Pakistan's Violence

Home , Jamhoori Wattan Party, Mamnoon Hussain, Outline of Pakistan, Pakistan Awami Tehreek, Pakistan Peoples Party, Qaumi Watan Party

Pakistan’s Violence Causes of Pakistan’s increasing violence since 2001

Anneloes Hansen July 2015

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations Word count: 21481 First reader: S. Rezaeiejan Second reader: P. Van Rooden Studentnumber: 10097953

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms List of figures, Maps and Tables

Map of Pakistan

Chapter 1. Introduction §1. The Case of Pakistan §2. Research Question §3. Relevance of the Research

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework §1. Causes of Violence §1.1. Rational Choice §1.2. Symbolic Action Theory §1.3. Terrorism §2. Regional Security Complex Theory §3. Colonization and the Rise of Institutions §4. Conclusion

Chapter 3. Methodology §1. Variables §2. Operationalization §3. Data §4. Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 4. Pakistan §1. Establishment of Pakistan §2. Creating a Nation State §3. Pakistan’s Political System §4. Ethnicity and Religion in Pakistan §5. Conflict and Violence in Pakistan

§5.1. History of Violence §5.2. Current Violence §5.2.1. Baluchistan §5.2.2. Muslim Extremism and Violence §5. Conclusion

Chapter 5. Rational Choice in the Current Conflict §1. Weak State §2. Economy §3. Instability in the Political Centre §4. Alliances between Centre and Periphery §5. Conclusion

Chapter 6. Emotions in Pakistan’s Conflict §1. Discrimination §2. Hatred towards Others §2.1. Political Parties §2.2 Extremist Organizations §3. Security Dilemma §4. Conclusion

Chapter 7. International Influences §1. International Relations §1.1. United States – Pakistan Relations §1.2. China – Pakistan Relations §1.3. India – Pakistan Relations §2. Neighbouring Weak States

Chapter 8. Conclusion and Discussion §1. Conclusion §2. Discussion §3. Further Research

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AJIP Awami Jamhuri Ittehad Pakistan AML Awami Muslim League APML All Pakistan Muslim League ANP Awami National Party BNP Balochistan National Party BNP-M Balochistan National Party BNP-A Balcohistan National Party Awami BLA Baloch Liberation Army BLF Baloch Liberation Front BRA Baloch Republican Army FATA Federal Administered Tribal Areas HRCP Human Rights Commission Pakistan ICG International Crisis Group IDP internally displaced people IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IMF International Monetary Fund IPDF Infrastructure Project Development Facillity JWP Jamhoori Wattan Party JI Jamaat-E-Islami JIP Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan JUI-F Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam JWP Jamhoori Wattan Party KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LJ LAskhakr-e-Jangvi MMA Mattahida Majils-i-Amal MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement MQM-P NP National Party NPP National Peoples Party PAT Pakistan Awami Tehreek PBS Pakistan Bureau of Statistics

PMAP Pukhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party PML Pakistan Muslim League PML-N Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz PML-F Pakistan Muslim League Functional PML-J Pakistan Muslim League Junejo PML-Z Pakistan Muslim League Zia-ul-Haq Shaheed PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam PPP Pakistan People’s Party PPPP Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians PPP-S Pakistan People’s Party Sherpao PTI Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf QWP-S Qaumi Watan Party (Sherpao) TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan UNDP United Nations Development Program WTO World Trade Organisation

List of Figures, Maps and Tables

Figures Figure 1. Theoretical Framework.

Maps Map 1. Pakistan. Map 2. Pakistan: Administrative Divisions. Map 3. Pakistan, Ethnic Groups. Map 4. Pakistan, Languages. Map 5. Pakistan, Religions.

Tables Table 1. Fragile State Index. Table 2. Division of Seats of National Assembly of Pakistan 2002-2015. Table 3. Division of Seat Senate of Pakistan, 2003-2015. Table 4. Presidents of Pakistan 1998-2015. Table 5. Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 2002-2015. Table 6. Fragile State Index, Neighoubring Countries.

Map 1 Pakistan. Source: ICG, 2014c:26.

Chapter 1. Introduction

On 16th December 2014 the Pakistani Taliban executed it deadliest terrorist attack ever by attacking the Army Public School in Peshawar, 125 people were wounded and 141 people died (BBC, 2014). Most of the victims were children studying at the school. The Pakistani Taliban claims that they executed the attack because of the offensive carried out by the Pakistani army against them in the Khyber and North Waziristan areas. A month earlier, a suicide attack on the Pakistan-India border killed 55 people and wounded more than 150 people (Al Jazeera, 2014). Remarkable is that different groups claim responsibility and that they all mention the same reason for the suicide attack: the military offensive in Waziristan. And because the attack took place on the Pakistan-India border, the already existing tensions between the two countries increased. On 30th January, 2015 Jundallah – a Sunni militant group – attacked a Shia mosque during the Friday prayers in Shikarpur (BBC 2015). The bomb blast led to the death of at least 40 people. These three events illustrate the current situation in Pakistan, it has to deal with various types of violent conflicts spread throughout the country. Riedel claims that ‘Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today’ (Riedel, 2008:31). Even though this claim is arguable, it is true that it is dangerous in Pakistan: (sectarian) violence, terrorist attacks and serious crimes occur on regular basis and are spread throughout Pakistan. Since the establishment of Pakistan, the country has been stricken by violent conflicts. After a relative quiet period in the 1990s, the level of violence started to increase in the first decade of the millennium (UCDP, 2014b, UCDP 2014c, UCDP, 2014d). This is especially the case for terrorist attacks and their subsequent impact (START, 2013).

§1. The Case of Pakistan When Pakistan became independent in 1947 this led to mass migration, the Hindus that were then living in Pakistan moved to India and Muslims that were then living in India moved to Pakistan. This is one of the reasons that the population of Pakistan is diverse. Different ethnic groups, with their own languages and rituals were ‘forced’ to share a nation state, the only common denominator (most of) the citizens had was Islam – although they differ in their expression of this religion. The migrated people – that had formed the elite in British India – now mainly formed the new elite in Pakistan. To overcome the problems caused by the ethnic diversity, the government tried to centralize and homogenise the Pakistani culture. By doing

8 this the political elites privileged their own ethnic groups, which led to dissatisfaction among the remaining ethnic groups. As a consequence, Bangladesh became an independent country and conflicts between the national government of Pakistan and the Baloch and Sindh arose. The centralisation and homogenisation of the Pakistani culture failed, and the ethnic groups in Pakistan often have (violent) conflicts with each other. Since the establishment of Pakistan there have been violent conflicts between ethnic groups; between religious sects; between the government and ethnic groups; between the army and the government et cetera. Some militant groups have been sponsored by the Pakistani government, while others have been in conflict with the government since 1947, or have indeed been both ally or enemy of the government, at different times. The conflicts in Pakistan are diverse and are recurrent. In the 1990s there was a period of relative peace – even though the violence continued – but from the second half of the zeroes onwards the violence in Pakistan increased dramatically. After the start of the war on terror in Afghanistan, extremist Muslim groups started to commit terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan. The government executed several offensives in the FATA district and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), where most of the Extremist Muslim groups are based. Besides the increase of Muslim extremist violence, separatist violence in Baluchistan started to increase as a reaction to the 2005 military insurgency. The violence in Pakistan is diverse and complex. It is not a conflict between fixed actors, but in addition there are also a number of actors with constantly changing affiliations. And besides that, the relations between actors have been changing all the time. Besides the fact that Pakistan has to deal with violence, there are political and economic problems in the country. Pakistan’s political history is turbulent: since its establishment only once a democratically chosen leader turned the power democratically over. Every other time coups were committed by the army, or the Prime Minister was disposed by the President, before a new democratic leader could be chosen. Additionally, Pakistan has to deal with corruption in both the political and economic system. Pakistan’s economy has been a victim of the current violence, since 2005 almost no economic growth took place. Furthermore Pakistan has to deal with poverty, 21% of the population lives below the poverty line. Pakistan is thus troubled by violence, political and economic problems.

§2. Research Question In this thesis, the causes of the increasing violence are investigated. The aim of the research is to examine the relation between violence and the political and economic system of Pakistan. Also the colonial past of Pakistan is taken into account, this is mainly focussed on how this influenced Pakistan’s current political and economic system. This culminates into the following research question:

What is the cause of the rise in violence in Pakistan post 9/11 and how is this related with its political and economic system and the fact that Pakistan is a former colony?

§3. Relevance of the Research This research focuses on the causes of civil conflict, which is based on the literature of civil war. Civil conflict can be seen as preliminary stage of civil war. The causes of violence are complex and within the academic world there is disagreement on the origins of civil war (Cederman, 2010; Fearon and Latin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2003; Kaufmann, 2006). It is important to understand the causes of civil conflict, because only then solutions can be found and new conflicts can be prevented. Which again is important, because when civil conflicts have arisen they are difficult to end. Whereas civil violence often enfeebles a country economically and politically, the country becomes more vulnerable for violence. This process can lead to a circle of violence, whereby the state becomes weaker, which leads to more violence, with as consequence a weaker state. Furthermore, this research is socially relevant because civil conflicts have high costs for the citizens. The conflicts disrupt people’s lives. In Pakistan 1.8 million people are internally displaced, children lack the ability to go to school and capital crime rates are high (ICG, 2014a:34; ICG, 2014c; IDMC, 2015). With knowledge on how civil conflicts and wars arise, methods can be developed to prevent those in the future. For the international community civil conflict and weak states are important, because they are breeding grounds for (international) terrorists. This is seen in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and in also Pakistan. As consequence, the violence in Pakistan is not only a threat for Pakistan, but for whole world. This research is scientifically important, because it elaborates on existing, but conflicting theories on civil war. The biggest contrast in the theories is that one movement argues that people are rational and behave rationally, while the other movement argues that people cannot always be rational and that emotions also determine how people behave (Cederman, 2010;

Kaufmann, 2006). This research examines the causes of the conflict in Pakistan, and by doing so it tests both theories. Furthermore, this research links colonialism with civil war. Much research is done to investigate the link between colonialism and development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Bernard et al., 2004; Denk and Anckar, 2014; Jackson and Rosbergg, 1982; Kenny, 2015; Lange, 2004; Olsson, 2009). However, most of the research is done for countries in Africa. In this research the link will be tested for Pakistan and the theories on post colonialism will be connected with theories about civil war.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework To answer the research question it is in the first place important to understand the origins of violence, for this theories about civil wars and terrorism are used. Secondly the regional security complex theory is explained to show the influence of the region on civil violence. Finally, to understand the influence of the political and economic system on violence, theories about weak states and how institutions come into being are used. This is combined with theories about the effects of colonialism on the establishment of institutions, this is done to examine the relation between colonialism and violence.

§1. Causes of Violence To explain the current violence in Pakistan it is necessary to understand the general causes of violence. Theories about civil war and theories about terrorism can be used to explore the situation. Even though we do not speak of a civil war in Pakistan these theories are useful, because they explain the causes of violence in general – civil violence can escalate into a civil a war. In this thesis the concept of civil violence will be used. Theories of terrorism are also used because after 9/11 there was an increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, and also the impact of these attacks is increasing. Terrorism is a specific form of civil violence, and although it is political, the fact is that both terrorism and civil violence have similar motives. Tactical terrorism is also explained in the section on civil violence although the motives are not discussed separately. Civil violence is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to explain, and this had led to controversy among researchers. The following section (§1.1) describes in the first place terrorism, after that it compares two major theories on civil war. The two theories argue that there are different causes of civil war. The first is the theory of rational choice, which says that actors react rationally. The second theory is the symbolic action theory, and in contrast to the rational choice theory, this theory claims that actors do not act rationally but emotionally(Kaufman, 2006:47). Finally, tactical terrorism will be explained; why people use this specific form of violence.

§1.1 Rational Choice The rational choice theory has as basic premise that people act rationally. An important rational choice theory on civil wars is from Fearon and Latin. They claim that civil violence is not caused by ethnic factors or religious diversity and grievances between the different groups

(Fearon and Latin, 2003:88). Instead they claim that conditions that favour insurgency – ‘a form of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practising guerrilla warfare from rural base areas’ – are the causes of an actual civil conflict (Fearon and Latin, 2003:75). Insurgency is favoured by state weakness combined with poverty, a large population and instability (Fearon and Latin, 2003:88). If these conditions are lacking there may be tensions between different groups, however there is less chance that they will actually fight each other. This is because insurgency can only be effective if insurgents are able to hide, if they have enough motivation – this can be grievances, poverty et cetera – to commit violence, and last, the most important factor, insurgents must possess local knowledge (Fearon and Latin, 2003:80/88). This is because local knowledge enables the insurgents to threaten the local population so that they do not denounce the insurgents to the government. These insurgents do not recoil for harsh methods even though it is against their own people. Thus even though the insurgents are only small in number they can create civil conflict. Fearon and Latin claim that inside a civil conflict the actual grievances occur, mostly as a strategy of the insurgents (Fearon and Latin, 2003:88). This can be one of the reasons why it is more difficult to stop a civil conflict than to start one. Another rational choice theory is from Collier. He argues in his book the Bottom Billion that civil conflict is more likely to arise when a country is a low-income country – and thus has to deal with poverty – and when a country has to deal with slow growth, stagnation or decline of the economy – which creates hopelessness for the future (Collier, 2007:19/20). This is because in a situation of hopeless poverty insurgent armies become attractive for, especially, young men. Those groups give protection and the possibility to hope for a better future. Collier also claims that if an economy is weak, often the nation is also weak, which makes it easy for insurgents to operate (Collier, 2007:21). People who support or join an insurgent project, according to Collier, have their own framework of grievances, they imagine that the insurgents defend their interests, which is not always the case (Collier, 2007:22). The insurgents use those frameworks the generate a bigger discourse of grievance that people agree on, so that receive support. This theory puts more emphasis on grievances when compared to the theory of Fearon and Latin. However, Collier also argues that there must also be factors that favour insurgency. Finally, the theory of Kalyvas is discussed. Kalyvas argues that civil wars mostly originate by either greed – the Hobbesian idea of a war of all against all, whereby there is breakdown of authority – or grievance – civil war based on a group of loyalties and beliefs (Kalyvas, 2003:475). Kalyvas claims however, that civil wars are not binary conflicts with one master cleavage based on either greed or grievance, instead they are ‘complex and ambiguous

13 processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions’ (Kalyvas, 2003:475). In these processes both the ‘interaction between political and private identities and actions’ and the interaction between centre and periphery play an important role (Kalyvas, 2003:475/479). This is because in the first place actions taken on the ground are often more related to private or local issues than to the master cleavage. Thus Kalyvas claims that instead of a master cleavage, in which a civil conflict is mostly analysed, there are local cleavages that are framed in the master cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003:475). Private conflicts are framed as political issues that fit in the master cleavage, a civil war than functions as a medium whereby different (local) grievances are realized in the greater conflict. This has as consequence that political violence is not always political (Kalyvas, 2003: 487). Secondary interaction between centre and periphery is important since Kalyvas claims that beside cleavages also alliances are taking place and thus must be taken into account (Kalyvas, 2003:486). Alliances lead to cooperation between actors in the centre and periphery, consequently actors create agency in both. The local actor mostly receives external muscle from the supralocal actor, in return they support the supralocal by obtaining local control, resources and information. Beside alliances between local and supralocal actors, there can also be alliances between, insiders and outsiders, individuals and organizations, civilians and armies. (Kalyvas, 2003:487). These alliances are not necessarily between actors that have the same identities and interests. The combination of cleavages and alliances between the actors with different backgrounds insinuate that civil wars are actually built on local cleavages that are arrayed around the master cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003:486). The three rational choice theories have in common that grievances do play a role in conflict, however they are not the actual cause? of the conflict. Fearon and Latin and Collier argue that there must be circumstances that favour conflict. Fearon and Latin argue that the grievances arise with the conflict, while Collier argues that because of the circumstances grievances that finally can cause conflict can arise. Kalyvas argues that civil violence is caused by a mixture of private/political conflicts/grievances and by the alliances between the centre and periphery. Because Kalyvas argues that private grievances can be based among other things on identity, this theory is not completely a rational action theory. In the next section on the Symbolic Action Theory, this will become more clear.

§1.2 Symbolic Action Theory As mentioned above, in contrast with the rational choice theory, the symbolic action theory claims that actors do not behave rationally. Based on neuroscience it claims that emotions also determine how people act, people are not able to behave rationally all the time (Kaufman, 2006:51). These emotions are influenced by the ethnic identity of a person. To understand how this works it is important to understand what ethnic identity is according to the symbolic action theory. Kaufman argues that ‘each ethnic group is defined by a “myth-symbol complex” that identifies which elements of shared culture and what interpretation of history binds the group together and distinguishes it from others’ (Kaufman, 2006:50). Thus, ethnic identity is a construct, that is deeply rooted in both the history and culture of a group a person is part of. It is impossible to chance from an ethnic group, since ethnic identity is fixed by birth (Kaufmann, 1996:140). In the symbolic action theory symbols are important since they refer both to an emotionally laden myth and to an interest (Kaufman, 2006:52). Symbols are often used to frame a conflict as a fight against evil, this leads to emotions as resentment, fear, and hatred. These emotions are used by politicians to make people act. However, for civil violence Kaufman claims that beside a group mythology also the fear for existence and the political opportunity must be present (Kaufman, 2006:53). An actual conflict arises when there is mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization, and a security dilemma1. Another symbolic action theory is that of Cederman. He claims that civil conflict is caused by ethno nationalist claims to state power (Cederman et al.: 2010:87). Nationalism is ‘a political principle that demands that the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent’ (Cederman et al.: 2010:92). Nationalism is based on the idea of a community with a shared history and culture, Anderson calls this an imagined community. This is because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’(Anderson, 2006:6). The concept of imagined community is related to Kaufmann’s myth-symbol complex, only in Anderson’s theory – and accordingly in Cedermans’ theory – symbols are not mentioned. An important premise – based on the concept of ethnic community – in Cedermans’ theory is that ethnic groups do not want to be ruled by other ethnic groups (Cederman et al., 2010:93). Charles Tilly’s polity model supplements Cedermans’ theory by making a distinction between included and excluded groups in politics. Tilly claims that every group tries to receive as much executive

1 The security dilemma is based on the idea that states – or in the case of civil war, civil groups – seek for security. ‘Actions taken for one’s own security can threaten the security of others, leading to arms races, conflict and war. The fundamental cause of the security dilemma is [thus] uncertainty’ (Mitzen, 2006:341/342). 15 power as they can, however there are always groups excluded from power (Tilly, 1977). Based on the polity model and imagined communities Cederman argues that civil violence arises because ethnic groups do not want to be governed by another ethnic group and because ethnic groups are trying to gain (more) power in the political system by which they can represent and defend their own ethnic group (Cederman et al., 2010:92/93). Following civil conflict is ‘more likely to erupt when: (1) representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher their mobilization capacity is, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past’ (Cederman et al., 2010:88). To complete the two symbolic action theories the theory of Anderson and also the concept of nationalism, developed by Gellner, will be explained. These two theorists are important for the symbolic action theory, because both claim that nationalism or ethnic solidarity is made, these feelings, according to the symbolic action theory, can lead to violence. Anderson’s most important concept is the afore mentioned imagined community. He claims that nationalism that arises with the imagined communities, invents nations instead that nationalism awakens the self-consciousness of a nation. (Anderson, 2006:6). Nations are according to Anderson imaged as limited, ‘even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations’; sovereign, ‘the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm’; and as a community, ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 2006:7). Gellner argues that nationalism arises with the change from an agrarian society into an industrial society (Gellner, 1983). This is because in an agrarian society central education is not necessary, communities are self-reproducing and are thus able to educate their own people (Gellner, 1983:37/38). Only a small amount of people is part of the high culture and has access to complex literacy. As consequence, there is no common culture between different communities inside a state. In an industrial society, it is necessary that people have literacy and technical competence to let the economy grow. This is only possible when there is ‘a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required’ (Gellner, 1983:34). Because people are all taught by the same system, one central culture arises (Gellner, 1983:36). Only the state is able to accomplish this central education, therefore nationalism arises. Gellner mentions that there are two stages of nationalism. In the first stage, the early stage, there is big gap between the poor and the rich.

According to Gellner this rarely led to conflict, only when people of one group ‘identify themselves and each other culturally and ethnically’ related, conflict can arise (Gellner, 1983:75). If so, this can lead to a new nation. It is important that it is about feeling culturally connected, they do not have necessarily be connected. In the second stage, the late stage, only old existing cultural differences can lead to conflict and new frontiers. Another point Gellner makes is that high culture often goes hand in hand with secularisation, however, in the case of Islam clerks do play an important role (Gellner, 1983:78-81). Van der Veer claims that not only the Islam can be important in nationalism, but that also religious nationalism in general exists. He says that religious identity is constructed and generates imagined communities (Van der Veer, 1994:ix). Important in constructing the religious identity are ritual discourse and practice, the symbols Kaufman mentions. Beside the ‘normal’ religious identity, there is also religious nationalism. This amalgamates the religious discourse and the national discourse, accordingly a national identity based on religion arises (Van der Veer, 1994:x). Thus all say that nationalism and cultural feelings are made, however they have different opinions how those feelings are established. Anderson claims that first the feelings of solidarity arise and because of this a nation. Gellner says this happens the other way around, there is a nation and because of a central education system feelings of solidarity arise. Van der Veer claims based on those ideas that nationalism also can be religious when people feel religiously connected. In the symbolic action theory identity is thus important. According to both Collier and Kaufman civil war is caused by grievances between ethnic groups. Added to the symbolic action theory are the theories of Anderson and Van der Veer, those theories explain how identity is established. This is important to understand violence in Pakistan, since in Pakistan there are different ethnic groups from which some use religion to define their group. This is also important for the next section, that is about terrorism, since Jihadism is a problem in Pakistan.

§2.3 Terrorism Since 9/11 there is an major increase in terrorist violence in Pakistan. Even though before there were also terrorist attacks in Pakistan, they took not place that often as the last 14 years. Terrorism is a contested concept. In the first place because it is difficult to distinguish from other forms of (political-)violence and secondly because the concept of terrorism is used to frame resistance from adversaries as illegitimate (Crenshaw, 2000:406). Pedahzur et al. did a study about how terrorism is conceptualized by other scientists. They argue that there is a consensus that ‘terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role (Pedahzur et al., 2004:782).

However, because this definition is based on consensus it is an ambiguous definition. In this thesis a more precise definition is used to prevent indistinctness. The definition used is from the European Union.

Intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, shall be deemed to be terrorist offences: (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).

Not only terrorism is a contested concept, also the causes of terrorism, as the causes of civil violence in general, are contested. As mentioned terrorism is political violence, to understand why people uses violence instead of non-violent or political methods, the field of terrorism looks at macro, meso and micro factors. Also, there is a distinction between preconditions – the macro, meso and micro factors – and precipitants (Crenshaw, 1981:381). Precipitants are as catalysts, they are not the reason why people radicalize, but they accelerate the radicalization process (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007:451). Important catalysts are trigger events – events that create grievance – and the recruiting of people. Macro level causes of terrorism can be distinguished in three categories: political, economic and cultural causes (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007:449). The causes are manifested

18 externally from the individual and determine the surrounding of individuals. Individuals almost have no influence on these factors (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007:451). However, these circumstances do not influence the behaviour of individuals directly. In combination with, among other things, social factors – the meso causes of terrorism – behaviour of individuals is influenced. Meso level factors are identification processes, relative deprivation and network dynamics (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007:449). On micro level it is about how an individual experiences its surrounding. Psychological characteristics, personal experiences and rationality are dimensions that determine if an individual radicalises (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007:449/452). Theories on civil violence do not make the distinction between macro, meso and micro factors as clear as the field on terrorism is doing, however in their theories this distinction is also made but more subtle. Fearon and Latin for example, claim that a combination of the three leads to a bigger chance that people commit violence. Kaufman’s theory in contrast puts more emphasises on micro and meso factors. Thus again – as the sections on rational choice and symbolic action theory have shown – there is no univocal answer on why actual civil violence arises. Agreement in the terrorist field is on the fact that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, terrorists are not able to confront their enemy directly by military force (Kydd and Walter, 2006:50; McCarten et al., 2008:62). Because of this, terrorists try to influence the public with fear, to reach their goals. They show the public with terrorist attacks how far they are willing to go and what they are capable to do, this is important because they have to make credible threats to influence the public (Kydd and Walter, 2006:50/51). Accordingly the psychological aspect of terrorism is important; there is always the fear for (another) attack (McCarten et al., 2008:62). Besides that, terrorism is also used to gain attention for the objective of the terrorist, which can lead to both positive and negative support from the public (Crenshaw, 1981:386). In Pakistan terrorist attacks are often claimed by Jihadi organisations. ‘Jihadi terrorism is the type of […] terrorism that draws on extreme interpretations of Islam for its rationale, its ideology and to varying degrees its motivation, and whose focus is not limited to any one national or ethnic milieu’ (Pillar, 2011:7). However, the causes of this specific form of terrorism do not differ from terrorism in general. Terrorism based on religion, in this case the Islam, claims that current politics are immoral and that the public life needs to be cleaned from this (Jurgensmeyer, 1997:20). Jihadi terrorism is thus legitimized by religion, however their causes do not have to differ from non-religious terrorism (Kalyvas, 2014). Terrorist use their tactics thus as a mean to reach a certain goal, that is why terrorism is seen as a rational act (Crenshaw, 1981:385; McCarten et al., 2008:61).

§2. Regional Security Complex Theory The regional security complex theory is about how security is clustered in regions. The theory used in this thesis is developed by Buzan and Waever. The theory is based on the regionalist perspective, which is a mix of both neorealism and globalism (Buzan and Waever, 2003:11). It uses the neorealist focus on territory and security, however, while neorealism is state centric regionalism is focussed on the region. Regionalism uses the globalist claim that deterritorialisation is taking place (Buzan and Waever, 2003:11). In contrast to globalism, regionalism argues that the logic of territoriality is still important in the domain of security. This is because ‘threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:12). However, while globalism does not address the security perspective, regionalism argues that globalisation is constructed as a threat, it is securitized2. ‘Securitisation processes around the world’ are according to Buzan and Waever, ‘in some essential ways caused by the bundle of developments captured in in the term globalisation’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:12). The different reactions on the globalisation processes, result in different outcomes, often clustered in regions (Buzan and Waever, 2003:13/44). Based on these premises Buzan and Waever developed the regional security complex theory. Buzan and Waever claim that countries are not globally ‘integrated in security terms’ (Buzan and Weaver, 2003:43). They argue that in contrast this is the case in region. In this regions states and/or other units must be ‘together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered spate from each other’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:43). A region security complex is thus a subsystem whereby security interaction is mostly internal (Buzan and Waever, 2003:41). Security and securitisation is determined in regions by ‘rivalry, balance-of- power and alliance patterns’ within a regional security complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003:47). However, even though the regions are the central units used in this theory, also other units and actors outside the region are important, this is because, the region is also influenced by actors outside the region. Who those actors are and how they relate with security is explained in the next section. The regional security complex theory says that there are three types of powerful actors: super powers, great powers and regional powers. ‘Super powers and great powers have the ability to execute securitization in countries that are not part of their own regional security

2 Securitization is the process in which issues got constructed in a way that they become threat. ‘A successful securitisation rests on the capacity of a securitising actor […] to ‘speak security’, that is, to present a certain problem as an existential threat that challenges the survival of a referent object, in a way that resonates with a ‘significant audience’’ (Mavelli, 2013:164) . 20 complex, while regional powers only have the ability to do this in their own region (Buzan and Waever, 2003:34). Because of this, super powers and great powers affect the global security dynamics. When countries actually interfere in other regions they penetrate: they make alignments with states outside their own region (Buzan and Waever, 2003:46). Super powers have this ability because they have ‘first-class military-political capabilities […], and the economies to support such capabilities’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:34). Great powers do not have as much power as super powers, however because other countries have the expectation that they are going to become super powers they gain power. Thus for great powers it is not about the actual capabilities they have, but about the potential to become a super power (Buzan and Waever, 2003:35). How an regional security complex develops and arises, depends on ‘the anarchic structure’, ‘its balance-of-power consequences’ and geographical factors (Buzan and Waever, 2003:45). Regional security complexes are characterised by historical and cultural factors. Some countries do not fit in one region, they are called insulators (Buzan and Waever, 2003:41). They are effected by more than one region, an example is Afghanistan. There are different types of regional security complexes, there is in the first place a distinction between standard and centred regional security complexes. A standard regional security complex is ‘Westpahlian in form with two or more powers and a predominantly military-political security agenda’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:55). A centred regional security complex has three manifestations: two are based on an unipolar system with either a great power or a super power, and the last one is a system in which a region is ‘integrated by institutions’ – in this type of a regional security complex desecuritisation takes place instead of the usual securitisation. Beside the distinction between centred and standard regional security complexes, it is also possible that a regional security complex has more than one great power or that is part of a supercomplex. When there is more than one great power in a region this has as consequence that there is a bigger impact globally. The region of the great powers than does not have that much influence on how great powers interact, except when there are (security) problems inside the regional security complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003:59). A supercomplex is a interregional complex in which a superregional level replaces the weak interregional level (Buzan and Waever, 2003:60). However, supercomplexes do not override the regional dynamics. Supercomplexes have as consequence that when alliances are formed this does not only effects the regional level but also the global level. A country’s security and international security is thus, according to the regional security complex theory, determined by factors inside the regional security complex

21 and by super powers and great powers that have the ability to interfere in other regions than their own. Pakistan is part of the South Asian regional security complex – which includes Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives; insulators are Afghanistan and Myanmar – and is part of the Asian supercomplex – which also includes South-East Asia, China and Australia. The South Asian regional security complex arose in 1947, as a conflict formation (Buzan and Waever, 2003:101). In 2003 – when the book of Buzan and Waever was written – the regional security complex was characterized by a continuity of violence on domestic level in the different countries and also conflicts between countries, especially between Pakistan and India, kept going on. Pakistan itself had to deal with: the unrest in Afghanistan and actually involved in the conflict; securitisation between the different religious identities in the country; and its own weak state, as consequence Pakistan became increasingly an unstable fragmented state (Buzan and Waever, 2003:107/117). While before Pakistan was a challenger of India to be a regional power, in 2003 it looked like it was losing that position. Finally the South Asian regional security complex is also penetrated by countries outside the complex. In the first place by the United States, because Pakistan has nuclear weapons: ‘the United States could not afford to let Pakistan fall apart’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003:115). Also the role of China as great power is important: there has always been rivalry between China and India, this reflects in the support from China to Pakistan. In the chapter on regional causes the developments of the last 12 years are going to be expound.

§3. Colonization and the Rise of Institutions In this thesis the focus is on the rise of violence in Pakistan; the thesis will investigate, among other things, if the violence in Pakistan is related with a colonial past. This paragraph links colonialization and decolonization with state failure, an extreme form of a weak state. As mentioned in the theories about the rise of violence, being a weak state is one of the most important conditions that favour violence. State failure happens, according to Robert Rotberg, when states fail to deliver public goods to the public (Rotberg, 2004:4). This based on the expectation that nation-states must ‘provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders)’ (Rotberg, 2004:2). The most important public good is security (Rotberg, 2004:3). When there is a sufficient amount of security, the state is able to supply other

22 political goods. If a state fails depends thus on the degree in which a state is able to deliver public goods to all inhabitants (Rotberg, 2004:4). Iqbal and Starr did research on the effect of state failure on the region. They claim that a failed state causes unrest, instability, interstate, and civil wars in the region (Iqbal and Starr, 2008:328). This is especially the case for civil and interstate war, as mentioned in the regional security complex theory. However, state failure itself does not spread throughout the region. Bertocchi and Burezoni argue that the most important causes of state weakness are institutional factors, such as ethnic diversity, governance, civil liberties, conflicts and revolutions (Bertocchi and Buerzoni, 2012:773/779). To conclude if a states fails, is determined by their own institutions and/or failure in the region. State failure is related with colonization and decolonization since those processes establish institutions and those institutions determine among other things, if a state is likely to fail. Decolonization must be understand as a period, in which institutions undergo a substantial subnational change (Kenny, 2015:145). Jackson and Rosberg both did research on why former African colonies remain weak states. One of the reasons they mention is that when the states were colonized, the colonizer did not take the distribution of ethnicity into account (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:14; Jackson, 1987:525). When the colonies became independent this resulted in a raise of both national and ethnic political awareness. As result ethnic groups wanted to have their own independent states, however the former colonial borders were used (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:15). The state Pakistan arose independent from India, because of the claim for a separate Muslim state (Ahsan, 2003:351). This because British India was dominated by Hindus, they were afraid to lose their identity (Ahsan, 2003:352/354). However, the Muslim population in Pakistan ethnically diverse (Haleem, 2003:467). Acemoglu et al. did research on why institutions differed in colonies. This is important because the institutions established by the colonial power are still present, they did not disappear with decolonization (Acemoglu, et al., 2001:1370). Accordingly they still have an impact on the current institutions. Acemoglu et al. argue that the different institutions in different former colonies, can be explained by the differences in colonial experience (Acemoglu et al. 2001:1395). The colonies all had different forms of institutions, since the circumstances in all the colonies were different. The way in which institutions were established depended on the colonial power and on the ability to settle safely in a colony (Acemoglu et al., 2001:1373). When the conditions to settle were favourable for the colonizer, they settled in large numbers and developed institutions that protected their investments, property, et cetera, they governed by direct rule. If the conditions were unfavourable to settle, institutions were not developed

23 because extractive institutions would be more profitable and thus colonies were governed by indirect rule. Lange found a negative relationship between indirect rule and the postcolonial level of development (Lange, 2004:917). When colonialized states became independent, the newly established states did not always satisfy the qualifications of a state, they lacked institutions as a sustainable economic and political system and they did not have people with experience how to govern. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:16; Jackson, 1987:526). Because of this, the decolonized states became with their independence weak states – Jackson calls them quasi-states. Former colonies usually adopted the legal system from their colonizer, both voluntary and involuntary (La Porta, 1998:1126). Generally spoken in common-law countries – countries that have a law system that has its origins in England – have strong law enforcement (La Porta, 1998:1115/1151). When Pakistan became independent the Western educated class came into power, as consequence a gap between the elite and the mass. ‘This gap […] was filled by scores of religious leaders and activists throughout the country’ (Ahsan, 2003:355).

§4. Conclusion

Figure one summarizes the theoretical framework. The factors that are coloured in blue are from the symbolic action theory, the factors coloured in orange are from the rational choice theory, the factor that is coloured orange and blue is from both theories and the blank factors are part of the other theories used in this research. The striped line indicates the factors that influence Pakistan because it is former colony.

Figure 1. Theoretical Framwork

Chapter 3. Methodology

Based on the final diagram of the previous chapter, this chapter expounds which variables are investigated, how they are operationalized and with which data they are examined.

§1. Variables As the diagram in chapter two shows, there are many variables that influence the arise of civil violence , or the increase in intensity of the violence. There is also some overlap and disagreement in the theories. This thesis examines which factors and accompanying theory best explains the situation in Pakistan in the last 13 years. The dependent variable in this research is the increasing violence in Pakistan since 9/11. Because of the different theories used there are many independent variables that must be examined to understand why the violence in Pakistan is increasing since 9/11. First, the rational choice theory emphasizes that state weakness is an important factor that increases the chance of civil violence. Besides state weakness, variables as large population, poverty, political instability, a weak economy, existing (private) grievances – often from previous conflicts – and alliances between the centre and periphery increase the chance of civil violence. The symbolic action theory and the rational choice theory have some independent variables in common. In the first place, both state that the colonial past increases the chance of civil violence. According to the rational choice theory this is because indirect rule increases the chance of state weakness and on a weak economy. For the symbolic action theory the chance of violence increases because decolonialization does not take ethnicity into account, and therefore former colonies can have a diverse ethnic population. According to the symbolic action theory, ethnic diversity is a condition for civil violence, because between the ethnic groups emotions of fear and hatred can arise. Those feelings are based on identity, created among other things by nationalism, ethnicity, religion and language. When negative emotions between different groups arise this increases the probability of civil violence. Politicians can increase those emotions by chauvinistic political mobilization. In the case of Pakistan, it is not only chauvinism that must be taken into account, but also the propagation of extremist religions. This is related to the (private) grievances and the alliances between centre and periphery as described in the rational choice theory. Also conflicts in the past, chauvinistic political mobility, a security dilemma and ethnic groups that are excluded from state power are factors that, according to the symbolic action theory, increase the probability of civil violence.

Finally, it is important to understand the influence of international factors on Pakistan, for this purpose variables based on the regional security complex theory are used. To understand the influence of factors outside Pakistan, the relations between Pakistan and the regional power of the South Asian security complex, great powers and super powers must be taken into account. The next paragraph explains how the variables mentioned above are going to be operationalized.

§2. Operationalization

Civil violence The most important variable is the dependent variable civil violence. Civil violence is the preliminary stage of a civil war. It is violence within a state, it has a national character and can be executed by the government as well as citizens – usually violent citizens are united in groups – and targets also can be both government and citizens. There is a grey area between a civil war and civil violence, it is difficult to determine if a civil conflict converted into a civil war.

Indirect Rule in a Colony Indirect rule in colonies took place, if conditions were unfavourable to settle in the colony. Indirect rule is operationalized by the tax-system: when a colony was governed by indirect rule the taxes were mostly collected by local landlords, while when the colony was directly ruled the colonizer itself collected the taxes.

Weak State Pakistan is known as a weak state. For this research it is in the first place important to understand why Pakistan is called a weak state. Weak states fail in delivering public goods. To measure this, in this research the security, infrastructure and education levels are taken into account. The level of security is based the monopoly of violence by the government and on the amount of violence in Pakistan. Infrastructure is measured by actual infrastructure, the supply of water and finally the supply of electricity. Finally the level of education is measured by the average amount of years people had education, by illiteracy and the amount of public schools. Besides these three factors, also the Failed State Index is used to give an overall picture on Pakistan and to compare it with other countries.

Instability at the Political Centre The most extreme form of instability at the political centre is when governments are taken over by coups, or other forms of involuntary resignation. Moderate forms of instability take place when the government is frequently replaced and if politicians are replaced.

Economy The strength of Pakistan’s economy is determined by the level of economic growth, inflation and by its diversity. Besides that, poverty is also measured. This is done using the Gini-index based on the number of people that live below the poverty line and on inequality in the country.

Identity Identity is formed in the process of identification, in this process someone categorizes himself in ‘particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications’ (Sets and Burke, 2000:224). Every person has his own unique identity, based on social categories and where somebody positions himself. This research focuses on identity based on people’s ethnic background, religion and language. Identity based on ethnic background cannot be changed, because it is fixed by birth. In contrast, religion and language are interchangeable and therefore identity based on those factors can be influenced by other actors. Education can influence religion and language. The influence of education on identity in Pakistan is determined by classifying the schools according to religion and language.

Grievances Grievances are difficult to measure, especially private grievances. The best method is to interview people from Pakistan, however this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to measure private grievances. Nevertheless non private grievances can be measured by the use of proxies. In the first place discrimination is used as a proxy, because discrimination can create grievances. Discrimination is measured by looking at the exclusion of ethnic groups from state power, both in the national government and in the provincial governments. This done by expounding the division of seats from 1999 in both the provincial and national governments. Discrimination is also examined by measures against ethnic/religious/linguistic groups. Secondly conflict in the past is used as proxy, because as argued in the rational choice theory, conflict creates grievances. Thirdly, a more direct method to measure grievances is to examine if political parties and violent groups dehumanize and/or label other groups as an enemy. This is researched by analysing the party programmes of the main political parties. The propaganda

28 material on the internet of violent groups is used. Both the political parties and violent groups are also analysed if and how they legitimize violence, because this will show their attitude towards other groups.

Security Dilemma A security dilemma arises when actors are uncertain about the intentions of other actors. Because of the secrecy around security issues, it is difficult to directly measure if there is a security dilemma. Therefore, two proxies are used. In the first place the outcome of peace deals are examined. If these and negotiations often fail, this creates distrust between the actors and thus a security dilemma can arise. Secondly the type of weapons and the type of assaults are analysed. If these become more sophisticated over time for both parties, probably an arms race is evolving and this is a sign that there is a security dilemma.

Alliances between Centre and Periphery Alliances between the centre and periphery are difficult to measure directly, but as mentioned in chapter two, alliances are often based on the exchange of local knowledge for the government and increasing the power of local groups by the government. For this research the exchange of local knowledge is impossible to measure. However, increasing power of local groups can be seen by the spread of weapons from the government and by actual support from the army to local groups. Because it is difficult to receive primary data on arms supply and the reason of this support, government reports and scientific articles are used to described these two factors as completely as possible.

International Influences According to the regional security complex theory, countries can be influenced by both regional powers from their own regional security complex, and by super powers and great powers throughout the whole world. To examine if Pakistan is influenced by those countries, the security policy of the country is analysed, focussing on sudden changes in this policy. Additionally aid towards Pakistan and economic deals between Pakistan and regional powers, super powers and great powers are analysed. Finally also state failure in the region is taken into account. If neighbouring states have failed this is determined by the use of the failed state index.

§3. Data For this research mostly secondary literature is used. The data from this literature focusses on describing the violence in Pakistan, data sets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program and START are used and also reports from the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace are used. To describe Pakistan’s history scientific articles are used from magazines as Asian Survey and Foreign Affairs. To describe Pakistan in general again rapports from the International Crisis Group are used and additionally also reports for the UN Development Programme and data from the CIA Factbook are used. Data from the IMF and World Bank are used to analyse the economy. Primary data is used to investigate grievances. If available the websites of violent groups, are used. The party manifestos are used to investigate political parties. To examine if parties are excluded from politics, the division of seats in the provincial and national government are examined. The data for this is collected from official websites of the Pakistani government.

§4. Structure of the Thesis In chapter four Pakistan as a country is explained. Its history, government, society and the violence are expounded. Chapter five is about factors that according to the rational choice theory causes civil conflict. This chapter investigates if those factors are present in Pakistan. The following chapter, expounds the factors that according to symbolic action theorists, cause civil conflict. Chapter seven investigate if international influences are the cause of the civil violence in Pakistan. And finally, the thesis is concluded with a conclusion and discussion.

Chapter 4. Pakistan This chapter examiness in a more or less chronical order Pakistan as country. This is necessary because Pakistan is a complex country, with a relative short but turbulent history that still affects the country to the present day. This chapter explains the (political) history and society of Pakistan, focussing on the different ethnic and religious groups living inside Pakistan. Finally, the chapter explains the violence in Pakistan, the past and also the present violence. The description, however, remains a summary and describes Pakistan by and large, consequently it misses some details of the complex history and society of Pakistan.

§1. Establishment of Pakistan In the second half of the 19th century the British India government decided that it was their responsibility to Westernize British India by introducing Western and Christian education (Ahsan, 2003:352). As part of this program, the British started to reform the political system whereby representatives of various communities could join the Imperial Legislative council. In 1885 this led to the establishment of the National Congress, with a Hindu dominance in the government and bureaucracy. Because of this Muslims, which were a minority in British India, became afraid that they would be dominated by Hindus. This caused the establishment of a Muslim identity. This identity and the resulting (religious) nationalism were based on the Islam (Ahsan, 2003:353-354). To defend the Muslims’ interests in the National Congress, the All- India Muslim League was established. This party was led by a small Muslim elite from Muslim minority provinces, to a large extent not located in current Pakistan. Even though the party was based on the Islam, the party can be better described as a secular nationalist group of Muslims who felt economically threatened, not necessarily religiously (Khan, 1999:168). Hence, the party was focussed on the defence of Muslims as a community, not the Muslims as a religious community. At first the All-India Muslim League tried to improve the position of Muslims within British India, only in 1946 they started with promoting a separate state for the Indian Muslims (Khan, 1999:169). Earlier , an independent India was proposed as a confederation with a weak political basis, with the provincial governments – based on either a Hindu-majority or a Muslim-majority population – having the most power (Biaxas, 2008:3). However, because the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the All-Indian Muslim league could not reach an agreement on how to establish this situation the British agreed with a two state solution. As a consequence, British India split up two separate states in 1947: India – with a majority of Hindus – and Pakistan – with a majority of Muslims. Important to note is that, before separation

31 none of the Muslim provinces located in current Pakistan, advocated the two nation state solution.

§2. Creating a nation state When Pakistan was a part of the British Indian Empire it was governed for about 60% by indirect rule – this is an estimation, because there is no data available for Pakistan alone, only data for the whole of British India (Lange, 2004:909) In Punjab and KPK there were almost no institutions. Because the British recruited soldiers from these districts, it was more important to keep the people satisfied, and thus the tribal and feudal society was kept intact (Ghaznavi, 1990)When Pakistan became independent it did not have any form of established government, ‘Pakistan had to create a new capital and a new government’, because ‘the existing state apparatus had remained in India’ (Ahsan 2003:356 and Subrahmanyam, 2006:108). It had no army, bureaucracy and most importantly it did not have any base for a constitution. After almost 10 years – in 1956 – the first constitution was declared. This constitution stated that only law that was consistent with the Quran and Sunnah could exist (Khan, 1999:178). Pakistan also became an Islamic republic, however, the Islam did not become the official religion of Pakistan. Since the existence of Pakistan there has been disagreement on how the Islam as a state religion could be brought in practice (Ahsan, 2003:359). After the establishment of the first constitution, the President planned to appoint a commission which would advise on how to implement the Islam in law. However, this commission never came into being, because in 1958 a coup took place by British trained civil and military bureaucrats. The new military government made a new constitution which became effective in 1962. This constitution decreased the role of Islam (Khan, 1999:178). Accordingly orthodox Islamic organizations protested. To prevent riots, the Islamic elements that were removed from the previous constitution, were replaced. After the partition of Bangladesh another constitution was set up. In this constitution a commitment to an Islamic moral standard was mentioned and the Islam became the official religion of Pakistan (Ahsan, 2003: 359; Khan, 1999:178). However, again the government failed to bring the Islam in practice. To fulfil the demands for a state directed by Islam, arbitrary ‘Islamic’ rules such as that alcohol was prohibited and Friday became a public holiday instead of Sunday came into force. Nonetheless, these rules did not have any effect on the general well-being of inhabitants of Pakistan, which caused an overall hatred against President Bhutto. In 1977 President Bhutto was removed by the army.

After Bhutto, General Zia-ul-Haq came into power. He led Pakistan from 1977 till 1988 by a military dictatorship, and under which the 1973 constitution was abolished (Federal Research Division, 2005:18). Under his regime the Islam became part of the public life. Zia-ul- Haq used the Islam to legitimize his sometimes cruel policies, which included public hanging, sexism, intolerance et cetera (Khan, 1988:180). In 1988 Zia-ul-Haq died by an plane crash – under suspicious circumstances – and the period of military dictatorship ended. After his death democratic elections took place and the following governments all continued with increasing the role of Islam in public life. The powerful army, however, did not wanted to lose influence in Pakistan’s politics. (Pattanaik, 2004:275). To maintain influence, they supported their favourite political parties with money and muscle. The democratically chosen governments, in the 1990s all had problems with ethnic conflict, with the economy and with a lack of legislative support (Federal Research Division, 2005:4). Besides that, none of prime ministers was able to stay until the end of his term of office. In 1999 the military took over the government. General Musharraf became both president and chief of army staff and suspended – as Zia-ul-Haq had done – the 1973 constitution until 2002. This paragraph shows the turbulent political history of Pakistan, with many coups and a considerable influence of the army. The next part of this paragraph explains how the political system of Pakistan should work, according to the 1973 constitution.

§2.1. Pakistan’s Political System ‘Pakistan has a federal parliamentary system, with a President as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of government’, together they are the executive power (Federal Research Division, 2005:18). The president, who must be a Muslim, is chosen for five years by ‘an electoral college composed of members of the national and provincial legislatures’. ‘The prime minister is an elected member of the National Assembly and is the leader of the National Assembly’s dominant party or coalition’, however the prime minister must also be formally appointed by the president. The parliament is called Majlis-i-Shoora and is made up of a Lower House – the National Assembly – and the Upper House – the Senate, they are the legislative power. Members of the National Assembly are directly chosen by the electorate for five-years. 2013 was the first time in Pakistan’s history that a freely chosen democratic government handed over the power to another freely chosen government. Before, either a democratic government was disposed by the army or President, or the elections were organised by the army. The Senate members are chosen by the provincial assemblies. The National Assembly and Senate differ in that the National Assembly alone has authority over the federal budgets. 33

Pakistan is divided in four provinces – Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjub and Sindh – and several federally administered areas – Islamabad, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit- Baltistan which are both part of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir areas and the 13 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs). Map two shows where the provinces and federally administered areas are located. The federally administered areas are directly governed by the federal government. The federal government alone has authority over the Federal Legislative list, these are subjects such as external affairs, defence, taxes, citizenship, national highways, natural resources, industrial development et cetera. The provinces have shared control with the federal government over the so called Concurrent Legislative list, which are subjects as ‘civil and criminal law, transfer of property and registration, population planning, social welfare, environment, tourism and electricity’ (ICG, 2006:5). However, the federal government can override the provincial government on these subjects. The remaining subjects are under control of the provincial governments.

Map 2. Pakistan: Administrative Divisions. Source: CIA, 2015.

§3. Ethnicity and Religion in Pakistan Pakistan has a population of 196 million people. The population has an ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. After the establishment of Pakistan there are seven major ethnic groups living inside the country: Bengalis, Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Sariaki, Baloch and Muhajir (Khan, 1999:167). With the partition of East-Pakistan the Bengalis disappeared as major ethnic group – as they were mostly living in Bangladesh. Map 3 shows the division of the ethnic groups and how the ethnic groups are spread throughout Pakistan. Important to note, is that this map makes a distinction between Jats and Punjabis, however, this distinction is not always made. The ethnic division in Pakistan is as follows: Punjabis 24,62%, Jats 22,76%, Pashtuns 17,89% Sindhis 11,2% Saraikis 10,23%, Muhajirs 7,17%, Baluch 3,57%. Besides the ethnic division this map also shows the population density. The majority of the Pakistani population lives in the East of Pakistan. Punjab and Sind are both densely mixed populated provinces. Punjab is to a large extent populated by Punjabis, Jats and Saraikis, and there are also some small ethnic groups living in Punjab. In Sind the majority of the population is Sindhi, also two other major ethnic groups, the Baluchs and Muhajirs are living in Sindhi. The FATA and KPK districts are both mostly populated by Pashtuns, with in the north of KPK and other some small ethnic groups. The Balochistan and the Gilgit-Baltistan district are both to a great extent sparsely populated. In Gilgit-Baltistan are several ethnic groups. This is also the case in the north of Balochistan however in the South – the most homogenous part of Pakistan – the majority of the population is Baluch. Map 4, shows how Pakistan is divided linguistically. The map shows many similarities with the ethnic division of Pakistan. This is because most of the ethnic groups in Pakistan have their own language. Even though Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, it is only the mother tongue of 7,57% of the citizens . Urdu is mostly spoken by Muhajirs.

Map 3. Pakistan, Ethnic groups. Source: Izady, 2014a.

Map 4. Pakistan, Languages. Source: Izady, 2014b. Besides the difference in ethnicity, Pakistan also has different religious groups. This is shown in map 5. The majority of the Pakistanis is Islamic, with a Sunni majority and a Shia minority. Besides the Islam, there is small Christian and Hindu minority. There are also some other religions in Pakistan, however as indicated in map 5 they are either small, or small Islamic movements – for example Wahhabism/Salafism. The map indicates that in the west of Pakistan the majority is Sunni, however there are some mixed Sunni-Shia regions. In the east of Pakistan – Punjab and Sindhi – the population is more mixed. The only area where the Shia are a majority is located in the centre of Sindhi. In both Punjab and Sindhi the border regions are populated with, other than Islamic, religious minorities.

Pakistan is thus an ethnically, a linguistically and religiously divided country. Especially the ethnic and linguistic division has a geographical basis. The division of religion is when compared to these two more mixed throughout the country. However, the different ethnic groups do also live together in some areas – especially in urban areas – and most importantly all these different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups do share one state with one national government. The next paragraph expounds on the conflicts between all these different groups.

Map 5. Pakistan, Religions. Source: Izady 2014c.

§4. Conflict and Violence in Pakistan As became clear in the first two paragraphs of this chapter, Pakistan has a turbulent history. The two paragraphs did not mention conflict in Pakistan specifically, this paragraph will expound on the highlights of the history of conflict and the current violence.

§4.1. History of Violence In 1946 – one year before the partition of British India – violence with a purificatory character started to take place, between the different religious communities. Previous to this, there was always violence between the different religious and ethnic groups in British India, however this generally took place on a local level. In 1946 and 1947 the violence on a local level was used by elite leaders as support for their interests on national level (Gilmartin, 1998:1085). The violence was framed in the partition frame and then connected to the Muslim and Hindu territorial claims. People who were living on the wrong side of the territory, had to leave. Because violence had been the instrument to ‘solve’ local conflicts, violence became the method to move people from the ‘wrong’ side (Gilmartin, 1998:1086). As a consequence of their former loyalty to the British rulers, after partition Muhajirs – who were mostly ‘immigrants’ from current India – and the Punjabis dominated the Pakistani state system (Khan, 1999:171/172). They favoured their own ethnic groups and regions, which led to discontent within other ethnic groups and regions. The government tried to solve this with centralizing and homogenising of culture. The most important measure was imposing Urdu – which was only the language of 3.7% of the population, mostly Muhajirs – as national language. In 1972 a linguistic conflict between the Muhajirs and Sindhis arose in Sindh, when the Sindh Assembly passed a bill that identified Sindhi as the language of the province, however the national government banned this law (Haq, 1995:992/993). Besides the linguistic conflict, conflict arose because Bhutto – a Sindhi – imposed an urban-rural quota, which led to the fear of Muhajirs that they would lose their jobs and socio-economic states (Ahmar, 1996:1033). In the same period a conflict also arose between East- and West-Pakistan. The Bengalis living in East-Pakistan felt neglected, among other things because the Bengali language was not recognized and they did not feel represented in the bureaucracy seated in West-Pakistan (Ahsan, 2003:360/361 and Baixas, 2008:5). In 1971 this led to the Civil War in East-Pakistan and finally to the separation of East-Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. Since the establishment of Pakistan there has been conflict between the Baluch who want to become independent, and the central government. Baluchistan is the largest province of

Pakistan, however it is also the least populated province (Baixas, 2008:9). The majority of the Baluch are a part of the Hanafi Sunni sect (ICG, 2006:3). The Baluch felt neglected because the central government ignored their appeal for political and administrative autonomy. Besides that, Baluchistan’s natural resources were exploited by the national government, while Baluchistan did not receive any compensation (ICG, 2006:4). The conflict between the Baluch and the national government is fought on several levels: by using actual violence, by banning Baluch opposition, political leaders et cetera and by arming Pashtun Islamist parties in Baluchistan that could counter the Baluch (ICG, 2006:6). The conflict between the Baluch and the national government is an ongoing conflict although it does differ in intensity. The arming of Islamist parties by the government did not only take place as a tactic to fight the Baluch, but also to fight in (Indian) Kashmir against India and in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Stern, 2000:118/119). An example is the support of the Taliban in the 1990s. The arming of Islamist groups is one of the origins of the ongoing Jihadi violence in Pakistan (Riedel, 2008:32). The problems for Pakistan with those violent organizations arose when the interests of the government and of the militant groups were not aligned anymore (Stern, 2000:116). The militant groups started to kill civilians, commit terrorist acts that damaged Pakistan’s international reputation and it increased sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia populations. This started to increase because the Shia living in this area stopped to support the mujahidin (ICG, 2009:15). Since then both sects have their own extremist groups that commit violence on members of other sects.

§4.2 Current Violence Since 2001 the violence in Pakistan increased dramatically. There is violence between different tribes – mainly in FATA – between Islamic extremist groups, the government and Islamic groups, the government and separatists and finally groups against Pakistanis in general (UCDP, 2014b; UCDP, 2014c; UCDP, 2014d). As a consequence of the rise of violence the number of casualties increased as well (UCDP, 2014a). The next two sub-paragraphs expound the two main categories of violence in Pakistan.

§4.2.1 Baluchistan Baluchistan is since the establishment of Pakistan a turbulent province. However, after a period of relative peace in the 1990s – because of democratic opportunities for the Baloch nationalists – Musharraf centralised power back to the national government which led to dissatisfaction by the Baloch nationalists (ICG, 2006:7/8). Even though there were incidents, it remained

41 relatively quiet in the district. In 2002 – after three years of military rule by Musharraf – democratic elections were held. Before the elections the military tried to counter their opponents by alliancing with the mullahs and their Muttahida Majils-i-Amal (MMA) party, which are opponents of the Baluch. After the elections Baluchistan was governed by a coalition of the MMA and the Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) – Musharraf’s party. In an attempt to keep the Baloch satisfied a Baloch chief minister is appointed, however he almost had no power. The refusal of the army to investigate a rape, led in 2005 to an actual conflict in Baluchistan (ICG, 2006:8). Militants attacked security forces, and gas plants and pipelines, which caused problems with the supply of gas throughout Pakistan. The army reacted with an insurgency in Baluchistan, whereby civilians were killed. When in 2006 the military killed Bugti – the leader of the Baluch resistance – this led to even more violence, a spiral of violence arose (ICG, 2006:9). More young Baloch started to join the resistance movement, which in turn led to the increasing presence of the army, with as a consequence more anger and Baloch violence. Important actors of the current violence in Baluchistan are the militant groups Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) (UCDP, 2014d). Those three organizations commit the most violence acts, however there are more militant organizations active in Baluchistan. The three organisations carry out (terrorist) attacks against the Pakistani army, natural resource plants, infrastructure et cetera (START, 2013). The BLF is the oldest organisation, established in 1964, however after a conflict in the 1970s, it was inactive until 2009 (UCDP, 2014d). The BLA was established in 2002 as a reaction to the expropriation of the natural resources located in Baluchistan (Siddiqi, 2012:164). After the unrest in 2005 BLA started to became more a nationalist organisation focussed on an independent Baluchistan, this also changed the violence. Until 2005 the violence was mostly focussed on the Pakistani army and on people and organisations that made the exploitation of natural resources possible, after 2005 the Punjabi-speaking community in Baluchistan was also seen as an enemy and became a target of Balochi violence (Siddiqi, 2012:166). This led to an increase in ethnic tensions and violence in Baluchistan in the last ten years. The BRA was established in 2006 as a reaction to the violence by the Pakistani army (BRA, 2013).

§4.2.2 Muslim Extremism & Violence Pakistan has to deal with both Sunni and Shia extremism, however the violence that has arisen since 2001 is to a large extent violence caused by Sunni extremist groups (START, 2013; World Bank, 2010:45/46). The majority of this type of violence takes place in FATA and in the PATA parts of KPK (ICG, 2009:1/2). Those areas are all located close to the Afghanistan border. Even though the origins of these groups are to a large extent located in areas of Pashtun, they also tend to commit violence outside these areas . Terrorist attacks are chiefly carried out throughout the country – for example the attacks on the Marriot Hotel in 2009 and the attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi in 2014. The violence in FATA and PATA occurs between many different groups in various combinations which makes it difficult to trace down the violence to a specific group. To make it more complicated, it is often unknown who carried out the attack. The insurgencies and the actual confrontations between different extremist groups and the government and the extremist groups are for the greater part centred in the FATA and PATA districts. In the period from 2001 to 2013 7511 terrorist attacks were committed (START, 2013). Graph 1 shows the number of terrorist attacks each year, from 2001 to 2013. Since 2007 there was an especially large increase in the number of terrorist attacks. Most of these attacks were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), they are responsible for 11.5% of the total number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan and responsible for 51,3% of the attacks where the terrorist organization were identified. (START, 2013). The groups related with violence in Baluchistan are together responsible for 4.3% of the terrorist attacks and 17.7% where the terrorist organization were identified. Two other groups that are responsible for a relative large number of attacks are Lashakr-e-Islam (1.1% / 4.8%) and Laskhakr-e-Jangvi (LJ) (0.9% / 4.2%). Both are extremist Sunni organisations. These low percentages show – even though these percentages show only who commit terrorist attacks – how the violence in Pakistan is splintered. Besides that, most terrorist attacks are committed by unknown terrorists. Because of the large number of extremist groups it is impossible to analyse and mention them all in this thesis.

Amount of Terrorist Attacks per Year 2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Graph 1 Number of Terrorist Attacks per Year. (START, 2013) The TTP is at the moment the most important Muslim extremist group in Pakistan, it can be seen as an umbrella organisation for Sunni extremist organisations in Pakistan (Yamin and Malik 2104:9). It is linked with international organisations and with other Sunni groups in Pakistan. The role of LJ is important, and form a nexus between al-Qaeda and the TTP (ICG, 2009:7). The TTP allies as well with Jaish-e-Mohammed, which is focussed on the Jihad in Kashmir. The former leader and founder of the TNSM –– terrorist organisation, Faqir Mohammad, was one of the senior commanders of the TTP (Yusufzai, 2009:1). In Pakistan the TTP is the central actor in the Jihadi network. However, the TTP as organisation also has to deal with internal struggles (Yamin and Malik, 2014:9/10). When the founder, Hehsud, was killed the TTP fractured into many splinter groups; the new leader, Fazlullah, lacked the authority to rule the whole TTP. However, the TTP remains a powerful organisation, that is capable of executing major terrorist attacks – such as the Peshawar school attack in December 2014 – and other (sectarian) violence. The extremist violence that has taken place since 2005, is characterized by attacks on symbols of the state in general, while previously the majority of the attacks was concentrated on attacks towards Shia Muslims and other religious and sectarian minorities (ICG, 2009:3). This original type violence, however, did not decrease when attacks on state symbols started to arise. The extremist groups received support from the government, however, when international pressure arose after the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf promised to stop this support and combat the extremist groups (ICG, 2009:4). Nevertheless the support went on by allowing militants to return to Pakistan after fighting in Afghanistan and even new jihadi groups emerged because of the failure to reform the education system. Especially in FATA and PATA the extremist groups

44 could operate freely, without any interference of the Pakistani army. In 2008 when democracy was recovered measures against the extremist groups were actually taken. Military operations that were set up caused civilian causalities and internally displaced people (IDP) and until now the military is not able to decrease the violence from extremist groups in Pakistan (ICG, 2013:2). The government tried several times to make peace deals with the extremist groups. These peace deals often contain the implementation of the Sharia in a PATA or FATA district, in return for ending violence and schooling for boys and girls (ICG, 2009:14; ICG, 2013:9). However, those peace deals often failed because extremist groups continued to increase their demands and when these were not met, they turned to violence again. Finally the city Karachi must be mentioned. This metropolitan city with eighteen million inhabitants, is a demographic jumble, which leads to ethnic tensions in the city (Yamin and Malik, 2014:13). All the different types of violence present throughout Pakistan are all represented in Karachi. The sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia groups in Pakistan occurs mainly in Karachi. Ethnic and religious groups fight each other in turf wars and are influenced by political parties (ICG, 2009:10; Yamin and Malik, 2014:13/14). Important political parties that are connected with violence are the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) – which represents the Muhajir community – the Awami National Party (ANP) – which is a Pashtun nationalist party – the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) – which allies with Baloch gangs – the Jamaat-e-Islami – an Islamic religious political party. Finally Karachi has to deal with capital crimes, that are carried out to finance the FATA and PATA based violence (ICG, 2009:10). The current violence in Pakistan is diverse, but in general characterised by either nationalist violence in Baluchistan or sectarian violence mostly concentrated in FATA and KPK. Terrorist attacks carried out by the violent groups, take place throughout Pakistan. These two types of violence are both represented in Karachi.

§5. Conclusion This chapter explained Pakistan as country and some of the problems it has to deal with, focussing on the (civil) violence in Pakistan. Pakistan has to deal with violent conflicts since it was established. According to both the rational choice theory and the symbolic action theory, conflict in the past is an factor that increases the chance of civil violence. In this chapter Pakistan’s diverse demographic composition is explained. For the symbolic action theory ethnic diversity is a condition for civil violence, because only then

45 grievances between these groups can arise as is the case in Pakistan. Chapter six will examine if there are grievances between the different ethnic and religious groups in Pakistan. For the rational choice theory a large population is a factor that increase the chance of violence, in Pakistan this is the case with a population of 200 million citizens. This chapter also mentions the indirect rule in Pakistan when it was part of the British India. Indirect rule influences the economy and negatively affects the strength of a state. The next chapter, that tests the rational choice theory, will examine if this is the case for Pakistan.

Chapter 5. Rational Choice in the Current Conflict In this chapter the rational choice theory is tested. According to the rational choice theory, certain factors are required, if those are not present civil conflict cannot arise. These factors are a weak state, a large population, a weak economy, poverty, instability in the political centre, and alliances between the centre and periphery. The first paragraph expounds if Pakistan is a weak state. Secondly, Pakistan’s economy is analysed. After that, the instability in the political centre is measured. And finally, alliances between centre and periphery are investigated.

§1. Weak State To measure Pakistan’s state weakness, the fragile state index from The Fund For Peace (FFP) is used. Since 2005 this organisation measures the strength of almost all the states in the world. A weak state fails in providing citizens public goods. The fragile state index indicated several categories that represent the public goods a strong state must provide to its citizens. For each category a country can receive points from zero to ten, whereby zero is the best score and ten is the worst score. The index also mentions some categories that are discussed in separate paragraphs in this thesis, this is because in the rational choice theories used, these factors are also mentioned separately; they thus have a larger impact on civil conflict than only increasing state weakness. Table 1 gives an outline of Pakistan’s results since 2005 – the first year that the fragile state index was drawn up. The table shows that Pakistan’s state strength declined during the last 10 years. This was especially the case in 2006, from then onwards Pakistan’s score fluctuates around 102 points. Since 2006 Pakistan’s ranking has been in the top 15 of weak states, this is high. In 2005 the FFP assigned Pakistan’s status as high warning, while from 2006 onwards it became high alert. The table shows that especially the social factors – indicated in green – declined. The demographic pressures in Pakistan increased, these pressures are natural disasters, diseases, pollution, population growth et cetera. Pakistan has to deal with natural disasters such as the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and the floods caused by the monsoon in 2010, 2011 and 2012 whereby millions of people are affected (ICG, 2009:8; ICG, 2012b:6). Pakistan also has a fast growing population (World Bank, 2014:22). Also the refugees and IDP pressure increased during the last ten years. The instability in Afghanistan has led to a stream of refugees towards Pakistan, this started at the end of the 1970s with the war and occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (Schöch, 2008:1) In total Pakistan hosts 1.63 million registered and 1.40 million unregistered Afghan refugees (ICG, 2014b: 18) The IDPs are an result of both natural disasters 47

2005 34 89,4 5,0 5,0 6,0 8,0 9,0 3,3 9,8 7,5 8,1 9,0 9,3 8,5

2006 9 103,1 9,3 9,3 8,6 8,1 8,9 7,0 8,5 7,5 8,5 9,1 9,1 9,2

2007 12 100,1 8,2 8,5 9,0 8,1 8,5 5,8 8,7 7,1 8,7 9,5 9,5 8,5

2008 9 103,8 8,0 8,6 9,5 8,1 8,8 6,2 9,5 7,1 9,5 9,6 9,8 9,1

2009 10 104,1 8,3 8,6 9,6 8,3 8,8 6,4 9,1 7,5 8,9 9,5 9,6 9,5

2010 10 102,5 8,1 8,9 9,4 7,9 8,4 6,2 8,9 7,3 8,9 9,7 9,5 9,3

2011 12 102,3 8,8 9,2 9,3 7,5 8,5 6,6 8,6 7,3 8,7 9,4 9,1 9,3

2012 13 101,6 8,5 9,0 9,6 7,2 8,2 7,2 8,3 7,0 8,6 9,3 9,1 9,4

2013 13 102,9 8,9 9,1 9,7 6,9 7,9 7,5 8,4 7,3 8,7 9,8 9,2 9,6

2014 10 103,0 8,8 8,8 10,0 6,9 7,6 7,5 8,5 7,6 8,6 9,9 9,5 9,3

2015 13 102,9 9,0 8.9 10,0 7,0 7,3 7,7 8,6 7,9 8,4 9,6 9,2 9,3

2010 13,2 101,4 8,3 8,5 9,1 7,6 8,4 6,5 8,8 7,4 8,7 9,5 9,4 9,2

Table 1. Fragile State Index. Source: FFP, 2005; FFP, 2006; FFP, 2007; FFP, 2008; FFP, 2009; FFP, 2010; FFP, 2011; FFP, 2012; FFP, 2013; FFP, 2014; and FFP, 2015. and violence inside Pakistan. Group grievance has risen to the maximum score of the FFP index, 10. This is measured by the violence between ethnic, sectarian and religious groups and the presence of communal violence, but also discrimination and the powerlessness of the government is taken into account. As explained in the previous chapter, this is all present in Pakistan. The only social indicator that declined in the last ten years is human flight. This indicator does not relate to people that flee to Pakistan, but about people fleeing from Pakistan. This indicator is based among other things on the brain drain3. Because economy and poverty are explained in the next paragraph, those indicators not covered here. The political and military indicators – indicated in blue – all have had scores of more than 8, except the public services. State legitimacy indicates the level of corruption, democracy, power struggles, effectiveness of the government et cetera. The indicator human

3 Brain drain or human capital flight, takes place when educated or professionals leave a country. This causes a loss of knowledge and skills. 48 rights is about the violation of human rights and the effectiveness of the rule of law. The score of the security apparatus is based on the monopoly of violence, as explained in chapter four, Pakistan does not have the monopoly of violence. The indicator factionalized elites, notifies if politicians or leaders are in a deadlock. This is going to be explained more deeply in paragraphs three and four. External intervention in Pakistan does take place, mainly by the United States. Because the role of international actors in Pakistan will be explained in chapter seven, for now it is only mentioned that there is external intervention, which negatively influences the strength of the state. Finally the indicator public services, which has in comparison to the other indicators a relatively low score. It indicates the level of provision of public services such as health care, education, and sanitation. In Pakistan the state fails to provide these services. Earthquakes, floods and violence destroyed for example school buildings throughout the country (International Crisis Group, 2014b:0). Pakistan has to deal with a high out-of-school population (World Bank, 2014:18). The average years of schooling was in 2000 3.3 years, this grew to 4.7 years in 2013 and almost 45% of the population is illiterate (UNDP, 2014:2; UNICEF, 2015). Additionally the accessibility to education is inequitable for some groups. Only 43% of the poorest families are for example able to go to school (World Bank, 2014:19). Compared to other countries Pakistan performs poorly in education; Pakistan is ranked as 113th out of 120 on the Education for All Index. Besides the accessibility problems, social services in Pakistan– such as education, or health care are sometimes provided by Islamic extremist groups. These groups then gain considerable influence via the education system. They set up schools, called madrassas, with a curriculum based on a strict and orthodox Islam (International Crisis Group, 2011:31). How this is related with violence is expounded in chapter six. Pakistan is thus a weak state, it fails according to the indicators based on Rotberg’s failed state theory and on all the factors measured by the FFP index. According to Rotberg a state’s most important public service, is to provide security. Pakistan fails in this, as expounded in chapter four and also the fragile state index indicates this with the high score on legitimacy of the state. The infrastructure in Pakistan undeveloped. To begin with physical infrastructure, it has, according to the Pakistan Ministry of Finance, a reasonably developed transport system, however the road density is low (IPDF, 2007). Pakistan’s airports are as well developed and its ports are at the moment developed. However, Pakistan’s railway system outmoded, which is an essential for the industry. Second the accessibility of water, in 2011 and 2012, 67% of the population has access to piped water and for drinking water people 29% uses tap water (PBS, 2013:134/138). The other 71% uses water from wells, pumps and rivers et cetera. This drinking

49 water has a bigger risk to be polluted. In Pakistan in 2010, 91.4% of the population has access to electricity (World Bank, 2015a) .Compared with other countries, this not really low, Pakistan’s neighbours Afghanistan and India have percentages of 41.0% and 75.5% .

§2. Economy As the fragile state index indicates, Pakistan does not have a strong economy and there is uneven development – even though this is declining. The index indicates that the economy of Pakistan became weaker during the last ten years. However, financial institutes such as the IMF, argue that Pakistan’s economy is since the last couple of years a tepid growing economy (IMF, 2015a: 62; IMF, 2015b; Ministry of Finance, 2015:4). In 2014 it had a real GDP growth of 4.1% and is expected to grow to 4.7% in 2016 (IMF, 2015a:63). Since 2001 Pakistan’s growth has fluctuated between the 1.7% and the 7,7% (World Bank, 2015a). In 2004 and 2005 the growth was highest, then it decreased enormously and since 2011 it is slowly growing. In comparison to other South Asian countries, Pakistan lags behind (Ministry of Finance, 2015:6). Pakistan’s inflation has varied during the last ten years , however in general it has been high since 2001 (World Bank, 2015c). Pakistan’s unemployment rates slightly declined since 2001, remaining around 6% during the last couple of years (CIA, 2015). In 2001 34,5% of Pakistan population lived below the poverty line, this declined to 22,3% in 2005 (World Bank, 2015d). However, this decline has stagnated and today still 21% of Pakistan’s population lives below the poverty line (UNDP, 2015). The GINI index, finally, measures the inequality level in Pakistan. Since 2001 the GINI index has a value around the 30. This is not really high, in comparison India and Sri-Lanka had values around the 33, Bangladesh and the United States around the 40. Pakistan’s major sectors are agriculture, industry and services (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The agriculture sector is responsible for 25,1% of the GDP and 44% of the labour force works in this sector; the industrial sector is responsible for 21,3% of the GDP and 22% of the labour force works in this sector; and finally the services sector is responsible for 53,6% of the GDP and 33% of the labour force works in this sector. As this distribution shows, Pakistan’s economy is not diverse, and therefore , even though the estimates are positive, the economy remains vulnerable. Pakistan also has an export deficit, it imports more than it exports, this again makes an economy vulnerable. To support Pakistan’s economy the IMF gave a loan in 2013, which should support Pakistan to stabilize its economy (IMF, 2013). To summarize, Pakistan has a weak economy and poverty problems. Even though Pakistan’s economy growing at the moment, it remains vulnerable for macroeconomic and political instability, because it is a fairly homogenous economy. The economy has suffered 50 from the violence in Pakistan during the last ten years. In combination with the low level of foreign investment, this violence caused a slow growth and underdevelopment (CIA, 2015). Fearon and Latin and Collier argue that poverty is a condition that favours civil violence, because it creates a hopeless situation for the population. Collier argues that violent organizations create hope for a better future.

§3. Instability in the Political Centre Instability in the political centre makes it easier for violent groups to commit violence, because it creates a lack of central authority. Pakistan’s politics are dynamic and presidents and prime ministers often do not finish their term. Besides that, the political parties in Pakistan are splintered. Tables two and three show the division of seats in the National Assembly and the Senate. There are especially many parties in the National Assembly. The letter behind some of the parties, marks the different faction that arose after differences of opinion. From 2002 to now both the National Assembly and the Senate did not have to deal with, much instability, all the terms of office were completed. This is in contrast with the Presidents and Prime Ministers. As tables four and five show both have had to deal with enforced resignations. In 1999 Musharraf took power, he suspended the Prime Minister – Muhammad Sharif who is now Pakistan’s President – suspended the constitution and became Chief Executive. Pakistan’s President – Muhammad Rafiq Tarar – was allowed stay in office . However, in 2001 he was forced to resign by Musharraf, when Musharraf dissolved Parliament. Musharraf appointed himself as President (The Commonwealth, 2015). In 2008 Musharraf resigned after the PML-N impeached with a charge for treason (The Guardian, 2008). Muhammad Mian Soomro was appointed as interim President until a new one was chosen. Asif Ali Zardari became the new president and he completed his term. Mamnoon Hussain is the current President, he became president in 2013. The first elections for a new Prime Minister during Musharraf’s regime took place in November 2002. The first Prime Minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, resigned after two years. Probably this is because Musharraf wanted to replace him by someone who was better able to counter parliamentary opposition and execute Musharraf’s reformations (The Iris Times, 2004). Shaukat Aziz became his successor, he remained in office untill the end of his term in 2007. In 2008 Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani became Prime Minister, however after four years he was disqualified by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court claimed that Gillani was found guilty when he refused to reopen fraud investigation against the President in office, Zardari (The Guardian, 2012). Raja Pervez Ashraf became the successor of Gillani, he completed the

51 term. At the moment Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is Prime Minister. In 1999 he was removed from his position as President by Musharraf. Party 2002 to 2008 2008 to 2013 2013 to date AJIP – Awami Jamhuri Ittehad - - 1 Pakistan AML – Awami Muslim - - 1 League ANP – Awami National Party - 13 - APML – All Pakistan Muslim - - 1 League BNP – Balochistan National 1 1 1 Party Independent 1 20 9 JWP – Jamhoori Wattan Party 1 - - JI – Jamaat-E-Islami - - 3 JUI-F – Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam - - 9 MMA – Muttahida Majlis-e- 59 8 - Amal MQM – Muttahidda Qaumi 17 25 - Movement MQM-P 1 - 19 National Alliance 16 - - NP – National Party - - 1 NPP – National Peoples Party - 1 1 PAT – Pakistan Awami 1 - - Tehreek PMAP – Pukhtoonkhwa Milli 1 - 3 Awami Party PML – Pakistan Muslim - 50 2 League PML-N – Pakistan Muslim 18 92 148 League Nawaz PML-F Pakistan Muslim 5 5 4 League Functional PML-J – Pakistan Muslim 3 - - League Junejo PML-Q – Pakistan Muslim 118 - - League-Quaid-e-Azam PML-Z – Pakistan Muslim 1 - 1 League Zia-ul-Haq Shaheed PPPP – Pakistan Peoples Party 80 125 37 Parliamentarians PPP-S – Pakistan Peoples Party 2 1 - Sherpao PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 1 - 26 QWP-S – Qaumi Watan Party - - 1 (Sherpao) Table 2. Division of Seats of National Assembly of Pakistan, 2002-2015. Sources: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015c; Election Commission of Pakistan, 2012; and Election Commission of Pakistan, 2013.

Party 03-2003 03-2006 03-2009 03-2012 03-2015 to to to to to date 03-2006 03-2009 03-2012 03-2015 ANP – Awami National Party 2 2 7 11 6 BNP-M – Balochistan National Party 1 BNP-A – Balcohistan National Party 2 2 2 3 2 Awami Independent 11 11 10 12 10 JIP – Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan 3 3 1 JUI-F – Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam (F) 3 6 8 5 5 JWP – Jamhoori Wattan Party 1 1 1 MMA – Mutahidda Mujlis-e-Amal 16 8 MQM Mutahidda Qaumi Movement 7 6 6 7 8 N/A 4 NP – National Party 1 1 2 1 3 PMAP –Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami 2 3 2 Party PML-F – Pakistan Muslim League 2 2 1 1 1 Functional PML – Pakistan Muslim League 34 38 20 7 4

PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League 2 2 9 16 26 Nawaz PPP-P – Pakistan People’s Party 11 9 26 42 27 Parliamentarian PPP-S – Pakistan People’s Party 2 3 1 (Sherpao) PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 1 7 PMAP – Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami 1 3 Party Table 3. Division of Seats Senate of Pakistan, 2003-2015. Source: Senate of Pakistan, 2015. President Term of service Political party Reason resign Muhammad Rafiq 01-01-1998 to PML-N Enforced to quit, by Tarar 20-06-2001 an extraconstitutional order made by Musharraf Pervez Musharraf 20-06-2001 to PML-Q Resigned after 18-08-2008 impeachment by PML-N Muhammad Mian 18-08-2008 to PML-Q Interim, until new Soomro 09-09-2008 President was chosen on 09-09- 2008 Asif Ali Zardari 09-09-2008 to PPP End of term 08-09-2013 Mamnoon Hussain 09-09-2013 to date PML-N - Table 4. Presidents of Pakistan 1998-2015. Source: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015a; the Guardian, 2008

Prime Minister Term of Service Political party Reason resign Mir Zafarullah Khan 23-11-2002 to PML-Q Came unexpectedly, Jamali 26-06-2004 probably Musharraf wanted to replace Jamali for someone that was better able to counter parliamentary opposition Chuadhary Shujaat 30-06-2004 to PML-Q Interim until new Hussain 26-08-2004 Prime Minister was chosen on 26-08- 2004 Shaukat Aziz 28-08-2004 to PML-Q End of term 15-11-2007 Muhammad Mian 16-11-2007 to PML-Q Caretaker, resigned Soomro (caretaker) 24-03-2008 when new president was chosen. Syed Yousaf Raza 25-03-2008 to PPP Disqualification by Gillani 25-04-2012 the Supreme Court, when he refused to reopen fraud investigations Raja Pervez Ashraf 22-06-2012 to PPP End of term 24-03-2013 Hazar Khan Khose 25-03-2013 to Independent Caretaker, resigned (caretaker) 05-06-2013 when new president was chosen. Muhammad Nawaz 05-06-2013 to date PML-N - Sharif Table 5. Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 2002-2015. Source: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2015b; The Iris Times, 2004; and The Guardian, 2012. As the four tables show there have been seven large political parties since 2002: MMA, MQM, PML, PML-N, PML-Q, PPP-P and PTI. The tables also show that former popular parties can be dissolved by the next elections, for example the MMA, PML and the PML-Q. It also occur the other way around: the PML-Q has grown from a small political party, to a party that has the absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Senate has less political parties than the National Assembly and because of this the division of seats is less prome to change. Additionally the election system makes the Senate more stable as every three years half of the Senate is chosen. It is remarkable that after every term for every Prime Minister and President their political party decreases in popularity in the National Assembly. Pakistan’s political centre is not stable. Since Musharraf’s coup in 1999, there have not been any more coups.. However, since 2001 two Presidents out of five, did not finish their term

54 and also two Prime Ministers out of eight, did not finish their term. Pakistan’s political parties are also splintered and the results of the elections fluctuate considerably.

§4. Alliances between Centre and Periphery According to Kalyvas civil conflicts are characterized by switching alliances between the centre and periphery. As in chapter four expounded, in Pakistan the centre had supported religious extremist groups in the past. These were groups often focused on the Jihad in Kashmir. After 9/11 Pakistan it started fighting against al-Qaeda, however the Kashmir Jihadi groups LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed were only banned after international pressure but allowed to re-emerge under new names (ICG, 2009:3). After the 2002 election Musharraf’s regime was depended on the MMA, which was a six-party religious alliance, led by JUI-F and JI, both pro-Taliban parties (ICG, 2009:4). Therefore Musharraf did not fight the extremist groups actively, which have led to an the expansion of their sphere of influence (ICG, 2009:5). With the establishment of a new government led by the PPP the (indirect) support towards extremist groups stopped and an active policy against terrorism is implemented. For Baluchistan there is no prove that there are alliances between the centre and periphery. The civil conflict is mostly between the government and the nationalist Balochs. However, because alliances are difficult to investigate, these can be missed in this research.

§5. Conclusion The rational choice theories used for this research, mention different factors that increase the chance of civil violence. This chapter examines if these factors existing Pakistan. In the first place Pakistan is a weak state, according to Fearon and Latin this makes it easier for violent groups to commit violence, because the government lacks the ability to control them. In Pakistan this is especially the case in the FATA district and in NWFP. Pakistan’s economy is weak and there is considerable poverty. This makes it, according to Collier, tempting for people to support violent groups or join those groups. However, because there is no data on why people support or join the violent groups, it is not possible to claim that this is the case in Pakistan. Also, there is a lack of stability in the political centre. This makes it again easier for violent groups to commit violence, because instability in the political centre makes it difficult to form a long term policy against the violent groups. Finally, there have been alliances between the centre and periphery. These mostly exist under the regime of Musharraf, however after his resignation those alliances were broken.

In the case of Pakistan the rational choice theories explain why a country as Pakistan is vulnerable for violence, however, these theories do not explain why the increasing post 9/11 violence is occurring in Pakistan. The conditions that favour violence have been present in Pakistan, since its establishment and in the past they have led to civil conflict on several occasions. Thus to understand why the increasing violence in Pakistan is taking place since 2001, other theories must be taken into account as well.

Chapter 6. Emotions in Pakistan’s Conflict This chapter investigates if grievances are the reason for violence in Pakistan. First is determined if discrimination takes place in Pakistan, this is based on the exclusion of ethnic groups from state power and on measures taken against groups. Second, grievances are examined by the textual analysis of party programmes of political parties and of propaganda material of violent groups. Finally, a test to see if there is a security dilemma between the different groups in Pakistan will be done.

§1. Discrimination Discrimination takes place on large scale in Pakistan with religion, ethnicity and gender as basis. The last form focusses on the discrimination of women. However, this form is not examined in this research, because this group is affected as whole and is thus represented in all ethnic and religious groups. In Pakistan especially non-Sunni minorities are discriminated; Shiite Muslims, Ahmedis, Christians, Sikhs and Hindus (HRCP, 2009:124-125/132-133; HRCP, 2015:124-132). These groups suffer discrimination in education, finding jobs and are often victims of violence. However, the current violence is dominated by either Sunni extremist groups or Baloch. Thus even though discrimination against the groups mentioned above could have led to grievances, in general it does not lead to violence from those groups. FATA and KWK are the provinces that are mainly the home base of Muslim extremist groups. As a reaction to the extremist groups in these provinces, insurgencies by the military and other security forces led to the use of disproportionate violence against citizens (HRCP, 2015:69). The Baloch is the most discriminated ethnic group in Pakistan that commits violence on a large scale. They have been discriminated for many years and by (political) leaders from the whole political spectrum (ICG, 2006:3-4). The Baloch’s political and economic rights, invested in the 1990s were removed, when Musharraf came into office (ICG, 2006:7). The political autonomy of Baluchistan decreased with the centralisation of power by Musharraf. He pushed out the nationalist Balochs in the 2002 elections by establishing a coalition between PML-Q and the MMA (ICG, 2006:8). In an attempt to keep the Balochs satisfied a Baloch was appointed as Chief Minister, however his function was mostly symbolic, he had little power.

Besides the political and economic discriminations against Balochs, they have to deal with disappearances of suspected terrorists, who are arrested and never seen again (HRCP, 2015).

§2. Hatred towards others This paragraph is split up into two parts, the first part examines if political parties spread hatred. The party manifestos of the 2013 elections from six (former) large parties are analysed, focussing on the spread of hatred and on how they intend to end the violence in Pakistan. The second part of this paragraph analyses the spread of hatred by violent groups and because it is impossible to analyse all the violent groups two representatives are chosen. The violence in Pakistan can roughly be divided in two types: violence from Baloch nationalists and from Muslim extremist organisations.

§2.1. Political Parties First it is important to mention that after 2008 the PML-Q changed its name to PML. Thus these two names are the same party and thus to analyse the PML-Q body of thoughts the PML manifesto is used. The tone of the manifesto is neutral, there are no negative references to specific ethnic or religious groups. The violence in Pakistan, must be combatted by a special counter terror team. The PML argues that terrorism is caused by problems as the lack of democracy and its pluralism, thus this must be solved. And finally the PML says that military action is not the solution to combat terrorism. The MMA’s manifesto is heavily based on the Islam. The MMA is an extremist political party that wants to enforce the Sharia in Pakistan. Important spearheads of their perspective are: to implement a humane economic system, based on the Islam, to free the country from imperialistic (international) forces and finally to support the suppressed located in Kashmir, Palestine, Afghanistan and Chechen. The manifesto from MMA does not speak out against terrorism, they do not mention it. The manifesto of MQM has a more aggressive tone, however it does not spur to violence, they explicitly distantiate from the current political ‘feudal system’. To counter terrorism the MQM wants to solve the root causes – according to them poverty and the lack of education – provide law enforcement in now lawless areas, awareness campaigns against extremism and hatred et cetera and finally they want to disarm Pakistan. The PML-N manifesto explicitly refers to Musharraf as a corrupt politician. The tone of the manifesto is reproachful. In addition to blaming a recent corrupt politician for the status of

Pakistan today, it blames the United States for the rise of terrorism. To counter terrorism the PML-N argues that the root causes must be tackled and that the extremists must be countered by violence. The tone of the PPPP manifesto is mild, the problems of Pakistan are discussed, but they do not blame anyone. In order to counter terrorism they also want to attack the root causes, a specific point they mention is regulation of the Madrassas. Besides that they want more targeted military operations and to dismantle militant groups. They do not mention, however how they intend to do this. Finally they mention the alliance with the US which they want to uphold. However, they do mention that they are against the drone attacks executed by the US. The political parties, therefore, do not promote violence. However, there are tensions between some parties. The manifestos are official documents that should be used to promote the parties, in reality they can be used to spread more hatred.

§2.2. Extremist Organizations Baluchistan has to deal with violence between the Baluch nationalist groups and the government and Baluch nationalist groups and Pashtun living in Baluchistan. To understand the motives of the Baluch, the website of the BRA is analysed to find out why they commit violence and how they legitimize it. The BRA argues that their country is occupied and because of this the exploitation of natural resources is illegitimate. They legitimize their violence with the argument that they need to liberate Balochs from occupation. Non-ethnic Balochs are seen as spies. The most important Muslim extremist organisation is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. To understand why they use violence, their (propaganda) material is analysed, however there is only a little available in English. Because of this, the source used is an once-only English magazine they published in October 2014 magazine – the Ihyae Khiliafat. The Voice of Tehreek- e-Taliban Pakistan ǀ Striving for Global Khilafah – explains to the readers why they commit violence and how they legitimize it. The TTP has two main themes by which they legitimize and explain their use of violence. In the first place their religion, Islam legitimizes violence. They argue that they should spread the Islam, and free Pakistan (and the world) from nonbelievers as these people are seen as evil. The second theme is the same as the Baloch Republic Army legitimizes their violence, injustice. The TTP argues that the violence used by the Pakistani army has been disproportional and that innocent women and children are killed. Their violence can be seen as a revenge.

The extremist organisations use injustice and in the case of the Muslim extremist groups Islam to legitimize their violence. With this they appoint ‘others’ as enemies or evil, by this they spread hatred, which can lead to support of their organisations, new members and this leads to more violence.

§3. Security Dilemma Security dilemmas arise because of a lack of confidence between parties. In Pakistan the government tried to stop the violence by concluding peace deals with violent groups. This, mostly occurred with Muslim extremist groups located in FATA and KWK. However, until today the Pakistani government has not succeeded. There have been a couple of peace deals, nevertheless those have been violated by one of the parties (ICG, 2013:1). The distrust that this creates makes it difficult to establish new peace deals and to stop violence. The Pakistani government started with peace deals as a strategy to stop the violence in 2004 (ICG, 2013:7). However these peace deals failed often within a couple of months and as a result it only strengthened the Muslim extremist groups (Khattak, 2012). An exception has been the peace deal in Swat in 2009. This deal between the government and TNSM contained the implementation of the Sharia in this district in return for the cessation of violence. However, TNSM entered the neighbouring district Buner, which led to a violent insurgency by the military that caused three million IDPs (ICG, 2013:2). As well as mistrust between the government and violent groups, the Pakistani government has to deal with another problem: the violent groups are splintered (The New York Times, 2014). Therefore if they make a peace deal, not necessarily all the factions agree and commit themselves. If there is an arms race between the fighting parties, this often indicates a security dilemma. In Pakistan this not the case. The extremist organisations outside FATA and KWK mostly use terrorist attacks as a weapon. Terrorist attacks are a weapon of the weak, this means that they are not able to confront the military directly. However, with the terrorist attacks they weaken Pakistan’s state and military. The military lacks the force to actually confront and defeat the extremist organisations. Thus there is no arms race between Pakistan and the violent groups.

§4. Conclusion In Pakistan there is considerable discrimination, between the different ethnic and religious groups. Within the violent groups, the Baloch are the most discriminated. Politicians in Pakistan do not directly incite people to commit violence. However, because elections manifestos were used to examine this, ‘reality’ can be missed. The violent groups however spread hatred,

60 whether consciously or not, and this can create grievances. Finally in Pakistan there is a security dilemma between Muslim extremist groups and the government. The symbolic action theory therefore explains that grievances do exist in Pakistan, and that they are used to legitimize violence. However, just as the rational choice theory it does not explain why the current wave of violence is now taking place in Pakistan.

Chapter 7. International Influences

Besides the internal factors, that are discussed in the previous chapters, violence in Pakistan is also influenced by international factors. According to the regional security complex theory securitisation is influenced by super, great and regional powers, these are the United States, China and India. Securitisation influences policies of countries by determining the threats. Paragraph one expounds if Pakistan’s securitisation process is influenced by the US, China and India. The second paragraph examines if neighbouring countries are weak states, since these states weaken the Pakistani state as well.

§1. International Relations §1.1. United States – Pakistan Relations The US and Pakistan have a long diplomatic relationship, that found its origins in the Cold War and their alliance against the Soviet Union (Kronstadt, 2009:32). Their relationship is troubled by Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program, this led in 1970 to the suspension of aid. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US started again with an aid program, with as consequence that Pakistan became ‘a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance,’ now known as the Taliban (Kronstadt, 2009:32; ICG, 2009:4). In the 1990s however, the US introduced sanctions because of the nuclear weapons and the military coup. After 9/11 the US again took initiatives with Pakistan to fight terrorism. During the last 14 years the relationship between Pakistan and the US can be described as a relative stable. Since 2001 the two countries have an alliance in the ‘War on Terror’ (USDP, 2014). Nevertheless the alliance is subjected to mutual distrust and dissatisfaction (Kronstadt, 2009:49/52; Qazi, 2012). This began, when Musharraf only indulged to support the US after international pressure (ICG, 2009:4). However, the measures were selective and in addition Pakistani politicians often use a narrative, whereby the US is branded as a country that used and ditched Pakistan for its own goals (Kronstadt, 2009:33). They use Pakistan to solve problems, such as the Soviets and terrorism, but they leave the aftermath problems for Pakistan. However, behind the scenes, politicians often support the US and approve for example their drone strikes so as not to lose public support, (Qazi, 2012). In 2009 the US Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. This act demonstrates that the US will support Pakistan in the long run (U.S. Department of State, 2014). This civilian assistance act has five priority areas: energy, economic growth, community

62 stabilization of restive areas, education and health. Besides the assistance, the US are also Pakistan’s biggest export country, which strengthen their relationship (WTO, 2014). In 2015 the relations between the countries can be described as positive, however the new developments in the relationship with China and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could change this (Zenko, 2015).

§1.2. China – Pakistan Relations China has been Pakistan’s most consistent ally throughout (FRD, 2005:21). Both shared antipathies against India and Russia. In the 1990s China distanced itself from Pakistan, as reaction to India’s growing military power. However, in the same period China still supplied nuclear weapons to Pakistan. In contrast with the US, China does not support Pakistan with their problems of extremist organisations and violence they cause. The Pakistan-China relationship is based more on the military strength, but focussed on its international status, and the support of Pakistan’s economy. The focus on military strength is caused by the (often) negative relationships with China and India (Afridi and Bajoria: 2010). From the first decennium of this century onwards China approached Pakistan again. Since then China focusses for a large extent on the economic development of Pakistan, however military affairs are still form part of the relationship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). In 2008 a free trade agreement was signed between the countries. And today China is Pakistan’s second biggest export country and China is the second biggest country from which Pakistan imports (WTO:2014). In the last couple of years China has increased its investments in Pakistan as China is aiming to bypass the Mallaca Strait (Detsch, 2015). This must be done by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that connects Beijing with the Gwadar Port in Balochistan. China invests in Pakistan’s poor infrastructure by subsiding roads, rails, pipelines and establishing a power network. Finally a Joint Statement was made in 2014 between the two countries, Pakistan describes the relationship with China as a friendship and calls China the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014).

§1.3. India – Pakistan Relations The relationship between India and Pakistan has been difficult since the establishment of the two countries. The main problem between the two countries is the Kashmir dispute (ICG, 2012a:1). This has led to actual wars in 1965, 1971 and 1999. The largest threat for India from Pakistan is terrorism, experienced by the Mumbai attacks which were committed by Pakistani

63 terrorists. Besides the fact that, terrorists with a Pakistani origin commit terrorist attacks in India, India suspects Pakistan of using the terrorist organisations as proxies in Afghanistan to counteract the influence of India (ICG, 2012a:14). On the other hand India’s increasing presence in Afghanistan is interpreted by Pakistan as a tactic to support the PTT in FATA and the Baloch nationalists in Baluchistan. Furthermore Pakistan and India have disputes about water and water distribution. These disputes are caused among other things by building a barrage upstream in India. Despite the distrust between the countries they have diplomatic relations. However, the relationship remains weak, there is little trade between the countries. (ICGa, 2012:5) Only 1 per cent of Pakistan’s trade is with India. A Joint Statement between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries in 2012 indicated that both countries are willing to work on a positive relationship, however their relationship remains fragile.

§2. Neighbouring Weak States Pakistan is surrounded by Iran, Afghanistan, China and India. Their state strength is determined by the Fragile State Index of the FFP. The results are showed in table six. The table shows that especially Afghanistan is a weak state, its scores are high. In 2005 and 2006 the state strength is classified as alert – total scores between the 90.0 and 99.9 – and from 2007 onwards it has been classified as high alert – total scores between 100.0 and 109.9. Compared to other countries Afghanistan is ranked high, mostly in the top ten of fragile states. Iran’s state strength is classified as warning – total score between 70.0 and 79.9 – and high warning – total score between 80.0 and 89.9. Compared to other countries Iran’s score can be described as an average. China is mostly ranked in the high warning group, with one exception in 2005 it was ranked in the warning group. In comparison to other countries China is a middle bracket country. The last neighbouring state is India, and this is the strongest state. Except in 2005, when it is categorized in the low warning group – total scores between 60.0 and 69.9 now categorize it in the category warning.

Year Afghanistan China India Iran Rank Total Rank Total Rank Total Rank Total 2005 11 99.8 75 72.3 76 69.5 57 83.8 2006 10 99.8 57 82.5 93 70.4 53 84.0 2007 8 102.3 62 81.2 110 70.8 57 82.8 2008 7 105.4 68 80.3 98 72.9 49 85.7 2009 7 108.2 57 84.6 87 77.8 38 90.0 2010 6 109.3 62 83.0 79 79.2 32 92.2 2011 7 107.5 72 80.1 76 79.3 35 90.2 2012 6 106.0 76 78.3 78 78.0 34 89.6 2013 7 106.7 66 80.9 79 77.5 37 89.7 2014 7 106.5 68 79.0 81 76.9 44 87.2 2015 8 107.9 83 76.4 68 79.4 44 87.2 Table 6. Fragile State Index, neighbouring countries. Source: FFP, 2005; FFP, 2006; FFP, 2007; FFP, 2008; FFP, 2009; FFP, 2010; FFP, 2011; FFP, 2012; FFP, 2013; FFP, 2014; and FFP, 2015. Of the four neighbouring countries only Afghanistan can be classified as a weak state. As Iqbal and Star argue state failure itself does not spread through the region, however it can spread instability and violence. With the start of the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan, the state collapsed and a civil war arose. Pakistan is affected, since the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan – where a power vacuum exists - are a refuge for the Muslim extremist organisation that are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

§3. Conclusion To conclude, Pakistan securitization is influenced by the US, China and India. Whereby the US actively influenced Pakistan’s policy towards the Muslim extremist groups in FATA and KWK – from supporting to attacking. China does not actively influence Pakistan’s security policy, it focusses on the economy which in the end could support China’s economy. India does influence Pakistan’s security policy, India is seen as a threat which leads to a defensive and aggressive policy towards India. However, it did not influence Pakistan’s behaviour towards the extremist Muslim organizations nor influence the extremist Muslim organizations themselves. Afghanistan as weak state could have influenced Pakistan by spreading its weak state situation across the border. . However, it is impossible for this research to determine if this, or the spiral of violence is the case of Pakistan as a weak state. Thus only the US has influence on the attitude towards the Muslim extremist groups in FATA and KWK. They caused the insurgencies that led to a drawback of extremist Muslim violence throughout the country. However, the influence of the US alone is not the cause of the violence in Pakistan.

Chapter 8. Conclusion and Discussion

§1. Conclusion The aim of this research is to explain the rise of violence in Pakistan post 9/11 and to investigate if this is related with Pakistan’s political and economic system and the fact that Pakistan is postcolonial state. This culminated into the following research question:

What is the cause of the rise in violence in Pakistan post 9/11 and how is this related with its political and economic system and the fact that Pakistan is a postcolonial state?

This thesis shows that the violence in Pakistan is complex and so are the causes. Chapter four examined Pakistan as country. It showed the complex, turbulent and often violent history; the ethnic, religious and linguistic diverse society; and the diversity of violent groups in Pakistan. Chapter five examines the rational choice theory as explanation of the post 9/11 violence. The rational choice theories of Latin and Fearon, Collier, and Kalyvas argue that civil violence is more likely to increase if a country is a weak state, it has a weak economy, there is instability in the political centre, and that alliances between the centre and periphery can influence violence. Pakistan is a weak state, has a weak economy, the political centre is instable and between 9/11 and 2008 there have been alliances between the centre and periphery that stimulated the increase violence. However, those factors have been there before 9/11 and thus do not explain why the increasing violence in Pakistan occurred post 9/11. Chapter six examines the symbolic action theory, based on Kaufman and Cederman. Based on the premise that people do not behave completely rationally, they argue that emotions based on ethnicity can lead to a civil conflict. Both theorists emphasizes the role of negative emotions based the fear for existence as factors that increase the chance on civil conflict. In Pakistan there is a lot of discrimination, especially the Baloch are discriminated. They have no political autonomy, are economically undeveloped compared to the rest of Pakistan and they have to deal with disappearances. By the party manifesto’s the political parties do not spread hatred, however since those are official documents in reality it can be different. The violent Baluch organizations and the extremist Muslim organisation both spread hatred and legitimize their violence by injustice, and the extremist Muslim organisation also by Islam. The discrimination and spread of hatred resulted to negative emotions that increase the chance on violence. Finally, there is a security dilemma between the government and the Muslim extremist

66 groups in FATA and KWK, this distrust results to an increasing chance on violence. However, also the symbolic action theory does not explain why the post 9/11 increase on violence in Pakistan is occurring. The Muslim extremist groups exists already since the 1970s and also the Baluchistan conflict is an old existing conflict. Chapter seven is about international factors that influence Pakistan. The regional security complex theory explains that only super, great and ‘local’ regional powers can influence a country’s security policy by securitization. In Pakistan the US has influenced it security policy towards the Muslim extremist groups, which have led to the insurgencies against them. Finally, Pakistan is influenced by Afghanistan, since Afghanistan is a weak state. However, it is impossible to determine the cause of Pakistan’s weak state, thus it is not clear if Afghanistan’s weak state or to what extent Afghanistan’s weak state influenced Pakistan. Separately these theories do not explain Pakistan’s post 9/11 rise of violence, but combined they do. The rational choice theory is based on several factors that increase the chance on violence and that make civil conflict possible. Those factors are present in Pakistan, but have been present since its establishment. If this theory is combined with the regional security complex theory it explains why the Muslim extremist violence started to increase after 9/11. In the first place the weak state, weak economy, the instability at the political Centre made violence possible. After the international pressure to fight the Muslim extremist, Pakistan started to do this. This led to a violent reaction from the Muslim extremist groups. In 2008 the alliance between the government and some of the extremist violent groups stopped, this led to even more violence. Because those groups are not able to confront the army directly they often use terrorist attacks, which causes civilians causalities throughout the country. Finally, the failed peace talks increased distrust, which in turn again led to more violence. In the symbolic action theory emotions based on ethnicity are important. In Pakistan the Baluch as group feel deprived, this creates breeding ground for hatred and thus violence, however again these emotions have been there since Pakistan’s establishment. In 2006 their nationalist leader was shot, this sparked the spiral of violence in Baluchistan. This violence is dominated by a security dilemma between the government and the violent Baluch nationalist organizations, which makes it difficult to end. The violence in Pakistan is related with its political and economic system, since both are weak. A weak political system makes it possible for violent groups to commit violence. While the weak economy is a breeding ground for violence. However, a weak political system or a weak economy does not always results into a civil conflict.

The fact that Pakistan is a postcolonial state is related with the post 9/11 violence, because Pakistan ethnic diversity is due to the border the British once ‘drew’. Because the lack of experience in governance, Pakistan state and economy remain undeveloped.

Thus to answer the research question. The post 9/11 violence in Pakistan is related with its status as postcolonial state, because it caused its weak political and weak economic system. Which make civil violence possible. The violence increased after 9/11, because the influence of the US on Muslim extremist groups and in Baluchistan there has been a spark which led to a spiral of violence dominated by distrust between the government and the Baluch nationalist movements.

§2. Discussion The goal of this research is to explain the post 9/11 violence in Pakistan. To a large extent the results are reliable and valid. However, especially the measurement of grievances has been problematic. Because it is impossible to actually interview people, proxies are used. In this thesis the political party programs are used, however they do not reflect the reality of those parties: their official statements deviate from their acts. For the violent groups the measurement was problematic because there is not a lot of English material available. This decreases the reliability. Also the security dilemma is difficult to measure, because it is about secrecy and distrust there is not a lot of public information. In general data about Pakistan was difficult to gather, the official institutions of Pakistan compared to our institutions are chaotic, and the information supply is outmoded. However, in my opinion all together the data gives a good survey of Pakistan and the civil conflict in Pakistan.

§3. Further Research Further research must be done both on Pakistan and on the causes of civil conflict. Pakistan is a complex country, to understand it, research could be done on its political system, the influence of the political parties, the influence of the army; but also on its history and how this is connected with its current problems. Also research should be done on the motivations of people to commit violence, this makes it possible to test Kalyvas’ theory on a more valid and reliable way.

The field of civil wars, on which the theoretical framework of this thesis is based, is at the moment mainly focussed on internal factors that lead to civil wars, as the case Pakistan shows it is important to take other international factors into account. Thus to conclude, research must be done on how international factors are related with civil war.

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