Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan As Case Studies

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Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan As Case Studies Structure of Mobilization and Democratization: Youth Activism in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan as Case Studies by Mohammad Yaghi A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Mohammad Yaghi, April, 2015 ABSTRACT STRUCTURE OF MOBILIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION: YOUTH ACTIVISM IN TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN AS CASE STUDIES Mohammad Yaghi Advisors: Professor Janine A. Clark University of Guelph, 2015 Professor Jordi Diez Professor Francesco Cavatorta This dissertation argues for a correlation between the dynamics of the protests at their climax and the processes of democratization in case these protests succeed. Using youth activism in Tunisia and Egypt where the protests succeeded, and in Jordan where they failed as a contrasting case study, this research shows that youth activism leads to democratization if three conditions are met at the protests’ apex: domination of autonomous youth movements, an inclusive master frame (MF), and a decentralized leadership. In doing so, the research provides an atypical narrative about the role of activists during the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The primary sources that informed this research are not only based on the activists themselves, but also on the analysis of the protests videos, slogans, and documents of the youth movements. Furthermore, the research contributes to the literature on social movements in four domains. First, it reveals that the state’s use of repression and the way it uses it is a necessary condition, but is insufficient to turn a reform protest cycle into a revolution; the other necessary condition is that an autonomous opposition also must be dominant when the state uses repression. Secondly, it shows that a movement’s resources are linked more closely to its framing strategy and to its choices of the locations of the protests. Thirdly, it develops tools to measure the inclusivity and exclusivity of MFs. Finally, it provides analytical tools to study the dynamics of protests in the absence of a unified leadership. The research also arrived at three main conclusions. First, the social demands in Tunisia and Egypt were at the core of protests and poor people carried the burden of the protests. Second, activists in Tunisia and Egypt maintained unity because they did not expand on the goals of the protests. Finally, the protests in Jordan failed in part because the activists did not seek to mobilize poor Jordanians. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Janine Clark, for her excellent guidance, patience, and the time she dedicated to read and comment on several drafts. Without her support, this dissertation would have never been completed. I would like to thank Dr. Jordi Diez, who drew my attention to important literature on social movements that proved to be vital for the formulation of the research hypotheses. I would also like to thank Dr. Francesco Cavatorta, for his early important comments on the dissertation’s framework of analysis, and for helping me developing a good knowledge of the literature on civil society. Special thanks goes to Dr. Donatella Della Porta, the external examining committee member, whose comments during the defense were very enlightening. iv Table of Contents Chapter I- Literature Review and Framework of Analysis 1 Part I: Literature review 1 Youth as an Analytical Category 3 Youth in Social Movement Theory 9 Youth Activism and Democratization 18 Research Questions and Significance 31 Part II: Framework of analysis, methods, and findings 35 Relationship Between Structure of Mobilization and Democratization 36 Methodology 98 Findings 122 Chapter II- Tunisian, Egypt, and Jordan: A Brief Historical Background 128 Tunisia 129 Egypt 140 Jordan 154 Chapter III- Tunisia: Domination of AYMs at the Cycle’s Apex 164 State Repression and AYMs Domination During the CoP 167 Domination of AYMs during CoP’s apex 171 AYMs and the Resource Problem 172 Poor Tunisians and Domination of AYMs 194 Chapter IV-Tunisia: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame 204 Work, Freedom, National dignity 205 Inclusive MF 214 Deployment of Inclusive Identity 219 MF Inclusivity During CoP’s Apex 225 Testing MF Inclusivity Hypothesis 233 Chapter V-Tunisia: Decentralized leadership at the CoP’s Apex 240 Decentralized Leadership Prior and During the CoP’s Apex 241 Dynamic of Protests Under Decentralized Leadership 247 The Process of Democratization 260 Chapter VI- Egypt: Domination of AYMs at the Cycle’s Apex 275 v State Repression and AYMs Domination During the CoP 277 AYMs and the Resource Problem 286 Poor Egyptians and Domination of AYMs 297 Chapter VII- Egypt: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame 305 Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity 305 Inclusive MF 309 Deployment of an Inclusive Identity 317 MF Inclusivity During CoP’s Apex 319 Chapter VIII- Egypt: Decentralized Leadership at the CoP’s Apex 330 Emergence of Decentralized Form of Leadership 331 Decentralized Leadership During the Sit-in in Tahrir Square 334 Dynamic of Protests Under Decentralized Leadership 341 The Process of Democratization 353 Explaining the Dissimilarities with Tunisia 361 Chapter VIV- Jordan: Domination of NYMs at the Cycle of Protests’ Apex 373 Domination of NYMs Prior to CoP’s Apex 377 Reasons for NYMs Domination 382 CoP’s Apex and NYMs Domination 386 Significance of NYMs Domination on the CoP’s Apex 392 Other Explanatory Variables 398 Chapter X- Jordan: Protest Cycle Injustice Master Frame 408 Two Injustice MFs 409 Exclusive MF 422 Deployment of Exclusive Identity 428 MF Exclusivity During CoP’s Apex 433 Chapter XI- Jordan: Centralized Leadership at the CoP’s Apex 437 Centralized Leadership at CoP’s Apex 439 Dynamic of Protests Under Centralized Leadership During CoP’s Apex 444 Titular Reforms 455 Chapter XII- Conclusions and Implications 458 Bibliography 466 Appendices 491 vi List of Tables Table I-1 Relationship between youth activism and democratization, 98 Table I-2 Movements’ sample, Tunisia, 115 Table I-3 Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Tunisia, 116 Table I-4 Movements’ sample, Egypt, 117 Table I-5 Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Egypt, 117 Table I-6 Movements’ sample, Jordan, 119 Table I-7 Distribution of interviewees on movements and CSOs, Jordan, 120 Table I-8 Summary of the thesis main findings, 123 Table III-1 Incitement, social, and political slogans during the entire CoP, 184 Table III-2 Distribution of slogans according to protest periods, 185 Table III-3 Distribution of incitement slogans according to their type with examples, 187 Table III-4 Distribution of victims in Greater Tunis according to their work and place of death, 196 Table IV-1 Reasons for the uprising as described by seventy-six activists, 211 Table IV-2 Distribution of slogans between December 17, 2010 and January 11, 2011, 212 Table IV-3 Slogans that called for national unity, 216 Table IV-4 Slogans drawn from the Tunisian collective memory, 217 Table IV-5 Distribution of activists’ answers to when slogans calling for Ben Ali’s departure appeared, 227 Table VI-1 Distribution of victims in Greater Cairo on neighbourhoods, 299 Table VII-1 Distribution of Slogans that Called for National Unity, 313 TableVII-2 Slogans drawn from Egyptians collective memory, 315 Table VII-3 Reasons for not planning to topple regime during preparations for demonstrations, 320 Table VII-4 Distribution of activists’ answers of when the slogan ‘the people want to topple Mubarak’ appeared on January 25, 2011, 321 Table VII-5 Distribution of the Egyptian’s Revolution slogans, 346 Table VIV-1 Locations of protests of AYMs from January 7 until March 23, 2011, 378 Table VIV-2 Locations of protests of NYMs from January 7 until March 23, 2011, 378 Table VIV-3 Slogans on corruption, social demands, and political demands, 381 Table VIV-4 Workers protests in March for salary increase, 404 vii Table X-1 National unity and factional slogans in protests organized by Jayeen between January 7 and March 23, 2011, 425 Table X-2 National unity and factional slogans in protests organized by IAF at Al-Huseini mosque between January 7 and March 23, 2011, 426 viii List of Figures Figure I-1 Possible combinations of SOM, 52 Figure I-2 Framework of Analysis, 97 Figure IV-1 Tunisia CoP’s Injustice MF, 213 Figure VII-1 Egypt CoP’s Injustice MF, 308 Figure X-1 Jordan CoP’s Injustice MF, 421 ix Abbreviations A15M April 15th Youth Movement A6M April 6 Movement ABRI Indonesian military junta ACC Anti-Corruption Commission AYMs Autonomous youth movements CCP Chinese Communist Party CFPR Council for the Protection of the Revolution CFR Congress for the Republic CFSE Campaign for Supporting El-Barade’ CoP Cycle of protest CPC Civilian presidential council CRG Council of the Revolution Guardians CSF Central Security Forces CYR Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution Ennahda Islamic Ennahda Movement Ettajdid Ettajdid Mmovement FDTL Democratic Forum of Work and Liberties FSM Free Students Movement GFJTU General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions GIMs Grassroots informal movements GMNI Concentration of Indonesian Student Movement HAMAS Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement HASHD Jordan's Democratic People's Party HCAORDT Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objectives of the Revolution and the Democratic Transition HCCNOP Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties HCFRGPRDT Higher Commission for the Fulfillment of Revolution Goals,
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