Pakistan--Violence Versus Stability

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Pakistan--Violence Versus Stability Pakistan—Voilence versus Stability versus Pakistan—Voilence Pakistan—Violence versus Stability versus Pakistan—Violence a report of the csis burke chair in strategy Pakistan—Violence versus Stability a national net assessment 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 C E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org ordesman Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Varun Vira Cordesman / V ira / Vira September 2011 ISBN 978-0-89206-652-0 CSIS Ë|xHSKITCy066520zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS a report of the csis burke chair in strategy Pakistan—Violence versus Stability a national net assessment Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Varun Vira September 2011 About CSIS At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel- ops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Cover photo: Pakistanis watch from the distance as US and Pakistani troops unload supplies from a CH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, Sept. 13, 2010. The U.S. military delivered more than 5 million pounds of supplies to victims of the 2010 Pakistani floods, which affected nearly 20 million Pakistanis and forced many from their homes. US Army photo by Pfc. Joshua Kruger, http://www.defense.gov/PhotoEssays/PhotoEssaySS.aspx?ID=1866. © 2011 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN 978-0-89206-652-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Pakistan—violence versus stability : a national net assessment : a report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy / authors, Anthony H. Cordesman, Varun Vira. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-89206-652-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Pakistan—Politics and government—1988– 2. Political stability—Pakistan. 3. Internal security—Pakistan. 4. Pakistan—Foreign relations. 5. Pakistan—Military policy. I. Vira, Varun. II. Title. DS389.C68 2011 954.9105’3—dc23 2011029391 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org ii contents List of Figures vii Acknowledgments ix Executive Summary x The Challenges of Internal Violence xi The Challenges of External Relations xii Instability as a Self-Inflicted Wound xiii The Broader Cost of Pakistani Instability xiv 1. Setting the Stage 1 Pakistan’s Political Landscape 1 Civilian Governance with Military “Preeminence” 1 The Uncertain Role of the ISI 4 Military Rule Lite 6 Stability Problems within the Army 8 Nuclear Safety 11 Semi-dysfunctional Civilian Government 13 A Continuing History of Failed Civil Politics and Governance? 14 A Background of Modern Feudalism 17 Appeasement in the Face of Extremism 18 Faltering Progress toward Reform 19 Weak Police and Rule of Law 19 Rise of Religious Extremists 23 The Grim Legacies of Zia and Musharraf 24 The Wrong Kind of Movement toward Political Unity 26 But Extremists Remain a Threat to Extremists 27 Religious Extremism and Anti-American Populism 29 Demographics, Economics, and Education 29 The Struggling Economy 32 Educating a Nation for Failure 34 Madrassa Education versus Secular Failure 36 Symptoms of a Failed State: Forcing Private as the Substitute for Public Education 38 | iii 2. The Current Crisis: Patterns of Militancy and Violence 41 The State of Militancy 41 3. The Pashtun Belt and Beyond 51 A Shattered Political and Economic Landscape 52 Administrative Systems 52 The Weakening of Traditional Structures 53 Chronic Underdevelopment 54 The Militant Landscape 59 The Pakistani Taliban and Local Affiliates 60 The Afghan Taliban 65 The Haqqani Network 67 Transnational Groups and Al-Qaeda 70 The Growing International Role of Lashkar-e-Taiba 73 Criminal Groups 73 Pakistani Military Operations and Counterinsurgency 74 Tactical Success; Questionable Strategic Impact 75 Inadequate Initial Performance 76 Growing Tactical Capabilities 82 The Strategic Future 86 4. The Situation in Balochistan 91 The Threats 91 Efforts at Reform 92 The Resource Curse 95 Uncertain and Unstable Politics 96 The Separatist Rebellion 97 Reconciliation Attempts Fail to Address Core Grievances 104 Strong Military; Weak Police and Governance 106 The Taliban Sanctuary and Its Impact on NATO 107 Drugs and Interactions with Criminal Networks and Powerbrokers 110 5. The South Punjab and the Rise of the Punjabi Taliban 114 Failing the People While Playing Self-destructive Games 115 The Punjabi Taliban 119 Lack of Law Enforcement Capability and Political Will 121 iv | pakistan—violence versus stability: a national net assessment 6. Karachi: Threatening the Economic Engine 124 The Internal Sources of Violence 125 A Taliban Financing and Operational Hub 127 Rising Levels of Taliban Violence 128 The Madrassa Factor 130 Vulnerable Shi’ites 132 7. External Relations: The United States 134 Uncertain US Goals and Progress 139 A Turbulent History of Relations 140 “Victimhood” 143 Overcoming Public Hostility 144 The India Factor 145 Competition over the Afghan Future 146 US Military Involvement in Pakistan 149 Drone Strikes 149 Intelligence Cooperation and Conflict 153 Covert US Operations inside Pakistan 155 The Backlash from Ground Force Raids 157 Military Sales and Assistance 160 Coalition Support Funds 162 Foreign Military Financing 162 Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) Funds and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF/PCCF) 163 Economic Aid and Civilian Assistance 164 US Leverage 168 8. The Cost to Pakistan of Its Conflict with India 170 The Conventional and Nuclear Military Balance 170 The “Endless” Kashmir Issue 174 The Kashmiri Jihad 174 The Militant Landscape—The Pro-Independence and Pro-Pakistan Split 178 State-sponsored Terrorism? The Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Threat to Both India and Pakistan 182 Pakistani-Indian Competition in Afghanistan 185 anthony h. cordesman and varun vira | v 9. Sino-Pakistani Relations 189 Hedging India 190 Mercantilism: Ports, Oil and Resources 193 The Strategic Future 195 10. Pakistani-Iranian Relations 197 An Uncertain History of Relations 197 Baloch Separatism 199 Pipelines and Ports 199 11. Conclusions 201 About the Authors 202 vi | pakistan—violence versus stability: a national net assessment List of Figures Figure 1.1: Trends in Pakistani Population (1950–2050) 30 Figure 1.2 : Pakistan’s Youth Bulge in 2010 31 Figure 1.3 : Key Educational Statistics 35 Figure 1.4: Education Funding (2005–2010) 35 Figure 1.5: Educational Institutions by Province 36 Figure 1.6: Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan 38 Figure 1.7: Provincial Public-Private Breakdowns in Educational Sector 40 Figure 2.1: Attacks in 2010 by Type 42 Figure 2.2: Militant Attack Levels by Province (2008–2010) 43 Figure 2.3: Density of Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan (2007–2010) 44 Figure 2.4: Militant Lethality by Province in 2010 44 Figure 2.5: Militant Attacks by Weapon 45 Figure 2.6: Militant Attacks by Target (Human) 46 Figure 2.7: Militant Attacks by Target (Facility) 47 Figure 2.8: NATO-related Attacks 48 Figure 2.9: Militant Groups in Pakistan 49 Figure 3.1: Literacy Rates 57 Figure 3.2: Educational Enrollment 57 Figure 3.3: Population Per Hospital Bed 58 Figure 3.4: Annual Development Program (ADP) Funding Allocation for FATA 58 Figure 3.5: Tribes and Insurgent Groups in FATA 61 Figure 3.6: Growth in Force Numbers in FATA (2002–2010) 78 Figure 3.7: Major PAKMIL Offensives (2008–2011) 79 Figure 3.8: Force Deployments in FATA 80 Figure 3.9: Pakistani Security Force Casualties in 2010 81 Figure 3.10: Security Forces to Militant Casualty Ratio in 2010 81 Figure 3.11: Percentage of Population Displaced per Agency 85 Figure 3.12: Perceptions of Powerbrokers in FATA 89 Figure 3.13: Public Opinion on FATA Security Providers 89 Figure 3.14: FATA Public Support for Military Operations 90 Figure 3.15: Pakistan Security Force-to-Militant Casualty Ratio (2007–2010) 90 anthony h. cordesman and varun vira | vii Figure 4.1: Human Development Statistics for Balochistan 93 Figure 4.2: Violence in Balochistan 102 Figure 4.3: Force Composition in Balochistan 103 Figure 4.4: NATO-related Attacks in Balochistan 110 Figure 4.5: Major Pakistani Drug Trafficking Routes 113 Figure 5.1: Human Welfare in South Punjab Compared to State Average 116 Figure 5.2: State Development Funding in South Punjab 116 Figure 5.3: Government Investment in South Punjab Relative to Province 117
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