Kesselring and German War Crimes in Italy

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Kesselring and German War Crimes in Italy Richard Raiber. Anatomy of Perjury: Field Marshal Albert Kesserling, Via Rasella, and the Ginny Mission. Edited and with a preface by Dennis E. Showalter. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008. 269 pp. $55.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-87413-994-5. Reviewed by Waitman W. Beorn Published on H-German (November, 2009) Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher Historians sometimes despair that we may from promising careers in the Heer to the Luft‐ never fnd a "new" or "groundbreaking" docu‐ waffe in autumn 1933" (p. 26). Raiber points out ment in the archives, especially in collections that Kesselring's origins in the middle class, not the have been much pawed over. With this book, the Prussian aristocracy. Having won favor over Er‐ late Richard Raiber proves that important discov‐ win Rommel, he became one of Adolf Hitler's eries still remain. A World War II veteran and re‐ trusted commanders. This characterization be‐ tired physician who embarked on a second career comes important in explaining his later behavior. as a historian, he took as his subject German Field On March 23, 1944, Italian partisans detonated a Marshal Albert Kesselring and his involvement in bomb in the Via Rasella in Rome as a German po‐ two specific atrocities that occurred while Kessel‐ lice company marched by, killing thirty-three sol‐ ring was Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd‐ diers. Upon notification, an incensed Hitler or‐ west in Italy: the reprisal shootings at the Ardea‐ dered reprisals carried out on the order of ten tine Caves and the execution of ffteen American civilians executed for every dead German. The special operations soldiers, both in 1944. The Gestapo chief in Rome, SS-Obersturmbannführer work seeks to demolish what Raiber terms a "Lü‐ Herbert Kappler, was eventually tasked with car‐ gengebäude" created by the feld marshal and his rying out the reprisal and selecting the victims. close associates, a construction that endured for He initially chose from those "deserving death" in over fifty years (p. 164). his own jails (p. 81). (Of course, this definition Raiber begins with a concise but informative could have included a wide range of innocent in‐ biography of Kesselring. He paints Kesselring as a dividuals.) When Kappler had exhausted those capable, ambitious officer with little experience prisoners, he turned to Jews to complete the re‐ commanding troops. He was "one of four over‐ quired number. The sentence was carried out by achieving [General Staff] colonels transferred the SS and Gestapo in the Ardeatine Caves, where H-Net Reviews 335 civilians and Jews were shot in the backs of convicted of war crimes, sentenced to death, and their heads. shot by a fring squad on December 1, 1945--the In 1947, Kesselring was tried for war crimes first German general to be executed for war because he approved the execution order. He was crimes committed during World War II. convicted and sentenced to death, but his sen‐ It is the considerable achievement of Raiber's tence was later overturned. Raiber's examination research that he is able to tie Via Rasella and GIN‐ of the trial transcripts and testimony about this NY together to expose the body of lies concocted reprisal is presented in an interesting, albeit com‐ by Kesselring and his associates. In short, the au‐ plex, narrative that offers readers a glimpse into thor's careful investigation of captured German the decision-making behind it and the execution documents in the National Archives proves that of the action. Though exploring the combination Kesselring was not at his headquarters at Monte of racial and military policy is not Raiber's prima‐ Soratte as he (and others) testified, but instead on ry goal, his analysis provides details about yet an‐ an inspection tour of the coast, placing him in La other instance in which these two important as‐ Spezia on both the day the Americans were cap‐ pects of National Socialist policy intersected in the tured and the day they were condemned to death. selection of victims. For Raiber, however, the im‐ Kesselring and his men lied about his location to portance of this trial was that Kesselring, his cover up this proximity to the GINNY crimes. They chief-of-staff Siegfried Westphal, and his adjutant went so far as to refuse to support Dostler (who Dietrich Beelitz all swore (falsely) under oath that requested that Kesselring and Westphal testify on Kesselring was at his headquarters at Monte So‐ his behalf regarding the GINNY killings.) Thus, ratte on the evenings of March 23 and 24, to re‐ Raiber suggests, Kesselring was personally in‐ ceive the two orders. Raiber connects this conspir‐ volved in the order to kill the U.S. POWs. Knowing acy to a second war crime that occurred in the that involvement in the murder of American ser‐ same period on the Italian peninsula. vicemen was likely the more dangerous charge, On March 23, 1944, a ffteen-man squad of Kesselring and others concocted the alibi that he uniformed U.S. soldiers belonging to an Office of was nowhere near La Spezia. While the book does Strategic Services group landed near La Spezia, not offer definitive proof of a Kesselring order Italy. They were conducting Operation GINNY, a specifically regarding the execution of the U.S. mission to destroy a railroad tunnel. The next day, POWs, its evidence is strongly suggestive and like‐ however, they were captured. On the morning of ly to implicate him deeply. In light of Kesselring's March 26, following a standing Führerbefehl that character and prior behavior, his participation in demanded the execution of all "commandos" and this event is not a huge surprise. It is also interest‐ "saboteurs" whether uniformed or not and re‐ ing to note that the same honor that Kesselring gardless of prisoner status, all ffteen were execut‐ and others claimed prohibited them from dis‐ ed by a coastal fortification unit. Raiber's research obeying Hitler did not preclude them from mak‐ provides a fascinating account of the capture and ing Dostler the "fall guy" for an atrocity for which execution of these men. One German officer re‐ they were culpable. fused to carry out the order and another allowed The strength of Raiber's book lies in his abili‐ a prisoner to steal his pistol for an escape attempt. ty to marshal a large amount of testimony and sig‐ In the end, on the orders of General Anton Dostler nificant number of military documents to con‐ (who claimed to have received them from his struct what is probably a highly accurate narra‐ higher headquarters), the Americans were shot tive of events. He provides a detailed (if some‐ and buried in an unmarked grave. Dostler was times factually overwhelming) description of both 2 H-Net Reviews the Via Rasella reprisal killings in Ardeatine Caves but nothing more than murdering 'bandits' to the and the GINNY executions. He opens the door for occupiers, exactly as today's terrorists are heroes future research on German complicity in war among their own kind but vicious killers to oth‐ crimes in the Italian theater. This book will also ers. Which wears the white or the black hat de‐ be of interest to those studying postwar policy on pends solely on perspective" (p. 181). Later, prosecution of war criminals. Raiber documents Raiber mentions My Lai in a similar vein. Given the process of U.S. military justice in a very useful the brutal behavior of the Wehrmacht and its col‐ manner, showing the general confusion in which lusion with the worst genocidal policies of the the immediate postwar trials took place. It might Nazi regime, it requires a rather harsh perspec‐ also be an excellent companion piece to the Eng‐ tive to see Italian partisans as "black hats." It is lish edition of Kerstin von Lingen's book, Kessel‐ true that reprisals against civilians were lawful ring's Last Battle (2009), which also deals with the according to the Allies, as well. It is also true that Kesselring trial and its political reverberations. the Allies committed atrocities (and that U.S. sol‐ Given the level of detailed research involved, diers have done so since then), but the sheer scale Raiber's work comes to a slightly anti-climactic and brutality of the Wehrmacht's policies (which ending. Greater issues beyond the matter of Kesselring fully supported) make a comparison Kesselring's perjury are raised by his results. here distracting and counterproductive. Perhaps Raiber seems to be focused on the Ardeatine the inclusion of a survey of recent historiography Caves purely as they relate to the feld marshal's regarding the German army and occupation poli‐ faulty alibi. Readers may fnd themselves asking cy, much of which was available before the au‐ questions not answered here, such as how much thor's death, would have tempered this tendency. Kesselring knew about events and the nature of Indeed, the trials of the Balkan generals at the victims, or why it was legally advantageous Nuremberg (United States of America vs. Wilhelm for him to admit to passing along an order to kill List et al., also known as the Hostages Trial) cov‐ 335 civilians rather than to the killing of 15 POWs. ered in detail international law and demonstrated Likely, the answer is that the Allies at this point systematic violations of that law by the German were more interested in trying those accused of military. killing their own than crimes against civilians. But Overall, however, Raiber is to be commended Raiber doesn't explain why this was the case. One for wading through the voluminous and often might also have hoped, perhaps, for a better contradictory postwar testimonies of German offi‐ placement of these events in the greater context cers as well as memoirs in order to reconstruct of Wehrmacht war crimes in Italy.
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