NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

1. Paul Struye in J. A. Goris (ed.), Belgium under Occupation (New York, 1947), p.15. 2. Ibid., p. 16. 3. James H. Huizinga in B. Landheer (ed.), The Netherlands (Berkely, 1947),p. 419. Cf. also Het Verzet van de Nederlandsche Bisschoppen tegen het Nationaal-Socia• Usme en Duitsche Tyrannie (Utrecht, 1945), pp. 24, 26. 4. Onderdrukking en Verzet, Nederland in Oorlogstijd (Arnhem-Amsterdam, 1948), I, 13. Cf. also: A. Seyss·lnquart, Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden, Gesammelte Reden (Amsterdam, 1944). 5. Paul Struye, L'evolution du sentiment public en Belgique sous l'occupation alle• mande (Brussels, 1945), p. 20. All quotations which were originally in Dutch, French, or German are translated by the author. 6. J. van der Tempel, Nederland in Londen. Ervaringen en Beschouwingen (Haar• lem, 1946), p. 27. 7. James H. Huizinga, op. cit., p. 420. Cf. also L. G. Kortenhorst, Economische Samenwerking, Collaboratie en Sabotage (The Hague, 1946), p. 17 (mimeographed). 8. H. Colijn, Op de Grens van Twee Werelden (Amsterdam, 1940), pp. 43, 44, 50. 9. There is a violent attack on Colijn's 1940 writings, and on his character in general in a pamphlet written by Visser van Nieuwpoort (pseudonym): De Anti-Revolutionnaire Partij en Dr. H. Colijn (Amsterdam, 1946). 9a. Cf. P. S. Gerbrandy, Enige hoofdpunten van het regeeringsbeleid in London (The Hague, 1946), pp. 7-8, 38. 10. D. J. de Geer, De Synthese in den Oorlog (The Netherlands, 1942). 11. Mr. Linthorst Homan made these points in a private statement which sub• sequently became public. The two other leaders of the Unie, Professor J. E. de Quay and Mr. L. Einthoven, intensely disagreed with it, and as a result the Unie was almost broken up in autumn 1940. The Unie went clearly into the anti-German camp when it refused to support the "crusade" against Russia. In July 1941 the Germans forced Mr. Linthorst Homan to resign as "Com• missioner of the Queen". Soon thereafter the Unie was forbidden. Cf. De Neder• landsche Unie en haar Driemanschap (Schiedam, 1946). Mr. Linthorst Roman's statement is discussed on p. 43 and p. 64 of this booklet. Note also the inter• estmg articles in Onderdrukking en Verzet (II, 76-108) by Prime Minister W. Drees and Mr. J. G. Suurhoff. Also: Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 17-21. 12. Ibid., p. 14. On the other hand, public demonstrations on June 29, 1940, Prince Bernhard's birthday, attest that the House of Orange was still very popular. The Germans were furious about these incidents. Professor L. G. J. Verberne believes that German "correctness" in May and June 1940 accomplIshed nothing but "a sharpenmg of national vigilance .... The nation appeared nninclined to assume even a wait-and-see attitude. It had chosen, firmly and unyieldingly". (1. Valkhoff [ed.), Grondwet en Maatschapptj fn Nederland I848-I948 [The Hague, 1948), p. 148). 13. German mistakes m the handling of the occupied countries were accentuated THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION 165

by internal dissension. All the cliques around Hitler that fought for power in Germany had their representatives in the occupied Netherlands, where they tried to enlist the aid of different groups of collaborators for their own purposes. Among Seyss-Inquart's three chief lieutenants, Rauter was Himmler's man; Fischb&k represented GQring and his policy of total spoliation; Schmidt was the N.S.D.A.P. (Borman) agent, but especially obedient to Goebbels. Ribben• trop had planted his special emissaries before the invasion, where they checked on the pro-Junker German ambassador Zech von Burkersroda. The Junkers were generally influential among the occupation troops of the Wehrmacht, and especially in its intelligence agency, the Abwehr. However, the S.D., the SS's intelligence outfit, became more and more powerful, particularly after the July 1944 Putsch. During the last year of the occupation Seyss-Inquart became more or less the tool of Himmler, whose SS had successfully infiltrated the N.S.B., the Dutch Nazi party. Schmidt, the N.S.D.A.P. man, is said to have been assassinated by the SS when he was on his way to Hitler to complain about its policies. One more German clique in Holland is interesting: the "Russian Front Shirkers". They created numerous quite superfluous bureaucratic empires and played German cliques against one another, which often served to continue their obviously unnecessary assignment in The Hague. Cf. Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 352. Documentatie, status en werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen uit de Tijd der Duitse Bezetting van Nederland (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 337. Het p.,oces Musserl (The Hague, 1948), pp. liS, 142. 14. H. Bekaert, Maatschappelijke Problemen van het Incivisme (Leuven, 1946), p. 7. IS. Cf. Nieuw Nederland (The Hague), Feb. 8, 1946. 15a. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the various economic, political, and social factors which favored the growth of Fascism in the interwar period. The spirit of June 1940, and collaboration in general can only be fully under• stood in their relationship with this period. 16. In the beginning of the occupation the N.S.B. expected to be permitted by the Germans to rule Holland. For that purpose more than 40 fronts and guilds were instituted, which were to dominate every phase of Dutch life. As the Germans never allowed the N.S.B. to run Holland, most of the fronts never amounted to anything. Some of them collapsed after a few months, and several had no other members than a cadre of N.S.B. fanatics. Quite a few fronts were nothing but "hobbies" of N.S.B. bigwigs who wanted to have their own "empires". 17. In 1922, 48 parties participated in the parliamentary elections, in 1933, 54. However, of these 54 parties only 14 received one or more seats in the Second Chamber, while only 19 polled more than 10,000 votes. The Dutch Nazis attempted to make political capital out of the many factions participating in the elections. They created the myth of the hopelessly divided Dutch nation which would be saved only by destroying the party system. Actually, Dutch politics between the wars, and more so today, have been determined by about 6 major parties. This was the division of seats in the Second Chamber of 1933:

Roman Catholic State Party...... 28 Social Democratic Labor Party ...... 22 Anti-Revolutionary Party (Conservative Protestant) 14 Christian-Historical Union (Cons. Protestant) 10 Liberal State Party. . . . 7 Liberal Democratic Party . 6 Communist Party. . 4 Seven other parties. . . . 9 100 lB. Cf. Documentatie, p. B; The Netherlands, p. 129. A former resident of the Dutch East Indies recalls how "like a prince", Mus• sert was received in the Indies. "He was to speak in the Dutch club at Djokja, and all officials, including those from the native court of Djokja, were ordered 166 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

(by local Dutch authorities) to be present." (Kr. Strijd, Wat moet e, met de N.S.B.'ers gebeu,en? [Almelo, 1945], p. 2). One observer distinguished between three general types of Dutch Nazis: the Southern Netherlands type, based on Italian-Fascist, and strictly authoritarian principles (Catholic region); the North-Eastern type, especially in the agrarian province of Drenthe, where the crisis·ridden small farmers have supposedly long believed in the "Race, Blood, and Earth" myth; finally, the Western• Netherlands type, especially of the big cities, where Nazism was at first a superficial fad and later was caused by commercial (anti-Semitic?) considera• tions. (Os. H. Bardeloos, "De Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Gevolgen van de Interneering", Toellicht, 1 [1948], 29). 19. All of the following quotations are translated from 2 volumes published by the N.S.B.: L. Lindeman, Bet NationaUsme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1940). L. Lindeman, Bet Socialisme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1941). Also Dr. C. B. Hylkema - a former Protestant minister who joined the N.S.B. in 1934 - published a book about the doctrines of Dutch Fascism: Het N elle,• landsc" Fascisme (Amsterdam, 1934). Dutch Nazis contributed essays on political and other subjects to: Keu,jaar· boek I93Z-I94z (Amsterdam, 1942). 20. The leader of the N.S.B., Mussert ,wrote the following to illustrate his idea of Socialism: "One of our members told me, when he first came to me: 'I am just a peasant'. Whereupon 1 put my hand on his shoulder and answered: 'Just a peasant? You are a peasant, one of those who are responsible for the cultivation of our land, so as to provide for the needs of our people'. It is equally wrong to say: 'I am just a worker'. The liberal and marxist gentlemen, who for their own advantage preferred the struggle between classes, talked you into that. How maltreated our workers have been, how exploited, and enslaved .... In the National Socialist state the worker will regain his self-respect, ... because he will be fully conscious that his labor ... is essential for the existence of the community .... " (Het Socialisme van de N.S.B., p. 82). The greatest height of N.S.B. thinking in the economic and Socialist spheres was obviously reached with this statement: "The aim of political economy is the rational provision of reasonable needs". This point was considered "so clearly formulated that no further commentary is actually required". (Ibid., p.26). 21. Helmut Otto, Die staatspolitischen Ziele der flamischen und hollandischen Na• tionalbewegungen nach Ilem Weltkriege (Giessen, Germany, 1936), pp. 79-80. 22. Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason (New York, 1947), p. 231. Dutchmen with German family ties were in general more attracted to the N.S.B. During the occupation, persons with German relatives are said to have accepted collab• oration more readily than others. A. J. Fonteijn, "Duitsche Huisvrouwen in Nederland", Toezicht, I (1948), 134-135. Also: D. Q. R. Mulock Houwer, Psychiatrisch-Juridisch Gezelschap, Vergade• ringen op ZZ Februari I947, 6 Maart I948 (Amsterdam, 1948), p. 5. 23. Max BlokziJl. Zijn Berechting, Veroordeeling en Executie (Amsterdam, 1947), pp.26-27. 24. From a speech by Mussert in March 1934. (Bet Socialisme van de N.S.B., p. 8). 25. Mussert in the official N.S.B. newspaper Volk en Vaderland of August 14, 1934. 26. This was confirmed by the Solicitor General who prosecuted van Genechten after the Liberation. Van Genechten, zijn Berechting en Veroordeling (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 33. Van Genechten was a Flemish Belgian by birth. After 'World ~Tar I he was sentenced to death by Belgian authorities because of collaboration with the Germans. He managed to escape to the then neutral Netherlands and became a Dutch Citizen in 1930. THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION 167

27. Ibid., pp. 58-60. Van Genechten prepared this statement after the Liberation for the Dutch court which sentenced him to death because of his collaborationist activities. Van Genechten committed suicide while his case was about to be considered by the court of appeal (cassation). 27a. For the case of invasion lists of persons to be arrested had been prepared by the government. Mr. van Thiel, then Solicitor-General in the North Holland• Utrecht district, testified before the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission that about 600 persons had been on these lists, in his district. However, when in• vasion came, more than 10,000 were actually arrested in Mr. van Thiel's district alone. (Report Pa1'lementaire Enquete Commissu [The Hague, 1949], Ic, 203). 28. Cf. Docurruntatie, pp. 127-128. 29. Het Proces Musserl, p. 311. 30. Ibid., p. 39. 31. Ibid., p. 313. 32. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 33. This was admitted by the Solicitor General who persecuted Mussert after the war. (Ibid., p. 76). 34. Ibid., p. 76. 35. Germany, "Greater-Holland", Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and possibly other "Nordic" states were to be the members of this Germanic League. Hitler was to be the first president of the League, with the title of Germanic Fuhrer, while he was expected to resign as head of Germany. Mussert himself was to be the leader of "Greater-Holland" which was to be the most powerful state of the League after Germany. It was to include the Flemish regions of Belgium, the Belgium Congo, South Africa, and the Dutch colonies. The League and each of the member states were to be organized according to the leadership principle. Inspite of this, Mussert expected the member states to be self-governing except for military and economic affairs. Mussert took this project very seriously, and evidently expected that because of it Hitler would elevate him to the rank of a great statesman. (Cf. Vijf Nota's flan Musserl aan Hitler Oller de Samen• werking flan Dllitsland en Nederland in een Bond flan Germaansche Volkeren I94D-44. [The Hague, 1947]). 36. Onderdrllkking en Verllet, I, 335. 37. Het P1'oces Musserl, p. 47. 38. DOCllmentalU, pp. 7, 107,229,263,322,376-377. 39. Cf. Docllmentatie, pp. 337-341. 40. This SS group within the N .S.B. must not be confused with the military SS, or Walfen SS, which was part of the German armed forces. Himmler usually managed to get all able-bodied foreign military volunteers into his Walfen SS. Only a few of the Dutch volunteers in the Waffen SS came from the SS group of the N .S.B. 41. For example, in the Flemish part of Belgium the organization "De VIag" represented Rimmler's clique, while the more Flemish-nationalist V.N.V. was aided by the German National Socialist party. In the French speaking part of Belgium, and in France the SS was fighting hard, but not completely success• fully, to eliminate its competitor. In Norway, on the other hand, Quisling's "Natjonal Sammlung" was a tool of the SS. (Cf. Docllmentalie, p. 338). 42. The N.S.N.A.P. had been forbidden by the Dutch government in June 1939. After the German occupation, it was organized again. Dr. van Rappard received his degree at Vienna, where he had studied under the pro-Nazi economist Spann. Psychologists may find interest in the fact that Mussert married his aunt, and van Rappard his parents' German housekeeper. Cf. on the N.S.N.A.P.: DocII• mentatU, pp. 230-258. 43. Cf. for ex. Docllmentatie, pp. II, 13. Concerning the strength of N.S.B. member• Ship, cf. Onderd1'lIkking en Verllet, II, 44. 44. Laval stated during his trial: "France needed a complete hand where its destiny and life were concerned. Not a single card must be lacking in her hand. Even if the German card was uncertain, even if it was bad, France had to have 168 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

this German card in her hand, simply because it was a card". (Quoted in: Albert Naud, PourqflOf;1 n'ai pas IUjmau PUrrI Laval [Paris, 1948], p. 33-34). De Becker, a prominent Belgian collaborator, used the same defense: "From the Belgian point of view it is quite natural ... that some Belgians play the German card, anticipating German victory, and that other Belgians play the Anglo-Saxon card, anticipating an Anglo-Saxon victory. Both types of Belgians are patriots, as long as they collaborate for national aims .... " (Quoted by J. Dautricourt, La traMson par collaborat.on avec 1'_,," occupant Ie terrftoW national [Brussels, 1945], pp. 77, 78). 45. Cf. Professor P. Geijl's interesting study in which he analyses the fundamental differences between the "Patriotten" of the Napoleonic period and the Quislings of the recent war. (P. Geijl, Patriotten en N.S.Bo'ers, un historisclle parallel [Amsterdam, 1946]). 46. Verslag der werk8aamheden van de Stichting Touicht Politieke DeUnquenten (The Hague, 1948), p. 10. In July 1945 the Netherlands Institute for Statistics held a public opinion poll in the three western provinces of the Netherlands. One of the questions was: "What is the most important reason for your dislike of the N.S.B.?" An analysis of the answers showed that 21 per cent condemned the N.S.B. for its treason; 18 per cent disliked its dictatorship and terror; another 18 per cent objected to its imitation of the German system; 7 per cent had religious objec• tions; 6 per cent cited the anti-Semitic and racial theories; 8 per cent objected to the N.S.Bo's Nazi principles without giving any specific reason; 15 per cent disliked the N.S.B. men's behavior; finally 7 per cent mentioned other reasons or could give no particular motive for their hatred. The Netherlands Institute for Statistics commented: "We note that the great majority of the population actually do not know why they dislike the N.S.B. We hate the N.S.B. violently, but our motives are not clear .... Very few bothered to get acquainted with the principles and aims of the N.S.B." (B. M. Sweers, Vrije Mem'ngen in een vrij Land [Amsterdam, 1946]). 47. M. Ganshof van der Meersch, Re/lexions sur la Repression des crimes contre la surete exterieure de l'Etta (Brussels, 1946). 48. Report of the Central Bureau for Statistics, quoted in Keesings Historiseh A rchiet, October 17-23, 1948. A number of Dutch German army volunteers are still in Russian hands. Some of these were repatriated in November 1950, and another shipment is expected during 1951. 49. Cf. the number of Dutchmen who lost their citizenship as a consequence of military or state serVIce for the enemy. The official estimate of 60,000 includes about 20,000 wives, who, according to Dutch law, automatically follow the citizenship status of their husbands. (Cf. Chap. III). In May 1944 a U.S. Army source estimated that, at most, 25,000 Dutchmen had volunteered for the Eastern Front. (Civ,' Affairs Handbook, The Netherlands [Army Service Forces, 30 May 1944] section 2 a, p. 110). 50. In one established case, a few Dutch residents of Dusseldorf helped the Reiclts• wehr with the surprise capture of a rail-and-foot bridge along the Dutch• German border. (Cf. Beknopt overzieht van de krijgsverrichtingen del' Koninkll)ke Landmacht, IO-I9 Mei I940 [Leiden, 1947], p. XIV). 51. The offiCIal report of the Dutch army (ibid.), and also the Dutch army's hIsto• rian, General van Hilten (m Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 156-157), state ex• plicitly that there IS no evidence for actIvitIes of a Dutch FIfth Column in spring 1940, except in the case mentioned above on the Dutch-German border. The outstandlIlg and sobermmded statesman, Dr. van Klefiens, then Dutch MlIlister of Foreign Affairs, speaks 1Il hIS otherwise excellent Juggernaut oveT Holland (E. N. van Kleffens, Juggemaut over Holla11d [New York, 1941J, p. 126) of Dutch traitors who during the lIlvasioIl, in The Hague and Rotter• dam, "in some cases helped by their children, buili barrIcades from behmd which they shot at anyone who came 111 SIght". Dr. van Klcffens states that THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION 169

even in a few cases in The Hague artillery was used in the streets to destroy the houses of Quislings which had been turned into "regular little fortresses". Equally unfounded for that matter, were the reports about German parachutists dropped disguised as "post-men, civilians, tram conductors, or even women"; or reports about the former German maid servants "who, landing in the neigh• borhood of houses that had once employed them, made themselves useful as guides for other parachutists". (Ibid., p. 119). However, German soldiers did on several occasions use Dutch uniforms, especially those of the Royal Mounted Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee). One author suspects that German residents of Holland were responsible for minor acts of sabotage, such as light signals, to create panic. (Onderdrukking en Verzet, II, 75). 52. The Dutch army was greatly handicapped by the rumors of Fifth Column activities. Constantly, patrols had to be sent out by the already over-tired troops to investigate untrue reports of suspected shots and treacherous light signals. 53. Cf. on the Dutch Legion, the Landstorm, the N.5.K.K., etc.: Documentatie, pp. 182-185, 212, 273. 54. Documentatie, pp. 332-333. 55. A. F. G. van Hoesel, De ]eugd die wij vreesden (Utrecht, 1948). 56. About 16,000 persons died in the three western provinces during the winter of 1944-1945 as a direct consequence of nQt getting enough food. This figure does not include the various often fatal diseases which in turn were caused by the insufficient diet. (Cf. Keesing's Historisch Archie!, Oct. 17-23, 1948). During the "hunger-months" black market prices soared so high that only very few could afford them. A bread in the black market cost 40.- fI., which represented a worker's average weekly wage. A kg. of butter cost 150.- fi. (Economische en Sociale Kroniek del' Oorlogsjaren I94o-I945 [Utrecht, 1947], p.266). Cf. also: Dr. G. J. Kruyer, Sociale desorganisatie-Amsterdamtijdens de hanger• winter (Netherlands, 1951). 57. Vae Victis, ou deux ans dans la L.V.F. (Paris, 1948). 58. Mulock Houwer, op. cit., p. 11. 59. Cf. also Maandblad voor Berechting en Reclassering (1946), p. 155. The author of Vae Viais remarked that his comrades in the French Waffen 55 hated politics, and never talked about them. (pp. 78, 111). 59. G. E. Langemeijer, "Oost West - thuis best", Toezicht, I (1948),17-19. 60. Van Hoesel, op. cit., p. 23. 61. G. Th. Kempe, Misdaad en Wangedrag voor, tijdens, en na den Oorlog (Amster• dam, 1946), p. 191. 62. Psychiatrisch-]uridisch Gezelschap, p. 18. Mr. J. R. ter Horst, in an unpublished essay prepared at Utrecht University in 1949 (Het Probleem der Politieke Delinquenten), also gives a table of motives for enlistment. However, this study was admittedly superficial, and limited to only 87 cases. Although Mr. ter Horst did also consider men born before 1922, most of his volunteers were youths. These were his results: "Profiteers, in the wide sense of the word" 23 Adventurers...... 18 Economic hardships or difficulties at home 8 IdealiSln ...... 8 N.S.B. milieu...... 7 Tricked or forced into enlistment . 7 Afraid of police. . . . 5 Anti-Communism . . . 5 Victims of propaganda . 4 "Escape" motive . . . 2 87 Comparison of these results with Dr. van Hoesel's is not particularly fruitful, especially since the "profiteers in the wide sense of the word" were not too 170 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

clearly defined. Mr. ter Horst mentioned one significant fact: of the 52 married men in his group, 22 had German wives. In an article in the Belgian Rev," de droit pbull etcriminologie (1946-1947, pp. 843-855) the motives of Belgian volunteers for the German armed forces were discussed. In a fairly representative group, 68 per cent had enlisted to secure material benefits; 26 per cent were adventurers; for only 6 per cent political idealism seemed to be the dominating motive. To 90 per cent of the group enlistment had meant higher wages than they had had before; 45 per cent actually made twice as much as before. On the whole, Belgian circumstances seem to have been different from Dutch in military collaboration. In Belgium the Germans appear to have instituted more non·combat units than in Holland. In the group analyzed above only 25 per cent volunteered for combat duty; the rest went into purely guard and transport outfits. 63. Langemeijer, op. cit., p. 19. Regular and reserve officers of the Dutch armed forces who volunteered to fight for the Germans did in several cases get the death penalty. However, all of these received pardons. (Mr. J. Le Poole, letter to author, Jan. 9, 1951). In Norway, too, volunteers for the German armed forces were treated leniently. Average sentences were from three to four years, or even less. (Cf. Professor J. M. van Bemmelen's article on the Norwegian purge in the Netler14ntlsck JU"stenblatl of April 27, 1946). 64. After the Liberation one dollar was equal to 2.65 guilders. Recently the guilder dropped to 3.80. 65. Economische en Sociale Kroniek, p. 7. 66. Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 15. 67. Ibid., p. 54. 68. Ibid., p. 58. 69. Ibid., p. 159. 70. Ibid., p. 4. 71. A Belgian author believed that in today's total war and total occupation the required standards of civilian conduct should equal those of soldiers. Where the soldier is required to risk his life, the civilian should at least be required to risk internment in a concentration camp. (Cf. Jacques E. Duval, Des not.ons de contrainte morale et d''tat de necessite appliques au:.: crimes et diflits contre la suret'de I' etat [Brussels, 1945]). This view was not accepted in either Belgium or Holland. Except in one or two cases, the courts decided that if a person had been threatened with internment in a concentration camp, even military service for the enemy could be excused. Cf. W. J\I. E. Noach, De Bijllondere Rechtspleging [The Hague, 1948], p. 130). In accordance with such a View, the necessity to earn a living was always accepted as an excuse for economic collaboration. 72. Cf. Directoraat-Generaal voor Bijzondere Rechtspleging, Algemeen Voor• lichtingsrapport inzake Col14boratie (The Hague, April 1947), p. 17 (mimeo• graphed). 73. Cf. Algemee1~ Voorlichtingsrapport, pp. 8, 17. Also Kortenhorst, op. cit., p. 41. 74. Mr. Kortenhorst, President of the Dutch Second Chamber, believed that "the great majority" of Dutch employers acted on patriotic motives when they accepted German orders. (Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 49-50). Cf. the general subject of Verlagerung - this was the term used by the Germans for the placing of German orders in Dutch enterprises - in Algemem Voor• lichtingsrapporl, pp. 2-3, 7, 17-23. 75. Algemeen Voorlichtfngsrapport, pp. 3, 19,21-23. Cf. the article by a Rotterdam TrIbunal preSident In the Tijdschrift VOOI' Stra/• recht, LVI, 151. 76. Rapport over de Collaboratie in de Bowwmjverheid ill het District Amsterdam, prepared by the Polit.eke Opsporingsdienst te Amsterdam, Bureau Voorollderzoek Collaboratie (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 10. 1'\0 other figures were released by Dutch authOrities for publicatIOn. A report THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION 171

concerning the occupation attitude of the Dutch steel industry, for example, was never made public. 77. lbill., p. 11. 78. Revue de dl'oit plftal et crinrinologu (1946-1947), p. 840. After the liberation one dollar equalled 44 Belgian francs. 79. A public opinion poll, held in summer 1945, asked the Dutch public to judge the resistance attitude of different occupational groups. The answers were put into the following table:

Conduct rating (percentage) Classes rated Good Fair Bad

Doctors .. 96 3 Priests and preachers. 92 7 1 Students 87 12 1 Public servants 35 46 19 Workers .. 30 48 22 Judiciary . 20 40 40 Manufacturers . 12 44 44 Contractors . 3 19 78

(The Nethel'lands during Gef'man Occupation, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [Philadelphia, 1946], p. 178). The medical profession only accepted a minimum of German coercion. At one time 90 per cent of Dutch physicians handed in their resignation as a protest against a Nazi measure; as a result of this the Germans admitted defeat, and gave up Nazification attempts. The medical profession as such was probably least dependent on the occupier's favors. According to Professor Romein, "it has been established that, generally speaking, students behaved themselves better than professors". (Ibid., p. 172). The low opinion of the judiciary was probably connected with the Dutch Supreme Court's reputation of weakness. This is discussed in Chap. IV. Inexplicably, farmers were not included among the groups considered in the poll. 80. J. Dautricourt, L'arlicle IIS du code pinal et la I'epression de la col'abOl'ation Iconomique (Brussels, 1945), p. 18. Kempe, op. cit., pp. 154-155. 81. Vef'slag Stichting Toe6icht, p. 12. 82. Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 24-26. 83. Keesing's HjstOl'Ssch Al'chiel, Oct. 17-23, 1948. 84. Cf. on German pressure to Dutch workers: Documentatie, pp. 38-40, 333-334. 85. The N ethel'lands during the German Occupation, pp. 4-5. Cf. the Solicitor-General's curt remarks during the Mussert trial. (Het Pl'oces Mussm, pp. 77-78). 86. Ondel'drukking en Ver6et, I, 402. 87. "It is certain that by sticking to the posts of command ... many high officials were able to sabotage cleverly the enemy's plans, even if they did have to submit often .... It can be said that in the great majority of cases, Belgian officials of all ranks practised in this way a policy of intelligent resistance." (Minister Struye in Belgium undel' Occupation, p. 23). 88. Cf. a brochure by Dr. K. J. Frederiks, who before and during the occupation was the secretary-general of the crucial Ministry of the Interior. (K. J. Frederiks, Op de BI'BS I94D-I944, Overncht van de Werk6aamheden aan net Departement van Binnenlandsche Zaken gedurende de OOl'logsjaren ['s-Gra• venhage, 1945]). Mr. A. L. Scholten - unlike Mr. Frederiks a person whose "purity" was doubted by no one after the Liberation - is of the same opinion. Mr. sCholten was 172 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

secretary-general of the Ministry of Labor (Sociale Zaken) before and after the invasion; he resigned, however, as early as July, 1940. (Onderdrukking en Verlet, I, 402). 89. The Aanwijlingen and the Commentary of 1943 are cited in ibid., pp. 389-394. 90. Ibid., pp. 386, 396-397. 91. L. G. Kortenhorst, Was Samenwerking met den Vijand geoorloofd? ('s-Graven- hage, 1945), p. 30. 92. Mr. Bosch Ridder van Rosenthal in Onderdrukking en Verset, I, 385. 93. Mr. H. M. van Randwijk in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 383. 94. Reported in the Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant, Jan. 23, 1946. 95. Cf. Mr. A. L. Scholten in Onderdrukking en Verlet, I, 403. 96. Handboek Militair Gezag (London, April 1945), pp. 24-25. Statistics indicating the number of civil servants who resigned during the occupation or were fired by the Germans were not available. 97. In Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak (Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle) II, p. 77, mention is made of a man who admitted delivering 40 Dutch Jews to the Germans, at five guilders a head. 98. According to a public opinion poll, held in late 1947, informers [verklikkers] were regarded as the most disgusting type of collaborators. (Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek, Opinie Onderzoek inzake Bestraffing van Politieke Delinquenten [The Netherlands, 1948]). Mr. J. Le Poole estimates that thousands of Dutchmen acted as "men hunters" and informers. (Letter to author, Jan. 9, 1951). 99. Not only sexual relations, but also movie-dates and dancing with Germans was considered taboo. Cf. on the Danish girl friends of German soldiers: Grete Hart• mann, The Girls They Left Behind (Copenhagen, 1946). The majority of the girls interviewed by Miss Hartmann preferred German soldiers to Danes be• cause they were more courteous and had better manners. (Ibid., p. 61).

CHAPTER II

1. Verslag Stichting Toelicht, p. 10. Noach, op. cit., p. 6. 2. An authoritative history of the organization and work of the Dutch resistance remains to be written. The resistance actually consisted of hundreds of separate groups, divided according to regional or functional purposes. For example, persons who worked On the escape lines for Allied pilots frequently knew little about "pilot helpers" in other areas, or about local groups engaged in other types of resistance, such as active sabotage, military espionage, hiding of Jews and slave labor evaders, and falSIfication of documents. Often, there were further subdivisions according to religious, political, or occupational lines. For example, in one small town in the province of Gelderland there was a Calvinist and a Catholic pIlot-escape group, with practically no contact with each other. It cannot be emphasized enough that thIS extremely decentralized form of organization provided the only possible protection against German methods of infiltration. Resistance groups usually grew spontaneously around two or three charter members. They were difficult to organize from above, as was experienced by Allied officers who were dropped to speed up or reorganize escape lines. Holland was one of the few countries where the resistance was not dominated by the Communists, or at least the more leftist parties. Calvinist-conservatives, conservative and progressIve Catholics, and others shared the risks of the underground struggle together with the Social Democrats and the few Dutch Communists. 3. Maandblad voor Berechting en Reclassering (1947), p. 37. The same opinion was expressed by Professor van Bemmelen in "Het Buitcn• gewoon Straf- en Tuchtrecht", Tijdschrifl van Strafrecht, LIV (1946), 138. Also by Mr. H. ]. "VoltJer in lnleidingen, Gehouden in de Openbare BiJcmkomst THE MASS ARRESTS OF COLLABORATORS AFTER THE LIBERATION 173

rn&n 1tet Landelijk ComiU _ Rechtsllekerheitl 01' Sl5 October I948 (The Hague, 1948), p. 31. Cf. also Ofler_lIt der WerklllUlm1Jeden flan 1tet Mflitair GesAg, I4 September I944 - 4 MlUlrl I946 (The Netherlands, 1947?), p. 259. 4. Noach, 01'. cit., p. 1. 5. VerslAg flAn de Werk1lAllmMden flAn de Verlr01lwensflUlnnen der Regenng (The Hague, 1946), pp. 3-4. 6. The letter is quoted in Ha Verla flan de NederlAndsclie Bisschoppen, p. 295. The Protestant churches made similar appeals. (Toe_lit, II, 105). 7. On May 4, 1945 a pro-Nazi policeman was shot by a pro-resistance policeman, as he was about to be arrested by a resistance patrol. (Cf. Dutch press of April 26, 1946). This is one of the few confirmed cases of lynching of the Liberation period. A few attacks, mostly against released collaborators, took place later. For example, on January I, 1946, a Dordrecht industrialist, who had just been released, was killed by unknown persons, presumably ex-resistance men. (Algemeen HandelsblAd, January 3, 1946). Similar attacks in early 1946, in Zwijndrecht and Maastricht, failed. (De Tijd, January 4, 1946; De WlUlrheitl, February 1\, 1946). In March 1946 a conditionally released Quisling was shot, but not killed, at Leiden. (Het KompAS, March 16, 1946). The most spectacular Dutch affair of lynch justice involved an army officer and a few soldiers, all ex·resistance men. On December 5, 1946 - the traditional Dutch SinterkllUls holiday - they delivered bombs, wrapped as presents, to supposed collabora• tors. These bombs killed one suspected Quisling and three innocent bystanders. 8. G. M. Nieuwenhuis, De StAd IUIn llet SplUlme in Zeven Eeuwen (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 442. 9. Gordon Wright, Tile Reshaping of French DemocrACY (New York, 1948), p. 58. Wright mentions further that French Rightists "inflated the number of rough• and-ready liquidations" to 80,000. (Ibid.) 10. Bekaert, 01'. cit., p. 23. 11. VerslAg StichUng Toe_lit, p. 10. Cf. also Kempe, op. cit., p. 149. 12. The impact on the liberated peoples of the German concentration camps can hardly be exaggerated. The newspaper reports and pictures, and above all the stories - and physical appearances - of the returning survivors, confirmed conditions which even the most pessimistic had not expected. While everybody in the occupied countries knew that horrible brutalities were taking place in the camps, nobody appears to have suspected the systematic horror of German cruelty. (Cf. Struye, L'IIIoltltion dll sentiment public, p. 12). For example, as late as autumn 1944, Dutch Jews, on transport to the East, do not seem to have realized that they were going straight to the gas-chambers, instead of being "resettled". (Cf. H. Wielek, De Oorlog die Hitler Won [Amster• dam, 1947], pp. 323, 324, 350. Of 110,000 Dutch Jews, only 5,000 managed to escape extermination). When Belgium was liberated, in September 1944, about 50-70,000 suspected collaborators were arrested. By May I, 1945 the number of arrestees had declined to 39,640, as a result of releases. However, after VE day, and - as is reported - mostly because of the indignation of Belgians over the substantiated reports on the concentration camps, another 20,000 collaborators were arrested. (Cf. Prof. van Bemmelen. in NederlAndsch JllristenblAd, of November 10, 1945. Also: Revue de droit penal a crimmoZogie [1946-1947], pp. 924-925). 13. Oflerllicllt Militair GesAg, pp. 257, 260. 14. The B.B.S. will be more fully discussed in Chap. III. 15. When a famed "horizontal collaborator" reappeared in the city of Terneuzen, on June 7, 1945, the popular reaction threatened to become violent. Probably this was the only incident of its kind in Holland which required Allied troops to restore order. (Cf. Ofler_lIt Militair GesAg, p. 314). The Norwegian government at first did not want to include the "Germans' wenches" in the mass arrests. However, public indignation was so great that frequent riots and beatings occurred. Therefore, about 1,100 girls were interned belatedly. "This ... was merely a safety device. There are no punishments for the sexual relations which Norwegian women may have had with the enemy 174 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

soldiers." Many of the girls could be released after a few months. (Yearbook of the Northern Associations 0/ Criminalists, 1944-1945 [Stockholm, 1947], p. 28). 16. The third "general mandate" is quoted and discussed in the Algemene lnstructie VOO1' de Binnenlandse St,ijdkrachten (Southern Netherlands?, 1945), pp. 46-57. 17. Overllicht Militair Gelag, p. 311. 18. Cf. on the three arrest-phases: Algemeene Inst,uctieBinnenlandseStrijdkrachten, pp. 29-31, 36-41, 60. Also: Overllicht Militair Gelfag, pp. 258-259. 19. For administrative purposes the P.O.D. belonged to the Direct01'aat Generaal VOO1' Bijllondere Rechtspleging. This was a new sub-department of the Ministry of Justice; it dealt with all affairs concerning collaborators. After the Special Courts were organized, the five SolicitorS-General [Procurcurs-Fiscaal] became the immediate bosses of the P.O.D. The name of the P.O.D. was later changed to P.R.A. [Politieke Recherche Ajdeling]. 20. Cf. the statement by the Ministers of Justice and War, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Aanhangsel, 1945-1946, pp. 77, 95. 2\. Cf. on the difficulties in setting up the camps: Verslag van de Paste Commissie VOO1' Pl'ivaat- en Strafrecht omtrent Belloeken aan I nterneeringskampen VOO1' Politieke Delinquenten, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1945-1946, No. 212, and 1947-1948, No. 631. Also: Overzickt Militair Gellag, p. 267. The same problems arose in Belgium: cf. Nederlandsch Juristenblad (1945), p. 319. 22. Handelingen Tweede Kamel', 1945-1946, No. 212, pp. 3, 5-6, and 1947-1948, No. 631. 23. "Om de Ziel der N.S.B.'ers," Weekblad Hervormde Kcrk, June 23, '1945. 24. Ds. van Wijhe, Het Kamp te Vugkt (Den Bosch, 1945). Ds. Kr. Strijd, op. cit. 25. In many cases both parents were arrested, and sometimes they took their children along. About 20,000 children were left behind after their parents' arrest. For 12,000 of these foster homes were found; 8,000 had to be put into special shelters and camps. (Verslag v.h. Bureau Bijz. Jeugdzorg v.d. 7e Afdeling v.h. Ministerie van JustiUe [The Hague, 1950J, p. 9). 26. The reports of the Vliegende Brigade (mimeographed) are available at the Modderman Stickting, Leiden. 27. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1945-1946, No. 212, pp. 6-7. 28. Handelingen Tweede Kamel', 1947-1948, No. 631, p, 15. 29. Dr. H. W. van der Vaart Smit, Kamptoestanden I944-' 45-' 48, Rapport (Haar• lem, 1949). 30. One of van der Va art Smit's stories was proved false in court (d. daily press of October 5, 1949). Cf. also Mr. J. Le Poole in Toezicht, II (May-June 1949),25, 29. Note also van der Vaart Smit's ridiculous appearance before the Parlemen• taire Enquete Commissie (Vol. II c, pp. 278-284). 31. Minister Wijers, Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 1948-1949, p. 489. 32. Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken, as quoted in the Nieuwe Courant (The Hague), January 28, 1950. 33. De Linie, May 28, 1948. 34. De Gooi- en Eemlander, September 26, 1947. The last two newspapers are cited by van der Vaart Smit. 35. Mr. J. Le Poole, one of the most farsighted Dutch authorities in these matters, asked: "Are the brutalIties ... mainly a result of the discharge of pent-up sentiments, or can they be explained mainly by the fact that the M.G. con• tained potentially all the dangers and moral faults of a dictatorship?" (Toezicht, I [November 1948J, 126). 36. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1945-1946, No. 212, and 1947-1948, No. 631. 37. lnterneeringsregeling 1946 (Decree G 310, of November 8,1946). Note especially articles 9, 20, 21. 38. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1945-1946, No. 212, p. 18. 39. A farm laborer, ex-guard at a camp for Quislings, was given a prison term of three months for havmg participated m brutalitIes against a prisoner who had consequently died. At the same tllllC a nurse was given a sentence of 200 guil- THE MASS ARRESTS OF COLLABORATORS AFTER THE LIBERATION 175

ders or 40 days in jail for having used emitic medicines to punish two sick prisoners. (NievwII Courant, February 25, 1950). In 1950 the former commandant of the internemt camp "Carel Coenraadpolder" received a prison sentence for nazi-type cruelties, committed by him from 1945-1947 against Quislings. (Telegraaf, August 11, 1950; Nieuwe Courant, December 22, 1950). 40. Cf. Oflersielrt MiUtair Geug, p. 260. 41. This is stated by Mr. H. J. Woltjer, a high official in the Ministry of Justice. CInleidingm, Landelijk Comitl floor RIIChtslleker1uid [1948], p. 31). 42. Cf. Chapter V for a discussion of the legal quality of the laws against collab• orators, decreed in London and The Hague without the aid of Parliament. 43. The district-courts at Amsterdam and The Hague admitted in May 1946, and February 1947, that the ordinary juqge was not permitted to give an opinion concerning the validity of a collaborator's arrest. (Noach, op. cit., pp. 98-99). 44. Cf. statement by Mr. Bijlsma in Second Chamber. (Handelingm Tweede Kamer, December 19, 1945). 45. The so-called Besluit Politieke Delitlljuenten. 46. Whenever in this study the term Solicitor-General is used, one of the Solici• tors-General [Procureurs-Fiscaal] at the five Special Courts for collaborators is meant. 47. The Besl"" Politieke Delinquenten mentions a further ground for release. Because of its very limited scope and general vagueness, it is not mentioned here. (Cf. Noach, op. cit., p. 103). 48. Term used by Noach, op. cit., p. 98. 49. Mr. Bijlsma, Handelingen Tweede Kamel', December 19, 1945. 50. Handelingm Tweede Kamer, 1945-1946, No. 212, p. 17. 51. "Those who were able ... to pay for a lawyer ... had a tremendous advan• tage over the 'little man', who often was among the least guilty." (Nederlandsch ]umtenblad [1947], p. 487). Although lawyers were provided at no charge to those who could not afford them, most of these so-called Pro Deo lawyers had hardly time to prepare their cases. Often, a lawyer had his first contact with the accused a few moments before the trial! (Ibid.) The 100,000 arrested Quislings, and the 300,000 dossiers prepared agaiust non• arrestees, provided lawyers with an unparalleled load of cases. The purge, and court proceedings against the many "economic" criminals (black marketeers), made the post-war years a boom period for Dutch lawyers. Many Quislings complained about high fees demanded by lawyers, and about the little time these devoted to each case. In one instance, a "judge of appeal" (Hoge Autori• teit) refused to confirm a sentence because the lawyer, instead of defending his client, "had acted more like a prosecuting attorney". (Tribunalm in Neder• land, Vol, II, p. 204). On the other hand, lawyers of Quislings often received little cooperation from court officials, and the P.O.D. During the period following Liberation the public blamed - and even threatened - lawyers for accepting the defense of collab• orators. Also, the bad transportation situation in the Netherlands in 1945, and early 1946, prevented lawyers from having closer contact with interned clients. Representatives of the resistance charged that "certain lawyers were under• taking the defense of Quislings because of inadmissible, financial motives". Therefore, spokesmen of the resistance suggested that the Special Courts should prepare panels of lawyers who alone were to be permitted to defend Quislings. In addition to the special courts and boards, special Parquets, and special police organs, "special lawyers" were needed, supposedly. The Ministry of Justice was not willing to accept this suggestion. (Cf. Witboek flan de Grote Adflies• Commissie der IUegaliteit [Amsterdam, 1950], p. 191). 52. By December 1948, the P.O.D. (P.R.A.) had made investigations on 451,735 cases. (Verslag Sticlrting Toellicht, p. 11). Several P.O.D. investigators, and even section heads were convicted of cor• ruption and other crimes. (For example, the ex-chief of the P.O.D. in Rotter• dam. Cf. Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant of February 6, 1950). 176 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

Many P.O.D. investigations were notoriously confused and superficial. Complete dossiers were lost. Sometimes, two dossie'fs were erroneously made on the same person and gave a completely different impression of the accused. (Prof. van Bemmelen in Nederlandsch juristenblad [1947], pp. 17-18). 53. Mr. H. J. Woitjer, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 54. Some critics pointed out that the Solicitors-General were just as busy as the judges. Instead of appointing assistants to the Solicitors-General, these critics believe that more judges should have been appointed to grant releases. (Cf., for example, Mr. Bijlsma, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, December 1945). In France, Commissions de Verification were set up to consider pre-trial releases, and arrests of Quislings in general. A commission consisted of a resistance re• presentative, a police investigator, and a judge [magistrat]. The commissions were to verify the legality of each arrest, immediately after the suspect had been taken into custody. (P. H. Doublet, La collaboration, l'epuration, la confiscation, les reparations aux fJictimes de l'occupation [Paris, 1946], pp. 33-34). Similar commissions were used in Belgium. (Nederlandsch juristenblad [1945], p. 301). It is difficult to say how well such commissions worked in practice. If one believes the memoirs, written by an anonymous, supposedly innocent, victim of the French mass arrests, these measures were none too affective. (Prisons de l'epuration [Paris, 1948]). 55. Cf. "Episodes uit het Leven en Werken van een Oppermachtig Heerser" Toezicht, December 1949, pp. 123-125. 56. Decree H 206, of July 31, 1947. 57. Noach, op. cit., pp. 99, 103. According to a law passed late in 1950 innocent victims of the mass arrests could be granted a compensation of up to eight guilders for each day of internment. (Keesings Historisch Archief, October 8-14, 1950). It has been estimated that not more than 500 persons would be eligible for benefits under this law. (De Tijd, Dec. 23, 1950). 58. Note the lengthy discussion about looting and confiscations in the Second Chamber, on December 4, 1947. (Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1947-1948, p. 627). It was charged, for example, that the administration of temporarily confiscated estates was often handed by the government to business compet· itors. It is certain that due to red tape delays estates were often returned to Quislings years after they had been released. Cf. for statistics on official confiscations: Toezicht, II (September-October 1949),91-92.

CHAPTER III

1. The reasons for inst;tuting separate courts for collaborators are discussed in Chapter V. 2. Decree D 62 (Besluit op de Bijzondere GerechtshofJen); decree D 63 (Besluit Buitengewone Rechtspleging). 3. However, action against ordinary judges was taken by the Supreme Court. The Crown deCIded on dismissals of the judges of the Special Courts. It would have been more logical to have given this power to the Special Court of Cassa• tion. (d. Noach, op. cit., p. 32). 4. Cf. Prof. D. van Eck, Het Misdrilf van Hulp aan den Vijand (Utrecht-Nijmegen, 1945), p. 24. 5. The accused could also appeal if the case had previously been sent back to the Special Court by the SpeCIal Court of Cassation. 6. Noach, op. cit., p. 26. Also in certain matters of procedure the accused had fewer rights in the Special Court than in the ordinary courts. 7. In Denmark, too, opportumties of QUIslings to appeal were limited to expedite hearings. ("Danish Purge Laws", The Journal 01 Criminal Law and Criminology, November-December 1948, pp. 454-455). 8. Nteuwe Courant (The Hague), May 1,1950. JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST COLLABORATORS 177

9. Decree D 61. 10. "No act can be punished unless by force of a valid penal provision preceding it." 11. Cf. Chapter V. 12. Cf. Chapter V. 13. The Danish law against crimes of collabOration, of 1945, created "new" crimes, and inflicted, retroactively, more severe penalties, including reintroduction of the death penalty. ("Danish Purge Laws", pp. 452-454). 14. Denmark introduced a special retroactive law against informers ("Danish Purge Laws", p. 453). Danish informers could be sentenced to death even if arrest of the person betrayed by them had not actually taken place. Prof. Noach believed that the Dutch law should have similarly provided for the death penalty in all cases of betrayal. The fact that a betrayed person survived the concentration camp had nothing to do with the more or less evil intentions of the informer. (Noach, op. cit., pp. 146-147). 15. Belgium and France introduced such provisions into their codes during the recent war. Professors van Bemmelen ("Het Buitengewone Straf- en Tucht• recht", Tijdschri/t flan Stra/recht, LIV [1946], 142) and Noach (op. cit., p. 151) thought that the maximum term of 15 years was far too low for such detestable criminals. The properties of Jews and political persecutees were often" acquired" by these profiteers. 16. In Dutch military justice the death penalty was never abolished. However, executions were limited to cases where the security of the state demanded it, and only during actual war. 17. Reported in Ell/mers Weekblad, November 3, 1945. 16. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1946, pp. 177-176. 19. Professor Hazewinkel-Suringa, "De Doodstraf", Tijdschri/t flan Stra/recht, LV, 2-23. Noach, op. cit., pp. 30-31. ' 20. Nieuwe Courant, December 11, 1946. Many Dutchmen protested when in early 1951 the death sentences of two famed German war criminals - Aus der Fiinten and Fischer - were changed to life-prison terms, by use of the Minister of Justice's power of pardon. Both Germans had played prominent roles in the persecution and deportation of Dutch Jews. The fact that the rules for the granting of pardon were kept secret also caused much criticism. (Keesings Historisch Archie/, Feb. 25-March 3, 1951). In Belgium, 4,170 collaborators were sentenced to death from 1944-1947. Of these, only about 230 had been actually executed by December 1949. Of the 4,170 death sentences, 3,193 were again~t volunteers for the German armed forces. (Nieuwe Courant, December 16, 1949). In Belgium, executions of collaborators were open to the public, and sometimes more than a thousand persons attended the "show". (Neder• landsch Juristenblad, 1945, p. 320). In Denmark, 23 Quislings had been executed by April 1946. ("Danish Purge Laws", p. 460). 21. The maximum fine was 100,000 guilders, which could be exceeded if the accused had enriched himself as a result of war and occupation. 22. The forfeiture of a Quisling's properties could be decreed. This was ordered frequently where the accused had obtained goods in illicit transactions. Also, if the accused had kept the use of his radio, bicycle, or car by belonging to the N.S.B., these were usually confiscated by the Special Courts. 23. Professor van Bemmelen, "Het Buitengewone Straf- en Tuchtrecht", Tijd· schri/t flan Strajrecht, LIV (1946), 145. 24. Many contractors were not excluded from their job, for the benefit of the Dutch reconstruction effort. 25. J. D. van den Berg, Herseel in Rechten fJan Politieke DelifllJUilnUn (Zwolle, 1949), p. 16. 26. This caused some complaints. It was not understood why ex-collaborators should be exempted from the tough campaigns against the Indonesian national• ists. Two per cent of the potential recruits in 1945 were deprived of the right to serve in the armed forces. (Ibid., p. 37). 27. Ibid., pp. 24-26. Dutch Quislings 12 178 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

28. Cf. the decision of the Special Court of Cassation of September 16, 1946 (Na• Oorlogsche Rechtspraak No. 840), and the circular letter by the Minister of the Interior of April 24, 1948 (cited in Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1948, p. 704). 29. Noach, op. cit., pp. 47-52. 30. Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 1948-1949, p. 489. 31. Also those who entered German service as minors (below the age of 21), did as a rule not lose their citizenship. 32. At least, this was the interpretation given to the "Decree on Enemy Properties" by the court concerned, the A/deling Rechtspraak van de Raad voor lut Rechts• herstel. This interpretation has been frequently criticized by the Stichting Toe• lIicht. Two categories of Quislings were treated as enemy nationals for prop• erty purposes although they had not been deprived of their Dutch citizenship: those who had entered German military service as minors (see previous note), and those who had been in German "public" service (see above, p. 66). 33. See the (official) Staatscourant of June 7, 1949 (No. 108). 34. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 190. 35. Het Vaderland, April 10, 1951. 36. Toencht, I (December 1948), back cover. 37. Wet Overgang Bijllondere Rechtspleging, November 26, 1947. 38. Cf. Professor Jonkers' article in the Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 669. 39. Keesings Historisch Archie/, April 1(}"16, 1949. 39a. According to a statement by the Minister of Justice, the Special Court of Cassation and the special chambers of the district courts would complete their work in 1951. (Keesings Historisch Archie/, September 24-30,1950). 40. Noach, op. cit., p. 37. 41. D. van Eck, op. cit., p. 26. 42. Cf. for example: Tribunalen in Nederland, III, p. 75. 43. G. J. de Lint, Rechtsbeder/ (The Hague, 1948), p. 60. 44. Mr. Mulder and Mr. Veen, "Zuivering", Tijdschri/t voor Stra/recht, LV (1946), 43. 45. Toelichting to Ontwerp Tribunaalbesluit, p. 2 (mimeographed). 46. Mr. Mulder and Mr. Veen, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 47. Cf. R. van Oppen in Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, November 24, 1945. 48. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 157. 49. In a few cases Quislmgs dld go before two courts. For example, one man was sentenced by a Tribunal for his membership in both the N.S.B. and "fronts"; for hls service in the Dutch Legion in Russia, the accused was referred to a Special Court. (Tribunalen in Nederland, 1945-1946, pp. 67-68). 50. At the end of 1947 the Mlmster of Justice stated that there were 7,200 cases left, sUItable for Tribunal trial. However, he said that 5,700 of these were really Special Court overflow cases. (N ederlandsch ] uristenblad, Bijvoegsel 502, p. 718). 51. In Holland lawyers very rarely become judges. Therefore the lawyer-judges of the Tribunals were often condemned: "Lawyers, who are temporarily judges and wlll have to judge past and future chents or opponents ... , should not be part of the 'sitting magistrature' of a rechtstaat". (Elzeviers Weekblad, November 11, 1947). 52. Tribunaal Besluit, Article 11. 52a. Lay Judges were known in Holland in the pachtkamers, courts where tenant farmers can dispute matters concerning the lease of their land. In the pacht• kamer the judge is assisted by lay judges, experienced in the problems of tenant farmers. Also the substitute of the Justice of the Peace [Kantonrechter• plaatsvervangerJ may be a non-jurist. 53. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 335. 54. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 220. 55. The lack of umformlty of Tnbunal sentences caused much criticism. Cf. Chap• ter V. 56. Noach, op. cit., p. 95. 57. This last clause referred to war tune deserters and tax evaders outside occupled Holland. JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST COLLABORATORS 179

58. NedMlandscll juristenblatl, 1946, p. 430. 59. Mr. Mulder and Mr. Veen, op. cit., p. 43. 60. Tribuft4len ilf Netlef'lalftl, Nos. 261, 283. 61. Tribuft4len ilf NedMlalftl, Nos. 307, 470a. 62. Tribuft4len ilf NedMlalftl, No. 259. Cf. Noach's discussion on "wittingly" (op. cit., pp. 67-70). 63. A Hoge Autoritett interpreted this "openly" to apply "if a person expresses his opinion in terms that can be understood by everybody, orally or in writing, even if the opinion is actually expressed only to one, or a few persons". (Tribulflum ilf Netlerlalftl, No. 526). This interpretation made possible conviction of persons for pro-enemy opinions expressed in intimate conversations and private letters. In practice, the Tribunals hardly ever acted in such cases. 64. Noach, op. cit., p. 62. 65. Cf. for example Netlerlalftlscll juristelfblatl, 1947, pp. 152-153. In Denmark mere membership in the Danish Nazi party was not punished. ("Danish Purge Laws", p. 459). Professor van Bemmelen appeared to oppose the penalizing of the "politically wrong state of mind". (1. M. van Bemmelen, "The Treatment of Political Delinquents in Some European Countries", jourtJal of Cr.mi1lt1J Sc;e1Ice, Great Britain, 1948, p. 122). 66. Article 3, Tribunaal Baluit. The Minister of justice specifically confirmed this. (Netlerlandscll juristelfblatl, Kamel'dukkm No. 470, p. 42). In one case a Tri• bunal decided not to give a prison term to an 84 year old man, who had been in pre-trial arrest for nine months. The judges stated that in view of his age, effective re-education could not be expected. (Tribu1lt1Jelf m N etlef'lantl, 1945- 1946, p. 34). A Hoge Autoriteit remarked that - strictly speaking - incorrigible collaborators should not have been interned at all, as re-education could not be expected of them. (Tribunatelf in NedMlalftl, No. 376). 67. Among the conditions imposed could be supervision by the SUcllUng Toellicllt (cf. Chap. VI); the prohibition to have relations with certain persons, or to join certain clubs, or to attend certain meetings; the obligation to do work, or to do certain work; the obligation to stay in a certain locality; the duty to pay certain fines. The prohibition to associate with certain persons or groups of persons always referred to possible neo-Fascist groups. (A Hoge Autoriteit refused to approve a sentence in which the accused was forbidden to associate with all ex-collaborators. [Tribunalm in Netlerlalftl, IV, p. 103]). The obligation to do certain work usually affected girls, who were assigned as maids to especially needy households. If an imposed condition was not obeyed, the prison term had to be served. 68. Only a few items of personal clothing, etc., were excluded, according to articles 447 and 448, Wetboek lIan Burgeriijke Reclltsllortlering. 69. This policy was not always followed. One rich farmer was fined 10,000 guilders - in addition to having undergone internment - merely for having been a N.S.B. man, and for having used this party affiliation to keep his radio. The Tribunal argued that membership in the N.S.B. of a rich and well known man was much more impressive than the same act committed by an unknown man. Besides, the Tribunal mentioned that the accused had an estate of 60,000 guilders, and no family. However, no profiteering seems to have been involved. (Sentence of the Tribunal chamber at Almelo, of December 13, 1946. Tribunatelf .n Netlerlalftl, III, pp. ~4). 70. The following figures include about 200 sentences pronounced by the justices of the Peace, the successors of the Tribunals. 71. Nteuwe Rottertlamse Courant, August 3,1948. The Minister of justice announced in September 1950 that the justices of the Peace would complete their Tribunal activities in 1951. 72. Therefore, it was suggested that all remaining Tribunal cases be transferred to the Special Courts, or to their successors. (Professor j onkers, N etlef'landsch. juristenblatl, 1947, p. 673). 73. de Lint, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 74. Often, nothing else was heard during sessions of the Tribunals than the defense 180 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

plea, possibly preceded by an interrogation of the accused. Witnesses and experts were frequently heard only in the non-public pre-trial examination. (R. van Oppen, in Nederlandse" /lIrislmlllad, 1945, pp. 333-335). Furthermore, the contact between the accused and his lawyer could be limited on fairly vague grounds. (Cf. the policy laid down by the Minister of Justice in the official SlIIatseolWant, 1946, No. 103). 75. Mr. H. J. Woltjer, a high official in the Ministry of Justice's division for collab• oration affairs, was of the same opinion. (Inleidmgm, LanUlijif Comitl flOOI' RechtS!lle1ferluJd, I948, p. 33). 76. Noach, op. cit., pp. 20, 63. Professor W. Pompe, Een'ge Aspeclm flan "et PoU• ti,lfe Stra!reeht (Utrecht, 1947), p. 10. 77. Nederlandse" /uristenlllad, 1949, pp. 150,220-221,269-271,332-334. 78. The 120 Tribunal chambers could decide about 2,000 cases a month. It should be noted that lay judges only worked part-time. (Noach, op. cit., pp. 16,20-21, 104). A law of July 31, 1947 attempted to increase the speed of Special Courts. It reduced the number of judges from five to three, permitted oral sentences, and gave a single judge the authority to decide cases involving prison terms of six years or less. However, this law was not very effective. The single judge method was little used. (Noach, op. cit., pp. 34, 36-37. Hatuielingen Tweede Kamer 1947-1948, p. 619). It has been estimated that ordinary Dutch courts and the special courts for collaborators worked with approximately equal speed. (ToeDeht, I [1948], 5). 79. In August 1946 ex-resistance men held a widely attended meeting in The Hague, under the slogan "first justice, then mercy", to protest mass releases. (Trouw, August 9, 1946). A public opinion poll in August 1946 determined that only 59 per cent of Dutchmen were in favor of immediate release of "light" cases of collaboration. Opponents of release could be found chiefly among workers and orthodox Protestants. Catholics seemed most willing to forgive. (Parool, September 13, 1946). 80. Noach, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 81. Bes'uit Politielfe Delinquenten 1945. 82. Verslag Stic"ting Toezieht, p. 17. Noach, op. cit., pp. 105-106. Hooge AutOt"itei Amsterdam, Tribunalen in Nederland IV, p. 209. 83. These were the same conditions which could be imposed by Tribunals in con• ditional sentences. 84. Verslag Stiehting Toezicht, p. 17. Noach (op. cit., p. 107) gave a somewhat different number. 85. Noach, op. cit., p. 108. 86. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 16. 87. A total of 127,000 Dutchmen were estimated to have been temporarely deprived of the right to vote by Special Courts, Tribunals, or out-of-court-settlements. 92,000 lost the right to serve in the armed forces, and 95,000 lost the right to hold government jobs. (Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 15). 88. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 18. 89. Van den Berg, op. cit., p. 12. Toellicht, II (1949), 93. 90. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 14-15. 91. Ibid., p. 17. 92. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1946, pp. 201-202, 364-365. 93. Cf. the editorial in the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, August 17, 1946. "94. In March 1949 Parliament protested severely when a famed war criminal, J. H. L. Munt, was given an out-of-court-settlement. The Minister had to promise that in future all war crimmals and other serious cases would be sen• tenced by a court. (Nieuwe Courant, March 18, 1949.) However, there was little objection to settlements given young volunteers for the German armed forces. 95. Mr. F. Hollander, "Episodes Ult het Leven en Werken van een Oppermachtig Heerser", Toezicht, II (1949), 125. Belgium and Norway used vanous forms of out-of-court-settIements. In Bel- THE OCCUPATIONAL PURGE BOARDS 181

gium, in more serious cases, a judge and two representatives of the resistance had to approve each settlement made by the Parquet. (Netlerlantlsch Jtwisten• blail, 1945, p. 317). 96. Toelieht, II (1949), 125. Persons against whom accusations of collaboration had been put forward, but who were found to be innocent by the Solicitor• General, were administered in one of two ways: if they had been arrested, they received a pre-trial release and an unconditional settlement. If they had not been arrested, the Solicitor-General usually dropped their case from his files and took no action whatever. 97. Toe.icht, I (1949), 176. On December 18, 1950, 1,829 Dutch Quislings were still arrested. Of these, 120 had for various reasons not yet been sentenced; only 24 were serving Tribunal sentences, and the remainder Special Court sentences. Of the 1,829, only 71 were born after Jan. I, 1923. (De Tijd, Dec. 23, 1950). According to official statistics, 3,965 Quislings were still in Belgian prisons in August 1950. (Keesings Historisch Archie!, Nov. 12-18, 1950).

CHAPTER IV

I. In this study, "purge" has been used to include all proceedings against collab• orators, including those meted out by occupational Purge Boards. "ZuilJering" has been used to refer to action by Purge Boards only. The Dutch sometimes use "ZuilJering" to include Special Court and Tribunal action. 2. Minister van der Leeuw, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, February 20, 1946. 3. Handelingen Eerste Kamer, March 6, 1947. 4. Van Eck, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 5. Handboek M.G., p.24. 6. "Zuivering", Tijdschri/t IJOOf' Stra/recht, LV, 47. 7. The presence of collaborators in industry, for example, was a continued cause of unrest, and even violence. (OlJer8icht M.G., pp. 115,372, 513-514, 537). 8. "Zuivering", Tijdschri/t 1J00f' Stra!recht, LV, 48-50. During the occupation, an "underground" pamphlet had advocated separate purge boards for all occupational groups. It was argued that only judges who were familiar with the circumstances of each group could administer such a purge. ("T.D.", ZuilJmng en IUegaliteit [printed in occupied Netherlands in early 1945], p. 10). 9. France used occupational Purge Boards, primarely in industry. One writer justified their existence because of their speed, which enabled them to operate faster than the Special Courts and Cllambres CiWques, the French equivalent of Tribunals. (P. H. Doublet, Commerce avec "ennemi pendant "occupation; epuraRon des entrepNses [Paris, 1945], p. 18). 10. This was the explanation offered in the Overlieht M.G., p. 91. Cf. discussion of the early problems of the civil service purge: OlJerlieht M.G., pp. 91-106. Also: Handboek M.G., p. 28. 11. From the Napoleonic occupation, the Netherlands kept a centrally organized administrative machine. All mayors, and the "governors" of the eleven pro• vinces - the "Commissioners of the Queen" - are appointed by the Minister of the Interior. However, elected provincial and local assemblies exercise cer• tain powers, and provide a very considerable degree of local self-government. 12. The ZuilJmng-Decree of 1944 is not discussed here, because it was seldom applied. 13. In the Netherlands there are "neutral" grade schools, high schools, and univer• sities, run by the government. In addition, there are "special" denominational schools and universities. These are government-financed, but privately operated. However, the government supervises their standards of education. 134. H. J. D. Revers, "Het Zuiveringsbesluit 1945", in Weekblad VOOf' Gemeentebe• langen, September 14, 1945, pp. 123-124. 182 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

14. The pre-war Parliament was purged by a special five-man commission. This commission consisted of the vice-president of the Council of State, the pre-war presidents of the Second and First Chamber, and the presidents of two resistance commissions. (Decree No. F 131, of August 2, 1945). The Dutch Parliament did not meet during the occupation. 14a. Civil servants who could not be charged with any of the crimes of this decree could still be firec.i: a decree (No. F 70, later No. F 221) made it possible to get rid of those who failed to inspire the confidence required in connection with their function. The actual handling of cases under this decree was shrouded in secrecy. 14b. No details could be found concerning the composition of this advisory com• mission. According to Mr. J. Le Poole, it was "decidedly, not a resistance-com• mission". (Letter to author, Jan. 9, 1951). 15. Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 407. 16. Overzicht M.G., p. 164. 17. Van Eck, op. cit., p. 13. 18. Toezicht, I, 156. 19. Van Eck, op. cit., pp. 11-13,21. 20. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 51. Toezicht, I, 58. 21. Cf. van Eck, op. cit., pp. 13-14. Also in France judges were at first purged by ordinary civil service Purge Boards. This was changed after April 15, 1945, when special boards for judges were instituted. (Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1946, p. 72). 22. No. F 242. 23. This included the Solicitor-General of the Hooge Raad. 24. In one case, a judge was dismissed for having temporarily been a functionary in a minor Fascist party. However, he was permitted to be court-clerk [grittier]. (Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak, I, p. 177). 25. Pro-Nazis were never in the majority on the Hooge Raad. 26. I.e. the Landoorlogsreglement of 1907. 27. Cf. Mr. L. H. K. C. van Asch van Wijck, in Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 511. 28. Ibid., pp. 511-512. 29. Prof. R. P. Cleveringa, in De Hooge Raad, Antwoord aan Mr. N. C. M. A. van den Dries (Amsterdam, 1945), pp. 20-22. Cf. also:Prof. R. P. Cleveringa, "Telders Geschriften over Volkenrecht", De Gids, 1949, pp. 36-64. 30. L. G. Kortenhorst, Was Samenwerking met den Vijand geoorlootd? (The Hague, 1945), pp. 18-19. 31. Cf. Vrij Nederland, October 27, 1945. 31a. However, the appointments of Mr. Smits and Mr. van den Dries as vice·presi• dents of the Hooge Raad again caused protests from resistance circles. (Witboek van de Grote Advies-Commissie der Illegaliteit, pp. 172-173). 32. For a full discussion of these categories, cf. Revue de droit penal et criminologie, 1946-1947, pp. 876-878. 33. Van Bemmelen, "Treatment of Political Delinquents", p. 125. 34. "Danish Purge Laws", Journal ot Criminal Law and Criminology, November• December 1948. French policies are discussed in Doublet, La Collaboration, pp.23-24. 35. Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak III, p. 285. 36. Revue de droit penal et criminologie, 1946-1947, p. 878. 37. For a discussion of the private Purge Boards, cf. "Zuivering", Tijdschritt voor Stratrecht, LV, 55-58. Many of the workers dismissed by private boards could have claimed that their dismissal was illegal, for it was not based on one of the grounds for dIsmissal specified by Dutch law and union-contracts. During the first weeks after the Liberation no "impure" worker thought it wise to insist on his legal rights. Later, the government provided legislation offICIally permitting discharge of disloyal workers. (Decree No. E 157). The same decree granted workers the right to leave pro-Nazi employers, even where this was not in accord with their contract. THE OCCUPATIONAL PURGE BOARDS 183

38. Ofle1'lIicht M.G., p. 115. "Zuivering", Tijdschri/t flOO1' Stra/recht, LV, 55-58. 39. Decree No. F 160. 40. French industrial Purge Boards consisted of 12 judges: a jurist presiding judge; 2 resistance representatives; 3 union representatives; 2 "technical" represent• atives (including 1 engineer); 1 employer; 3 persons from the same branch of industry as the accused. These French boards prosecuted not only the leaders of industry, but also workers and lower employees. French conditions made private boards impossi• ble. (Doublet, Commerce avec l'ennemi, pp. 18-24). 41. In the latter case, a completely new set of judges had to sit on the Purge Board. 42. Quoted by permission of Mr. J. B. W. P. Kickert from the two confidential reports of the Central Purge Board of July 1, 1946, and January 1, 1947. 43. Mr. J. B. W. P. Kickert, personal interview, 1949. 44. N a-001'logsche Rechtspraak, III, p. 283 ff. 45. Mr. Kickert, personal interview, 1949. 46. Professor van Bemmelen, "Treatment of Political Delinquents", pp. 125-126. 47. Landelijk Comitt voor Rechtszekerheid, Inleidingen (The Hague, 1947), p. 24. 48. After 1947, if Tribunals or Special Courts considered economic collaborators, they usually imposed the job-suspension penalty which the Purge Board would have suggested. (Mr. J. M. C. Romeijn, Landelijk Comite flOor Rechtszeke1'heid, Inleidingen [The Hague, 1948], p. 39). 49. Usually, the special economic branch of the P.R.A. assembled dossie1's and forwarded them to the Solicitor-General of the district. The Solicitor-General selected appropriate cases and sent them to the Central Purge Board. The Central Purge Board, in turn, distributed cases to the various Purge Boards. 50. This was especially true where big companies were concerned .(Cf. the report of the Central Purge Board, July 1, 1946, pp. 10-11, 14). 51. Fiscal measures against Quislings were severe. The "property increase tax" [Vermogensaanwasbelasting] took away all increase of property during the occu• pation, above all illicit gains of black marketeers and collaborators. The Dutch financial reform of September 1945 - probably the most thorough and most severely enforced measure of its kind on the continent - caused all banknotes to be turned in and temporarily froze all bank accounts. This made difficult use of Quislings' funds. Additional measures, such as the registration of stocks and bonds, and decrees against simulated transactions involving illicit funds, had similar effects. Although certain Quislings undoubtedly managed to salvage some of their loot, it was indeed difficult for them to do so. 52. Documentatie, pp. 318-319. In Belgium, too, the great popular demand for the German-controlled newspapers was noted. (Struye, l'evolution du sentiment public, p. 45). Movies, although full of direct and indirect German propaganda, were more popular than ever during the occupation. (Documentatie, p. 319). 53. Documentatie, pp. 320,323. However, according to Mr. J. B. Th. Spaan (Onder• drukking en Ve1'Jlet, II, 135, 146-147) there were considerable internal struggles in German press matters in Holland. Supposedly, Dutch editors and journal• ists could at times exploit jealousies between the following factions: Propa• ganda Ministry (Goebbels); Reichspresseche/ Dr. Dietrich; the Foreign Ministry; the O. K. W.; Himmler. Mr. Spaan believes that until early 1942 Goebbels had most influence; after that Dr. Dietrich's representative, Dittmar, became most powerful. 54. Ibid., p. 324. 55. Ibid., pp. 325-326. 56. Ibid., p. 316. 57. Revue de droit pinal et criminologie, 1947-1948, pp. 227 228. 58. During the last years of the war the resistance press grew increasingly impor• tant. A great many daily and weekly papers - often of large circulation - were secretly printed (or mimeographed) and distributed. The Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation, in Amsterdam, has a remarkable collection of these "underground" newspapers. 184 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

59. Decree No. E 69. 60. Duermltt M.G., pp. 119-120. 61. Decree No. F 177. 62. The ordinary courts enforced such suspensions. In January 1950, for example, a prison term of three months was demanded for an excluded journalist who had published an article. (Nieuwe Courant, January 13, 1950). 63. Decree No. H 211. 64. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., p. 23. 65. Case of the Nieuwsblad lIan /Jet Noorden, March 9, 1948. A few sentences of the Board of Appeal for the Press are available at the Modderman Stichting of Leiden University. (Korl Oller/sicltt ]urisprudentie, typed). 66. Case of Het Leidsch Dagblad, April to, 1948. 67. Case of the Zeisler Courant, March 30, 1948. 68. Case of the Algemeen Handelsblad, May I, 1948. 69. Case of the Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, March 9, 1948. 70. Case of the Zieriklleesche Nieuwsbode, April 8, 1948. 7t. Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, June 2,1946. 72. HandelSngen Eerste Kamer, 1946-1947, p. 425 (6) (Bijlagen). 73. Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 1946-1947, p. 725 (11). 74. Personal Interview, 1949. 75. Cf. the purge of the French press: Noel Jacquemart, Quatre ans d'histoire de la presse francaise (Paris, 1948); Jean Mottin, Histoire politique de la presse (Paris, 1949). 76. A. Thomas, quoted in National Zeitung (Basel), December II, 1947. 77. Life, February 28, 1949. 78. New York Herald Tribune (Paris), March 7, 1949. The Partisan Review of May and June 1949 carried several articles on the Pound-Bollingen prize question. 79. ]e Maintiendrai, November 23, 1945. 80. Ibid. 8t. As late as autumn 1947 the performance by the Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra of a recent composition by Richard Strausz ("Metamorphosen") caused violent protests. It was claimed that the work in question had been dedicated to Hitler, that its composer had been a Nazi, and that the sacrifices of the resistance would have been in vain if such pieces were played. (Cf. the Groene Amslerdammer in October, 1947). In January, 1951, the engagement of the Dutch-born, but German-naturalized Paul van Kempen as conductor of the Amsterdam Concerlgebouw Orchestra caused trouble. At one of his first concerts in Amsterdam a tremendous uproar started in the concert hall, followed by throwing of stench bombs; then, sixty• two members of the orchestra walked off the stage, as protest agamst van Kempen. Also in The Hague van Kempen's appearances were interrupted by loud protests and even tear-gas. Ex-resistance associations, and a special committee of protest - including among its supporters Professors G. van den Bergh, N. A. Donkersloot, and J. M. Romein - charged that van Kempen, as a German CItizen, had never been cleared by a Dutch purge board. Furthermore, he was accused - but this point does not seem clearly established - of having participated in German cultural propaganda m the occupied Netherlands. The AffaIr van Kempen was complIcated by long standmg difficultIes between management and musicians of the orchestra, and by thorough CommunIst exploitation of the whole issue. (Cf. the Dutch press, and also Daniel L. Schorr's articles In the New York Times of Feb. 4 and Feb. 25,1951). 82. Overzicht M.G., p. 117. 83. Decree No. G 84. 84. Exclusion terms were VIOlated 111 only a few cases. In January 1950, Jo van Ammers-Kuller, probably the most famous excluded Dutch author, was accused of having had a book published whIch had been WrItten under a dIffer• ent name. (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, January 16, 1950). Mrs. van Amlllers• Kuller was cleared of thIS charge in March, 1951. The court stated that It was THE OCCUPATIONAL PURGE BOARDS 185

not established that she had received any kind of payment for the book in question, and that therefore there was no evidence that she had exercised her profession of author during the period of exclusion. (Het VadMland, March 19, 1951) 85. Cf. Mr. Goedhart's speech in the Second Chamber (February 20,1946). 86. Decree No I 228. 86a. According to one estimate, about one thousand Dutch artists were considered by the purge boards. (Nuuwe Courant, Dec. 28, 1950). 87. Mr. Wendelaar, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, February 20, 1946. Mr. A. van der Ent (secretary of Central Purge Board), personal interview, 1949. 88. Na-Oorlogsche Recntspraak, II, p. 512. 89. "The ... exceptional qualities of ... [Mengelberg], his fame, and the limit• less admiration for him ... developed his vanity and sense of superiority to such an extent that he considered himself above the normal standards of behavior .... Therefore, he thought that he could sacrifice all interests - even those of the Dutch people in its desperate resistance against the occupier - to his music: he failed to realize that there were higher aims than the satisfaction of the artist's personal musical passion." (Central Purge Board, Na-Oorlogsche Rechtspraak, IV, p. 54). 90. Membership in the Nederlandsche KuUuurkamer was obligatory to all those who "participated in the production, the reproduction, and the publication of 'cultural' goods", unless this consisted of purely "commercial, adminstrative, technical, or mechanical tasks". The KuUuurkamer, the product of Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda, was not effective at all. Its activities were on a limited scale; artists who refused to join merely had to interrupt public appearances. Actually, other German organizations - the SS intelligence service (the S.D.) and the office of paper rationing - were preferred by the Germans to super• vise Dutch cultural life. Also, other German "fronts" competed with the KuUuurkamer: the Nederlandsche KuUuurkring, and the Nederlandsche Kul• tuurraad. (Documentatie, pp. 145, 148-149, 166-169). Membership in the Kultuurkamer was not punished after the Liberation, neither by Tribunals and Special Courts, nor by artists' Purge Boards. (Mr. A. van der Ent, personal interview, 1949). However, resistance circles condemned KuUuurkamer members, unless they acted like Dr. Roland-Holst, Holland's outstanding poet. He accepted membership, but at the same time wrote a letter to German authorities stating that by doing so he submitted to a German police measure. C'est Ie ton qui fait la musique. In Onderdrukking en Ver:ret (II, 510) Prof. N. A. Donkersloot protests against the post-Liberation tendency to underestimate the potential danger of the KuUuurkamer. lie points out that its aim was complete nazification of Dutch cultural life, and concludes - with much justification - that without Dutch resistance against the KuUuurkamer, it could have done tremendous harm to the nation. 91. F. W. Blase (ed.), Studenten onder de Besetting (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 15. 92. Ander In:richt - De StudentenfJerklaring onder de Loupe (Delft? 1945?), p. 5. 93. Immediately after the Liberation there was even a tendency to exclude children of collaborators from grade schools and high schools. The M.G. had to instruct school authorities that children of Quislings were not to suffer for their parents' acts, and that youths below fifteen years were not to be held responsible for their political opinions. Still, in some instances "impure" children had to be excluded, as otherwise the "pure" children would have stayed away from school. (OfJer:richt M.G., p. 113). School teachers were purged under the ZuifJering• Decree for government employees. The N.S.B. had managed to attract a num• ber of the most poorly paid grammar school teachers, the so-called Kwekelingen met aete. (Verslag Stichting Toe:richt, p. 50). 94. ]aarboek der RijksunifJersiteit te Leiden, 1945-1946, Vol. II, 88. 95. Published in the (official) Staatscourant, No. 58, August. 30, 1945. Amended in Staatscourant No. 115, November 20, 1945. Q6. ]aarboek Lei-den, 1945-1946, Vol II, 89. 186 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

97. Almanak LMdsch Studenten Corps, 1949, pp. 108-109. However, purge policies at Leiden University seem to have been more lenient than those at other universities, inspite of the fact that Leiden had been a center of student resistance. (Dr. J. G. Sauveplanne [secretary of Purge Board at Leiden University], personal interview, 1949). 98. Ander Inzicht, p. 3. 99. Professors were purged according to the Zuivef'ing-decree for government employees. It has frequently been noted that the resistance attitude of Dutch students was better than that of professors. (Cf. the statement by the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences in Studenten onder de Bezetting, p. VII). 100. Cf. Ander Inzicht, a pamphlet published by "signers" from Delft University. 101. Cf. the editorial in the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, January 7, 1946. 102. Minister Gielen, letter to Second Chamber, December 13, 1946. 103. The usual punitive measure applied by occupational Purge Boards consisted, as we have seen, of suspending the accused from his occupation. The Tribunals and Special Courts also could do this. Although many persons faced both a Purge Board and a Special Court or Tribunal, only few conflicts took place be• cause of parallel powers of job-suspension. Whenever a person had previously been sentenced by a Purge Board, the Tribunal or Special Court would take no further action on job-suspension. If an accused was first judged by a Tribunal (or Special Court), the decision of job-suspension would usually be left to the Purge Board, if it concerned a person for whom a Purge Board existed. (Noach, op. cit., pp. 88-89). A few jurisdictional conflicts did occur. For example, the Tribunal at Almelo, supported by its Hoge Autoriteit, claimed that it was permitted to suspend a journalist. The Purge Board for the Press argued that it alone had this power. (Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1948, pp. 709-711). When the Special Court of Cassation suspended a Protestant minister for a period of ten years, it was argued that such a decision should have been left to the purge authorities of the church. (Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1949, pp. 203-204). 104. Elzeviers Weekblad, December I, 1945. 105. Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1946, p. 238. 106. Kortenhorst, Was Samenwu'king met den Vijand Geoorlootd? p. 45. 107. Elzeviers Weekblad, December I, 1945. 108. December 7,1945. 109. "Lack of publicity [openbaal'heid] is an evil of the entire Zuivering (Minister van der Leeuw, Second Chamber, January 22, 1946). Cf. the long, but fruitless discussions on Zuivering in the Second Chamber in January and February 1946. (HandeUngen Tweede Kamer, pp. 314-386,571-585).

CHAPTER V

1. "There has been no logically defended opposition against Staatsnoodrecht. Although in a few newspapers and periodicals statements appeared which attacked Staatsnoodrecht as legally unsound, this opinion was not further elaborated." (Noach, op. cit., p. 11). 2. I nleiding tot de Studie van het N ederlandsche Recht (Zwolle, 1948), p. 65. This pre-war standard textbook has been brought up to date by Professor Lange• meyer. (The original author of this book, Mr. L. J. van Apeldoorn, could not be mentioned on its title page or cover, because he had been a Quisling). 3. R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlalldsch Staatsrecht (Haarlem, 1947), I, 448-449. 4. Quoted by Noach, op.cit., p. 7. 5. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 6. "To camouflage blatant violations of the Constitution, the concept of Staats• noodrecht was introduced, which is just another way of saying that Might comes before Right." 7. A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnoodrecht en Democratie (Alphen, 1947), p. 23. Cf. also the same author: Staatsnoodrecht en Rechtstaat (Alphen, 1946). REACTIONS TO THE PURGE 187

8. R. Kranenburg, "Staatsnoodrecht", Tijdschrift voor Overheidsadministratie, 1946, p. 89. D. van Eck, op. cit., p. 34. A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnood• reeht en Democratie, p. 23. 9. Noach, op. cit., p. 11. 10. Ibid., p. 8. 11. R. Kranenburg, H et N ede,landsch Staatsrecht, II, 23. Cf. also the sentence of the Special Court of Cassation of December 5, 1945. (Na-Oorlogsche Reehtsp,aak No. 150). 12. Professor Duynstee (Noach, op. cit., p. 14); A. A. L. F. van Dullemen, Staatsnoodrecht en Democratie, p. 23. 13. In World War I the Belgian Parliament authorized the King and his Cabinet to issue decrees, having the force of laws, in connection with the war effort. 14. Report Parlementaire Enquete·Commissie, Vol. II a, pp. 75-75. 15. Ibid., pp. 75-77. 16. Ibid., Vol. II c, pp. 395-396. For similar reasons the government in 1922 had refused to consider a proposal to add an emergency clause to article 21 of the Constitution. (P. J. Oud, Ret Constitutioneel Recht van het Koninkrijk de, Nederlanden [Zwolle, 1947], 1,98). 17. R. Kranenburg, "Staatsnoodrecht", Tijdschr#t IIOor Ove,heidsadministratie, 1946, p. 89. 18. I nleiding tot de Studie van het N ederlandsche Recht, p. 225. 19. M. W. Mouton, Oorlogsmisdrijven en het Internationale Recht (The Hague, 1948), p.409. 20. Pompe, op. cit., p. 18. Cf. also Professor Jonkers in Nederlandsch juristenblad, 1948, p. 45. 21. Noach, op. cit., pp. 28-29, 2-3. 22. G. Russel, De Londense Besluiten in het Licht van Staatsnoodl'echt (1948),48-49. De Lint, op. cit., pp. 21, 49. 23. Tijdschri{t voor St,a/,echt, LIV, 143. 24. Revue de droit penal et criminologie, 1947-1948, p. 969. 25. journal of Criminal Science, 1948, p. 116. 26. Noach, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Nederlandsch ju,istenblad, 1945, p. 302; 1946, p. 277. 27. "Danish Purge Laws", pp. 448-449. Nederlandsch juristenblad, 1947, p. 51. 28. Dautricourt, La Trahison, pp. 215-216. 29. Quoted by Prof. Franz Neumann, Behemoth (New York, 1944), p. 445. 30. Noach, op. cit., p. 3. Kranenburg, Ret Nederlandsch Staatsrecht, II, 32. Neder- landsch juristenblad, 1947, p. 701. 31. "Danish Purge Laws", p. 454. 32. Professor Jonkers, Nede1'landsch jU1'istenblad, 1948, pp. 42-43. 33. De Lint, op. cit., p. 42. 34. "Doodstraf en Cassatie bij de Bijzondere Rechtspleging", Tijdschrift voor Stra/,echt, LV, 188-190. Nederlandsch juristenblad, 1945, pp. 334-335. 35. Tijdschri,ft VOO1' Strafrecht, LIV, 140. Nederlandsch ju,istenblad, 1947,65; 1946, 275. 36. "The difference in punitive measures decreed by different Special Courts and Tribunals, or even by different chambers of the same Tribunal, is so great that any notion of applying objective judicial standards seems to have fallen into disuse." (Nederlandsch juristenblad, 1947, pp. 217-218). The masses of arrestees, the limited possibilities of appeal, and the "protection" granted economic collaborators for reconstruction purposes contributed to the lack of uniformity in sentences. Furthermore, the Tribunals were supposed to be "people's courts", and therefore followed public opinion with its gradually less severe attitude towards crimes of collaboration. Consequently, sentences immediately after the Liberation were invariably much more severe than those after 1947. (Noach, GP. cit., p. 23). Also, it was noted that Tribunals in the Catholic provinces of Brabant and Limburg tended to be less severe than those in, for example, the orthodox Protestant province of Zeeland, corresponding to different regional ideas about the seriousness of collaboration. (Mr. Woltjer, 188 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

Landelijk Comill voor Rechtuekerheid, I nleidingen, t 948, p. 33). The provinces of Brabant and Limburg had been liberated in September of t 944, and thus had been spared the extreme hardships and brutalities of the last seven months of the war. Less severe sentences against Quislings in Brabant and Limburg can partly be explained by this. Fortunately, many disproportionately severe sentences were corrected by pardons, or early-release rules [vervroegde invrijheidstelling]. 37. Pompe, op. cit., p. t 1. 38. Noach, op. cit., p. 165. 39. Toellicht, I, 45. 40. H. A. Lunshof, Vlag Haltstok (Amsterdam, 1948), p. 8. 41. H. M. van Randwijk, De Held en de Rovers (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 8. 42. Verslag Stichting Toellicht, p. 56. 43. The press must also be held responsible for many public misconceptions regard• ing Quislings. Many observers noted that the Dutch press as a whole has served poorly in matters relating to the purge, with superficial, inexpert, sensationalized, and even malicious reports. (Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp.53-54. Professor Kempe, op. cit. p. 190. Board of Editors, Nede1'landsch JU1'istenblad, 1949, p. 237. Professor van Oven, Nederlandsch Juristenblad, 1947, pp. 150-153). Furthermore, the truly staggering costs of the purge surely did not increase its popularity. Professor Duynstee estimated that in 1946 Holland was spending 5 per cent of its national income on the purge. (Je Maintiendrai, May 24, 1946). 44. G. Russel, op. cit., p. 50. 45. Het Kompas, September 14, 1946. 46. H. A. Lunshof, Moderne Inquisitie (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 23. In February, March, and April of 1950 Mr. Lunshof wrote eight lengthy articles in the Telegraa/ about injustice and irregularities supposedly committed in the purge-action against P. N. Menten, a Dutch business man who resided in Poland from 1918-1943. In his characteristic style Mr. Lunshof described this "af fair", in which he found "crystallized all elements of injustice which dominated the Netherlands since the Liberation .... " 47. Cf. Chap. VII. 48. Mr. J. E. van der Starp, Een Dolkstoot in de Rug van het Nedel'landse Yolk (Dordrecht, 1950), p. 37. In March 1951, Mr. van der Starp faced court action for libel in connection with another of his violent brochures. The court psy• chiatrist found that at the time of the writing of the brochure van der Starp "was not fully responsible mentally [verminderd toerekeningsvatbaar], as a resul t of the difficult times he had had in his youth". (Het Vaderland, March 7,1951) 49. Cf. Verslag Stichling Toezicht, p. 24. 50. This statement was made by a Social-Democratic ex-resistance man in the Nieuwe Courant of January 15, 1949. For a detailed account of resistance criticism of the purge, see Witboek van de Grote A dvies-Commissie del' Illegaliteit, pp. 152-196. 51. On "lampistes", cf. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. c~t., pp. 80-81. 52. Zuivering en Illegaliteit, p. 14. 53. One author charged that also the London government had been affected by a rage to reform, and accordingly issued decrees which failed to correspond to pre-war laws and practices. (Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1946, pp. 122-124). 54. Mr. Stokvis, Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1948-1949, p. 622. 55. Ibid., 1947-1948, p. 612. 56. De Waarheid, June 28, 1946. 57. Pompe, op. cit., p. II. 58. Toezicht, I, 88. 59. Nederlandsch ]uristenblad, 1947, p. 272. 60. Pompe, op. cit., p. 42. 61. The Parhamentary Commission of Inquiry revealed that Dutch authorities ill London had expected a rapId hberation of the entire Netherlands, and had never antIcipated the sItuation that actually developed after the Allied defeat at Arnhem. (Nieuwe Courant, December 17, 1949). RE-EDUCATlON AND RETURN INTO SOCIETY 189

CHAPTER VI

1. Article 1, Interneef'ingsf'egeling 1946 (Decree No. G 310). 2. Vef'slag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 21-22. 3. Handelingen Tweede Kamef', 1945-1946, No. 212, p. 15. 4. Cf. Noach, op. cit., pp. 80-81. 5. Gerda de Bock, Incivisme en Repf'essie (Antwerp, 1946), pp. 54-56. Miss de Bock reported that only 20 per cent of the women in the camp felt guilty. 30 per cent believed to have acted properly; the majority, being "care• ful", admitted only that they had been "uncareful" during the occupation (p.55). Most collaborators regarded themselves as losers, delivered to the victor, but not as criminals facing their judge. Many Eastern Front volunteers argued that their only mistake had been one of timing, and that instinctively they had tackled the real problem. (Vae Victis, p. 226). Also the Judicial Commission of the Second Chamber found that most internees failed to realize their guilt. (Handelingen Tweede Kamef', 1945-1946, No. 212, p. 15; 1947-1948, No. 631, p.12). 6. Toesicht, I, 32. 7. Revue de df'oit penal et cf'iminologie, 1949, p. 382. 8. Cf. Overzicht M.G., pp. 141, 516. 9. "However paradoxical it may sound, the [Judicial] Commission believes that ... [collaborators] would be cured sooner in free society .,. than in internment camps." (Handelingen Tweede Kamef', 1945-1946, No. 212, pp_ 15-16). 10. Vef'slag Stichting Toexicht, p. 34. 11. Handelingen Tweede Kamef', 1947-1948, No. 631, pp. 3, 9,12. 12. Ibid., p. 9. 13. J. Le Poole, "Naar Kampen zonder Prikkeldraad", Vf'ij Nederland, November 22, 1947. 4. Cf. Toellicht, I, 113-116; II, 153-155. A related experiment took place at "Westpolder". (Toezicht, I, 101). 15. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1947-1948, No. 631, p. 10. Internees in the mining-camps sent home as much as 140 guilders a month - about ten times as much as those in ordinary internment camps. (Ibid.) In Belgium, too, Quislings were permitted to volunteer for underground work in the mines. 16. Ibid. Toellicht, II, 152-153. 17. There have been a few rather queer schemes which - along the lines of Mussert's pre-war plans for Dutch Jews - advocated forced deportation of Quislings to outlying colonial areas. According to one pamphlet, all N.S.B. members, all other Quislings, and large-scale black marketeers were to be shipped to the Indies. (Tichelman and Alting von Geusau, N.S.B.-Deporlatie naaf' Oost en West [1945]). A Communist member of the Second Chamber advocated forced deportation of "heavy" and "medium-heavy" collaborators to outlying areas• like Siberia, he did not fail to add. (Mr. Stokvis, Handelingen Tweede Kamef', 1947-1948, pp. 615, 624). In practice, forced deportation of Quislings was never seriously considered by the government or the Dutch public. 18. Toezicht, II, 34, 163. 19. Cf. on the East Indies projects: Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 54-55; Toellicht, I, 151, and II, 162-163; the special report by the Stichting Toezicht of June 21, 1947 (mimeographed). Technically speaking, each volunteer was given a conditional release when he boarded ship for New Guinea. The condition in each case was that he would faithfully execute the terms of his labor-contract with the Dutch East Indies government. 20. Toezicht, II, 156. 190 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

21. Technically speaking, there were two kinds of camps for youths: those of the Directoraat-Generaal flOor Bijllondere Rec'lltspleging, and the many "open" te1luillen of the Bureau Bijllondere Jeugihorg. The latter only contained youths who had been granted a conditional settlement or a conditional release. The condition in each case was "residence" in the camp. The last of these camps closed on Jan. I, 1950. (Cf. Verslag flan lIet Bureau Bijllondere Jeugihorg flan de 7e Aldeling flan lIet Mmisterie flan Justme [The Hague, 1950]). 22. Van Hoesel, op.cft., pp. 2-3. Throughout the following pages, dealing with re-education of young collaborators, Dr. van Hoese!'s unique study has been used. 23. Program of the Nederlandsc1l-Belgfsc1le Bijeenkomst flan C'fmmologm, Septem• ber 11-12, 1948, p. 4 (mimeographed.) The educators of the youth-camps appeared wholeheartedly devoted to provide the atmosphere of the traditional Dutch home. Mr. Huysmans, the director of Hutlle Ollem at Noordwijk, opened his own study to the young men after working hours. Entirely unscheduled discussions were started there, which seemed to be very useful. 24. Van Hoesel, op. eft., 182, 129. 25. Reflue de d,oft pinal et c,iminologie, 1949, p. 372. This emphasis on the demo• cratic milieu, rather than on direct political indoctrination, was also advocated by the Paetlagogfsc1le Commissie flan Bijllonde,e Jeugihorg for the province of North-Holland. This commission conducted an inquiry among educators on this question. Only two, out of twenty-two, were in favor of "direct, conscious, rational indoctrination by means of lectures, debates, etc." (Maandblad floor Berecllting en Reclasse,ing, 1946, pp. 114-119). The Judicial Commission of the Second Chamber saw little value in direct political education, because the internees - after having been fooled by Goebbels - were cynical about any kind of propaganda. (HandeUngen Tweede Kamer, 1947-1948, No. 631, p. 12). Miss de Bock, too, noted that merely rational arguments could as a rule not convert Quislings, since Nazi ideas were rooted too deeply in their most intimate emotions. Miss de Bock suggested holding direct discussions only on the most basic principles of citizenship. (De Bock, op. cit., pp. 63-64). 26. Van Hoesel, op. cit., pp. \13-\14. Children of parents who had become Nazis during the occupation for purely opportunist reasons hardly felt guilty. "The occupation had usually been for them and their parents a period of glory. With pride and longing they remembered the privileges they had enjoyed formerly, and above all the 'high' position which their father held in the party or elsewhere. After all, among their parents were many who had risen rapIdly during the occupation. [For example], a movie usher had become an inspector for the motion-picture guild; ... both of his sons hated having to face his demotion after the capitulation. Therefore, they sighed: 'We never had it so good .... ' Thus also with this group no feelings of guilt can be found, but only feelings of sorrow that the 'good old days' were over so soon .... 'We had a good time, why should I feel guilty?' " (Ibid., p. 118). 27. Ibid., p. 119. 28. Toezicht, I, 150-151. 29. Van Hoesel, op. cit., p. 125. 30. Ibid., p. 93. 31. Ibid., pp. 66-68. 32. Ibid., pp. 80-81. 33. Dr. van Hoesel suspects that all Dutchmen may have been unconsciously influenced by German anti-SemitIsm. (Ibid., p. 151). 34. Ibid., p. 181. 35. Ibid., pp. 232-234. 36. Ibid., pp. 133-134. 37. Ibid., p. 235. 38. HandeUngen Tweede Kamer, 1947-1948, No. 631, p. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Ter Horst (op. cit., p. 54) complamed that the funds allotted to the youth RE-EDUCATION AND RETURN INTO SOCIETY 191

camps were insufficient, so that frequently only mediocre educators and youth leaders could be employed. Concerning youthful Quislings in general, one seemingly useful suggestion - coming especially from Stichting Toezicht circles - was never followed by the government: the institution of special judges for youthful collaborators only. 39. According to the Verslag Stichting Toezicht, the Queen could have intended only to permanently exclude those who would receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. (p. 29). 40. Z uivering en I Uegaliteit, p. 1. 41. N.S.B.·Deporlatie naar Oost en West, pp. 17,19,49. 42. The public opinion poll was conducted by the Netherlands Foundation for Statistics, and reported in Parool (Leiden), December 6, 1945. 43. Toezicht, I, 73. 44. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 42-43. 45. Toezicht, II, 134. 46. Ibid. 47. Verslag Stichting ToeJlicht, pp. 42-43. In Norway, ex-Quislings were also able to get jobs, except in the merchant marine or government. (National Zeitung [Basel], July II, 1947). Ex-Quisling Belgian workers, too, were easily absorbed. (Revue de droit penal et criminologie, 1946-1947, p. 899). 48. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, p. 43. 49. Cf. Handelingen Tweede Kamer, March 21, 1947, p. 1282. 50. Toezicht, I, No. 12, back cover. 51. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 43-44. 52. Rechtskundige Adviseurs are legal advisors who do not possess a law degree. They are often employed in routine cases because their fees are considerably below those of regular lawyers. 53. Ad. de Vries, De Rechtskundige Adviseur, May, 1948. 54. Toezicht, II, 60. 55. Trouw, September 6, 1949. 56. Parool, September 13, 1946. 57. Ds. Bardeloos, Toezicht, I 38-39. Cf. the same author, "Het Streekkarakter en het Nationaal Socialisme", Socioiogisch Bulletin, 1948, p. 66. 58. Toezicht, II, 143-145. Generally, the population in the Southern Netherlands appeared less hostile. (Maandblad voor Berechting en Reclassering, 1947,75-76). 59. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 38-39. 60. Toezicht, I, 75. 61. Nieuwe Courant, December 4, 1948. 62. Ibid., October 25, 1948. 63. Ibid., November 7, 1949. 64. Verslag Stichting Toellicht, pp. 53-54. One newspaper reported that the postal department had appointed an ex• Quisling as a letter carrier, although an army volunteer had also applied for the job. After several other papers had reprinted this story, with the inevitable sour comment, it was admitted that the army volunteer had only existed in the editor's imagination. (ToeJlicht, II, 35). 65. Toezicht, I, 59. The same was true in Belgium. Miss de Bock reported how particularly in smaller towns and villages released collaborators often saw no other solution than to move to another region. (Op. cit., pp. 52-53). 66. Verslag Stichting Toezicht, pp. 29-30. 67. Nieuwe Courant, December 21, 1949. 68. Toezicht, II, 104. Verslag SUchting Toezicht, p. 37. Bekaert, Maatschappelijke Problemen van het Incivisme, p. 15. 69. Toezicht, II, 100. 70. Ibid., p. 173. 71. Copies of more than 2,000 of these reports are available at the Criminological Institute of Utrecht University. Unfortunately, many of them are sketchy. 72. The Stichting also employed a full-time cell-visitor, who regularly visited intern• ment camps. All internees could arrange private interviews with him. Further- 192 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

more, the Stichting established libraries, and organized concerts and lectures in camps. 73. Of these, more than one-third were women. Almost 11,000 were below 25 years of age; 6,000 were between 26 and 30; 16,000 were laborers; 4,000 were farmers, artisans, or small shopkeepers; 8,000 were housewives; 6,800 were clerical employees or professional people; 288 were students. (Verslag Stichting Toe:icht, pp. 17-19,21,23,30-31). By January 1949,41,847 persons were still under supervision. (Toe:icht, II, 24). 74. Dutchmen had always been interested in reclasse1'ing [rehabilitation of prison• ers]. Organized in government-approved rehabilitation associations, tbey tried to smooth the return into society of released prisoners. The Stichting was an outgrowth of these associations, specializing in Quislings. It used the pool of rehabilitators and other social workers, more numerous in Holland than in most other Western countries. 75. In January 1948, in a total of 16,708 Stichting supervisors, approximately 1,600 were laborers; 2,300 were farmers, shopkeepers, or artisans: 2,000 were house• wives; 6,500 were clerical employees; 1,544 were professional people; 191 were students. Most supervisors were above thirty. (Verslag Stickting Toesicht, p. 31). By January 1949, the total of supervisors had grown to 17,388. (Toellickt, lI, 24). Surprisingly many of the supervisors were ex·resistance men. 76. Toe:icht, I, 1-2. 77. Ibid., II, 171. Cf. the experiences of supervisors as described in Toellicht, I, 9-10, 12-13 (No.2). 78. Mr. J. Croese, the head of the Hilversum office of the Stichting, had this to say about the work of his more than seven hundred supervisors: "Considering the very heterogeneous composition of the body of supervisors, it is pleasant to note that the practice of supervision was satisfactory as a whole, although we would have preferred to see some things different. Some supervisors limited their efforts to the social field; some gave especially moral support; some emphasized political aspects; some considered their task more along police lines; finally there was the group of sluggards [lauwen), those who did nothing at all". (Toezicht, II, 69). 79. Nieuwe Courant, December 28,29, 1949. Toezicht, II, 172.

CHAPTER VII

1. To be sure, memories of the recent purge will serve to make collaboration unattractive to many who suffered from it. It is possible that only a few World War II Quislings would be disloyal again. 2. In 1948 the Communists obtained 7.7 per cent of the vote, and in 1946 10.6 per cent. In 1946 more than 600,000 Dutchmen voted Communist. 3. On March 7, 1949 the Dutch Communist party declared itself to be in complete agreement with the statements of Thorez and Togliatti. (Keesings Historisch Archie!, 1949, p. 8011). 4. New York Herald Tribune (Paris), February 24, 1949. 5. Ibid., March 11, 1949. 6. J. Wechsberg, "Letter from Prague", The New Yorker, August 6,1949. 7. M. Guehenno, quoted by D. PIckles, France between the Republics (London, 1946), p. 139. 8. Van Hoesel, op. cit., pp. 149-151. Another author called the post-war increase of anti-Semitism "a reaction to Nazi propaganda, and mainly the consequence of the forced separation of Jews from the rest of the population, during the occupation". (J. W. Matthijsen, Het Anti-Semitisme in Na-Oorlogstijd [Baren• drecht, 1945), p. 51). Cf. also Onderdrukking en Verzd, II, 138-139. Neo-Facism, as a polItical movement, has not yet reappeared in Holland. (Cf. Professor van Bemmelen, Revue de drMt penal et criminologie, November 1947, p. 185). Its prospects do not seem bnght, unless Germany IS again per• mitted to adopt Nazism. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE 193

9. "Soekamo [the president of the new Indonesian state] ... is nothing but a stooge left behind by the Japanese, who is now again used by England and the United States to hide ... their determined intentions to chase us from the Indies, of course not in the interests of the natives, but because of the con• cessions which Soekamo ... will have to grant to these 'Allies' of ours." (J. E. van der Starp, op. cit., p. 64). Concerning Mr. van der Starp, see note 48, Ch. V. Although this quotation should certainly not be called representative of the feelings of the great ma• jority of Dutchmen, similar sentiments have been expressed to the author on many occasions. 10. Dautricourt believed that the mildness and mistakes of the Belgian purge after World War I contributed much to encourage collaboration in World War II. (La Trahiscm, p. 56). 11. Nederlandsch ]vristenblad, Kamerstukken, No. 470, p. 24. 12. The report of this commission is not expected before late 1950. In the three Scandinavian countries similar commissions are at work. Prof. Stephan Hur• witz heads the Danish. An international commission of jurists has been organized to study problems relating to Quislings and war criminals - the Commission ,ntemaUonale per• manente povr l'ttvde de la repression des crimes contre Ie droit des gens et des faits commis dans l'intern de l'ennemi. Most Western European countries are members. Headquarters of the commission is in Brussels, and its journal is the Revve de droit pinal et criminologie. 13. Article 196, adopted on September 3, 1948. 14. J. Dautricourt, I'A rticle II5 dv Code Pinal et la repression de la collaboration Iconomiqve (Brussels, 1945), p. 97. 15. Noach, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 16. Tribvnalen in Nederland, 1945-1946, p. 192. 17. Noach, op. cit., p. 166. 18. De Bock, op. cit., p. 45. 19. Bekaert, MaatschappeZijke Problemen van het 1ncivisme, pp. 5-6. The same point is made by: Ganshof van der Meersch (op. cit., pp. 83-84); Dautricourt (La Trahison, p. 34); the Belgian Minister of Justice, Mr. Lilar (Revve de droit Pinal et criminologie, November 1947, p. 165); a Dutch psychiatrist, Dr. A. L. C. Palies (De Politiek, Delinqvent [Assen, 1948] pp. 24-25); Ds. Bardeloos (ToeDcht, I, 30-32). 20. De Bock, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 21. Palies, op. cit., p. 24. 22. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and 1mmoral Society: A Stfld" in Ethics and Politics (New York, 1932), p. 4.

Dutch Quislings 13 INDEX

Aanwijzingen (1937), 28, 35-38 Bosch ridder van Rosenthal, Mr. Abwehr, 165 L.H.N., 172 Algemene Lastgevingen (M. G.), 44 Broyn, A. C. de, 5 Alting von Geusau, Jonkheer, 189 Buitenvervolgingstelling: Ammers-Kiiller, Jo, van, 184 conditional setllements, 80+-82 A.N.P.,I05 criticism, 82-83 Anti-Revolutionary party, 165 necessity, 79-80 Anti-Semitism, see under Jews. public hostility against, 80 Apeldoorn, Mr. L. J. van, 186 unconditional settlements, 80 Artists: Bureau Bijzondere jeugdzorg, 174, Central Purge Board, 116 190 organization and powers Purge Burger, Mr. J. A. W., 86 Boards, 115-116 Buys, Prof. T. J., 132 policies of purge, 116-117 and politics, 112-114 Chambres civiques, 181 purpose of purge, 114-115 Christian-Historic Union, 135, 165 Asch van Wijck, Mr. L. H. K. C. Citizenship, deprivation of, 66-68 van, 182 Civic Education, and collabora- Auschwitz, 64 tion, 162-163 Aus der Fiinten, 177 Civil service: Aanwijzingen (1937), 35-38 Backhaus, Wilhelm, 113 and collaboration, 34-35 Bardeloos, Ds. H., 166, 191, 193 Commentary (1943), 36-38 Becker. de, 168 purge of, see purge. Beel, Dr. L. J. M., 37 Cleveringa, Prof, R. P., 95, 182 Bekaert, H., 162, 165, 193 Coal mines, and purge, 100 Belgium, 1-3, 126, 170 Colijn, Dr. H., 3, 5, 6, 164 Belgium, definition economic col• Collaborator, term, 6 laboration, 97-100 College van Vertrouwensmannen, Belgium, Supreme Court, 95 41,69 Bemmelen, Prof. J. M. van, 64, Commissioners of the Queen, 89 120, 121, 129, 130, 133, 170, Commissions de verification, 176 172, 179 Communists: Beoordelings Beschikkingen, see attitude in case of Russian under students. invasion, 158 Berg, Mr. J. D. van den, 177 criticism of purge, 138 Bergh, Prof. G. van den, 127, 184 Concentration camp guards, 38 Bernhard, Prince, 46, 164 Concertgebouw Orchestra, 117, Bijlsma, Mr. K., 175 184 Bijltiesdag, 41 Confiscation, of properties of Bijzondere Gerechtshoven, see Spe• Quislings, 56-57 cial Courts. Constant, Benjamin, 131 Bijzondere Raad v. Cassatie, see Constitution, Dutch: Special Court of Cassation. art. 21, 187 Blase, F. W., 185 art. 162-163, 132 Blokzijl, M., 10,166 art. 164,53 Bock, G. de, 140, 162, 189-191 art. 167,76 Bormann, M., 165 art. 196, 193 INDEX 195

Contractors, and purge, 31, 177 Dutch East Indies, 160, 193 Corruption, and purge, 55 Duval, J. E., 170 Croese, J., 192 Duynstee, Prof. F. J. F. M., 154, Czechosfovakia, 159 156, 188 Duynstee, Prof. W. J. A. J., 124- Dal, Mr. A. J. M. van, 113 125 Dautricourt, J., 161, 168, 171, 193 Death penalty, 63-64, 177 Decrees: Eck, Prof. D. van, 69, 92, 176 Besluit Bijz. Gerecktskoven (No. Economic collaboration: D 62), 59, 176 advantages to Dutch, 29-30 Besluit Buitengewone Reckts• advantages to Germans, 29 pleging (No. D 63), 59, 176 Dutch production for Germans, Besluit Buitengewoon Stra/reckt 26-27 (B.B.S., No. D 61), 44,61-63 and loyal business men, 28-30 Besluit Politieke Delinquenten, pressure on workers, 32-34 54, 175 and profiteers, 30-32 Emergency Decree for the Press, purge measures, see Purge see under press. Boards. on enemy properties, 57, 67, 178 and workers, 32-34 Interim Press Decree (1944, sabotage of production, 30 1945), see under press. Economic hardships, in Holland Interneringsregeling 1946 (No. G after Liberation, 134, 160 310), 52. 174 Einsatzstab Rosenberg, 66 Tribunal Decree, 74-76, 78, 79 Einthoven, Mr. L., 164 Wet Overgang Bijz. Rechtsple• Employment, for released Quis- ging, 68, 178 lings, 150-152 Zuiverings Decree (1944, 1945), England-Spiel, 136 90-91,93 Ent, Mr. A. van der, 185 No. E 69, 107, 184 Ex post facto laws, see retroactive No. E 157, 182 laws. No. F 70,182 No. F 131, 182 No. F 160, 101, 183 Feldmeyer, 15 No. F 177, 107, 184 Fifth column, 20, 168-169 No. F 221, 182 Financial reform, in Netherlands, No. F 242, 93, 182 183 No. G 84, 115, 184 Fiscal measures, against Quislings, No. H 206, 55, 176 183 No. H 211, 109, 184 FischbOck, 165 No. I 228, 116, 185 Fischer, 177 Delft University, 118 Fonteijn, A. J., 166 Denmark, 99 Forces of the Interior (N. B. S.), Deportation, of Quislings, 189 46-48, 53, 56 Dietrich, Dr., 105 France, 42, 181, 183 Frederiks, Dr. K. J., 171 Directoraat-Generaal VOOf' Bijz. Recktspleging, 174 "Fronts", of N.S.B., 45, 165 Dittmar, 105 Donkersloot, Prof. N. A., 85 184, Ganshof van der Meersch, Prof. 185 ' W. J., 168, 193 Donner, Dr. J., 96, 97, 161 Gas-chambers, 64, 173 Doublet, P. H., 176, 181 Geelkerken, van, 9 Drees, Dr. W., 164 Geer, Jonkheer D. J. de, 4, 6, 164 Drente, province, 152, 166 Geijl, Prof. P., 168 Dries, Mr. N. C. M. A. vanden, 182 Genechten, Dr. van, 10, 166-167, "Due process," lack of, 78, 121, 133 Gerbrandy, Prof. P. S., 164 D~~~i~6 Prof. A. A. L. F. van, German army, conduct in June 1940, 1-2 196 INDEX

German family ties, and collab• Jews: oration, 166 anti-Semitism, 9, 117, 148, 160, Germanic League of Nations, 14, 190, 192 167 deportations, 37, 63, 173 Germans, internal dissension, 164- J onkers, Prof. J. E., 178, 187 165 Judicial commission, of 2nd cham• Gielen, Dr. J., 112, 186 ber, 50, 51, 141, 142, 149, 161, Girl friends, of Germans, 38, 80, 174, 189 173 Juliana, Queen, 150 Gieseking, W., 113 GObbels, J., 105 Kantonrechters, 77, 78 Goedhart, F. J., 185 Kempe, Prof, G. Th., 32, 169, 171, Goring, H., 13, 105 188 Goris, J. A., 164 Kempen, Paul van, 184 Groningen,' police in, 46 Kickert, Mr. J. B. W. P., 102, 183 Guehenno, M., 192 Kleffens, Dr. E. N. van, 168 Kortenhorst, Dr P. G., 121, 164, Hague Regulations on Land War- 170, 172 fare (1907), 28, 36-37, 94 Kranenburg, Prof. R., 124, 128, Hartmann, Grete, 172 186, 187 Hauptmann, Gerhard, 113 Kruyer~Dr. G. ].,169 Hazewinkel-Suringa, Pro~. D., 64 Kultuurkamer, 185 Heeres Kraftpark, 22 K ultuurkring, 185 High school teachers, association Kultuurraad, 185 of,1 52 Hijlkema, Dr. C. B., 166 Labor unions, and Quislings, 150- Hilten, Generaal van, 168 151 Himmler, H., IS, 165 "Lampistes", 137 Hitler, A., 13, 34, 148 Landoorlogs-reglement (1907), see Hoesel, Dr A. F. G. van, 22-25, Hague Regulations. 146-149, 159-160, 169, 190 Landheer, B., 164 Hollander, Mr. F., 180 Landstorm, 21, 22, 66 Hooge Autoriteiten, see under Tri• Langemeyer, Prof. G. E., 25, bunals. 124,128,161,169, 186 Hooge Raad, 61, 69, 90, 93, 97, Laval, Pierre, 167 126, 133 Lawyers, and the purge, 175 Huizinga, James H., 164 Leeuw, Minister G. van der, 181, Hurwitz, Prof. S., 193 186 Huysmans, W. J., 145, 190 Legal advisors, association of, 151 Informers, 38, 172 Legioen Nederland, 21, 66 Internment camps: Leiden University, 119 bad conditions, 48-51 Le Poole, Mr. J., 142, 143, 170, brutalities, 49-51 172, 174, 182, 189 Commissie van Toezicht, 52 Liberal Democratic Party, 165 mining-camps, 143-144 Liberal State Party, 165 negative influence on re-edu- Lilar, Minister, 193 cation, 140-142 Lindeman, L., 166 "open camp" experiment, 142- Lint, Mr. G. J. de, 78, 129, 132, 143 135, 178 personnel, 49 Lintborst Homan, Mr. J., 4, 164 work for internees, 141-142 Lippman, Walter, 158 work-projects in Dutch East London, Dutch government in, 18, Indies, 144 41, 42, 70 Lunshof, H. A., 135, 136, 188 Jacquemart, Noel, 184 Lynch justice, 41-42 Jannings, Emil, 113 J ellinek, Prof., 125 Mann, Thomas, 113 INDEX 197

Mass arrests: "mayors' school", 17 jurisdictional conflicts, 45-47 political theories, 7-12 looting, 56 preferred treatment during oc- number of arrestees, 40, 181 cupation, 17-18 phases of arrest, 47-48 public reaction against, 18-20, Matthijsen, J. W., 192 168 Mayors, and purge, 88-89, 92 social composition, 7, 166 Medical profession, and collab- strength before 1940, 7 oration, 171 SS influence, 15-16 Mengelberg, Prof. W., 115, 117, "sympathizers", 17 185 N.S.D.A.P., 16, 165 Menten, P. N., 188 N.S.K.K., 21, 22, 66, 67 Militair Gezag (M. G.), 41, 43-48, N.S.N.A.P., 16, 45, 167 50, 51, 53, 88, 89, 91, 115, 118 Military collaboration: Oppen, Mr. R van, 178 motives for enlistment, 22-25, Orange, House of, 148, 164 169-170 Ordnungspolizei, 66 number of volunteers, 20 Organisation Todt, 34, 66, 67 public reaction, 25 Otto, Dr. Helmut, 166 Military Penal Code, Dutch, 62, Oud, Mr. P. J., 187 129 Out-of-court-settlement, see bui- Mining-camps, see internment tenvervolgingstelling. camps. Oven, Prof. J. C. van, 188 Modderman Stickting, 174, 184 Motion pictures, during occupa- Packtkamers, 178 tion, 183 Palies, Dr. A. L. C., 163, 193 Mottin, Jean, 184 Parlementaire EnquUe-Commissie, Mouton, Dr M. W., 128 52, 126, 127, 188 Mulder, Mr., 178 Parliament, purge of, 182 Mulock Houwer, D. Q. R, 166, Parool, Het, 111 169 Parties, in Netherlands, 165 Munt, J. H. L., 180 "Patriotten", 18, 19 Mussert, A., 7, 12-16, 18-19, Penal Code, Dutch, 61-63, 128- 165-167 129, 136, 161 Mussert-Garde, 15 Pickles, D., 192 P.O.D. (P.RA.), 47, 48, 54, 55, N ationale ] eugdstorm, 45 102, 174-176 National Sammlung, 167 Police, and purge, 46-48, 92 Naud, Albert, 168 "Political infection", 148, 159 N.B.S., see Forces of the Interior. 160 Nederlandscke Unie, 4, 5, 14, 164 Politieke delinquent, term ,6 Neo-Fascism, 192 Pompe, Prof. W. P. J., 112, 129, Netherlands Institute for Sta• 134, 135, 138, 139, 161, 180 tistics, 168, 172 Pound, Ezra, 113, 184 Netherlands Institute of War Press: Documentation, 183 during occupation, 104-107 Neumann, Prof. Franz L., 187 Emergency Decree for Press New Guinea, work projects, see (1947), 108-109 internment camps. German press policies, 105 Niebuhr, Prof. Reinhold, 163 Interim Press Decree (1944), Nieuwenhuis, G. M., 173 107 Noach, Prof. W. M. E., 64, 74, Interim Press Decree (1945), 129, 130, 132, 161, 162, 170, 187 107-108 Norway: Press Commission, 107 and Staatsnoodreckt, 126 Press Council, 108 Supreme Court, 95-96 press, post-war,and purge, 188 N. S. B.: Purge Boards, organization and internment in May 1940, 12 policies, 108-111 198 INDEX

Telegraaf-Affair. 111-112 Reichsarbeitsdie1lSt. 66 Underground press. 37.106-107. Resistance: 130. 183 general criticism of purge. 137 Pre-trial release: and mass arrests. 40-41. 45-48 and M. G .• 53 organization. 172 -rules. 53-56 and purge of civil servants. and Solicitors-General. 54-56 88-89 and Special Courts. 55-56 Retroactive laws: and Tribunals. 53. 55-56 criticism of. 129-131 Professors. and purge. 118. 120. in B.B.S.• 61-63 171. 186 necessity of. 128-131 Propaganda. 106. 145-146. 148 Revers. H. J. D .• 181 Purge. (term). 181 Revue de droit pinal et criminologie, Purge. general criticism of. 134- 193 139 Ribbentrop. J .• 165 Purge of artists. see artists. Roland Holst. Dr. A .• 185 Purge Boards. criticism of. 120- Roman Catholic Church. 41. 153 122 Roman Catholic State Party. 165 Purge of government employees: Romein. Prof. J. M.• 171. 184 critiscism of. 92-93 Romeyn. Mr. J. M. C.• 183 description ot disloyal acts. 90- Rost van Tonningen. 12. 15 91. 182 Rubinstein. Arthur. 113 jurisdictional conflicts. 88-89 Russel. Prof. G .• 129. 135-137. 187 persons affected. 90. 93 punitive measures. 91 Sauveplanne. Dr. J. G .• 186 Purge of industrial and economic Schmidt. 165 collaborators : Scholten. Mr. A. L.. 171 basic policies. 102-103 Seyss Inquart. Dr. A., 2. 6, 14, 15, criticism of. 103-104 34, 35, 164, 165 definition economic collabora- Schorr, Daniel L.. 184 tion.97-100 Sicherheitsdienst (S.D.). 165 and industrial leaders. 101 Slave laborers. Dutch, 33 Purge Boards. 100-102 Smits. Mr.• 182 and workers. 100 Snijders, Mr. F. J. H .• 124 Purge of judges: Social acceptance. of released High College of Judicature. 93- Quislings. 152-154 94 Social Democratic LaborParty, 165 Hooge Raad. case of. 94-97 Soekarno, 193 Purge of press. see press. Solicitors-General: Purge of university students. see and buitenvervolgingstelling. 80- students. 83 and economic purge, 104 and pre-trial release. 54-56 Quay. Prof. J. E. de. 164 statistics on activities, 83-84 Quisling. Vidkun. 15 South Africa, 167 Quisling. term. 6 Spaan, J. B. Th., 183 Special Court of Cassation, 60-61, Raad voor het Rechtsherstel. 178 126 Randwijk. H. M. van, 172, 188 Special Courts: Rappard. Dr Ernst Henri Ridder appeal, see Special Court of van. 16. 167 Cassation, Rauter.165 deprivation of rights, 64-65 Re-education. of collaborators. dissolution. 68-69 144-149 judges, 59-60 Reformed Church, Dutch, 49. 154 jurisdiction and crimes judged. Regulations on Land Warfare, 61-63 The Hague, of 1907, see Hague organization. 59-60 Regulations. statistics on activities, 68-69 INDEX 199

Special courts for Quislings, ne- Kantonrechters, 77-78 cessity of, 131-133 organization, 72 SS, Dutch political, 15-16, 66, 167 and pre-trial release, 53, 55-56 SS Division Nederland, 21, 22 secretaries, 72-73 SS Postschutr, 22 statistics on activities, 77 Staatsnoodrecht, 123-128 Tuchtrecht, 70-71, 76 Starp, Mr. J. E. van der, 136, 188, Trouw, 111 193 Tuchtrecht, see under Tribunals. Stichting Toezicht: Tuyll van Serooskerken, Mr. A. M. organization, 154-157, 192 van, 174 aims, 155-156, 191-192 supervision of released Quis- Uniformity, lack of in purge, 104, lings, 81-82, 156-157, 192 133, 187-188 Stokvis, Mr. B. J., 188, 189 U.S.S.R., 158 Strausz, Richard, 113, 184 Utrecht University, 191 Strijd, Ds. K., 49, 166 Struye, Paul, 1-2, 164, 171 Vaart Smit, Dr. H. W. vander, 51, Students: 174 Beoordelings Beschikkingen, 119 Valkhoff, Mr. J., 164 criticism of purge, 119-120 Veen, Mr., 178 loyalty-statement, 117-118 Verberne, Prof. L. G. J., 164 Purge Boards, 118-119 Verlagerung, 170 purge statistics at Leiden Uni• Visser van Nieuwpoort (pseudo- versity, 119 nym), 164 Superior-orders-plea, 37 "De Vlag" (Belgium), 167 Supreme Court, Dutch, see Hooge Vliegende Brigade (M.G.), 50, 174 Raad. V.N.V., 167 Suurhoff, J. G., 164 Vries, A. de, 191 Sweers, B. M., 168 Vugt,49 Teachers, and purge, 185 W.A.,45 Teitgen, Minister, 42 Wechsberg, J., 192 Telegraal-Affair, 111-112, 121 Wendelaar, Mr. W. C., 185 Tempel, Dr. J. van der, 3, 164 West, Rebecca, 10, 166 Ter Horst, Mr. J. R., 169, 190 "Westpolder", 189 Thiel, Mr. van, 167 "Westvaart" ("open" camp), 143 Thomas, A., 184 Wielek, H., 173 Thorez, Maurice, 158 Wijhe, Ds. van, 49, 174 Tichelman, 189 Wilhelmina, Queen, 20, 123, 128, Toetsing-arrest, see Hooge Raad. 149 Toezicht, 156 Woltjer, Mr. H. J., 172, 175, 187 Togliatti, 159 Wright, Gordon, 173 Toscanini, A., 113 Wyers, Mr. Th. R. J., 174 Tribunals: conclusions, 78-79 Youth-camps, 144-149 confiscatory powers, 76-77 deprivation of rights, 77 Zech von Burkersroda, 165 "desbewust" [wittingly], 74-75 Zuivering: dissolution, 77-78 concept of, 85-87 function of, 69-71 criticism of, 120-122 Hooge Autoriteit (review), 73-74 term, 85, 181 judges, 72, 79 Zuiveringsraden, see purge and jurisdiction and crimes judged, Purge Boards. 74-75