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Notes and References Notes and References 1 Deficiences in Preparation: August 1914 I. For the principles of British strategy and military operations see C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey (London, 1970) and D. French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London, 1990). 2. See P.M. Kennedy, The Rise ofthe Anglo-German Antagonism. 1860-1914 (London, 1980). 3. G. Monger, The End of Isolation: .British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 1963); K.M. Wilson, 'The Dissimulation of the Balance of Power' and 'The Invention of Germany', in The Policy ofthe Entente: Essays on the Determinants ofBritish Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 59-84 and 100-20; P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), pp. 182-256 passim. 4. Barnett,op. cit., p. 298; J.E. Helmreich, Belgium and Europe: A Study in Small Power Diplomacy (The Hague , 1976), pp. 146-53; D.H. Thomas, The GuaranteeofBelgian Independence and Neutrality in European Diplomacy, 1830s-1930s (Kingston, Rhode Island, 1983), pp. 273-304. 5. E.M. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer (Edinburgh, 1980). 6. For the strategic geography of Belgium see Thomas, op. cit., pp. 3-6. For German and French strategy in relation to Belgium see G. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique ofa Myth (London, 1958); and S.R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969), pp. 210-13. 7. 'Report of the Sub-Committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire (Europe)' (24 July 1909), Cabinet Office: Committee of Imperial Defence Ad-hoc Sub-Committees of Enquiry; Proceedings and Memoranda, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London, (CAB 16): CAB 16/5. 8. For the history of British strategic planning see J. Gooch, The Plans of War, c.1900-16 (London, 1974); M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972); J. McDermott, 'The Revolution in British Military Planning from the Boer War to the Moroccan Crisis', in P.M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans ofthe Great Powers, 1880-1914 (London, 1979), pp. 99-117; N. d'Ornbrain, War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain, 1902-14 (Oxford, 1973); N.W. Summerton, 'The Development of British Military Planning for a War Against Germany, 1904-14' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2 vols, 1970); J.E. Tyler, The British Army and the Continent, 1904-14 (London, 1938); Williamson, op. cit. 9. The deficiencies of British military preparations are analysed in more detail in W.J. Philpott, 'British Military Strategy on the Western Front: Independence or Alliance, 1904-1918' (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1991), pp. 5-77. 166 Notes and References 167 10. lbid., pp. 11-6S passim. 11. W.J . Philpott, 'The Strategic Ideas of Sir John French', The Journal of Strategic Studies, XII (1989), pp. 4S8-78; K.M. Wilson, 'The War Office, Churchill and the Belgian Option: August to December 1911', Bulletin of the Institute ofHistorical Research, L (1977), pp. 218-28; Esher journal (4 Oct. 1911), Viscount Esher papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, ESHR 2/12. 12. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 168-9; Summerton, 'The Development of British Military Planning', ii 366-430; 'The Military Aspects of the Continental Problem', memorandum by the General Staff (IS Aug. 1911), Cabinet Office: Committee of Imperial Defence Miscellaneous Memoranda, PRO (CAB 4): CAB 4/3/130B . 13. Wilson awaits an adequate biography. Maj.-Gen. Sir C.E. Callwell, Field­ Marshal Sir Henry Wilson : His Life and Diaries (2 vols, London, 1927) and B. Collier, Brasshat: A Biography ofField-Marshal Henry Wilson (London, 1961) both rely uncritically on Wilson's private diaries, while B. Ash, The Lost Dictator: Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London, 1968) argues spu­ riously that Wilson was above politics. 14. Committee of Imperial Defence, 'Minutes of the 114th meeting' (23 Aug. 1911), Cabinet Office: Committee of Imperial Defence Minutes, PRO (CAB 2): CAB 212; D'Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, pp. 100-7; Callwell, op. cit., i 86-IS6 passim. IS. Asquith to the King (IS Nov. 1911), Earl of Oxford and Asquith papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, file 6; D'Ombrain, op. cit., pp. 106-7. 16. Wilson diary (31 Aug. 1911 passim), Wilson to Nicholson (31 Aug. 1911) and 'Appreciation of the Political and Military Situation in Europe', by Wilson (20 Sept. 1911), Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Papers, Imperial War Museum, London (73/1) , HHW 2170/12 and 3/6/6; Wilson to Churchill (29 Aug . 1911), in Wilson, 'The War Office, Churchill and the Belgian Option' , p. 219. 17. 'Records of a Strategic Wargame, 1905' , War Office: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers, PRO (WO 33): WO 33/364; Williamson, The Politics ofGrand Strategy, p. 47. 18. 'The Military Aspects of the Continental Problem', memorandum by the General Staff (1S Aug. 1911), CAB 4/3/130B; Committee of Imperial Defence, 'minutes of the I 14th meeting' (23 Aug. 1911), CAB 212; Wilson diary (23 Aug.-13 Sept. 1911 passim); Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, i 86-lS6 passim. 19. Esher journal (6 Sept. 1911), in M.V. and O. Brett (eds), Journals and Letters of Reginald. Viscount Esher (4 vols, London , 1934-38), iii S8; Williamson,op. cit., p. 188. 20. 'Notes of Conferences held at Whitehall Gardens' (19 Dec. 1905 and 6, 12 and 19 Jan. 1906), CAB 2/1; 'The Assistance to be Given by Great Britain to France if She is Attacked by Germany', note by French (S Jan. 1909), CAB 16/S; Philpott, 'The Strategic Ideas of French', passim . 21. Lt.-Col. Barnardiston to Grierson (14 Feb., 30 and 31 Mar. 1906), in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, /898-/9/4, vol. 3: The Testing of the Entente , /904--6 (London, 1928), pp. 190-2 and 197-9; Sir G.T.M. Bridges, Alarms and Excursions 168 Notes and References (London, 1938), p. 62; Helmreich, Belgium and Europe, pp. 162-3; Summerton, 'The Development of British Military Planning' , i 131 and 137-41 and ii 512-5; Philpott, 'British Military Strategy', pp. 28-9 and 63-4. 22. Minutes of the first meeting of the 'Sub-committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire (Europe)' (3 Dec. 1908), CAB 16/5. 23. 'Secretary's Notes of a War Council Held at 10 Downing Street, 5 August 1914' , Cabinet Office: Cabinet Papers, 1915-16, PRO (CAB 42): CAB 42/1/2; Wilson, The Policy ofthe Entente, pp. 129-33. 24. WilIiamson, The Politics ofGrand Strategy , pp. 312-6. 25. /bid., pp. 64-81 . 26. /bid., pp. 178-81. 27. Wilson, the Policy ofthe Entente, pp. 122-4. 28. WilIiamson,op. cit., p. 222. 29. Committee of Imperial Defence, 'Minutes of the 114th meeting' (23 Aug. 1911), CAB 2/2. 30. Williamson, op. cit., p. 316. 31. 'Notes of Conferences held at Whitehall Gardens' (19 Dec. 1905 and 6, 12 and 19 Jan. 1906), CAB 2/1; C. a C. Repington, The First World War (2 vols, London, 1920), i 6-12; Philpott, 'The Strategic Ideas of French' , pp.462-3. 32. Asquith to Venetia Stanley (I and 2 Aug. 1914), in M. and E. Brock (eds), H.H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley , pp. 139-40 and 145-7; Asquith to the King (28 July and 2 Aug. 1914), Asquith papers, file 7; W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis, /9/J-/8 (6 vols, London, 1923-31), i 201-2. 33. Asquith to the King (30 July 1914), Asquith papers, file 7. 34. Wilson, The Policy ofthe Entente, pp. 135-47 . 35. Asquith to Venetia Stanley (2 Aug. 1914), Brock, op. cit., pp. 145-7 ; H.H. Asquith, Earl of Oxford and Asquith, The Genesis of the War (London, 1923), p. 209. 36. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, /892-/9/6 (2 vols, London, 1925), i 319. 37. For the political and strategical background to Britain's entry into the war see Wilson, op. cit., pp. 135-47 and M. Brock, 'Britain Enters the War', in R.J.W. Evans and H. Pogge von Strandmann (eds), The Coming ofthe First World War (Oxford, 1988), pp. 145-78. 38. C. Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, July /9/4 to May /9/5: A Prologue to the Triumph ofLloyd George (London, 1971), pp. 113-14. 39. Asquith to Venetia Stanley (2 Aug. 1914), Brock op. cit., pp. 145-7. 40. King Albert 1 to the entente governments (4 Aug. 1914), in M.-R. Thielemans and E. Vandewoude (eds), Le Roi Albert au Travers de ses Lettres Inedites, /882-/9/6 (Brussels, 1982), p. 507. 41. R.A. Prete, 'French Strategic Planning and the Deployment of the BEF in France in 1914', Canadian Journal of History, XXIV (1989), pp. 42-62: p.53. 42. 'Secretary's Notes of a War Council' (5 Aug. 1914), CAB 42/1/2. 43. Asquith to Venetia Stanley (6 Aug. 1914), Brock, op. cit. , pp. 158-9. Notes and References 169 44. 'Report on the Opening of the War' by Committee of Imperial Defence Historical Section (I Nov. 19I4), Cabinet Office: Miscellaneous Records, PRO (CAB I): CAB 1/10/30, p. 8. 45. See for example, Wilson diary (17 and 25 Nov. 1912). 46. Ibid. (5 Aug. 1914). 47. 'Secretary' s Notes of a War Council' (5 Aug. 1914),CAB 42/112. 48. Philpott, 'British Military Strategy' , pp. 39-42 and 58-62. 49. 'Secretary's Notes of a War Council' (5 Aug. 1914),CAB 42/112. 50. Hamilton to French (13 Aug.
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