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Home , Alfredo Stroessner, Colorado Party (Uruguay), Continuismo, Uruguay, Uruguayans

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 109± 125, 1997

Paraguayand : modernity, traditionand transition

PAULCSONDROL

Introduction Paraguayand Uruguay in the 1990s both highlight the complicated dilemmas ofconsolidating democracies in . Political change in formerly authoritariansystems takesplace within the context of historical legacies, culture,the economic environment, as wellas thestructural/ governmentalarena. Thispaper analyses the nature, underlying dynamics and outcomes of efforts at politicalliberalisation and democratisation in and Uruguay. As partof thelarger transitions to democracy buffeting Latin America, Eastern and theformer Soviet Union, the Paraguayan and Uruguayan cases teachsimilarities anddifferences in elite and mass effortsto blend and reconcile newer, workable democraticelements with enduring authoritarian, corporatist arrangements. Detailedcase studiesoften reveal important nuances overlooked in broader, comparativeworks. Paraguay and Uruguay thus add a speci®c comparative perspectiveand analysis to the broader examination of regime change and democratisation;that forms thepaper’ s majorcontribution.

Alternativedevelopmental models: Paraguayand Uruguay Toeducated generalists, Paraguay and Uruguay share certainattributes that wouldsuggest a parallelpolitical and social development. Politically, both countriespossess traditional,multiclass, two-party systems thatare amongthe oldestin the ; dating back to the 19th century. Culturally, the two nations boastthe most homogeneous social structures in Latin America (Paraguay’ s the mostracially mixed, society; Uruguay’ s themost European), lacking large,oppressed indigenous populations, whose existence determines the socio- ethniccleavages and economic extremes of wealthor povertyfound in so many otherLatin American nations. Geopolitically, Paraguay and Uruguay are twoof thesmallest states inSouth America, and both are buffer-stateshistorically ensnaredbetween the combined and con¯ icting ambitions of the ’s twogiantsÐ and . Yet,despite these resemblances, a deeperexamination of Paraguay and Uruguayreveals perhaps the greatest dyadic contrast in LatinAmerican in terms ofsocio-historical development, economic progress and political evolution. For example,landlocked Paraguay was colonisedat Asuncio Ânalmosttwo centuries

PaulC Sondrolis attheDepartment of PoliticalScience, University ofColoradoat ColoradoSprings, 1420 Austin BluffsParkway, PO Box7150, CO 80933-7150,USA.

0143-6597/97/010109-17$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 109 PAUL CSONDROL beforecoastal Uruguay was establishedin 1726. Paraguay is oneof the poorest countriesper capita in Latin America; Uruguay, one of the richest. Paraguayan politicalculture remains largely subject-centred and authoritarian; Uruguay’ s is overwhelminglyparticipatory and democratic. 1 Uruguay’s democraticexperience throughout most of the twentieth century was exceptionalin Latin America, and light-years from anything familiar to Paraguay’s drearyhistory of despotism. Uruguay experienced at least 60 years ofdemocracy in this century; longer overall than , or .Yet it is ironicthat Uruguay’ s `polyarchyof exception’ was largely attributableto thecontributions of one .PresidentJose ÂBatlley OrdoÂnÄez, whoovershadowed national politics between 1903± 1929, engineered the inte- grating coparticipacioÂn power-sharingmechanisms between the dominant, feud- ingColorado and Blanco parties. 2 Uruguay’s Coloradoand Blanco (National) parties, along with Paraguay’ s Coloradosand Liberals, 3 formperhaps the most enduring two-party systems that datefrom the 19th century. However, a distinctionhaving enormous conse- quencesfor the dissimilar political evolution of Paraguay and Uruguay was the developmentand institutionalisatio nofUruguay’s co-participationaccord, incor- poratingminority interests and labour into a uni®ed governmental hierarchy. Incorporatinglabour peacefully through the party system andpolitical party co-existenceallowed Uruguay to stabilise and ultimately democratise by inte- gratingdisparate party elites, their followers, and engendering a strongsocietal consensusabout the rules of the electoral game. Bythe late 1930s, Uruguay seemed destinedtowards a bright,shining future ofsocial democracy. The country was enjoyingor aspiring to a middle-class standardof living via progressive welfare policies, work in the huge admini- strativebureaucracy or nationalised industries. Instead, Uruguay began a slow economicand political decline beginning in the 1940s. Over-reliance on tra- ditionalcommodity exports (, mutton, cattle and grains), coupled with asmalldomestic economy worked against industrialisation; Uruguay was simultaneouslya modern,yet distinctly non-technological society, and one dependenton a moretraditional agro-export economy, subject to all the ¯uctuationsin price and demand in the capitalist world economy. Economic degenerationaccelerated by the mid-, when exports decreased in response toshrinking world demand, competition from -raising , and theintroduction of synthetic® bres allconspired to expose Uruguay’ s vulnerable, export-dependenteconomy. A growingtrade de® cit led successive governments toborrowincreasingly and to expandthe money supply, triggering both debt and in¯ ation.4 Economicpressures thusslowly rotted Uruguay’ s carefullycrafted political balance,polarising class con¯ict as workers’demands increased on theColorado andBlanco political/ patronageparties, which proved unwilling or unable to resist escalatingsectoral pressures forincreased wages, services, subsidies and publicemployment. The cumulative nature of this distributional process in- evitablycollided with the limited capacities of the Uruguayan state, as the competitionfor dwindling economic bene® ts destroyedthe consensual Batllista legacyand accelerated political disorder. 110 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Astradeunion strikes and riots enveloped society, a leftistguerrilla movement (theTupamaros), spawned by disillusionment with governmental inef® ciency andcorruption, reached major proportions in the 1960s. While urban guerrillas battledpolice, the ruling , backed by the military, responded to thespiral of violence by moving sharply to the right. Uruguay’ s unique colegiado (a weakened` collegial’executive system modelledon ’ s begunin 1952and designed to prevent caudillismo )was blamedfor immobilism andreplaced in 1966 by a uni-personalpresidential form with greatly expanded powers.A series ofincreasing political restrictions portended the gradual militarisationof Uruguayan society throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. By1973, the military had assumed predominatepolitical power in response to theabsence of cohesive,adaptable programmatic parties and civilian paralysis in theface ofrising civil violence. The demise of Uruguayan democracy in the 1970sthus illustrates the type of econo-political factors that can doom poly- archy,even where long-standing social conditions are auspicious. Paraguayanhistory and culture have been the antithesis of Uruguay’ s. Since independencein 1811, Paraguay has experiencedtwo protracted periods of extremetyranny (1816± 1870; 1940± 1989) sundered by one semi-democratic intermission(1870± 1940). In fact, even though Paraguay’ s founding19th cen- turyleadersÐ Jose ÂGasparRodrõ Âguezde Francia, Carlos Antonio Lo Âpezand FranciscoSolano Lo ÂpezÐwere extreme despots, they are promotedtoday as archetypesof Paraguayan nationalism and independence. Paraguay’ s involve- mentin two of Latin America’ s threegreat inter-state wars (theTriple AllianceWar, 1865± 1870; the Gran Chaco War, 1932± 1935) also enhanced the positionof the armed forces, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, as national saviours.Political leaders in Paraguay constantly play up the historic reality of Paraguayanresistance to foreign aggressors andthe Paraguayan military is probablymore highly regarded by civilians than soldiers are anywhereelse in LatinAmerica. Thedecidedly fascist cast tothe military regimes headed by Major ,Marshall Fe ÂlixEstiggaribia and General Higinio Morõ Ânigothroughout the1930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeating Paraguayanpolitical culture and enshrined authoritarian values among elites and masses. These buttressedthe norms of resistance to and suspicion of `foreign’democratic ideas not geared to the realities of the Paraguayan experi- ence.5 Anextreme brand of Paraguayan patriotism, an ethos justifying an ampli®ed military role in politics, and a monotonousheritage of punctuatedby only brief and chaotic interludes of open government, are underlyingfactors nurturing and sustaining a soldierlyelite vested in militarism anda publichabituated to authoritarianism. Having rarely experienced democ- racy,Paraguayans can only compare an historical record associating strong-man rulewith autonomous progress, and open politics (as duringthe so-called Liberal era between1904± 36) with foreign domination and governmental ineffective- ness.6 Moreover,in contrast to Uruguay’ s congenialtwo-party system ofincorpora- tion,co-participation, non-violent competition and power-sharing, Paraguay’ s dominantColorado and Liberal parties have long remained venal and repressive 111 PAUL CSONDROL towardsone another. Whereas Uruguay’ s modelof labour incorporation and partyco-participation helped spawn a profoundlydemocratic value structure, Paraguayanelites sought only to penetrate,control or crushorganised labour; to exileand exclude oppositionists from the spoils system thatis governmentjobs andcontracts. As aresult,party hatreds are fannedalong with the incessant denunciations,conspiring and vicious double-crosses that characterise party politicsin Paraguay. 7 GeneralAlfredo Stroessner descended from this lineage of despotism, political intrigueand military intervention. His political life spanned an era ofParaguayan historycharacterised by international con¯ ict, civil war (in 1947) and military intromission.Following the Chaco War with , Stroessner watched or collaboratedwith various factions of the Paraguayan military as theyseized powerwith mundane impunity: in 1936, 1937, 1948, three times in 1949, in 1954when he seized power, and ® nallyin 1989 when Stroessner himself was overthrown. Insum, throughout most of the twentieth century, utilised the stabilisingaspects ofan interparty co-participation accord, giving opponents a power-sharingrole in government, until economic crisis andsocial unrest destroyedthe civic culture. Paraguayans, however, historically played a much moreexclusionary, zero-sum political game. Out-of-power groups, facing virtual monopolyparty/ militarycontrol over positions and patronage, could expect little exceptrepression, exile or execution. Stroessner did not invent this system, but playedthese rules as hefound them.

Authoritarianregimes TheUruguayan and Paraguayan were discrete from one another, andparticular to theregion. Many scholars have argued that among the Southern Conetyrannies in the 1970s, Uruguay’ s was theclosest approximation to a totalitarianstate. Similarly, Paraguay under Stroessner was overidenti®ed with variousmilitary dictatorships. These portrayals are incorrect,and fail to capture theessence ofthese two hybrid forms ofauthoritarianism. 8 Uruguay’s militaryregime was neithera totalistmovement fusing a utopian ideologywith an of® cial party, nor a moretraditional± personalist dictatorship suchas Stroessner’s. Uruguayanauthoritarianism was similarto the develop- mentalist,non-personalistic ` bureaucratic±authoritarian’ regimes (Brazil, 1964± 85;Argentina, 1966± 73) and perhaps even more analogous to the extremely repressive,demobilising ` neo-conservative’systems modelledin Argentina (1976±83) and (1973± 89). 9 Militaryrule in Uruguay focused on hyperstable governance; the dictatorship was nota revolutionarymovement bent on driving citizens towards some brave newworld. The armed forces intendedto demobilise and depoliticise the politicalenvironment in the face ofcivil unrest. Once in power, army of® cers andcivilian technocrats approached politics from the military’ s perspective:with anemphasis on hierarchy, authority, discipline and solidarity. For authoritarian elites,democracy had meant compromise, immobilism, the substitution of 112 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION politicalcriteria for ef® ciency,and a myriadof special-interestlegislation, for a rationalintegrated plan. ` Antipolitics’and an aversion to ` lazyand petty politicking’characterised military rule in Uruguay. 10 Butthe lack of participation andrepresentative institutions also blighted regime attempts to form a mass-base ofsupport, either through the existing Colorado and Blanco parties, or through establishmentof a newof® cial, military party, as inauthoritarian Brazil. Uruguayanof® cers, outof mutual distrust and lack of political acumen, were alsohampered by theabsence of aclear-cutmaximum leader, such as Stroessner inParaguay, or General in Chile. The military corporation ruledUruguay, not a caudillo.Uruguay’s generalsremained a ratherfaceless junta.11 Stroessner’s Paraguayis illsuited to comparisons with the various develop- mentalist,technocratic or military dictatorships that descended across thefar Southof Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. While exercising control and coercionakin to the authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the ParaguayanArmed Forces possessed nomodernising agenda. Rather, the mili- taryunder Stroessner remained a regressive,repressive institution, more rep- resentativeof what Almond and Powell termed ` conservativeauthoritarianism’ : preoccupiedwith the maintenance of existing social and institutional arrange- mentsand having no transformative goals. Stroessner had no larger utopian visionthan keeping himself in power. 12 Moreover,neither the military nor the of®cial Colorado party ruled Paraguay: Alfredo Stroessner did. Stroessner was not simply primusinter pares withina contemporaryjunta like Pinochet in Chile orGeneral-President Gregorio Alvarez in Uruguay. Stroessner was theclassic `strongman’, totallydominating the political regime for 35 years. 13 Stroessner’s autocracyÐlike Uruguay’ sÐ certainly lacked any full-blown totalitarianideology. But it was alsoan exception to the general principle that authoritarianregimes lack ideational self-justi® cations and mass legitimation,as fewcontemporary dictatorships endure a thirdof a centuryrelying on ham-®sted repressionalone. While Stronismo neverbecame a comprehensiveideology, a vaguer,emotional attitude or programmaticconsensus gave spirit to the regime’ s doctrine.Key elements included loyalty to the persona of Stroessner as presi- dent,a virulentnationalism bordering on xenophobia, an almost maniacal anti-communismand a distinctivecommunitarian, populist tenor. Stroessner thussecured a popularbase forhis regime. Mass acceptanceof Stroessner stemmedfrom Paraguay’ s longtradition of personalist± authoritarianism, Stroessner’s manipulationof theultra-nationalist myths and values of thenation, thepenetration and politicisation of themilitary and civil society and corruption, whichglued regime elites together. A personalitycult developed in Paraguay underStroessner that resembled General ’ s inSpain, and even certainaspects ofEasternEuropean Communist regimes (particularly in Nicolae Ceausescu’ sRomania). 14 Yetthe armed forces werea mainstayof Stroessner’ s regimeand, together withthe of® cial Colorado party, acted as interlockingtwin pillars of an authoritariansystem thatnevertheless possessed certainorganisational features, impulsesand leanings, found in more advanced mobilisational systems. The 1992discovery of fastidious documentation from the regime’ s intelligence 113 PAUL CSONDROL agenciesreveals the pervasiveness with which the dictatorship penetrated almost allsocial institutions, and belies the stereotypical notion that Stroessner’ s was simplyan old-fashioned, poorly organised personalist regime. 15 TheUruguayan and Paraguayan dictatorships were different from one another, andfrom their more developmentalist counterparts in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.Yet, ironically, the machinery of dictatorship was muchmore sophisti- catedin Stroessner’s Paraguaythan in Uruguay’s militaryregime. The waves of authoritarianhistory that have washed over Paraguay not only eroded incipient democraticideals, but also sharpened the authoritarian tendencies. Given Paraguay’s violenthistory of mass-involvement in politics (notably the 1947 civilwar), the Colorado party and its ancillary organisations came as closeto becominga totalitarianmovement as Paraguay’s rudimentarytechnology and Stroessner’s limitedaims wouldallow. 16

Re-democratisationin Uruguayand liberalisation in Paraguay Insimilarand differing ways, Uruguay and Paraguay participated in thewave of politicalliberalisation that appeared to sweepthe globe, beginning in the 1980s. Analogous(but not identical) variables accelerating the demise of these two autocraciesincluded: (1) regime failure of political and economic policy; (2) popularmovements accelerating regime change; and (3) the role of the military inpolitical withdrawal (Uruguay), or reconstructing governmental elites (Paraguay). Uruguay’s generalsproved as illsuited in dealing with the nation’ s politico- economiccrisis as werethe civilian political institutions, whose ineffectual responses originallypoliticised Uruguayan of® cers inthe 1960s. Moreover, the Uruguayanmilitary created still newer problems that continue to haunt the nation.The junta claimed it came topower to build a `new’Uruguay; to cleanse societyof subversionand restore patriotism and traditional values and to be the `guardiansof the permanent’ . 17 Yetvirtually all the military’ s attemptsat politicaland economic re-engineer- ingfailed. Most of the old politicos, as wellas thetraditional Blanco and Coloradoparties, survived the dictatorship and reemerged in the mid-1980s ®rmlycommitted to democracy and civilian rule. Unions were never restruc- tured,foreign debt quadrupled instead of falling, and privatisation of money- drainingstate-sponsored industries remained limited, despite the neoliberal blandishmentsof military and technocratic elites. Instead, the military’ s long drawn-outpolitical withdrawalÐ beginning with the 1980 defeat of its consti- tutionalreferendum and ending with the successful NavalClub pact in 1984Ð ledto a generalrestoration of a statusquo ante (government giganticisim, presidentialismand fractionalised party politics). 18 InParaguay, adverse economic conditions also accelerated Stroessner’ s politicaldemise. The boom years ofthe 1970s, fuelled by construction of the giantItaipu Âhydroelectricproject with Brazil, gave way in 1983 to serious recessionstemming from the fall-off in construction activities. Thereafter, in¯ation, unemployment and debt intensi® ed. The boom had nurtured a nascent 114 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Paraguayanmiddle class andmobilised greater popular expectations. The bust leftin traina Paraguayanpopulation more alienated and less passivetowards the oppressive,seemingly interminable Stroessner regime. Institutionalised corrup- tion,long an integral aspect of Stroessner’ s webof patronage and predatory sultanism,began to strain political relationships within the regime. Business elites,for example, traditionally quiescent towardsÐ if not supportive ofÐ Stroessnerin a Faustianbargain for peace and prosperity, began to resent the enormousrake-offs and graft among military and Colorado party elites and to hankerfor a less politicisedjudiciary and bureaucracy. As Stroessnerand the enduringclique around him aged, the regime gradually deteriorated, becoming antiquatedand unable to conjugate more than minimal levels of legitimacy and effectiveness. 19 Militaryroles held certain similarities, but also differences in theauthoritarian breakdownsin Uruguay and Paraguay. In Uruguay, civilian opposition to militarismwas collective,organised and sustained. In a remarkable1980 referendum,Uruguayans resoundingly rejected military attempts to institution- alisetheir rule via a new,highly repressive constitution. This stark defeatÐ and themilitary’ s acceptanceof that rejectionÐ uncovered (even among of® cers) Uruguay’s latentcommitment to democracy and the basic illegitimacy of militaryrule. From 1980 on, opposition to the authoritarian regime, though still perilous,was public.Thus began the long dialogue of military extrication betweenof® cers andcivilian politicians, culminating in the 1984 national electionsand democratic restoration. 20 Uruguay’s redemocratisation,along with Argentina’ s andBrazil’ s, leftauth- oritarianParaguay isolated and buffeted by liberalisinggales from exiles, human rightsgroups and the Embassy in Asuncio Ân.Unfortunately for Stroessner,the Carter administration’ s humanrights policy had become an essentialcomponent of US foreignpolicy not easily reversed by the Reagan administration,which subsequently saw anopportunity for criticising and pres- suringStroessner without fear ofa `communist’takeover, as ameans of legitimisingthe Reagan anti-leftist ` dictatorship’policy in SandinistaNicaragua. Moreover,Stroessner’ s smalland remote despotism never had the public support withinright-wing US circlesthat Chile’ s high-pro®le Augusto Pinochet enjoyed. Paraguay’s pariahstatus eroded Stroessner’ s abilityto suppress dissentand to maintainelite consensus, since US support(in the name of anti-communism)had longremained a pillarof regime legitimacy. 21 UnlikeUruguay, however, in the ® nalanalysis it was notany brawn within Paraguayancivil society that forced Stroessner from power. Stroessner’ s declin- inghealth and detachment from day-to-day decision making, a successioncrisis, andmost importantly, instability within the ruling Colorado party, led an army factionto intervene violently and overthrow him, paving the way for a political liberalisation. 22 Uruguay’s militarythus presents a muchclearer picture of praetoriandisinte- grationthan does Paraguay’ s. Thesigni® cance of Uruguay’ s priordemocratic culture,illuminated in the surging empowerment of civil society from 1980 onwards,eroded the military’ s resolveto maintain power. The 1984 election of PresidentJulio Maria Sanguinetti of the Colorado party restored Uruguay’ s 115 PAUL CSONDROL democracyafter 11 years ofmilitary rule. The 1989 victory of Blanco party presidentialcandidate, Lacalle, further consolidated Uruguay’ s democracy. Bycontrast, Paraguay’ s prolongedpraetorian legacy displays no sustained precedentof the military accepting as normala relativelynarrow scope of prerogatives,nor of civilians governing military affairs. On 3 February,1989, theStroessner dictatorship ended as itbegan: in a coup.Unlike Uruguay’ s negotiatedtransition between the armed forces andleaders of the major oppo- sitionparties, Paraguayan citizens played little role in Stroessner’ s ultimate demise; thearmy revolted in a classic golpe.UnlikeUruguay’ s popular-based transition,Paraguay’ s rupturewas anelite ` transitionfrom above’ with the militaryas themajor, controlling actor, maintaining the same symbioticalliance withthe dominant Colorado party. Themajor difference between these two cases is impliedin the section subheading.Democratisation and liberalisation stand as discretetransitional processes. Liberalisationdoes not necessarily imply movement towards a demo- craticpolity, since it is byno means certainthat those who have presided over orpromotedParaguay’ s recentliberalisation efforts are seekingto transform the post-Stroessnerpolitical system intoa Western-styledemocracy. TheRodriguez coup was designedto correct contradictions in Paraguay’ s authoritariansystem, not abolish it. The transition began as partof a strategy, orchestratedby the military, to restore the balance of power along more liberal lines,not to pursue a genuinelydemocratic outcome. Change came toParaguay inthe traditional way: from the top, via an ` indispensable’military leader, and withoutthe participation of average citizens. Rodriguezis awealthybene® ciary of three decades of collaboration with Stroessner,and a productof the authoritarian system fromwhich he emerged. HeÐlike so manyranking militares andColoradosÐ has beeninvolved, during hisentire professional life, in a wholeseries ofparasitic ventures, involving rake-offs,graft and cronyism, that remained a cornerstoneof his power. This is becausecorruption was anessential component which bound elite loyalty to Stroessnerfor a thirdof acentury.High-ranking military of® cers, partymembers andbureaucrats enjoyed lucrative side interests involving rich sinecures in state monopoliesthat controlled major commercial areas, andwhich often served as frontsfor less respectable,but more lucrative, businesses likenarcotics traf®cking, contraband and prostitution. 23 Theblackmarket system ofrake-offs andgraft bought complicity, support, and a convergenceof elite interestsÐ thus decreasingthe likelihood of inter-elite con¯ ict since so manyhad a personal stakein the continuation of Stroessner’ s spoilssystem. Thedecision to liberalise Paraguay was morethe result of a `Dahlian’ calculationby elites of the perceived risks inmaintaining government by repressionin the face of: (1)divisions in the once-monolithic Colorado party whichthreatened its symbiosis with the military, and (2) a changinginter- nationalenvironment (democratisation, end of the Cold War and US support foranti-communist dictatorship), than any ideal implemented by enlightened polyarchs.In order to retain their power and enormous perquisites, Colorado andmilitary elites determined that things had to change if they were to remain the same.24 116 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Authoritarianlegacies Dictatorshipleft indelible scars andmultiple meanings across thecultural psychesof Uruguayans and Paraguayans. For Uruguayans, the military regime utterlydestroyed the carefully structured national mythology. The halcyon days ofthe late 1980s following the democratic restoration have given way in the 1990sto the sober realisation that the consensual welfare state is illusory. Itshould be stated plainly that in Uruguay, as inmost nations, civil society helpeddestroy its own . The old dole system was destroyedas muchby inept political corporatism under civilian politicians unwilling to say no topowerfulgroup demands for services andsubsidies, as bycontinuedeconomic mismanagementunder the junta. Bythe late 1960s democratic institutions and elites reacted to Uruguay’ s generalisedsystemic crisis andfound themselves unable to contain mounting con¯ict. By the early 1970s sectors ofbothmajor political parties were disloyal todemocracy. The parties abdicated responsibility in the face ofeconomic malaiseand an urban guerrilla insurgency by factionalisingand refusing to form coalitions,thus leading to imobilismo.Civiliansalso failed to come to theaid of PresidentJuan Maria Bordaberry, when he was facedwith a rebelliousmilitary. Mostpolitical groups encouraged military role expansion at one point or another, believingthey could utilise the military to their advantage. 25 Currently,over one quarter of all Uruguayans are dependenton worthonly a fractionof their former value. A jadedcounter-imagery now pervadesMontevideo, constructed upon a ratherinsipid foundation that Juan Rialterms `inverseHobbesiansim’ . Ever-risingstandards of livingand advanced socialprogrammes that once made Uruguay such a happyand unique nation, are nowsacri® cedupon the alter of ` democracyat any cost’ . Toomuch social upheavalover the perennial question of cui bono mightusher in a new, revanchistmilitarism. A commoncommitment exists to protectthe rather shabby socioeconomicstatus quo against any societal tumult enticing the military from thebarracks. 26 Thissocietal reticence revealed itself in a 1989referendum, to annul a controversiallaw exempting the army and police from Nuremburg-like revenge trialsfor human rights abuses committedunder the dictatorship. That referendum was defeatedand army immunity upheld by a marginof 57% to 43%. Another plebiscite(December 1992) soundly thwarted President Lacalle’ s economic privatisationscheme tosell off Uruguay’ s state-controlledindustries. Uruguayansvoted by 72%against privatisation, despite the prevailing neoliberal economicreforms sweepingLatin America. The defeat was anenormous blow tothe prestige of Lacalle, and sapped any remaining momentum for economic reformduring the remaining two years ofhis term. The defeat of the privatisa- tionreferendum signalled Uruguayans’ overwhelming desire to reject a new economicpath, promising long-term economic goals (low in¯ ation and balance- of-paymentsequilibrium). Instead, the nation turned to thetraditions of the past; ineptpolitical corporatism, complex bureaucracy and the satisfaction of more immediatesocial wants/ demands(health care andpublic housing). The process ofpolitical and economic regeneration in Uruguay provides lessons forother 117 PAUL CSONDROL re-democratisingregimes where the ethics of security can override the ethics of change.The intense longing for a returnto something like the pre-authoritarian pastcan overshadow and obviate historical opportunities for political innovation providedby regime rupture. The outcome of these particular, transitional `moments’becomes the vehicle which determines the precise timing, style and circumstancesof regime change. InParaguay, General Andre ÂsRodrõÂguez’s coupand subsequent rubber-stamp electionas presidentin May 1989, nevertheless leavened democratic yeast buds incivil society. To his credit, Rodrõ Âuezput some distancebetween himself and his consuegro (RodrõÂguez’s daughterwas marriedto one of Stroessner’ s sons) andthe patron that he had supported for so long. Press restrictionswere lifted, politicalprisoners released from jails and political exiles were allowed to return. RodrõÂuezeven thwarted the Paraguayan habit of continuismo ,bypeacefully turningover power to his (chosen) successor. TheAugust 1993 inauguration of Coloradoparty candidate saw acivilianpresident in Paraguayfor the ® rst timein almost 40 years. Clearly,Rodrõ Âguezinitiated something of a Paraguayan glasnost, as the Stronato (Stroessnerregime) has givenway to a societybrimming with upstart students,haranguing news editorials and stubborn trade unions. But scepticism regardingParaguay’ s potentialdemocratic consolidation exists given the nature anddegree of authoritarianism there. Democracy has neverbeen the norm, nor eventhe clear-cut preference in Paraguay, and the sheer durationof a half- centuryof military/ Coloradodomination makes anydemocratic transition dif®cult. Aside from purging some die-hard Stronistas,mostof the traditional politicalelite remain in placeÐ within the leadership of the Colorado party, seniorarmy of® cers, andthe state bureaucracy. Most continue to owe their positionsto amiguismo(cronyism) and view these sinecures as asortof personal andprivate ® efdomfrom which to plunder. A longprocess ofsocialisation must besustained if a moredemocratic culture is eventuallyto emerge. The1993 national elections were the ` cleanest,dirty’ vote in 48years. But the process clearlydid not represent a breakthroughfor democracy. The climate of intimidationagainst opposition parties that preceded the plebiscite made it clear thatthe military would only accept a Coloradovictory. The ruling Colorado/ Military/Bureaucratictriad controlled the guns, money, patronage and electoral machinery.The vote was notsurprisingly marred by prematureprojection results proclaiminga Coloradovictory, convenient communications failures and a grenadeand machine-gun attack on the only opposition television station. 27 Wasmosy,a richindustrialist and political neophyte, appears incapable of cultivatingor imposing loyalty and unity among disparate politico-military factions aÁ la Stroessner.His weakness is evidentin the constant political re-alignmentsand plotting, public denunciations, power struggles and military meddlingthat characterise the swirling vortex of Paraguayan politics in the 1990s.Paraguay’ s transitioncontains signi® authoritarian elements and an overlayof newer democratic features. It is notfully one or the other. 28 Forits part, Uruguay no longer conforms to the old stereotype as asortof polaropposite of Paraguay. Uruguay today is moresimilar to Paraguay than Uruguayansever thought in the past: indebted,corporate, underdeveloped, and 118 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION veiledby the dangerous precedent of a politicisedmilitary. Yet, in contrast to Paraguay,Uruguay’ s priorcommitment to democracy and more sophisticated citizenryinspires a certainoptimism. Whatever its failings, Uruguay’ s is a `pacted’democracy; one honed through compromise, give and take, bargaining andrevision, between contending civil and military elites, congruent with the old Battlista legacyof coparticipation.In Uruguay, at least, political competition is almostalways about increments; in Paraguay it is normallyabout wholes. InUruguay, politics is aboutsomething; in Paraguay, politics is aboutevery- thing. Paraguay’s is nota `pacted’democracy; it is an` imposed’liberalisation in whicha tolerantand accommodating civic culture akin to Uruguay’ s has yetto develop.A half-centuryof Colorado/ militarydomination, as wellas theiralmost completecontrol over the transition, bolsters a naturaldisposition of theseelites toco-govern unilaterally, without any compulsion to push for greater partici- pationand contestation. Re¯ ecting the mood, current army strongman, General LinoOviedo, has statedthat the Colorados, together with the military, will continueto rule Paraguay `porseÂculaseculorum {sic}¼whetheranyone likes it ornot’ . ParaguayanVice-President Angel Seifart echoed this point, stating ` the Coloradoparty’ s patiencehas itslimits’ if confrontedby threatening opposition demandsdefying historical parameters. 29 InUruguay, the foundational pact that led to military withdrawal has at leastlaid the basis fora degreeof mutual trust among contending groups (the military,parties, business associations, trade unions, etc), if only because these groupsare nowsocialised to procedural bargaining. It is dif®cult to imagine anythingsimilar occurring in Paraguay. Precisely because the military/ Colorados exercisedsuch control over the transition, they have never fully agreed, nor been compelled,to compromise. The dimensions of political space are expandingin bothnations. But in Paraguay, governmental tolerance of and responsiveness to escalatingopposition and societal demands show less adaptionthan in Uruguay. Harsheconomic conditions also continue to impactpolitics in bothnations. In Paraguay,a decadeof stagnantliving standards and frustrated rising expectations cannotlong continue without serious repercussions for political stability, let alonedemocracy. A Paraguayanversion of ’ s `Chiapassyndrome’ , repletewith rural protests throughout the country in 1994, demonstrated that campesinos are nolongeroverwhelmingly atomised and passive, and that issues suchas ruralland reform can no longer remain submerged by Paraguay’ s predominantlyurban politics. The government’ s knee-jerkreaction to peasant- blockedroads and land seizures (inresponse to revelations that 15 millionacres hadbeen given to Stroessner cronies) was simplyto dust off the shop-worn `communist-inspiredinsurgency’ cliche Âandorder in the police and military in fullbattle-gear. Still, the peasant protests struck a responsivechord with Paraguay’s threeumbrella labour organisations. These unions, protesting work- ers’ fallingwages (shrunk by 42%over the last six years inthe face ofin¯ation), coordinateda generalstrike on 12 May 1994; the ® rst tobe held in Asuncio Ân since 1959. InUruguay, anaemic (currently under 2%), coupled with a 50%rate of in¯ ation, now requires major cut-backs in the already emasculated 119 PAUL CSONDROL socialwelfare system. Uruguay today has onepensioner for every two working citizens.The perennial Uruguayan question of ` whobene® ts’ clouds expecta- tionsthat development can be sustained without addressing fundamental struc- turalreform of politics (factionalism in political parties) and economics (inept corporatismand statism). TheNovember 1994 national elections brought former President Julio Sanguinettiback to power, but he must now work closely with his rivals in the Blancoparty and a leftistcoalition. Sanguinetti’ s Coloradoparty failed to capturea majorityin the 30-member Senate, winning only 10 seats (thesame as outgoingPresident Lacalle’ s Blancoparty). The leftist Progressive Encounter coalitionwon nine seats. Inthe 98-seat Chamber of Deputies, the breakdown was muchthe same: 32seats forthe Colorados, 31 for the Blancos and 30 for ProgressiveEncounter. In order to prevent gridlock in a congressalmost evenly dividedthree ways, Sanguinetti handed out six of 12 cabinet positions to the oppositionBlancos and smaller parties in March 1995. Nevertheless, these electionsÐthe third in a decadeÐcon® rm thatUruguayans have returned to participatorydemocracy, enabling very different political groups to express themselves.

Conclusions TheUruguayan and Paraguayan cases teachbroader, comparative lessons regardingthe vexing question of democratisationin theThird World. One lesson cautionsagainst the temptation to apply concepts (democratisation, ,totalitarianism, etc) to a broaderrange of cases thanis warranted, leadingto a stretchingor distortion of meaning associated with the original construct.The Paraguayan case suggeststhat civil± military elites in Asuncio Ân are overseeinga controlledliberalisation from the top down, as ameans of maintainingthe military± Colorado± bureaucratic triad that has ruledthe nation for50 years. Certainspecial characteristics of the Paraguayan experience also suggest a proto-totalitariantone going beyond the usual authoritarian mode. Paraguay hintsthat non-democratic regimes vary in direction, intensity and totality. Stroessner’s dictatorshipimplies that the larger taxonomies are moreordinal thannominal; not ® nal,immutable forms. Paraguay’ s currenttransitional system likewisede® es normalcategorisation. To put it awkwardly, Paraguay is some- wherebetween a less-than-democraticand less-than-truly-authori tarianregime. Empiricalunderstanding of comparative politics requires the use ofmore discretecategories. Simply to termall systems as `authoritarian’or `democratic’ obscuresimportant distinctions. 30 Paraguayis `liberalising’; perhapseven `democratising’. Paraguayappears to be attempting to blend newer tenets of liberalpluralism with older authoritarian elements. Appearances, however, are far frommeaningless, as theysometimes create opportunities for further changes. Thusa secondlesson from both Uruguay and Paraguay concerns the interac- tionof social movements and elite reformers inshaping newer democracies. 120 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

Whileliberalisation is acosmeticexercise in granting selected concessions as a means ofpreserving the status quo, liberalisation sometimes provides strategic aperturesfor social movements to force democratisation well beyond elite intentions. 31 Inthe Uruguayan case, amilitarydictatorship organised a plebisciteit hoped towin in 1980, was shockedto lose it, but found it impossible to set asidethe election.Instead of provided a controlled,limited opening, Uruguay’ s generals accededto the vote count and returned power to civilians. Political scientist SamuelHuntington asserts thatthese ` stunningelections’ are becominga pattern inthe breakdown of modern authoritarian regimes. Other recent examples in LatinAmerica include the votes in Pichochet’ s Chile(1988) and Sandinista (1990). 32 Thewhole notion of cultural explanations of national differences in political practicesemerges as athirdlesson from these two cases. Thecultural variable evokesalmost violent debate in academic circles. Culture expresses theunique- ness ofeach nation, thus limiting generalisability across cases. Perhapsmost damning,` culture’becomes an easy residualtautological category when no other seems convenient,implying a certainfatalism regarding change. Research, for examplechallenges the notion of a fundamentallyauthoritarian political culture innon-democratic regimes as `natural’to the milieu. 33 If Uruguay’s polyarchywas exceptionaland thus not to be compared with a moreSpanish± American, Indian, authoritarian, or ` backwardculture’ as in Paraguay,what, then, led to the 1973 democratic breakdown? The Uruguayan case remindsus thatmore is atwork in the demise of democratic regimes than simplyculture. A crucialfactor in political development and decay remains a politicalsystem’ sresponsecapacity in relation to demands. 34 Clearly,cultural explanations, utilised sloppily, can lead to gross stereotyping andoversimpli® cation. But the importance of culture cannot be ignored. Care- fullyutilised as oneamong several important variables (political institutions, class, exogenousfactors) political culture illuminates other societies, non-ethno- centrically,by examining patterns of orientations. Utilisingthe Paraguayan case as anexample, one can argue that clientelism (interpersonal,dyadic ` contracts’binding individuals in asymmetrical relation- shipsof faithfulness and obligation) is botha cause andeffect of authoritarian caudillismo ;atleast partly responsible for creating an intellectual and political environmentconducive to the steady ascendancy of executive-caesarism, at the expenseof countervailing institutions (congresses, courts, pressure groups). Lowerranking members ofa camarilla (politicalclique) anticipate aid, protec- tionand patronage while higher status individuals (patrons) expect loyalty, deferenceand service from their clients. Paraguayan society is composedof generallyinterwoven chains linking thousands of patron± client relationships that are organisedhierarchically. In this way they cut across class linesto separate thepeasantry and other lower-class sectors fromone another, while reinforcing thestatus and power of elites. Moreover, distinctive to Paraguayan clientelism isthesyndrome’ s linkageto the national system. This effects the politicisationof the masses, yetdirects their support to reactionary elites not actingin their interests. 35 121 PAUL CSONDROL

Inthe end, any understanding of Paraguay’s transitionmust take into account thenation’ s sustainedlegacy of extremetyranny. Its culturedictates circumspec- tionregarding the short-term habituation of newerdemocratic norms in the face oflong-standing personalist, militarist and elitist structures and routines. The cuartelazo bySenior Army Commander, General , in April 1996, onlyhighlights the fact that the Paraguayan armed forces maynot govern at present,but they are neverfar frompower. Since at least the Chaco War, no Paraguayanregime has remainedin power without military backing. 36 Afourthlesson drawn from these cases concernsthe issue ofde® ning civil±military relations, unresolved in Paraguay and Uruguay, as elsewherein the developingworld. As amatterof de®nition, what, precisely, constitutes ` success- ful’or ` permanent’military disengagement? Like the larger authoritarian, totalitarianor democratic taxonomies, the case studiesimply that ` demilitarisa- tion’ is more or less militarisation,rather than either civiliancontrol of the military, or militaryintervention in politics. Does a shiftfrom overt military `participation’in governmentdecisions to intermittent ` in¯uence’ mark success- fulwithdrawal? In the Paraguayan case, howdoes a `civilian’regime operate thatis characterisedby near-complete military jurisdiction over certain policy matters,with the army as apermanentfactor in any calculus of power? Lastly,Paraguay and Uruguay teach us somethingof the issue ofcorruption indeveloping societies. Corruption in developing countries is misunderstoodin theFirst World; there exist functional attributes to corruption as acrucial mechanismin politics. By allocating spoils, corruption buys complicity and supportfrom elites with a personalstake in the continuation of the system. Corruptionis utilisedas apurgingmechanism and scapegoat device; displacing blamefor systemic, governmental failures and assigning culpability to less destabilisingindividuals (` afewbad apples’ ). 37 Butcorruption can become dysfunctional if it assumes anever-heightening spiralbeyond all rational boundaries. Corruption is pervasivein Paraguay. The Paraguayanform of corruption closely approximates that found in Mexico, but differscompletely in magnitude and nature from that found in Uruguay. The Uruguayanvariety is amalodorouslubricant for local political bosses and entrepreneursthat get public housing, highways, resorts andshopping centres built.Paraguayan corruption is incapacitating;a malignancythat poisons an entirepolitical and social system inwhich people rapaciously prey upon one anotherwith little thought of ultimate consequences. 38 TheParaguayan and Uruguayan cases clarifyand suggest new questions and crossnationalcomparisons regarding such diverse issues as civil±military rela- tions,personalist rule, clientelism, corruption, reformism and liberalisation, and howvalue orientations shape social structures. These are alluniversal phenom- ena,but their meaning is in®nitely variable across timeand space. At present, noconsensus exists among scholars as towhich conditions, variables, or characteristicsare mostessential in understanding politics in the developing world;no single,universal and teleological ` grandtheory’ of developmentexists. Butthis shifting focus in the literature, brimming with eclecticism and ` islands’ ofmiddle-range theories of change, represents less fractureand more a vibrant maturationof development studies. Paraguay and Uruguay illuminate the 122 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION changesafoot in the Third World and the paradigms with which to better understandthose changes.

Notes 1 KennethJohnson, ` Measuringthe scholarly image ofLatin American democracy, 1945±1985’ , inJames Wilkie, ed, StatisticalAbstract of Latin America ,26,Los Angeles, UCLA LatinAmerican Center,1988, p198.Johnson shows Paraguay ranking either 18th or 19th out of 20 Latin American states innine successive surveysof democratic developmentat ®veyear intervals.Uruguay, however, consistently ranked as themost democratic nationin Latin America from1945 until the mid-1960s. 2 Thus,to one degree oranother, an underlying current of authoritarianism and personalism may be found throughoutLatin America, butits incidence and permanence varies across time andspace. Viewed inthis light,Paraguay’ s General AndreÂsRodrõÂguezand Uruguay’ s Battle yOrdoÂnÄez are notparticularly different. 3 Themore formal name forUruguay’ s Blancosis theNational Party. Paraguay’ s Coloradoparty is formally termed theNational Republican Association, or ANR. 4 See Herman Daly,` TheUruguayan economy: its basic natureand current problems’ , Journalof Inter- AmericanStudies and World Affairs ,7,1965, pp 316± 30; Luis Costa Bonino, Crisis delos partidos tradicionalesy movimientorevolucionario en el Uruguay ,:Ediciones de la BandaOriental, 1985. 5 See AlfredoSeiferheld, Nazismoy fascismoen el Paraguay:visperas dela II GuerraMundial, 1936± 1939 , AsuncioÂn:Editorial Historica, 1985, ch 4. 6 Paraguayhad three strongdictators between independenceand the Triple Alliance War in1865. After 1870, thenext 80 years broughtdozens of cuartelazos (barracks revolts),overt threats of coups and seven successful ones.Between 1870and the 1930s Paraguay had 32 presidents, two of whomwere assassinated andthree overthrown.In the decade 1901±11 Paraguay had 10 presidents, including four in 1911. 7 Theparties emerged fromthe ashes ofParaguay’ s crushingdefeat inthe Triple Alliance War (1865±70). Thoseclaiming to be the heirs to Francisco Solano Lo Âpez formedthe Colorado Party. The Liberals, fashionedfrom survivors and descendants of exiles who¯ edParaguay during the father/ sonLo Âpez dictatorship,constitute the main opposition.As aresultof theircollaboration with the occupying Brazilians after thewar, theLiberals suffered from an anti-patriotic stigma appliedby the Colorados. See Harris GaylordWarren, Paraguayand the Triple Alliance: The post-war Decade, 1869± 1878 ,Austin,TX: Universityof Texas Press, 1978. 8 On` totalitarian’Uruguay, see AlfredStepan, RethinkingMilitary Politics ,Princeton,NJ: UniversityPress, 1988,p 14;and Martin Weinstein, Uruguay:Democracy atthe Crossroads ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1988,p 56.On Paraguay’ s `military’dictatorship, see RoyMacridis, ModernPolitical Regimes , Boston, MA:Little, Brown, 1986, p 216. 9 Ondistinctions between bureaucratic±authoritarian and neoconservative military regimes, see Hector E Schamis,` ReconceptualizingLatin American authoritarianismin the 1970s’ , ComparativePolitics , 23(2), 1991,pp 201± 20. 10 Theterm `antipolitics’comes fromBrian Loveman & ThomasJ Davies, Jr,eds, ThePolitics of Antipolitics: theMilitary in Latin America ,Lincoln,NB: UniversityPress, 1989.The quote was translatedfrom the militarycommunique Â,Juntade Comandantes en Jefe, LasFuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental: el Proceso PolõÂtico,Montevideo:Las Fuerzas Armadas, 1978,p 247. 11 PaulC Sondrol,` 1984revisited? A re-examinationof Uruguay’ s militarydictatorship’ , Bulletinof Latin AmericanResearch ,11(2), 1992, pp 187± 203. 12 Gabriel Almond& GBinghamPowell, ComparativePolitics: A DevelopmentalApproach ,Boston,MA: Little,Brown, 1966, pp 280± 84. 13 See RAndrewNickson, ` Tyrannyand longevity: Stroessner’ s Paraguay’, ThirdWorld Quarterly , 10 (1), 1988,pp 237± 59; Paul C Sondrol,` Authoritarianismin Paraguay: an analysis of three contending paradigms’, Review ofLatin American Studies ,3(1),1990, pp 83± 105. 14 Stronismo shouldnot be confused with Coloradismo .By1967 Stroessner had completely converted the century-oldparty into a personalistvehicle to develop a mass base ofsupport.To the preexisting Colorado `mentality’(traditional hatred of the Liberals, a contemptfor formal procedures,rather populistin party appeals topoor farmers), Stroessnermelded authority with control and representation into a leadership principle (FuÈhrerprinzip )andabsolutist regime ( FuÈhrerstaat ).Stroessnerthus became `ElContinuador’, in thetradition of Francia andthe Lo Âpezes. See RobinTheobald, ` Patrimonialism:research note’, World Politics,34,1982, pp 548±549; Frederick Hicks, ` Interpersonalrelationships and caudillismo inParaguay’ , Journalof InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs ,13,1971, pp 89± 111. 123 PAUL CSONDROL

15 Thetotalitarian feel ofStroessner’ s Paraguaywas evidentin the Colorado party’ s systematisationof traditionalhatreds into a kindof ideology, mass-line penetrationof societal life,and the politicisation of the military.What is particularlyinteresting regarding Stroessner is thathis personalist rule rested uponno charismatic elements. See PaulC Sondrol,` Totalitarianand authoritarian : a comparisonof Fidel Castroand Alfredo Stroessner’ , Journalof LatinAmerican Studies ,23(3),1991, pp 599± 620. On the recent release ofsecret-police ®les, see RAndrewNickson, ` Paraguay’s Archivodel terror’ , LatinAmerican Research Review ,30(1), 1995, pp 125± 129. 16 See PaulLewis, ParaguayUnder Stroessner ,ChapelHill, NC: Universityof North Carolina Press, pp 225±30. 17 General LuisQueirolo, El Soldado,74, 1980. ( El Soldado is amonthlyperiodical and unof® cial voiceof the of® cer corpspublished by the Centro Militar in Montevideo). 18 See Charles GGillespie, NegotiatingDemocracy: Politiciansand Generals inUruguay ,Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991. 19 Corruption,as Stroessneronce said, was `theprice ofpeace’ .See CarlosMaria Lezcano G,`Lealtad al General-Presidente’ ,AsuncioÂn:Investigacio Ânes Sociales EducacioÂnComunicacioÂn,1986; Tomas Palau,ed, Dictadura,Corrupcio ÂnyTransicioÂn ,AsuncioÂn:BASE/ InvestigacionesSociales, Programa de Estado y Sociedad(ISPES), 1990. On the Paraguayan economy, see Bejamin Arditi, RecesioÂnyestancamento:la economõÂaparaguayadurante el perioÂdopost-` boom’(1981± 1986) ,AsuncioÂn:Centro de DocumentacioÂny Estudios,1987; Melissa HBirch,` Ellegado econo Âmico delos an Äosde Stroessner y el desafõÂoporla democracia’ ,inDiego Abente, ed, Paraguayen transicio Ân ,AsuncioÂn:Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1993, pp 31±52. 20 Foranalysis of the cronograma ofmilitary withdrawal, see LuisE GonzaÂlez, `Uruguay,1980± 1981: an unexpectedopening’ , LatinAmerican Research Review ,19,1983, pp 63± 76. 21 See ThomasCarothers, Inthe Name ofDemocracy: USPolicyToward Latin America inthe Reagan Years , Berkeley,CA: Universityof California Press, 1991,pp 163± 66. On Paraguay’ s internationalisolation, see Jose LuisSimo Ân,` Aisalmientopolitico internacional y desconcertacion:El Paraguay de Stroessner de espaldas aAmerica Latina’, RevistaParaguaya de Sociologia ,25,1988, pp 185± 243. 22 Amore detailedexamination of backgroundfactors leadingto the 1989 coup is providedin Paul C Sondrol, `TheParaguayan military in transition and the evolution of civil± military relations’ , Armed Forces and Society,19(1),1992, pp 105± 22. 23 TheCox newspaper group, citing a classi® edUS State Department report,said Rodrõ Âguezwas considered byUS law enforcement authoritiesto be Paraguay’ s numberone narcotra®cantero. See TheArizona Daily (Tucson),5 February1989, p 11. 24 RobertDahl, Polyarchy,New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1971. 25 Gillespie, NegotiatingDemocracy , p 239. 26 JuanRial, ` Thesocial imagery:utopian political myths in Uruguay’ , inSaul Sosnowski & LouiseB Popkin, eds, Repression,Exile, andDemocracy: UruguayanCulture ,Durham,NC: Duke University Press, 1993, pp85± 86 (uncorrected page± galley proofs). 27 See Jan KnippersBlack, ` Almostfree, almost fair: Paraguay’s ambiguouselection’ , NACLA: Report on Democracy,27(2), 1993, pp 26± 8. 28 PaulC Sondrol,` Theemerging new politicsof liberalizing Paraguay: sustained civil± military control withoutdemocracy’ , Journalof Interamerican Studies and World Affairs ,34(2), 1992, pp 127± 63. 29 LatinAmerican Weekly Report ,13May 1993, p 213;27 May 1993, p 1. 30 InLarry Diamond, Juan Linz & SeymourMartin Lipset, eds, Democracy inDeveloping Countries , Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, p 8,theauthors offer terms toindicatethe mixture of democratic and non-democraticelements thatcan befound in the developing world. One generichybrid regime is termed `pseudo-democracy’, giventhe existence ofdemocratic institutionsand procedures (multiparty elections, new constitutions,etc) enshrinedin law thatoften mask a de facto authoritarianregime as away of legitimisingit. Paraguay’ s system, alongwith Mexico’ s, closely resembles thistypology. But Paraguay’ s militaryoccupies a far greater place inpolitics than does Mexico’ s, thus Paraguay also parallels theless institutionalised,typically more personalisticand unstable Central American systems ofEl Salvador, orHonduras. 31 ShahidQadir, et al,`Sustainabledemocracy: formalism vssubstance’, ThirdWorld Quarterly ,14(3),1993, pp 415±22. 32 Samuel Huntington, TheThird Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century ,Norman,OK: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991. 33 See, forexample, JohnA Booth& MitchellSeligson, ` Thepolitical culture of authoritarianismin Mexico: areexamination’, LatinAmerican Research Review ,19(1), 1984, pp 106± 24; and Susan Tiano, ` Authoritar- ianism andpolitical culture in Argentinaand Chile in the mid-1960s’ , LatinAmerican Research Review , 21 (1),1986, pp 73± 98. 34 At thesame time, onecould add that a militarycoup would surely have occurredÐ much earlierÐ in the long process ofeconomic deterioration and political delegitimation in any number of other Latin American/ African/Asian cases thatlacked the depth of Uruguay’ s democratic culture. 124 PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

35 Hicks,` Interpersonalrelationships and caudillismo inParaguay’ . 36 OnGeneral Oviedo’s attemptedputsch, see WallStreet Journal ,29April 1996, p 1. 37 StephanD Morris, Corruptionand Politics in Contemporary Mexico ,Tuscaloosa,AL Universityof Alabama Press, 1991. 38 Thisobservation is notempirical, noruniversal; clearly there are manyhonest, dedicated public servants in Paraguay.But low salaries commonlyjustify utilising one’ s of®ce to` supplement’one’ s income,if for no otherreason than, ` everyoneelse doesit’ . These impressionswere gleanedduring extended visits to Paraguayand Uruguay in 1989, and a year inParaguay as aFulbrightscholar in 1994 (including a month inMontevideo).

Contem porary Asia EDITORS Gowher R izvi, New York, USA R ob ert C assen , Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, UK T h ere is a g row ing realizatio n that S o uth A sia has to b e b o th treated and stu died as a region. C on tem po ra ry S ou th A sia do es ju st th at. T h e p u rp o se o f th e jo u rn al is to cultivate an aw aren ess th at S ou th A sia is m ore than a su m of its p arts: a fact o f g reat im po rtan ce n ot on ly to th e states and p eo p les o f th e reg io n , b ut to the w orld as a w h o le. It also add resses th e m ajor issues facing S o u th A sia from a region al an d in terd isc ip lin ary p ersp ec tiv e. C o n tem p o ra ry S o u th A sia fo cu ses o n issu es co n cern in g th e reg io n th at are n o t circu m scrib ed by th e n atio n al b o rders o f th e states. W hile natio n al p ersp ectiv es are n o t ig n o red, th e jo u rn al’ s o v errid in g p u rp o se is to en co u rag e sch o lars w ith in S o u th A sia an d in th e glob al co m m u nity to search for m eans (bo th th eo retical and practical) b y w hich o u r u n d erstan d in g o f th e p resen t pro b lem s o f coo p eratio n an d co n fro n tatio n in th e reg io n can b e en h an ced . Volume 6, 1997, 3 issues. ISSN 0958-4935. Carfax Publishing Company PO Box 25 · Abingdon · Oxfordshire OX14 3UE · UK Tel: +44 (0)1235 521154 · Fax: +44 (0)1235 401550 E-mail: [email protected] · WWW: http://www.carfax.co.uk

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