Hugo Cores Former Guerrillas in Power: Advances, Setbacks and Contradictions in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio For over 135 years, Uruguayan politics was essen- tially a two party system. There had been other “small parties” including socialist parties, commu- nist parties or those inspired by Christian groups but all of them garnered little electoral support. Within the two principal political parties that competed for power, however, there were factions within each that could be considered to a greater or lesser extent progressive, anti-imperialist, and/or committed to some kind of vision of social justice. For the most part, the working class vote tended to gravitate towards these progressive wings within the domi- nant parties. The Twentieth Century history of the Uruguayan left would have been very distinct had pragmatism prevailed, an attitude that was later called the logic of incidencia by leaders of the Independent Batllist Faction (CBI – Corriente Batllista Independiente). Indeed, what sense did it make during the 1920s, 30s, 40s and 50s to be a socialist, communist, or Christian Democrat when if all taken together, they failed to reach even 10% of the vote? When the “theorists” of the CBI spoke of the “logic of incidencia, they referred to the idea that voting and cultivating an accumulation of left forces within the traditional political parties was a viable strategy to 222 • Hugo Cores have an organised impact upon the state apparatus, establishing positions of influence from within. The intent of the CBI itself to pursue such a strategy ultimately failed and disintegrated or became absorbed within the ranks of political support given to the Colorado Party of Sanguinetti.1 To remain outside of the traditional political parties, in contrast, meant that the opposition would be deprived of incidencia. Partisans of the CBI asserted that political groups that maintained such a posture were destined to remain activists purely of principle. This form of pragmatic reasoning ultimately managed to keep much of the left tied to the conservative political parties for decades and this posture remained influential right up until the elections of 1999. That was the year that Jorge Batlle of the Colorado Party beat Tabaré Vázquez, the latter being the candidate of the leftist Frente Amplio. The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) as a Centre of the “Accumulation of Forces” The 1960s was a time of change for the traditional parties. It had become increasing difficult for progressive forces to remain in the traditional parties as the space available to them was shrinking. Batllistas like Zelmar Michelini decided it was necessary to leave the Colorado Party and Enrique Erro had already left the National Party.2 It was from out of these progressive ten- dencies in conjunction with the prior independent tendencies mentioned ear- lier that the Frente Amplio (FA) was formed. It was a conceived as a broad political front created to change the country’s direction, to break with the IMF, to implement an agrarian reform, to free political prisoners, defend national industry and provide work for the nation. If we logically analyse that situation from the point of view “of the possible,” keeping our eyes strictly limited by pragmatic electoral politics, we would have to say that the Frente Amplio with all of its formidable composition was a failure after its first bout of participation in national elections when it obtained just 18.8% of the vote. Indeed, the traditional parties together garnered the support of over 80% of Uruguayan voters. Did this mean that the formation of the Frente Amplio, its programme and its style of politics was a mistake? That its principled attitude of resolute 1 Julio María Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party was President of Uruguay from 1 March 1985 to 1 March 1990 and from 1 March 1995 to 1 March 2000. 2 Both would later become important activists of the Frente Amplio..