ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 109± 125, 1997 Paraguayand Uruguay: modernity, traditionand transition PAULC SONDROL Introduction Paraguayand Uruguay in the 1990s both highlight the complicated dilemmas ofconsolidating democracies in Latin America. Political change in formerly authoritariansystems takesplace within the context of historical legacies, culture,the economic environment, as wellas thestructural/ governmentalarena. Thispaper analyses the nature, underlying dynamics and outcomes of efforts at politicalliberalisation and democratisation in Paraguay and Uruguay. As partof thelarger transitions to democracy buffeting Latin America, Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union, the Paraguayan and Uruguayan cases teachsimilarities anddifferences in elite and mass effortsto blend and reconcile newer, workable democraticelements with enduring authoritarian, corporatist arrangements. Detailedcase studiesoften reveal important nuances overlooked in broader, comparativeworks. Paraguay and Uruguay thus add a speci®c comparative perspectiveand analysis to the broader examination of regime change and democratisation;that forms thepaper’ s majorcontribution. Alternativedevelopmental models: Paraguayand Uruguay Toeducated generalists, Paraguay and Uruguay share certainattributes that wouldsuggest a parallelpolitical and social development. Politically, both countriespossess traditional,multiclass, two-party systems thatare amongthe oldestin the world; dating back to the 19th century. Culturally, the two nations boastthe most homogeneous social structures in Latin America (Paraguay’ s the mostracially mixed, mestizo society; Uruguay’ s themost European), lacking large,oppressed indigenous populations, whose existence determines the socio- ethniccleavages and economic extremes of wealthor povertyfound in so many otherLatin American nations. Geopolitically, Paraguay and Uruguay are twoof thesmallest states inSouth America, and both are buffer-stateshistorically ensnaredbetween the combined and con¯ icting ambitions of the Southern Cone’s twogiantsÐ Argentina and Brazil. Yet,despite these resemblances, a deeperexamination of Paraguay and Uruguayreveals perhaps the greatest dyadic contrast in LatinAmerican in terms ofsocio-historical development, economic progress and political evolution. For example,landlocked Paraguay was colonisedat Asuncio Ânalmosttwo centuries PaulC Sondrolis attheDepartment of PoliticalScience, University ofColoradoat ColoradoSprings, 1420 Austin BluffsParkway, PO Box7150, CO 80933-7150,USA. 0143-6597/97/010109-17$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 109 PAUL CSONDROL beforecoastal Uruguay was establishedin 1726. Paraguay is oneof the poorest countriesper capita in Latin America; Uruguay, one of the richest. Paraguayan politicalculture remains largely subject-centred and authoritarian; Uruguay’ s is overwhelminglyparticipatory and democratic. 1 Uruguay’s democraticexperience throughout most of the twentieth century was exceptionalin Latin America, and light-years from anything familiar to Paraguay’s drearyhistory of despotism. Uruguay experienced at least 60 years ofdemocracy in this century; longer overall than Costa Rica, Colombia or Venezuela.Yet it is ironicthat Uruguay’ s `polyarchyof exception’ was largely attributableto thecontributions of one caudillo.PresidentJose ÂBatlley OrdoÂnÄez, whoovershadowed national politics between 1903± 1929, engineered the inte- grating coparticipacioÂn power-sharingmechanisms between the dominant, feud- ingColorado and Blanco parties. 2 Uruguay’s Coloradoand Blanco (National) parties, along with Paraguay’ s Coloradosand Liberals, 3 formperhaps the most enduring two-party systems that datefrom the 19th century. However, a distinctionhaving enormous conse- quencesfor the dissimilar political evolution of Paraguay and Uruguay was the developmentand institutionalisatio nofUruguay’s co-participationaccord, incor- poratingminority interests and labour into a uni®ed governmental hierarchy. Incorporatinglabour peacefully through the party system andpolitical party co-existenceallowed Uruguay to stabilise and ultimately democratise by inte- gratingdisparate party elites, their followers, and engendering a strongsocietal consensusabout the rules of the electoral game. Bythe late 1930s, Uruguay seemed destinedtowards a bright,shining future ofsocial democracy. The country was enjoyingor aspiring to a middle-class standardof living via progressive welfare policies, work in the huge admini- strativebureaucracy or nationalised industries. Instead, Uruguay began a slow economicand political decline beginning in the 1940s. Over-reliance on tra- ditionalcommodity exports (wool, mutton, cattle and grains), coupled with asmalldomestic economy worked against industrialisation; Uruguay was simultaneouslya modern,yet distinctly non-technological society, and one dependenton a moretraditional agro-export economy, subject to all the ¯uctuationsin price and demand in the capitalist world economy. Economic degenerationaccelerated by the mid-1950s, when exports decreased in response toshrinking world demand, competition from sheep-raising New Zealand, and theintroduction of synthetic® bres allconspired to expose Uruguay’ s vulnerable, export-dependenteconomy. A growingtrade de® cit led successive governments toborrowincreasingly and to expandthe money supply, triggering both debt and in¯ ation.4 Economicpressures thusslowly rotted Uruguay’ s carefullycrafted political balance,polarising class con¯ict as workers’demands increased on theColorado andBlanco political/ patronageparties, which proved unwilling or unable to resist escalatingsectoral pressures forincreased wages, services, subsidies and publicemployment. The cumulative nature of this distributional process in- evitablycollided with the limited capacities of the Uruguayan state, as the competitionfor dwindling economic bene® ts destroyedthe consensual Batllista legacyand accelerated political disorder. 110 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION Astradeunion strikes and riots enveloped society, a leftistguerrilla movement (theTupamaros), spawned by disillusionment with governmental inef® ciency andcorruption, reached major proportions in the 1960s. While urban guerrillas battledpolice, the ruling Colorado party, backed by the military, responded to thespiral of violence by moving sharply to the right. Uruguay’ s unique colegiado (a weakened` collegial’executive system modelledon Switzerland’ s begunin 1952and designed to prevent caudillismo )was blamedfor immobilism andreplaced in 1966 by a uni-personalpresidential form with greatly expanded powers.A series ofincreasing political restrictions portended the gradual militarisationof Uruguayan society throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. By1973, the military had assumed predominatepolitical power in response to theabsence of cohesive,adaptable programmatic parties and civilian paralysis in theface ofrising civil violence. The demise of Uruguayan democracy in the 1970sthus illustrates the type of econo-political factors that can doom poly- archy,even where long-standing social conditions are auspicious. Paraguayanhistory and culture have been the antithesis of Uruguay’ s. Since independencein 1811, Paraguay has experiencedtwo protracted periods of extremetyranny (1816± 1870; 1940± 1989) sundered by one semi-democratic intermission(1870± 1940). In fact, even though Paraguay’ s founding19th cen- turyleadersÐ Jose ÂGasparRodrõ Âguezde Francia, Carlos Antonio Lo Âpezand FranciscoSolano Lo ÂpezÐwere extreme despots, they are promotedtoday as archetypesof Paraguayan nationalism and independence. Paraguay’ s involve- mentin two of Latin America’ s threegreat inter-state wars (theTriple AllianceWar, 1865± 1870; the Gran Chaco War, 1932± 1935) also enhanced the positionof the armed forces, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, as national saviours.Political leaders in Paraguay constantly play up the historic reality of Paraguayanresistance to foreign aggressors andthe Paraguayan military is probablymore highly regarded by civilians than soldiers are anywhereelse in LatinAmerica. Thedecidedly fascist cast tothe military regimes headed by Major Rafael Franco,Marshall Fe ÂlixEstiggaribia and General Higinio Morõ Ânigothroughout the1930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeating Paraguayanpolitical culture and enshrined authoritarian values among elites and masses. These caudillos buttressedthe norms of resistance to and suspicion of `foreign’democratic ideas not geared to the realities of the Paraguayan experi- ence.5 Anextreme brand of Paraguayan patriotism, an ethos justifying an ampli®ed military role in politics, and a monotonousheritage of dictatorship punctuatedby only brief and chaotic interludes of open government, are underlyingfactors nurturing and sustaining a soldierlyelite vested in militarism anda publichabituated to authoritarianism. Having rarely experienced democ- racy,Paraguayans can only compare an historical record associating strong-man rulewith autonomous progress, and open politics (as duringthe so-called Liberal era between1904± 36) with foreign domination and governmental ineffective- ness.6 Moreover,in contrast to Uruguay’ s congenialtwo-party system ofincorpora- tion,co-participation, non-violent competition and power-sharing, Paraguay’ s dominantColorado and Liberal parties have long remained venal and repressive 111 PAUL CSONDROL towardsone another. Whereas Uruguay’ s modelof labour incorporation and partyco-participation helped spawn a profoundlydemocratic