“LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES”

Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy (1919-1940) - Vincent O’Connell -

The inter-war period in Eupen-Malmedy remains a sensitive arena in which the experiences and sensibilities of its inhabitants have barely been broached by historians. The controversial milestones of the interwar period in Eupen-Malmedy have been covered over with the palimpsest of what the late Tony Judt has referred to elsewhere as ‘selective forgetting’ where communities as well as individuals shield certain episodes or events of the past from intrusion by historians1. The German historian Freddy Cremer describes this phenomenon as akin to ‘amnesia as therapy’. The period following the Nazi invasion and annexation of the former Germany districts in 1940 and their later liberation conspired to further compound an already complex situation. Since then the historical narrative has been shrouded beneath a veil of silence. This article aims in some small way to pull back this veil so that in Cremer’s words “the past may not be left untouched”2. 11 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

Klaus Pabst’s Eupen Malmedy in der bel­ Pieter Lagrou in his work on national memory gischen Regierungs- und Parteienpolitik and recovery in post-Nazi Europe argues 1914-1940 published in 1964 has been the that : Awareness of and explicit research into traditional starting point for scholars inte­ representations of a historical event im­me­ rested in this borderland territory and deli­ diately afterwards, generally helps the his­ neates the political relationship between torian to avoid the bias implicit in many of Eupen-Malmedy and Belgium up to the Nazi his or her sources, and to avoid the pitfalls annexation of 1940. More recently Bruno of partisan accounts or carefully construc­ Kartheuser has examined the phenomenon ted self-serving narratives that might other­ of pan-German activity in Eupen-Malmedy wise impose themselves as ready-made inter­ in the wake of the period of transition and pretations4. its later transformation at the hands of Nazi opportunists. His study shows how In a similar vein, neglecting to focus on previously anodyne cultural organisations the events which precede a particular his­ became transformed into incubators of covert torical event can also lead to distortions Nazi activity3. Christoph Brüll argues that in the historical narrative. This article de­ although Kartheuser demonstrates the degree monstrates argues that while a myriad of of enthusiasm and accommodation for Nazi social, political and economic concerns ideas in the districts, he fails to explain why may have helped to play a part in pushing people chose a particular route. He accuses individuals one direction or another, the Kartheuser of concentrating instead on making primary factor which allowed the pheno­ moral judgements and thus losing the nuance menon of pro-Nazism to emerge almost between motivations which were either unhindered in the wake of the period of pro-German or pro-Nazi. Martin Schärer’s transition was the level of disillusionment Deutsche Annexionspolitik im Westen had felt among in­habitants of Eupen-Malmedy previously focused on the annexationist who having been forced against their will policies of the Third Reich in Eupen Malmedy “into the bosom of the Motherland” were demonstrating how these proved counter eventually betrayed by her and left confu­ productive to gaining support among the sed and disillusioned as to which route to erstwhile pro-German population. take5.

1. Tony Judt, Postwar. A history of Europe since 1945, London, 2005, p. 803-831. See also his interview with Donald A. Yerxa, “Postwar. An interview with Tony Judt”, in Historically Speaking, vii (3), 1-2.2006, http://www.bu.edu/historic/hs/judt.html. 2. Freddy Cremer cited in “Freddy Cremer beklagt ‘Amnesie als Therapie’”, in Grenz Echo, 29.9.2010. 3. Bruno Kartheuser, Les années 30 à Eupen-Malmedy. Regard sur le réseau de la subversion allemande, Neundorf, 2001. 4. Pieter Lagrou, The legacy of Nazi occupation. Patriotic memory and national recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge, 2000, p. 4. 5. Christoph Brüll, “Eupen-Malmedy 1918-1945. Le temps des déchirures”, in Hommage à Henri Bragard (1877- 1944), – Collection “Mémoire wallonne”, 13, Liège, 2009, p. 7-38. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 12

I. ‘Into the Belgian Family’ up to the Nazi-annexation, where this particular territorial gain increasingly came to The conditional cession of the German be seen as a Trojan horse in the eyes of many10. districts of Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium in Any perceived disadvantages were subsumed 1919 fell far short of Belgian expectations at by concerns for Belgium’s future security and the outset of the peace negotiations in Paris6. the desire for economic recompense, quite The eventual outcome saw Belgian hopes of apart that is from the palpable appetite for territorial aggrandisement evaporate almost retribution11. This view was best summed up by entirely7. Apart from the colonial territory a number of visiting Belgian parliamentarians of Ruanda-Urundi which was mandated to in June 1919, just prior to the signing of the Belgium by Great Britain in 1920, the two Versailles Treaty when they concluded that German districts together with Neutral Mores­ the general rule of thumb in terms of territorial net were to be the only tangible territorial­ claims ought to be “the minimum of Germans acquisitions the country would show for its with the maximum of forest”. The welfare of efforts8. To some segments of the population the inhabitants of the region sat far down the inside Belgium gaining Eupen-Malmedy menu of considerations12. risked inviting trouble as much as securing the borders of the state. So soon after the war Within these two districts lived two cultural­ and the oppressive German occupation, a ly distinct communities which together num­ tangible distrust among the Belgian­ populace bered around 64,000 inhabitants. Whilst towards these so called redis­covered brothers Eupen was predominantly ethnic-German in (frères retrouvés) was evident in press and in character, Malmedy contained almost 10,000 parliament9. Such suspicions would continue Walloons who had been subjects of the German to colour public opinion inside old-Belgium Empire for over a century13. The majority of

6. A separate piece of legislation regulated the status of the triangular snippet of territory known as Neutral-Moresnet (Moresnet-Neutre); Bibliothèque royale du Royaume de la Belgique (KBR), Annales parlementaires, 1918-1946, M.B.19; Loi réglant le statut du territoire de Moresnet- neutre, 15 September 1919, in Moniteur belge, 17.10.1919; Firmin Paquet, “Le territoire contesté de Moresnet, dit Moresnet-Neutre”, in Bulletin de la Société verviétoise d’Archéologie et d’Histoire, XLVII, 1960, p. 53-153. 7. Archives du Palais royal (APR), I/981. Hymans was assisted at the Paris Peace Conference by Emile Vandervelde the leader of the Belgian Socialist party, and Jules van den Heuvel who gained a seat on the Reparations Commission (“La Belgique et la paix”, 8.3.1920). 8. By The Treaty of Versailles, i.22, Belgium was granted a mandate over the former German colony of Ruanda-Urundi. This was confirmed by the League of Nations on 20 July 1922 and reaffirmed on 31 August 1923W ( illiam R. Louis, “Great Britain and the African peace settlement of 1919”, in American Historical Review, 71, 1966, p. 875-892). 9. Le Courrier de l’Armée, no. 677, 23.11.1919 and no.681, 21.12.1919. 10. Gazette de la Croix, 10.8.1926. 11. Robert Devleeshouwer, “L’opinion publique et les revendications territoriales belges à la fin de la première guerre mondiale”, inMélanges offerts à G. Jacquemyns, Bruxelles, 1968, p. 207-38. 12. Note remise par …..Puisset, Impériali and Jules Destrée à la commission des affaires extérieures à propos de Mlamédy (sic) [Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AAEB), D3311, nr. 10]. 13. Martin R. Schärer, Deutsche Annexionspolitik im Westen. Die Wiedereingliederung Eupen-Malmedys im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Bern/Frankfurt am Main, 1978², p. 86; Gerd Kleu, Die Neuordnung der Ostkantone Belgiens 1945-1956. Politik, Kultur und Wirtschaft in Eupen, Malmedy und St.Vith, Essen, 2007, p. 12. 13 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

the population however were ethnic German. administration in the short term he was met The town of Malmedy itself had just 6,000 with the following response: inhabitants and was largely dependent on its famed paper milling and tanning industries14. “See that it goes well and that it doesn’t cost Eupen was geographically a much smaller too much. When you will have good things Kreis than Malmedy albeit more densely to communicate to me, do so. You will be populated. The 15,000 inhabitants who lived like a colonial governor but a colony directly there were in the main employed in textiles, connected to the Metropolis”17. weaving and in agriculture15. The cession of Eupen-Malmedy by the Versailles The law of 15 September 1919 established Treaty was conditional on the holding of a the transitory Eupen-Malmedy Government popular consultation (described in the treaty of an indefinite duration under Baltia. Baltia as a “public expression of opinion”)18. As soon embarked on a project of nation-building at as he was installed in his seat of government a time when many new nation states were in Malmedy, Baltia set about administering forming across Europe. Even so, the territory the popular consultation with zeal. He in which this mission was to take place sat on clearly understood the perils attached to one of the many geopolitical fault lines of the such a far from assured endeavor. Writing post-war period alongside the neighbouring to Delacroix in February he warned, “If the contested territory of Alsace -Lorraine. Baltia results [of the consultation] and the decision likened the granting of Eupen-Malmedy to of the League of Nations will go against us, I Belgium in place of the great expectations should not alone with my functionaries bear demanded by the Belgian delegation in Paris the responsibility”19. The wording of Article as “giving a gourmand a bone to chew”16. He 34 of the Versailles Treaty gave free reign to was surprised with Belgian Prime Minister Belgium to exploit the consultation while the Léon Delacroix’s rather lax attitude as to international community looked the other how the administration was to operate. In his way. A fair criticism of the article would be memoirs Baltia writes, “Delacroix appeared that it was too limited in its explication as to to have thought no more about giving me how the entire exercise was to be conducted20. directives”. When he queried the Prime Berlin registered serious misgivings at the Minister as to what might be expected of his lack of checks and balances associated with

14. Statistique de la Belgique. Population, Recensement Général, 31.12.1920, p. 570-583. 15. Lucien Colson, Malmedy et les territoires rétrocédés, Liège, 1921, p. 21. 16. Idem, p. 7-9. 17. Landesarchiv Nord-Rhein Westfalen (LANRW), RW/10/5, Sammlung Baltia. Erinnerungen des belgischen Generals Baltia, 1918-1922, Gouverneur (Hochkommissar) für die abgetretenen Gebiete Eupen-Malmedy aus seiner Tätigkeit [Erinnerungen Baltia], p.7-9; Christoph Brüll, “Eupen-Malmedy 1918-1945… ”, p. 8-9; Freddy Cremer & Werner Miessen, Spuren. Materialien zur Geschichte der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens, Eupen, 1995, p. 9 (Cegesoma, BA21/668). 18. Heinz Doepgen, Die abtretung des gebietes von Eupen- Malmedy an Belgien im jahre 1920, Bonn, 1966, p. 115-179. 19. Eupen-Malmedy, Herman Baltia to Léon Delacroix, 9.2.1920 (AAEB, 10/792/II/1654). 20. The Versailles Treaty, iii.i.34, 28.6.1919. A map of Belgium in 1920. The districts of Eupen-Malmedy are in pink with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the south. Immediately to the north of Eupen is the Dutch province of Limburg which Belgium also failed to acquire at the Paris Peace Conference along with Flemish Zeeland (also in blue on the map, bordering the north-west of Belgium). (National Archives of the United Kingdom, London, FO / 3644B)

Eupen, Malmedy and St. Vith,on the border between Belgium and Germany, are also highlighted. (National Archives of the United Kingdom, London, FO / 3644B) 15 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

the consultation and not least the fact that out of the war on the winning side but having the League of Nations had not entrusted the also liberated “the national soil of her children surveillance of the popular consultation to a who freely came back to her”24. neutral observer. What’s more, the process was to be an open one where locals would Up to the termination of the transitory have to travel from their villages and farms to Eupen-Malmedy Government in 1925 Baltia the Hôtel de Ville in either Eupen or Malmedy and his government engineered a process and sign the register of protest in the presence of incremental change which involved a of Baltia’s functionaries21. synthesis of newly introduced Belgian and existing German legislation whilst at all Throughout the course of the consultation times promising to take account of the droits numerous allegations of intimidation by the acquis (vested interests) of the inhabitants. As Belgian authorities were highlighted by both Belgian legislation was gradually introduced German and neutral observers alike. When during the initial phase of the transitory the registers finally closed on 23 July, only 271 process, what transpired was a peeling back names out of an eligible total of more than of the layers of decrees, arrêtés and other 33,726 inhabitants appeared on the register pieces of legislation which had accumulated of protest22. The result was later endorsed under previous regimes. Baltia’s role was to by the League of Nations on 20 September facilitate the legislative, administrative and 1920 and the sovereign status of the territory juridical incorporation of the districts into resolved or so it appeared, in the eyes of the Belgian state. This was almost totally the international community. The following achieved when the transitory government day the Belgian tricolour flew on all state was eventually wound down in June 1925. buildings across the kingdom and in Eupen- The more demanding mission of assimilating Malmedy23. In the Belgian parliament the what Selm Wenselaers describes as these ‘last Government’s proclamation began the official Belgians’ into the Belgian nation was still far process of writing the new national narrative. from certain25. The government’s proclamation stuck rigidly to the myth of a Belgian nation once again Be that as it may in 1925 the outgoing Foreign restored by stating that “after a separation of Minister Henri Jaspar was in no doubt that “the more than a century, the two districts have moment had come to integrate these people come back to the mère patrie”. Belgium could into the Belgian family [dans la famille belge]. now be doubly satisfied not only having come To do otherwise would mean that instead of a

21. Klaus Pabst, “Das Problem der deutsch-belgischen Grenze in der Politik der letzten 150 Jahre”, in Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins, 77, 1965, p. 183-210. 22. Heinz Doepgen, Die Abtretung…, p. 115-212; Freddy Cremer & Werner Miessen, Spuren…, p. 9. 23. Incorporation of Eupen-Malmedy into Kingdom of Belgium, Sir George Grahame to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, 21.9.1920 [The National Archives (TNA), FO/371/5456]. 24. “Eupen- Malmedy”, in Moniteur belge, 20 & 22.9.1920 (AAEB, 10.792/III/10). 25. Selm Wenselaers, De laatste Belgen. Een geschiedenis van de Oostkantons, Antwerpen, 2008. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 16

de-annexation from Germany, Belgium would strong support in the region31. Yet in spite of have performed merely an opportunistic the Union catholique’s success, the deputy annexation and this did not sit well with ‘the elected to represent the territory was the esteemed role played by Belgium during the socialist candidate and member of the Parti war’”26. Thus by the law of 6 June Eupen- ouvrier belge (POB) was Marc Somerhausen, Malmedy became absorbed into the province a 25 year old lawyer originally from Ghent32. of Liège27. The national elections later that year His election owed much to the majority were the first in which the inhabitants of what socialist vote produced in the more urbanised were now three districts would participate arrondissement of Verviers to which Eupen, in tandem with the rest of the Belgian Malmedy and St.Vith were now attached33. population28. In the interim, representatives Whilst no indigenous pro-German party cam­ of Belgium’s main political parties visited the paigned in the election, the socialists strong­ towns and villages promising the populace a ly advocated the holding of a new and secret much freer and inclusive political existence. plebiscite. Somerhausen in line with his party “Soon you will feel the difference” exclaimed colleagues was concerned with how the entire the outgoing Liberal representative for period of Baltia’s tenure had impacted on the Verviers and Minister for National Defence inhabitants of the contested territory. He was Pierre Forthomme at a rally when comparing also of the view that the disgraceful episode the political future that awaited these “redis­ of the public expression of opinion in 1920 covered brothers” (frères retrouvés) against had served only to damage Belgium’s claim to the state of exception that had gone before29. the districts. He furthermore claimed that the assimilatory efforts under Baltia had alienated The results of the 1925 election albeit a these ‘new Belgians’ noting : “One must resounding victory for the Union catholique in not lose sight of the fact that the majority of the territory, did not reveal a great deal about these people served voluntarily, courageously the national allegiance of what was in any under German flags. It is not a question here case a predominantly Catholic population30. of individuals like the Alsatians and Lorrainers Prior to the annexation, the staunchly Catholic who marched contre-coeur (reluctantly) or German Zentrum Partei had equally enjoyed deserted”34.

26. Chambre, 4.3.1925, p. 855-856 (KBR, Annales Parlementaires, M.B.19). 27. Conseil des Ministres (1916-1949), 6.6.1925 [Archives générales du Royaume (AGR) BE-A0510/1252/02]. 28. Malmedy had been divided into Malmedy and St.Vith in 1921. 29. Pierre Forthomme, addressing a Liberal Party meeting at the Hôtel de l’Europe (La Nouvelle Belgique, 4.4.1925). 30. Jochen Lentz, Das Wahlverhalten in den Kantonen Eupen, Malmedy und St.Vith bei den Parlamentswahlen von 1925-1939, Eupen, 2000, p. 29-55. 31. Pierre Maxence, Les atouts gaspillés, ou le drame des Cantons de l’Est, St.-Niklaas, 1951, p. 29-30; Klaus Pabst, “Eupen- Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs – und Parteienpolitik 1914-1940”, in Zeitschrift des Aachener Gesichtsvereins, 1964, p. 354-356. 32. Klaus Pabst, “Eupen-Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs – und Parteienpolitik…”, p. 354. 33. Roger E. de Smet, René Evalenko & William Fraeys, Atlas des élections belges 1919-1954. Annexe statistique, Bruxelles, 1958, p. 10. 34. Le Peuple, 26.12.1925. Lieutenant-general Herman Baltia in 1921. As the High Commissioner of the annexed territories of Eupen-Malmedy between 1920 and 1925, he was accountable only to the prime minister. Baltia combined legislative and executive powers. (Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and Military History Brussels, B 1.130.2) Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 18

The outcome of the general election was question. This had its genesis in Germany’s followed by 73 days of wrangling (the injection of over six billion marks into the longest such gap of the inter-war period) Belgian economy during the occupation38. before a Catholic-Socialist government was Albeit withdrawn from circulation after the eventually formed. This was hardly the war by the Banque nationale, the Belgian greatest example of the benefits attaching to Government over ambitiously fixed the value Belgian democracy35. Yet in spite of this 1925 of the occupation currency at a very generous was a promising year, not alone for these new exchange rate of 1.25 francs to the mark. This Belgians but for the wider European continent was in anticipation of Germany being forced also. Rapprochement had replaced the mutual to reimburse Belgium as part of the post- distrust of the previous few years as Germany’s war peace agreement. The Government thus Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and his assumed the responsibility of repaying the French counterpart Aristide Briand made efforts Banque nationale from expected reparation to forge a new era of understanding in the dividends. Attempts to incorporate such a wake of the Ruhr crisis36. As the interchanges stipulation into the Versailles Treaty fell on over a Rhineland pact continued, a parallel deaf ears39. Even the Dawes Plan which acted process of deliberation between Belgian and as a catalyst for post-war rapprochement was German contacts gathered pace also37. to make no allocation for Belgium’s mark problem40. To add further to Belgium’s woes II. ‘Selling Souls’ : Belgian-German once the Government revealed its generous redemption additional marks were smuggled Negotiations on the Retrocession of into the territory. Hence, as the German Eupen- Malmedy currency became further weakened over the coming years the ever worsening financial Belgium had been devastated by the war, and situation impacted exponentially on Belgium’s although it had been fortunate to be exempted financial status. Yet by 1925 this seemingly from payment of its war debts, its economic intractable issue now looked as if it could be recovery was severely hampered by the marks circumvented by other means41.

35. Carl-Hendrik Höjer, Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940, Uppsala, 1946, p. 145-147. 36. John Horne, “Locarno et la politique de démobilisation culturelle 1925-1930”, in ‘Démobilisations culturelles après la Grande Guerre’ (Theme issue) 14-18 Aujourd’hui- Today-Heute, 5, Paris, 2002, p. 73-87. 37. “Germany and the Eupen-Malmedy Affair, 1924-1926 : ‘Here lies the spirit of Locarno’”, in Central European History, 8 (3), 9.1975, p. 221-250 (224). 38. Robert P. Grathwol, “Germany and the Eupen-Malmédy Affair 1924- 26”, in Central European History, nr. 3, 1975 (8), p. 221-50; Jacques Bariéty, “Le projet de rétrocession d’Eupen-Malmedy par la Belgique à l’Allemagne, et la France (1925-1926). Un cas d’utilisation de l’arme financière en politique internationale”, in Les relations franco- belges de 1830 à 1934, Metz, 1974, p. 325-348. 39. Robert P. Grathwol, “Germany and the Eupen-Malmédy affair…”, p. 221-250. 40. This was essentially a plan whereby Germany would pay reduced reparations albeit the final amount was not specifiedM ( anfred J. Enssle, Stresemann’s territorial revisionism. Germany, Belgium and the Eupen-Malmédy question 1919-1929, Wiesbaden, 1980, p. 69). 41. Robert P. Grathwol, “Germany and the Eupen- Malmédy Affair…”, p. 223. 19 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

Already by November 1924 advances were a favourable solution to the marks ques­ being made to Germany with the specific aim tion was possible if Belgium returned the of finding a resolution to the marks question annexed territories. Addressing the cabinet, through the intercession of the former Bel­ Theunis estimated that it was impossible to gian Prime Minister Léon Delacroix; now take such a suggestion into consideration; the Belgium’s representative on the Reparations main concern being how Britain and France Commission. By December of that year the would view such a move44. In February 1925, President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Hjalmar somewhat buoyed by the wave of optimism Schacht held follow-up talks with Émile following agreement on the Dawes Plan, and Francqui an influential Belgian financier, the more conciliatory stance being taken centering on finding a solution to Belgium’s by Edouard Herriot’s Cartel des Gauches economic ills42. The following March Schacht administration in France, Germany dispatched paid a visit to Brussels and again met with the draft text of a “security pact proposal” to Francqui and the president of Belgium’s both London and Paris advocating “a pact Banque nationale, Fernand Hautin. Schacht expressly guaranteeing the present territorial now developed the matter further by linking status [gegenwärtiger Besitzstand] on the the redemption of marks to the redemption of Rhine”45. The proposal contained no reference Eupen-Malmedy by Germany. Delacroix also to Belgium. Stresemann argued that arbitration seemed keen to proceed on that basis. Around agreements were the best route to take in the same time, the British Foreign Secretary terms of the lesser continental powers such Austen Chamberlain was expressing some as Belgium and Luxembourg. It would in time reservations over the legitimacy of Eupen- become clear that Stresemann’s intentions for Malmedy’s status within Belgium in view of a revision of Germany’s eastern borders lay the fact that the referendum as provided for at the heart of his pact proposal. But it was by the Treaty of Versailles was somewhat not the sole motivation. Germany was equally distorted in its application43. anxious to precipitate an allied evacuation of the Rhineland. The Versailles Treaty stipulated Schacht also had a meeting with the that the Rhineland would remain under allied Belgian Prime Minister Georges Theunis. occupation for 15 years with one allied zone The encounter was described as “very cour­ being evacuated every five years following teous and the question of marks was not the Treaty coming into effect46. Stresemann raised”. Schacht suggested to Francqui that therefore calculated that a security pact which

42. Klaus Pabst, “Eupen-Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs – und Parteienpolitik…”, p. 456-457. 43. Manfred J. Enssle in his work on the negotiations over the retrocession of Eupen-Malmedy to Germany states that it was unclear when Schacht had visited Brussels and suggests that it may have been April. However from the documentation available at the AMAEB it is clear that he visited Brussels in March 1925 [Baron de Gaiffier d’Hestroy to Paris to Paul Hymans, 10.3.1925 (AAEB, Eupen-Malmedy, 10.792/I/304/1446); Manfred J. Enssle, Stresemann’s territorial revisionism…, p. 102]. 44. Conseil des Ministres (1916-1949), 24.3.1925 (AGR, BE-A0510/1252/02). 45. The text of the security pact is cited in full in “German and French notes on the Security Pact”, in Advocate of Peace Through Justice, 87 (8), 8.1925, p. 491-493. 46. The Treaty of Versailles, xiv. i.429, 28.6.1919. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 20

would ease French fears by guaranteeing the departure whereby Germany and Belgium existing Rhineland borders would in turn could begin a new relationship, particularly facilitate an early evacuation of the entire in terms of economic cooperation. For Rhineland47. Stresemann Locarno was not merely an end in itself but “the beginning of a collaboration The German Foreign Minister sought to agree of confidence”49. He saw no contradiction a separate bilateral agreement with Belgium; between the aims of the Locarno negotiations leaving open the question of Eupen-Malmedy’s and his objective in seeking a return of Eupen- future status. This exclusion of Belgium Malmedy to Germany. Hence, the German was eventually reversed following French foreign minister expressed a willingness to insistence that all such matters pertaining to examine the possibility of dealing with the Germany’s western frontiers be included in marks question with the intention that it would a security pact. Stresemann knew that any pave the way for the eventual retrocession of such agreement which recognised Germany’s Eupen-Malmedy50. Whilst not wholly critical western borders as inviolable would smother of Stresemann’s viewpoint, Everts nevert­ any attempted rectification of the Eupen- heless conveyed the difficulties that would Malmedy question, especially one premised be posed in linking the payment of monies on a financial exchange. He therefore sought to the territorial question, and how “it would to ensure that any future security pact agreed be impossible for the Belgian Government with the allies, while abrogating war as to expose itself to being reproached for solution would not exclude the possibility selling a territory granted to it by the Treaty of achieving such an end through peaceful of Versailles”51. An internal memo in the negotiation. Belgian Foreign Ministry discounted the viability of such a move whilst throwing Pleased with the way in which the Locarno suspicion on German good will. It contended, negotiations were progressing Stresemann “In effect, it’s at the moment where Germany met with Robert Everts the Belgian Minister has barely initialed the Locarno Accords in Berlin in October 192548. Stresemann that she is already looking to renege on her looked on the Rhineland Pact as a point of engagements”52.

47. An end to allied control of German disarmament was also a consideration [Gustav Stresemann, Vermächtnis. Der Nachlass in drei Bänden, Berlin, 1932, Bd. ii, p. 67-69 (edited by H. Bernard, Wolfgang Goetz & Paul Wiegler)]. 48. Eupen-Malmedy- zeit der Sicherheitspaktverhandlungen bis zur 1. Ablehenden Antwort der belg. Regierung, E120424-5, Gustav Stresemann, Abschrift, Reichsministerium, 2534, 20.10.1925 [Auswärtiges Amt (AA), R 29057k]. 49. Valentine Thomson, Briand. Man of peace, New York, 1930, p. 29. 50. Manfred J. Enssle, Stresemann’s territorial revisionism…, p. 80-114. 51. Robert Everts to Émile Vandervelde, 21.10.1925 (AAEB, 10.792/I/7116/1957, Eupen-Malmedy, ‘Pacte de Sécurité’); Eupen-Malmedy-zeit der Sicherheitspaktverhandlungen bis zur 1. Ablehenden Antwort der belg. Regierung, E120424-5, Gustav Stresemann, ‘Abschrift’, Reichsministerium, 22.10.1925 (AA, R 29.057k); Carl von Schubert, Staatssekretär,‘Abschrift’, 22.10.1925; Eupen-Malmedy zeit ser Sicherheitspaktverhandlungen bis zur 1. Ablehenden Antwort der belg. Regierung, Stresemann to Schacht, 22.10.1925 (AA, R 29.057k/E120426/5-8). 52. Eupen-Malmedy, Note to Émile Vandervelde, Belgian Foreign Minister, 27.10.1925 (AAEB, 10.792/I/20). 21 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

However Stresemann told the Reichstag’s would be interpreted as undermining its newly foreign affairs committee in January that reclaimed territories of Alsace and Lorraine. the connection between the retrocession of ‘Belgium’, he wrote, “in welcoming Germany’s Eupen-Malmedy in return for a resolution of overtures would gravely compromise itself in Belgium’s marks question had not originated the eyes of the allies”56. The Foreign Ministry with him but came from “various sides in was quick to dismiss suggestions that the Belgium”53. When Aloys Van de Vyvere, who question of altering Eupen-Malmedy’s status held the post of Belgian Prime Minister briefly had been entertained either at Locarno or in 1925, met with Dr. Schacht in December London. A press release insisted that “Not a of that year, they talked about the possible word was uttered with regard to this subject payment of marks by Germany to Belgium and no such transaction had begun”57. and the organisation of a new plebiscite. Stresemann seemed optimistic that France was In spite of their denials and hushed diplomacy, on the brink of entertaining discussions of a by March further communications had taken similar nature over the Saarland. In exchange place between Stresemann and Belgian for abandoning its insistence on deferring representatives58. In a meeting with Everts, any consultation in the Saar before fifteen Stresemann suggested solving the question years, France could acquire mining rights of Eupen-Malmedy through the initiation of in the mineral basin. As Enssle points out, a new Belgian-German “friendship treaty” Stresemann seemed to have overestimated the where all other questions could be addressed extent to which Germany’s relatively strong including the marks question. He looked economic position could dictate its revisionist forward to meeting with Vandervelde ‘in ambitions54. Indeed the German Chancellor private’. According to Stresemann Everts was furthermore overlooked French concerns for of the opinion that Belgium did not want to be the future of Alsace-Lorraine55. seen to be taking the first step and preferred to see the matter put before ‘her friends’ in order Vandervelde had previously written to Everts to measure their reaction. Furthermore Everts in November pointing out that the question of seemed anxious that agreement be reached rendering Eupen-Malmedy back to Germany on the kinds of figures involved. Stresemann was all the more peculiar since the Locarno insisted that one must first be clear as to Treaty had just reinforced Belgium’s present whether an agreement was at all possible status. Furthermore, he warned that as far as “even beyond the numbers”. He suggested France was concerned such a development to Everts that if Vandervelde were “ready for

53. Köpke to Auswärtiges Amt, 16.1.1926 [AA, Belgien, (Bd.2-Bd.3), R/28581/D/590636/56]. 54. Manfred J. Enssle, Stresemann’s territorial revisionism…, p. 122-123. 55. Idem, p. 115- 120. 56. Émile Vandervelde to Robert Everts, 3.11.1925, letter cited in Note pour le Roi sur la Question d’Eupen-Malmédy, p.10-11, 6.8.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I/27, Eupen-Malmedy, Eupen-Malmedy). 57. AA, Eupen-Malmedy-zeit der Sicherheitspaktverhandlungen bis zur 1. Ablehenden Antwort der belg. Regierung, R 29057k/E120424/14/560, Telegram, 16.12.1925, Circulaire d’information, no.147, 17.12.1925. 58. Émile Vandervelde to Baron de Cartier de Marchienne, 28.12.1925 (AAEB, 10.792/613/34, Eupen-Malmedy). The city of Eupen lies on the river Vesder and borders on the vast Ducal Forest. With 15,000 inhabitants in 1920, it was the largest city in the annexed German territory. Below: Eupen’s Town Hall where inhabitants could voice their protest in 1920, under the benign eye of the new rulers. (Cegesoma, nr. 35777 and nr. 35779) 23 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

serious negotiations”, he for his part was ready formulate a proposition without having prior to consult with the Governor of the Bank of consultation with the English and American, England Montagu Norman, and the Agent and made it known to Delacroix that he was General for Reparations Parker Gilbert on the going to raise the issue within Norman and design of the scheme59. Gilbert in a matter of days61.

In March Delacroix was back in Berlin and Édouard Rolin-Jaequemyns now Belgian met with Stresemann. During previous visits Interior Minister showed little enthusiasm for Delacroix and Dr. Schacht had discussed such a strategy. His analysis of the situation the possibility of Germany handing over is revealing. He told Everts : “The Belgian five million German marks to the Belgian Government can only but reject Stresemann’s Government. Now Gustav Stresemann wished overture. The organisation of a plebiscite in to take up where the previous talks had ended the terriotires annexés would be unjustified. and simultaneously explore the question In effect, the annexation of this territory in of the retrocession of Eupen and Malmedy. 1918 (sic) was not motivated by the will of the Delacroix was open to such a discussion peoples; they were only consulted to verify but made it clear that in order that the talks if an accentuated [German] national will reach a successful conclusion two conditions was going to become an obstacle to a more would have to be adhered to. One was that important and desired annexation, whether the Belgian Government could not hope to right or wrong, by the Belgian Government”62. impose a new referendum in the cantons without the imprimatur of the British and Albeit conceding that the method of execu­ French Governments. Therefore it was up to tion of the public expression of opinion in Germany to make representations in London 1920 was not above criticism, Jaequemyns and in Paris in order to facilitate such an believed that if anything, the results de­ outcome60. monstrated “beyond doubt, that the population of the annexed territories were in large part Secondly, as far as the repayment of marks was lukewarm and indifferent” to the outcome63. concerned it was imperative that Berlin make The more the Belgian Government considered a suitable offer which would be acceptable its options, the less it began to look favourably to Brussels. Stresemann duly agreed to the on tinkering with the status quo not least conditions and urged Delacroix to speak in light of the Locarno Treaty. Vandervelde again to Dr Schacht about the exchange of told the cabinet on 3 May “it is impossible marks. As with Stresemann, the President of to begin negotiations on this subject as long the Reichsbank was of the opinion that the as the British and French governments have German Government would not be able to not taken the initiative”64.

59. Unterredung mit Herrn Delacroix, 26.3.1926 (AA, R285.81, Belgien, Bd.2-3, D/590670- 74/91-5). 60. Robert Everts, Belgian Minister in Berlin to Émile Vandervelde, 27.3.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I, Eupen-Malmedy). 61. Ibidem. 62. Note de Rolin Jacquemyns to Everts, 26.4.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I/40, Eupen-Malmedy, “Strictement Confidentiel”). 63. Ibidem. 64. Conseil des Ministres (1916-1949), 3.5.1926 (AGR, BE-A0510/1252/02). Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 24

By 8 May Vandervelde was rowing back on “But where to find this money?” he asked. the advances made by Delacroix. He told “Germany which is currently teeming with Everts in Berlin that “It is important above all money following the industrial crisis has to note that Mr Delacroix in his conversation just made us a proposition”. The Reichsbank with Mr Stresemann (…) only forwarded a offered to immediately pour 30 million dollars personal opinion; the Government of the King into the Belgian state. The loan would be paid not having charged him with any mission to to the Banque nationale to the account of the this end”65. Vandervelde now insisted that Belgian state. the question of the recovery of marks from Germany was a “moral obligation” which Francqui advised that France ought to be the German administration had to fulfill “un­ consulted before committing to any deal. conditionally”66. Stresemann reacted calmly Jaspar sought clarification on the fact that the on hearing of the latest shift in opinion from Reichsbank offered to lend 30 million dollars Brussels. He believed that the occasion to to be paid back over 30 monthly payments discuss the holding of a referendum in Eupen- from 30 Nov. 1926. “Our situation would Malmedy would present itself again, once be greatly improved” he told the cabinet Germany was represented on the Council of “as instead of disposing of 5 million dollars the League of Nations67. But while Brussels per month we would have to pay only 1 may have appeared reticent, the prospect million a month which would be possible of doing some kind of a deal had not been for us to support”. Jaspar was eager to go entirely discounted. down this route, but he too recognised the importance of obtaining French permission. On 26 July Henri Jaspar, who had only recently Vandervelde agreed to support such a move taken over as Prime Minister, asked Francqui and proposed together with Francqui, to if Germany was willing to pay “an important consult with the French Government in Paris. sum” independent of the Eupen-Malmedy Justice Minister Hymans lent his support to question. At the time Delacroix had gone to the meeting also, asking; “In the event that Berlin to meet again with Schacht. Francqui it would be opposed, one should ask what drew the cabinet’s attention to the current [Paris] proposes instead”. Jaspar was satisfied financial situation in Belgium. The Belgian with the cabinet’s unanimity­ in favour of economy was operating a deficit of between a demarche to Paris. In terms of public 300 and 400 million francs per month. There knowledge the meeting was to be portrayed was the added problem of exterior debt as Brussels simply making contact with the payments which were due in three months new French Government under Raymond amounting to a sum of 45,000,000 francs. Poincaré68.

65. Émile Vandervelde to Robert Everts, 8.5.1926 (AAEB, 10792/III/43/350/26). 66. Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic, London, 2004, p. 75. 67. Robert Everts to Émile Vandervelde, 27.5.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/III/44). 68. Poincaré took over as Prime Minister of France and leader of the Democratic Alliance government [Alliance démocratique] which was a government of National Union (1926-9), replacing the Cartel des Gauches under Aristide Briand and briefly under Edouard Herriot. It would be his final tenure as French Premier [Conseil des Ministres (1916-1949), 26.7.1926 (AGR, BE-A0510/1252/02)]. 25 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

Around this time a report prepared for the “no serious strategic reasons” to compensate Belgian king by Count Pierre van Zuylen at for the disadvantages already stated. In the Belgian Foreign Ministry presented the total, it suggested that the advantages of the arguments for and against Eupen-Malmedy annexation were not worth the risks endured. remaining part of Belgium69. It asked, “if On the other hand, the union of the districts Belgium, free of all engagement had to decide with Belgium, endorsed by the League of whether it was advantageous or dangerous to Nations made it impossible to return them to attach Eupen and Malmedy to its territory”. Germany. Chiefly because the people who The report began by first arguing the wisdom hadn’t considered an attachment to Belgium of not acquiring the territory, citing three had since become either accommodated or specific reasons which, had they been made resigned to the new regime. A number had public would have surely have sounded the furthermore already demonstrated their loyalty death knell for Belgium’s annexation. to Belgium by taking the oath of allegiance to the king and the state 72. The first of these points stated how the population of the district had not dreamt of an Van Zuylen suggested that if the district of attachment to Belgium. If in some cases the Malmedy and the surrounding Walloon vil­ ties of friendship and of neighbourliness were lages were not included in the retrocession affirmed on either side of the border between to Germany this latter issue would not pose Eupen-Malmedy and Belgium as proof of a a problem. In this way, even at the heart of common existence since ancient times, there the political establishment it was recognized was never a serious aspiration towards union. that assimilation to the Belgian nation had The people were ‘attached’ to Germany and not happened. Fear was expressed over “had not asked to change patrie”70. the problems which a new consultation would bring. In the first instance it would The second point argued how the reattachment mean admitting to irregularities in the first to Belgium rendered any reconciliation to consultation and would furthermore be Germany more difficult. In effect, Germany interpreted as “a blatant denial of the Leauge continued to consider the people as its own of Nation’s ratification”. Of course, at the and sought to create an irredentist agitation. core of such fears were the implications This was a worrying development the report which the retrocession of Eupen-Malmedy warned as, “[T]he day when the Reich wishes in whole or in part would have on the Ver­ to undertake a war of revenge it will find in sailles Treaty itself. Such a move threatened this question a pretext by which to attack to isolate Belgium internationally at a time us”71. In arguing against the annexation the when it needed commitments from France report finally noted how there seemed to be and Belgium in the wake of the Locarno

69. Baron Pierre van Zuylen was appointed to the second section of the Comité politique at the Ministère des Affaires étrangères in January 1921 with responsibility for Northern Europe. He would serve in this post until October 1944. 70. Baron Pierre van Zuylen, Note pour le Roi sur la question d’Eupen-Malmedy, 6.8.1926 [(AAEB, 10.792/III/27). 71. Idem, p. 16. 72. Idem, p. 17. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 26

Accords73. In spite of these fears the report but was of interest to the whole of Europe. listed a number of the benefits which might He reminded those present how during the accrue to Belgium in the event of striking a negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference deal. The only way of moving things forward the POB had raised objections against the in this regard was for Germany to take the acquisition by Belgium of purely German initiative to remove any obstacles resulting villages. He then insisted that an acquisition from the Treaty. Whether or not Germany did of this nature was “in opposition to the this in conjunction with France and England political principles professed by Belgians”, or whether it did so at the League of Nations and “had the potential for stoking up trouble didn’t matter. At all costs Belgium could not down the road”. Vandervelde went on to be seen to have taken the first step74. claim how he was close to resigning over the issue at the time. He rowed back on this in III. France’s Double Game view of the trouble it would have brought to the delegation’s work. Having listed the efforts made by the Belgian state in recent months in As Belgian officials individually and collec­ attempting to tidy up its finances, Vandervelde tively continued to hypothesise about the outlined the communications which had taken prospect of Eupen-Malmedy being returned to place between Dr Schacht and Delacroix Germany either in part or whole, it was always over the recovery of the German marks. He a given that any agreement would depend on told how Delacroix had raised with Everts the the approval of both Britain and France. The virtual impossibility the Germans would have meeting between French and Belgian officials in recovering the marks as they were tied by on the situation in Eupen-Malmedy took place the conditions attaching to the Dawes Plan76. on 30 July 1926, at the French spa town of Châtel Guyon in the Auvergne where Belgian Instead, Germany offered to provide the ministers tested the waters of French opinion. Belgian Treasury with a loan of 30 million The meeting was attended by Vandervelde, dollars. If Belgium would agree to link the and Francqui as well as Baron de Gaiffier loan to the return of the two districts Germa­ for the Belgian side. Across the table sat ny promised to offer extremely favourable Poincaré now once again French Premier and interest and repayment terms. Stresemann, beside him Aristide Briand, who as Foreign it was noted, was dogged in his intention to Minister had been one of the chief architects start negotiations on the matter and indicated of Locarno75. Vandervelde opened the session that he would raise the issue at the time of by providing a brief resumé on how Eupen- Germany’s admission to the League of Nations Malmedy had been annexed to Belgium. He in Geneva. It was then hoped that it would be observed that the ‘retrocession’ of the cantons possible to organise a plebiscite in the cantons to Belgium at that time was something that or at least in the strongly populated German concerned not only Belgium and Germany communes.

73. Idem, p. 18-19. 74. Idem, p. 19-20. 75. Jacques Néré, The foreign policy of France from 1914-1945, London, 1975, p. 65-80. 76. Baron de Gaiffier,Entrevue entre les ministres belges et français du 30 juillet 1926, à 2 heures de l’après-midi, 7.8.1926, p. 3 (AAEB, 10.792/I/55). Belgium’s first post-WWI government was led by Léon Delacroix. It consisted ofsix Catholic, three Socialist and three Liberal ministers. Next to Delacroix (on the far left) is Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, (fourth from the right) next to Henri Jaspar, the Minister of Economic Affairs, (third from the right). (Cegesoma, nr. 40916) Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 28

At the very mention of ‘plebiscite’ an irritated It wasn’t just in France that passions were Poincaré intervened and shouted “That would raised. In Eupen the former secretary general be even worse”. The gathering now took on of the Eupen-Malmedy Government Pierre a more intense atmosphere. Francqui took Van Werveke was incredulous on hearing of up the argument for the Belgians following the moves by Belgium to sell back the German Poincaré’s intervention and detailed the speaking communes80. He wondered, how difficulties being faced by the Belgian Treasury “having governed the people of these districts and how beneficial a loan of 30 million for six years and having attempted to assi­ dollars from Germany would be. ‘Germany’, milate them into the state that Belgians dared he stated “is awash with gold. It doesn’t know to propose that we throw in the towel, and how to spend it”77. This was in reference to push for this abominable exchange”. Van the new loans arranged from the United States Werveke likened such notions to “selling as part of the Dawes Plan78. Poincaré then souls”81. His criticisms were largely premised interrupted Francqui to verify if Germany’s on the potentially adverse impact on the local demands amounted to the retrocession of economy if the districts returned to Germany, Eupen-Malmedy and St.Vith in their entirety and not on any historical or ethnic grounds. or just the ethnic German villages. “The German villages, most certainly” Francqui In spite of Poincaré’s smothering of the replied. Then, having listened to the Belgian prospect of a retrocession to Germany in late representatives Poincaré gathered himself for July, the Belgian Government took its time a moment before replying : The Government to quell rumours of an imminent deal being of the Republic raises the most serious struck. It would take a further three weeks objections against any connection between before a definitive statement was issued by a loan being granted to Belgium by Germany the Belgian Prime Minister Henri Jaspar on and the question of Eupen-Malmedy. The the matter of the putative Rückkauf. In the Reich does not attach a great importance meantime, local and international press re­ to these cantons, on the contrary it attaches ports continued to predict that a deal in some a very great importance to dismantling the shape or form was imminent. The Manchester Versailles Treaty. It has hatched and ripened Guardian noted how “It is unquestionable its plan. It begins with Eupen-Malmedy to that the plebiscite which took place in Eupen continue by Alsace79. and Malmedy under the Peace Treaty was a

77. Ibidem. 78. Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des relations internationals. Les crises du XXe siècle de 1914-1929, Paris, 1957, p. 244-247. 79. Entrevue entre les ministres belges et français du 30 Juillet 1926, p. 5 (AAEB, 10.792/I/55). 80. Pierre Van Werveke (1893-1952) was a lawyer but also worked for some time as a journalist with Libre Belgique. He would succeed Baltia in 1923 following calls for Balita’s departure, however his powers would be greatly reduced as Brussels began to take a more direct role in the territory. Following the German invasion of 1940 he was arrested on account of his suspected anti-German activities. He was eventually released and fled to Brussels where after the war he worked as a lawyer at the Court of Appeal. He was later made a justice and sat in Eupen where he was also president of the Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (Gerard Kleu, Die Neuordnung der Ostkantone Belgiens…, p. 25). 81. Pierre Van Werveke in a letter to Bien Public, 11.8.1926 (AMAEB, 10.792/I/63, Eupen-Malmedy). 29 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

complete imposture, and that the population blocking the negotiations86. If the Belgian was always overwhelmingly pro-German. A Government had unconditionally made new plebiscite would therefore be a matter of clear to the outside world that it had no in­ simple justice even if Belgium were to receive ten­tion of exchanging les cantons rédimés no indemnification”82. According to its Berlin in whole or part for whatever­ recompense correspondent a plebiscite was likely in the was on offer,­ few were convinced. Jaspar autumn. He concluded “Humanly speaking, was once more forced to issue a public it would be all for the better if the inhabitants statement on the in­accuracy of press reports of Eupen, Malmedy and the Saar could be in spite of his statement of 21 August. In liberated from alien rule and sources of a dispatch to the district commissioner of constant friction be removed”83. Verviers Jaspar noted that : I have already twice denied these fantas­tic rumours. As In Berlin, Everts appeared at sixes and sevens the press continues to be pre­occupied with it, I by mid-August when he wrote to Vandervelde : beseech you to employ all of your influence “In essence I really don’t know which point on the authorities under your control to scotch of view to put forward in my conversations, these baseless utterings87. and furthermore I have not received any information on the talks which ought to be in The rumours persisted however because in hand since Monsieur Delacroix’s last visit to reality it was not Belgium but France which Berlin some weeks ago”84. was to have the final say as to whether this double redemption of marks for ‘souls’ would When Henri Jaspar eventually issued a firm go ahead. But for the intervention of Poincaré denial of any deal having been done with the result may have been altogether different. Germany the game was up. In response to a A lingering feeling of a lost opportunity question posed by the Daily Telegraph cor­ among the Germans and thoughts of what respondent in Brussels, Jaspar stated “there might have been by a certain segment on have never been, and there will not be, offi­ the Belgian side continued to hang in the cial negotiations on the part of the Belgian air. Later conversations between Briand and Government concerning the redeemed can­ Stresemann at Thoiry on the margins of the tons …… there have been no official negotia­ Geneva summit that year to ratify the Locarno tions whatsoever”85. His denial was equally Accords ignited the possibility of some quid represented­ in the German press as was Bri­ pro quo between France and Germany over tish Prime Minister Austen Chamberlain’s in­ Eupen-Malmedy. Germany had been admitted sis­tence that he had nothing to do with to the League of Nations earlier that month88.

82. “Germany’s lost provinces. Repurchase plan, Eupen, Malmedy and the Saar, Conversations­ begun” (Manchester Guardian, 13.8.1926); Heidi Christmann, Presse und gesellschaftliche­ Kommunikation in Eupen-Malmedy zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, München, 1974, p. 318- 24. 83. Ibidem. 84. Robert Everts to Émile Vandervelde, 18.8.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I/6433/1770). 85. Henri Jaspar cited in Daily Telegraph, 21.8.1926 (AA, R285.81Belgien, Bd. 2-3, 54/204-5). 86. Robert Everts to Émile Vandervelde, 23.8.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I/68). 87. Henri Jaspar cited in La Libre Belgique, 25.8.1926. 88. Valentine Thomson, Briand…, p. 279. After the annexation, German traffic signs were replaced by bilingual signs, which could lead to errors in the French version… (Cegesoma, nr. 35789) 31 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

Briand and Stresemann struck up a very close hostile to talks over the cession of Eupen- relationship during their virtual ownership Malmedy, today, without consultation takes of their respective foreign ministries. They the initiative”91. When Vandervelde made now sought to build on the as yet fragile a representation to the French ambassador foundations of the Locarno Accords. At Thoiry Herbette he was assured that no accord with the two men examined in general terms a Germany would have been finalised without number of possible solutions to some of the first consulting Belgium. Vandervelde was more vexing questions that divided France and enthusiastic about the prospect of a settlement Germany89. Among which was the question of of the Eupen Malmedy question. However he returning the Saarland to German sovereignty was adamant that Belgium needed to be at the without a plebiscite. The idea being that heart of the negotiations and not referred to Germany would buy back the Saar coalmines as an afterthought when all details had been from France for some 300 million marks. The settled. Directions were to be given without issue of German disarmament would have to delay to Belgium’s foreign representatives92. be dealt with also, along with the winding down of the Inter-Allied Military Control Such preoccupation with the Eupen-Malmedy Commission, which had been established to question in spite of Jaspar’s denials shows how oversee German disarmament. In addition, fluid the situation remained in the autumn of the military occupation would be brought 1926, six years after the Versailles Treaty had to an end well ahead of the 1935 deadline. come into effect. One individual remained If common agreement on all of these issues of a clear and fixed opinion as to how to could be reached then Germany would be proceed from this juncture. In an interview allowed a free hand to re-open negotiations that summer General Baltia, echoed the words with Belgium over the retrocession of Eupen- of US President Wilson in 1918 when he Malmedy90. stated that “We cannot treat their inhabitants [of Eupen-Malmedy] like merchandise which An enraged Prime Minister Jaspar told the one cedes to the highest bidder”. Furthermore Belgian cabinet that if the conversations Baltia insisted that any doubt thrown on the between Germany and France were confir­ legitimacy of the consultation of 1920 was med it would be necessary to make a formal unfounded. “As a soldier, I merely observed protest to the French Government. It is in the Treaty of Versailles. There was no talk of a effect “intolerable that France, having made referendum, neither of a plebiscite, as claimed it clearly understood to us that she was today by Germany”93. Baltia had consistently

89. Time, 27.9.1926. 90. As Jacobson and Walker point out and as is evident from Strese­ mann’s papers both he and Briand had long planned for such a meeting since the time of the Locarno Conference the previous year [Gustav Stresemann, Vermächtnis. Der Nachlass in Drei Bänden, Berlin, 1932-1933, ii, p. 437-438, 451-3,465-6, 470-3 & iii, p. 15-16; Jon Jacobson & John T. Walker, “The impulse for a Franco-German entente. The origins of the Thoiry Conference, 1926”, in Journal of Contemporary History, 10 (1), 1.1975, p. 161-165]. 91. Conseil des Ministres (1916-1949), 21.9.1926 (AGR, BE-A0510/1252/02). 92. Idem, 6.10.1926. 93. Lieutenant General Baron Baltia cited in Matin belge, 18.9.1926. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 32

made the distinction between a plebiscite in part or whole had abated. Nevertheless, or referendum and the popular consultation the full impact of these events had yet to as stipulated by article 34 of the Versailles be felt. By the end of 1926 it seemed that Treaty. But perception was just as important as for both Germany and Belgium the best procedure and the stain of la petite farce belge opportunity yet to strike a deal on Eupen- had not faded with time. Malmedy had passed. Yet as the shadow over these events slowly retreated the Belgian state On New Year’s Day 1927 most of the region’s would have to show just how ready it was newspapers collectively published a petition to complete Baltia’s project of assimilation addressed to the government in Brussels and honour the commitments made in his demanding that a new and secret plebiscite proclamation. A second attempt by Germany be held94. In the rest of Belgium a similar in 1929 to reignite the Eupen-Malmedy for campaign was led by the Socialists who marks question did not meet with the same looked on such a referendum as a necessary enthusiasm from the Belgian side98. Even so step to resolve the thorny issue of Eupen- Belgium’s ham-fisted attempts at attempting Malmedy’s future. The electoral success of to sell back the districts to Germany in 1926 the Socialists in the elections was seen as did much to undermine its influence; its good testament to the popularity of their stance faith having already been called into question on the plebiscite95. The socialist deputy Marc following the infamous public expression Somerhausen endorsed this demand, stressing of opinion in 1920. But these were not the how after five years of a transitory government only issues which threatened to undo the even the Walloons of Malmedy had hardly assimilatory project. been assimilated to the Belgian State96.

The Governor of Liège Gaston Grégoire IV. Confluence of Conscience published a proclamation confirming that Eupen-Malmedy and St.Vith would remain The administrative structures put in place within Belgium and dismissing the prospect in the wake of Baltia’s departure seemed ad of a new popular consultation to decide the hoc at best. In essence, there appeared to future of the territories. The proclamation was be little coordination between the different signed by the Prime Minister Henri Jaspar, services of the state. The commissioner for the Foreign Minister Emile Vandervelde and arrondissement of Verviers Bribosia was now Interior Minister Vauthier97. By now the threat also the representative of central government of a quick sell off of Eupen-Malmedy either for the three districts of Eupen, Malmedy and

94. La Semaine; Die Arbeit; Eupener Nachrichten; Der Landbote; Malmédy St. Vither Volkszeitung. Three newspapers did not sign the petition however : La Nouvelle Belgique; L’Invalide; and La Gazette des Métiers et Négoces. 95. Le Soir, 9.1.1927; Obert de Thieusies, Chargé d’Affaires de Belgique to Émile Vandervelde, 10.1.1927 (AAEB, 10.792/I427-17); Procureur du Roi, Verviers to Procureur Général, 4.1.1927 (AAEB, 10.792/I/14). 96. Marc Somerhausen cited in Die Arbeit, 26.12.1925. 97. “Proclamation”, 3.2.1927 (AAEB, 10.792/ III). 98. Manfred J. Enssle, Stresemann’s territorial revisionism…, p.178-180; Klaus Pabst, “Eupen Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs- und Parteienpolitik…”, p. 481-488. 33 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

St.Vith. Bribosia had a considerable amount of Belgium”. In a brief outline of the experiences additional problems with which to contend, of the cantons since their attachment to not least the fact that the majority of his new Belgium, de Grand Ry appears defeatist in charges were ethnic-German, while dearth concluding : “Neither our legislation, nor our of functionaries proficient in German seve­ principles can be of much aid to us in this rely hampered his administrative objectives. struggle. This territory will always remain an Whilst the commissaires d’arrondissement irredentist territory and an object of discord cor­­responded with their subordinates in between a great power and a small country. German, at the provincial headquarters of I do not see how we will ever be able to the permanent deputation in Liège, which assimilate this population”100. oversaw the entire province, not one person was proficient in the German language. Such an admission would surely have Bribosia’s only ad-joint was Jules de Grand Ry unhinged even the most confident of Belgian based in Eupen. statesmen had it been made public. De Grand Ry was merely putting into print what many De Grand Ry had formerly been the District of his contemporaries were thinking. His final Commissioner for Eupen under Baltia, during few words leave us in no doubt as to how which time he wielded considerable authority. precarious Belgium’s position had become in Privately de Grand Ry believed that in the the region, and carried with them a portent of absence of a strongman such as Baltia the future upheaval. “Fatally” he wrote, “sooner central administration in Brussels had fallen or later we will enter into conflict with the short in terms of facilitating the assimilation Reich”101. and had become estranged from its new citizens99. De Grand Ry recognised that certain German irredentist organizations were primed to A memo written by the former district take full advantage of the confusion created commissioner in 1927, posed a number by Belgium’s botched negotiations over the of searching questions which the Belgian marks question and what looked increasing­ Government seemed unwilling to ask. De ly like the unraveling of its project of assi­ Grand Ry wondered : “To what must we milation. The work of patriotic German attribute this lack of success which we have orga­nizations such as the Heimatbund and always sought to veil as much as possible the Landwirtschaftlicher Kreisverband were in official reports?”. He continued, “We essential in maintaining cultural ties with have made many illusions as to the true Germany. The Heimatbund, founded in the sentiments which animate this population so Hotel Genten in St.Vith in 1926, boasted some fundamentally German and who, at the end 450 members at the time of its inception102. of the day, never wanted to be attached to Membership of the organisation could be

99. Commissariat de District à Eupen, 23.3.1927 (AAEB, 10.792/III, Rapport Jules de Grand Ry). 100. Ibidem. 101. Commissariat de District à Eupen, 23.3.1927 (AAEB, 10.792/III, Rapport Jules de Grand Ry). 102. Bruno Kartheuser, Les années trente à Eupen-Malmedy…, p. 59. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 34

gained by the payment of one franc. By 1930 initial reasons given in support of Belgium’s its membership had risen to over 3,000103. The annexation of Eupen-Malmedy was that the Heimatbund presented itself as an organisation territory would act as a buffer zone between based on defending the mores and customs “old Belgium” and Germany107. However, now as well as the traditions and the mentality of the realization seemed to be that this Trojan the German people104. But the Heimatbund horse had brought with it more problems than was just one of a number of German cultural it actually had solved. organisations dedicated to the welfare of Germans living abroad or Auslandsdeutsche. The general election of 1929 again saw the Many of these organisations straddled the line Socialists receive the largest share of the vote between cultural affirmation and political nationally, albeit only narrowly ahead of the agitation. They had their genesis in the middle Catholic Party. Despite this, they would not of the nineteenth century in territories to form part of the incoming administration where significant German populations had which was to be a coalition of the Union emigrated105. The ease, with which such catholique and Liberals with Jaspar once organizations took root and indeed flourished, again as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, in was addressed in a report compiled by the Eupen, Malmedy and St.Vith a pro-German Belgian Foreign Ministry in 1930. The report political party the Christliche Volkspartei pointed to a lack of foresight on the part of entered the fray for the first time taking more the architects of Versailles in not properly than 52 % of the votes; almost twice that of mapping out a period of economic transition the POB and two and a half times that of the for the region as had been the case with other Union Catholique108. The CVP emerged from territories ceded from Germany106. among dissident elements within the Union catholique which had become disenchanted As with the aborted sale of Eupen-Malmedy with the party’s opposition to a new plebiscite. to Germany in 1926, it was the prospect of When combined with the vote for the POB in economic gain which dictated Belgium’s the region it meant that more than 75 % of approach to the cantons in the post-Baltia the electorate had voted for a party advocating period. But it was not the only consideration. a new plebiscite109. The result of the election, Belgium’s security was another. One of the as with the communal elections of 1926, was

103. Julius Böhmer, Eupen-Malmedy-St.Vith. Ein Heimatbuch, Eupen, 1934, p. 72-74. 104. Gazette de la Croix, 10.8.1926; Ministère de la Justice to Ministère de l’Intérieure, 25.8.1926 (AAEB, 10.792/I/33/6256). 105. Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal & Nancy Reagin (eds.), The Heimat abroad. The boundaries of Germanness, Ann Arbor, 2005, p. 40-57. 106. Note remise par …..Puisset, Impériali and Jules Destrée à la commission des affaires extérieures à propos de Mlamédy [sic] (AAEB, Classement B, D331/10). Contained in MAE correspondence to Baron Moncheur, 6.1919. Receiver Sets in Belgium, 13.4.1950, RG. 59, Central Decimal 511.553-511.55A5, f: 2, NARA. 107. Paul Hymans, Note LIII, 16.4.1919 (AAEB/D331). 108. Roger E. de Smet et al, Atlas des élections…, p. 224; Kurzer Querschnitt über die Lage in Eupen- Malmedy [no date but around the time of the election in May 1929] (LANRW, Regierung Aachen Präsidialbüro und Sondergruppen, 1655/6836/218). 109. Jochen Lentz, Das Wahlverhalten in den Kantonen Eupen, Malmedy und St.Vith bei den Parlamentswahlen von 1925-1939, vol. I, Eupen, 2000, p. 29-55; Christoph Brüll, “Eupen-Malmedy 1918-1945…”, p. 10-12. Post cards from 1925 on the occasion of the Locarno Conference, where Emile Vandervelde (upper right) represented Belgium. Above we can also see (from left to right) Briand, Chamberlain and Stresemann, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Great Britain and Germany respectively. The picture below shows a seated Stresemann, Chamberlain and Briand. They would receive the Nobel Peace Prize for their work at Locarno. (Bundesarchiv)

Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 36

seen by German revanchists as a definite in such a toxic environment it was extremely verdict against attachment to Belgium110. important that Brussels did not perform “the In the legislative elections of 1932 both the politics of the ostrich”. It was obvious to Jaspar POB and the CVP vote dipped, albeit slightly that something needed to be done about these while the Union catholique experienced a “new Belgians who hid in the shadow of resurgence. The Union cathoique’s resurrec­ the constitution” which allowed them great tion was aided in no small way by the Bishop freedom of movement and of expression. of Liège Monsignor Kerkhofs’ pastoral letter which he ordered to be read in all of the There was good reason for such renewed churches throughout the border districts. The vigour from Brussels. On 30 January 1933 the letter warned the faithful of the conduct of the coming to power of Adolf Hitler as German ‘autonomists’ and the CVP. Chancellor was accompanied by an increased incidence of pro-German agitation in the In light of the electoral successes recorded districts. Overt displays of Nazi paraphernalia by the CVP and pro-German candidates, became a regular occurrence. The Belgian a renewed attempt was made by Brussels authorities were forced to confront the to reorganise the administrative network in problem of pro-German as well as pro- the cantons. Prohibitive measures against Nazi activities in the border region head anti-Belgian activity were introduced and a on. A veritable “work of purification of the new, “properly constructed politics” sought administrative framework was systematically “through psychological means to tie the new pursued” by Brussels. The gendarmerie at citizens to Belgium”111. In March one hundred the border received instructions to round up gendarmes cyclistes were sent from Brussels foreigners who had come from the other side to the cantons to reinforce surveillance on the of the border and indulged in such activities as border with Germany, equipped with “special political agitation, singing pro-Nazi songs, and armaments”. The barracks in Eupen and in wearing uniforms or insignia of a particular Malmedy received reinforcements of 76 mor­ political persuasion. Such foreigners were to tars and some military vehicles. In addition be rounded up and presented with expulsion weekly leave arrangements for soldiers sta­ orders, whilst the crime which they were tioned in both districts were regulated in such deemed to have committed would be pursued a way as to allow for a sufficient number of by the courts113. units to be available at any one time. Troops stationed in Verviers, Spa and in Liège could Aboard the trams from Eupen to Aachen the be sent as further reinforcements if needed112. railway personnel began to sport the swastika Henri Jaspar as Interior Minister believed that symbol on their headgear. Although this was

110. Neueste Nachrichten, 29.5.1929; “Die Wahlen in Belgien”, in Politisches Tageblatt, 27.5.1929. 111. Tableau de la politique, p. 2 (AAEB, 10.792/III). 112. Ministère de la Défense to Paul Hymans, 3.3.1933 (AAEB, 10.792/I/62). 113. Unauthored internal memo at the Ministère des Affaires étrangères [No date] (AAEB, 10.792/I); Monsieur l’Inspecteur Général de la Gendarmerie to Général Major, Commandant le Corps de Gendarmerie, Bruxelles, 29.8.1933 (AAEB, 10.792/I). As Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Henri Jaspar was a key figure in the negotiations with Germany on Eupen-Malmedy in the 1920s. (Cegesoma, nr. 40951) On 5 April 1925, the inhabitants of Eupen-Malmedy could participate in Belgian parliamentary elections for the first time. The young socialist candidate Marc Somerhausen became the first elected representative from the expanded district of Verviers, of which Eupen-Malmedy was now part. (Cegesoma, nr. 164257) 39 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

reluctantly accepted by Belgian officials utterly”116. Werson, the socialist burgomaster as unavoidable, it was at the same time not of Malmedy who, as a citizen of the Reich unusual for flags bearing the swastika to be had fought for Kaiser and Vaterland in the seen protruding from train carriages. The Great War, and had facilitated the sending of railway line from Raeren to Kalterherberg schoolchildren to Germany on Ferienkinder, crossed German territory for a stretch of about now no longer wished to be involved in such 20kms. This had been the less than satisfactory activities117. result of torturous deliberations by the border commission set up under the Treaty of In spite of such fervent activity Count André de Versailles. The resulting conundrum had been Kerchove de Denterghem who had replaced a worry to the Belgian authorities. Now as Everts as Belgium’s minister in Berlin was of tensions rose to new heights the track became the opinion that “since the arrival of Hitler an important artery for anti-Belgian activity. an almost complete calm reigned between Passengers increasingly found themselves Belgium and Germany, contrasting sharply intimidated by Nazi activists who boarded with the daily incidents and recriminations the trains once they entered German territory. that were produced previously”. In his view The trains were searched for anti-German “this radical political modification” was due newspapers and passengers were made to to Hitler’s own desire to give a completely give the Nazi salute on demand 114. different direction to German foreign policy and to re-establish Germany in all its military In Belgium, the socialists now began to power before proceeding to its territorial distance themselves from talk of a new claims, in as much as they could not be plebiscite with Hitler’s coming to power and settled amicably in the meantime. Kerchove this disenchantment was assured following his de Denterghem believed that the disturbances dissolution of all political opposition parties reported in Eupen and Malmedy were of in July 1933115. In the cantons themselves a more localised character and confined the party split amid the spread of Nazi mainly to agitators in the Rhineland118. In fervour. The former deputy for Verviers Marc spite of mounting evidence to the contrary De Somerhausen would later observe that from Kerchove believed Hitler’s peaceful intentions that moment Eupen-Malmedy and St.Vith towards Belgium to be “sincere”. The true “had converted to Nazism” and that from then culprits behind “the so called Hitlerian on he had become “the bête noire of the pro- propaganda in the cantons rédimés” needed German community….. The Nazis didn’t like to be unmasked and thus it was imperative me and let it show…. the climate had changed that “[t]he Belgian press, so quick to attack the

114. La Dernière Heure, 2.8.1933. 115. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936. Hubris, Harmonds­ worth, 1998, p. 475-478. 116. Marc Somerhausen cited in Alain Colignon, “Les dix-huit jours”, in Francis Balace (dir.), Jours de guerre, 2, Bruxelles, 1990, p. 105-113 (p. 105). 117. Katja Schenk, Les mouvements de jeunesse germanophiles dans le canton d’Eupen pendant l’entre- deux-guerres (2 vols), mém.lic. ULg, Université de Liège, 1997, [unpublished thesis]; Le Jour, 26-27.8.1933. 118. Count de Kerchove de Denterghem to Paul Hymans, 28.10.1933 (AAEB, 10.792/I/13273). Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 40

Third Reich, did not confuse a direct emissary plebiscite. Furthermore the CVP disappeared of the Führer with a former enemy from the as a political force with the outlawing of the Centre, skillfully camouflaged à la mode Zentrum Partei in Germany. Many who had nouvelle”119. supported the CVP now put their energies behind a new political formation in the When the result of the Saar plebiscite became region, the Heimattreue Front or “Defence known in January 1935 a fresh impetus was of the Homeland”, which was in essence the given to claims for a new plebiscite to be nazification of the CVP123. The Heimattreue held in Eupen-Malmedy. Few had expected Front did not contest the 1936 election and such a definitive result where over ninety instead directed its followers to boycott the percent of the population voted for a return exercise and enter a “vote blanc” in protest. to Germany120. “Nobody had ever believed If those wasted ballots had been counted they the possibility of seeing such a formidable would have amounted to more or less the majority declare itself in favour of Hitler’s same percentage of the vote as gained by the Germany”, wrote Belgium’s minister in CVP in the 1932 election124. Berlin121. The evident acclaim with which the result was greeted throughout Germany In the national elections of 1939 the and in Eupen was tempered by reflections in Heimattreue Front took almost 46 % of the some German publications as to the lack of vote, the largest for any party in the region transparency associated with other plebiscites in that election125. The Socialists were by conducted under Versailles. Publications such now almost obliterated in the cantons, cap­ as the Germania once again focused attention turing barely 5 % of the vote. However on the legitimacy of the public expression of nationally the Socialists still won over 30 % opinion of 1920, deeming it “a farce”122. of the votes, only slightly down on their 1936 performance. Although the Union catholique The national election in Belgium the following vote in real terms evinced an increase of some year was very different to any that had taken 1,541 votes, its share of the vote was still place in the districts. To begin with, although more than 7 % behind that of the Heimattreue the POB vote had held up nationally, in the Front, which achieved the highest vote of any cantons it had dropped by a third following the party in the three districts. Albeit in overall party’s policy U-turn on the holding of a fresh terms the vote for the Heimattreue Front was a

119. Ibidem. 120. It is interesting to note that although the result was overwhelmingly in favour of a return to Germany, many of those pro-German protestors wrote “gegen Hitler” [against Hitler] on their ballots (James Kerr Pollock, “The Saar plebiscite”, s.l., 1935, p. 282). 121. Count de Kerchove de Denterghem to Paul Hymans, 14.1.1935 (AAEB, 11.047/574, Légation belge). 122. Völkischer Beobachter, 19.1.1935. 123. Thomas Müller, Zwischen Maas und Rhein. Ein nationalsozialistisches Medienprojekt im deutsch-belgischen-niederländischen Grenzgebiet, Aachen, 1999, p. 23; Hubert Willems, Victimes et héros de la guerre, 1940-1945. Essai historique, Bruxelles, 1990 [unpublished], p. 55-57 (Cegesoma, A1192). 124. Roger E. de Smet et al, Atlas des élections…, p. 219-223. 125. Klaus Pabst, “Eupen Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs- und Parteienpolitik…”, p. 415-416. 41 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

minority one, nevertheless the party vote had greeted initially at least by a profound sense stabilized at around 46 %. That said the party’s of relief. If at the time the German authorities Nazi tendencies were enough to frighten off a had been inclined towards establishing a civil number of pro-German voters who had made administration under King Leopold III, the vast a clear distinction between pro-Nazi and pro- majority of Belgians would have had little German. Furthermore the anti-Catholic ethos problem in supporting it129. of the Nazi party discouraged many from embracing the movement especially in light However the occupation of Belgium and the of the anti-Nazi pronouncements of the local annexation of the Eastern Cantons were not one clergy126. and the same thing. The tight administrative structure in place in Eupen-Malmedy and While the invasion of Belgium in May 1940 St.Vith made it extremely difficult to resist was not wholly unexpected the rapidity of the regime. But even more constraining the German victory was. On 18 May Hitler were the primordial ties that bound many declared that “The territories separated individuals to their Vaterland, their German from the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles heritage and their Heimat. In commenting on and annexed by Belgium are once again in the French experience of Nazi occupation, the possession of Germany”127. As well as Julian Jackson has suggested that the history Eupen-Malmedy and St.Vith on 29 May a of the period “should be written not in black further ten communes in the north-east of and white, but in shades of grey”130. In the Liège in which a German patois was spoken Eastern Cantons this is equally the case. The were also annexed to the Reich128. In the lack of any pronouncement from the Belgian wake of “la campagne de dix-huit jours” the Government at the time of the annexation rest of Belgium was occupied and a military again made many feel that the territory had administration [Militärverwaltung] established been all but conceded to Nazi Germany. The in place of the Belgian government now in combination of historical antecedents only exile in London. Most Belgians believed that served to heighten the sense of confusion for them the war was over, and Belgium’s shared by the people of Eupen, Malmedy and role within the New Order a fait accompli. St.Vith, together with the more recent episodes Following the tumultuous years of political of the Rückkauf and the public expression of and ethnic wrangling inside Belgium cou­ opinion of 1920131. In the aftermath of the war, pled with the imminent threat of trouble these issues would again be painted over for from Germany the eventual occupation was the sake of political convenience.

126. Carlo Lejeune, Die Säuberung, i, p. 37-43; Peter M. Quadflieg, “Zwangssoldaten” und “Ons Jongen”. Eupen-Malmedy und Luxemburg als Rekruiterungsgebiet der deutschen Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Aachen, 2008, p. 32-33. 127. “Eupen-Malmedy wieder im Reich”, in Westdeutsche Wirtschafts-Zeitung, 23.5.1940. 128. Martin R. Schärer, Deutsche Annexionspolitik im Westen…, p. 168-174. 129. Paul Struye, L’évolution du sentiment public en Belgique sous l’occupation allemande, Bruxelles, 1944, p. 18-20. 130. Julian Jackson, France, the dark years, Oxford, 2001, p. 2-8. 131. Martin R. Schärer, Annexionspolitik im Westen…, p. 71. Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 42

The Nazi annexation opened yet another and Cremer have shown how correspondence transitory phase in which the inhabitants from the Belgian Justice Minister Janson who of Eupen-Malmedy would once again be along with the rest of the Belgian Government forced to comply with the exigencies of had fled to London in 1940, was willing to an annexationist state. Just twenty years recognise the annexation134. After the war it previously the territory had begun a difficult was touted that the Belgian Prime Minister transition from a no man’s land of confusion Hubert Pierlot had broadcasted a speech via and uncertainty to where people were deemed the BBC in July 1943 while heading Belgium’s in theory at least to have been assimilated into government in exile and stated that “The the famille belge. It was also a period in which population of Eupen-Malmedy is Belgian the democratic pulse stopped for the people of and will stay Belgian”. However no record Eupen-Malmedy. The annexation condemned of the speech has ever been found135. In this all of its inhabitants not only to four difficult way the inhabitants of Eupen-Malmedy and years of Nazi rule but to a further period St.Vith became the scapegoats for a nation of chastisement and collective culpability (and particularly its government) anxious to following the liberation of Belgium. While cleanse itself of its guilt over mistakes made some 700 joined the Wehrmacht of their during the interwar years. own volition a further 8,000 were forcibly conscripted132. Much ignorance still exists Commenting on the appetite for retribution throughout Belgium as to the nuances and throughout Belgium at the time, the Auditorat complexities as well as the ambiguities Général Walter Ganshof Van der Meersch, associated with this period of history. The the man charged with overseeing the mili­ sense of attachment ethnic Germans had tary tribunals, “[t]he nation wanted justice with their former Vaterland was by the same as much as it did bread. Even more than token misconstrued to at once mean pro- bread”136. A general ignorance as to the German, anti-Belgian or pro-Nazi. nuances and ambiguities pertaining to the situation in Eupen-Malmedy ensured that The Belgian Government officially at least those accused of collaboration with the refused to recognise the annexation of the enemy would in the end not receive justice. Eastern Cantons as legitimate since it had been The dossiers opened by the conseils de guerre declared on 18 May while the country was still established in both Eupen and Malmedy at war with Germany133. However Miessen from 1946, to try those accused of incivisme,

132. Pro Justicia, no. 350, 19.6.1946 (Cegesoma, Documents et rapports du service de l’Audi­torat général, AA/1418/350). 133. Béatrice Roeh, Les cantons de l’Est et l’annexion des territoires belges au Reich, p. 21. 134. Freddy Cremer & Werner Miessen, Spuren…, p. 29. 135. Martin R. Schärer, Deutsche Annexionspolitik im Westen…, p. 7. 136. Walter Ganshof van Der Meersch, Réflexions sur la Répression des crimes contre la sûreté ex­ térieure de l’État belge, Bruxelles, 1946, p. 6; John Gilissen, Histoire de la Répression de la collaboration avec l’ennemi ‘résumé’, 3.1984 (Cegesoma, Documents François Debroux concernant Belges en France et justice militaire et répression, 1940-2000, AA 1848/68). 43 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

implicated around 25 % of the population of a vulnerable population caught in the of the Eastern Cantons. This figure was interplay of irredentist ambitions on one much higher than the 4.5 % figure for the side and larger national aspirations on the greater part of Belgium137. When I sought other. The inhabitants of this borderland permission to consult the dossiers for Eupen- territory had often little option but to Malmedy which are presently in the care of navigate cautiously between the two poles Belgium’s Procureur général, I was refused on of conflicting national expectations. Belgium the grounds that the material was too sensitive was slow in reacting to the need to reassert and not yet suitable for public consultation138. its authority over the new districts, but My aim was to examine some of the transcripts when it finally did so it seemed too little in order to facilitate a better understanding of too late139. Following the Nazi invasion of the motiviations of those so called “inciviques”. Belgium in May 1940 and its occupation, I wanted to see how, in their own words, they Hitler decreed that Eupen and Malmedy defended their actions, not just in terms of along with some other villages which had their Nazi ‘collaboration’, but also in light of never before formed part of that territory the previous events of the interwar period. The were now annexed to the Reich. Thus dossiers relating to more than 15,000 hearings began a counter phase of nation building. lie quarantined in a storeroom in Mons. In this This was once more a period in which the archival sarcophagus lies a body of testimony democratic pulse stopped for the people of which has yet to be exhumed and forensically Eupen-Malmedy. examined. But such an endeavour must be undertaken with empathetic hands and an The treatment of these people from the objective mind. flawed public expression of opinion to the exploitation of the young and impressiona­ ble at the hands of both Belgian and V. Conclusion German propagandists contributed to the emergence of a confluence of conscience The malaise which characterised Belgium’s among the population at large. From the approach to la nouvelle Belgique up to signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919 the the mid 1930s hindered the progressive inhabitants of Eupen, Malmedy and St.Vith assimilation of the cantons as was evident found themselves trapped in a twilight in the rapid spread of pro-German cultural existence; torn between the demands of organisations and their eventual permeation the putative mother country [mère patrie] by Nazi elements. The success of such and the primordial and historical ties of the organisations relied also on the exploitation Vaterland to which they once belonged. The

137. Pierre Maxence, Les atouts gaspillés…, p. 55-56. 138. L. De Vidts, Avocat, près la Cour Militaire délégué au parquet de la Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles, to the Author, 12.2.2009. 139. Pierre Maxence, Les atouts gaspillés…, p. 37-39. German troops are welcomed in the Eastern Cantons in 1940 with Nazi flags and salutes.(Cegesoma, nr. 12768) 45 Belgium’s Ambiguous Assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy

ease with which the Nazi annexation was Malmedy Government during the period of eventually realised in 1940 was a conse­ transition observed that since his departure : quence of this confluence of conscience “[T]he Eupenoise and Malmedians, so used where having felt abandoned by the mother to waiting for directions under a German country, a bewildered populace sought secu­ regime or being able to address a functio­ rity and strong leadership in the arms of the nary during the period of transition had now Vaterland. In the last months of his life, been left to their own devices, with the feeling Herman Baltia who once headed the Eupen- that nobody cared about them anymore”140.

VINCENT O’CONNELL is from Cork city in Ireland, and lectures in Modern European History at the University of Limerick. His recent unpublished PhD thesis Becoming Belgian : Herman Baltia’s transitory regime and the attempted assimilation of Eupen-Malmedy 1919-1939 examines the transition of Eupen-Malmedy from German to Belgian sovereignty in the interwar period.

Abbreviations AA Auswärtiges Amt HC High Commissioner (Haut Com­ AAEB Archives du Ministère des missaire) Affaires Étrangères de Belgique HF Heimattreue Front ADV Alledeutscher Verband IARHC Inter-Allied Rhineland High AGR Archives Générales du Royaume­ Commission AO Army of Occupation (Armée JO/ME Journal Officiel – Amtsblatt – d’Occupation Malmedy-Eupen APR Archives du Palais Royal KBR Bibliothèque Royale du Royau­ BAB Bundesarchiv Berlin me de Belgique, Brussels BAK Bundesarchiv Koblenz KLM/MRA Musée Royal de l’Armée et Bd. Band d’His­­toire Militaire BIHG British International History LANRW Landesarchiv Nordrhein West­ Group falen Cegesoma Centre d’Études et de docu­ POB Parti Ouvrier Belge mentation Guerre et Sociétés RCW Royal Club Wallon contemporaines SA Sturmabteilung CVP Christliche Volkspartei SAE Staatsarchiv Eupen DKG Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft SS Schutzstaffel Ét. Maj. État-Major TNA The National Archives (Kew) FO Foreign Office ZBV Zur besonderen Verwendung GQG Grand Quartier Général Zgs. Zeitgeschichte

140. Erinnerungen Baltia, p. 32 (LANRW, Sammlung Baltia, RW/10/5).