AN ORIGINAL COURSE

THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR WAR Why the World Lives in Its Shadow

Prepared in collaboration by Kathleen Kanet, RSHM Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace

and William J. Russell Educational Consultant

RUSSELL, WILLIAM JAMES RUSSELL--William James. Passed away on Thursday, June 1, 2006 of natural causes at the age of 90 years. William was born in Clinton, MA, in 1915. He was a graduate of Clark University where he received his bachelor's degree and Syracuse University for his master's degree. Shortly after WWII began he enlisted in the Air Force. He was a navigator on B-17's and completed two tours totaling 50 missions. Mr. Russell was discharged from the service as a first lieutenant in 1945. Upon returning home he married Virginia Nichols and began working in education. William was a teacher and ultimately a principal for Pelham High School from 1945 to 1973. He ended his career in 1976 as a principal at Port Washington High School. William J. Russell was loved dearly and will be missed by many.

Kathleen Kanet, RSHM,

Kathleen in collaboration with others …..

---Taught and was a principal in an elementary school ---Worked in developing and implementing peace education and human rights for youth and adults locally, nationally and internationally. ---Worked as a caseworker and then as supervisor for preservation of families with a mother who is/was incarcerated. ---Developed a peace and justice education and training program with several colleagues designed for educational leaders and presented it in Catholic Schools for 50 USA dioceses and in several in Canada, Germany and the Philippines. ---Developed an educational process for adults to learn structural analysis, implemented nationwide. LEAVEN Program sponsored by Sisters of Mercy ---Co-founded several organizations nationally and internationally promoting peace and justice including Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace NYC, Center of International Learning, and Network for Peace through Dialogue. The Specter of Nuclear War: Why The World Lives In Its Shadow

This course is designed to foster and require individualized research. Research is guided by a series of questions in every cycle, questions which are judgmental, not retrieval, in nature. Answers to questions are to be written on the pages of the course. The space provided is deliberately limited to demand precision and conciseness in the expression of judgments. It is the judg­ ments that are entered on the pages of the course. The research upon which these judgments are based will vary with each indivi­ dual and will be recorded as necessary in note books. This is, then, not a textbook. There is no sustained narra­ tive, although introductions to each cycle serve the function of orientation. Library resources, and liberal access to library are indispensible to any use of the course. A minimum biblio­ graphy has been carefully prepared and included as a basis for planning and purchase of materials by individual school libraries. The expanding literature on nuclear arms control must, of course, continuously be evaluated for inclusion in any minimum library of resources. Seminar interaction is built into the course as the process by which judgments are exchanged, tested, sharpened and modified. Dialogue, indeed enlightened dialogue, on the vital issue of nu­ clear arms control is the supreme value, particularly as it leads to effective participation in national policy debates and to some measurable impact upon decision making.

Prepared in collaboration by: Kathleen Kanet, R.S.H.M. Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace 20 Washington Square North New York City, NY 10011 and William J. Russell Educational Consultant

Copyright 1981 The Specter of Noclear War: Why the World Lives in its Shadow An Original Course prepared In Collaboration by Kathleen Kanet, RSHM Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace William J. Russell Educational Consultant

Single copies of this cours~, commercially xeroxed and unbound are available at $15.00 postpaid. This price is set at cost. The Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace is not a profit­ making institution. It engages in a wide variety of activities designed to promote peace and justice throughout the world. In relation to the nuclear arms race, its purpose is to foster enlight­ ened dialogue, to develop commitment to peace and disarmament and to encourage effective participation in national policy formation. To this effect, it is involved in coordinating a continuing pro­ gram of adult seminars utilizing the materials and methods of a course on "The Specter of Nuclear War: Why the World Lives in its Shadow." These seminars are offered without cost to participants. It is our hope and intention to extend and broaden this program. Uith this in mind, the privilege of reproducing this copyrighted course is being granted, without limit, except as stipulated be­ low, in recognition of a donation of $50.00 or more to the Inter­ commun~ty Center for Justice and Peace. Such donations will be deeply appreciated and effectively utilized.

Stipulations for Reproduction of course 1. All reproduced copies are to be restricted to internal institutional use. 2. No reproduced copies will be sold, although costs of re­ production may be reclaimed. 3. Title page, showing copyright and authorship• shall appear on every copy and/or every cycle. ..

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WHY THE WORLD LIVES IN ITS SHADOW

An original one-semester course Prepared in collaboration by KATHLEEN KANET, R.S.H.M. Interconnnunity Center for Justice and Peace and WILLIAM J. RUSSELL Educational Consultant

September 1980 FOREWORD

The preparation of these materials was motivated by conviction and couunitment. That the risk of nuclear war is all the greater, the greater the ignorance, the indifference, the non-involvement, of people here and in all nations--this is the underlying conviction. The elimination of this ignor­ ance, the shattering of this indifference, the transformation of this non-involvement into articulated concern and enlight­ ened intervention--this is the commitment. Any use of these materials implies a matching conunitment. There is also connnitment to a process of learning. This process is library-centered, resource-oriented, individualized. Resources are not prescribed. There is no textbook. The com­ mon learning, organized around a core of questions requiring judgment, evaluation, critical thinking, is in fact as indivi­ dualized as each learner's motivation, depth and scope of re­ search, reflective capabilities. Whatever the depth and scope of research, questions are to be answered concisely, each answer virtually a precis, an abstract, of the learner's critical evalu­ ation of his/her ovm research. The process includes, as a vital component, interaction-­ interaction of learner with learner, in planned seminars, and of learner with a variety of human resources in panels. Panels are designed not as presentations, but as class interviews, class questioning, of cross-section panels representing a breadth of experience, opinion, expertise and role. This breadth should include students, faculty, connnunity, as well as the specialized expertise appropriate to the panel topic. The integrity of pa­ nels and seminars as settings for interaction should not be violated. Process involves its own commitments and obligations. Learners must have access to resources, whether of school libra­ ry, or of public and university libraries. Such access, on as liberal a basis as possible, is a sine qua non of any effective use of these materials. This acce~on one-level, requires the expenditure of school funds for the purchase of an authen­ tic minimum library of resources. On another level, it involves an organization of total school program that allows and encour­ ages extensive use of the school library during school hours. The seven-day cycle suggested for effective implementation of this course represents a basic minimum of learner access to resources and to the professional expertise of librarians. This cycle comprises, for a hypothetical class of 24-25, one full­ class panel session, two seminar sessions for each of two seminar groups of 12 with alternate library opportunity for the un­ scheduled seminar group, and two alternate-day op 4 '~tunities for teacher to work with individuals of each seminar group (remediation, motivation, specialized assistance) as necessary or appropriate. In each cycle, therefore, the student has a potential four days of access to library resources during re ularl scheduled class time. Additional opportunities, signi icantly transcen ing t e framework of this seven-day cycle, are urgently recommended, indeed realistically impera­ tive. If the school program provides its own adequate framework for teacher-student conferences, instructional flexibility in use of the basic core of questions is enhanced. Specific ques­ tions, or groups of questions, might for example be assigned in special situations to individuals or to connnittees in each seminar group, with appropriate reports to the respective group during the cycle day set aside for individualization. Should such an approach be deemed necessary at any time, the same in­ junction against "presentations" invoked in relation to panels and seminars would apply equally to individual or group reports. Interaction would remain the vital key to optimum use of these materials. TABLE of CONTENTS

ForAword. Schedule of IN-CLASS eommon 1P.arn1ng experiences a-f Schedule of OUT-of-CLASS common learning experiences 1-201 Schedule of DIVERSIFIED 1Parn1ng experiences 202-204 General introduction 1 Cycle I The A-bomb 1s produced and used 4 Cycle II The world fails to control the .new weapons 38 Introduction, Cycles III, IV, V 59 Cycle III Cold war 61 Cycle IV "Moment of Hope" 78 Cycle V Birth of non-alignment 86 Introduction, Cycle VI 97 Cycle VI Limited Test-ban 99 Introduction, Cycle VII 107 Cycle VII Non-Proliferation 109 Introduction, Cycle VIII 124 Cycle VIII Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 126 Introduction, Cycle IX 145 Cycle IX Special Session of General Assembly on Dis­ armament 147 Introduction, Cycle X 159 Cycle X Non-alignment today 162 Introduction, Cycles XI, XII 180 Cycles XI, XII· Whither humankind 182

Bibliography 205 Appendix i-:ti Appendix A Letter of Einstein to Pres. Roosevelt, 8/2/J9 i Appendix B Franck Report, summary iii Appendix c Stimson's letter and. memorandum to Pres. Truman, 9/11/45 v

Appe'nd1x D Conclusion of Pres. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace address x SCHEDULE of

IN-CLASS

COMMON LEARNING EXPERIENCES -a-

Cycle I Day 1 Full class Orientation

Day 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Class~oom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) _ Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar~1: Atomic physicists in 1939 would have been wise to withhold their discoveries about uranium fission. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 1: Atomic physicists in 1939 would have been wise to withhold their discoveries about uranium fission. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 2: There is no moral distinction between conventional and atomic bombmc. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 2: There is no moral distinction between conventional and atomic bombiJllg. Group 1 Research (Library)

Cycle II

Day I Full class Panel 1: What role should morality haveplayed in the decision· to produce the atomic bomb? Day 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 3: Governments have the same right to command scientists as they have to draft for military serviceo Group 2 Research (Library) Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 3: Governments have the same right to command scientists as they have to draft for military service. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 4: Scientists have no responsibility to consider the consequences of their research. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 4: Scientists have no· .-responsibility to consider the consequences of their research. Group 1 Research (Library) -b-

Cycle III Day 1 Full class Panel 2: What mo.ral liabilities rest upon the Ur So for its massive program of atmospheric testing througho~ the 1950 1 s? Day 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 5: If adopted, the Baruch proposal would have transformed world history. Group 2 Research (Library) Da.y 5 Group 2 Seminar 5: If adopted, the Baruch proposal would have transformed world history. Group 1 Research (Library) !By 6 Group 1 Seminar 6: Stimson was naive to think that Russia in 1945 would respond to trust. Group 2 Research (Library) ·nay 7 Group 2 Seminar 6: Stimson was naive to think that Russia in 1945 would respond to trusto Group 1 Research (Library)

Cycle IV

Day 1 Full class Panel 3: By what right did the u.s. seek to contain Soviet Russia in the post-World War II period? Day 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) D3.y 3 Group 2 Research (Li~ary) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 7: It was immoral for any nation to maintain a posture of neutrality in the Cold War. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 7: It was immoral for any nation to maintain a posture of neutrality in the Cold War. Group 1 Research (Library) Da.y 6 Group 1 Seminar 8: Cold War provocations originated mainly in Soviet Russia. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 8: Cold War provocations originated mainly in Soviet Russia. Group 1 Research (Library) -c-

Cycle V Day 1 Full class Panel 4: . How much innocence was there in the 1950 1 s about the hazards associated with peaceful development of atomic energy? D:ty 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization {Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 9: It was irresponsible of the nuclear scientists not to warn us of the dangers of nuclear reactors. Group 2 Research {Library) Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 9: It was irresponsible of the nuclear scientists not to warn us of the dangers of nuclear reactors. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 10: The French-British proposal of 1954 was no moment of hope; it was already too lateo Group 2 Research (Library) lBy 7 Group 2 Seminar 10: The French-British proposal of 1954 was no moment of hope; it was already too late. Group 1 Research {Library)

Cycle VI

Day 1~ ~1 .._~1as~ .....•,~_51 1ll.d the United Nations become a better vehicle for peace with the large increase in newly independent and non­ aligned member nations? JB.y 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 11: Non-alignment inevitably contains a bias against the former imperialist powers. Group 2 Research (Library) !By 5 Group 2 Seminar 11: Non-alignment inevitably contains a bias against the former imperialist powers. Group 1 Research (Library) Da.y 6 Group 1 Seminar 12: Non-alignment represents a net gain for Soviet ~ssia. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 12: Non-alignment represents a net gain for Soviet Russia. Group 1 Research (Library) -d-

Cycle VII Day 1 Full class Panel 6: How vital is a com~rehensive test ban? JB.y 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) IBy 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) IBy 4 Group 1 Seminar 13: The Partial Test-Ban Treaty actually represented a major setback in effective arms control. Group 2 Research (Library) Jay 5 Group 2 Seminar 13: The Partial Test-Ban Treaty actually represented a major setback in effective arms control. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 14: Non-aligned participationi'n·test-ban negotiations is essentially futile. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 14: Non-aligned participation in test-ban negotiations is essentially futile.

Cycle VIII :ray 1 Full class Panel 7: How adequate is the IAEA to enforce the Non-Pro- liferation Treaty? Da.y 2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Da.y 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) lil.y 4 Group 1 Seminar 15: The non-nuclear nations made a bad bargain in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Group 2 Research (Library) Jay 5 Group 2 Seminar 15: The non-nuclear nations made a bad bargain in the Non-Proliferation Treatye Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6' Group 1 Seminar 16: The Superpowers are destroying the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Group 2 Research (Library) Da.y 7 Group 2 Seminar 16: The Superpowers are destroying the Non-Proliferation Treaty• Group 1 Research (Library) -e-

CyclP- IX Da.y 1 Full class Panel 8: How much does thP SALT process contribute to reducing thP- threat of nuclear war? Day 2 Group 1 RPsearch (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 RPsParch (Library) Group 1 Ind1v1dua11zat1on (Classroom) Da.y 4 Group 1 SPm1nar 17: SALT discussions outside thP framework of the United Nations are fut11P.. Group 2 Re.search (Library) Da.y 5 Group 2 SPm1nar 171 SALT discussions outside the framework of the ·<·United .. ··Nations are futile. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 SPminar 181 The extension of the nuclear arms race into the European theater is proliferation at its worst. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 18: The extension of the nuclear arms race into the European theater is proliferation at its worst.

CyclP. X Day 1 Full class Panel 9 How enduring has been the impact of the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament? Day 2 Group 1 RPsearch (Library) Group 2 Individualization (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (Library) Group 1 Individualization (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 19a U.N, discussions and resolut~ons on peace and disarmament are exercises in futility. Groip 2 Research (Library) · Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 19a U,N. discussions and r~solutions on peace and disarmament are PXeroises in futility. Group 1 ResParch (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 20s Non-alignP.d idealism is the real hope of the United Nations. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 201 Non-alignP-d idealism is. the real hope of the United Nations. Group 1 Research (Library) -t-

Cycle XI Day 1 Full class Panel 10a How much non-alignment is there 1n the non-aligned movement? · Day 2 Gr~up 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Ind1V.1dual1zat1op (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (tibral;'y,) Group 1 Ind1v1dua11zat1on (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 21a Castro has betrayed his own people. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 5 Group 2 Seminar 21 a .. Castro has bet·rayed his own people. Group 1 Research (Library) Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 221 Pope John Paul~'S appeal to the U.N., not Castro's, represents the only authentic non-alignment. Group 2 Re~earch (Library) Group 2 Seminar 221 Pope John Paul's appe·a1 to the U.N., not Castro's, represents the on:J.y authentic non-alignment. Group 1 Research (Library)

Cycle XII Day 1 Full class Panel 111 What are the ingredients of a stable world order? Day ·2 Group 1 Research (Library) Group 2 Indiv1dual1zat1on (Classroom) Day 3 Group 2 Research (L1br$ey) Group 1 Ind1v1dual1zat1on (Classroom) Day 4 Group 1 Seminar 2)a The U.N. response to the Iranian and Afghanistan crises represents the .climactic failure of the organization. Group 2 Research· (Library) Day 5 -Group 2 Seminar 23 1 The U.N. response to the Iranian and Afghanistan criaes represents the climactic failure. of the organ1zat1on. Group 1 Research (Library) · Day 6 Group 1 Seminar 241 There is no place in humanity's future for the nation-state. Group 2 Research (Library) Day 7 Group 2 Seminar 24: The.re is no place in humanity's future for the nation-state. Group 1 Research (Library) .. · .

.· '• . ~ ~

SCHEDULE of

OUT-o f~CLASS

·coMMO~ LEARNING EXPERIENCES 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of dispair, we had every­ thing before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way .... "

It was 1945, the end of a tumultuous and violent period, the end of a world conflagration whose scale of death, devasta­ tion and human debasement was unparalleled in human history, in which genocide ceased to be an abstraction and became horrible reality, in which war spread from battlefields into centers of population, in which death from the air reached its culminating peak of intensity in the fire-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One could well have lamented, during that long war's agony, that it was, indeed, the season of darkness and despair, that it was the worst of times, that humankind's foolishness had triumphed over reason and humanity, that the future was clouded, beset with uncertainties, fraught with nameless perils. And yet there was also hope at war's end. There were dreams and aspirations, yearnings rooted in the depths of hu­ mankind's most authentic needs. For the first time humanity had caught a glimpse of "one world", the reality of it, the urgency, the indispensability of it. For the first time humanity spoke of freedom not merely in the context of civil and political · rights, but in the most humanitarian terms, "freedom from fear, freedom from want". The forces of evil, as these had been per­ ceived, were destroyed. Humanity stood on the mountaintop and saw the Promised Land of peace. All of humanity's hopes and dreams and yearnings coalesced in the new United Nations, whose effectiveness seemed assured by the presence and commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom emerged from the war as superpowers, although only one of them had experienced the full, terrible ordeal of the war's brutal and destructive force. In the preamble to the United Nations Charter was articulated elo­ quently the burden of faith and trust humankind was placing upon the new world organization--"to save succeeding genera­ tions from the scourge of war". The early adoption· of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights formalized the sweeping dimensions of human justice now perceived as moral obligations of societies and governments. 2

The United States answered the appeal of devastated nations, nations whose productive capacity had been virtually wiped out, with an incredible extension of funds for economic rehabilitation, and a mountain of emergency supplies (food, clothing, medicines) pending resumption of normal production. Even our war enemies, Germany and Japan, were included in this extraordinary gesture of good will and humanitarianism. In­ deed, the two archenemies of modern European history, Germany and France, found it desirable and possible within a very few years of the war's end, to pool their vital productive capacity in the European Coal and Steel Community. And the process was set in motion almost innnediately, first through our own release of the Philippines into independence on July 4,· 1946, and then gradually, albeit with the grudging con­ sent and sometimes open resistance of.some colonial powers, for the termination of colonialism around the world and the wel­ coming of many peoples into the family of nations, equal in status and dignity, equal in international rights, equal in the universal quest for peace and justice. In and through all of this was the atom, with its incredi­ ble source of energy, now for the first time revealed experi­ mentally, now for the first time brought, as it was thought, under humankind's control. Boon this would be, transcending anything humanity had dreamed possible. The atom, with benefits as incalculable as they would surely be universal, was judged to have ushered in a climactic era of human progress.

What happened to this dream? What happ~ne4 to all these possibilities for the transformation of human life, to the opportunity vouchsafed humanity to chart a new, safer, mqre rational and humane course into the twenty-first century? How did two superpowers, triumphant allies in the most devastating war in history, become deadly adversaries, suspicious, distrust­ ful, hostile competitors for world power, influence and pres­ tige? Why and how did peace slip from our grasp? Why have so many colonial peoples had to fight for their independence, or fight to retain authentic sovereignty even after gaining inde­ pendence? Why do haves and have-nots confront each other still with envy and selfishness, with essentially unseeing eyes and insensitive hearts? Why have violence and conflict, terrorism and ruthlessness, exploitation and deprivation, persisted in ever new and more distressing ways? Why do peace and justice remain frail human hopes at best? Why have atomic weapons multiplied and proliferated, posing the ultimate threat to humanity's very survival, to the existence of life on this planet? Why have not the United Nations., why have not nego­ tiations bilateral and multilateral, treaties and pacts, 3

understandings and agreements, peaceful coexistence and detente, and the increasingly active intervention of the Third World--why have these, none of them, brought us closer .to our dreams of a generation ago? And why has even the predicted boon of peaceful atoms at work for all humanity turned into a potential nightmare? Whither humanity? Are these dreams still valid, still authentic? Or are they will-o'-the wisps, mirages, delu­ sions? How will we be saved--saved from our own weaknesses and selfishness, our own stupidities and stubbornness, our own failures and inadequacies, our own myopia and blindness? This course will explore these vital issues, and raise additional questions for which there may be no ready answers. 4

Cycle I

World War II had its roots in world War I, as World War III, should it come, may have its roots in World War II. In each case, arranging a just and enduring peace proved even more difficult than achieving victory. The Treaty of Versailles has become the historical symbol of a peace treaty in which seeds of renewed warfare were planted almost in de­ fiance of logic and reason. To promote his purposes, Adolf Hitler exploited and violated the Treaty of Versailles. Re­ occupation of the Rhineland, rearmament of the Third German Reich, preceded and anticipated the Anschluss with Austria, the occupation of the Sudetenland, the Munich Compromise-­ Chamberlain's "peace in our time"--and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The brutality and ruthlessness of Hitler's campaign against the Jews, the fanaticism of his hatred, the relentlessness of his determination to liauidate them, sent shivers o~ horr~r through the consciences-of free people every­ where. His ultimate resort to massive armed force to achieve his goal--domination of the European continent, and, indeed, of the world--represented the formal beginning of World War II.

Paralleling Hitler's accession to power and his drive for dominance in Europe came a "break-through" of enormous signi­ ficance in nuclear research. "Break-through" in science is rarely, if ever, what it appears to the layDerson. Scientific discoveries grow out of the patient, meticulous, often discour­ aging and frustrating laboratory experimentation of scientists all over the world. Chadwick.' s discovery of the uncharged neutron in 1932 is a case in point, but no less revolutionary on that account. Neutron bombardment of atomic nuclei was pursued by scientists everywhere. Among those engaged in such experimentation was the Italian, Fermi, who, like many other scientific emigres, came to seek in immigration to the United States more fertile, less restrictive and repressive conditions for his scientific research. In late 1938, the German team of Hahn and Strassmann discovered that the uranium nucleus under neutron bombardment "split," i.e., underwent fission. Almost simultaneously, in early 1939, Joliet in France, Fermi and Szilard and others in the United States, confirmed what had been immediately inferred, that in this fis­ sion of the uranium nucleus additional neutrons were emitted, and that these emitted neutrons bonbarded other nuclei freeing still more neutrons in the process. This emission of neutrons, of course, represented change in nuclear mass, and, in accor­ dance with Einstein's famous E=mc2, release of tremendous energy. Given a critical mass, it was apparent that a chain reaction might be induced which if allowed to proceed unchecked would result in an explosion of incredible and unprecedented force. Controlled, the chain reaction would generate such heat as to make production of electric power feasible. 5

Such was the new and exciting plate au upon which, at the outbreak of World War II, the world's nuclear pl ··sicists found themselves poised. What they had discovered was ~abora tory truth. What could be inferred from this was the possibility of revolutionary applications, applications whose feasibility remained to be determined in t he context of incalculable en­ gineering complexities, and still unknown and unpredictable ramifications, having far-reaching significance for humanity. The theory was there, in the mainstream of world nuclear re­ search, the property of no physicist, the monopoly of no nation.

Leo Szilard, a Hungarian emigre doing nuclear research in the United States, began to express among his colleagues in this country and abroad a deep personal concern about these applications, particularly as they might be developed by Nazi Germany and constitute a critical threat to the free world. His concern prompted him to seek a professional agreement among the physicists at the forefront of nuclear research not to publish the results of their burgeoning research in this critical field. He was successful, although there were ser­ ious misgivings, in securing tentative and provisional agree­ ment among the leading scientists in America, but receiv ed a negative response from Joliot in France, whose paper was al­ ready well along in the process of being printed. Szilard's plans had inevitably to be abandoned with the publication of Joliot's paper.

In your judgment, should the world's nuclear physicists have dropped a cloak of secrecy over their research in 1939-40? Explain. 6

Do you feel that such a move would have been possible? Explain.

Would such a move, assuming Sziiard's plan had been executed, have denied Nazi Germany the possibility of developing an atomic bomb? Explain.

Would it have preclud~d the Hiroshima-Nagasaki tragedies? Explain. 7

What would you judge to have been the nature of the nuclear physicists' responsibility toward any application of "chain reaction" to produce a new and horribly destructive weapon of war? Explain.

To what extent would you think that the war accelerated appli­ cations that otherwise might have developed more slowly,. more cautiously? Explain.

Szilard now pressed to enlist the United States govern­ ment in a campaign of assistance to nuclear physicists so that at the very least what he perceived to be a race to atomic weapons would be won by the free world. A letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt was composed, signed by Albert Einstein, himself an emigre from Nazi Germany, and delivered on October 11, 1939. The war had begun with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Read and study this letter with care, remembering that the President was a layman in relation to nuclear physics, and that the ramifications of the letter, whether for physicist or lay­ person, were not at that time clearly and fully discernable. 8

Using evidence from the letter to substantiate your point of view, evaluate the degree of urgency communicatE ~ to the President.

What significance do you find in.the choice of target sugges­ ted to illustrate the destructive potential of the new bomb?

What reasons might explain the uncertainty as to feasibility of air delivery of the new bomb? 9

Evaluate the concrete recommendations and requests made in the letter.

What do they say about the scientists' priorities at the time of the letter?

To what extent does the letter advise, recommend or urge the. U.S. government to produce an atomic bomb? 10

Using evidence from the letter to substantiate your answer, explain what appears to be the scientists' prim~ v motiva­ tion for writing to the President.

To what extent do you read in the letter any misgivings as to the historical impact of the development of atomic bombs. Ex­ plain.

To what extent does the letter deal with the radiation hazards associated with nuclear fission, whether in production of power or of explosives? 11

There were months of delay before any significant government action was taken in response to the letter. Wh~ reasons can you suggest for this?

What do you think your own reaction and response might have been if you had been President and read this letter, with an ordinary layperson's understanding of scientific matters?

Einstein is subsequently quoted as saying: "My participation in the production of the atomic bomb consisted of one single act: I signed a letter to President ·Roosevelt." Do you believe that his signing of the "letter" was as de­ tached and uninvolved as this seems to suggest? Explain. 12

If we were to assume that his signing of the letter was, in fact, such a detached and uninvolved act, what \ )llld be your judgment of Einstein's awareness of world politic~! realities?

Your judgment of his sense of responsibility?

If we were to assume that his signing of the letter symbolized deep and powerful feelings about Nazi Germany, what position on possible use of atomic weapons against Germany does the letter suggest? Explain. 13

What position on any actual use of atomic weapons does the letter suggest? Explain.

What position on war and peace does the letter suggest? Explain.

With all the benefit of hindsight, re-conceptualize the composition of this letter. Re-·write it as you would now· wish it had been written. Hand in separately.

There was little apparent reaction from the U.S. govern­ ment for months after the submission of the letter to Presi­ dent Roosevelt. According to Spencer Weart, author of "Sci­ entists in Power," the real impetus to American production of an atomic bomb came from the Maud Committee's report in Great Britain in mid-1941. This report, in whose recommendations both French and British nuclear physicists concurred, for the first time defined not only the feasibility of building such a bomb in time to affect the outcome of the war, but recommended that such a project be set in motion without delay. It was largely as a result of this committee's recommendations and the exhortations of French and British scientists, that the 14

1pace of decision-making was accelerated in the United States. The secret and costly Manhattan Project, whose ~~rk culminated in the Alamogordo test in July 1945, and the bomb drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945, was the fateful result. This multi-faceted project brought together in Los Alamos, New Mexico, under the direction of Robert Oppenheimer, a brilliant group of nuclear physicists whose precisely defined role was to produce a workable atomic bomb.

In retrospect, the production and use of the A-bomb appear almost to have assumed the aspects of Greek tragedy. Was there no moment when the inexorable drift toward Hiroshima could have been reversed? Were the crucial questions of precedent and of morality never raised? Was there no turning back? In the con­ text of today's incredible nuclear confrontation of the world's two superpowers, these questions seem at once supremely rele­ vant and yet utterly futile. But humanity, hovering as it is on the brink of disaster, has no choice but to examine these issues for whatever lessons may be learned and for whatever light may be shed on the perilous path that lies ahead.

Why was the A-bomb produced? Use library resources to whatever extent necessary to gain insights and to formulate judgments.

If a new and more powerful weapo~ can be built, it should be. How do you react to this?

Would it make any difference to you if it was wartime or peace­ time? Explain. 15

If a new and more powerful weapon can be built, it will be. Do you agree with this? Explain.

When the Manhattan Project was launched, we were at war with Japan and Germany. In your judgment, did the existing threat to our security and that of the free world justify the explor­ ation of any and all means to· assure victory? Explain.

The political decision to produce an A-bomb would probably not have been made but for the initiatives of nuclear phy­ sicists. To what extent do you hold physicists morally responsible for unleashing this destructive weapon upon humanity? 16

Is it, in your judgment, a right of scientists to withhold their expertise for cause? Explain.

Is it, in your judgment, within the legitimate power of govern­ ment to command the expertise of scientists? Explain.

Would you say that the physicists at Los Alamos were acting essentialiy under military orders and conditions? Expl~in. 17

What would you consider to be the ingredients of any inner motivation they might have felt? Explain.

How would you assess the German effort to develop an A-bomb?

Robert Oppenheimer is quoted as saying on November 2, 1945, after his. resignation as director of· the Los Alamos Labora- tory: "When you come right down to it the reason that we did the job is because it was an organic neces­ sity. If you are a scientist you believe that it is good to find out how the world works; that it is good to find out what the reaiities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its lights.and its values." {The New Yo·r·k Times· Book ·Review, May 11, 1980, p. 9) 18

In your judgment was the production of the bomb in fact "an organic necessity"? Explain.

To what extent does the statement suggest an obligation of scientists to make moral judgments on the way their research is utilized? Explain.

To· set conditions on the way their research is applied? Ex­ plain. 19

What obligations do you feel scientists must shoulder in these respects? Explain.

"Among the hundreds of thousands of documents written by scientists and engineers in various countries over the first five years of nuclear fission work, not a single memorandum or letter has been found that attempts to analyze at length the consequences for society of develop­ ing reactors. Even the general implications of nuclear bombs were almost never discussed until around the time they were exploded upon cities." (Scientists in P-ower, Weart, Spencer P., p. 273)

"It seemed that hardly anybody had been troubled until after Hiroshima. While the work was going on, they (the scientists at Los Alamos) had been absorbed in scientific details and totally dedi­ cated to the technical success of the project. They had been far too busy with their work to worry about the consequences." (Quoted in The New Yorker, August 13, 1979, p. 67, from: ·Reflections, Dyson, Freeman)

Does any of this surprise you? Why? 20

How do you explain it?

How do you justify it?

Oppenheimer is quoted in Time, February 1948: "In some sort of crude sense, which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose." (Quoted in The New Yorker, August 13, 1979, p. 67, from Reflections, Dyson, Freeman)

Do you agree that there was "sin"? Explain. 21

"To have built the bomb, when their country was engaged in a desperate war against Hitler'E ~er­ many, was morally justifiable. But they did not just build the bomb. They enjoyed building it. They had the time of their lives while they were building it." (Quoted in The New Yor·ker, August 13, 1979, p. 67, from: Ref"le·cti·ons, Dyson, Freeman)

What reasons can you suggest for the attitude of Los Alamos physicists?

To what extent can you personally identify with their behavior? Explain.

To what extent can you justify it? Explain. 22

Do you agree that the war itself made the building of the bomb "morally justifiable"? Explain.

Using appropriate library resources, research the military, political and scientific positio~s taken on the dropping of the atomic.bomb. What wa:s the ·military ·rationale ·for ·u:se ·of-'the ·A-bomb ·against Japan? · · · · · ·

How would you evaluate the evidence that Japan was close to surrender without the atomic bomb drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

To what extent would you judge that a fanatical defense of the home islands was a distinct possibility? Explain. 23

What would you consider to be the stakes involved in a stubborn Japanese defense of the home islands?

How would you evaluate Eisenhower's expressed position on the possible use of the atomic bomb?

If the bomb had been available for use prior to D-day in Europe, what do you think Eisenhower's position might have been? 24

How would you explain this?

How critical had Soviet Russian entrance into the war against Japan been judged by the United States?

What reasons can you suggest for Soviet Russia's swift decla­ ration of war against Japan after Hiroshima? 25

What was the political rationale for us·e· of the- -A-bomb. ~gainst Japan?

How would you evaluate Churchill's position on the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan?

What would you judge to have been Churchill's primary concern at the time of the decision? Explain.

To what extent would you judge that the United States shared Churchill's concern? Explain. 26

What reasons can you suggest as the basis for this concern?

Wou!d you judge these reasons to be valid? Explain.

If the decis.ion to drop the atomic bomb were made, in whole or in part, for reasons other than perceived military neces­ sity, what would be your reaction? 27

What political and strategic reasons can you suggest for American "second thoughts" about Soviet Russian "Volvement in the war against Japan?

Once the Manhattan Project had been set in motion, would you judge that the ultimate decision to use the bomb could ever be in doubt? Explain.

What significance would you judge the costs of the Manhattan Project might have had on the d~cision to use the bomb against Japan? 28

President Truman is said to have displayed conspicuous pride at the demonstration of American military might ~ver Hiro­ shima. How would you explain this reaction?

How would you justify it?

Is it your feeling that the atomic bomb, though used against an Asian people, would never have been used against a western society? Explain. 29

To what degree would you say that the Einstein letter supports your argument?

What validity do you give to the argument .that the atomic bomb drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however costly in human lives, may have saved many times that number of lives. Explain.

How would you evaluate Soviet Russian intentions and objec­ tives in the way she responded to Japanese peace overtures in the summe~ of 1945? 30

Stalin was not notified in specific terms of the successful A-bomb test. Do you feel that as an ally he she ·ld have been fully briefed? Explain.

What rights do. you consider Stalin possessed as an ally to know, even in advance of the test, at least the existence and general purpose of the Manhattan Project?

How do you explain the U.S. failure to keep Stalin continu­ ously informed? 31

What do you tnink Soviet Russia's position would have been if the first atomic bomb had been researched anl ~eveloped there rather than in the United States? Explain.

Where did nuclear. physicists stand on use .. of the A-bomb agains·t ·Japa·n·1· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·. · · · ·

Robert Oppenheimer was a member of the advisory committee that recommended dropping of the A-bDinb on Japanese military targets. He concurred in .this recommendation~ Wo.uld you have expected him, as Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, to take any other position? Explain •.

To what extent does the evidence indicate that Oppenheimer was influenced by national security considerations? 32

32 To what extent does the ~vidence indicate that he was fl ue~~ed by conc~rn fa~ humanity? ~.. i .;:. ~:;

To what extent does the evidence indicate that he was in­ fluenced by concern for humanity?

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Would it have prevented the development of a nuclear arms race? Explain.

To what extent would you say that the report sought to pre­ pare the way for international nuclear controls? Explain.

How clear a position does the report take on the maintenance and strengthening of the "lead" achieved by the United States in the development of the bomb? 34

How likely is it, given continued testing, that the "secret" of the bomb's development would have been sustai ~d very long, with or without the drops on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Explain.

To what extent does the report appear to be influenced by the hazards of radiation as well as by the bomb's destructive po­ tential?

Leo Szilard was one of tbe signers of the Franck Report, as he was also the prime composer of the Einstein letter to President Roosevelt. How would you reconcile the two acts? 35

What reasons can you offer for the government's negative response to the Franck Report's suggestion of a 1 emonstra­ tion explosion?

How would you evaluate the report's admonition, even before any test explosion of the bomb, against an "unannounced" use of the bomb on Japanese targets? 36

The decision to drop the bomb was ultimately a political one, made at the highest level by the President afte. fuil counsel and advice from poiitical, military and scientific advisors. Do you think scientists should have had the decisive voice? Explain.

If the Los Alamos research group had had the decisive voice, what do you believe would have been their decision? Explain.

Would the United States have been better off if Hiroshima and Negasaki had never occurred? Explain. 37

Would the world have been better off if Hiroshima and Nagasaki had never occurred? Explain.

Do you believe this was an easy 9-ecision, whether political, military or moral? Explain. ~:-c·..___... ____ _

38

Cycle II

As World War II came to a close, and with the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki still reverberating, the United Nations came into existence. Conceived as humani­ ty's best hope to avoid another world conflict, its birth co­ incided with the emergence of a peril so great as to place humankind's very survival in jeopardy. The new organization confronted, therefore, both challenge and opportunity, pro­ spects both hopeful and desperate, a future as transitory or enduring as humanity's readiness and will to transcend narrow and selfish national considerations in the interests of world community and of world peace. Tests of its potential and its efficacy were not long in coming. The very first resolution of the new General Assembly, adopted on January 24, 1946, established an Atomic Energy Connnission, "with the urgent task of making specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction.'' Only one nation in the world possessed atomic bombs at that time. Not six months had elapsed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Research the historical efforts of the U.N. Atomic Energy Connnission to fulfill its mandate. Use appropriate United Nations documents and publications, and such other resources as will provide a basis for making judgments.

What reasons can you give for the sense of urgency displayed by the U.N. General Assembly?

In June 1946, Bernard Baruch, U.S. representative to the Atomic Energy Commission, introduced an American proposal for the international control of all atomic energy activi­ ties. This proposal had been developed by Acheson, Lilien­ thal and Oppenheimer, and modified by political leaders to 39 take into account both foreign policy and security exigencies, as these were perceived. How altruistic and un~ 'lfish would you judge this proposal to be? Explain.

The initial Russian proposal, put forward three days later, took a substantialiy different approach, focusing, not on atomic energy per se, but on existing atomic weapons. What justification do you find for Soviet Russia's difference in emphasis? Explain.

The possibility of Soviet Russia's acceptance of the American proposal for international control foundered on three principal areas of disagreement: ll. the veto, 2) inspection, 3) timing of nuclear weapon prohibition. In each area evaluate the degree to which the vital interests of the United States were critically involved. The veto 40

Inspection

Timing of· nuc·1ea·r weapon ·prohibition

In each area, evaluate the degree to which the vital interests of the Soviet Union were critically involved. The veto

Inspection 41

Timing of nuclear weapon prohibition

Which of the two positions would you judge to have been more in harmony with the ideals and commitments of the U.N. Char­ ter? Explain.

The United States initiated the Bikini nuclear test series in the summer of J.946, a few short weeks after the Baruch Proposal had been submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Com­ mission. Can the two actions be reconciled? Explain. 42

How do you interpret the readiness of a clear majority in the Atomic Energy Commission and in the General ~sembly to accept and to implement the American proposal?

Given such a preponderance of support for the American propo­ sal, how would you evaluate Soviet Russia's refusal, under the Great Power unanimity rule of the Security Council, to permit its implementation? ·

In your judgment, what degree and nature of compromise could the United States have reasonably offered without excessive risk to national security? Explain. 43

In your judgment, what degree and nature of compromise could the Soviet Union have reasonably offered without excessive risk to national security? Explain.·

What is your own evaluation of the American plan's potential for preventing a nuclear arms race?

For exploiting the peaceful development of nuclear energy for th~ benefit of all humanity? 44

To what degree would the American proposal, if adopted, have transcended the basic framework of nation-state ~overeignty visualized ·in the U.N. Charter? Explain.

Would this have been good or bad? Explain.

What would you judge to have been the impact upon subsequent development and effectiveness of the United Nations if the Baruch Proposal had been adopted and implemented? 45

The Commission for Conventional Armaments was established by the Security Council on February 13, 1947. I ~ plans for a "preliminary census and verification" of the conventional armaments and armed forces of member states of the U.N. were to be a first step toward reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. The proposal for "census and verification" met with the approvai of the General Assembly, but not of the Security Council where Soviet Russia's veto was decisive. Use U.N. documentary resources to explore the historical role and success of this agency.

How would you evaluate Russia's refusal to separate considera­ tion of conventional armaments from nuclear armaments?

To what degree would you find Soviet Russia's position on "census and verification" to have been· -predictable?

Consistent? 46

Justified?

How would you explain the refusal of the United States to include in "census and verification" its own stockpile of atomic weapons? ·

What degree of justification do you find in this refusal?

What would you judge to be Soviet Russia's interpretation of this refusal? 47

How would you interpret Soviet Russia's ultimate decision to boycott both the Atomic Energy Commission and tr~ Commission for Conventional Armaments?

What would you consider to be the historical significance of the failure of the U.N. to achieve agreement on international control of atomic energy?

To what extent would you say that this failure contributed to the Cold war? Explain.

Was a part of the Cold War? Explain. 48

Secretary of War Stimson had pressed in the spring and summer of 1945 both for the use of the atomic bo-~ against Japan and for its use diplomatically to counter Soviet Russia's initiatives in Europe. In September, as he prepared to leave public life, he wrote a memorandum to President Truman radi­ cally revising his position as to how to deal with Russia. Read carefully Stimson's letter and memorandum to President Truman, assessing the thrust of his recommendation in the con­ text of subsequent .developments in the Atomic Energy Commission.

In what specific ways did Stimson's suggestions for dealing with the atomic threat differ from the provisions of the Baruch Proposal made in the United Nations several months later?

How would you evaluate the morality of Stimson's suggestions?

• 49

What kind of reaction do you judge such an approach would have received from Soviet Russia? Explain.

What risks for the United States and for the world do you think would have been involved? Explain.

How would such risks have compared with those experienced as a result of the failure to win acceptance of the Baruch Proposal? 50

To what extent, drawing upon subsequent experience with the Baruch Proposal, would you agree with Stimson tt~t the approach be directly to Soviet Russia, not through the Uni~ed Nations? Explain.

Whether success or failure, would such an initiative have had any adverse impact upon the fledgling United Nations? Explain.

What reasons can you suggest for Truman's rejection of Stim­ son's urgent admonition? 51

Do you agree with Stimson that one becomes trustworthy by being trusted? Explain.

While debates over international control of atomic energy faltered and foundered, American testing, improvement and di­ versification of nuclear weapons proceeded apace. Technolo­ gies of bomb production remained officially secret, even from Great Britain and France, altho~gh nuclear scientists insisted that neither the physics nor the technologies could long remain secret to any nation committed to the development of an atomic bomb. Soviet Russia was so committed, in the face of an American monopoly it would not ~ccept. In 1949, earlier than had been predicted, the first Russian A-bomb was exploded. A heated controversy ensued in the United States over the need to launch a crash program to develop a thermonuclear weapon, the H-bomb. Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller were the main protagonists in this debate, insofar as the scientific community was· concerned. The political decision, made by Presi­ dent Truman, was undoubtedly influenced by the Korean War and the threat posed by Communist China, as well as by other Cold War factors. Using all available resources, research the basic argu­ ments and positions of Oppenheimer and Teller, and the general nature and ramifications of this H-bomb controversy.

What would you consider to have been the impact of the Russian A-bomb explosion upon this debate? Explain. 52

How would you assess the risks for the United States in Oppenheimer's recommendation that development of the H­ bomb be delayed?

To what extent would you judge that Oppenheimer was taking American security interests into consideration? Explain.

How would you assess the relative validity of H-bomb arguments ~aised by Teller and Oppenheimer, respectively, 1) in relation to Soviet Russia, 2) in relation to world peace. Teller, in relation to· Sov'iet Rus·s·ia 53

Oppenheimer, in relation to Soviet Russia

Teller, in relation to wor·ld peace

Oppenheimer, in relation to world peace

Teller is quoted as saying to Szilard, on the question of whether the Russians could be trusted to cooperate in nuclear arms control and reduction: "It is irresponsible to be so trusting." Szilard responded: "It is irresponsible to be 54 so untrusting." With which of these viewpoints would you identify? What are your reasons?

Teller, who played perhaps the key role in developing the H­ bomb, has recently called upon the U.S. government to under­ take a massive civil defense program to minimize casualties in the event of a nuclear attack. To what degree do you find inconsistency here?

Conflict?

Moral ambiguity? 55

The U.S. exploded its first II-bomb in 1952; the Soviet Union in 1954. How serious do you consider the failux' to hold the nuclear stalemate on the A-bomb level?

How serious do you consider any escalation in destructive capability, from whatever level initiated?

What conclusions do you draw from the speed with which Soviet .... Rus.sia developed both an A-bomb and an H-bomb? 56

With nuclear competition in full movement by the mid-l950s and the threat to humanity ever more grim, how 1 'Sponsibly would you. judge that scientists had conducted themselves? Explain.

Should scientists be expected to face a more severe test of responsibility and accountability than government officials or citizens generally? Explain.

How would you compare the decision to produce the H-bomb with the decision to produce the A-bomb in terms of 1) strategic necessity, 2) morality, 3) impact upon world peace? Strategic necessity 57

Morality

Impact upon world )?e·ace

Do you feel that humanity was meant to discover .all the secrets of the universe? · Explain. 58

How capable is humanity, in you~ judgment, of dealing w1th the ultimate secrets of the :uniyerse?

To what extent should humanity draw a line beyond which scientific investigation should not proceed? ·Explain. 59

The failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to forestall and obviate the unfolding of a nuclear lrms race is at once cause and reflection of a deterioration in relations between the two superpowers, a deterioration characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust, rivalry for world power and in­ fluence, and periodic, if not continuous, hostility. This de­ terioration appeared to originate in conflicting interpretations of the Yalta agreements, particularly as they applied to Eastern Europe, but undoubtedly had deeper roots iri contrasting philos­ oph~es of government, clashing visions of world mission, and· perceptions of national security in which each superpower saw the other as its chief adversary, its primary threat. The con­ frontation that ensued, fluid and ever-changing as it was, came to be known as the Cold War. On the American side "containment" of the Russians and of communism was the urgent objective. Alliances - mutual defense and regional - became the primary in- struments. NATO, SEATO, CBNTO, ANZUS, Japan, Nationalist China {!ermosa/Taiwan), Philippines -- all were central both to Amer­ ican defense and to containment of Soviet Russia. On the Russian side, assumption of effective control over Eastern Europe was identified with its vital security interests. The Korean and Vietnam Wars involved both superpowers, the United States in full and open combat, the Soviet Union only through proxies. Indeed,~ the Cold War did not see the Superpowers at any time in direct military conflict one with the other, although the confrontation was no less critical and perilous on that account, and the Berlin Blockade and Cuban missile crisis were sufficiently explosive in nature to have exposed the world to such a fateful risk. The manifestations of Cold War spilled over inevitably into the United Nations, where Russian use of the veto in the Security Council exceeded anything that had been anticipated in the una­ nimity. rule. They were present also in the continuous struggle to find a basis for compromise, a modus vivendi, on control of nuclear weapons. Opportunities came and went, and the desperate effort to find a formula for slow-down in production, for reduc­ tion and ultimate prohibition, of nuclear weapons seemed in­ creasingly futile, as did any valid assigning of blame and res­ ponsibility for repeated failures. Production and improvement of nuclear weapons never flagged, and testing only when it suited strategic interests. A new·and higher level of threat to human survival accompanied the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile in the late 1950's. Where to stop? How to stop? Was there no escape? Newly established nations, the oppressed and exploited peoples of western imperialism, found the world of Cold War unpalatable, indeed intolerable. Why should they choose sides in a confronta­ tion that was essentially unrelated to their vital needs as inde­ pendent nations?. The Cold War was none of their business, they insisted. To choose one or the other side was to sacrifice their 60 independence, their freedom of action. It was to place them­ selves under imperialistic control and domination. to be mani­ pulated for alien purposes. Confronted with the ci1arge that neutrality in the Cold War was basically immoral, and with the admonition that failure to choose the West was to risk absorption by Soviet Communism, the new nations of the Third World increasingly chose non-alignment as their wisest and only practicable course. Their ultimate impact upon the United Nations, both because of their numbers and the eloquence of their new~found collective voice, was profound. Neither superpower has been immune to the virulence of their independent commentary and criticism. How the Cold War, with its alignment and its non-alignment, its ceaseless and inexorable confrontation, limited and cir-· cumscribed the potential effe~tiveness of the United Nations in establishing conditions for enduring world peace, is a subject for serious study and exploration. 61

CYCLE lII

The backgrounds of selected war and post-war situations are briefly sketched below, merely to establish a context within which you may usefully explore their Cold War ramifications. Use what­ ever resources are necessary to gain insights and to form judg­ ments. Remember that these are representative situations only. The selection is intended to be helpful and revealing, not exhaus­ tive.

In 1944, shortly after D-Day on the beaches of Normandy, armies of Soviet Russia advanced into Poland. When they reached the Vistula River, directly across from Warsaw, an uprising against the Nazis occurred in the City of Warsaw. It was a popular up­ rising, unsupported by armaments and supply lines. Before it was suppressed by the Germans many thousands of Poles had died.

To what extent did Soviet Russia provide aid to the Polish insur­ gents?

To what extent did the Soviets allow aid to come from the West? 62

What explanation can you give for Soviet Russia's actions?

To what degree do you see these actions justified? Be specific.

War was formally declared by Great Britain and France only after the Nazi invasion of Poland in September of 1939. A Polish government-in exile functioned in London during the entire balance of the war after the fall of Poland. As Soviet Russia advanced westward across Poland in 1944, it indicated its intention of re­ cognizing as the provisional government of Poland, not the London government-in-exile, but the so-c~lled Lublin·Committee. This precipitated bitter exchanges between Soviet Russia and the Western allies.

What reasons can you cite for Soviet opposition to the Polish government-in-exile? 63

What reasons can you cite for Soviet support of the Lublin committee?

Why was ·Great Britain in an embarrassing situation in relation to the entire Polish question?

To what degree did the confronta~ion over the nature and the identity of the provisional Polish government anticipate the larger confrontation of the Cold War? 64

How authentic was the Polish issue in terms of Yalta agreements?

Yalta agree~ents on Eastern Europe, designed to smooth the transition from war to peace, were already at war's end a source of misunderstanding and friction between Soviet Russia and the West. Bach side maintained the validity of its position. Com­ promise, already i~plicit if not explicit in the Yalta agreements, became progressively more and mor~ remote as a way out of the impasse.

What do you judge to have been the postwar intentions of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe?

How do you explain western opposi~ion to Russian strategy in Eastern Europe? 65

How do you evaluate Soviet Russian intervention in Rumania in 1945?

To what degree do you find either the Soviet Russian or the western position on Bastern Burope more defensible? Explain.

Agreements negotiated between Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom defined the conditions under which Iran would be occupied for strategic reasons during the war. They also stipulated the withdrawal of Russian forces from Northern Iran at the conclusion of the war. Events indicated Russian intentions of maintaining and reinforcing her control in ~orthern Iran. The crisis thereby precipitated became an early test of wills, Soviet Russian vs. the West, and of the newly established United Nations. ·

What would you consider to be Russian motivation in seeking to retain armies in northern Iran after the war? 66

What would you consider Western motivation in resisting this?

How effectively did the United Nations respond to Iran's appeal?

How would you interpret Russia's apparent yielding on this issue?

What significance does this incident have in the context of recent developments in Iran? 67

The Truman Doctrine was enunciated in 1947 in response to Soviet Russian threats against Greek and Turk~sh govern­ ments, threats made either directly or indirectly through her so-called satellites in the Balkans. America's reaction in­ cluded both economic and military assistance.

To what degree did Great Britain play a role in precipitating this crisis?

What objectives, or what sense of need, might have led Soviet Russia to apply such pressure against Turkey?

Against Greece? 68

How would you evaluate the strategic need of the Cnited States to resist these pressures?

'

How far-reaching would you judge the language of the Truman Doctrine to be?

How justified?

How would you evaluate the immediate Russian reaction to the American response in Greece and Turkey? 69

What would you assume to be the predictable response of Soviet Russia to the long-range implications of the TrL.:1-n Doctrine. Explain.

How tenable or enforceable have events proved the Truman Doctrine to. be? Be specific.

How would you evaluate its relevance and validity in American foreign policy today? Be specific. 70

The communist "coup'' in Czechoslovakia in· 1948 was con­ sidered in the West to be not only a symbol of ~"'Viet Russia's post-war intentions, but a tragedy in terms of Czechoslovakia's pre-war image as a bulwark of democracy in Central Europe. Examine a map of Europe.

What do you judge to be the strategic significance of Czecho­ slovakia in relation to the Cold War?

Compare the communist coup in Czechos~ovakia in 1948 with the so-called appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938.

How would you evaluate the suicide of Thomas ~asaryk, Czecho­ slovakian patriot, shortly after the communist coup? 71

Evaluate the impact of this coup upon the .West.

In 1956, Soviet Russia found it necessary to use armed force in Hungary; in 1968, in Czechoslovakia.

How would you interpret her "need" to take such actions?

How effective would you judge the response of the United Nations?

The United States? 72

The non-aligned countries?

What would you judge to be the significance of Soviet Russia's resort to force in East Europe?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence in 1949. It represented the West's collective re­ sponse to what was perceived as an authentic Rus~ian military threat. In 1955, Soviet Russia organized East Europe into the Warsaw Pact. The addition of nuclear dimensions on both sides constitutes an even graver threat to world peace today.

What reasons can you give to explain the West's fear of war· with Soviet Russia so soon after World War II? 73

Which of these reasons do you consider most valid? Explain.

What historical significance do you find in U.S. participation, indeed leadership, in this defense pact with other North Atlan­ tic Nations?

NATO's inclusion of West Germany as a full member in 1955 pre­ cipitated the organization of the Warsaw Pact by Soviet Russia. How would you explain the swiftness of Russia's response to the entry of West Germany into NATO? 74

How would you explain Russia's failure to respond .in precisely this way at the time NATO was organized?

Evaluate the threat to world peace posed by the perpetual confrontation of these two military alliances.

After the war; Germany was divided into four zones of occupation: f!ussian, British, American and French. The capital of Germany, Berlin, was similarly divided into four zones, al­ though located deep inside the Soviet zone. Cooperative Allied jurisdiction was guaranteed, pending negotiation of a peace settlement for Germany. In 1948, Soviet Russia attempted to block western access to Berlin. This blockade of Berlin was met by a determined and succes·sful airlift of supplies into western Berlin, so successful th.at the blockade was lifted in one year. Ultimately, the Russians erected the Berlin Wall. This wall still stands as a symbol of the Iron Curtain between East and West.

What do you interpret to be the Russian fears about post-war Germany? 75

How important do you find western stubbornness in ~efending rights of access to West Berlin?

How would you interpret the flight of East Germans to the West?

What combination of reasons led Soviet Russia to erect the Berlin Wall in 1961?

What alternative do you think Soviet Russia would have_pre­ ferred? Explain. 76

How do you explain her failure to press this?

The occupation of North Korea by the Russians, and South Kprea by the United States, was carried out after World War II in accordance witP- wartime agreements. These agreements also called for a Korea united under one freely ·elected govern­ ment. North and South Korean governments still confront each other across the 38th parallel after almost thirty-five years. It is a confrontation of armed adversaries. The prospect of a united and free Korea appears remote.

What would you consider to be the strategic importance of a free Korea to the United States?

Of a Russian-controlled Korea to Soviet Russ.ia? 77

What reasons can you give for the refusal of Russian-supported -North Korea to submit to United Nations supervised elections?

How would you assess responsibility for the Korean War?

Evaluate the role of the United Nations in the world community's response to North Korea's invation of South Korea. 78

Why did the Korean War not resolve and settle the "Korean Problem"?

CYCLE IV

In 1952, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission· and the U.N. Commission on Conventional Armaments were dissolved and a new Commission on Disarmament created, with instructions to work toward both atomic and conventional disarmame.nt. The same problems of control, inspection and veto persisted, as well as disagreement on timing of any prohibition of atomic weapons (manufacture, possession, use). Discussions appeared to be stalemated when in 1954 a French-British proposal linking re­ duction, prohibition, disclosure and verification in one inte­ grated plan was accepted in principle by the Soviet Union as a basis for discussion.

What significance do you find in the fact that this new ini­ tiative was undertaken not by the United States or the Soviet Union, but by France and Great Br·itain? 79

Weighing all previoµs disarmament positio~s taken by the Soviet Union, how would you evaluate the RussiaL qcceptance of the French-British plan as • basis for discussion. Be specific.

How radical a change in Western arms strategy would you say the French-British proposal involved? Be specific.

Russian and Western counter-proposals through the spring of 1955 narrowed the gap between the two sides. Based upon final positions taken, how-realistic would you judge the possibility of achieving an historic.break-through at that time? 80

What differences still appeared to be stumbling blocks?

Evaluate these in terms of: Legitimacy as issues

Intrinsic importance to an effective disarmament plan

After the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, Harold Stassen, U.S. representative on the Disarmament Commission, placed a· reservation on "all pre-Geneva substantive positions" taken by the U.S. on disarmament pending the outcome of a study of inspection methods. What was the significance of this m·ove in relation to the 1954-55 discussions on general disarmament? 81

How would you explain the action taken by the United States at this time?

ln light of subsequent developments in general disarmament, how would you evaluate the coll~pse of the 1954-55 discussions?

What importance did the United Nations attach to the establish­ ment of effective international controls in any disarmament plan? 82

What importance do you attach to such controls? Explain.

Nobel Peace Prize winner, Philip Noel-Baker, has referred to this French-British proposal as a "moment of hope." What reasons can you suggest for su~h a viewpoint?

To what extent do you agree with him? Explain. 83

Un December 8, 195~, President Dwight Eisenhower delivered· his "Atoms for Peace'' address to the U .1't. General Assembly. Read this speech in its entirety in Public Papers of the President, or in the course_appendix in its abbreviated form. Study and analyze it. Was it part of Cold War strategy? Was it an attempt to find a way· around the Cold War in the interests of humanity? Was it a calculated trap for Soviet Russia? Was it a significant thrust for world peace?

To what degree does the speech of President Eisenhower contain any of the rhetoric of the Cold War? Explain.

How closely does the President identify with the hopes and fears of the people of the world?

In what specific ways would the International Atomic Energy Agency proposed by Eisenhower differ in power and prerogatives from the Atomic Energy Commission proposed by Bernard Baruch in 1946? 84

To what extent did the President's speech make implementation contingent upon Soviet Russia's participation?

How vital would you consider such participation to have been to the success of the plan?

What specific reasons for hope would developed nations of the world find in "the atoms for peace" proposal? 85

Exactly what role would inspection play in the President's proposal?

Evaluate this in relation to the President's motives.

In relation to the potential success of the plan.

How would you evaluate the U.N. response to this proposal? 86

Cycle V.

The Third World began to respond formally to the demands and ramifications of Cold War alignments in the Bandung Conference of 19~5. Its response became more sophisiicated and precise in the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Fear o~ im­ perial~stic domination.and/or manipulation has always been a powerful deterrent to alignment, whatever the quid pro quo advantage_s offered in a variety of ways, subtle and direct alike, by the Superpowers. The significance of this deter­ rent, anchored as it was in the historical experience of colonialism, was enhanced by a growing sense that the issues of war and peace in the world were not, and could not be, within the special province and prerogative of superpowers to dispose and resolve. It became increasingly clear, even as superpower confrontation persisted in the framework of a deadly nuclear arms race, that non-alignment properly con­ ceived and expressed, could be a force and an influence for restraint and sobriety, and perhaps ultimately decisive in de-fusing the nuclear threat to humanjty. It was thus that non-ali~nment emerged as a third force, beset, like East and West, with all the inner contradicti6ns, inconsistencies, pettiness, seifishness and myopia that are part and parcel of human and of international life. Its moral validity was questioned from the outset, but some of the noblest expres­ sions of post-war history may well be found in the ideals and aspirations of Third World ·non-alignment or neutralism. · Carefully study the genesis and development of this movement as revealed in the Bandung·.:~··.~nd Belgrade· Conferences.

What "common denominators" would you say characterized the nations participating in the Bandung Conference? 87

Which of these would you judge to be the most significant. Explain.

To what extent were East-West polarities manifested at the Conference? Explain.

In what specific ways did the final communique represent a compromise on the most divisive of these polarities? 88

Chou En-Lai gained world recognition for ''restrained and statesmanlike" conduct at the Conference. What vidence can you cite to justify the characterization of ''restrained"?

Why might he have been expected to be more aggressive than restrained?

To what extent did the U.N. give recognition to the Bandung Conference?

How would you evaluate the significance of this recognition? 89

Nehru's famous five principles, embodied in the Panch Sheel, received general endorsement at the Conference 8S the basis for peaceful relationships among the nations of t:1e world. If honored by both East and West, is it your judgment that these principles would have had any significant effect upon the Cold War? ~xplain with specific reference to the United States.

To the Soviet Union.

Which of the five principles would you consider especially relevant to the nature and purpose of the Bandung Conference?

How authentic or valid would you consider the "Asian-African" . designation given to this conference? 90

How significant?

To what extent could you say that the conference was open, rather than controlled by a particular bias or point of view?

Non-alignment as a movement had not yet crystallized in the Third World. Do you find any seeds of non-alignment in the Bandung Conference. Explain. 91

Belgrade Conference, 1961

What significance do you see in the Tito-Nasser sponsorship of the Belgrade Conference, 1961?

In the Belgrade site of the Conference?

In what specific ways did Yugoslavia in 1961 illustrate non­ alignment? 92

To what degree did Yugoslavia's "non-alignment" evolve as a philosophical position?

To what degree. as a pragmatic response to circumstances?

Several nations which had been represented at the Bandung Conference were not invited to Belgrade. Explain the signi­ ficance of their not receiving invitations. Be specific.

What clarification was given to the.concept of non-alignment at the Belgrade Conference? 93

How would you contrast the priorities of Nehru and of Sukarno as articulated at Belgrade?

How would you evaluate them?

Which of these would you say more accurately characterizes the non-aligned movement today? Explain. 94

Evaluate the position taken hy the Belgrade Conference on Soviet Russia's United Nations "troika" proposal

Evaluate the position taken by the Conference on nuclear testing.

Evaluate the position taken by the Conference on peaceful negotiations between the Superpowers. 95

Which of these would you say is closer in spirit to positions generally taken at the Bandung Conference? Expi ·i.n.

Which of these would you say is most remote from any position articulated at Bandung? Explain.

How important would you consider the post-conference visits of Nehru to ~rushchev and Kennedy? Explain. 96

How productive? Explain.

United Nations membership changed in radical ways between the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Exactly how would you describe the practical im­ pact of this change upon the United Nations?

In your judgment, are the United Nations and the world better or worse served as a result of this change? Be specific in justifying your answer. 97

In 1946, one short year after Alamogordo, eleven months after Hiroshima and Nagasakt, the United States ·rganized and executed a series of nuclear tests at Bikini. The tests were designed to answer questions as to the vulnerability of naval vessels.to nuclear bombing. To everybody's surprise, many of the vessels survived both air and under-water explosions. But the nature, extent and persistence of radioactive con­ tamination became a reality that humanity henceforth would ignore or dismiss at its peril. Despite this, the demands of national security were judged sufficiently urgent to war­ rant continuation, acceleration and expansion of testing by the United States and Soviet Russia alike. Arms control and safety considerations consistently lagged behind security in official decisions to develop bigger, more efficient and powerful weapons. Technology was harnessed to perpetual re­ finement, diversification, and megatonnage-enhancement of nuclear weapons. The United States decision to resume continental test­ ing in the early 1950's was momentous. It carried an impli­ cit assurance to the populations of Nevada and Utah that no danger to life and health was involved. Subsequent contami­ nation of a Japanese fishing ves~el in conjunction with a Pacific test, and the death of ~undreds of sheep after a Nevada test, raised doubts, but .triggered no significant public outcry. Government was adamant in discounting test hazards. Even "atoms for peace" appeared to have its own comforting connotation. Americans remained essentially quiescent and passive until fall-out from Chinese test explo­ sions ultimately received such press and media coverage that concern became articulate and vociferous for the first time. Nevertheless, voices began to be raised more and more insistently in the United Nations about the relationship of continued testing, not only to hazards of fall-out, but to the ever more dangerous crescendo of nuclear arms production. "Overkill" entered the language, vividly describing humanity's capacity to destroy itself many times over. World public opin­ ion was sufficiently strong in the late 1950's to bring about an informal moratorium on atmospheric testing, a moratorium broken when Soviet Russia resumed testing in 1961, and was followed soon after by the United States. But the United Nations-sponsored Disarmament Commission, whose membership had been raised to a total of 18 nations for the express pur­ pose of recognizing the legitimate concerns and rights of non-aligned nations on all issues of war and peace, turned with greater and greater urgency toward a comprehensive test ban as the single most hopeful and practicable way to reverse the nuclear arms race. 98

How the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 wa~ negotiated, how crucial was the influence of the United NatiL~S and of non-aligned nations, how sweeping was the commitment ultimate­ ly negotiated and adopted, how far the nuclear arms race was, in fact, slowed and/or reversed--these vital questions will be explored in the .following section. 99

Cycle VI

Research the Limited Test-Ban treaty of 1963, giving critical attention to the issues involved, the nature of the debates that preceded its adoption, and the terms of the treaty it­ self. ENDC (Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission) discussion in 1962 focused with increasing intensification upon a compre­ hensive test ban. What three reasons can you cite to explain the intensification of effort and concern at that specific time?

How would you differentiate between the apparent concerns expressed by world public opinion about continued testing and those expressed by non-aligned members of ENDC? 100

How crucial a role would you say that non-alignl ~ members played in test-ban discussions? Be specific.

The Superpowers and the non-aligned members of ENDC had two different concepts of the feasibility of monitoring under­ ground nuclear tests. Which of the two approaches would you judge to be more realistic. Explain.

How significant a concession would you say that the Soviet Union made on the question of on-site inspections? 101

How do you interpret the refusal of the United States to see this concession as significant?

How would you evaluate the failure of the Superpowers to agree on an acceptable number of on-site inspections?

How realistic would you judge the non-aligned compromise proposal on number of on-site inspections? 102

What is your evaluation of the "challenge and invitation" proposal made by Sweden's representative on the ~NDC?

In your op1n1on, why did the Superpowers finally pursue dis­ cussions in Moscow separate from ENDC leading to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963?

Evaluate the specific gains accruing to the world from the Partial Test-Ban Treaty.

The specific losses. 103

Evaluate the degree of responsibility that must be shared jointly and/or respectively by the United State~ and the Soviet Union for failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban at that time.

To what extent would you consider this responsibility to reflect a deliberate purpose to maintain a testing capability?

Exactly what was the United Nations respon~e to the partial test-ban agreementJ

How would you evaluate this? 104

Based on all d1scuss1ons which took place within HNDC, and within the framework of expressed United ~!at· ons hopes and concerns, how would you evaluate the Superpowers' respect for and responsiveness to the United Nations?

How would you explain the position of France on the Partial Test-Ban Treaty?

How wo.uld explain the position of China? 105

What significance for the world do you find in the positions taken by France and China?

There was nego·tiated in 1974 a "Threshold" underground test ban of 150 kilotons; this threshold is so high that no signi­ ficant change in the nature and scope of the test-ban could possibly be inferred. Would you agree or disagree with this statement? Explain.

What priority would you as an individual, in the interests of world peace, give to the achievement of a total and compre­ hensive test-ban? 106

What role would you judge the citizen, of whatever nation, can play in bringing such a test-ban closer to i -,ality?

How would you explain the world's failure thus far to have achieved this goal? Be specific.

In this context, evaluate the pledge written into the pre­ amble to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. 107

. Where did the Partial Test-Ban Treaty leave humanity on issues of fall-out, nuclear arms control, nul ~ear disarma­ ment? Where did it leave humanity on the issue oi war and peace, nuclear holocaust or survival? The refusal of France and the People's Republic of China to become signatories meant, inevitably, that fall-out from atmospheric testing would continue on some significant scale. Underground test­ ing, authorized without limitation by the treaty, burgeoned. In the ensuing decade, something on the order of 1,000 under­ ground test explosions occurred, which clearly negated both nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. Atmospheric testing was, in fact, no longer vital either for the Soviet Union or for the United States. Weapon refinement and so­ phistication were no longer dependent upon atmospheric test­ ing; Perhaps this is why non-aligned members of ENDC pressed so strongly for a comprehensive test ban. But this was not to be! The confrontation persisted, the warheads multiplied, the ever-present risk of nuclear war remained a haunting, te!rifying nightmare. The nightmare had intensified when France and China joined the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia as nuclear powers. What had been implicit from the begin- ning was now reality--an inevitable proliferation of nuclear weapons among more and more nations. When and where would this stop? And how?! Proliferation swiftly became the cru­ cial issue as the promise of "atoms for peace" began to be translated into a demand for atomic power as a basic right of all nations. Developing countries saw the nuclear re­ actors as an invaluable and indispensable source of energy to power ne~ industries, raise standards of living and to narrow the affluence gap in the world. The technologies and the fuels could not remain the monopoly of a privileged few. They were vital in meeting the needs of all developing na­ tions. And the developing nations were now insisting with increasing asperity, and as of right, upon some early and measurable progress toward redressing the grossly inequi- table distribution of the world's weal th. Ironically, ''atoms for peace" became for nuclear powers both an economic wind­ fall and a source of concern. The prospect of building re­ actors around the world, even if massive credits were involved, was and remains a tremendous trade incentive. But what if there were any diversion of fuel, or of by-products of the chain reaction, to weapons production? Would uranium enrich­ ment plants also be built for the non-nuclear nations? Re­ processing plants? Would plutonium become widely available through lack of international controls? For the first time, perhaps, nuclear powers feared, not just each other, but the still unknown and un-numbered addi­ tions to their ranks. Restraints, though unofficial, and 108

unrelated to strong and effective arms control agreements, had nonetheless operated between the Superpowers anr among the five great powers. But what about the 6th, the ~th. the 15th? This was unsettling in the extreme since it portended the possibility of superpower involvement in nuclear war, not by calculation but by the sheer accident of circumstances. "Atoms for peace" became, therefore, for the Superpowers, a dilemma of economic profit versus nuclear jeopardy. For the develop­ ing nations, it remained primarily the symbol of escape from poverty and want, and in the ultimate event, from starvation. Their concern, their fear, had always been, and remained, the dreadful and still-escalating stockpiles of nuclear weapons possessed by the Superpowers. Out of this combination of conflicting forces and in­ fluences came the debates over non-proliferation, and agree­ ment on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. What compro­ mises were necessary, what controls were built in, how much insurance against nuclear war was achieved, what degree of justice was extended to non-nuclear powers--these are ques­ tions, no.less vital and relevant today than in 1968, that will be explored in the following cycle. 109

Cycle VII

In 1960 and 1964, respectively France and then the People's Republic of Orlna became the fourth and fifth of the world's nuclear powers. 'lhe possibility of further proliferation caused increasing anxiety, and discussions on this matter by the ENDC (Eighteen Nation Disarmament Cmmission) accelerated in 1965. These discussions cul­ minated in the Non-Proliferation 'l'reaty of 1968, which, after ratifi­ cation by a sufficient number of signatories, became effective in 1970. Study the non-proliferation debates and the provisions of the Non­ Proliferation ·Treaty itself. Carefully weigh and evaluate all the issues involved.

How would you evaluate the concern formally expressed in the mid-1960s by the General Assembly. on the need for action to prevent further pro­ liferation?

Which do you see as the greater threat to world peace, horizontal or vertical proliferation? Explain. 110

In what specific context was the question of vertical proliferation addressed in ENDC discussions?

What is your evaluation of the position taken by the Superpowers?

What is your evaluation of the position taken by representatives of non-aligned nations? 111

In your judgment, how adequately was the matter of vertical non­ proliferation settled by treaty provision?

li>w would you evaluate subsequent superpower attention to their treaty responsibilities in this area of vertical non-proliferation?

How would you explain this? 112

What effect do superpower nuclear arsenals have upon non-rroliferation generally? Explain.

In your judgment, has the thi.ted Nations mobilized its full influence to deal with vertical non-proliferation? Explain.

lbw adequately, in your judgment, did the treaty deal with the problem of horizontal proliferation? Explain. . 113

Two basic guarantees were perceived by non-nuclear weapons states as pre-requisite to any pledge o'f non-proP -Feration on their part, their security in a world threateneu by nuclear war, and their access to nuclear technology for the production of power.

How authentic do you consider the concern of non-nuclear weapons states about their national security? Explain.

How effectively would you judge their security is guaranteed by treaty provision?

Why was access to nuclear technology considered so vital by non-nuclear weapons states? 114

lbw adequately would you judge this access to be guaranteed by treaty provision? Explain.

lbw would you evaluate the relative burden of responsibility .Placed by treaty provision upon nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states?

lbw fair and equitable do you consider the framework of safeguards under International Atomic P.nergy Agency supervision? 115

What is your evaluation of these safeguards in terms of effectiveness in preventing diversion of materials, equipnent or technology fran peaceful to weapons production?

What is yam- judpent of the validity of including peaceful nuclear explosives tDlder treaty control?

lbw significant do you consider peaceful nuclear explosives in humanity's future? Explain. 116

In 1974, India exploded what she called a peaceful nuclear device. Explain whether or not this was in accordance with relevan stipula­ tions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Why did this test explosion cause concern and misgivings in Pakistan?

Why did it cause concern and misgivings in the world cammmity? 117

What degree of validity do you find in India's insistence that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion, not a nuclear bomb?

lbw would a canprehensive nuclear test-ban compare with the Non-Proli-· feration Treaty in its significance for world peace?

In its practical impact upon vertical as well as horizontal prolifera­ tion? 118

lbw would you evaluate the references to test-ban made in the Non­ Proliferation Treaty? Explain.

What reasons can you give for refusal of several nations to sign and to ratify the ?bl-Proliferation Treaty? Be specific.

Do you consider any of these reasons to be valid? Explain. 119

What aotiva~ion 1«>Uld any non-nuclear weapons state have for signing and ratifying this tnaty?

In recent years the sale of rmclear teclmology to developing nations has becane a highly cmpetitive enterprise, placing in jeopardy some of the basic objectives of non-proliferation. Uranhn enrichment and re­ processing plants carry risks of diversion of critical fuel elements for weapons production. Breeder reactors are considered by any to be. even more risky. kcess to plutonit11 and/or use of plutmim as a reactor fuel 1«>Uld appear to be the crucial issue. ltlat reasons can you suggest for the recent shelving of the U.S. breeder reactor program? Be specific.

In your jtxtgMnt, is this a wise decision? Explain. 120

Why do such European nations as France take a radically dif­ ferent view of this matter?

To what extent would you consider the more rigorous U.S. con­ ditions (established under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978) for transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and/or technology contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Non­ Proliferation Treaty?

How would you evaluate U.S. motivation in imposing such con­ ditions? 121 lbw would you evaluate the right of the lhited States to impose such conditions unilaterally?

What MJUld you judge the reaction of non-nuclear weapons states to be? Explain. .

To what extent wuld you find this reaction justifiable? Explain. 122

'lbe Non-Proliferation Treaty deals with procedures for transfer of nuclear mterials, equipmmt and teclmology under IAPA safeguards. If the basic principles of intemational ownership of all fissionable ma·~-3rials and control of all nuclear activities, rejected in the context of the Baruch Proposal, were now to be re-considered, would you judge it a more effec­ tive approach to non-proliferation? Explain.

Would the time and circumstances, in your judgment, be more propitious now than in 1946? Explain.

What position muld you anticipate the 1hited States might take on this issue? Explain. 123

What position 'WOUld you anticipate the Soviet thion might take on this issue? Explain.

What position would you anticipate the tbited Nations might take on this issue? Explain.

What position l«Jllld you anticipate the non-aligned nations might take on this issue? Explain. 124

Both the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty included pledges by the Superpowers to Wl-k diligently and rapidly toward nuclear disarmament. In the ±urmer case, it was a statement of honorable purpose contained in the pre­ ambl~; in the latter, it was an explicit obligation defined in one of the articles of the treaty itself. Expectations, no less than the yearnings of humanity, would appear to have been clearly.articulated, as, indeed, they had been articu­ lated repeatedly in General Assembly ~iscussions and resolu­ tions throughout the fifties and the sixties. Perhaps some of these influences were finally beginning to have an effect; perhaps the hair's-breadth reprieve from disaster in the Cuban missile crisis had left its mark; perhaps the very costs, economic and human, of an escalating armaments race began to appear excessive in relation to other heavy demands and pressing needs; perhaps it was the sobering reality, at last beyond debate and beyond escape, that East no less than West possessed the capability of destroying the other. In any case, Brezhnev responded affirmatively, even with the United States heavily involved in the Vietnam War against a Soviet client state, to an initiative by President Johnson to open discussions on strategic weapons in the fall of 1968. The discussions were postponed by the United States in reac­ tion to Soviet Russia's military moves in Czechoslovakia, but were set in motion as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks lSALT) under President Nixon. They have continued through SALT I, the ABM Treaty, the Vladivostok agreements and the SALT II Treaty, whose ratificatio~ by the United States Senate has been indefinitely delayed pending some acceptable resolu­ tion of the Afghanistan crisis. What had been perceived as "detente"--an easing of East-West ·tensions, an expansion of trade, cultural and scientific contacts between East and West, and, indeed, efforts to achieve East-West cooperation and collaboration in selected areas--has at least temporarily dissolved in the revival of Cold War rhetoric and confrontation following the Soviet in­ vasion of Afghanistan. The authenticity of "detente" had, however, been called into question over and over again as Soviet moves in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East had repeatedly revised suspicions as to her international purposes, and her fidelity to the spirit, if not the letter, of "detente". But the most searching questions about "detente" concern SALT itself, both as pro­ cess and as product, and must be directed to the United States and Soviet Russia without distinction. Have the pledges given in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty been fulfilled? Has there been a serious and sustained effort ·to fulfill them? Is there less or more destructive power in the nuclear armaments of the Superpowers today than when SALT began? Is there less 125 or more sophistication in nuclear weapons? Less or more accuracy in delivery systems? Less or more tec11ological enhancement of the destructive potential of each Jnissile, each missile launcher? Is there less or more security in the world against the threat of nuclear war? Less or more security for the populations of Soviet Russia and of the United States? Less or more security for the people in non-nuclear weapons states? Less or more suspicion and dis­ trust even with regard to negotiated SALT agreements? Has the commitment of national resources to perceived defense ' requirements begun to decline? Are the dimensions of nuclear confrontation contracting or expanding? Do our allies take solace and comfort from our SALT negotiations and agree­ ments? Have we, in fact, taken any-measurable step toward disarmament? There are harsh questions--harsh in their .thrust, harsh in their connotation. But the world needs truth, not false re­ assurance. Where does the truth lie? Will legitimate fears underwrite any negotiated agreement, at whatever level of threat to humanity? Will people, anywhere, everywhere, shun the apparent complexity of arms discussions, leave the matter to "experts," acquiesce passively in whatever ensues? Que sera, sera? SALT in the seventies raised far more than technical questions, of whatever complexity. Perhaps the ultimate question is whether humanity, in all its multipli­ city of peoples, and races, and individuals, will have a voice in its own survival or demise, will raise its voice collectively and individually, to claim and exercise the right to be involved in those fateful decisions which will define, and limit, and circumscribe, whatever future remains for any of us. 126

Cycle VIII

1he seventies were the decade of strategic arms limitation talks, of SALT discussions and negotiations, of detente, of raised hopes and of disappointments for the world in the control and reduction of nuclear arms. Research SALT I, the .AJM Treaty, the Vladivostok understandings, and the SALT II Treaty, in terms of the critical issues--nuclear arms limitation and reduction, removal of the threat of nuclear war, easing of international tensions, re-direction of arms expenditures to meeting vital and urgent human needs around the world.

?laerical equivalence in missile J.auncM.rs was not a crucial considera­ tion for the tilited States in the negotiatim of SALT I. lbl wuld you explain this!

ttbat is your evaluation of the Jackson Jaendment mandating such numeri­ cal equivalence in all post-SALT I arms control agreements! . 127

Why has there been no serious attempt to achieve numerical equivalence in such categories as mmber of missiles, maber of warheac... *'

Why is it that no restrictions on MIRVing of JDJClear missiles were included in SALT I?

lbw significant would you judge this failure to be in relation to sub- sequent developments? Explain. . 128

Where.1«>111.d you place responsibility for this cnission? Explain.

Whf did the Vladivostok agreements in 1974 include MIRVed missile lmmchers for the first time?

lhat arms .control lesson might be dram. fran the entire story of MIRV developmnt and deployment?" 129

lt>uld you say that Vladivostok represented.any gains for arms control? Explain.

Jay losses? Explain.

lhlt is the significance of the Vladivostok agreement on Russian heavy missiles? 130

President Ol.rter's initial SALT proposal in early 1977 was swiftly repudiated by Soviet Russia. Explain why this might have b .. "11 expected? :ee specific.

lfhat 'WOUl.d you judge Ol.rter's motives to have been in preparing and presenting this proposal? ·

In the cmtext of arms control, how would you c:anpare the basic thrust of the Ol.rter proposal with SALT I and Vladivostok? 131

With the fully negotiated SALT II treaty?

What reasons l«)U]d you advance to explain why all SALT agreements thus far have essentially left the door open to continuing teclmological im­ provements in weapons development?

Would you defend this? Explain. 132

1iJw significant to authentic arms control wuld you judge limits and restrictions on weapons modernization to be?

liJw 1llOUld you assess the significance of MIRV launcher limitations in SALT II? .

lbw wuld you assess the significance of MIRV warhead limitations in SALT II? 133

Evaluate the response of non-aligned nations to SALT II.

Explain why arms control adwcates, whether or not they are prepared to support the SALT II Treaty, are in general disappointed with it.

lhi.ch of the arguments advanced against ratification of SALT II 'WOUld you ccmsider to be most valid? Explain. 134

ltdch of the argments advanced in favor of ratification of SALT II in its negotiated form wuld you consider most valid? BxplaL.

'Die Soviet Union has :&om the beginning of the nuclear missile age stressed the development of heavy missiles; the thited States chose instead to develop smaller missiles. lhat reasons can you suggest to explain the respective strategies of weapons development?

liJw M>Uld you explain the willingness of both Soviet Russia and the thited States to negotiate and ratify the .Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, virtually foreclosing any further development of defensive missiles? 135

Why are we presently concerned that a counter-force strateav employed by the Soviet tnionmight negate the advantages we sought\., gain through the AJM Treaty?

P.xactly why is Soviet Russia in an increasingly f awrable position to employ a counter-force strategy?

li>w would you differentiate between ''nutually assured destruction" as a strategy of deterrence and the counter-force strategy? 136

D> you believe that the thited States should pursue a cour•er-force strategy? Explain.

lhat justification do you see for the development and deployment of the MX missile?

What qqestiOD$ would you personally raise about MX development and deployment? 137

The United States expects each MX complex to count as a single missile launcher. How valid would you consider tl ~q position to be?

How would you assess the vulnerability of MX deployment in the absence of a ratified SALT II?

How authentic in the arms control context would you judge Brezhnev's 1979 offer to reduce Russian missile and general military strength in East Europe? Explain. 138

What is the significance of Soviet Russia's development and deployment of the SS-20?

Explain why "theater" nuclear weapons systems have thus far been left outside the framework of SALT discussions.

To what extent would you consider this to have been a wise policy? Explain. 139

What urgency might there be in including ''theater" ·nuclear weapons systems in SALT III negotiations?

H>w lfOUl.d you evaluate the NATO decision to deploy both cruise missile and modernized Pershing II missiles in Westem Jbrope?

What is your judgment of Carter's decision on the B-1 bomber? Explain. 140

Your judgment of his motives? Explain.

What is ~ assessment of Carter's decision on the neutron bomb?

Your assessment of his motives? Explain. 141

lhat impact wuld you say these two policy decisions have "'qd upon the strategic balance?

Upon arms control?

Would you judge the neutron bomb to be morally more objectionable than atanic and thermmmclear bombs? Explain. 142

lbw valuable a contribution would you say the SALT process ;u made to strategic balance between Past and West? Be specific.

To placing a cap on the total destructive capabilities of Russia and the thited States?

To maintaining and preserving world peace? 143

To strengthening and reinforcing thited Nations disarmamen,,_ objectives?

To honoring superpower CClllli.tments tmder the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968?

Is it your judgment that we would be better off without the SALT process? Explain. 144

liJw realistic would you judge it to be to abandon the bila... ~ral nego­ tiations of SALT for some Dill.ti-lateral framework? Explain.

lbw wuld you evaluate the role played by the mrl.ted Nations throughout all of the SALT negotiations? 145

"To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war .... " It was for this primary purpose th~ the United Nations was established, and to this cause that a~l nations, whether charter members or later entrants, were committed by the conditions and obligations of membership. There has not been war-not the great war, not the unthinkable war--between the Superpowers. There has, unfortunately, been war, major war, involving the United States directly, in Korea and in Vietnam, and Soviet Russia indirectly. War has, in addition, broken out in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia. There has been use of force in Europe by the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and the continuous threat of war between the United States and Russia. One can hardly refer to this as a period of peace!! The initial failure of the United Nations fo find a formula for international control of atomic energy was fate­ ful. Out of this failure came the full-fledged, and relent­ lessly accelerating, nuclear arms race. The General Assembly called unceasingly for members to work toward "general and complete disarmament," always combining this plea with insis­ tence that such disarmament be under effective international control. Problems of inspection and verification, which plagued disarmament discussions and negotiations from the very beginning, have persisted to this day, despite development of sophisticated modes of surveillance. But there was never any doubt, whether before or after the entry of approximately 100 new nations, that the United Nations sought a guaranteed dis­ armament, not one that would place the organization itself in jeopardy. Short of "general and complete disarmament," the United Nations appealed continuously for a comprehensiv~ test ban, for reduction in conventional forces, and for a termi­ nation and reversal of the nuclear arms build-up. Non-aligned nations were increasingly articulate on all these questions, whether in the General Assembly or in commit­ tees charged with specific aspects of disarmament. Sweden pressed its arguments from a base of political stability, industrial and technological sophistication, and enlightened neutralism. others, the majority, spoke out of a deep and haunting fear that, whatever the immediate exigencies of development, their emergence from colonialism to indepen­ dence and their achievement of full dignity as human beings and equal status as nations would forever remain hostage to the nuclear confrontation of Superpowers. The apparent fu­ tility of General Assembly resolutions on disarmament, however eloquent they might be, a growing frustration at being shunted into secondary, subsidiary or peripheral roles in serious arms control or disarmament discussions, impatience with the con­ tinued failure of the Superpowers to honor their disarmament 146 pledges, anxiety over the lingering danger of nuclear war, even disillusionment with the ability of the Un_ ··~ct Nations, as an ins ti tut ion, to deal effectively with disarH1ament- - all of these contributed to an insistent call for a world disarmament conference. These calls were resisted by the nuclear powers for years, but finally there was a compromise agreement to convene the General Assembly in the spring of 1978 in a Special Session on Disarmament. What impact this Special Session had, whether the reality brought satisfaction or disappointment to those who had pressed so long and hard for such a dialogue, how nuclear and non-nuclear nations conducted themselves in the debates, and how the world per­ ceived the United Nations at work on this most critical and urgent of humanity's problems--these questions, and others equally relevant, comprise the thrust of the next cycle. 147

Cycle IX

Carefully explore the circumstances under which the Special Session on Disarmament came to be called. Study and evaluate the disOJSsions and debates as they unfolded during the session. Examine the roles played by the Superpowers, other major nations, and the non-aligned nations. .Ana­ lyze the final document in tenns of its validity as a contribution to dis­ armament and world peace. li:Jwwould you explain the delay of almost twenty years before the decision was reached to call a Special Session of the General .Assembly on Disarm­ ment?

What was the position of each of the Superpowers in relation to the pressure brought by non-nuclear powers to convene a World Disarmament Conference? Explain. 148

Why wre the non-aligned cOlDltries dm-ing those years of d--,a.y so persistent in demanding a World Disarmament Conference?

lbw l«>Uld you explain the nan-aligned preference for a World Disarmament Conference over a Special Session of the General .Assembly?

liJw wuld you assess the difference between the two in potential effectiveness? 149

To what extent do you think a subject like disarmament lends itself to productive discussion and decision-mak~·5 in a large group?

The United Nations had declared the decade of the 70's as the Decade of Disarmament. · At the opening of the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, how would you evaluate the progress actually achieved toward disarmament?

Where would you place responsibility for this? Explain. 150

How would you differentiate between arms control and disarma­ ment?

How would you explain the agreement to convene the Special Session on Disarmament after so many years of delay and resistance!

To what extent did propaganda play a role in special session discussions? Cite evidence to prove your point. 151

To what degree were discussions motivated by selfish national considerations? Explain.

Extreme nationalism has been considered to be one of the main causes of modern war. Would you say that during the life of the United Nations, nationalism has diminished or increased? Explain.

What impact would you judge non-alignment has had on national­ ism in the world today? Explain. ' I' 152

What significance do you find in the role played hy non­ governmental organizations in the Special Session.

To what degree would say the Superpowers were criticized and/or indicted in special session discussions? E~plain.

In the final document? Explain. 153

l How would you evaluate the realistic impact of such i~dictment on the Superpowers?

How much justification do you see for this criticism and/or indictment? Explain.

How would you assess the organizational changes in the U.N. machinery for disarmament, as made by the Special Session? 154

What value or importance would you attach to nuclear-free zones in the context of disarmament? Explain.

Why has there not been more significant progress toward the creation of nuclear-free zones?

What value or importance would you attach to "zones of peace" in the context of disarmament? Explain. 155

How effectively did the Special Session on Disarmament deal with the question of no-first-use of nuclear weap ~s? Explain.

How effectively did the Special Session on Disarmament deal with the banning of nuclear tests altogether? Explain.

How effectively did the Special Session on Disarmament deal with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? Explain. 156

How effectively did the Special Session on Disarmament deal with superpower nuclear competition? Explain.

To what degree would you say that the Special Session on Dis­ armament gave new impetus to disarmament? Explain.

Why is it that the articulated aspirations, indeed the pleas, of the world for disarmament do not appear to be reflected in concrete Salt progress? 157

How secure would you feel if the UN's objective of general and complete disarmament were to be achieved under th~ guidelines defined by the Special Session on Disarmament? Explain.

How realistic a goal do you consider this to be? Explain.

How do you evaluate the success of the Special Session on Disarmament? 158

What reasons would you advance to explain this? Be specific.

What binding obligations for member nations are included in the final document? Explain.

Would you now recommend that a World Disarmament Agency be established on a permanent basis? Explain.

To what degree do you feel that a "new process" has been established on the question of disarmament? Explain. 159

Non-alignment unfolded in the middle fifties and in the early sixties as an ideal. It represented f!rst the aspirations of people liberated from colonialism, their sense of coming into their own at last, and their understandable anxiety to.safeguard and protect their new independence from whatever danger. The danger they inevitably perceived to be greatest was that of a return to colonialism, whether by the direct or indirect action of former imperialist powers. With each other they thought to avoid differences and conflict by postulating a relationship of peaceful coexistence, non­ interference and non-intervention in their internal affairs, full respect for cultural, religious and political differ­ ences, and an insistence upon racial equality. Such a rela­ tionship, sustained with honor and dignity, appeared to minimize if not to eliminate any threat to their independence coming from one another. With the Superpowers they thought to avoid entangling alignments and/or alliances which might involve them disastrously in Cold war crises. The Organiza­ tion of African Unity, born in the early sixties, embraced these ideals even more specifically and· consciously. It represented a rejection of the option, advanced by Nkrumah of Ghana as a potential third force in the world, of a United States of A£rica. Non-alignment was not in fact originally conceived as such a force or bloc in world affairs, pitting itself against East and West for whatever objectives, what­ ever gains. As neutralism it articulated a clear framework of international values to which, large and small, all non­ aligned nations committed themselves, and which they proposed for universal world application. As values these commitments were never uncongenial to the spirit of all that is best in the American tradition. One would have expected, therefore, a happy and productive rela­ tionship of mutual respect between the United States and the non-aligned. Although not one of the classic historical examples of western imperialism, in the sense· of seeking control over African and Asian territories and peoples, the United States was identified, perhaps due to its superpower status vis-a-vis Soviet Russia, and perhaps because in that capacity it represented the West which included all of the former imperalist powers, with imperialism, with exploita­ tion, with neo-colonialism. Perhaps, in addition, its own history, particularly in relation to Latin America, whether of economic domination or of repeated military intervention, contributed to the development of this symbolism. Soviet · Russia was not seen as a part of the imperialist tradition, and its articulated ideals and objectives for socialist society were heard more clearly and more eloquently by the Third World than the ideals of American and western liberalism and democracy. The non-aligned nations were never, therefore, inclined to accept the American position, reiterated again and again by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, that there could be only one option for them on moral 'grounds and that this was basically one of opposition to and defense against the threat of Kussian expansionism. On the .other 160

hand, they never turned to Soviet Russia in unqualified acceptance of Russia's role in the East-West cor~rontation, nor with unqualified faith in the economic, socia4 and political promises of. Soviet Russia. Although the United States tended prematurely to see non-alignment as virtual defection to the East, history is not likely to corroborate such an interpretation. It is, however, certain to corroborate the philosophical contra­ dictions and conflicts, and the policy difficulties, that caused the United States such anguish as a direct result of its forming alignments and alliances with several oppressive and dictatorial governments around the world, all in the name of defending the free world against communist expansionism. But it is also true that as non-alignment has aged, maturity has not necessarily brought wisdom, consistency, . fulfillment of its own commitments. Ideals so clear and forceful in their original articulation have increasingly become contaminated by many of the forces at work in the world. Non-aligned leaders, being human, have behaved like human beings, sometimes displaying animosity, obstructionism, ambition, envy, selfishness, greed, aggressiveness, and all the other characteristics, both positive and negative, that characterize humanity. They have experienced from each other interference in their internal affairs, military intervention, war, regional rivalries for power and influence, and compe­ tition that begins to have even nuclear overtones. These newly-liberated nations have, in short, become nation-states, behaving like nation-states, with their own national priori­ ties, their own national security considerations, their own national vital interests to foster and to safeguard. These realities have posed problems for the non-aligned in the United Nations and with one another, problems which, like those of the United States with some of its client states, have produced equal anguish among the non-aligned in their own honest perception of contradictions. They have at times· avoided confronting issues where these contradictions exi.sted. They have, on the other hand, been capable of extraordinary courage in rising to the demands of difficult situations involving some of their own members. All of the problems of non-alignment have been coming into clearer focus in recent days and may be seen in some perspective against the backdrop of the 1979 Havana Con­ ference of Non-Aligned Nations. Will non-alignment remain a moral force in today•s·world, contributing constructively and creatively to the building of world peace? Will the voice of non-alignment infuse disarmament discussions with the articulated conscience of humanity? Will non-alignment transcend the limitations of the nation-state? Will it 161 tend increasingly to conform to historic patterns of nation­ state behavior? Will its leadership hold fast to ~he ideal­ ism that gave birth to the movement? Or will it be increas­ ingly influenced by considerations of power, national self­ interest and world politics? These are questions that urgent­ ly need study. They constitute the essence of the next cycle. 162

Cycle X

Research the -Havana Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, evaluating the struggle for control of the conference and of the movement itself. Analyze the Final Document, asses­ sing the .validity and objectivity of official non-aligned positions taken at the conference. Explore the unfolding role of non-alignment within the United Nations subsequent to the Havana Conference.

According to the principles of non-alignment, what position would you feel you had to take if you were a member of the U.N. Security Council and the question of Vietnam's overthrow of the Pol Pot regime came up? Explain.

Do you see any significance in the stand actually taken by most non-aligned nations? Explain. 163

What position would you feel you had to take if y~i1 were a representative at the Havana Conference of Non-Ali~ned Nations~ 1979, and the question of which Cambodian regime would be recognized came up? Explain.

Why was there considerable dissatisfaction with the way this question was resolved at the Havana Conference?

It was resolved differently as the General Assembly of the United Nations opened in New York after the Havana Conference. Explain why there was a different outcome in the General Assembly. 164

In your judgment, should the documented cruelty of the Pol Pot regime be taken into consideration in determining ··1hich is the legitimate Cambodian government? Explain.

Would your answer be different if the Heng Samrin regime had come to power by revolution or civil war. Explain.

Using only the Havana Conference for evidence, how do you evaluate Castro's adherence to non-alignment? Be specific. 165

To what extent would you say that the organization and administration of the Havana Conference were in h ~mony with the principles of non-alignment? Be specific.

How radical was Castro's challenge to Tito's historical position in the non-aligned movement? Explain. ·

How would you interpret Tito's primary concerns as the Havana Conference unfolded? 166

How fair and impartial would you consider the conference discussions on the respective roles of the U.S. a.i. 1 U.S.S.R. in today's world? Explain.

How objective would you consider the Final Document to be on this same question? Explain.

Which of the Superpowers was described as the "natural ally" of the non-aligned nations? By what reasoning could such a conclusion be reached? 167

What is your evaluation of such a position?

While the Havana Conference was in session, the issue of Soviet Russian troops in Cuba claimed the attention of the United States. Quite apart from the question whether these troops were or were not a combat brigade, whether their pre­ sence in Cuba did or did not constitute a threat to the security of the United States, what significance do Soviet Russian troops in Cuba have in relation to Cuba's official leadership of the non-aligned· movement over the next three years?

Words often carry symbolic meanings. What importance to you attach to the inclusion of the word "hegemony" in the Final Declaration? 168

To what degree does the Final Declaration reiterate the original ideals motivating non~aligned nations?

The Final Document deals in specific terms with Israel, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Evaluate each presentation as a contribution to world peace. Israel:

Zimbabwe:

South Africa: 169

Would it be your judgment that non-alignment as a movement gained or lost stature as a result of the Havana ~~nference? Explain.

What significance do you attach to Cuba's failure, so soon after her sponsorship of the Havana Conference, and in the initial prominence of Castro's leadership of the non-aligned movement, to win the competition with Colombia for a seat on the Security Council?

How would you evaluate the non-aligned position on the question of condemning Iran's holding American diplomatic personnel as hostages? 170

How would you evaluate the non-aligned position on the question of imposing sanctions against Iran?

How would you evaluate the non-aligned position on the question of condemning Soviet Russia's military moves in Afghanistan?

What explanation would you give for what appears to be a radical change from non-aligned positions as of the Havana Conference? 171

Do you believe that non-alignment has an authentic role to play in future international developments? Expla!n.

Would it be your judgment that it is a role of diminishing or increasing importance? Explain.

How important to non-align~ent would you judge the United Nations to be? Explain. 172

What importance to you attach to the American use of the United Nations machinery and procedures both in relatior to the hos­ tages and in relation to Afghanistan?

What would you judge our motivation to be? Explain.

How effective would you judge the United Nations to be in its handling of the hostage problem? Explain.

· ... ·...... ' :;.· 173

How effective would you judge the United Nations to be in its handling of the Afghanistan problem? Explain.

What value do you see in resolutions of condemnation? Explain.

How would you compare a resolution of condemnation with reso­ lutions calling upon the Superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals? Explain. 174

To what extent to you believe that the United Nations is at a crossroads at this point in time? Expla_in. 175

Cycle IX continued

Shortly after the Havana Conference had adjourned, Fidel Castro and Pope John Paul II delivered major addresses to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Study these speeches carefully, comparing them in relation to values articulated, diagnoses of critical world problems offered, and thrust of recommendations made.

John Paul II and Fidel Castro spoke, each in his own way, to the consciences of delegates and of all humanity. Explain the nature of the Pope's appeal to conscience. Be specific.

Explain the nature of Castro's appeal to conscience. Be specific. 176

Which of the two appeals do you consider more basic, i.e., gets closer to the root of the world's problems, +he world's needs? Explain.

The Pope laid great stress upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the cornerstone of world peace. What specific relationship do you see between abuse of human rights and dignity anywhere in the world, and the achievement of enduring peace?

John Paul cited two grave threats to human rights in today's world: 1) inequitable distribution of the material goods of life, and 2) injustice in the field of the spirit. To what degree would you say that Castro agrees with him on the first....,t~!.eat? Explain. 177

To what degree would you.say that Castro agrees with him on the second threat? Explain.

Exactly what would be your interpretation of "injustice" in the field of the spirit?

Citing evidence solely from Castro's speech, how non-aligned would you judge him to be? 178

Compare Castro's plan for aiding developing nations with the solution proposed by John Paul.

How would you evaluate the respective messages on the question of arms and armaments?

Which speech would you judge adds greater stature to the United Nations in terms of its role in working for world peace? Explain. 179

Which speech made the greater demands upon member nations? Explain.

Which speech came closer to identifying the vital weakness of the United Nations? Explain.

What do you personally feel to be the vital weakness of the United Nations? 180

It is now 35 years since the United Nations Charter was adopted and the organization was born. The worl · has not yet seen the end of war, nor the threat of war, and indeed the risks for humanity have multiplied incredibly in the interven­ ing years. Why? Why? The question is articulated out of the very desperation and urgency of our condition. It must be asked. Is there an answer? Probably no simple one-:--Over these 35 eventful and fateful years, the United Nations, the Superpowers, the non-aligned nations--all have declared their· undying commitment to the achievement of peace; all have pro­ claimed the urgent priority they give to this effort; all have evoked principle to justify their actions; all have claimed to be the crucial, the supreme, agents in the search for peace and justice throughout the world. But there is no peace; and how can one speak of justice and equity while millions of men, women and children experience hunger, want, even starvation, in many areas of our world? Clearly something is wrong when moral positions staked out so carefully and so publicly are not translatable into substantive and qualitative changes in humanity's condition. Clearly something is wrong when at the end of a long sequence of formal international efforts--resolutions of approbation and of condemnation; eloquent appeals for peace and disarma­ ment; connnittees, commissions, special sessions, sununit meet­ ings; discussions, debates, negotiations, strategic arms limi­ tation talks, even treaties--the destructive nuclear capabili­ ties of East and West have not only not been reduced, but have instead been significantly enhanced. Is the United Nations the source of the problem? As an organization had it already become obsolete when the atomic bombs were falling on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What has been the impact of the veto? Of great power domination of the Security Council? Of a secretariat conceived in an administra­ tive rather than an executive context? Should the United Nations, could the United Nations, have had authentic authority and power to intervene, no matter where in the world, to main­ tain and preserve the peace? Should the United Nations Charter be amended to correct deficiencies? Should a new charter be written? Or is it possible, as Secretary-General Waldheim has himself suggested, that attitudes of member nations are at least partly to blame for any organizational ineffectiveness that exists·? Do these attitudes reflect failure to live up to char­ ter commitments? Are national priorities placed above those of the world community? Is there full respect for and compli­ ance with United Nations requests, recommendations, decisions? And the Superpowers? Exactly what are their intentions, their purposes, their objectives? Are they negotiating in good faith, seriously seeking a basis for nuclear arms reduction, for ultimate disarmament, as they are pledged to do? Or are they playing what Alva Myrdal has called "the game of disarma­ ment," determined to maintain high levels of nuclear deterrence 181 and to pursue continuous technological improvement of nuclear weaponry, while soliciting world approval and appreciation for their "disarmament" efforts? Are they engag 0 d in a deadly struggle for power and influence, perhaps _Jr su­ premacy, in the world? And must the world forever quake lest the stalemate of nuclear deterrence be shattered by some impulsive and irrational move by one or the other power, or by what Secretary of Defense Brown has described as a "cosmic roll of the dice?" Is the villain of the piece the nation-state, large and small without distinction? Is there an obsession in today's world with national sovereignty--resistance to curbs or limi­ tations on the one hand, and aggressive extension beyond na­ tional boundaries, to whatever extent possible, on the other? Every nation for itself and the Devil take the hindmost? And this at the moment in human history when world community has ceased to be dream and become stark necessity? Is the nation­ state obsolete? Will world government in some form supplant the United Nations? Are nation-states ready for it? Would they yield to it? And would things be different the next time? Is there still a place, no matter what form of international organization, for cultural uniqueness and difference within each nation, for the involvement of people at all levels in the fostering and enhancement of this uniqueness, and their participation in the determination of priorities? For finally one must ask: Whose business is all of this anyway? The search for peace and justice in the world? The reduction and elimination of nuclear arms? The re-direction of massive expenditures for arms into improvement of the human condition throughout the world? Can one honestly respond: It is the business of the people of the world, men and women every­ where on earth, humanity itself? Will their voices be raised as never before? Will they be heard in the corridors of in­ fluence and the council chambers of power? Will they rise, inexorably, from neighborhood and community dialogue, from dia­ logue with government officials high and low, from people to people dialogue across national boundaries and transcending national differences, to articulate for all humanity the values which make us human, which bind us together as one human family, and which, if we live them, may yet prove to be our salvation? If the answer to these questions is not "yes," then we must ask with Norman Cousins, but with far greater anguish than when he posed the question in the first years of the nuclear age, "Is Moder-n Man obsolete?" . Cycles 11 and 12 deal with these sobering questions of world order and human destiny in an age of atomic and thermo­ nuclear bombs, of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and of human institutions which may or may not be equal to the challenge and the need. 182

Cycles XI and XII

Study the U.N. Charter and the historical experience of the United Nations for evidence of organizational weak­ ness and/or strength. Assess its potential for viability in a rapidly changing world. Evaluate the nation-state as a force for peace and/or stability, focusing on the behavior of a cross-section of the U.N. membership. Analyze the reasons for the emergence of regional organizations and assess their potential contribution to world peace. Explore the literature on world order and world government and evaluate world government in any of its models as an alternative to the United Nations.

The nation-state is frequently perceived as a fundamental impediment to world peace. What reasons can you give to explain such a perception?

To what degree do you consider such a perception valid? Explain. 183

In what specific ways would you say the U.N. Charter enhances the influence and role of the nation-states in tL contemporary world? ·

Why do you think that the Great Power unanimity role was written into the U.N. Charter?

Would you judge this rule to have been basically positive or negative in its conception? Explain. 184

Would you judge it to have been basically positive or negative in its implementation? Explain.

In the world of 1980 how much support do you think there would be for an amendment to modify or to eliminate the unanimity rule? Explain.

What do you think the position of non-aligned nations would be in relation to such an amendment? Explain. 185

To what extent do you personally believe the unanimity rule to be an obstacle to world peace? Explain.

The U.N. Charter was adopted prior to Hiroshima. Do you believe that prior knowledge of the atomic bomb would have made a difference in the kind of international body organized after World War II? Explain.

Do you believe that in those circumstances it should have made a difference? Explain. 186

Approximately 100 new member states have been admitted to the U.N. since 1945. To what degree would you say t. ,t the new members have placed a value upon national sovereignty? Explain.

Most of the new members have been liberated from colonial control. Would you say that their attitude toward national sovereignty was predictable? Explain.

Regional organizations established since 1945 include OAS (Organization of American States), OAU (Organization of African Unity), the Arab League, ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). How would you assess the role which national sovereignty plays in these organizations? Explain. 187

Do you see this as a plus or minus in relation to world peace? Explain.

Nkrumah of Ghana proposed for Africa an organization which would have had sovereign powers throughout the continent. This proposal was rejected. Is Africa the better or worse for reject'ing such a formula for unity? Explain.

What significance do you attach to the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in West Europe after World War II? 188

To the establishment of the Common Market? .

To the election of a _European Parliament·in 1979?

How would you assess·the progress being made toward a United States of Europe? 189

How would you assess the obstacles that exist?

In the context of world peace, how vital would you consider the international cooperation fostered within U.N. specialized agencies?

Which would you consider the most feasible at the present moment? Explain. 1) radical amendments to the U.N. Charter 2) a re-written U.N. Charter 3) a newly conceptualized and organized world government 4) a heightened sense of urgency in making the U.N. work 190

Which of these options would you cons.ider most desirable? Explain.

What specific attributes might a world government have that the U.N. does not possess? Explain.

Would you consider the nation-state obsolete? Explain. 191

Apart from the threat of nuclear war, what other contemporary world conditions make it critical for humanity to find a way to achieve peace? Explain.

In what specific ways to you think the U.N. could strengthen its own cause even as it is presently constituted?

To what degree would you consider a U.N. failure a U.S. failure? Explain. 192

What reason is there to believe that failure of nation-states to cooperate within the U.N. would be reversed if a change to some form of world government were to occur?

Would pluses outweigh minuses if an American imperium were to be established in the world? Explain.

Russian political institutions differ radically in their functioning and in their philosophical underpinnings from ours. What reasons have we to think that a world government would follow Western traditions? 193

In your judgment would it matter if a world government were to be established on Russian rather than Western Principles? Explain. ·

Do you think you would be better off Red than dead? Explain.

Must humanity choose between a nuclear holocaust and surrender to one or the other Superpower? Explain. 194

Must humanity choose between world government and the U.N.? Explain.

To what degree is that desirable? Explain.

How would you expect a world government to react in relation to the American hostage crisis in Iran? 195

To the Russian invasion of Afghanistan?

What sovereign powers would a world government have to possess if it were to be more capable than the U.N. of implementing and enforcing its will?

What sovereign powers would remain for each nation-state to exercise? 196

Sovereignty aside, are there any values inherent in the nation-state that would be worth preserving? Explain.

What role is there for the individual human being in moving the world closer to peace than to war? Explain.

How effective do you believe passive resistance by individuals to be in halting the trend toward war? Be specific. 197

A banner displayed at a rally opposing draft registration carried the slogan, "Nothing is worth dying for." Would a world government using force to put down aggression be worth dying for? Explain.

How much allegiance do you think you would give to a world government? Explain.

To what extent would your allegiance survive world govern­ ment censure or ~ctions against your own country? Explain. 198

How would you feel if your country were to declare unilater­ ally its intention to discontinue all nuclear tests? Explain.

How would you feel if your country were to declare unilaterally a no-first-strike pledge in relation to nuclear weapons? Ex­ plain.

To what extent would you personally commit your energies to pr~ssing for either of these unilateral .declarations? Explain. 199

How would you feel if your country were today, in 1980, to reduce unilaterally its nuclear arsenal, by whatever amount? Explain.

Would you be willing to serve in the military forces of a world government?

Do you believe the youth of this country would be willing · to volunteer? Explain. 200

Do you believe that the military forces of a worid government ought to possess nuclear bombs and the means of delivery? Explain.

How would you feel about paying income taxes to a world govern- . ment? Explain.

Would it make any difference if the taxes were earmarked for the elimination of poverty in the world? Explain. 201

.would it make any difference if it were indirect taxation, i.e., that a percentage of the income tax receipts of your COUli'try were to he turned over· to the world government? · . Explain. ·, ·····-·· . ~

SCH!:!:DULE of.

DIVERSIFI;ED.·LE~HNtNp EXPERI..ENCES 202

DIVERSIFIED LEARNING EXPERIENCES

Choose twelve of the following. Prepare written reports as indicated. Timetable of completion, and modification, if any, for class or individual, by direction only! In every case include bibliography of all resources· used.

1) Choose two of the following: Hans Bethe, Leo Szilard, Edward Teller, George Kistiakowsky. Through study of their lives, their roots, their expertise, their roles, evaluate the degree to which they may have contributed to today's nuclear con~rontation, whether directly or indirectly. Evaluate also the degree to which they may have been conunitted to the maintenance and preservation of world peace.

2) Choose one: a) ·compare Oppenheimer/Sakharov in terms of the relationship between government and science, government and the scientist, government and the individual. b) Compare Oppenheimer/Teller on the question of H-bomb development, focusing upon motivation· ·and objectives, the logic and morality of the respective positions, and the historical sig­ nificance of the debate's resolution. NOTE: Do n·ot choose b) if you have chosen Teller under 1). -

3) Choose one: BertrancrRussell, Albert Einstein, Albert Schweitzer. Analyze his pacifism in relation to its scope, inten­ sity, integrity, manifestations, impact.

4) Choose: two: The. Two --CUl tur·e·s : and A Second Look, C. P . Snow. · sc·fentfsts ·in P'ower, Spencer R. Weart. · Lette·r·s· ·and Rec·otte·c·tlons, Robert Oppenheimer, . Edited by Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner. Evaluate the role of science in today's world, its appropriateness and adequacy in relation to humanity's urgent needs, the degree to which the scientist iden­ tifies with and serves humanity. 203

5) Choose one: Pugwash-;-"lrulletin of Atomic Scie.ntists, Unfon of Concerned· S"cienti.sts. Analyze in relation to organization, motivation, con­ sistency, authenticity, impact.

6) Presidents of the United States have had to make difficult and fateful decisions on American security, virtually on an administration to administration basis. Choose· ·one of the following presidents and analyze the specifie

7) Choose one of the following non-aligned nations: Yugoslavi~, India, Swed~n. Explore the special national and world circumstances that explain its non-alignment, the consistency and authenticity of its non-alignment, the validity of its contribution to world peace.

8) Choose one of the following leaders: Chou en-lai, Nasser, Sukarno. Analyze the leader's background, motivation, contri­ bution to his own nation's world status, contribution to world peace.

9) Choose one of the following "client states" of the United States: Republic of Korea, Philippines, Iran, South Vietnam. Evaluate the relationship in terms of its strategic value to the United States, its strategic value to the "client state," its impact upon the people of the "client state," its impact upon world peace, its durability. 204

10) Choose one of the following "client states" of the Soviet Union: -- Egypt,- Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Cuba. Evaluate the relationship in terms of its strategic value to the Soviet Union, its strategic value to the "client state," its impact upon the people of the "client state," its impact upon world peace, its durability.

11) Choose one of the following issues which confronted the United Nations with historic challenge: The emergence of the Congo from colonial domination. Changing Arab-Israeli relationship after the Yom Kippur War. Vietnamese intrusion into Cambodia. Analyze in terms of United Nations decision-making, member­ nation respect for the United Nations role, impact upon world peace, impact upon the United Nations as a force for world peace.

12) Choose one: a) Evaluate the 1979-80 INFCE debates (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation) in relation to the future of nu­ clear reactor development, the risk of proliferation in nuclear weapons, the stability and effectiveness of non­ proliferation safeguard procedures, the unity of nuclear weapons states and the unity of non-nuclear weapons states on issues of control and regulation. b) Evaluate the 1980 5-year review conference, prescribed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in terms of signatory consensus as to treaty effectiveness, the nature and validity of questions raised, the outlook for strengthened regulatory procedures under the treaty, the continuing relevance of the treaty in the context of the 1980's.

13) Choose two: DaedaluS,-Swmner, 1975 ("Arms, Defense Policy, arid Arms Control"). Who Speaks for Man?, Norman Cousins (or any other model for world government approved in lieu of this) The Age of Overkill, Max Lerner. The Game of Disarmament, Alva Myrdal. Describe significant insights gained from reading and study: insights into issues of war and peace, arms con­ trol and disarmament, world order and world government, individual opportunity and responsibility for involvement in decision-making processes. 205

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE: This is not designed to be a comprehensive bibliography. It is meant only to suggest a framework within which a basic minimum of resources may be purchased for a school library, and access to other vital resources carefully planned.

j Liberal access to the following, covering the time-span of the source, is crucial: A-- Americana Books of the Year Britannica Books of tlie Year United Nations Yearbooks SIPRI Yearbooks on World Armaments and Disarmament (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Public Pa ers of the Presidents o'f the United States Historic Documents, Congress1ona uarter y, Inc. (annual compilations with conunentary starting in 1972) The New York Times Facts on File Deadline Data on World Affairs

B-- General histories of World War II and of the post­ war world. Memoirs and biographies of World War II leaders, political and military. Memoirs and biographies of political leaders in the post-war period.

C-- Memoirs, biographies, autobiographies of nuclear scientists.

D-- Studies on the role of science in the modern world.

E-- Studies on world order, arms control, disarmament.

Library ownership of the following books is advised, with multi­ ple copies of those preceded by an asterisk: Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965). Norman Cousins, Who Speaks for Man? (New York: Macmillan, 1953). 206

Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1973). Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). *David Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement (New York: Halsted Press, 1973). Max Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962). *Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976). John Newhouse, Cold Dawn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). Robert Oppenheimer, Letters and Recollections, Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). W.K.H. Panofsky, Arms Control and SALT II (Seattle: Uni­ versity of Washington Press, 1979). C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures: and A Second Look (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Strobe Talbott, Endgame: the Inside Story of SALT II (New York: Harper and Row, 1979). *United Nations, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945- 1970 (New York: United Nations, 1970). *United Nations, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1970- 1975 (New York: United Nations, 1976). *United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1977). *united Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1977 (New York: United Nations, 1978). *United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1978 (New York: United Nations, 1979). *United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1979 (New York: United Nations, 1980. *U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977). 207

U.S. Arms Controt and Disarmament Agency, SALT and American Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). Spencer R. Weart, -Scientists in Power, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

*The number of multiple copies will necessarily be a function of the general accessibility of library to students, i.e., the less time available for library use outside the frameworl

Library ownership of the following periodicals is advised as part of the basic minimum of relevant resources: Annals July, 1964--"Africa in Motion" *November, 1965--"Non-Alignment in Foreign Affairs" November, 1969--"Protagonists, Power and the Third World" March, 1973--"The Military and American Society" *March, 1977--"Nuclear Proliferation" November, 1978--"The European Connnunity after Twenty Years" March, 1979--"The Human Dimension of Foreign Policy"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists *March, 1979--"Einstein and Peace"

Daedalus *Sp.ring, 1966--"Conditions of World Order" *Summer, 1975--"Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control" Fall, 1979--"The State" Winter, 1979--"Looking for Europe"

Department of State Bulletin *January, 1979--Charles Maynes, "What's Wrong with the U.N.--and What's Right?" Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Policy: The U.S. Approach to Non-Proliferation--Are We Making Progress?" Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.­ Origin Nuclear Materials"

Foreign Affairs *July, 1978--Richard Burt, "Scope and Limits of SALT" *Winter, 1978-79--Jan M. Lodal, "SALT II and American Security" *Summer, 1979--Francois de Rose, "The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe" Thomas L. Neff and Henry D. Jacoby, "Non-Proliferation Strategy in a Changing Nuclear Fuel Market". Gregory F. Treverton,. "Nuclear Weapons and the Gray Area" 208

Readers' Guide to Periodicat Litel:,"ature will be an indispensable .research tool for tapping of an extensive literatur~ bearing upon the issues of this course. i

APPENDIX A

Albert Einstein's Letter to F.D. Roosevelt

8/2/39

F.D. Roosevelt President of the United States White House Washington, D.C. Sir: Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and impor­ tant source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I_ believe, therefore, that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations. In the course of the last four months it has been made probable·--through the work of Joliot in France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America--that it may become possible to set up nuclear chain reactions in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium­ like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost cer~ tain that this could be achieved in the immediate future. This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable--though much less certain-­ that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be ex­ ploded. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat or ex-· ploded in a port_, might very well destroy the whole port to­ gether with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might very well prove to be too heavy for t~ansportation ·by air. The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate_ quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is the Belgian Congo. . In view of this situation you may think it desirable to· have some permanent contact maintained between the Adminis­ tration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. One possible way of achieving this might be for ii you to entrust with this task a person who has your confi­ dence and who could perhaps serve in an unofficial capacity. His task might comprise the following: a) To approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further developments, and put forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem of securing a supply of uranium ore for the United States. b) To speed up the experimental work which is at present being carried on within the limits of the budgets of Univer­ sity laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds are re­ quired, thr~ugh his contacts with private persons who are willing to make contributions for this cause, and perhaps also. by obtaining the cooperation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment. I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from Czechoslovakian mines which she has taken over. That she sould have taken such early action might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, von Weizsacker, is attached to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut in Berlin, where some of the American work on uranium is now being repeated. Yours very truly,

(signed) A. Einstein iii APPENDIX B From the Franck Report

Summary The development of nuclear power not only constitutes an important addition to the technological and military power of the United States, but also creates grave political and economic problems for the future of this country. Nuclear bombs cannot possibly remain a "secret weapon" at the exclusive disposal of this country for more than a few years. The scientific facts on which their construction is based are well known to scientists of other countries. Unless an effective international control of nuclear explo­ sives is instituted, a race for nuclear armaments is certain to ensue following the first revelation of our possession of nuclear weapons to the world. Within ten years other coun­ tries may have nuclear bombs, each of which, weighing less than a ton, could destroy an urban area of more than ten square miles. In the war to which such an armaments race is likely to lead, the United States, with its agglomeration of popu­ lation and industry in comparatively few metropolitan districts, will be at a disadvantage compared to nations whose population and industry are scattered over large areas. We believe that these considerations make the use of nu­ clear bombs for an early unannounced attack against Japan in­ advisable. If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons. Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achieve­ men·t of such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected uninhabited area. In case chances for the establishment of an effective international control of nuclear weapons should have to be considered slight at the present time, then not only the use of these weapons aga~nst Japan, but even their early demon­ stration, may be contrary to the interests of this country. A postponement of such a demonstration will have in this case the advantage of delaying the beginning of the nuclear arma­ ments race as long as possible. If, during the time gained, iv ample support can be made available for further development of the fie~d in this country, the postponement will substan­ tially increase the lead which we have established during the present war, and our position in an armament race or in any later attempt at international agreement would thus be strengthened. On the other hand, if no adequate public support for the development of nucleonics will be available without a demonstration, the postponement of the latter may be deemed inadvisable, because enough information might leak out to cause other nations to start the armament race, in which we would then be at a disadvantage. There is also the possi­ bility that the distrust of other nations may be aroused if they know that we are conducting a development under cover of secrecy, and that this will make it more difficult even­ tually to reach an agreement with them. If the government should decide in favor of an early demonstration of nuclear weapons, it will then have the possibility of taking into account the public opinion of this country and of the other nations before deciding whether these weapons should be used in the war against Japan. In this way, other nations may assume a share of responsibility for such a fateful decision. To sum up, we urge that the use of nuclear bombs in this war be considered as a problem of long-range national policy rather than of military expediency, and that this policy be directed primarily to the achievement of an agreement permit­ ing an effective international control of the means of nuclear war.

J. Franck, Chairman D.J. Hughes G.T. Seaborg J.J. Nickson J.C. Stearns E. Rabinowitch L. Szilard v APPENDIX C

Stimson's Letter and Memorandum to President Truman

September 11, 1945

Dear Mr. President: In handing you today my memorandum about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I am not unmind­ ful of the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and be­ fore she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen. I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the ultimate importance of a change in Russian attitude toward individual liberty but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable. I believe that the change in attitude towards the indi­ vidual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons are set forth in the memorandum I am handin& you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Rµssia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship in the matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined. Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War vi

The President The White House MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 11 September 1945 SUBJECT: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs. The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere al­ ready extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe. In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substan­ tial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the con­ tinent. We can be certain that the Soviet Government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the develop­ ment of this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo­ Szxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet towards the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced. if we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that someday we shall arrive at a satisfactor inter­ national arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our imme­ diate peace council objectives. Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace-loving vii nations of the world. It is true if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise. To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connec­ ted with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they became immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievabl~ embittered by the way in which we app·roach them now an • ·me·rely con:ttnue· to ne·gotiate with them, having this weap·on rather oste·n:ta·tio·usly ·on our hip, their sus icions and thefr distrust of ou·r ur ·o·s·es and motives will increase. It wi inspire t em to greater e orts in an all-out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can--one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever. The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him.untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust. If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pat­ tern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to prescribe the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolu­ tionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control--his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human pro­ gress. viii

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contem­ plated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations. My idea of an'approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encoura$e the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in t.he United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrange­ ment a covenant with the U.K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes. I would make such an approach just as soon as our imme­ diate political considerations make it appropriate. I emphasize {>erhahs beyond all other considerations the importance of takint t is action with Russ·ia as a lroposal of the United States-- acked b Great Britianbut ecu iarl the proposa o t e nite tates. ction o any internationa ~roup of nationst including many small nations who have not emonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in mt ohiniona be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates w ic woul surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant favor from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program. ix

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and finally to incorporate the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent lever to­ wards having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history of the world.

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War x

APPENDIX D

Conclusion of Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Address

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of ·all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here--now--today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage. To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now. I, therefore, make the following proposals: The Governments principally involved, to the ext.ent per­ mitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect tha.t such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures, and other details, would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I have referred to earlier. The United States is prepared to undertake these explora­ tions in good faith. Any partners of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not un­ reasonable or ungenerous associate. Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control. The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scien­ tists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable materlal can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure. xi

The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apoly atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful acti­ vities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant elec­ trical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind. The United States would be more than willing--it would be proud to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited . Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one. I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would: First--encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate . Second--begin to diminish the potential destructive powers of the world' s atomic stockpiles . Third--allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, t he great powers of the world, both the East and the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up t he armaments of war. Fourth--open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult probl ems that must be solved in both private and public conver­ sations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace . Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and hope for peace . The coming months will be fraught with fateful discus­ sions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military head­ quarters of t he world; i n the h earts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into ueace.