Review Article

Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 66 (1), 117 – 125 (2013) DOI: 10.1556/AOrient.66.2013.1.8 REVIEW ARTICLE DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK Institute of History, University of Warsaw Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire. Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010 [paperback, 2012], xviii + 284 pages* Baki Tezcan’s previous publications have al- is best known as the unfortunate leader of the ready shown him to be one of the most interest- Khotin campaign (1621), a topic that Tezcan ing contemporary scholars of the Ottoman Em- previously covered in a separate article.3 pire, combining an excellent knowledge of his In order to examine turbulent events and sources with a sociologist’s toolkit and a meth- their context, the author relied on the opinions odologically original orientation.1 The author is and accounts of Ottoman writers as well as a Turkish historian who teaches at the Univer- Western diplomats and travellers. A glance at sity of California, Davis, and the monograph un- his bibliography reveals extensive and rich der review is an extensively revised version of source material still scattered across manuscript his doctoral dissertation, the subject of which holdings of libraries in Istanbul, Konya, Cairo, was the internal conflict that resulted in the depo- Sarajevo, Paris, London, Vienna, Leiden, and sition and death of the young Sultan Osman II, Princeton. Tezcan makes use not only of sources in 1622.2 In Central-Eastern Europe, Osman II in Ottoman Turkish, but also – and this unfor- tunately is rare among modern Ottomanists – sources in Arabic, which, along with Turkish, * A previous version of this review was pub- constituted an acknowledged means of com- lished in Polish in Kwartalnik Historyczny 119 munication among Ottoman intellectuals and (2012), pp. 394–403, which was translated into English by Adam Siegel and revised by the author. jurists. 1 The reader will find references to the au- The bloody coup d’état of 1622 is merely a thor’s previous publications in the bibliography pretext for the author to present an account of of the book under review. the Ottoman ruling elites along with the changes 2 B. Tezcan: Searching for Osman: A Reas- that took place in Ottoman society in the late sessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sul- 16th and early 17th centuries. According to Tez- tan Osman II (1618–1622). Unpublished Ph.D. can, a series of brilliant victories, beginning with thesis, Princeton University, 2001. The author has extensively revised his dissertation in the book under review, expanding some compo- 3 B. Tezcan: Khotin 1621, Or How the Poles nents, and eliminating others to fit within a Changed the Course of Ottoman History. AOH framework suggested by the publisher. 62 (2009), pp. 185–198. 0001 – 6446 $ 20.00 © 2013 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 118 DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, gave was also the son of the kadiasker of Anatolia, the Ottoman sultan such powerful legitimacy as who in 1687 deposed Sultan Mehmed IV, and a ruler that, as a result, the feudal system was the grandson of the grand mufti of Istanbul, who replaced by a patrimonial system in which vir- in 1648 oversaw the deposition and execution tually the entire state became an extension of of Sultan Ibrahim. In this way deposing sultans the royal court, with political power in the prov- became something of a family tradition, as it inces being held by slaves recruited from among were: just as Yahya legitimized the deposition the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan and edu- of Mustafa II, so too did his father to the sul- cated in the imperial palace. This system lasted tan’s father, and his grandfather to the sultan’s throughout the reign of Suleiman the Magnifi- grandfather (pp. 6 and 220). cent, but by the latter half of the 16th century the Especially noteworthy is Tezcan’s attempt economic development in the Ottoman prov- to offer a new explanation of the rise of sekban inces, owing, the author contends, to an influx units, mercenary infantry recruited from the end of Spanish silver, led to an increasing emanci- of the 16th century on, mainly in the Asian pation of the Ottoman elite and a parallel in- provinces of the empire. This new military for- crease in the position of viziers who, while for- mation, which enabled many a Muslim peasant mally retaining their status as slaves of the sul- to ascend the social ladder, challenged the tra- tan, began to form client networks independent ditional division between a tax-exempt military of the royal palace.4 The development of these class (askeri) and tax-paying subjects (re‘aya) networks, linking the imperial centre with the who were deprived of the right to bear arms. provinces, was facilitated by the monetization Thus were thousands of peasants armed with of the economy, the development of the common firearms, only to refuse to work the land after market, and credit. Here the author emphasises returning from military campaigns, which is re- the rising role of the sharia law as well as the garded by many scholars as the main cause of Muslim jurists, the ulema, who, in times of in- the scourge of banditry that overwhelmed the tensified commercial activity became guaran- Anatolian provinces in the 17th century. Up to tors of the public order, earning the trust of the now the dominant thesis in Ottoman historiog- public. Increasingly confident of their own po- raphy, formulated by Halil Inalcik, has appro- sitions, jurists gradually established a process priated Geoffrey Parker’s theory of a military of judicial review of the sultan’s orders, and, revolution and regarded the development of the eventually, of the sultan’s authority. A careful sekban units as a response to the need of Otto- study of Ottoman prosopography led the author man authorities for infantry, particularly in the to a fascinating discovery: we learn, for exam- wars against the Habsburgs and the Safavids. ple, that Yahya, chief military judge (kadiasker) Tezcan, however, cites sources indicating that for Anatolia, who in 1703 authorised the re- sekban units originally appeared in Syria, where moval of Sultan Mustafa II from the throne, the need to provide troops for distant military campaigns did not play a role. According to the 4 To illustrate this process Tezcan cites a author, it was rather domestic factors that con- revelatory anecdote contained in the Ottoman tributed towards the development of the sekban chronicle by Peçevi, according to which Prince units, namely competition among Ottoman dig- Murad (the future sultan Murad III), after the nitaries who, thanks to the influx of Spanish sil- death of his father in 1574, still uncertain as to ver, possessed the funds to build private armies whether he or one of his brothers would ascend to enhance and maintain their position, fight to the throne, bowed with the intention to kiss their competitors, and sometimes even openly the hand of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu, confront the central government.5 who had held the position since the days of Murad’s grandfather Suleiman the Magnificent, and who to all practical purposes held the reins 5 To a Polish historian, a useful analogy of power at the outset of the new reign (p. 98). would be the example of the private armies re- Acta Orient. Hung. 66, 2013 .

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