NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES CHAPTER I 1. Paul Struye in J. A. Goris (ed.), Belgium under Occupation (New York, 1947), p.15. 2. Ibid., p. 16. 3. James H. Huizinga in B. Landheer (ed.), The Netherlands (Berkely, 1947),p. 419. Cf. also Het Verzet van de Nederlandsche Bisschoppen tegen het Nationaal-Socia­ Usme en Duitsche Tyrannie (Utrecht, 1945), pp. 24, 26. 4. Onderdrukking en Verzet, Nederland in Oorlogstijd (Arnhem-Amsterdam, 1948), I, 13. Cf. also: A. Seyss·lnquart, Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden, Gesammelte Reden (Amsterdam, 1944). 5. Paul Struye, L'evolution du sentiment public en Belgique sous l'occupation alle­ mande (Brussels, 1945), p. 20. All quotations which were originally in Dutch, French, or German are translated by the author. 6. J. van der Tempel, Nederland in Londen. Ervaringen en Beschouwingen (Haar­ lem, 1946), p. 27. 7. James H. Huizinga, op. cit., p. 420. Cf. also L. G. Kortenhorst, Economische Samenwerking, Collaboratie en Sabotage (The Hague, 1946), p. 17 (mimeographed). 8. H. Colijn, Op de Grens van Twee Werelden (Amsterdam, 1940), pp. 43, 44, 50. 9. There is a violent attack on Colijn's 1940 writings, and on his character in general in a pamphlet written by Visser van Nieuwpoort (pseudonym): De Anti-Revolutionnaire Partij en Dr. H. Colijn (Amsterdam, 1946). 9a. Cf. P. S. Gerbrandy, Enige hoofdpunten van het regeeringsbeleid in London (The Hague, 1946), pp. 7-8, 38. 10. D. J. de Geer, De Synthese in den Oorlog (The Netherlands, 1942). 11. Mr. Linthorst Homan made these points in a private statement which sub­ sequently became public. The two other leaders of the Unie, Professor J. E. de Quay and Mr. L. Einthoven, intensely disagreed with it, and as a result the Unie was almost broken up in autumn 1940. The Unie went clearly into the anti-German camp when it refused to support the "crusade" against Russia. In July 1941 the Germans forced Mr. Linthorst Homan to resign as "Com­ missioner of the Queen". Soon thereafter the Unie was forbidden. Cf. De Neder­ landsche Unie en haar Driemanschap (Schiedam, 1946). Mr. Linthorst Roman's statement is discussed on p. 43 and p. 64 of this booklet. Note also the inter­ estmg articles in Onderdrukking en Verzet (II, 76-108) by Prime Minister W. Drees and Mr. J. G. Suurhoff. Also: Kortenhorst, op. cit., pp. 17-21. 12. Ibid., p. 14. On the other hand, public demonstrations on June 29, 1940, Prince Bernhard's birthday, attest that the House of Orange was still very popular. The Germans were furious about these incidents. Professor L. G. J. Verberne believes that German "correctness" in May and June 1940 accomplIshed nothing but "a sharpenmg of national vigilance .... The nation appeared nninclined to assume even a wait-and-see attitude. It had chosen, firmly and unyieldingly". (1. Valkhoff [ed.), Grondwet en Maatschapptj fn Nederland I848-I948 [The Hague, 1948), p. 148). 13. German mistakes m the handling of the occupied countries were accentuated THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATION 165 by internal dissension. All the cliques around Hitler that fought for power in Germany had their representatives in the occupied Netherlands, where they tried to enlist the aid of different groups of collaborators for their own purposes. Among Seyss-Inquart's three chief lieutenants, Rauter was Himmler's man; Fischb&k represented GQring and his policy of total spoliation; Schmidt was the N.S.D.A.P. (Borman) agent, but especially obedient to Goebbels. Ribben­ trop had planted his special emissaries before the invasion, where they checked on the pro-Junker German ambassador Zech von Burkersroda. The Junkers were generally influential among the occupation troops of the Wehrmacht, and especially in its intelligence agency, the Abwehr. However, the S.D., the SS's intelligence outfit, became more and more powerful, particularly after the July 1944 Putsch. During the last year of the occupation Seyss-Inquart became more or less the tool of Himmler, whose SS had successfully infiltrated the N.S.B., the Dutch Nazi party. Schmidt, the N.S.D.A.P. man, is said to have been assassinated by the SS when he was on his way to Hitler to complain about its policies. One more German clique in Holland is interesting: the "Russian Front Shirkers". They created numerous quite superfluous bureaucratic empires and played German cliques against one another, which often served to continue their obviously unnecessary assignment in The Hague. Cf. Onderdrukking en Verzet, I, 352. Documentatie, status en werkzaamheid van Organisaties en Instellingen uit de Tijd der Duitse Bezetting van Nederland (Amsterdam, 1947), p. 337. Het p.,oces Musserl (The Hague, 1948), pp. liS, 142. 14. H. Bekaert, Maatschappelijke Problemen van het Incivisme (Leuven, 1946), p. 7. IS. Cf. Nieuw Nederland (The Hague), Feb. 8, 1946. 15a. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the various economic, political, and social factors which favored the growth of Fascism in the interwar period. The spirit of June 1940, and collaboration in general can only be fully under­ stood in their relationship with this period. 16. In the beginning of the occupation the N.S.B. expected to be permitted by the Germans to rule Holland. For that purpose more than 40 fronts and guilds were instituted, which were to dominate every phase of Dutch life. As the Germans never allowed the N.S.B. to run Holland, most of the fronts never amounted to anything. Some of them collapsed after a few months, and several had no other members than a cadre of N.S.B. fanatics. Quite a few fronts were nothing but "hobbies" of N.S.B. bigwigs who wanted to have their own "empires". 17. In 1922, 48 parties participated in the parliamentary elections, in 1933, 54. However, of these 54 parties only 14 received one or more seats in the Second Chamber, while only 19 polled more than 10,000 votes. The Dutch Nazis attempted to make political capital out of the many factions participating in the elections. They created the myth of the hopelessly divided Dutch nation which would be saved only by destroying the party system. Actually, Dutch politics between the wars, and more so today, have been determined by about 6 major parties. This was the division of seats in the Second Chamber of 1933: Roman Catholic State Party. 28 Social Democratic Labor Party . 22 Anti-Revolutionary Party (Conservative Protestant) 14 Christian-Historical Union (Cons. Protestant) 10 Liberal State Party. 7 Liberal Democratic Party . 6 Communist Party. 4 Seven other parties. 9 100 lB. Cf. Documentatie, p. B; The Netherlands, p. 129. A former resident of the Dutch East Indies recalls how "like a prince", Mus­ sert was received in the Indies. "He was to speak in the Dutch club at Djokja, and all officials, including those from the native court of Djokja, were ordered 166 NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES (by local Dutch authorities) to be present." (Kr. Strijd, Wat moet e, met de N.S.B.'ers gebeu,en? [Almelo, 1945], p. 2). One observer distinguished between three general types of Dutch Nazis: the Southern Netherlands type, based on Italian-Fascist, and strictly authoritarian principles (Catholic region); the North-Eastern type, especially in the agrarian province of Drenthe, where the crisis·ridden small farmers have supposedly long believed in the "Race, Blood, and Earth" myth; finally, the Western­ Netherlands type, especially of the big cities, where Nazism was at first a superficial fad and later was caused by commercial (anti-Semitic?) considera­ tions. (Os. H. Bardeloos, "De Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Gevolgen van de Interneering", Toellicht, 1 [1948], 29). 19. All of the following quotations are translated from 2 volumes published by the N.S.B.: L. Lindeman, Bet NationaUsme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1940). L. Lindeman, Bet Socialisme van de N.S.B. (Leiden, 1941). Also Dr. C. B. Hylkema - a former Protestant minister who joined the N.S.B. in 1934 - published a book about the doctrines of Dutch Fascism: Het N elle,­ landsc" Fascisme (Amsterdam, 1934). Dutch Nazis contributed essays on political and other subjects to: Keu,jaar· boek I93Z-I94z (Amsterdam, 1942). 20. The leader of the N.S.B., Mussert ,wrote the following to illustrate his idea of Socialism: "One of our members told me, when he first came to me: 'I am just a peasant'. Whereupon 1 put my hand on his shoulder and answered: 'Just a peasant? You are a peasant, one of those who are responsible for the cultivation of our land, so as to provide for the needs of our people'. It is equally wrong to say: 'I am just a worker'. The liberal and marxist gentlemen, who for their own advantage preferred the struggle between classes, talked you into that. How maltreated our workers have been, how exploited, and enslaved .... In the National Socialist state the worker will regain his self-respect, ... because he will be fully conscious that his labor ... is essential for the existence of the community .... " (Het Socialisme van de N.S.B., p. 82). The greatest height of N.S.B. thinking in the economic and Socialist spheres was obviously reached with this statement: "The aim of political economy is the rational provision of reasonable needs". This point was considered "so clearly formulated that no further commentary is actually required". (Ibid., p.26). 21. Helmut Otto, Die staatspolitischen Ziele der flamischen und hollandischen Na­ tionalbewegungen nach Ilem Weltkriege (Giessen, Germany, 1936), pp. 79-80. 22. Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason (New York, 1947), p. 231. Dutchmen with German family ties were in general more attracted to the N.S.B. During the occupation, persons with German relatives are said to have accepted collab­ oration more readily than others.