Chapter 10

Post-Independence Period

The Indian interest in the Psychological Warfare after the Independence has been more spasmodic than episodic. It has been used in shooting wars; counter-insurgency and proxy wars and peacekeeping operations without its practitioners having much benefit of institutionalised doctrinal, organisational, policy and plan back up. But whenever and wherever, the Psychological Warfare has been resorted to, it has given encouraging results. The military activities of this time of ours can be classitied into three categories, viz., Wars, the Proxy War and Counter-Insurgency Operations for the sake of better appreciation. There was not much of any Psywar of any kind in the fust three wars India fought after the partition-independence, including 1948 Kashmir War, Sino- Indian Border War of 1962, and Indo-Pak War of 1965. The war and security related attitudes and psychological iinpact did develop before, during and aft;er the hostilities and maybe the media coverage of those wars played a role in forming the attitudes. But that cannot be called the Psywar. It just happened. It is difficult to get any official confirmation, but it was learnt during a visit to Tawang-Sela-Bomdila sector in April 1999 that in 1962 the Chinese had dropped leaflets having portraits of an Indian soldier, a Chinese soldier and a local tribal juxtapositioned to reinforce their theme question to the people of then NEFA, 'who looks more like you? An Indian or Chinese.' No specimen of the pan-Mongolian appeal could be found either but it appeared to be plausible in some context. This was of course an instance of the Psychological Warfere. But a poor attempt for its creator had not done much homework. The fact is that the local people who speak excellent Hindi besides their tribal dialect, are traditionally lukewarm to the Chinese and even'Tibetans for whatever reason. The Radio was never tired of its anti-India propaganda making all sorts of appeals and allegations and the All India Radio's retaliation in some

206 form or the other also do not fit much in the art and science of the Psywar, at the most such exchanges can fall in the category of is what is called tond sukh in Marathi, meaning the pleasure of calling names. Such activity is aimless and gives no strategic or tactical result. India tried its hand in the Psywar in the Bangladesh War, for the first time in many centuries, though by a 'trial and error' method.

BANGLADESH LIBERATION WAR

The Bangiadesh Liberation War of 1971 (Operation C&ctus and Lily) can be described as the first war in which India practised the Psychological Warfare in both, strategic and tactical areas. This short war of 14 days culininated in unprecedented surrender of over 90,000 Pakistani troops, roughly an army strength, who were well armed, equipped and supplied but got unnerved when the All India Radio repeatedly broadcast the surrender appeal of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. (later, Field Marshal) S.M.F.3. Maneckshaw, telling them that with their air force had been grounded, ports surrounded and the navy neutralised, they had no way but to surrender and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.' The surrender appeal had a warning that the , the resistance militia of the Bangladesh, and the people were waiting to take revenge against the Pakistani troops for the atrocities they had committed.^ The Psychological Warfare had continued in the POW camps after the sunender. With a view to better explaining the Indian political system and the ethos of apolitical armed forces, a camp bulletin was launched to educate the Pakistani ofiQcers and troops in the camps.^ Earlier, the Indian Air Force had dropped leaflets making the surrender appeal in the name of the Army Chief'' But these efforts were rather late in the day, almost when the Indian troops had reached the outskirts of Dacca. Therefore, the Indian Psychological Warfare cannot take ftill credit for it because it played no role in creating the strategic-tactical scenario that had compelled the Pakistanis to surrender. It was the result of a brilliant operational plan and its gaOant execution.' One wonders if aggressive tactical Psyops borne out of the plan carried out by a dedicated organisation could have brought about the same

207 situation earlier with lesser bloodshed and efforts, especially when an over-riding compulsion and objective was, according to , to attain victory in the shortest possible time in view of likely international intervention.^ Particularly when the Pakistanis had exhibited tell tale signs of their very low morale and tendency to surrender or abandon theii- posts. The Justice Commission appointed by Pakistan to inquire into the causes of the entire Eastern Command's surrender, notes in its report that on the fourth day of war, major fortresses of Jessore and Jlienidaon in the west and Brahinanbaria in the east were abandoned without a fight and 9 December, a divisional commander abandoned his area of responvsibility with his headquarters, leaving his formation behind. On the same day more two more fortresses of Kushtia and Laksham were deserted, leaving behind even the sick and wounded.^ In his deposition before the Commis.sion after repatriation from the Indian POW camp, the surrendering Pakistani commander, Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi estimated that he had 26,400 troops and could have held out for at least another two weeks. His enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces in the Dacca area and another week to reduce the fortress of Dacca. This means that he had at least one week's time even if he was scared of any battle wanted to surrender without any fight. The Commission obsen'es, '"If Gen. Niazi had fought and lost his life in the process, he would have inade a history and would have been remembered by the coming generations as a great hero and a martyr, but the events show that he had already lost the will to fight after the 7* December 1971, when his major fortresses at .lessore and Brahmanbaria had fallen. The question of creating history, therefore, was never in his mind."'^ India almost had a free run in the Psywar. The activity was much misunderstood in Pakistan. It was perceived in that military propaganda meant that one had to report imaginary or fabricated victories to raise the morale of the own troops and the people. As early as 7 April 1971, the Radio Pakistan that almost a division equivalent of the Indian forces were destroyed, killed or captured in the Jessore sector.''* This proved to be highly counter­ productive for Pakistan because at that India was not sure if the break-up of

208 Pakistan was desirable. The Pakistani claim was seen as a deliberate step to escalate the situation (of its internal problem) to a direct conflict between the twc countries."' Secondly, the sentiment in India was very strongly against Pakistan. The Bangladesh crisis had come too closely after the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and had resulted in pouring in of millions of refugees. The public opinion in Bangladesh had hardened like a rock and India was only required to assure them its support to their cause, by official broadcasts and pushing in leaflets across the border." A clandestine radio broadcast regularly from a transnBtter kept afloat in the Hugli river, changing its position periodically by going up and down to confuse the Pakistani radio direction finder and give a false impression that Swadheen Bangla BetaarKendra was operating fi-om within their '.''^ Pakistan did not have any Psywar option, particularly after the blunder of brutal use of military force it committed in March-April 1971 to put down the Bengali separatism. The strategic goal of the Indian Psywar was to project these atrocities to deny it any sympathy and support in the world capitals. India forceftilly impressed upon the western press in New Delhi that Pakistan was the guilty party and responsible for the influx of over 10 million refiigees. These journalists were extended all facilities for visiting the refiigee camps on the eastern border and seeing for themselves their condition. Besides they were supplied with photos and newsreels. This resulted in the US media and people having no support to the pro-Pakistan policy of Wasliington.'' This did work. The report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission says that the Indian propaganda was so successftjl that all efforts made by the military regime in Pakistan to deftise the situation in East Pakistan left the world unimpressed. The scenario turned complex as India and the USSR signed the mutual assistance treaty in August 1971. All Pakistan-friendly governments told Gen. that they would not be in a position to render any physical assistance to Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India.'" Like the Tactical Psywar, the Strategic one was also conducted in an ad hoc manner without the benefit of either a plan or a dedicated organisation. The Psychological Warfare was the domain of the Policy Planning Committee headed

209 by Prime Minister comprising some of her cabinet colleagues, senior bureaucrats, diplomats and heads of the intelligence officers.'* The impression one gets from other sources is that this was an informal body, something like prime minister's war staff, assisting her the way the headquarter staff would assist the commander. It was not a statutory body and stopped flmctioning soon after the war. They were taking spot decisions in view of the prevailing situation of the day and deciding or approving themes which would be got translated into action, using available PR personnel in the external affairs or defence ministry and the PMO."' But there is another version of the organisation of the higher command. Three other committees also flinctioned. Gen. Maneckshaw who was also the Chauman of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee had insisted for political involvement in evolving a broad strategy—though he was himself in direct touch with the Prime Minister and through her with the PoUtical Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. So the late D.P. Dhar, chairman of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs was inducted in the War Council headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff. Dhar was the political representative of the Government. The second was the Joint Intelligence Committee headed by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff and that included representatives of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau and the Directors of Intelhgence of the three services. The third body was a secretariat committee set up to take executive decisions and comprised secretaries of defence, home, finance and external affairs. The Director of the RAW, R. N. Kao was the member-secretary.'^ The understanding between Kao and Dhar and the coordination between Maneckshaw and Dhar paid rich dividends.'" Thus, like other military operations, the Psychological Operations also depended a lot on mutual understanding among the key functionaries of the higher echelon rather than any institutionalised and policy-backed support. The RAW had branches like Electronic Technical Section, Aviation Research Centre, Special Ser\'ices Bureau etc, like other intelligence agencies but not a psychological warfare unit unlike them.

210 INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE

Under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted in Sri Lanka to facilitate laying down of arms by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) and other militants to a third party and maintain general law and order. But soon this lightly armed force ended up fighting a fiill-fledged counter-insurgency war in which its adversary, the LTTE had a head start. Being a guerrilla warfare organisation, the Psywar was one of the regular actixnties of the LTTE and was already dominating the media spectrum. The LTTE Psywar planners so to it that that the TamOs did not develop any soft comer for the IPKF because of its various humanitarian service projects. A small Psyops Cell (POC) was formed at the Headquarters of the 54 Infantry Division, under its Deputy GOC (General Officer Commanding), comprising the Commanding Officer of the Signal Regiment, Officer-in-Charge of the Civil Affairs Cell, Intelligence Officer and Public Relations officer." The POC targets were the LTTE cadres, Tamil population in Jaffna peninsula, detenus in rehabilitation centres, people of Tamil Nadu and own troops. The objectives included projection of friendly image of the Indian troops and the IPKF, justification of the presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, imperatives of the Tainil participation in the democratic process, utility of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord in meeting the Tamil aspirations, counter-Psywar, boosting morale of the Indian troops and futility of the LTTE operations against the IPKF. The LTTE themes were: atrocities of the IPKF, calling Rajiv Gandhi 'butcher of Lankan Tamils,' impossibility of co-existence of the Tamils and Singhala, IPKF would go home leaving the Tamils to the mercy of the Sri Lankan army, inexperienced Indian prime minister was duped into sending in the IPKF to fight the Tamils while the Lankan troops played volley ball. Both the sides used usual methods and means like leaflets, books, posters, newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts. But the IPKF tried even ineetings of the citizens committee and organised distribution of leaflets, booklets, posters and pro-lPKF local and Indian newspapers. The IPKF Psyops paid off well. They denied free run to the LTTE and succeeded in facilitating holding of provincial council elections despite the LTTE

211 boycott, got fulfilled the Tainil aspirations of recognition of Tamil as a national language of Sri Lanka and merger of North and Eastern provinces."'' But this elaborate arrangement was perhaps confined to 54 Inf Div headquartered at Jaffna. It seems all four divisions of the IPKF had made their own separate arrangements or no such arrangement. For instance, at least, 36 Inf Div of Trincomalee had no POC,^' The IPKF Hq in Chennai did not even have any POC. The MOD spokesman based in Cheney was looking after even the public relations work of the IPKF.^^ From the practices of other annies, the minimum one would expect is the IPKF Hq to have a Psywar branch planning and producing the material for the needs of the entire Op Pawan according to its overall plan and as per the guidelines received fi-om a sort of high-powered body having representatives of the armed forces, central intelligence, external affairs, home ministry and perhaps the Tamil Nadu government. The divisions would have given the critical field feedback and the intelligence input besides disseminating the propaganda and even producing some materials to meet specific requirement of their own respective area—all working in a tandem. The cotmter guerrilla warfare nature of the Op Pawan only underscored this requirement. Often the media handling did not get the necessary command support.

KARGIL WAR

What distinguishes the Kargil War fiom the previous conflicts fiom the Psywar point of view is that for the first time Pakistan had annexed a rudimentary Psywar plan to its tactical one. It is a different matter that the main plan itself was so immature that the mission could not benefit from its operation. India, greatly surprised by the large-scale intrusion at an unexpected time and place, had httle in place to counter or compete in this area and hastily created some capacity, like it raised the 14 Corps. If the intruder positions were well stocked with food and ammunition, the Skardu Radio Station was already armed with upgraded and expanded transmission capacity. The Indian side would have remained oblivious to round the clock broadcast of the Skardu Radio, had the Pakistani guns not targeted the

212 Kargi] Radio and TV transmitters.'^'' This alerted India and it sent a mobile radio station to Kargil to take on the Skardu.''' Pakistan could have saved itself the trouble of damaging the poor radio station at Kargil, so weak that even in its designed range of about 10 km, its medium wave broadcast were not reaching everywhere in hill-locked villages and if reached, the reception would be of very inferior quality. Secondly, the Kargil Radio, called LRS or Local Radio Station in the AIR parlance, was not strong in talent and provided the listeners very low quality programmes because good broadcasters could not be recruited for years because of ban on recruitment imposed to curtail expenditure. The Skardu Radio's programmes were aimed at rousing Muslim sentiments, according to J&K Minister of State for Works Qamar Ali Akhoon who represents Kargil constituency in the state assembly.^"^ So it is difficult to say that the mobile station really made any difference. The TV transmission had, however, continued despite damage to its building. When the Kargil crisis erupted, India was already fighting the Pak- fostered Proxy War, the main feature of which is guerrilla warfai-e having the Psychological Warfare built in its tactics. So anybody would have expected India to have an edge in this area. On the contrary, the radio and television were among the weaker points of the Indian counter-proxy wai\ The citizens in LOC district like Kupwara that has remained in tliick of the proxy war, had to switch on Pakistan Television (PTV) just before the Kargjl War because of Hobson's choice. The Doordarshan was just off the air because of a minor snag in its Very Low Power Transmitter (VLPT).^^ Like the shelling of the Kargil TV and Radio Stations, equally uncalled for was India's ban on cable operators showing PTV. first, it made no difference in the most important Kargil sector where no cable network existed in the rural sector and the households in the urban areas have their private dish antennae. The ban proved to be a shot in the arm of the PTV.^'' The ban on PTV's cable distribution and blocking of the Dawn website by the VSNL seemed 'a knee-jerk' reaction and not particularly weU considered to the Kargil Review Committee. "Pakistan was able to portray these as acts of Indian censorship for fear of the 'truth' whereas PTV's falsification of news from

213 Kargil would have been the best antidote to its crude propaganda," it observes."*' The interesting aside was that the most vociferous protest against the action came from the Indian media and media bodies who feared that the steps were an attack on the freedom, in spite of the reputation of the PTV and quasi-permanent ban on the Indian media and fibns in Pakistan. The deployment of mobile radio station reminded one of having a black station floating in the Hugh during the Bangladesh Liberation War (the 'boat radio' had appeared in the Korean War also) and the American deployment of the flying radio and TV station. Commando Solo. Whether it floats or flies, the concept is more or less same. But India cannot pat its back for the mobile radio was not a Psyop platform. Unlike the Americans who had programs on pre­ selected themes based on years area studies and also linguists or even local announcers on hand, the Indian stations in Kashmir and particularly the one is Kargil did not have a Baltic and other local languages broadcasters to reach people across the LOC.^"* Witliin a month and when the war was still on. Union Information and Broadcasting Minister Pramod Mahajan said while inaugurating upgradation of Srinagar Doordarshan Metro that provided the range of 45 kms, that a Bofbrs shell could go only 27 km into the enemy territory but the DD Kendra could penetrate 45 km. But he was not perhaps aware that the broadcasters in Kashmir did not know the dialects like Balti. But the silver line was that the government staned raising rapidly more stations along the border from Kargil to Kutch with the investment of Rs. 400 crore. The discovery of intrusion, courtesy Kargil shepherds, did surprise the Indian Army and the Government and the biggest Psywar mistake they committed in their panic reaction was that of letting other side know not only that they were surprised but also how much. A comparative study of the Kargil and the World Trace Centre bombing, reveals that the Americans were no less surprised than the rest of the world but they did not show it and secondly, for the first few days, even before the planning of Op Enduring Freedom was initiated, the fu-st weapon they used was that of the Psywar on the home front. This was evident from the way the American and Western media covered the 'shock period' of the post-

214 WTC and a kaleidoscopic way their TV bulletins' 'super' changed.^'' The super or the identification tag of the news story changed trom simple and generic 'WTC bombed' to loaded 'America Under Attack' to a determined 'War on America' to assertive 'America at War.' This did not happen without considerations and consultations at the highest level. This could happen because of dedicated organisations flinction there according to well-thought out doctrines and guidelines. The fiinctioning of the high command and their headquarters in India was never well defined and institutionalised. Still it delivered in the Bangladesh War because of personality attributes of the ftmctionaries and not the system. Besides, they had enough time to put in place an ad hoc body like Policy Planning Committee or give an ad hoc assignment if it were an existing one. Being multi-discipline by its very nature, the Psyop involves different ministries and departments and institutionalised coordination among them. And therefore, the late arriving Indian Air Force thought of dropping smart bombs but not humble leaflets and no authority was around to direct the broadcasters to impress upon the occupants of peaks that if not the Indian infantry, the frost bite would surely get at them unless they climbed down to the safety of Skardu. India's .state of surprise and shock was the source of great jubilation in Pakistan which got expressed in the government controlled radio and TV leading the rest of the media in praising sky-high the feat of the 'mu/ahideens.' This thoughtless war propaganda revealed that Pakistan had factored the Psywar somewhat only in its tactical plan and not so carefully in the strategic one. The fulcram of the plan was to impress upon the rest of the world that no intrusion has taken place for those who have crossed the LOC are the Kashmiri mujahideens who have been fighting the Indian 'occupation' for many years now and secondly, the LOC has never been a static line. Because the propaganda that generated such victorious fervour denied credibility to the Pakistani propaganda in neutral capitals that it was not involved and gave India an advantage in impressing upon those audiences that the occupants were the Pakistani regulars. The second self- inflicted Psywar wound of Pakistan was that the praising propaganda heightened

215 the popular expectations at home and lead to a belief that Kashmir was as good as won and it was only a matter of time.

"On their part, Pakistan television and radio should not have gone along with much of the print media in over-playing the Mujahideen's heroic feat as an enduring achievement in positional warfare. The position the government is taking now, after a useless trip to Washington, could have been taken much earlier. Foolishly it allowed the temper and expectations of the people to rise on an untenable basis and now it will have to reap what it did not prevent from being sown earlier," said a Pakistani analyst when Nawaz Sharif was struggling to get his country extricated from the misadventure.""

Pakistan's strategy was to stun India on one hand and push the Kashmir issue at the centre stage as India recovers from the shock. Meanwhile, to gain the position of strength and to be even with the bigger adversary, cut oflFSiachen.

This had to be achieved by totally denying their OV^TI involvement in what then Indian Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. V.P. Malik called, facade. But what was ignored was the powerful media dimension of the principle of surprise. The sui-prise and particularly the strategic one is also directly related to media attention: greater the surprise, higher and hyper is the media attention. The advantage of surprise was disproportionately outweighed by the credibility of the surprise, rendered poor by the media attention it generated in India and rest of the world. Pakistan could not use the international media and could hardly allow the media persons on its side to .see what as happening, out of fears of getting exposed. These fears were not misplaced. But the end result was that it afforded India an open opportunity and made its advantage of surprise rather counterproductive.

The Indian defence establishment's weakness in coping up with the media demands, let alone utilising it flilly to its advantage, was a poor consolation for Pakistan. The Indian media also failed to frilly appreciate the Kargil for weeks after the first discovery of the intruders and perceive it as nothing but infiltration until the lAF was committed on 26 May this was also the political and military perception.^•^ India used the media, particularly the television, to convince the

216 world that the inti-uders were none other than the Pakistani Army and Indian Army was fighting them." Despite glaring lapses on the part of the military, civil sendees and also media, the coverage proved to be of immense help to the overall Indian position. While the organisational and percept ional .shortcomings were serious, one cannot also ignore the fact that it was the first televised war for the country. For the first time, perhaps, the AHQ set up an Information and Psychological Warfare Cell under a Major General having direct access to the P Anny Chief This enabled the AHQ monitor and disseminate information in a better and cahbrated manner than would have been the case otherwise.^"^

Secondly, India could tell its citizens how gallantly, the jawans and airmen were fighting to through out the Pakistani intruders. For the first time was allowed the going home of the dead soldiers, in the Tricolour draped coffins, received at solemn military ceremonies, with local formations according military honours at the fiinerals and state ministers being among mourners.^^ The patriotic fervour was palpable and was evident in the inflow of over Rs. 250 crore in the army welfare fund in few weeks. This was all despite the political turmoil rendering the incumbent government to the status of being only a caretaker one and fiinctioning under ensuing elections.

PROXY WAR AND COUNTER-IJNSURGENCY

Proxy War fi^ont in Kashmir has been witnessing a high intensity Psychological Warfare, involving deployment of all kinds of the weapons and tactics by India and Pakistan. Like the covert war, the Psychological Warfare is also being waged by the ISI, At least two black radio stations, Sada-e-Hurriyat and Hamara Kashmir are operating fi^om across the border. The white broadcasts of Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television (PTV) try to reinforce the impact of the black broadcasts. Their second means is the Kashmiri press. Its support is obtained with coercive methods to a considerable extent. Problems of logistics and operations do not permit Pakistan to use leaflets and posters on a large scale.

The objectives of the Pakistani Psychological Warfare as a part of its proxy war against India are:

217 • Promoting separatism • Propagating pan-Islamism • Maligning Indian security forces as the occupation army • Demoralising the security forces by getting them bogged down in wild allegations of atrocities and human rights violations • Telling the neutral countries that the Kashmir problem is entirely an Indian creation because India is not solving it

In the post-1989 phase of the Proxy War, the Pakistanis succeeded in launching and sustaining a human rights violation campaign against India and the Indian Army/^' cashing on the West's sensitivities to such issues—^making full use of the NGOs, neutral, Pakistani and even Indian media. Even the Village Defence Committees of the terrorism threatened villages in the Valley came iinder such attacks. Deeply upset by what it saw as baseless or grossly exaggerated charges levelled against it in the press, the Army Headquarters moved the Press Council of India with a request to investigate these allegations."" The investigation by the Council's committee headed by noted journalists, Mr. B.G. Verghese and Mi. K. Vikram Rao found how frivolous the allegations were and even ventured to say, "the Indian Army has broken a new ground in taking the bold decision to throw open its human rights record to public scrutiny through the Press Council of India. Few armies in the world would invite such an inquiry. The Indian Army has cooperated in this task. And it has, all things considered, emerged with honour."'** But very few Indian newspapers and magazines cared to publish the findings of the quasi-judicial body. The campaign continued and its perpetrators did not even care that in charges like mass rape they were forcing the women of cited villages live a stigmatised life, for instance, Kunan and Poshpura villages where three independent inquiries exonerated the Army.'" Indian Response: It took several years and perhaps crisis like Hazrat Bal and Charar-e- Sharif for the Indian Army to understand what was going on and found itself wanting on the media front. Having little to hide, it decided to disarm its

218 distracters with the transparency The request to the Press Council was a part of that strategy and it worked but paitly The second step was to make its commanders media-sa\'vy. The Army has considerably stepped up its Psychological Warfare since then and many officers attribute the improved conditions and successful holding of the elections in the state to these efforts, which are far more systematic than before. A bit of planning based on intelligence, identification of targets, development of themes and creation of the propaganda material are being undertaken by difierent headquarters in the valley The Psychological Warfare is considered to be a highly sensitive and secTet subject and very few officers involved in the task like to talk about it. But one does get a faint picture affei getting sketchy details. The Army Headquarteis in New Delhi has a small group called Army Liaison Cell that is supposed to be engaged in the Psychological Warfare in Kashmir. The Cell works under the Directorate of Military Intelhgence of the Army Headquarters (AHQ) and is internally lefened to as MI 24. Its job is to evaluate intelligence and plan and develop themes and even get the material produced. It is also engaged in 'covert'media relations so far as the counter-proxy war measures are concerned.

mm 1^

A poster telling people in the Valley, particularly women, how important it is to join the decision making process--the recent Assembly Elections, which the Jihadis opposed. Right: A brochure targeted at the Indians and NRIs giving details of the Proxy War that the Army is fighting in the Valley and how deep is Pakistan's involvement in it. Source Indian Army

219 The Army Liaison Cell is rumoured to be operating several websites, maybe of all hues.

An officer connected with the Cell shared some themes with this researcher while refusing to say if all of them are used. Some of them are: 1. You Kashiniris are Indians. A beautiful Islamic calendar showing all famous Muslim shrines in the country, including Ajmer Sharif, Hazrat Bal, Nizamudin, Jama Masjid etc. are used along with Quranic verses teaching peace and brotherhood etc. 2. Pakistan is unreliable. Look, what it has done to Afghanistan and what is the guarantee that it would not do the same to Kashmir? This is a grey leaflet. 3. Militancy is bad; peace is good for aU. 4. How Pakistan is ruining Kashmir by exporting and sustaining terrorism 5. AIDS is a dreaded disease. It cannot be cured but surely prevented by following the teachings of Islam. Tlie preventive measures include no intimate contact with strangers. This is supplemented by a word of mouth that Pakistani knocking on village doors for food and shelter could be HIV- positive. The Cell also prepares target-specific propaganda. The targets include Kashmiri youngsters, women and children, Kashmiris in general, groups in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Non-Kashmiri Indians and the Indians living abroad. The Northern Command Headquarters (CHQ) at Udhampur has the Psychological Warfare Cell, a part of the General StafFBranch, directly under the Chief of the Staff. The Psychological Warfare plan and actions are as per the overall diiection of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief'" The Command Intelligence Branch under the COS works in close collaborations with the RAW, IB etc. to get the target and impact assessment and input for developing themes. The Psychological Warfare Cell, a secret organisation, prepares inputs for the plans and works out various themes. The responsibility for drawing the plan and selecting (hemes in accordance with the prevailing strategic and tactical situation and in conformity with the operational and other plans is the re.sponsibiUty of the General Staff Branch and fmally the Chief of Staff under the overall guidance of

220 the GOC-'m-C. The GS may create a task force to execute the plan but normally existing units of the formations concerned are tasked for its execution.'*^ The Psychological Warfare is a command function at all the levels and the responsibility of the preparations is with the General Staff Branch who carries it out with the support of the General Staff Operations and General Staff Intelligence. AH three work under the same authority, the COS and have lateral communication. They do not function in separate watertight compartments.'*'' Scaled down versions of the same practice are adopted at the Corps and Division levels. The Corps and Divisional headquarters may have an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) in charge of the Psychological Operations, instead of a cell. The Psyop OSD may suggest modification to the plan and theme to meet the needs of his own formation and its area of operation. His main task is to coordinate and conduct the operation of the plan of the CHQ. The Brigade Headquarters may not have even an OSD but its Intelligence Staff gets the additional responsibility.

The principle problem of the Psychological "Warfare in the counter-proxy war operations is the paucity of themes. In Bangladesh, the Indian Army did use the theme of Bangla nationalism no such theme is available in Kashmir. Pakistan is using themes like Islamic Jihad and the presence of the 'Indian Occupation Anny' in Kashmir. The Northern Command has to avoid such themes, except, perhaps, in its black Psychological Warfare.

The Indian Army has no dedicated training course, leave aside a school, teaching the Psychological Warfare to its cadres. But different training courses do have the Psychological Warfare components providing a faiily good idea about what the Psychological Warfare is. Besides, the Territorial Army has the Psywar specialists."''

The entire set up is ad hoc but it is working. Special and dedicated units are good but very expensive for the Army having a shoestring budget, in view of former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen. (rtd) H.M. KJianna. India is

221 spending only half of what Pakistan is spending in terms of the GDP though 'we are the most thieatened country in the world today.'''^

Pswar Talk:

The 'Psywar Talk' is the latest tactic the Army is practising of lately the Valley.'"' At the end of each 'Surround and Search Operation,' conducted to flush out terrorists/militants from a suspected 'safe' house in a village, the commander of the Aimy detail delivers a small talk to somewhat harried villagers, ostensibly to express his profound regrets about the inconvenience caused to them. Then he links the inconvenience to the presence of the mercenary or militant in their village and underscores the point that the militaiy had followed the militancy. He would point out that the presence of the Army was due to that of the militancy. The talk ends with a strong suggestion that the villagers should not support the militants in any way. The militancy was bringing in only misery to them. Instead, they should look after theij- children and work for the weliai^e of theii" families and the village. The contingent departs with an assurance that the Army would leave the Valley once the militancy ended. No leaflet distribution takes place. The world of mouth is the principle means of this Psyop. The new concept is: "the troops should not go where the bullets can and the bullets must not go where the words caa' Earlier, the troops would storm the safe house in such an operation and would suffer heavy casualties because the holed up mercenaries/militants could fire at them fi-om the cover of the safe house. The higher casualties of the troops gave the mercenaries a psychological ascendancy in the village society where only the numbers would be counted and not the tactical advantages and disadvantages. Now the house would only be surrounded and the militants inside would be taunted and to come out and fight if they were brave as the siege wears them out. If among the fellows hiding inside are the local Kashmiri boys, they are encouraged to surrender ahead of the foreigners. The good offices of the village elders are also used. If wanted persons are captured alive, the local boys are given a preferential treatment and if they are not facing serious criminal charges, are

222 even restored to their families after a friendly and brotherly advice. Each of these steps has a psychological app'eal Assam: Since the trouble in Assam and other states of the North East region is of insurgency natuie and not proxy war, the approach of the Amiy is different. It relies heavily on posters and the use of the local media. Grey posters appealing to the popular conscious, their interests, and dark side of the militancy of different groups aie used Themes like the militants killing the innocents and retarding the socio-economic development of Assam are innovatively used. \i SOUL ^-^

f^-m---^--^'^Yl§md^^^::Jft ^

Posters on various themes, targeting students and intellectuals groups In Assam Source An Army formation

Besides, wide publicity is arianged for the developmental and social service projects undertaken by the Army to project that the Army belongs to the people and is working in their interest as their friend The Army has succeeded in wanning the confidence of the wi iters and other intellectuals of Assam who have good standing in the society. Their stand and statements are used for under.sconng a point or two. This researcher has come across black brochuies and booklets describing luxurious and debauch lifestyle of top leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom and other groups, which is compared with the privations of the misguided cadies It is difficult to tiace the origin of publications to a particular authority but the local media souices say that thousands of copies circulated m Assam. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs has circulated several white brochures on themes like ^'^ • Assam, an ethnic and cultural mosaic—having Ahoms, Bodos, Koch- Rajbonshis, Santhals, Mishmgs, Dimasas, Kukis, Hmars, Zemis (Nagas),

223 Karbis and innumerable other smaller tribes besides , Biharis, Oriyas, Nepalis. it is a mini India. • The tea industry that has made Assam famous worldwde is being mined and the banks so important for the institutional credit needed for development are victims of brigandage • Modus Operandi of the ULFA is to use front organisations to cany out propaganda aimed at embarrassing the elected government, use Anchai committees and armed cadres for extortions, intimidations and kidnappings for ransom

The Army does not appear to be having the same command and control. The impression one gets is that the most of the planning and execution of the Psychological Warfare is done at the Divisional levels, by Colonel GS and his intelligence staff. The Corps and Command headquarters, however, remain posted by sitreps—situation reports.

ANTI-NAXALITE OPERATIONS

That the Psychological Warfare works in all situations and can succeed even when practised by the civilian police is evident from Operation Vishwas. The Maharashtra Police and revenue administration have very successftilly used it in controlling 25 year-old Naxahte insurgency in the state, giving the Naxals a taste of their own medicine, particularly in thickly rugged, undulating and far- flung areas of Gadchiroli district. Using guerrilla warfare tactics, the Naxalites of the Peoples War Group have been exploiting the local geographic and socio­ economic conditions in the area that borders with Andhra Pradesh in the south and Chhatisgarh on the east. Similar conditions prevail nearby area of Orissa. The geography is such that even a small band of tv/o-dozen insurgents can pin down about half a dozen companies of the policemen. In a carefully planned Psyop, the police officers dissuade the tribal from believing the Maoist dogmas and bring them back to the mainstream. They have devised a three-tier approach.''^ First they hold village or taluk level conventions where senior officers explain how the

224 Naxalites are misinforming them and how wrong their path is. They would also describe the excesses committed by the ultras, using photographs, maps etc. to describe specific incidents in nearby villages. This is followed up by posters, leaflets, audiotapes of songs based on folk music to drive home themes like fLitility of the Naxalite ideology, merits of democracy, peace, development progress etc. In the third step called 'Gram Bhet,' a top police or ciNolian officer pays a social visit a village to meet the tribal-villagers where he does not even mention the Naxalites but enquires about their welfare and talks about their problems and encourages them to aii- their grievances like lack of roads, health­ care, power supply, agricultural inputs etc. and even discussion on people's democratic rights with subtle reference to the Naxalite propaganda. Small complaints are redressed on the spot and the rest shortly. On the parallel track, welfeje activities are carried, like health camps, literacy camps, healthy baby contests, immunisation, sports, community feasts, even community weddings and distribute gifts to newly-weds etc. Sometimes the gatherings would be target group specific, e.g., village heads, schoolteachers, police 'patils.' To make inroads into the tribal society and also to provide employment, the police recruited constables from the area. The Naxals felt the pinch and they attacked the police action in their monthly inouthpiece, Prabhat. The response to their recruitment drive from the tribal youths not only dwindled but they also lost shelters in many villages.'*^ To assert their authority and run their writ, the Naxalite groups would always boycott the elections. But the Police propaganda very eflFectively conveyed to the people that it was their right to vote and it was also in their interests. The police organised the citizens' guards at polling stations to prevent the Naxalites from taking away ballot boxes. The villagers would chase away the Naxalites from the polling stations and after the removal of the boxes to their counting stations, they would hold dance and feast parties. The police campaigned like a political party and their candidate was none other but democracy, out to defeat the Naxalite insurgency."^'' The result is that the voters' turnout in Gadchiroli was among the highest in Mahara.shtra. The police Psyop was code named, Operation Vishwas (confidence). The state police has a detailed an Inspector General of Police for

225 planning and coordination of the ANO, headquartered at Nagpur, while the police superintendents of the four affected districts serve as field commanders. In neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, from where the Naxalite activities' intensity is much higher, the anti-extremist wing of the state police produced a four-episode teleserial, Cheekati Velugulu, and got it telecast on a popular channel. The state government has also announced a 'surrender and rehabilitation' package to take advantage of the serial's impact. It is a carrot and stick approach for the police also launched a major 'military action' against the hideouts of the People's War Group, the official name of the ultra group.

226 ' Rao, Ramamolian I., Infoiniation ConsuJtant to Defence Minister, Ministry ofDefence, m an mteiviewfo tins researclier m his office on 19 December 2002 Mr Rao was PRO of Army and press officer of Gen (latei Field Marshal) Maneckshaw during the war Later, he served as director ot Defence Public Relations, media advisor ot Jaminu and Kashmir Government, and Principal Intonnation Officer, Govemnient ot India ^ Raina, 4soka, Inside ILiWthe story ojIndia's Secret Service, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, p 45 ' Chandoi kar, Lt Gen., the tlien Director of Military Intelligence, Amiy Headquarters, in a persona] interview with (his rebcarcher in eaily 2001 But in the General'^ views this was not a psychological warfaie But it had an impact The Pakistani authorities decided against lem ducting many of these POWs after they letumed home and underwent a special screening •* Shashi, Dr., S. S., Defendeis ojIndia, Publication Division, Indian School Supply Depot, p 130 These leaflets also asked non-Bengali civilians whom Niazi had armed, to leave the area It was a thiee-pionged approach bypassing Pakistani strong points in cross-country outflanking moves in the teiraiii of Bangladesh, which is full of water obstacles ^ Manecksha>v, Field MarshaJ, S.H.F.J., in foreword to 1971 The Sappeii,' Wc7f, compiled by Col R.B Khanna, Published by Engineer-m-Chief, Army Headquaiters. Nev\'Delhi, 1995 ' The Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Chapter IV Conclusions, para 32 Just ten days aftei Pakistan's suiiendei m Dacca on 16 December 1971, its new piesident, Z A Bhutto appointed the commission under Section 3 of the Pdtasian Commissions oflnquiiy Act, 1956 to inquire into the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern Command sunendeied and the members of the armed foices of Pakistan undei his command laid down their at ms The Commission was headed by the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr Justice Hamoodur Rahman and other members were Mr Justice S Anwarul Haq, Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan and Mr Justice Tufaif Ah Abdui Rahman, Chief Justice of Smd and Baluchistan High Court Lt Gen (RtdJ Altaf QadiT was its military advisei and Mi M A Latif, Assistant Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was it secretary Not smprisingly, the report that damned the Pakistan's high command, GHQ and its suriendeimg Commander, Eastem Command, Lt Gen AAK Niazi, remained one of the top-seciet documents of the countiy But soon after the Kaigil wai, India Tcx/uv published somepaits of it much to the shock ol the powers that be in The Indian magazine and Pakistani newspaper. Dawn put the available pages on then websites as well But suipnsmgly the expose failed to touch off any debate in the Indian media The Indian media suppressed it as if the .suriendei were its own scandal " The Chiel Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Chapter IV Conclusions, Sub­ section Tlie Suiiendei, paia 33 ' A>oob, Mohammed and K Subrahmaniam, The Libeiatwn Wai, S Chand & Co P Ltd, New Delhi, 1972 p 182 '" Avoob, Mohammed and K Subrahmaniam, The Libeiatwn W^ar. S Chand & Co P Ltd, New Delhi. 1972, p 182 Rao, Ramamohaii I.. Information Consultant to Defence Minister, Ministry of Defence, in an interview to Uus researcher m his oflice on 19 December 2002 '^ Gadgil, Milind a very senior defence journalist and veteran of then press coverage of the '71 War, in an inteiview with this researclier Rao, Ramamohan I.. Information Consultant to Defence Minister, Ministry of Defence, in an interview to this researcher m his> oflice cm 19 December 2002 '•' The Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commissiion Report, Chapter I'V Conclusions, para 14 Rao, Ramamohan I , Inlormjtion Consultant to Defence Minister, Mimstry of Defence, in an interview to this leseaicher in his office on 19 December 2002 Rao lefiised to give details of die nature of the top poup that conducted the Psj'war Rao, Ramamohaii I .Intonnation Consultant to Defence Minister, Mimstry of Defence, in an interview to this researcher m his oflice on 19 December 2002 '^ Raina, Asoka, Inside RA W the stoiy of India's Sect el Servic e, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi. 1981, p 57 and 58 '* Raina, Asoka, Imide RAW the story oJ India i Secret Sei vice, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi 1981, p 58 Rao Capt N Sailendia "Psvchologicil Opeiations During Counter-Insurgency Operations-Sri Lank.i,' Coiiibal Journal Vol 17 No 3 Novembei 1990 p 43

227 '" Rao, Capt N. Sailendra,' Psychological Opeiations During Counter-Insurgency Operations- Sn Lanka, Combat Journal. Vol 17, No 3, November 1990 p 45 " Singh, Maj. C.K., Public Relations, OfTicei, 36 Inf Div. IPKF, in an mlerview with this researcher m Miimbai on 20 January 2003 The Indian Information Service oflicer is serving PRO, MOD in Mumbai " Singh, Maj. C.K., Public Relations OfTicei, 36 Inf Div. IPKF. in an interview vvith this researcher m Miimbai on 20 Januarv 2003 The Indian Information Service officer is serving PRO, MOD in Mumbai ^' Sanant Gaurav et al,' Pak Has Edge m War of Waves," Indiuu Exprea. 3 June 1999 " Jaleel, Muzamil, "Govt Steps Up Info War with Pakistan." Indian Express, 3 July 1999 '* Jaleel, Muzamil, "Govt Steps Up Info War with Pakistan," Indian Expiess, 3 July 1999 ^'' Masoodi, Nazir, "Pakistan TV scores as Doordaishan Transmittei Hits Snag," The Indian E^presi.. 10 Apnl 1999 " Saw ant, Gaurav et al. "Pak Has Edge m War of Waves," Indian Express, 3 June 1999 ^* Subrahmanyam, K. at el, Fiom Surprise to Reckoning, Kargil Review Committee Report, New Delhi 15 December 1999, p 183 Mi Subi alunanyam, a leading stiategic analyst of India, was the chairman of the Committee Othei members were Lt Gen KK Hazari (rid), noted journalist B G Verghese and National Security Council Secretary Satish Chandra (member- secretaiy) " SubrahinanyaiD, K. at el, Fiom Surpnie to Reckoning, Kargil Review Coirnnittee RejDOil, New Delhi 15 December 1999, p 183 '" The word or phrase used to identify a developing or running news-story and is flashed on the TV screen whenever further development is leported in subsequent bulletins " Hasan, Dr. Muhashir. "Kargil scattered leahties," Dawn, 9 July 1999. p op-ed ^^ ^^ Subrahmanyam, K. at el, Fiom Suipnse to Reckoning, Kaigil Review Committee Report, Nev\ Delhi 15 December 1999. p 181 Rao, Ramamohdn I., Infomiation Consultant to Defence MmLster, Ministry of Defence, in an interviev^ to tins researcher in his office on 19 December 2002 ^'' Subrahmanyam, K. at el, From Surprise to Reckoning. Kargil Review Committee Report, New Delhi 15 December 1999 -Chapter VI Media Relations and Information Rao, Ramamohan [., Infomiation Consultant to Defence Mim.ster, Ministry of Defence, m an interview to tins researcher in his office on 19 December 2002 •"' Raman, B., A Terrorist State as a Fionthne Ally, Lancer Paper 7, Indian Defence Review, New Delhi, 2002, p 20 '^ Report of The Press Council of India, Crf^n and CredihiUt},\.ance<[ International, New Delhi, 1991, p JOI-102 '* Ibid,p 149 '"* Special Correspondent,' Aimy Has Wrested Trust of Kashmiris," The Hindu, 15 February 1999 '"' Ibid, citing a keynote addiess of Lt Gen Vinayak Patankar, then commanding a division m the valley as a major geneial, at a seminar in Mumbai Gen Patankai is now GOC, 15 Corps •" Khanna, Lt. Gen. (rtd) H.M., in an interview with this researcher Gen Khanna is a former GOC-in-C Northern Command '' Ibid '' Ibid "•' Ibid ^*lbKl '"' A former instructor of Army Counter Insurgency School, who prefers anonymity, in an interview to this reseaicher on 29 Octobei 2002 m Mumbai where the officer is posted now •" Ministry of Home Mfairs, Bleeding Assam The Role ofULFA, undated but was circulated around 1998 ** Estimate Committee, Maharashtra Legislature, Report on the haxaliie Acnvities in the State, Report No 24. 1998-99, ubled rnboth tlie houses on 22 December 1998 •'*' Estimate Committee, Maharashtra Legislature Report on the Nuxalite Activities m the State Report No 24,1998-99, tabled in lioth the hou'^es on 22 December 1998 " Jagannnthau. S., then Superintendent of the Police Gadchuoli distnct man interviewwntli this reseaicher m his office on 28 August 1999 He .said tliat tlie police teams hnd visited 972 of total 1587 villages ot tlie

228 district till tliat day and interacted with 53,260 villagers prior to the district's polling day, 5 September 1999 for the genera) elections for the Lok Sabha and tlie Maharashtra Legislative Assembly

229