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Here a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60 Bibliography on Corruption and Anticorruption Professor Matthew C. Stephenson Harvard Law School http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/ March 2021 Aaken, A., & Voigt, S. (2011). Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? Economics of Governance, 12(4), 301–324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0100-8 Aaronson, S. A. (2011a). Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up? Available at SSRN 1922190. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1922190 Aaronson, S. A. (2011b). Limited partnership: Business, government, civil society, and the public in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Public Administration and Development, 31(1), 50–63. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.588 Aaronson, S. A., & Abouharb, M. R. (2014). Corruption, Conflicts of Interest and the WTO. In J.-B. Auby, E. Breen, & T. Perroud (Eds.), Corruption and conflicts of interest: A comparative law approach (pp. 183–197). Edward Elgar PubLtd. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:ELGAR01620140507 Abbas Drebee, H., & Azam Abdul-Razak, N. (2020). The Impact of Corruption on Agriculture Sector in Iraq: Econometrics Approach. IOP Conference Series. Earth and Environmental Science, 553(1), 12019-. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/553/1/012019 Abbink, K., Dasgupta, U., Gangadharan, L., & Jain, T. (2014). Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 111(Journal Article), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 Abbink, Klaus. (2004). Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(4), 887–906. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008 Abbink, Klaus. (2005). Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption. In Kokinov & Boicho (Eds.), Advances in Cognitive Economics. Sofia: NBU Press. https://winster.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2002-05.pdf Abbink, Klaus. (2006). Laboratory Experiments on Corruption. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 418–440). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P60nmWlJWEoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&d q=Laboratory+Experiments+on+Corruption,%E2%80%9D+in+Susan+Rose-Ackerman+ ed.+International+Handbook+on+the+Economics+of+Corruption+(Edward+Elgar&ots=j 1 9agtH21zb&sig=2ojEcFGAw5WeEuD5KDd_f7alhb4 Abbink, Klaus, & Ellman, M. (2010). The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment. Journal of Development Studies, 46(8), 1327–1344. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380903428407 Abbink, Klaus, Freidin, E., Gangadharan, L., & Moro, R. (2018). The Effect of Social Norms on Bribe Offers. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 34(3), 457–474. Abbink, Klaus, Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An Experimental Bribery Game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(2), 428–454. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.2.428 Abbink, Klaus, & Serra, D. (2012). Anticorruption policies: Lessons from the lab. In New advances in experimental research on corruption (Vol. 15, pp. 77–115). https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=N48c72KXsD4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA77&d q=Abbink,+Klaus+%26+Danila+Serra.+2012.+%E2%80%9CAnticorruption+Policies:+ Lessons+from+the+Lab,%E2%80%9D+in+Danila+Serra+%26+Leonard+Wantchekon,+ eds.,+New+Advances+in+Experimental+Research+on+Corruption+&ots=uycq5h5aMR &sig=vUixS6mxw6Zc-7lPoVpnBt-ZQB8 Abbott, K. W. (2001). Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of bribery and corruption. Journal of International Economic Law, 4(2), 275–296. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/4.2.275 Abbott, Kenneth W. (2009). Fight Against Corruption. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law. Abbott, Kenneth W., & Snidal, D. (2002). International action on bribery and corruption: Why the dog didn’t bark in the WTO. In D. M. Kennedy & J. D. Southwick (Eds.), The political economy of international trade law. Abbott, K. w, & Snidal, D. (2002). Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption. The Journal of Legal Studies, 31(S1), S141–S177. https://doi.org/10.1086/342006 Abdalla, H. F., Maghrabi, A. S., & Raggad, B. G. (1998). Assessing the perceptions of human resource managers toward nepotism A cross-cultural study. International Journal of Manpower, 19(8), 554–570. Abdallah, S., Sayed, R., Rahwan, I., Leveck, B. L., Cebrian, M., Rutherford, A., & Fowler, J. H. (2014). Corruption drives the emergence of civil society. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society, 11(93), 20131044. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.1044 Abdixhiku, L., Krasniqi, B., Pugh, G., & Hashi, I. (2017). Firm-level determinants of tax evasion 2 in transition economies. Economic Systems, 41(3), 354–366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2016.12.004 Abdul‐Gafaru Abdulai. (2009). Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies: A comparative study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana. Journal of Financial Crime, 16(4), 387–417. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790910993753 Abé Ndjié, A., Atangana Ondoa, H., & Ngoa Tabi, H. (2019). Governance and youth unemployment in Africa. Labor History, 60(6), 869–882. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2019.1645320 Abed, G. T., & Gupta, S. (2002). Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. International Monetary Fund. Abidin, I. S. Z., Jantan, M. D., Satar, N. M., & Haseeb, M. (2014). Trade Linkages between Malaysia and the OIC Member Countries: Empirical Evidence Based on Gravity Model. American Journal of Applied Sciences, 11(11), 1938–1944. Abiona, I. A., & Savage, O. (2014). Influence of Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission on Female Civil Servants in Oyo State, Nigeria. Public Policy and Administration Research, 4(12), 36–43. Abrams, N. (2010). Federal criminal law and its enforcement (5th ed.). West. Abrams, N. (2011). The Distance Imperative: A Different Way of Thinking About Public Official Corruption Investigations/Prosecutions and the Federal Role. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 42, 207–741. Abrate, G., Erbetta, F., Fraquelli, G., & Vannoni, D. (2015). The cost of corruption in the Italian solid waste industry. Industrial and Corporate Change, 24(2), 439. Abreu, W. M., & Gomes, R. C. (n.d.). Shackling the Leviathan: Balancing state and society powers against corruption. Public Management Review, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2021.1893802 Abtidon, A. H. (2015). The Impact of Financial Accountability on Reducing Corruption in Mogadishu Somalia. Academic Research International, 6(2), 128–137. Abu, N., Karim, M., & Aziz, M. (2015a). Corruption, Political Instability and Economic Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Is There a Causal Relationship? Contemporary Economics, 9(1), 45–60. https://doi.org/10.5709/ce.1897-9254.159 Abu, N., Karim, M., & Aziz, M. (2015b). Low Savings Rates in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): The Role of Corruption. Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development, 36(2), 3. 3 Abu-Shanab, E. A., Harb, Y. A., & Al-Zoubi, S. Y. (2013). E-government as an anti-corruption tool: Citizens perceptions. Int. J. of Electronic Governance, 6(3). https://doi.org/10.1504/IJEG.2013.058410 Acar, M., & Emek, U. (2009). Preventing Corruption in Turkey: Issues, Instruments and Institutions. In Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity (pp. 164–188). Routledge. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992167 Acconcia, A. (2011). Tax evasion and corruption: Endogenous deterrence and the perverse effects of fines. Studi Economici : Rivista Quadrimestrale, 65(2), 31–53. Acconcia, A., D’Amato, M., Martina, R., & others. (2003). Corruption and tax evasion with competitive bribes (CSEF Working Paper No. 112). http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6664825.pdf Acconcia, A., Immordino, G., Piccolo, S., Rey, P., & others. (2009). Accomplice-witnesses, organized crime and corruption: Theory and evidence from italy. Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. https://ideas.repec.org/p/sef/csefwp/232.html Acemoglu, D. (1995). Reward structures and the allocation of talent. European Economic Review, 39(1), 17–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00014-Q Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2004). Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2/3), 162–192. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323067916 Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (1998). Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach. The Economic Journal, 108(450), 1381–1403. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00347 Acemoglu, D., & Verdier, T. (2000). The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption. American Economic Review, 90(1), 194–211. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.194 Acharya, A., Roemer, J. E., & Somanathan, R. (2015). Caste, corruption and political competition in India. Research in Economics, Journal Article. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2015.02.001 Achim, M. V., Văidean, V. L., & Borlea, S. N. (2019). Corruption and health outcomes within an economic and cultural framework. The European Journal of Health Economics : HEPAC : Health Economics in Prevention and Care. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-019-01120-8 Acht, M., Mahmoud, T. O., & Thiele, R. (2015). Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors. 4 Journal of Development Economics, 114(0), 20–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.005 Achua, J. K. (2011). Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement in Nigeria: Challenges and Competency Strategies. Journal of Public Procurement, 11(3), 323–353. Achury, C., Koulovatianos, C., & Tsoukalas, J. D. (2015). Political Economics of External Sovereign Defaults (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2631418). Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2631418 Adam, A., Delis, M. D., & Kammas, P. (2014). Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: Evidence from OECD countries. ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 15(1), 17–49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-013-0131-4 Adams, E.
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