PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION, 1947-65: An analysis of institutional interaction between American policy making bodies and the Pakistan Army. By Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of History and Classics University of Edinburgh Year of submission: 2009 This thesis is dedicated to my Parents- my Papa Syed Maqsood Ali Pirzada and my lovely Ammi (late) Hasnain Khatoon. Both of them always wanted to see me at the zenith of my education. Their aspiration remained a confidence boost for my academic achievements. ii Abstract This thesis examines through the use of archives and oral evidence the role of the Pakistan Army in the context of Pakistan’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Its main purpose is to explore the autonomy of the Pakistan Army in shaping national and foreign policy between the years 1947-1965. Focusing on its independent relationship with three instruments of policy-making in the United States – the Department of State, the White House and the Pentagon – the thesis argues that the relationship between the Army and these policy-making bodies arose from a synergistic commonality of interests. The Americans needed a country on the periphery of the Soviet Union to contain Communism while the Pakistan Army needed US military support to check Indian regional military hegemonism in South Asia. This alliance was secured to the disadvantage of democratic political institutions of Pakistan. The Army, which became stronger as a result of US military and economic support, came progressively to dominate domestic politics. This led not only to weakened civilian governments in the period I am examining, but in 1958 to the military seizure of political control of the country itself. The infringement of the Army into civilian spheres of government further caused a deterioration in relations between East and West Pakistan. The increasing clout of a US-backed Army whose elite officers had a bias against the eastern wing of the country, the thesis argues, thus indirectly resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan itself. To explain the Army’s ascendancy its transformation from British colonial army into a national political actor, is documented. The thesis explores the influence of the martial- race theory and of Punjabisation in the Army as it developed in the colonial era. Secondly, it reconstructs how provincial politics weakened the Federal Government and allowed the Army to usurp political power to a disproportionate degree. Thirdly, the thesis considers the extent to which the US-Army relationship influenced and even took precedence over decision-making within the government itself. It details the military pacts made between the two countries to contain the USSR in this period. Finally, it explores where and how the interests of the US and Pakistan Army diverged, in particular concerning their respective relations with India. The complications arising in Indo- Pakistan relations in consequence of an abrupt tilt of the US towards India after the Sino- Indian war in 1962 are also examined. In reaction to this new Indo-US nexus, it is argued the Pakistani military junta leaned towards China and in 1965 endeavoured to make use i of it advanced, US-supplied weaponry before – as they saw it – the strategic balance was to be irrecoverably lost in favour of India. In conclusion, the thesis argues that the period under consideration saw a complete failure of the US policy of containing communism whilst at the same time avoiding war between its allies in the region, and that this had tragic consequences for the future of democracy in Pakistan. ii Declaration I confirm that this thesis is entirely of my own composition and represents my own original research. Signed: Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi iii Acknowledgements Alhamdulillah, at the outset, all praise be to Allah for granting me courage and help for accomplishing this project. It would not have been possible without His spiritual support. My most respectful thanks, then, go to the ever-patient and pleasant Crispin Bates for going through the editing and production stages of the thesis most diligently. Though very busy in his fellowship in Japan and presenting papers at international conferences, Crispin helped me in making changes in the text, scanning maps, and editing. I am indeed also thankful to Markus Daechsel for his help and guidance. Markus, in spite of the considerable demands on his time and attention made by his teaching classes at the Royal Holloway and conferences, helped with valuable suggestions. Both of them ensured their help not only with regard to my project, as and when required, but also in my broader academic grooming. I must not forget Marina Carter for her generous help in reading the entire thesis and editing the text. For this she deserves a big thanks. Several of my friends were very encouraging and supportive and provided a critical perspective on my work. Gajendra Singh, Muhammad Asif, Julie Hartly, Kim Wagner, Saif Shah and my brother-in-law Syed Saleem Zafar top this list and hence are thanked a lot. A large number of friends were making earnest inquiries about the thesis throughout the period I was writing it. Their interest was most encouraging and spurred me on to complete it. Hence, I am especially grateful to Rashid Chughtai, Ms. Nasreen Ghufran, my brothers Ali, Masoom Ali, Makhdum Pirzada, Ashok Malhotra, Aqeel Omer, Kavin Ross, Shehzad Hanif, Tim Siddons, Khawar and Sarah. I am also grateful to quite a few serving military officers in Pakistan who provided witnesses and their opinion on the historical and present situation in Pakistan. As they requested anonymity, I am thanking them without their being named. I am also thankful to all those who allowed themselves to be interviewed or conversed with me on the subject. They have all been credited at appropriate places in the text. My PhD study would not have been possible without the generous help of funding agencies and the indulgence of my own and adoptive university. I am, therefore, thankful to the University of Peshawar, the University of Edinburgh, Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, and the Carnegie, Charles Wallace, and Newby Trusts for the generous support given to my research project. This thesis has been delayed by my daughter’s Laiba’s sudden illness which necessitated her hospitalisation. However, I am grateful to Allah for His return of Laiba to us twice during my thesis writing. Last but not the least; it gives me immense pleasure to mention the versatile and generous support given to me during the long period that it took to finish the thesis by my wife, Reena Soherwordi. She not only took care of Laiba and our infant- son Abdullah but also managed household affairs entirely on her own, while I was away in my study office or in the library for days on end. Thank you so much Reena. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Declaration iii Acknowledgements iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v List of Maps vii List of tables/illustrations viii Acronyms ix Glossary xi Mapof South Asia before 1971 xii Map of Pakistan xiii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1 Advent and Evolution: The Pakistan Army from the British Indian Army 1857-1947. 1.1 Introduction 12 1.2 The Advent of the British Indian Army 13 1.3 Post-1857 Regional Recruitment Shift– The Evolution of Punjabisation 17 1.4 Punjabisation with Caution – The Fallout of the Bengal Mutiny 22 1.5 The Indigenous Indian Army and the British 25 1.6 Social and Psychological Influences on Indigenous Soldiers 30 1.7 ‘Indianisation’ of the British Army 33 Conclusion 41 CHAPTER 2 Weak Political Institutions and The rise of the Army in Pakistan: 1947-58. 2.1 Introduction 44 2.2 Indo-phobia, Islam and the Creation of Pakistan 47 2.3 Civil and Military Relations 49 2.4 Weak Democratic Institutions 51 2.4.1 The Punjab 51 2.4.2 The NWFP 55 2.5 Pakhtoonistan 58 2.6 FEDERATION vs. THE PAKISTAN ARMY 65 Conclusion 92 CHAPTER 3 American Policy Making Bodies and the Pakistan Army: Towards Military Alliances 1947-57. 3.1 Introduction 94 3.2 Importance of Pakistan and the US Global Priority List 96 3.3 US Proposed South Asian Unity 99 v 3.4 Power Bloc Theory (PBT) of India 102 3.5 US Support to Pakistan for Leadership of the Muslim World 103 3.6 Pseudo-War Crisis between India and Pakistan 1951. 106 3.7 Mid-East Defence Organization (MEDO) 108 3.8 A Shift in US Policy: From MEDO to Military Alliances 114 3.9 Institutional Alliance in the Offing 116 3.10 The British displeasure over growing Institutional Alliance. 123 3.11 Offers and Pressures from the Soviet Union 135 3.12 Pak-US Cooperation with Other Middle Eastern Countries and Egypt’s Aspiration of Muslim Leadership 138 Conclusion 141 CHAPTER 4 Military rule in Pakistan and India as a Factor in Straining the Pak-US Institutional Interaction: 1958-62. 4.1 Introduction 143 4.2 MILITARY RULE IN PAKISTAN: 1958-62. 144 4.2.1 Military Rule and Ethnic Problem 153 4.2.2 Military Rule and the Country’s Legal System 156 4.2.3 Military Rule and the Plight of Foreign Services of Pakistan 159 4.3 INDIA AS A FACTOR IN STRAINING PAK-US INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION: 1958-62. 161 4.3.1 The US Fear of Communism in India 161 4.3.2 Growing Indo-US relations 164 4.3.3 India’s annexation of Goa 169 4.3.4 Further Dips in Pak-US Relations 170 4.3.5 Sino-India War and the Beginning of the End of Institutional Interaction 175 Conclusion 179 CHAPTER 5 Allies at Loggerheads: The US and the Pakistan Army 1962-65.