overview of various law enforcement authorities ....................................................................................... 33 Access to information .................................................................................................................................. 35 Public trust in law enforcement authorities ................................................................................................ 36 Trade unions and professional organisations .............................................................................................. 36 ANTICORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY POLICY ................................................................................................................... 36 Policy, planning, risk management and institutional mechanisms ............................................................. 36 Handling undercover operations and contacts with informants and witnesses .......................................... 38 Code of ethics, advice, training and awareness on integrity ....................................................................... 38 RECRUITMENT, CAREER AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE ................................................................................................... 40 Recruitment requirements and appointment procedure ............................................................................. 40 Performance evaluation and promotion to a higher rank, transfers and termination of service ................ 42 Salaries and benefits .................................................................................................................................... 45 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST .......................................................................................................................................... 46 PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................... 46 Incompatibilities, outside activities and post-employment restrictions ...................................................... 46 Gifts ............................................................................................................................................................. 48 Misuse of public resources ........................................................................................................................... 48 Misuse of confidential information ............................................................................................................. 48 DECLARATION OF ASSETS, INCOME, LIABILITIES AND INTERESTS ....................................................................................... 49 OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS ....................................................................................................................................... 49 Internal control ............................................................................................................................................ 49 External oversight ........................................................................................................................................ 51 REPORTING OBLIGATIONS AND WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ........................................................................................ 51 REMEDY PROCEDURES FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC.......................................................................................................... 52 ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 53 2 Disciplinary procedure ................................................................................................................................. 53 Criminal procedure ...................................................................................................................................... 54 Statistics ...................................................................................................................................................... 54 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ................................................................................................. 55 3 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Corruption is a highly topical issue in Spain. Citizens’ confidence in public institutions is low and, over the past quinquennium, corruption persistently ranks as a most pressing concern for society, only overtaken by unemployment. Many corruption cases have emerged and been brought to court in recent years, revealing corruption risks and mismanagement, particularly, in local-level public procurement in urban planning and construction. A judicial ruling on corruption was also an alleged reason behind a parliamentary no confidence vote which, for the first time in Spanish democratic history, ousted the Government in June 2018. 2. A set of structural reforms was launched, in 2013, to promote integrity in public life under the so-called
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