Proceedings in absentia are not incompatible with the Convention where the State has acted diligently (this was the weak point in the Colozza case) but unsuccessfully to give the accused effective notice of the hearing, and provided that the accused can subsequently obtain a hearing complying with Article 6 ECHR, i.e. a fresh determination of the merits of the charge (see the Colozza case, cit. supra, § 29). It is however open to question, in the European Court's view, whether the right to a rehearing applies where the accused has waived her/his right to be present at the initial hearing (see Poitrimol v. France, Series A, No. 277-A, 1993, § 3 1). The Corte Costituzionale expressed the view that a diligent action under Articles 159 and 160 CPP is extremely likely to allow the authorities to locate the accused: hence the finding that the system as such does not infringe the latter's defence rights as suggested. As to the second requirement, a fresh determination of the charge in proceedings which comply with Article 6 ECHR is nowadays guaranteed, at least formally, under Articles 172(2), 487(4), 603(4), 489(1) and 670 CPP. This question has been raised in too general terms to lead to any significant ruling on the respect of the defence rights of the accused in proceedings in absentia. The currently applicable provisions do, in all, represent a significant improvement on the previous ones, and it is undisputed that the need to ensure the full enjoyment of the right to a fair trial must be weighed against the need to ensure the viability of justice: the unjustified absence of the accused cannot result in the paralysis of the conduct of the trial. On the other hand, it is neither possible nor appropriate to examine them in abstracto. In this respect, the Corte Costituzionale has reserved its position as to possible concrete examples of limitations of the defence rights in trials in absentia: this dictum might suggest that it has not overlooked certain problematic aspects of the issue and only awaits a better occasion to tackle them. (The text of the judgement is reproduced in RDI, 1999, p. 504ff.). SIMONA GRANATA-MENGHINI XII. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW A. Tribunale militare di Roma, 22 July 1997, No. 322 Re: Priebke B. Corte militare d Appello di Roma, 15 April 1998, No. 24 Re: Priebke C. Corte di Cassazione (Sez. 1), 1 December 1998, No. 1295 Re: Priebke Erich Priebke was captain of the SS in Rome during the Nazi occupation of central and northern Italy, from 8 September 1943 to 25 April 1945. At the end of the World War II he was accused of having participated in the decision to execute 335 Italian civilians in Rome on 24 March 1944. The massacre, known as the Fosse Ardeatine massacre, was in retaliation to the killing of 32 German soldiers by the Italian Resistance. When criminal proceedings were instituted in Italy against Priebke's superior, Herbert Kappler, and the other Nazi officials involved in the massacre, Priebke disappeared. As a consequence, the public prosecutor decided not to include the charges against him in the trial, and no conviction was pronounced against him in the two judgments passed on the case by the Italian Military Courts (cf. Tribunale militare di Roma (Military Judge of First Instance), 20 July 1948, and Tribunale supremo militare (Military High Court, abolished by Law No. 180 of 7 May 1981), 25 October 1952, republished in Rassegna di giustizia militare, 1996). Priebke was eventually discovered in Argentina in 1995, and a warrant for his extradition was immediately issued by the Italian authorities. On 2 November 1995, the Argentinean Corte de Justicia de la Nacion ordered the extradition of Priebke, and consequently, criminal proceedings were instituted against him in Italy. In a judgement of 1 August 1996, the Tribunale militare of Rome found Priebke responsible for the massacre but held that the statute of limitations on the crime had run under Articles 185 and 13 of the Italian Military Criminal Code of War. According to the Court, the offenses qualified as crimes of war and not as crimes against humanity, implicitly acknowledging that crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitation. On 15 October 1996, the judgment of the Military Court was set aside on the grounds that the Court was not properly constituted (cf. Corte di Cassazione (Sez. 1), 15 October 1996, reproduced in Cassazione penale, 1997, p. 1058). Accordingly, the case came up again for rehearing before the Military Court of Rome. In the judgement of 22 July 1997, the Tribunale militare first rejected Priebke's argument that the massacre was a legal wartime reprisal taken by the occupying State in response to prior violations of its rights. The Court found that cruel or wanton killings of civilian population of occupied territory could not be construed as legal, neither as a reprisal under international laws of war, nor as a collective penalty under Art. 50 of the Hague Convention of 1907. The Court reasoned that in the case at issue two of the constraints imposed by international law on the right to take wartime reprisals were not satisfied. According to the Court, legitimate wartime reprisals may only be taken in response to a violation of international laws of war by the State against which they are directed, and secondly, they must be reasonably proportionate to the prior conduct to which they are a response. Third, as a subsidiary means of redress, the recourse to them is lawful only in cases of necessity. Finally, they must not violate basic principles of humanity. The Tribunal found that the requirements of proportionality and necessity had not been met: there was an obvious disproportion of the scale of 10 Italians killed for each German life taken, and there was an absence of a "serious" investigation aimed at the discovery of the real culprits. The Court, then, refused to characterize the massacre as a legal collective penalty under Art. 50 of the Hague Convention of 1907, in force at the time the facts were committed. Indeed, according to the judges, the concept of collective penalties could only involve financial or patrimonial sanctions, and it could not be construed as permitting a cruel and wanton killing. The Court next addressed the defense of superior orders, holding that, under Art. 40 of the Italian Military Criminal Code of War in force in 1944, the violation of a .