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Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets Portfolio allocation in presidential systems is a central tool that presidents use to deal with changes in the political and economic environment. Yet, we still have much to learn about the process through which ministers are selected and the reasons why they are replaced in presidential systems. This book offers the most comprehensive, cross- national analysis of portfolio allocation in the Americas to date. In doing so, it contributes to the development of theories about portfolio allocation in presidential systems. Looking specifi- cally at how presidents use portfolio allocation as part of their wider political strategy, it examines eight country case studies, within a carefully developed analytical framework and cross- national comparative analysis from a common dataset. The book includes cases studies of portfolio allocation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the United States, Peru and Uruguay, and covers the period between the transition to democracy in each country up until 2014. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, executive politics, Latin Amer ican politics and more broadly comparative politics. Marcelo Camerlo is Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Uni- versity of Lisbon (ICS- UL), Portugal. Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo is Associate Professor in the Department of Polit- ical Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Routledge Research on Social and Political Elites Edited by Keith Dowding Australian National University and Patrick Dumont University of Luxembourg Who are the elites that run the world? This series of books analyses who the elites are, how they rise and fall, the networks in which they operate and the effects they have on our lives. For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Routledge- Research-on- Social-and- Political-Elites/book-series/RRSPE 1 Coalition Government and 5 The Selection of Ministers Party Mandate around the World How coalition agreements Edited by Keith Dowding and constrain ministerial action Patrick Dumont Catherine Moury 6 Party Members and Activists Edited by Emilie van Haute and 2 The Selection of Ministers Anika Gauja in Europe Hiring and Firing 7 Political Representation Edited by Keith Dowding and Roles, representatives and the Patrick Dumont represented Edited by Marc Bühlmann and 3 Parliamentary Elites in Jan Fivaz Central and Eastern Europe Recruitment and 8 Ministerial Survival during Representation Political and Cabinet Change Edited by Elena Semenova, Foreign Affairs, Diplomacy and Michael Edinger and War Heinrich Best Alejandro Quiroz Flores 9 Government Formation and 4 The Selection of Political Minister Turnover in Party Leaders in Contemporary Presidential Cabinets Parliamentary Democracies Comparative Analysis in the A Comparative Study Americas Edited by Jean- Benoit Pilet and Edited by Marcelo Camerlo and William P. Cross Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Government Formation and Minister Turnover in Presidential Cabinets Comparative Analysis in the Americas Edited by Marcelo Camerlo and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Marcelo Camerlo and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Marcelo Camerlo and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-20560-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-46649-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 To Teresita and Oscarcito, por las cocoas de ayer y los mates de ahora To Emilia and Tomas, for keeping it real and making it fun Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Contents List of figures ix List of tables xi List of contributors xii Acknowledgments xiv 1 Portfolio allocation in the Americas 1 MARCELO CAMERLO AND CECILIA MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO 2 I did it my way: portfolio allocation in the United States (1969–2013) 21 M A R I A C. E scobar - L emmon , M ary A N N E B orrelli and MICHELLE M. TAYLOR- ROBINSON 3 Diverse profiles within single- party cabinets: portfolio allocation in Costa Rica (1978–2014) 48 GERARDO HERNÁNDEZ NARANJO AND JESÚS GUZMÁN CASTILLO 4 Parliamentary style: portfolio allocation in Uruguay (1967–2015) 67 DANIEL CHASQUETTI AND DANIEL BUQUET 5 Together we govern: portfolio allocation in Chile (1990–2014) 90 OCTAVIO AVENDAÑO AND MIREYA DÁVILA 6 Presidentially led coalitions: portfolio allocation in Brazil (1985–2016) 111 MAGNA INÁCIO Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 viii Contents 7 Bait and switch? Portfolio allocation in Colombia (1958–2014) 139 LUIS BERNARDO MEJÍA GUINAND AND FELIPE BOTERO 8 Cooperative but non- partisan: portfolio allocation in Peru (1980–2016) 159 SOFIA VERA AND MIGUEL CARRERAS 9 Unilateral, against all odds: portfolio allocation in Ecuador (1979–2015) 182 S A N T I A G O B asabe - S errano , J O H N P olga - H ecimo V ich AND ANDRÉS MEJÍA ACOSTA 10 Portfolio allocation in the Americas: a recap 207 CECILIA MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO AND MARCELO CAMERLO References 221 Index 236 Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 Figures 1.1 Situations of instability within one administration 13 2.1 The structure of executive power in the United States (2017) 26 2.2 Cabinet membership by partisanship (United States 1969–2013) 29 2.3 Secretarial profiles in initial cabinets (United States 1969–2013) 30 2.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (United States 1969–2013) 31 2.5 Ministerial turnover by type of exit (United States 1969–2013) 33 2.6 Minister duration by profile (United States 1969–2013) 35 A2.1 Use of cooperative and unilateral strategies during good and bad times 45 3.1 The structure of the executive power in Costa Rica (2017) 52 3.2 Cabinet membership by party (Costa Rica 1978–2014) 53 3.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Costa Rica 1978–2014) 55 3.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (Costa Rica 1978–2014) 60 3.5 Minister turnover by type of exit (Costa Rica 1978–2014) 61 3.6 Minister duration by profile (Costa Rica 1978–2014) 62 4.1 The structure of the executive power in Uruguay (2017) 72 4.2 Cabinet membership by party (Uruguay 1967–1973; 1985–2015) 75 4.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Uruguay 1967–1973; 1985–2015) 76 4.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (Uruguay 1967–1973; 1985–2015) 78 4.5 Minister turnover by type of exit (Uruguay 1967–1973; 1985–2015) 79 4.6 Minister duration by profile (Uruguay 1967–1973; 1985–2015) 81 5.1 The structure of the executive branch in Chile (2017) 94 5.2 Cabinet membership by party (Chile 1990−2014) 99 5.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Chile 1990–2014) 104 5.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (Chile 1990–2014) 104 Review Copy – Not for Redistribution Marcelo Camerlo - University of Lisbon - 21/04/2020 x Figures 5.5 Ministerial turnover by type of exit (Chile 1990–2014) 105 5.6 Minister duration by profile (Chile 1990−2014) 105 6.1 The structure of the executive branch in Brazil (2017) 117 6.2 Cabinet membership by party (Brazil 1988–2016) 121 6.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Brazil 1988–2016) 123 6.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (Brazil 1988–2016) 126 6.5 Minister turnover by type of exit (Brazil 1988–2016) 130 6.6 Minister duration by profile (Brazil 1988–2016) 131 7.1 The structure of the executive power in Colombia (2017) 144 7.2 Cabinet membership by party (Colombia 1958–2014) 149 7.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Colombia 1958–2014) 150 7.4 Portfolio allocation strategy (Colombia 1958–2014) 152 7.5 Minister turnover by type of exit (Colombia 1958–2014) 153 7.6 Minister duration by profile (Colombia 1958–2014) 154 8.1 The structure of the executive power in Peru (2017) 163 8.2 Cabinet membership by party (Peru 1980–2016) 165 8.3 Minister profiles at inauguration (Peru 1980–2016) 167 8.4 Portfolio
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