OCCUPATION BY “INDUCTION”: THE AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN CUBA, DECEMBER 1898- DECEMBER 1899 A Thesis by MARK CHRISTOPHER ASKEW Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Chair of Committee, Lorien Foote Committee Members, Brian Linn Jasen Castillo Head of Department, David Vaught May 2015 Major Subject: History Copyright 2015 Mark Christopher Askew ABSTRACT Many historians of the first American occupation of Cuba (1898-1902) assert that the military government of the island began and ended with a single strategic objective in mind: annexation. This assertion, however, ignores critical aspects of the first year of American operations under the direction of Major General Brooke that pursued more limited goals. To fill this historical void, this thesis examines two questions about the American Army of Occupation in Cuba. First, was the occupation government of Major General Brooke pursuing a strategy designed to lead to annexation? Second, how did the U.S. military government in Cuba exercise power in pursuit of Brooke’s strategic vision? This thesis combines traditional sources like the manuscript collections of James H. Wilson, Leonard Wood, Elihu Root, and William McKinley found in the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. as well previously unexamined reports and correspondence of individual post and garrison commanders found in Record Group 395 in the National Archives in Washington D.C. to answer these questions. The American Army of Occupation pursued political stability during its first year, not annexation. Brooke and his subordinates practiced cooperation with, not control of, Cuban leaders and institutions. Furthermore, the direction of American policy was not always a top- down process. Commanders at the post and district levels innovated solutions to problems that the central administration in Havana, while slow to recognize, eventually adopted as their own. By December of 1899, when Brooke turned over command to General Wood, Cuba possessed a functioning civil government at both the national and local level. ii DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my wife and sons. My wife’s patience and grace in dealing with two rambunctious boys is only exceeded by her indulgence of Cuba-centric dinner table conversation over the last six months. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the Texas A&M History Department faculty and its graduate students. The feedback provided by my peers and instructors on this and other projects have been invaluable to my development as a writer. I also owe special thanks to Dr. Linn and Dr. Foote for continually challenging me to examine my assumptions about how to write history and for preventing me from taking several unproductive roads during my research. Additionally, none of this would have been possible without the support of my mentors in the Army (Tim Brumfiel, Jack Vantress and Michael Payne). Thank you for your support and assistance in the pursuit of a non-traditional career path for an armor officer. Finally, I would like to thank my wife and sons for preserving my sanity with their endless ability to distract me from the daily grind of writing. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii DEDICATION ................................................................................................................ iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: AN OCCUPATION BY INDUCTION ..........................1 II CUBA AND REVOLUTION .......................................................................18 War Must Be Answered With War .......................................................20 The Teller Amendment And Intervention .............................................27 The Army Of Occupation And Its Chain Of Command .......................38 III STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY AND THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION ........44 Form A Free And Independent Government .........................................46 A Cuban Close Corporation ..................................................................54 To Assist A Patriotic People .................................................................67 How Far Should I Go In Protecting Guiterrez ......................................79 IV RESTORED TO A NORMAL CONDITION ..............................................93 Hopelessly Destructive Of Public Order ...............................................94 Actions As The Conditions Seemed To Demand ................................109 Changing The Customs Of A People ..................................................117 V CONCLUSION: I FIND IT WISE TO PROCEED SLOWLY ..................129 BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................144 v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: AN OCCUPATION BY INDUCTION When Major General James H. Wilson arrived in Cuba in late December of 1898, he decided to call on Major General John R. Brooke, the commander of the American Army of Occupation in Cuba. As the last of the department commanders to arrive, Wilson was anxious to understand the direction and basis of U.S. policy on the island before moving on to take command of American forces in the provinces of Mantanzas and Santa Clara. Wilson had his own ideas about the future of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. An ardent expansionist, Wilson had embarrassed President McKinley by publicly advocating the annexation of Canada while hosting a Presidential visit to his corps.1 In private, Wilson advocated similar policies for America’s recently acquired overseas possessions.2 When Wilson asked Brooke what the U.S. government’s policy and ultimate purpose in Cuba were, Brooke replied, “that he did not know except by ‘induction.’”3 This answer astounded Wilson. For the majority of American troops in Cuba, however, “induction” is perhaps the best description of their experiences. The strategic ambiguity surrounding McKinley’s attitude toward Cuba forced the Army of Occupation to make inferences about the direction and purpose of American policy based only on the general principles Brooke outlined for his subordinates. Thus, Brooke’s reply was perhaps more fitting than even he understood. An ongoing process of experimentation in policy contradicts much of the current scholarship on the American army in Cuba. Many historians of the occupation assert that the military government began and ended with a single strategic objective in mind: annexation. This assertion, however, ignores critical aspects of the first year of American operations 1 under Brooke’s direction that pursued more limited goals. The bulk of the historical scholarship, however, has virtually ignored this period in the development of U.S. policy and instead focused on the pro-annexationist administration of Governor-General Leonard Wood, Brooke’s eventual replacement. To fill this historical void, this thesis will examine two questions about the Army of Occupation and its role in Cuba. First, was Brooke’s government pursuing a strategy designed to lead to annexation? Second, how did the U.S. military government in Cuba exercise power in pursuit of Brooke’s strategic vision? The American Army of Occupation pursued political stability during its first year, not annexation. Brooke and his subordinates practiced cooperation with, not control of, Cuban leaders and institutions. Furthermore, the direction of American policy was not always a top-down process. Commanders at the post and district levels innovated solutions to problems that the central administration in Havana, while slow to recognize, eventually adopted as their own. By December of 1899, when Brooke turned over command to Wood, Cuba possessed a functioning civil government at both the national and local level. There are several key pieces of evidence that indicate that American commanders at every level were not pursuing a policy of annexation. First, McKinley’s instructions to Brooke included references to preparing Cuba for independence, not annexation. There is every indication that not only did Brooke understand his instructions this way but that the President tacitly re-affirmed his support for such a policy by refusing to intervene in the design of the military government for the island. Brooke appointed Cubans to oversee and run the civil components of his administration and allowed his appointees considerable autonomy to govern. In some cases, he even subordinated his own senior commanders to Cuban authority in questions related to Cuba’s civil government. Furthermore, at the 2 municipal level, Cubans maintained almost total control of municipal business even where American garrison commanders did not believe it wise to allow. Brooke prohibited American intervention in municipal affairs except on an emergency basis. As events would show, not even the prospect of potential violence was enough to warrant U.S. interference in local matters. Other evidence also contradicts the idea that the United States pursued a deliberate policy of annexation. When discussions of annexation arose, these deliberations were almost solely confined to Brooke and his senior subordinates in department command.