Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns Yale University Press Chapter Title: Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns Book Title: Patterns of Democracy Book Author(s): Arend Lijphart Published by: Yale University Press. (2012) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bg23.9 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Yale University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Patterns of Democracy This content downloaded from 117.97.164.147 on Wed, 01 Apr 2020 12:29:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Chapter 5 Party Systems: Two-Party and Multiparty Patterns he fi rst of the ten variables that characterize the majoritar- ian-consensus contrast, presented in Chapter 1, was the Tdifference between single-party majority governments and broad multiparty coalitions. This fi rst difference can also be seen as the most important and typical difference between the two models of democracy because it epitomizes the contrast between concentration of power on one hand and power-sharing on the other. Moreover, the factor analysis reported in Chapter 14 shows that it correlates more strongly with the “factor” representing the fi rst (executives-parties) dimension than any of the other four vari- ables that belong to this dimension. It would therefore make sense to devote this chapter—the fi rst of nine chapters that will discuss the ten basic variables1—to this fi rst and most typical variable. For practical reasons, however, it is necessary to discuss the sub- ject of party systems fi rst. The classifi cation of cabinets—single- party cabinets versus multiparty coalition cabinets, and bare- majority cabinets versus minority cabinets and cabinets that have 1. Two of the variables—constitutional rigidity and judicial review— will be discussed in one chapter (Chapter 12). 60 This content downloaded from 117.97.164.147 on Wed, 01 Apr 2020 12:29:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PARTY SYSTEMS 61 “unnecessary” parties in them—depends a great deal on how po- litical parties and the numbers of parties in party systems are defi ned. Hence these defi nitional problems have to be solved be- fore the question of cabinet types can be properly addressed. It is worth noting, however, that the type of party system is also a strong component of the executives-parties dimension. To preview the fac- tor analysis in Chapter 14 once more, the party-system variable correlates with the fi rst “factor” almost as strongly as the type of cabinet and more strongly than the remaining three variables. Two-party systems typify the majoritarian model of democ- racy and multiparty systems the consensus model. The tradi- tional literature on party systems is staunchly majoritarian and emphatically favors the two-party system. Two-party systems are claimed to have both direct and indirect advantages over multi- party systems. The fi rst direct benefi t is that they offer the voters a clear choice between two alternative sets of public policies. Second, they have a moderating infl uence because the two main parties have to compete for the swing voters in the center of the political spectrum and hence have to advocate moderate, centrist policies. This mechanism is especially strong when large num- bers of voters are located in the political center, but its logic con- tinues to operate even when opinions are more polarized: at the two ends of the spectrum, the parties will lose some of their sup- porters, who will decide to abstain instead of voting for what is, to them, a too moderate program, but a vote gained in the center, taken away from the other party, is still twice as valuable as a vote lost by abstention. Both claims are quite plausible—but also contradictory: if the programs of the two parties are both close to the political center, they will be very similar to each other and, instead of offering a meaningful “choice” to the voters, are more likely to “echo” each other.2 2. Most two-party theorists do not make both of the competing claims simultaneously. The advantage of party moderation is typically asserted by the American school of thought, whereas the claim of a clear-cut choice refl ects the British two-party school. This content downloaded from 117.97.164.147 on Wed, 01 Apr 2020 12:29:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 62 PARTY SYSTEMS In addition, two-party systems are claimed to have an important indirect advantage: they are necessary for the formation of single- party cabinets that will be stable and effective policy-makers. For instance, A. Lawrence Lowell (1896, 70, 73–74), one of the fi rst modern political scientists, wrote that the legislature must con- tain “two parties, and two parties only, . in order that the par- liamentary form of government should permanently produce good results.” He called it an “axiom in politics” that coalition cabinets are short-lived and weak compared with one-party cabi- nets: “the larger the number of discordant groups that form the majority the harder the task of pleasing them all, and the more feeble and unstable the position of the cabinet.” In the next two chapters I confi rm Lowell’s hypothesis linking party systems to types of cabinets and his “axiom” that single- party majority cabinets are more durable and dominant than co- alition cabinets. The majoritarians’ preference for two-party sys- tems is therefore clearly and logically linked to their preference for powerful and dominant one-party cabinets. Furthermore, in Chapter 8 I show a strong connection between party systems and electoral systems, which further explains the majoritarians’ strong preference for plurality, instead of proportional representation, because of its bias in favor of larger parties and its contribution to the establishment and maintenance of two-party systems. How- ever, whether this syndrome of features actually translates into more capable and effective policy-making than its consensual counterpart is another matter entirely. Lowell simply assumes that concentrated strength means effective decision-making; in Chapter 15 I show that this assumption is largely incorrect. In this chapter I fi rst address the question of how the number of parties in party systems should be counted and argue that the “effective number of parliamentary parties” is the optimal mea- sure. I also try to solve the problem of how to treat factionalized parties as well as closely allied parties: Should such parties be treated as one party or as more than one party? Next, the average effective numbers of parliamentary parties in our thirty-six de- This content downloaded from 117.97.164.147 on Wed, 01 Apr 2020 12:29:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PARTY SYSTEMS 63 mocracies are presented and discussed; these numbers exhibit a wide range—from well below two to more than fi ve parties. I close with a brief discussion of the relationship between the numbers of parties and the numbers and types of issue dimensions that divide the parties. THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES Pure two-party systems with, in Lowell’s words quoted above, “two parties, and two parties only,” are extremely rare. In Chap- ter 2, the party systems of Britain, pre-1996 New Zealand, and Barbados were also described as two-party systems in spite of the usual presence of one or more additional small parties in the legislature. Is this a correct description, or should it be modifi ed in some way? This question points to the most important prob- lem in determining the number of parties in a party system: whether to count small parties and, if not, how large a party has to be in order to be included in the count. One well-known solution was proposed by Giovanni Sartori (1976, 122–23). He suggests, fi rst of all, that parties that fail to win seats in parliament be disregarded, that the relative strengths of the other parties be measured in terms of parliamentary seats, and that not all parties regardless of size can be counted, but that one cannot establish an arbitrary cut-off point of, say, 5 or 10 percent above which parties are counted and below which they should be ignored. These preliminary assumptions are unexcep- tionable. More controversial are his “rules for counting.” He ar- gues that only those parties should be counted as components of the party system that are “relevant” in terms of having either “co- alition potential” or “blackmail potential.” A party has coalition potential if it has participated in governing coalitions (or, of course, in one-party governments) or if the major parties regard it as a possible coalition partner. Parties that are ideologically un- acceptable to all or most of the other coalition partners, and that therefore lack coalition potential, must still be counted if they are large enough. Examples are the strong French and Italian This content downloaded from 117.97.164.147 on Wed, 01 Apr 2020 12:29:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 64 PARTY SYSTEMS Communist parties until the 1970s. This is Sartori’s “subsidiary counting rule based on the power of intimidation, or more ex- actly, the blackmail potential of the opposition-oriented parties.”3 Sartori’s criteria are very useful for distinguishing between the parties that are signifi cant in the political system and those that play only a minor role, but they do not work well for counting the number of parties in a party system.
Recommended publications
  • Hugo Cores Former Guerrillas in Power:Advances, Setbacks And
    Hugo Cores Former Guerrillas in Power: Advances, Setbacks and Contradictions in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio For over 135 years, Uruguayan politics was essen- tially a two party system. There had been other “small parties” including socialist parties, commu- nist parties or those inspired by Christian groups but all of them garnered little electoral support. Within the two principal political parties that competed for power, however, there were factions within each that could be considered to a greater or lesser extent progressive, anti-imperialist, and/or committed to some kind of vision of social justice. For the most part, the working class vote tended to gravitate towards these progressive wings within the domi- nant parties. The Twentieth Century history of the Uruguayan left would have been very distinct had pragmatism prevailed, an attitude that was later called the logic of incidencia by leaders of the Independent Batllist Faction (CBI – Corriente Batllista Independiente). Indeed, what sense did it make during the 1920s, 30s, 40s and 50s to be a socialist, communist, or Christian Democrat when if all taken together, they failed to reach even 10% of the vote? When the “theorists” of the CBI spoke of the “logic of incidencia, they referred to the idea that voting and cultivating an accumulation of left forces within the traditional political parties was a viable strategy to 222 • Hugo Cores have an organised impact upon the state apparatus, establishing positions of influence from within. The intent of the CBI itself to pursue such a strategy ultimately failed and disintegrated or became absorbed within the ranks of political support given to the Colorado Party of Sanguinetti.1 To remain outside of the traditional political parties, in contrast, meant that the opposition would be deprived of incidencia.
    [Show full text]
  • URUGUAY: the Quest for a Just Society
    2 URUGUAY: ThE QUEST fOR A JUST SOCiETY Uruguay’s new president survived torture, trauma and imprisonment at the hands of the former military regime. Today he is leading one of Latin America’s most radical and progressive coalitions, Frente Amplio (Broad Front). In the last five years, Frente Amplio has rescued the country from decades of economic stagnation and wants to return Uruguay to what it once was: A free, prosperous and equal society, OLGA YOLDI writes. REFUGEE TRANSITIONS ISSUE 24 3 An atmosphere of optimism filled the streets of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Montevideo as Jose Mujica assumed the presidency of Caribbean, Uruguay’s economy is forecasted to expand Uruguay last March. President Mujica, a former Tupamaro this year. guerrilla, stood in front of the crowds, as he took the Vazquez enjoyed a 70 per cent approval rate at the end oath administered by his wife – also a former guerrilla of his term. Political analysts say President Mujica’s victory leader – while wearing a suit but not tie, an accessory he is the result of Vazquez’s popularity and the economic says he will shun while in office, in keeping with his anti- growth during his time in office. According to Arturo politician image. Porzecanski, an economist at the American University, The 74-year-old charismatic new president defeated “Mujica only had to promise a sense of continuity [for the National Party’s Luis Alberto Lacalle with 53.2 per the country] and to not rock the boat.” cent of the vote. His victory was the second consecutive He reassured investors by delegating economic policy mandate for the Frente Amplio catch-all coalition, which to Daniel Astori, a former economics minister under the extends from radicals and socialists to Christian democrats Vazquez administration, who has built a reputation for and independents disenchanted with Uruguay’s two pragmatism, reliability and moderation.
    [Show full text]
  • From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State
    Dissidences Hispanic Journal of Theory and Criticism Volume 4 Issue 8 Reconciliation and its Discontents Article 8 November 2012 From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Eugenio Di Stefano University of West Georgia Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences Recommended Citation Di Stefano, Eugenio (2012) "From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State," Dissidences: Vol. 4 : Iss. 8 , Article 8. Available at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences/vol4/iss8/8 This Article / Artículo is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Bowdoin Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissidences by an authorized editor of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Keywords / Palabras clave Reconciliation, Memory, Uruguay, Latin America, Politican Violence This article / artículo is available in Dissidences: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences/vol4/iss8/8 DISSIDEnCES Hispanic Journal of Theory and Criticism From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Eugenio Di Stefano / University of West Virginia During my first visit to Montevideo, I asked a close friend what he thought about the radical transformation of Punta Carretas from a prison that housed political dissidents in the 70s to an upscale, ultra-modern shopping center in the early 90s. The response was delivered in a matter-of- fact way: "The building was crumbling and an eyesore; besides the mall provides jobs." I was shocked, if not a bit saddened, by this response.
    [Show full text]
  • Teorías De Elección Racional: El Caso Del Frente Amplio Y Las Plantas De Celulosa
    ARTÍCULOS ISSN 0328-7998 TEORÍAS DE ELECCIÓN RACIONAL: EL CASO DEL FRENTE AMPLIO Y LAS PLANTAS DE CELULOSA Agustín PORTILLA Recibido: Agosto de 2008 Universidad de Buenos Aires Aprobado: Octubre de 2009 [email protected] Resumen: El presente artículo hace foco Abstract: This article focuses on Broad sobre la campaña electoral del Frente Front’s electoral campaign in 2004, seek- Amplio de 2004, y busca determinar en ing to determine to what extent the elec- qué medida las estrategias electorales toral strategies adopted impacted on the adoptadas impactaron sobre la forma en way in which this political force took que esa fuerza política se definió, a lo position, along the period, about the largo de ella, acerca de la posible instala- possible installation of two pulp mills ción de dos plantas de celulosa en las cer- near Fray Bentos. In that sense, it is stat- canías de Fray Bentos. En ese sentido, se ed that two complementary strategies afirma que se habrían implementado dos were implemented. The first one entailed estrategias complementarias. Por un lado, a process of political moderation with una moderación de posiciones con el fin the purpose of expanding its traditional de ampliar la tradicional base electoral de leftist support toward the center. The izquierda. Por otro lado, una estrategia de second one implied vagueness about cer- indefinición frente a determinadas cues- tain issues in order not to activate vari- tiones con el fin de no activar diversas ous internal contradictions, for example contradicciones internas. Este rumbo de the cellulosic question. The absence of acción fue el escogido frente a la cuestión an official position enabled the various de las plantas de celulosa.
    [Show full text]
  • The Art of Making Friends
    The art of making friends How the Chinese Communist Party seduces political parties in Latin America Juan Pablo Cardenal © 2021 KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG e. V. FUNDACIÓN KONRAD ADENAUER Plaza Independencia 749, of. 201, Montevideo, Uruguay Tel.: (598) 2902 0943/ -3974 E-mail: [email protected] www.kas.de/uruguay @KASMontevideo Director Sebastian Grundberger Subdirector Thomas Schaumberg English translation Judy Butler Cover image Shutterstock Design and layout Taller de Comunicación Obligado 1181, Montevideo, Uruguay www.tallerdecomunicacion.com.uy DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO (DP) is a platform for democratic dialogue among political opinionmakers about topics of relevance in Latin America, based on the values of freedom, solidarity, and justice. It connects the region with the great geostrategic debates in the world. It is a window for publicizing projects of the Konrad Adenauer Foun- dation in Latin America. DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO is part of the Regional Political parties and and Democracy in Latin America Program (KAS Partidos). Its objective is to reduce political polarization through constructive and informed pluralist debate oriented to the common good, to strengthen the po- litical center from its Social-Christian, Liberal and Conservative roots. www.dialogopolitico.org - @dplatinoamerica The Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL) is a private nonprofit and a-party foundation, whose mission is to promote international human rights and democratic solidarity. This work is exclusively distributed without profit motives,
    [Show full text]
  • Uruguay Country Monograph
    URUGUAY COUNTRY MONOGRAPH Published by Live and Invest Overseas www.LiveandInvestOverseas.com URUGUAY COUNTRY MONOGRAPH Published by Live and Invest Overseas Dr. Alberto Navarro Street, El Cangrejo, Panama City, Republic of Panama Publisher: Kathleen Peddicord Copyright © 2017 Live and Invest Overseas. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced by any means without the express written consent of the publisher. The information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. www.liveandinvestoverseas.com Uruguay[ Escriba Country texto Monograph ] T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Government ............................................................................................................. 1 Economy and resources ............................................................................................ 2 Climate .................................................................................................................... 3 Montevideo climatological data ....................................................................................... 4 Population and society ............................................................................................. 4 Infrastructure ........................................................................................................... 5 Practical information................................................................................................ 5 Special benefits for retirees .....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Uruguay#.Vdw Frbrbbs.Cleanprint
    https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/uruguay#.VdW_FRbRbbs.cleanprint Uruguay freedomhouse.org General elections dominated the political landscape in 2014. The leftist Broad Front (Frente Amplio) coalition remained a majority in the parliament and their candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, returned to the presidency for a second (nonconsecutive) term. A referendum on lowering the age of criminal responsibility was voted on at the same time as the legislative and presidential elections. While Uruguay still has a low crime rate compared to the rest of the region, security was a central theme in the presidential election. The referendum was rejected after passionate campaigning by both sides. Uruguay made international news by its willingness to accept six detainees from the U.S. military prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, who had been cleared for transfer. While the transfer was agreed upon by both countries early in the year, the United States had delayed the process after the controversial Bowe Bergdahl transfer, and Uruguay subsequently put off the transfer until after the general elections. The six men arrived in Uruguay in December. Political Rights and Civil Liberties: Political Rights: 40 / 40 [Key] A. Electoral Process: 12 / 12 The 1967 constitution established a bicameral General Assembly consisting of the 99-member Chamber of Representatives and the 30-member Senate, with all members directly elected for five-year terms. The president is directly elected for a single five-year term. In the October 2014 elections, the Frente Amplio retained their majority in parliament, winning 50 seats in the lower house and 15 seats in the Senate. The National Party placed second with 32 and 10 seats in the respective houses, followed by Colorado with 13 and 4 seats; the remainder were taken by the Popular Assembly and the Independent Party.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary of Important Pronouncements, Initiatives and Proposals to Reform the Law, 1999-2013
    Summary of important pronouncements, initiatives and proposals to reform the law, 1999-2013 1999 - “Legalisation.” Although speaking in a personal and not official capacity, then-President Jorge Batlle created an international stir in 1999 when he said he favoured legalization of “soft” drugs. Batlle would not only ratify this position in 2006, but would go a step further, saying that all drugs should be legalized. At the same time, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) and the Artiguista Current (Vertiente Artiguista), members of the ruling Broad Front (Frente Amplio), were taking steps designed to wean problematic users away from hazardous substances such as cocaine-based paste and incline them to eventually opt for marijuana instead. 2010 - A recently-formed congressional Special Commission on Addiction began examining the possibilities of reforming the drugs law as a result of the arguments and proposals put forth by different organizations of marijuana users and growers, such as the Association for the Study of Cannabis of Uruguay (Asociación de Estudios del Cannabis del Uruguay – AECU), Prolegal and Plant your Plant (Planta tu planta). These organizations argued that the “current law permits consumption and possession, but does not facilitate channels for acquiring marijuana.” November 2010 - The issue of decriminalization was entered into the congressional docket at the end of 2010 with the presentation of a bill by Congressman Luis Lacalle Pou, of the White/National Party (Partido Blanco/Nacional), which called for legalization of cultivation by authorizing the cultivation and harvesting of cannabis for personal consumption. The goal of this bill is to separate users from illicit markets in an attempt to combat drug trafficking.
    [Show full text]
  • Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service
    At a glance May 2015 Uruguay: Political parties Uruguay has the longest tradition of democratic stability in Latin America. The two-party system prevailing since the early 19th Century has gradually evolved into a multiparty system, with the emergence in 1971 of a major third force, the Broad Front. This party broke the National and Colorado parties' domination in the 2004 elections and has been in power since 2005. Background Uruguay is the most enduring democracy in Latin America, with an institutionalised two-party system (National (PN) and Colorado (PC) parties) that dominated the political arena from the 19th Century (after independence from Spain) until recently. With the emergence of the Broad Front, and especially after the 1989 elections, it has evolved towards a multiparty system. Thus, since 1990 most presidents have had to negotiate agreements to build coalitions or legislative majorities. Economic stagnation and rising political authoritarianism at the end of the 1960s led to a military dictatorship from 1973 to 1985. From 1985, Presidents Sanguinetti (PC, 1985-1990, 1995-2000) and Lacalle Herrera (PN, 1990-1995) gradually restored political stability. In 2005 this two-party domination was ended by President Tabaré Vázquez and his Broad Front, which has been in power ever since (with President José Mújica from 2010 to 2015, and now with the re-election of Tabaré Vázquez, who was sworn in on 1 March 2015). Political and electoral system Uruguay is a presidential republic. The President is elected for a five-year term, with no possibility of immediate re-election for a second consecutive term.
    [Show full text]
  • Queering of Uruguay and Its Limits Titulo
    “Progressive ” government (2005-2009) and the LGTTBQ agenda : on the (recent ) Titulo queering of Uruguay and its limits Ravecca, Paulo - Autor/a; Autor(es) Montevideo Lugar Instituto de Ciencia Política. Universidad de la República Editorial/Editor 2010 Fecha Documento On Line no. 1 Colección LGTTBQ - Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Transsexual, Bisexual, Queer; Discourse; Temas State; Social movements; Public policies; Uruguay; Doc. de trabajo / Informes Tipo de documento "http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/Uruguay/icp-unr/20170112033036/pdf_571.pdf" URL Reconocimiento-No Comercial-Sin Derivadas CC BY-NC-ND Licencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/deed.es Segui buscando en la Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de CLACSO http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) Conselho Latino-americano de Ciências Sociais (CLACSO) Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) www.clacso.edu.ar PAULO RAVECCA INSTITUTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA DE LA “PROGRESSIVE” GOVERNMENT (2005‐ FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS 2009) AND THE LGTTBQ AGENDA: ON THE SOCIALES DE LA (RECENT) QUEERING OF URUGUAY AND UNIVERSIDAD DE LA ITS LIMITS REPÚBLICA. MONTEVIDEO, DOCUMENTO ON LINE Nº [01/10] URUGUAY. [SETIEMBRE 2010] ISSN: 1688‐ 5058 TÍTULO‐CLAVE: DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO (INSTITUTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA. MONTEVIDEO) TÍTULO‐CLAVE ABREVIADO: DOC. TRAB. (INST. CIENC. POLÍT., MONTEV.) “PROGRESSIVE” GOVERNMENT (2005-2009) AND THE LGTTBQ AGENDA: ON THE (RECENT) QUEERING OF URUGUAY AND ITS LIMITS * Paulo Ravecca PhD candidate, Political Science, York University [email protected] * A previous version of this paper was published by CERLAC (York University) in its Working Papers series. To those children who suffer(ed) bullying at school for being putos (fags) or marimachos (butch women) –both the survivors and the others..
    [Show full text]
  • General Information
    iii THIRTY-FIRST SESSION OF ECLAC MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, 20 – 24 MARCH 2006 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN THIRTY-FIRST SESSION GENERAL INFORMATION 119-2006 1 INTRODUCTION The thirty-first session of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) will be held in Montevideo, Uruguay, from 20 to 24 March 2006. Pursuant to resolution 613(XXX) as adopted at the thirtieth session of ECLAC (San Juan, Puerto Rico, 28 June to 2 July 2004), member States agreed that the meeting would be held in Montevideo, Uruguay. As the Commission’s most important event in each biennium, the session provides an opportunity to analyse issues that are important for the development of countries in the region and to examine the progress of the activities conducted by ECLAC. The aim of this document is to provide delegates attending the session with useful background information and logistical support to facilitate their work at the thirty-first session of ECLAC. Session coordinators will be pleased to answer any questions you may have concerning the logistics or organization of the event, either before or during the session. 1. Basic information about Uruguay Location Uruguay is located in South America, between 30º and 35º latitude south and 53º and 58º longitude east. Population The population of Uruguay is mainly of European origin. Despite being a country known for livestock raising, 80% of the population live in urban areas, with 43% living in the capital Montevideo. Population 3,241,003 (2005) Annual population growth rate 0.6% Population density (inhabitants per km2) 18 Government Uruguay is governed under a republican, democratic, presidential system, with State functions divided up into the executive, legislative and the judiciary.
    [Show full text]
  • Qhomicides in Uruguay, While Still
    LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR A DAILY PUBLICATION OF THE DIALOGUE www.thedialogue.org Tuesday, April 9, 2019 BOARD OF ADVISORS FEATURED Q&A TODAY’S NEWS Diego Arria Director, Columbus Group POLITICAL Devry Boughner Vorwerk Can Uruguay Get Judge Blocks U.S. Corporate VP, Global Corporate Affairs Cargill Policy Keeping Joyce Chang Global Head of Research, its Rising Homicide Asylum Seekers JPMorgan Chase & Co. in Mexico Marlene Fernández Corporate Vice President for Rate Under Control? A U.S. federal judge blocked the Government Relations, Trump administration’s policy of Arcos Dorados keeping asylum seekers in Mexico Peter Hakim while their cases make their way President Emeritus, through immigration courts in the Inter-American Dialogue United States. Donna Hrinak Page 2 President, Boeing Latin America Jon Huenemann Retired VP, U.S. & Int’l Affairs, POLITICAL Philip Morris International James R. Jones Colombia’s Chairman, Monarch Global Strategies Lower House Craig A. Kelly Rejects Peace Director, Americas International Gov’t Relations, Exxon Mobil Senator Jorge Larrañaga, a member of Uruguay’s opposition National Party, has led the drive Deal Changes for a referendum for tougher policies against crime. // File Photo: Facebook site of Jorge John Maisto Larrañaga. The lower house of Colombia’s Director, U.S. Education Congress rejected President Iván Finance Group Homicides in Uruguay, while still relatively low among Latin Duque’s proposed changes to the Nicolás Mariscal tribunal tasked with handling war Chairman, American countries, increased by 45.8 percent in 2018 as Grupo Marhnos compared to a year earlier, according to Interior Ministry crimes. Page 2 Thomas F. McLarty III Q figures.
    [Show full text]