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Post-Independence Period Chapter 10 Post-Independence Period The Indian interest in the Psychological Warfare after the Independence has been more spasmodic than episodic. It has been used in shooting wars; counter-insurgency and proxy wars and peacekeeping operations without its practitioners having much benefit of institutionalised doctrinal, organisational, policy and plan back up. But whenever and wherever, the Psychological Warfare has been resorted to, it has given encouraging results. The military activities of this time of ours can be classitied into three categories, viz., Wars, the Proxy War and Counter-Insurgency Operations for the sake of better appreciation. There was not much of any Psywar of any kind in the fust three wars India fought after the partition-independence, including 1948 Kashmir War, Sino- Indian Border War of 1962, and Indo-Pak War of 1965. The war and security related attitudes and psychological iinpact did develop before, during and aft;er the hostilities and maybe the media coverage of those wars played a role in forming the attitudes. But that cannot be called the Psywar. It just happened. It is difficult to get any official confirmation, but it was learnt during a visit to Tawang-Sela-Bomdila sector in April 1999 that in 1962 the Chinese had dropped leaflets having portraits of an Indian soldier, a Chinese soldier and a local tribal juxtapositioned to reinforce their theme question to the people of then NEFA, 'who looks more like you? An Indian or Chinese.' No specimen of the pan-Mongolian appeal could be found either but it appeared to be plausible in some context. This was of course an instance of the Psychological Warfere. But a poor attempt for its creator had not done much homework. The fact is that the local people who speak excellent Hindi besides their tribal dialect, are traditionally lukewarm to the Chinese and even'Tibetans for whatever reason. The Radio Pakistan was never tired of its anti-India propaganda making all sorts of appeals and allegations and the All India Radio's retaliation in some 206 form or the other also do not fit much in the art and science of the Psywar, at the most such exchanges can fall in the category of is what is called tond sukh in Marathi, meaning the pleasure of calling names. Such activity is aimless and gives no strategic or tactical result. India tried its hand in the Psywar in the Bangladesh War, for the first time in many centuries, though by a 'trial and error' method. BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR The Bangiadesh Liberation War of 1971 (Operation C&ctus and Lily) can be described as the first war in which India practised the Psychological Warfare in both, strategic and tactical areas. This short war of 14 days culininated in unprecedented surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops, roughly an army strength, who were well armed, equipped and supplied but got unnerved when the All India Radio repeatedly broadcast the surrender appeal of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. (later, Field Marshal) S.M.F.3. Maneckshaw, telling them that with their air force had been grounded, ports surrounded and the navy neutralised, they had no way but to surrender and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.' The surrender appeal had a warning that the Mukti Bahini, the resistance militia of the Bangladesh, and the people were waiting to take revenge against the Pakistani troops for the atrocities they had committed.^ The Psychological Warfare had continued in the POW camps after the sunender. With a view to better explaining the Indian political system and the ethos of apolitical armed forces, a camp bulletin was launched to educate the Pakistani ofiQcers and troops in the camps.^ Earlier, the Indian Air Force had dropped leaflets making the surrender appeal in the name of the Army Chief'' But these efforts were rather late in the day, almost when the Indian troops had reached the outskirts of Dacca. Therefore, the Indian Psychological Warfare cannot take ftill credit for it because it played no role in creating the strategic-tactical scenario that had compelled the Pakistanis to surrender. It was the result of a brilliant operational plan and its gaOant execution.' One wonders if aggressive tactical Psyops borne out of the plan carried out by a dedicated organisation could have brought about the same 207 situation earlier with lesser bloodshed and efforts, especially when an over-riding compulsion and objective was, according to Sam Manekshaw, to attain victory in the shortest possible time in view of likely international intervention.^ Particularly when the Pakistanis had exhibited tell tale signs of their very low morale and tendency to surrender or abandon theii- posts. The Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission appointed by Pakistan to inquire into the causes of the entire Eastern Command's surrender, notes in its report that on the fourth day of war, major fortresses of Jessore and Jlienidaon in the west and Brahinanbaria in the east were abandoned without a fight and 9 December, a divisional commander abandoned his area of responvsibility with his headquarters, leaving his formation behind. On the same day more two more fortresses of Kushtia and Laksham were deserted, leaving behind even the sick and wounded.^ In his deposition before the Commis.sion after repatriation from the Indian POW camp, the surrendering Pakistani commander, Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi estimated that he had 26,400 troops and could have held out for at least another two weeks. His enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces in the Dacca area and another week to reduce the fortress of Dacca. This means that he had at least one week's time even if he was scared of any battle wanted to surrender without any fight. The Commission obsen'es, '"If Gen. Niazi had fought and lost his life in the process, he would have inade a history and would have been remembered by the coming generations as a great hero and a martyr, but the events show that he had already lost the will to fight after the 7* December 1971, when his major fortresses at .lessore and Brahmanbaria had fallen. The question of creating history, therefore, was never in his mind."'^ India almost had a free run in the Psywar. The activity was much misunderstood in Pakistan. It was perceived in Rawalpindi that military propaganda meant that one had to report imaginary or fabricated victories to raise the morale of the own troops and the people. As early as 7 April 1971, the Radio Pakistan that almost a division equivalent of the Indian forces were destroyed, killed or captured in the Jessore sector.''* This proved to be highly counter­ productive for Pakistan because at that India was not sure if the break-up of 208 Pakistan was desirable. The Pakistani claim was seen as a deliberate step to escalate the situation (of its internal problem) to a direct conflict between the twc countries."' Secondly, the sentiment in India was very strongly against Pakistan. The Bangladesh crisis had come too closely after the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and had resulted in pouring in of millions of refugees. The public opinion in Bangladesh had hardened like a rock and India was only required to assure them its support to their cause, by official broadcasts and pushing in leaflets across the border." A clandestine radio broadcast regularly from a transnBtter kept afloat in the Hugli river, changing its position periodically by going up and down to confuse the Pakistani radio direction finder and give a false impression that Swadheen Bangla BetaarKendra was operating fi-om within their 'East Pakistan.''^ Pakistan did not have any Psywar option, particularly after the blunder of brutal use of military force it committed in March-April 1971 to put down the Bengali separatism. The strategic goal of the Indian Psywar was to project these atrocities to deny it any sympathy and support in the world capitals. India forceftilly impressed upon the western press in New Delhi that Pakistan was the guilty party and responsible for the influx of over 10 million refiigees. These journalists were extended all facilities for visiting the refiigee camps on the eastern border and seeing for themselves their condition. Besides they were supplied with photos and newsreels. This resulted in the US media and people having no support to the pro-Pakistan policy of Wasliington.'' This did work. The report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission says that the Indian propaganda was so successftjl that all efforts made by the military regime in Pakistan to deftise the situation in East Pakistan left the world unimpressed. The scenario turned complex as India and the USSR signed the mutual assistance treaty in August 1971. All Pakistan-friendly governments told Gen.Yahya Khan that they would not be in a position to render any physical assistance to Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India.'" Like the Tactical Psywar, the Strategic one was also conducted in an ad hoc manner without the benefit of either a plan or a dedicated organisation. The Psychological Warfare was the domain of the Policy Planning Committee headed 209 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi comprising some of her cabinet colleagues, senior bureaucrats, diplomats and heads of the intelligence officers.'* The impression one gets from other sources is that this was an informal body, something like prime minister's war staff, assisting her the way the headquarter staff would assist the commander. It was not a statutory body and stopped flmctioning soon after the war. They were taking spot decisions in view of the prevailing situation of the day and deciding or approving themes which would be got translated into action, using available PR personnel in the external affairs or defence ministry and the PMO."' But there is another version of the organisation of the higher command.
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