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The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan Connection

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The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan Connection The killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan connection Standard Note: SN/IA/5947 Last updated: 3 May 2011 Author: Jon Lunn Section International Affairs and Defence Section 1) John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counter- Terrorism, briefs about the military operation, 2 May 2011 Extract: Q And if I could just ask, have you been able to determine how bin Laden was able to hide in this relatively prominent location, and do you believe the Pakistanis when they say that they had no idea that he was there? MR. BRENNAN: People have been referring to this as hiding in plain sight. Clearly this was something that was considered as a possibility. Pakistan is a large country. We are looking right now at how he was able to hold out there for so long, and whether or not there was any type of support system within Pakistan that allowed him to stay there. We know that the people at the compound there were working on his behalf, and that’s how we ultimately found our way to that compound. But we are right now less than 24 hours after this operation, so we are talking with the Pakistanis on a regular basis now, and we're going to pursue all leads to find out exactly what type of support system and benefactors that bin Laden might have had. Q But you don’t necessarily take them at their word that they didn’t know? MR. BRENNAN: We are pursuing all leads in this issue. Q Just to follow on that, is it really credible that Pakistani authorities had no idea that this compound was being built and that it existed -- such an elaborate compound? MR. BRENNAN: I think it’s inconceivable that bin Laden did not have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain there for an extended period of time. I am not going to speculate about what type of support he might have had on an official basis inside of Pakistan. We are closely talking to the Pakistanis right now, and again, we are leaving open opportunities to continue to pursue whatever leads might be out there. See video of briefing here. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. 2) Senior Administration official briefs the press, 2 May 2011 SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We shared our intelligence on this bin Laden compound with no other country, including Pakistan. That was for one reason and one reason alone: We believed it was essential to the security of the operation and our personnel. In fact, only a very small group of people inside our own government knew of this operation in advance. Shortly after the raid, U.S. officials contacted senior Pakistani leaders to brief them on the intent and the results of the raid. We have also contacted a number of our close allies and partners throughout the world. Sine 9/11, the United States has made it clear to Pakistan that we would pursue bin Laden wherever he might be. Pakistan has long understood that we are at war with al Qaeda. The United States had a legal and moral obligation to act on the information it had. And let me emphasize that great care was taken to ensure operational success, minimize the possibility of non-combatant casualties, and to adhere to American and international law in carrying out the mission. 3) Steve Coll, “Notes on the death of Osama bin Laden”, New Yorker, 2 May 2011 Extract: Abbottabad is essentially a military-cantonment city in Pakistan, in the hills to the north of the capital of Islamabad, in an area where much of the land is controlled or owned by the Pakistani Army and retired Army officers. Although the city is technically in what used to be called the Northwest Frontier Province, it lies on the far eastern side of the province and is as close to Pakistani-held Kashmir as it is to the border city of Peshawar. The city is most notable for housing the Pakistan Military Academy, the Pakistani Army’s premier training college, equivalent to West Point. Looking at maps and satellite photos on the Web last night, I saw the wide expanse of the Academy not far from where the million-dollar, heavily secured mansion where bin Laden lived was constructed in 2005. The maps I looked at had sections of land nearby marked off as “restricted areas,” indicating that they were under military control. It stretches credulity to think that a mansion of that scale could have been built and occupied by bin Laden for six years without its coming to the attention of anyone in the Pakistani Army. The initial circumstantial evidence suggests that the opposite is more likely—that bin Laden was effectively being housed under Pakistani state control. Pakistan will deny this, it seems safe to predict, and perhaps no convincing evidence will ever surface to prove the case. If I were a prosecutor at the United States Department of Justice, however, I would be tempted to call a grand jury. Who owned the land on which the house was constructed? How was the land acquired, and from whom? Who designed the house, which seems to have been purpose-built to secure bin Laden? Who was the general contractor? Who installed the security systems? Who worked there? Are there witnesses who will now testify as to who visited the house, how often, and for what purpose? These questions are not relevant only to the full realization of justice for the victims of September 11th. They are also relevant to the victims of terrorist attacks conducted or inspired by bin Laden while he lived in the house, and these include many Pakistanis, as well as Afghans, Indians, Jordanians, and Britons. They are rightly subjects of American criminal law. 2 Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/notes-on-the- death-of-osama-bin-laden.html#ixzz1LH6Ma3qE 4) US Assistance to Pakistan [Adapted from Library Research Paper 10/45, The AfPak policy and the Pashtuns (June 2010)] On 30 September 2009 Congress passed The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (S. 1707), which tripled US non-military aid to Pakistan to US$1.5 billion a year between 2010 and 2014. The legislation has a strong focus on strengthening democracy, promoting development and improving education in Pakistan. It also authorises military assistance to Pakistan, requiring that funds go mainly towards counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.1 The conditions attached to non-military aid in earlier drafts of the legislation had been considerably watered down by the time the Act was passed, following protests by powerful elements within the Pakistani political and security establishment.2 A joint explanatory statement by Senators John F. Kerry and Howard Berman stated: The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations. There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorization of $7.5 billion in non-military aid. The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the U.S. executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programs that most benefit the Pakistani people. In January 2010 the Office of the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan published an Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, which provided the most detailed overview yet available of the concrete measures being pursued, with price tags attached, by the US Government, as it sought to implement the AfPak policy.3 Below is a list of activity headings, with an approximate US Dollar figure for the resources available for each initiative during Fiscal Year 2010 (that is, October 2009-September 2010) next to each heading. Afghanistan Deploying additional civilian expertise $400m Rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture sector $300m Strengthening Afghan governance $1.8bn Enhancing Afghan rule of law $400m Supporting Afghan-led reintegration $100m Combating the Afghan narcotics trade $1bn Building an economic foundation for Afghanistan’s future $2.5bn 1 “House passes bicameral legislation increasing assistance to Pakistan, improving US-Pakistan ties”, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, press release, 30 September 2009 2 K. Fischer, “The AfPak strategy: Reactions in Pakistan”, Afghanistan Analysts Network policy briefing, March 2010, p6 3 In December 2010, following the death of Richard Holbrooke, Frank Ruggiero was appointed the new Special Representative. 3 Pakistan An enhanced Partnership with Pakistan $2.3bn Enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities $455m4 General Disrupting illicit financial flows to extremists Not specified Countering extremist voices $250m Mobilising international support Not specified A plan for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, first proposed by former President George W. Bush in 2006, under which duty-free access to the US market would be granted for certain goods, as part of the promotion of economic activity in the FATA and Afghanistan, also remains – despite prolonged Congressional delays – on the agenda.
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