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URUGUAY 1. General Trends After Slowing for Three Years, the Uruguayan Economy Grew at a Faster Rate in 2017 Than the Year Befor
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean ▪ 2018 1 URUGUAY 1. General trends After slowing for three years, the Uruguayan economy grew at a faster rate in 2017 than the year before and posted its fifteenth consecutive year of expansion. According to preliminary figures, gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 2.7% and is expected to expand at a rate of around 2% in 2018. As will be seen later, economic performance was uneven across sectors, with a combination of favourable and less favourable results. On the fiscal front, the Government continued grappling with a persistent overall public sector deficit, which stood at 3.6% of GDP at the end of the year. Despite implementing several contractionary measures since 2015, the Government does not have much more room to rein in spending and has failed to reduce the deficit meaningfully. The global financial situation led to the Uruguayan peso appreciating against the dollar in 2017, while the country’s monetary policy, focused as it is on managing growth in the monetary aggregate M1, was greatly influenced by fluctuations in money demand. Inflation was unusually low throughout the year, which allowed the Government to concentrate on other policy aspects while contributing to improvements in some social indicators. The upturn in economic activity was linked to improved regional and extraregional external demand, a recovery in consumer confidence and a fall in imports. Investment contracted once again, returning to levels seen prior to the commodity supercycle. Regional demand from Brazil, which had been significantly affected by the crisis in that country, showed signs of improving towards the end of 2017, although trade policy challenges remained. -
Hugo Cores Former Guerrillas in Power:Advances, Setbacks And
Hugo Cores Former Guerrillas in Power: Advances, Setbacks and Contradictions in the Uruguayan Frente Amplio For over 135 years, Uruguayan politics was essen- tially a two party system. There had been other “small parties” including socialist parties, commu- nist parties or those inspired by Christian groups but all of them garnered little electoral support. Within the two principal political parties that competed for power, however, there were factions within each that could be considered to a greater or lesser extent progressive, anti-imperialist, and/or committed to some kind of vision of social justice. For the most part, the working class vote tended to gravitate towards these progressive wings within the domi- nant parties. The Twentieth Century history of the Uruguayan left would have been very distinct had pragmatism prevailed, an attitude that was later called the logic of incidencia by leaders of the Independent Batllist Faction (CBI – Corriente Batllista Independiente). Indeed, what sense did it make during the 1920s, 30s, 40s and 50s to be a socialist, communist, or Christian Democrat when if all taken together, they failed to reach even 10% of the vote? When the “theorists” of the CBI spoke of the “logic of incidencia, they referred to the idea that voting and cultivating an accumulation of left forces within the traditional political parties was a viable strategy to 222 • Hugo Cores have an organised impact upon the state apparatus, establishing positions of influence from within. The intent of the CBI itself to pursue such a strategy ultimately failed and disintegrated or became absorbed within the ranks of political support given to the Colorado Party of Sanguinetti.1 To remain outside of the traditional political parties, in contrast, meant that the opposition would be deprived of incidencia. -
Currency Codes COP Colombian Peso KWD Kuwaiti Dinar RON Romanian Leu
Global Wire is an available payment method for the currencies listed below. This list is subject to change at any time. Currency Codes COP Colombian Peso KWD Kuwaiti Dinar RON Romanian Leu ALL Albanian Lek KMF Comoros Franc KGS Kyrgyzstan Som RUB Russian Ruble DZD Algerian Dinar CDF Congolese Franc LAK Laos Kip RWF Rwandan Franc AMD Armenian Dram CRC Costa Rican Colon LSL Lesotho Malati WST Samoan Tala AOA Angola Kwanza HRK Croatian Kuna LBP Lebanese Pound STD Sao Tomean Dobra AUD Australian Dollar CZK Czech Koruna LT L Lithuanian Litas SAR Saudi Riyal AWG Arubian Florin DKK Danish Krone MKD Macedonia Denar RSD Serbian Dinar AZN Azerbaijan Manat DJF Djibouti Franc MOP Macau Pataca SCR Seychelles Rupee BSD Bahamian Dollar DOP Dominican Peso MGA Madagascar Ariary SLL Sierra Leonean Leone BHD Bahraini Dinar XCD Eastern Caribbean Dollar MWK Malawi Kwacha SGD Singapore Dollar BDT Bangladesh Taka EGP Egyptian Pound MVR Maldives Rufi yaa SBD Solomon Islands Dollar BBD Barbados Dollar EUR EMU Euro MRO Mauritanian Olguiya ZAR South African Rand BYR Belarus Ruble ERN Eritrea Nakfa MUR Mauritius Rupee SRD Suriname Dollar BZD Belize Dollar ETB Ethiopia Birr MXN Mexican Peso SEK Swedish Krona BMD Bermudian Dollar FJD Fiji Dollar MDL Maldavian Lieu SZL Swaziland Lilangeni BTN Bhutan Ngultram GMD Gambian Dalasi MNT Mongolian Tugrik CHF Swiss Franc BOB Bolivian Boliviano GEL Georgian Lari MAD Moroccan Dirham LKR Sri Lankan Rupee BAM Bosnia & Herzagovina GHS Ghanian Cedi MZN Mozambique Metical TWD Taiwan New Dollar BWP Botswana Pula GTQ Guatemalan Quetzal -
INTELLECTUALS and POLITICS in the URUGUAYAN CRISIS, 1960-1973 This Thesis Is Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements
INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS IN THE URUGUAYAN CRISIS, 1960-1973 This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Spanish and Latin American Studies at the University of New South Wales 1998 And when words are felt to be deceptive, only violence remains. We are on its threshold. We belong, then, to a generation which experiences Uruguay itself as a problem, which does not accept what has already been done and which, alienated from the usual saving rituals, has been compelled to radically ask itself: What the hell is all this? Alberto Methol Ferré [1958] ‘There’s nothing like Uruguay’ was one politician and journalist’s favourite catchphrase. It started out as the pride and joy of a vision of the nation and ended up as the advertising jingle for a brand of cooking oil. Sic transit gloria mundi. Carlos Martínez Moreno [1971] In this exercise of critical analysis with no available space to create a distance between living and thinking, between the duties of civic involvement and the will towards lucidity and objectivity, the dangers of confusing reality and desire, forecast and hope, are enormous. How can one deny it? However, there are also facts. Carlos Real de Azúa [1971] i Acknowledgments ii Note on references in footnotes and bibliography iii Preface iv Introduction: Intellectuals, Politics and an Unanswered Question about Uruguay 1 PART ONE - NATION AND DIALOGUE: WRITERS, ESSAYS AND THE READING PUBLIC 22 Chapter One: The Writer, the Book and the Nation in Uruguay, 1960-1973 -
Countries Codes and Currencies 2020.Xlsx
World Bank Country Code Country Name WHO Region Currency Name Currency Code Income Group (2018) AFG Afghanistan EMR Low Afghanistan Afghani AFN ALB Albania EUR Upper‐middle Albanian Lek ALL DZA Algeria AFR Upper‐middle Algerian Dinar DZD AND Andorra EUR High Euro EUR AGO Angola AFR Lower‐middle Angolan Kwanza AON ATG Antigua and Barbuda AMR High Eastern Caribbean Dollar XCD ARG Argentina AMR Upper‐middle Argentine Peso ARS ARM Armenia EUR Upper‐middle Dram AMD AUS Australia WPR High Australian Dollar AUD AUT Austria EUR High Euro EUR AZE Azerbaijan EUR Upper‐middle Manat AZN BHS Bahamas AMR High Bahamian Dollar BSD BHR Bahrain EMR High Baharaini Dinar BHD BGD Bangladesh SEAR Lower‐middle Taka BDT BRB Barbados AMR High Barbados Dollar BBD BLR Belarus EUR Upper‐middle Belarusian Ruble BYN BEL Belgium EUR High Euro EUR BLZ Belize AMR Upper‐middle Belize Dollar BZD BEN Benin AFR Low CFA Franc XOF BTN Bhutan SEAR Lower‐middle Ngultrum BTN BOL Bolivia Plurinational States of AMR Lower‐middle Boliviano BOB BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina EUR Upper‐middle Convertible Mark BAM BWA Botswana AFR Upper‐middle Botswana Pula BWP BRA Brazil AMR Upper‐middle Brazilian Real BRL BRN Brunei Darussalam WPR High Brunei Dollar BND BGR Bulgaria EUR Upper‐middle Bulgarian Lev BGL BFA Burkina Faso AFR Low CFA Franc XOF BDI Burundi AFR Low Burundi Franc BIF CPV Cabo Verde Republic of AFR Lower‐middle Cape Verde Escudo CVE KHM Cambodia WPR Lower‐middle Riel KHR CMR Cameroon AFR Lower‐middle CFA Franc XAF CAN Canada AMR High Canadian Dollar CAD CAF Central African Republic -
URUGUAY: the Quest for a Just Society
2 URUGUAY: ThE QUEST fOR A JUST SOCiETY Uruguay’s new president survived torture, trauma and imprisonment at the hands of the former military regime. Today he is leading one of Latin America’s most radical and progressive coalitions, Frente Amplio (Broad Front). In the last five years, Frente Amplio has rescued the country from decades of economic stagnation and wants to return Uruguay to what it once was: A free, prosperous and equal society, OLGA YOLDI writes. REFUGEE TRANSITIONS ISSUE 24 3 An atmosphere of optimism filled the streets of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Montevideo as Jose Mujica assumed the presidency of Caribbean, Uruguay’s economy is forecasted to expand Uruguay last March. President Mujica, a former Tupamaro this year. guerrilla, stood in front of the crowds, as he took the Vazquez enjoyed a 70 per cent approval rate at the end oath administered by his wife – also a former guerrilla of his term. Political analysts say President Mujica’s victory leader – while wearing a suit but not tie, an accessory he is the result of Vazquez’s popularity and the economic says he will shun while in office, in keeping with his anti- growth during his time in office. According to Arturo politician image. Porzecanski, an economist at the American University, The 74-year-old charismatic new president defeated “Mujica only had to promise a sense of continuity [for the National Party’s Luis Alberto Lacalle with 53.2 per the country] and to not rock the boat.” cent of the vote. His victory was the second consecutive He reassured investors by delegating economic policy mandate for the Frente Amplio catch-all coalition, which to Daniel Astori, a former economics minister under the extends from radicals and socialists to Christian democrats Vazquez administration, who has built a reputation for and independents disenchanted with Uruguay’s two pragmatism, reliability and moderation. -
Uruguay Year 2020
Uruguay Year 2020 1 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED Table of Contents Doing Business in Uruguay ____________________________________________ 4 Market Overview ______________________________________________________________ 4 Market Challenges ____________________________________________________________ 5 Market Opportunities __________________________________________________________ 5 Market Entry Strategy _________________________________________________________ 5 Leading Sectors for U.S. Exports and Investment __________________________ 7 IT – Computer Hardware and Telecommunication Equipment ________________________ 7 Renewable Energy ____________________________________________________________ 8 Agricultural Equipment _______________________________________________________ 10 Pharmaceutical and Life Science _______________________________________________ 12 Infrastructure Projects________________________________________________________ 14 Security Equipment __________________________________________________________ 15 Customs, Regulations and Standards ___________________________________ 17 Trade Barriers _______________________________________________________________ 17 Import Tariffs _______________________________________________________________ 17 Import Requirements and Documentation _______________________________________ 17 Labeling and Marking Requirements ____________________________________________ 17 U.S. Export Controls _________________________________________________________ 18 Temporary Entry ____________________________________________________________ -
Memo Provided By: Globaledge.Msu.Edu and EXPORT.GOV
Uruguay Introduction Key Economic Facts Risk Assessment (Provided by Coface) Uruguay is a country located in South America bordering the Income Level (by per capita High Income Country rating: A4 - A somewhat shaky political and Southern Atlantic Ocean. Neighboring countries include GNI): economic outlook and a relatively volatile business Argentina and Brazil. The geography of Uruguay includes Level of Development: Developing environment can affect corporate payment behavior. mostly rolling grassland and a dense GDP, PPP (current international $77.94 billion (2019) network of rivers. The government system $): Corporate default probability is still acceptable on average. is a constitutional republic; the chief of GDP growth (annual %): 0.22% (2019) Business Climate rating: A3 - The business environment state and head of government is the GDP per capita, PPP (current $22,515.19 (2019) is relatively good. Although not always available, corporate president. Uruguay has a mixed economic international $): financial information is usually reliable. Debt collection and system in which there is a variety of private freedom, External debt stocks, total $14,349,584,000.00 (2011) the institutional framework may have some shortcomings. combined with centralized economic planning and (DOD, current US$): government regulation. Uruguay is a member of the Manufacturing, value added (% 11.74% (2019) Intercompany transactions may run into occasional Common Market of the South of GDP): difficulties in the otherwise secure environments rated A3. (Mercosur). -
General Agreement on L/1475 Tariffs and Trade
RESTRICTED GENERAL AGREEMENT ON L/1475 15 May 1961 TARIFFS AND TRADE Limited Distribution CONTRACTING PARTIES Eighteenth Session 15-19 May 1961 REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON THE URUGUAYAN SCHEDULE 1. The Working Party was instructed to examine the request by the Government of Uruguay for authorization to adjust the specific rates and "aforos" in Schedule XXXI in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(a) of Article II of the General Agreement and to report thereon to the eighteenth session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 2. The Working Party first considered the information supplied by Uruguay and the International Monetary Fund concerning the extent of the change in the Uruguayan exchange rates. It was noted that: (a) Following 6 October 1949, the Uruguayan exchange rate applying to most private imports, and maintained consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, had been 1.90 pesos per United States dollar. At present the rate of exchange recognized by the Fund as applicable to all imports was the free market rate, which since October 1960 had been stable at 11.03 pesos per United States dollar; this rate was also maintained consistently with the Fund Agreement. Thus, between 10 October 1949 and the present, the rate of exchange for the Uruguayan peso applicable to most private imports had been reduced by '2.8 per cent. The change represented an increase of 480 per cent in the number of pesos per United States dollar. (b) On 10 October 1949 Uruguay also maintained, consistently with the Fund Agreement, a rate of 2.45 pesos per United States dollar for imports of luxury articles and non-essentials and a rate of 1.519 pesos per United States dollar for government transactions and imports of newsprint, inks and cardboard matrices. -
Uruguayan E-Peso on the Context of Financial Inclusion
Uruguayan e-Peso on the context of financial inclusion Gerardo Licandro Basel, November 16th 2018 (The views in this presentation are those of the author and not of the Banco Central del Uruguay) CBDC: Is this the future? Outline of the presentation • Central Banks and Digital currencies • E-Peso in context • The experience of the E Peso – Aim – Design – Results • Questions in the Balance Central banks and Digital currencies • Are CBDC really necessary? What needs do we have that the current transaction tech does not deliver? – Money already exists in electronic form – Do CBDCs improve financial inclusion? • Tax collection • Territorial reach – Are CBDCs more efficient? Costs of Cash – Are CBDCs safer? – CBDCs might improve monetary policy (interest bearing). E-peso in the Uruguayan context • Financial inclusion was declared a priority by the Uruguayan government, and the financial inclusion program was created in 2011 • Financial inclusion Law (19210) was approved in 2014 – Target • Universal access • Labour market formalization • Improving payments system efficiency • Main measures – Wage and social benefits payable in (free) bank accounts – Tax benefits for debit and credit card payments – Mandatory electronic payments in large transactions (effective 2018) • Other measures of the program – Facilitating access . Subsidy to POS investment – Competition policies. Reduction in fees for credit and debit card transactions Fees on debit and credit card reduced to 3,5 and 1,3% The number of debit cards and electronic money instruments has -
Uruguay - Country Fact Sheet
URUGUAY - COUNTRY FACT SHEET GENERAL INFORMATION Climate & Weather Summers and Winters Time Zone UTC – 3 hrs. are mild. Summer is from December to March and the most pleasant time of the year. Language Spanish. Currency UYU – Uruguayan Peso. Religion Catholic. International +598 Dialing Code Population 3,442,547 as of 2016. Internet Domain .uy Political System Presidential representative Emergency 911 democratic republic. Numbers Electricity 220 volts, 50 cycles/sec. Capital City Montevideo. What documents Passport, work permit Please confirm Monthly directly into a bank required to open (can’t be done prior to how salaries are account. a local Bank arrival as expats usually paid? (eg monthly Account? aren’t granted their work directly into a Can this be done permits until 2-3 weeks Bank Account) prior to arrival? after they arrive to start their assignments. 1 GENERAL INFORMATION Culture/Business Culture Meetings are extremely formal, but don't usually start on time. However, be sure to arrive on time. Greetings are warm and accompanied by a firm handshake. Health care/medical There is a public healthcare system, with hospitals and clinics across treatment the country. There is also a private healthcare system. Education Public schools are not recommended in Uruguay and most assignees chose private schools, however there are limitations in the availability in the private schools. Utilities Electricity, Gas, Water, Internet, Phone, Cable. These are not included in monthly rent and paid separately by the tenant. Food & Drink Uruguayan cuisine has a lot of European influence, especially from Italy and Spain. Chivito is a traditional Uruguayan sandwich. -
From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State
Dissidences Hispanic Journal of Theory and Criticism Volume 4 Issue 8 Reconciliation and its Discontents Article 8 November 2012 From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Eugenio Di Stefano University of West Georgia Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences Recommended Citation Di Stefano, Eugenio (2012) "From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State," Dissidences: Vol. 4 : Iss. 8 , Article 8. Available at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences/vol4/iss8/8 This Article / Artículo is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Bowdoin Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissidences by an authorized editor of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Keywords / Palabras clave Reconciliation, Memory, Uruguay, Latin America, Politican Violence This article / artículo is available in Dissidences: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/dissidences/vol4/iss8/8 DISSIDEnCES Hispanic Journal of Theory and Criticism From Shopping Malls to Memory Museums: Reconciling the Recent Past in the Uruguayan Neoliberal State Eugenio Di Stefano / University of West Virginia During my first visit to Montevideo, I asked a close friend what he thought about the radical transformation of Punta Carretas from a prison that housed political dissidents in the 70s to an upscale, ultra-modern shopping center in the early 90s. The response was delivered in a matter-of- fact way: "The building was crumbling and an eyesore; besides the mall provides jobs." I was shocked, if not a bit saddened, by this response.