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Home , Abdullah Mirza, Baloch Regiment, Cable 1971, Claude Auchinleck, Colin David, Colonial troops

The Army Corps, and Strategic Culture 1947-2007

Mark Fraser Briskey

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

UNSW School of Humanities and Social Sciences

04 July 2014

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'I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only). I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/ ·11 apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.'

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Surname or Family name: Briskey

First name: Mark Other name/s: Fraser

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD

School: Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty:

Title: The Officer Corps, Islam and Strategic Culture 1947-2007

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

This thesis examines the use and mmipulation of Islam as a fu1m of identity and important elemmt of the strategic

culture of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps between 1947 and 2007. Despite the ethnic and cultural d:isparifus within the population that made up the new nation of Pakistan the Army has continued to rely on a rump of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who have relied on Army interpretations of Islam fur identity. The thesis al'>o argues that the Army from its outset has consistently conflated notions of the discredited'Mmtial Race' theory and Islam as the basis of the Army's superiority in comparison to other armies - Imst notably the .

Apart from the relationship between 'Mmiial Race' and Islam the thesis al'>o draws links between Islam and a number of other significant influences on the A1my. An important method of understanding the role of Islam in the Officer Corps is argued as usefully being understood through the prism of 'strategic culture' themy. Strategic culture theory highlights the relevance 'of an organisation's history. In particular the theory argues the importance of 'strategic' shocks and disasters

upon an organisation.. In this way the thesis argues that the tribulations of pmiition and the first War of 1947-48,

the 1965 War and above all the 'strategic shock' suffered in the Army's humiliating defuat to in 1971 were influential in shaping an Army culture in which Islam was prominent.

The thesis concludes that in a titre period when Western or other Asian powers may consider it anachronistic to call upon a religion and an uncompromising belief in a deity to provide an advantage in combat, there are Officers in the Pakistan Army in the last decade of the twentieth centUiy and in the first decade of the new centUIY who hold these belie£; as innate truths and an essential element of their Army culture.

Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Mi films to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

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ses that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a peri of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and re uire the a roval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

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THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS

ii

Abstract

This thesis examines the use and manipulation of Islam as a form of identity and important element of the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps between 1947 and 2007. Despite the ethnic and cultural disparities within the population that made up the new nation of Pakistan the Army has continued to rely on a rump of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who have relied on Army interpretations of Islam for identity. The thesis also argues that the Army from its outset has consistently conflated notions of the discredited‘’ theory and Islam as the basis of the Army’s superiority in comparison to other armies - most notably the Indian Army.

Apart from the relationship between ‘Martial Race’ and Islam the thesis also draws links between Islam and a number of other significant influences on the Army. An important method of understanding the role of Islam in the Officer Corps is argued as usefully being understood through the prism of ‘strategic culture’ theory. Strategic culture theory highlights the relevance of an organisation’s history. In particular the theory argues the importance of major ‘strategic’ shocks and disasters upon an organisation.. In this way the thesis argues that the tribulations of partition and the first Kashmir War of 1947–48, the 1965 War and above all the ‘strategic shock’ suffered in the Army’s humiliating defeat to India in 1971 were influential in shaping an Army culture in which Islam was prominent.

The thesis concludes that in a time period when Western or other Asian powers may consider it anachronistic to call upon a religion and an uncompromising belief in a deity to provide an advantage in combat, there are Officers in the Pakistan Army in the last decade of the twentieth century and in the first decade of the new century who hold these beliefs as innate truths and an essential element of their Army culture.

iii

Acknowledgements

In undertaking this dissertation I was very fortunate in receiving the help and generous assistance of many persons over a number of years. Firstly my great thanks to Eleanor Hancock and Jeff Grey for their advice, encouragement and patience over the course of the entire dissertation, and Craig Stockings for his motivation towards the end of the project. I am also extremely grateful for the funding of my travel to undertake research for this project on two occasions by the University of New South Wales. I would also like to thank the examiners of this dissertation for their comments which have made it all that more insightful. Additionally I want to thank Bernadette McDermot, Rita Parker, Mark O’Neill and Emily Robertson for their discussions and encouragement that helped this project along.

Many other people generously gave of their time, knowledge, advice and guidance on various matters over the years. Thanks to the Burma Star Association in the , Robert Lyman, Tom Bruin, John Randle, Patric Emerson, Tarak Barkawi, Brian Cloughley and his wife Margaret for graciously hosting me at their lovely home in to avail myself of Brian’s encyclopedic knowledge of the Pakistan Army. My thanks are also due to John Chiles, , Kaushik Roy, members of the Pakistan- Forum, the Pakistan High Commission Canberra and those officers of the Pakistan Army in Pakistan such as Talat Munir who inspired me to undertake this project and unstintingly gave of their time in steering me onto previously unknown troves of primary sources and responding graciously to my queries on matters new and old.

Finally, but not at all least, special acknowledgment to my wife Helen, children Flyn and Hannah for their love, enduring patience and kind understanding as I pursued this project over a long period of time in Australia and overseas. I love you all.

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Table of Contents

Abstract...... iiii

Acknowledge ments ...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

Glossary...... vii

Abbreviations ...... x

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter I Religion, Martial Race and Myth in the British Indian Army from the late 19th Century to 1947 ...... 22

Chapter II Turbulent Birth: the Pakistan Army ...... 54

1947 – 1951...... Partition, of the British-Indian Army, Kashmir, Islam and the foundations of the Strategic Culture of the Pakistan Army......

Chapter III Independence and evolution: 1951-1958 ...... 91

Chapter IV Birth of the Praetorian State: 1958-1970...... 119

Chapter V War, Islam and Dismemberment: 1970-1971...... 142

Chapter VI , Bhutto, Zia and the Institutionalisation of Islam: 1971-1988 166

Chapter VII The Army and Islam in the ‘Democratic Interregnum’ 1988-1999 191

Chapter VIII The Anvil 1999-2007 ...... 222

Chapter IX Conclusion ...... 251

Bibliography ...... 259

v

vi

Glossary

Amir Commander, chief

Basant Is a February spring festival acquired from Hindu tradition that was practiced and celebrated until recently by in by kite flying until the advent of Islamism in the new mille nnium

Bihar/Bihari and Bihari is not the identification of the people of Bihar but is rather referring to the variety of speaking people who migrated from India to after partition. In this regard they were referred to as as a manner of distinguishing them from

Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence

Ghazi Warrior of the faith (in British times a ‘fanatic’)

Hadith Traditio n (of the Prophet)

Hudood Islamic Penal Code

Hurs A Muslim Sufi community of Pakistan

Islam Submiss io n

Jatha A body of armed and/or war-party

Jawan Soldier

Jazirat-ul-Arab A Muslim reference to the Holy Land of the Arabian Peninsula

Jihad al- The greater (struggle)

Jihad al-asghar The lesser jihad

Jihad fi sabil allah Jihad in the way of Allah

vii

Jizya Poll tax levied on non-Muslims ‘Dhimmi’ monotheist ‘people of the book’

Kafir Unbelie ver, ungrateful for Allah’s blessings or apostate

Khalifa Temporal and spiritual leader of the Muslims (khilifa, caliph)

Khilifa t Authority over the Muslim community, the Ottoman claim to leadership of the Muslim world as inheritors of the Abbasid title of caliph or khalifah of the khilafat. Also the religious movement for restoration of Turkish Khilifat in India during the 1920s

Khutba Islamic religio us sermon

Lashkar Tribal war party

LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre of Military Archives

Malik A tribal elder

Mazar Is a word derived from usually referring to a shrine of a Sufi saint or famous person in the

Maulvi Informal title of one with some degree of religious standing in the community

Mohaarram Shia festival commemorating the martyrdom of Husain at Karbala

Mohajir Migrant (e.g. those Muslim Indians who migrated to Pakistan in 1947)

Mujahedin Muslim holy warriors

Mujtahid Muslim qualified to interpret Islamic law

Mullah Religio us preacher

Munshi Indian language instructor who provided tuition for Officers in order to pass required Urdu language examinations viii

Nisam-i-mustap ha System of order as in the time of the Prophet

Pir Muslim holy man, spiritual guide

Pukka An adjective derived from Hindi (Anglo-Indian) meaning ‘perfectly done’ and/or ‘genuine’, first class

Quaid-i-Azam Great leader, the title bestowed on

Raj Rule or reign

Razakars Armed volunteers

Sherwani A garment of South Asian heritage; a long coat worn traditionally by aristocracy and popularised by Mohammed Ali Jinnah during the

Salwar kameez Salwar is a loose pyjama like trouser and a kameez is a long shirt or tunic worn in Pakistan

Sifarish/Sifaarish In strict Urdu terms meaning ‘recommendation’ but in its pejorative sense as ‘unmerited recommendation’

Sepoy Soldier

Shaheed Martyr

Shariah Islamic law

Sufi Muslim mystic

Sunnah Actions and conduct of the Prophet Muhammad

Ulama Formally trained Muslim theologians (Alim singular)

Ummah The community of Muslims in the world

Zakat Islamic alms tax

ix

Abbreviations

BIA Britis h Indian Army

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India)

COAS Chief of Army

CGS Chief of Staff

CMLA Chief Administrator

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DGMO Director General of Military Operations

DMO Director Military Operations

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Agencies

FSF Federal Security Force

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

IWM Imperial War Museum

IOR/L/MIL Indian Office Records, Library, Military Department

OIOC Oriental India Office Collection

JI Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)

IMA

INA

JSPCTS Joint Services Pre-Cadet Training School

LT Lashkar-i-Taiba (Army of the Pure)

MI Military Intelligence

x

MQM Muttahida and/or Muhajir Quami Movement. A movement for the political rights of those Urdu speaking migrants and descendants who moved to Pakistan at the time of partition and is based in

NAM National Army Museum, Chelsea

NWFP North West Frontier Province

PAGB Pakistan Army Green Book

PMA Pakistan Military Academy located at Kakul near Abbotobad Pakistan. The P.M.A long course is so named because of its two-year duration compared to the initial six-month training at the JSPCTS in Quetta

PML Pakistan

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

RAW Research and Analysis Wing (India)

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisatio n

UNCIP Commission for India and Pakistan

US MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

US MDA United States Military Defense Assistance

xi

Introduction

It has been argued that ‘new’ South Asian military history has been neglected.1 A history of the impact of Islam upon the Pakistan Army is important for our understanding of the evolution of contemporary security matters in south and Southwest Asia and their global impact. Understanding the Pakistan Army and understanding Islam as it relates to the Pakistan Army is also important in a current era where globalised resurgent religion and fundamentalist approaches to religion are significant. These concerns are doubly relevant where the applicability of Huntington’s theory of the possibility of a clash of civilisations between the Islamic world and the West remains contested.2

A history of the influence of Islam upon the Pakistan Army Officer Corps is particularly important when considered against Pakistan’s pivotal role in the first and second decades of the twenty-first century as an ally in the US led ‘global war against terror’. Pakistan’s support is especially important in supporting the efforts of a number of western nations participating as members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) attempting to stabilise , and prevent the return to power of the Islamist regime formerly supported officially by Pakistan. Considered alongside contested claims of the Army’s continuing support for Islamist militant Jihadis makes an examination of the role of Islam in the Pakistan Army historically and contemporarily important. 3 Western concerns on the role of Islam in the Pakistan Army are not new, especially so since the beginning of the current millennium where concerns about the nature of a ‘radicalised nuclear capable

1 Gyanesh, Kudaisya. ‘In Aid of Civil Power: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919-42’, in, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004. 2 S.M. Thomas, ‘A Globalised God’, in Foreign Affairs, November/December, Vol. 89, No. 6. 2010, pp. 93-102 & Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, UK Ltd, 1997. 3Lois A. Delvoie, ‘The Afghanistan War: The Pakistani Dimension’s’, in On Track, Vol. 13, No. 4, Conference of Defence Associations, , Winter 2008, p. 31; Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism – Episode and Discourse, The University of Chicago Press, USA, 2005 & John L., Esposito, The Islamic Threat – Myth or Reality, , New York, 1995. 1

Pakistan Army’, and an Islamist mutiny within the Army have been the subject of considerable debate.4

The growth of popular journalism and scholarly works upon the Pakistan Army, Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalism since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 has been prolific. Despite the prolific nature of this literature there is little in the way of sustained studies addressing the specific issue of the influence of Islam upon the history of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps. Much of the material concerning the Pakistan Army and Islam has to be drawn by necessity from works addressing a broader cross-section of issues concerning the Pakistan Army. Importantly, much of this material has to be carefully filtered in order to guard against the disproportionate amount of contemporary commentary upon extremism and its propensity to taint a dispassionate scholarly focus upon the impact of Islam on the Pakistan Army since its formation in 1947.

This thesis will examine the history of the Pakistan Army between 1947 and 2007 and describe how Islam, though varying in its impact, has been a constant and significant factor of overt and indirect influence. Islam has manifested its influence on the identity and strategic culture of the Army from its very beginnings up to the conclusion of this study in 2007 in which the Army had adopted explicit Islamic philosophies for the conduct of warfare and ethical guidelines of the Officer Corps. It is the contention of this thesis that the story of what impact Islam has had upon the Pakistan Army has not been fully explored.

The most important original contribution made by this study is to provide a new interpretation of the history of the Army and contribute to a greater understanding of the Pakistan Army by examining the influence of Islam on the Officer Corps from its inception in 1947 to 2007. Importantly, this thesis draws upon the influence of the Army’s predecessor the British Indian Army in how Islam had been an important factor in the ‘martial race’ identities of those Officers and soldiers

4 Bruce Riedel considers a number of scenarios involving a nuclearised, radical and anti-American Pakistan in B. Riedel, ‘Armageddon in ’, in The National Interest, June 23 2009, http://nationalinterest.org, retrieved 21 September 2010; A. Malik, ‘On the brink of an abyss’, in Dawn, Newspaper, Karachi, 27 April 2009 & considerations of US contingency responses in ‘US has plans to safeguard Pakistan’s nukes: report’, New Age, , 12 November, 2007 & S.M. Hersh, ‘Defending the Arsenal’, in The New Yorker, USA 16 November 2009, in particular Hersh’s interview of Indian officials who claim the US is ignorant of intelligence concerning Pakistan Army Officers who wish to lead an Islamic Army. 2

who would form the first generation of the Pakistan Army.

It is the objective of this thesis to contribute to a greater understanding of the role of Islam in the Officer Corps by analysing the formal and informal sacralisation of the Army and to identify the influence of this religious dimension on the Pakistan Army between 1947 and 2007. This thesis considers the role of Islam as an important influence together with a constellation of related factors that have helped shape the Pakistan Army, such as: religious nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, martial race beliefs, ethno-nationalism, military professionalism, and praetorianism as; well as the management of ’s domestic and international politics.

Indeed the analysis of Islam and these other factors viewed chronologically over the period 1947–2007 through the historical paradigm will be pivotal in synthesising the conclusion to this thesis.

The thesis commences its exploration of the role of Islam by introducing and contextualising the subject in two introductory chapters followed by six chapters that consecutively address what the role of Islam has been in the Army. The time periods encapsulated by each chapter represent significant demarcations in the history of the Army and Pakistan. One concluding chapter then synthesises what the role of Islam has been and how it has been manifested within the Army over this time period. The thesis argues that the Army was influenced indelibly by inherited culture, concepts and beliefs from the British Indian Army. Concepts such as martial race conflated the Islam of the Army with the martial race indoctrination already imprinted onto the new Army’s Punjabi and Pathan majority. Paradoxically, though Pakistan achieved independence against Indian resistance the were dissatisfied with their inheritance at partition and were outraged at India’s acquisition of Kashmir. Within the Army this distrust was instrumental in propagating foundation myths and legends of the Army’s and Pakistan’s origins being forged in adversity as a Muslim homeland against near impossible odds and barriers presented by an irredentist and hostile Hindu India.

The danger argued as emanating from India intersects with the tenuous beginnings of the Army that was bereft of an identity, except for that acquired from the cultural inheritances of the British Indian Army. Apart from these qualities the

3

Army was formed in the absence of any national tradition and formed as an Army to defend a country with no historical precedent. In this way the thesis examines the early and evolving use and manipulation of Islam as a form of identity and basis of a strategic culture for the Army to adhere to. Despite the ethnic and cultural disparities within the population that made up the new nation of Pakistan the Army would continue to rely on an Islam for an Army and national identity. Furthermore, Islam would become equated as the basis of the Army’s superiority in comparison to other armies such as India.

The Army throughout its history would seek to promote Islam externally to such nations as the US during the early 1950s as an integral part of a pious anti- communist warrior character of the Army that made them superior soldiers. Internally, the Army during the first decade of the twenty-first century would formally establish Islam as the basis of a philosophy of warfare and ethics for the Army beyond the ken of a number of practices instituted during the Zia Islamisation years. It is then important to understand the nature of how Islam has historically been utilised within the Pakistan Army and how the Army’s evolution since 1947 has been influenced by its institutional inheritance from the British Indian Army. Ideas on ethnic recruitment and martial race and their intersection with Islam contributed to the establishment and evolution of the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army. Though this thesis addresses the time period 1947 to 2007, the first chapter examines the Pakistan Army’s immediate predecessor, the British Indian Army.

This examination is necessary because many of the first generation of Pakistani Army Officers commenced their careers in the British Indian Army prior to or during II, and up until the time of partition in 1947. This first generation included such significant figures as General Zia ul-Haq who exerted influence on the Army until the late 1980s. It is also important to have some knowledge of the history of the British Indian Army in regard to its management of religion, politics and ethnicity in the Army. While the Pakistan Army has significantly involved itself in politics the British Indian Army did not, except for those occasions when it acted in support of the ‘civil power’ to suppress riots and rebellions when the civil authorities could not.

4

In tracking the evolution of the impact of Islam upon the British Indian and Pakistan Army this thesis considers the centrality of Islam to the Pakistan Army. This study is situated alongside studies that have considered the role of religion and conflict in forming national identity. Professor Linda Colley argued that the experiences of the British wars against the French were indispensable to the birth of a modern British identity through their conflicts with Catholic France. Likewise, in certain aspects this study argues a similar process at least so far as the Pakistan Army Officer Corps views its identity and strategic culture in Islamic terms compared to a Hindu India. 5 Islam has manifested a pivotal role in the Army’s identity formation in juxtaposition to what the Army has described as a Hindu India. Islam has been critical in the evolution of both Army and Pakistani identity where Muslim identity was used in an attempt to overcome ethnic and cultural factors. In reflecting upon Colley’s study and especially her focus upon the importance of religion and warfare in the manifestation of identity, this study like hers also brings together the important elements of popular religious identity in Pakistan, being used to support strategic ends.

Over the course of the following chapters the study also draws upon how Islam has been present through the prism of Hassner’s ‘framing of the role of religon’, in the Army’s theology, hierarchy, icononography, ceremony and knowledge in the Army.6 Chapters throughout the thesis note at different points how the Army in this regard has at times equated religiosity with hierarchy in the Zia years, to the use of inconography and ceremony in the earlier years when the Army was seeking to establish an identity sometimes conflating Islam with inherited concepts from the Britis h.

The idea of an Islamic Pakistan also draws out competing arguments of those whose Islam and whose nationalism the Pakistan Army represents and to whose political ends they serve. The consideration of these strategic issues are more than abstract considerations given the ethnic, cultural and religious divides in Pakistan, and the Army’s role as a catalyst in fomenting these issues since the states establishment in 1947.

5 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1992. 6 Ron E.Hassner (Editor), Religion in the Military Worldwide, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014, pp.7-8. 5

Methodologically this thesis relies upon methods of historical enquiry as well as some theoretical perspectives in order to draw out and distinguish the nuances and subtleties of the impact of Islam upon the Pakistan Army. Historical enquiry encompasses the use of, “every kind of evidence that human beings have left of their past activities”.7 This thesis utilises archival records of government documents, manuscripts, memoirs, letters, emails, published and unpublished PhD theses, published studies and auto-biographies as well as oral history in the form of recorded interviews held at archives and interviews with witnesses to these events to interpet, analyse and provide a descriptive account of the Pakistan Army Officr Corps, Islam and Strategic Culture between 1947-2007.8 These sources wer interpreted by Historical method with the application of critical history methods in evaluating the production, authenticity, accuracy and bias of these written and spoken artifacts.9

The terms ‘Strategic Culture’ and to a lesser degree ‘Ethno-Symbolism’ are terms of elementary importance to this thesis and are important to define in order to contextualise their meaning in regard to this thesis. It is also important to note that the nature and veracity of these theoretical terms and the theory they propose remain contested, especially ‘strategic culture’.10 This thesis specifically notes for instance how the Army’s strategic culture was transmitted through time and why certain periods in the Army’s history were formative.

Strategic culture theory and descriptions of Islamic fundamentalism, Islamisation, and extremism are key contextual concepts for this thesis, while the theory of martial race shall be examined in the next chapter. Strategic culture has its deractors as well as supporters witth positions being argued divergently from strategic culture’s utility as, ‘a means for understanding what appears to be irrational state behaviour”, and serving, “as a pervasive guide to action…from grand strategy down

7 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History 5th Edition, Pearson Education, 2010, p.89.

8 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History 5th Edition, Pearson Education, 2010, p.89. 9 Professor of History JohnTosh notes these historical methodsh. The Pursuit of History, pp.119-142. 10 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring 1995) Johnston considers some of the problems within the different ‘generations’ of strategic culture, including definitional problems as well as the explanation of inconsistency and other issues such as perceived disjunctions between strategic behaviour and culture. Similarly, Johnston considers why some periods in history are considered formative and others are not, as well as how the strategic culture is transmitted through time. 6

to battlefield decision making” to those who see it risking being linked to, “simplistic ethnic stereotyping…”. 11

A strategic culture can be defined as a theory that argues that there are distinctive national styles in security and military affairs. There have been studies on a number of strategic cultures, for example: Israel, and France.12 The provenance of strategic culture effectively begins in the 1930s with Liddell-Hart’s theorising of a traditional British way of warfare, while Booth appealed in the late 1970s for strategists to be more conscious of their cultural context in their thinking. 13 The term ‘strategic culture’ it-self dates from the 1970s in Snyder’s explanation of Soviet strategy.14 Strategic styles influenced by the nature of the nation or ‘organisation’s history, which has been involved in theat state’s defence and are influenced by major shocks or disasters that occur to the state, society or organisation.15 Booth’s definition of strategic culture is also helpful,

…a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, customs, achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. 16

The thesis considers these elements in how the Army’s strategic culture was developed and influenced by significant events. This thesis will illustrate how events such as: the formation of the Army from the Muslim elements of the British Indian Army, the first Kashmir war of 1947–48, the 1965 war, the 1971 war and the formation of Bangladesh, as well as other major events such as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US have influenced the role of Islam in the Pakistan Army.

11 Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, Routledge, , 2006, pp. 5-10. 12 Gregory F. Giles, ‘Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture’, Defense Threat Reductions Agency, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-OO17, USA, 2002; Jennifer Knepper, ‘Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, 2008; Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine – France between the Wars’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4(Spring 1995). 13Sondhaus, Strategic Culture p. 3. 14Sondhaus, Strategic Culture, p. 1. 15 Jeffrey S. Lantis & Darryle Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture’, in John Bayliss, James J. Wirtz & Colin S. Gray , Strategy in the Contemporary World 4th Edition’, Oxford University Press, 2013, United Kingdom, pp. 76-95. 16 Sondhaus, Strategic Culture, p. 5. 7

History and experiences are important considerations in the evolution of strategic culture… Another source of strategic culture is the nature of a country’s….defence organizations. Myths and symbols are considered to be part of all cultural groupings and both can act as a stabilizing or destabilizing factor in the evolution of strategic cultural identities.17

Faruqi has argued that in terms of its historical legacies that Pakistani’s, “regard themselves as heirs to the Mughals of South Asia”, with such historical analogies also to be found in non-Asian cultures such as the idea of Romanita in 19 th and early 20th century Italy in their quest to emulate their historical forebears the Romasn. 18 Chapter Two illustrates the belief in such historical legacies and myths with the example of at least one senior officer involved in the first Kashmir war perceiving the heritage of the newly formed Pakistan Army within the historic legacy of the Muslim conquerors of South Asia.

This aspect of Pakistani strategic culture and the pivotal role of Islam, the predominant place of the Army and the formative events of partition to this culture have been explored by Pakistani scholars who note the Pakistani use of religion as a tool of policy19. The Pakistan Army scholar Fair in her comprehensive 2014 work also devotes attention to the strategic noting the influence of the British legacy in regards strategic environment, martial races and “instrumentalization of religious and ethnic differences”.20 The contours of Pakistani strategic culture have also argued by and Lavoy, though these scholars’ purpose was not to provide a sustained analysis of Islam or its role in Pakistan’s strategic culture over the course of its history as this study seeks to perform, while Rizvi importantly recognizes the impact of realism. 21

17Lantis & Howlett, p. 81. 18 Ahmad Faruqi, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, Ashgate, , 2003, p.2. & Brian R.Sullivan, ‘The strategy of the decisive weight: Italy, 1882- 1922’, Williamson Murrary, MacGregor Knox & Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 311-313. 19 Ijaz Khan, Pakistan’s Strategtic Culture and Foreign Policy Making, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2007, pp.16-20. 20C.Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, pp.24-27. 21 Hasan Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, in Michael R. Chambers (Ed), South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, USA, pp. 305-329; Feroz Hasan Khan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan’, Strategic Insights, 8

Historical experiences, perceptions of the adversary and a conception of self – the determinants of strategic culture – are relatively permanent, but each crisis situation may be totally or partly different…at times, the strategic cultural perspective and the dictates of realism may lead to the same or similar policy measures.22

Sondhaus argued that the role of supranational forces, such as Islamic fundamentalism, had influenced Arab and other Muslim states such as Pakistan and Iran. Sondhaus believes Islamic fundamentalism to have influenced these countries to behave in a manner contrary to their national interest, and in this he sees the influence of culture. 23

The theory of ethno-symbolism and nationalism developed by Professor Anthony Smith usefully aids the interpretation of the history of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps, Islam and its Strategic Culture. Ethno-symbolism and nationalism theory consider the culture, religion and history of social structures.

…ethno-symbolists consider the cultural elements of symbol, myth, memory, value, ritual and tradition to be crucial to an analysis of ethnicity, nations and nationalisms…these same cultural elements have endowed each community with a distinctive symbolic repertoire in terms of language, religion, customs and institutions… 24

The value of considering this history of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps through such a theoretical lens is important in the analysis of the role of Islam within the Institution of the Army.

Islam is not a thing, but a happening subject to the whims and motivations of people who make things happen.25 The Muslim world is also not singular entity though they do share a sense of transnational and cross-cultural unity known as the Ummah and despite these differences as well as being divided into the two main

Volume IV, Issue 10, USA, (October 2005) & Peter R. Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Contract No. DTRA01-03-D-0017, 31 October 2006. 22 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Culture’, in, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Carlisle, USA, South Asia in 2020,p.307. 23 Sondhaus, Strategic Culture, pp. 78 & 86-88. 24Anthony Smith Emeritus Professor of Nationalism and Ethnicity at the London School of Economics. Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism, Routledge, London, 2009, p.25. 25 David Waines, An Introduction to Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.1 9

groups of Sunni and Shi’i share belief in the Five Pillars of Islam.26 Islam in the sub- Continent formed a distinctive form since its inception through conquerors, mystics and traders.27

The fact that a number of Islamic Empires including the , Ghurids, sultanates and independent Muslim regimes that ended with the Mughals retains a significant level of importance for Pakistanis and this belief will be noted over the following chapters. 28 This thesis emphasizes the influence of Islam on the Army and its influence in seemingly irrational operations such as examined in Chapter Four. The role of Islam in these major political events noted on the preceding pages was an important locus of justification for the Army’s involvement in conflict. In Pakistan, as with other Muslim states, Islam is varied and sometimes elusively attached to political, ethnic and cultural expediencies and interpretation. This is also a factor with this thesis where in later chapters it is evident that Pakistani Officers pursue a diverse array of adherernce to Islam from moderate to extremist beliefs. These beliefs are sometimes redolent of the great degree of diversity within South Asian Islam noted more explicitly in the next chapter, as well as the difficulties discovered in actually defining a Muslim during the Munir Commission Report on the Ahmediyya disturbances in Lahore in 1953 discussed in Chapter Three. Green sums up the difficulties for the historian in describing Islam,

Like any other large scale religious or ideological label, for the historian, ‘Islam’ is only meaningful when conceived in terms of persons, institutions or discourses at work in the social world. It is in this way that sense can be made of the different ways in which religion operates in history: when ‘religion’ is seen in terms of contingent human beings rather than in terms of fixed theological ideals – when made present in living Muslims rather than when made abstract in a reified universal Islam.29

With this definition in mind the objective of this thesis is not to focus upon exegetical issues in Islam, but rather to look at the temporal reality of Islam for Pakistani Army Officers and its impact upon the institution of the Army across the period of 1947 to 2007.

26Waines, An Introduction to Islam, p.2 & John L.Esposito, ‘Islam in Asia: An Introduction’, John L.Esposito (Ed), Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics & Society, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.11-12.* 27 Ira M.Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.466. 28 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, pp.437-463. 29 Nile Green, Islam and the Army in : Religion in the service of Empire, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 5-6. 10

The terms Islamic fundamentalism and Islamisation shall be used in this thesis and a working definition for these terms will be useful. It is important to acknowledge that there are competing descriptions of such terms. One of these approaches tends to describe these terms negatively, which Vincent argues implied,

…fanaticism, dogmatism, intolerance, anti-intellectualism, terror or extremism. This sense can and does apply to many who would be described as religious, but it can extend well beyond any overt religious connotation. Anyone can be excessively narrow-minded and dogmatic.30

While a more literalist theological description shall be used as the preferred definition within this thesis,

Islamic fundamentalism alludes to contemporary political movements and concepts, primarily antagonistic to ruling secular regimes, which aspire to institute some Islamic state. The paradigm for this movement is sought in the earliest Islamic political community established by Muhammad in Medina in the seventh century and sustained by the Khulafah-i-Rashidun (the rightly guided caliphs) the four caliphs who immediately succeeded him.31

Apart from qualifying that the term fundamentalism has been defined in forms that may differ from the above, it must also be noted that the terms ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘fundamentalism’ are rejected by many Muslims who prefer the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ when referring to those who desire or advocate Islamic law and/or an Islamic state.32 All of these terms will be at times used in this manner throughout the thesis. When referring to Islam in the thesis the connotation is upon moderate Islam for whatever sect unless qualified by the aforementioned definitions and discussion of fundamentalism or any other criteria.

While examining the forerunner to the Pakistan Army, the British Indian Army, this thesis is limited to the study of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps. The thesis shall not consider the , Air Force, Inter-Services Intelligence

30 Andrew, Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies – Third Edition, Wiley-Blackwell, USA, 2010, p. 261 and more generally chapter (10) Fundamentalism, pp. 261-292. 31 Sami Zubaida, ‘Islam, The People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the ’, Routledge, New York, 1989, p. 38, quoted in Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995. 32 R.K.P. Multani, Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia, Sumit Enterprises, , 2007. 11

Directorate or the enlisted personnel of the Pakistan Army unless necessary to illustrate the influence of Islam more generally within the military and intelligence services of Pakistan. As others have written it is somewhat challenging undertaking research upon certain aspects of the Pakistan Army not least because it is difficult gaining access to internal Army publications and Army personnel and it is this very difficulty in obtaining information that contributes to a vacuity of knowledge and spawns misconceptions on the nature of Islamization within the Army. 33 This was true for this study with the acquisition of a number of issues of the Pakistan Army Journal and Green Book series proving to be problematic.

Use has been made of documentary, interview and oral history sources collected in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, United Kingdom, France and Australia upon the British Indian and Pakistan Army. The documents are usefully considered in conjunction with the interviews and correspondence conducted with a number of British Indian Army veterans to elicit facts and perspectives upon the British Indian Army and the evolution of the Pakistan Army. Interviews with former military personnel deployed to Pakistan as military attachés or UN observers have also been utilised. In one instance one source falls within a number of categories having been a defence attaché posted to Pakistan, a UN Kashmir observer, author of two books on the Pakistan Army, as well as being a South Asian security commentator for a number of security publications.

A useful source for the later chapters of this thesis was the Pakistan Army Green Book series published annually by the Pakistan Army Press since 1990. The Green Book series address topical themes of importance to the Army and include individual submissions by Officers whose work is sometimes critical of Army doctrine, policy and methods. Successful submissions to the Green Book series are adjudicated on the merit of their argument by Army editors. Each Green Book is a substantial publication with usually over one hundred submissions of three to ten pages in length that includes a biography of the submitting Officer, their photo, and their essential service details, such as: date of commission, service function, military interests and role at time of submission. A number of the Officers/authors of these submissions can be tracked across successive Green Books as well as their subsequent

33 C.Christine Fair, ‘Has the Pakistan Army Islamized?, p.6. 12

careers in the Army, including Officers who assumed such pivotal roles as Corps Commanders and Chief of Army Staff.34 These Green Books were chosen because of the wealth of primary source information on topics concerning this thesis as well as their detailed biographies of Pakistani Officers. These books were acquired from retail bookshops in Pakistan as well as from Pakistani Officers in Pakistan and Pakistani Defence Attaches deployed in Australia.

In addition to these aforementioned sources the thesis has also drawn from articles cited in the Pakistan Army Journal, Staff College Journal, National Defence University Journal, Officers handbooks and some internal reports on Islam, such as that encompassing philosophies of motivation, the role of Jihad and how Islam does or does not impact upon issues ranging from training to strategic doctrine. The thesis also draws upon commercial publications published in Pakistan for the military audience such as the Defence Journal as well as the substantial body of published autobiographies of Army Officers.

Sources for the early chapters of this thesis include interviews conducted with British and Pakistani veterans of the British Indian Army, the papers and records held by the Oriental and India Office Collection at the British Library and oral history recordings of that library. The British Library was chosen specifically because of its significance as the great repository of these records, as well as the Public Records Office at Kew, the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives and National Army Museums who similarly hold significant records on the British involvement in India as well as appropriate documentary evidence of the Army,.

The British and Pakistani veterans chosen were as representative as could be obtained given the passage of time and the few living veterans still in a position to be able to be interviewed. The British veterans were chosen with the assistance of the Mr Robert Lyman author and former Officer and the Burma Star Association in the United Kingdom, while the Pakistani veterans were identified with

34 The submission guidelines for the Green Book were obtained and clarified separately from three serving of the Pakistan Army.

13

the assistance of members of the Australia-Pakistan Forum, Pakistan Defence Attaches to Australia as well as serving and retired Pakistani based Officers. Other sources utilised include the oral history interview recordings of British Indian Army Officers held by the Templer Study Centre at the National Army Museum Chelsea. Sources were chosen with the assistance of the staff of the Templer Study Centre who identified appropriate records in regards service, location and era from their oral history series and written records.

The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at Kings College was also visited to consult the papers of the first two Commanders in Chief of the Pakistan Army. Lord Ismay’s papers and correspondence concerning the division of the British Indian Army in 1947 were also consulted at the Liddell Hart Centre. Memoirs and papers held by the Imperial War Museum were also consulted. Later chapters drew upon certain materials viewed at the Pakistan National Library and comments provided by the Dean of the Pakistan National Defence University.

The aforementioned troves of information proved to be of the greatest value in researching the subject of this thesis and believed to present a balance of perspective, bias and breadth between the British, Pakistani and other sources. While there remain no doubt additional Pakistani and Indian based military records that may be relevant, as well as other resources globally, it is not believed they would present a substantially different outcome than from what has been obtained with the primary source and other records utilised in this thesis.

A review of the literature in which this thesis sits reveals that it has been addressed by a diverse range of approaches by scholars and commentators of Pakistan. A number of works are distinct histories of Pakistan in which the Army is mentioned but is not the primary focus of the work. Other literature specifically addresses the Army but can be sub-categorised as either distinct unit histories or campaign histories that include some discussion of Islam in the Army. Literature can also be categorised chronologically from work that considers: the era of partition and formation of the Army, the post-formation era, the post-1971 era and the post- September 11, 2001 era. The earlier era includes a vast array of work on Pakistan’s wars and conflicts with India such as the initially clandestine 1947–48 Kashmir War, while later work addresses the 1965 War and the shock caused by the loss of the 1971 14

War. Autobiographies of senior Officers consider these events from an equally diverse range of opinions, including the justification, conduct and theory behind these conflicts as well as the apportioning of blame. The post-September 11, 2001 era is dominated by considerations of Pakistan’s role in the ‘Global ’ as well as analyses of the Army’s established and alleged relationships with Islamic fundamentalist groups.

Thematically then the work can be divided firstly into histories of Pakistan or studies upon Pakistan in which the Army’s role is addressed prominently with or without some reference to Islam. The second theme may be described as distinct campaign histories or all encompassing Army histories in which Islam is not a major focus. The third thematic group of work concerns Army autobiography in which, dependent on the authors piety, the role of Islam in the Army may or may not be mentioned, and lastly to specific studies on the strategic culture of the Army or the inculcation of Islamic warfare in the Army.

Examples of the first theme include Cohen’s 1994 work updated in 1998, The Pakistan Army 1998 Edition where he devotes one nineteen page chapter in this book to Islam and the Officer Corps.35 Cohen valuably explores Islam’s impact upon the state and the application of Islamic principles within the military and how these principles are inculcated into both strategic and tactical doctrine, though the study is now dated. Professor Howard Schaffer and Terisita Schaffer, both former diplomats to Pakistan provide an analysis of the cultural and identity imperatives of the political and military elites. 36

Nawaz’s 2008 book Crossed Swords provides a comprehensive political and military including attention to the promulgation of Islam by General Zia in chapter fourteen; while in 2010 he collaborated with Fair to produce a work on the changing nature of the demographics of Pakistan Army Officer Corps.37 Rizvi's The Military and Politics in Pakistan analyses the role of the military’s

35 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Pakistan Army 1998 Edition, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998.

36 Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 2011. 37 S. Nawaz, Crossed Swords – Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, London, UK, 2008 & C.C. Fair & S. Nawaz, ‘The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps, in, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Routledge, Vol. 34, No. 1, February, 2011, pp. 63-94. 15

persistent involvement in politics while Brigadier Siddiqi's The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality argues the continuance of a British oriented colonial image by the higher echelons of the Army. 38

Siddiqi’s argument is supported to an extent in Daechel’s Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the spectre of colonial perceptions where he interprets Islamisation and military rule in Pakistan as being a continuing manifestation of Pakistan’s colonial roots.39 Such studies underscore the importance of understanding and contextualising the British Indian Army model which Fair’s study noted earlier also emphasized the importance of British influence upon the strategic culture of the Army which is explored in the next chapter.

Works consulted from the second theme included The Story of the Pakistan Army, The Pakistan Army 1947–1949, The Pakistan Army 1966–71, Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War and Z. A. Khan’s The Way it Was, which all provide some insight into the role of Islam in the Army. 40 Similarly, the studies by Cheema and Cloughley that focus on an organisational history of the Army—including the narration of wars, battles and the leaders who led them—are useful with Cloughley’s noting the impact of Islamisation during Zia’s term in power useful from his perspective of having served as a defence attaché in Pakistan during this period. 41

Within the third theme the autobiographies of a large number of Pakistani Army Officers is available with those of , and Qasim being representative of this genre and include varying degrees of commentary upon Islam

38 Hasan-Askari, Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–86, Progressive Publishers, Lahore Pakistan, 1987 & A.R. Siddiqi (Brig. Retd) The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, Vanguard Books, Lahore Pakistan, 1996.

39 Markus Daeschsel, ‘Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the spectre of colonial perceptions’, in Contemporary South Asia (1997), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.141-160. 40 Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Wajidalis Printers for the Services Book Club, Lahore, Pakistan, 1989 & S. Riza, The Pakistan Army 1966-71, Wajidalis Printers for the Services Book Club, Lahore, Pakistan, 1990; T. Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2, Sage Publications, London, 2006, pp. 325-355 & Z.A, Khan, The Way it Was, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, Pakistan, 1998. 41 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2002 & Brian Cloughley, War, Coups & Terror – Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, United Kingdom, 2008 & Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army – Wars and Insurrections, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 1999. 16

and the Army. 42

The body of literature encompassing the last theme of work included studies that argue against propositions that there can be a form of warfare legitimately described as Islamic, to arguments that there does exist a continuous unbroken Islamic heritage of unconventional warfare.43 This theme also includes such works as Brigadier S. K. Malik’s The Quranic Concept of War and Haq’s Islamic Motivation and National Defence, that draw upon the exegesis of holy sources for the conduct of warfare and management of the Army.44 Similarly, Al-Fughom’s work on the spiritual preparation of Muslim armies is useful and focuses on the first two decades of Islam. Al-Fughom’s work is informative on classic portrayals of Islamic military doctrine, Islamic military leadership, strategy, self-denial, steadfastness, and sense of mission and is valuable in comparing the early Islamic communities views to those later views espoused as Islamic by Pakistani Officers.45

Before the impact of Islam upon the Army between 1947 and 2007 is examined in the succeeding chapters, an introductory chapter will provide the information required to establish historical context. Chapter One discusses the management of religion in the British Indian Army as well as the theory of martial race and political consciousness. This is important in understanding the subsequent conflation of martial race notions with the Muslim identity of the Officers who would form the Pakistan Army in 1947. Significantly, this conflated identity was expressed via powerful myths of a Muslim and martial exceptionalism amongst those Officers who would form the new Army. Chapter Two will examine the period 1947 to 1951 and explore how the interpretation of British and Indian actions by Pakistani Officers contributed to their feeling of having been defrauded of their rightful portion of military materiel and territorial inheritance despite paradoxically their having achieved the objective of a Muslim homeland constituted with the establishment of

42 General Mohammad Musa, From Jawan to Genera, East & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984; Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967 & Brig. Syed Shah Abul Qasim, Life Story of an Ex-Soldier, Publicity Panel Publishers, Karachi, 2003. 43 M.O. Khan, ‘Is there an Islamic Way of War”, in Small Wars Journal, published by Small Wars Foundation, USA, 2010 & H. John Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon – Militant Muslim Combat Methods, Posterity Press, Emerald, North Carolina, USA, 2004. 44 S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, Himalayan Books (reprint), New Delhi, India, 1986 & I. Haq, Islamic Motivation and national Defence, Vanguard Books, Lahore, Pakistan, 1991. 45 Nawaf Bedah Al-Fughom, ‘Factors in the Spiritual Preparation of Muslim Armies’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Leeds, April 2003. 17

Pakistan. Linked to this will be the Army’s views on the acquisition of the Muslim majority state of Kashmir by India and how this produced influential myths and narratives in which Islam was stated to be in danger from a Hindu India. This is significant because a fear of India is a pillar of Pakistani strategic culture evident throughout the period studied.

The unresolved issue of Kashmir contributed to the establishment of an Army culture and identity as well as a strategic culture in which Islam dominated. By culture the meaning in this context refers to culture as contestable and refers to the “values, norms and assumptions that guide human action…” that allow members of that culture to interpret situations in a limited and specific way.46 In the sense of the Pakistan Army being an organisational entity, culture is also helpfully explained in some aspects by reference to management theory which proposes that organisation’s maintain specific cultures that are formed in response to external environment and reflect the philosophy, attitudes, beliefs, and shared values of its members.47 These aspects Grant argues are furthermore “embedded within national cultures, and incorporate elements of social and professional cultures”.48 Cultures and national cultures influence strategic cultures.

Chapter Two argues that the impact of the division of the Army from the British Indian Army into the Pakistan Army, the travails of partition, the loss of Kashmir to India and the 1947–48 War contributed to the establishment of a myopic Army interpretation of these events. The influence of these events was critical and has been manifested throughout the history of the Army this thesis addresses. These events have influenced Army values, premises, and assumptions on their role. The term ‘myths’ is used in the sense of “commemoration of key individuals and events associated … during formative periods in its history”. 49

Chapter Three will deal with the period 1951 to 1958 in which command of the Army was assumed by its first indigenous Pakistani Commander in Chief, a modernist Muslim, and the consequences of Pakistan’s international and domestic

46 Peter H. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 1, January 2008, p. 14. 47 John Viljoen & Susan Dann, Strategic Management 3rd Edition, Longman, Australia, 2000, p. 487. 48 Robert M. Grant, Contemporary Strategy Analysis – Concepts, Techniques and Applications 4th Edition, Blackwell Publishers, Malden Massachusetts, 2002, p. 220. 49 Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, p. 20. 18

politics on the Army. Linked to this discussion will be an examination of the persistence of British Indian Army cultural influence on the Army amid attempts to inject more of an indigenous and Islamic identity into the Army.

Chapter Four examines the period 1958 to 1970 in which General Ayub Khan became both Commander in Chief of the Army and ruler of Pakistan. Khan’s modernist Islamic views are linked to his political experiments and his expedient use of Islam during the 1965 War with India, which had included the Army utilising Islam as a justification for conducting covert and asymmetrical warfare.

Chapter Five examines the 1971 War in which the shock of the Army’s defeat and the dismemberment of Pakistan ushered in a new focus on the role of Islam in the Army and in Pakistan. Importantly, Chapter Five notes how a number of officers in the Army viewed the senior Army leadership as being inauthentic Muslims who were viewed as slavish followers of Western vices. These perceptions were occurring, the chapter notes, during a nascent period of a global Islamic resurgence.

Chapter Six explores the period 1972 to 1988 in the aftermath of the shock and humiliation of having lost the eastern half of the country as the newly independent state of Bangladesh. The chapter considers the initially euphoric reception of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as the leader of Pakistan and his attempts to gain civilian control of the Army. The chapter notes how, during this period of a burgeoning Islamic resurgence, Bhutto attempted to outflank Islamist opposition by his own initiatives to prove his Islamic credentials. After a brief hiatus the Army returned to power with General Zia declaring martial law and subsequently detaining, convicting and executing Bhutto. During this period Zia performed the duties of Army Commander and President until 1988 during which he instituted an Islamisation process that had a profound impact on both Pakistan and the Army.

Chapter Seven studies the period 1988 to 1999 after the eleven year period of Zia’s rule and the impact of his Islamisation of the Army and Pakistan. The chapter examines dialogue within the Army concerning arguments on the role of Islam. This chapter examines the impact of Islam on Army culture as well as Islamic notions in the consideration of strategic alliances.

Chapter Eight covers the period 1999 to 2007 addressing the impact of the US alliance with Pakistan brought about after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on 19

the US. The chapter examines the role of Islam in the education of Pakistan Army Officers including their pre-selection and training. Arguments concerning the Army’s management of Islamic injunctions as part of a philosophy of war and its use as a leveraging aspect in unconventional warfare are also examined.

Chapter Nine concludes the thesis and synthesises the material presented over the previous chapters. The conclusion then details the original contribution made by this thesis upon the role of Islam on the Pakistan Army between 1947 and 2007 and the implications of this conclusion. The conclusion finally provides a number of suggestions for research arising out of subjects addressed within the chapters of this thesis as well as its conclusion.

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21

Chapter I Religion, Martial Race and Myth in the British Indian Army from the late 19th Century to 1947

One cannot spend years of one’s life in India without being conscious of the tremendous influence of religion and the mysteries of the spirit on the life of man. In the years that I was in India, that country was still steeped in religion.

(Lt. D.M. Killingley – Indian Army 1919–1945)50

Introduction

The introduction proposed that a history of the impact of Islam upon the Pakistan Army Officer Corps is required for a more effective understanding of contemporary security matters in south and Southwest Asia. Equally important in understanding the Pakistan Army Officer Corps is an understanding of the influences of its immediate predecessor the British Indian Army.

The aim of this chapter is to review the management of religion and martial race in the British Indian Army, which is important in understanding the nature of these practices and why they were transmitted into the Pakistan Army. The Muslim Officers who made up the first generation of the Pakistan Army brought some of these beliefs and practices concerning religion, martial race and British regimental culture with them to the Pakistan Army. British Regimental culture was designed to promote and instil a sense of belonging to one’s that entailed a sense of egality and shared comraderie overlaid with sometimes totemic symbols and rituals of arcane antiquity. The structure of the Indian Army promoted the development of a Regimental esprit de corps through its links to ex-servicemen and generations of family service within the Army, with Marston noting that during the interwar period, “it was not unusal for a jawan arriving at a regimental centre to be the fifth generation of his family to serve in the Army”. 51

50 Lt. Colonel D.M. Killingley, Farewell the Plumed Troop – A Memoir of the Indian 1919– 1945, Grevatt & Grevatt, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990, pp. 5-6. 51 Danile Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campagin, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p.25. 22

The Regimental spirit was perhaps epitomised by Colonel C.C. Spooner in marking the end of his command of the 2 Essex in 1939.

To me, the Regiment is a living soul, something more than what the casual person calls a Regiment. For its welfare there is nothing I would not do, and I believe those are the sentiments of us all here tonight. It is really the Essex Regiment that counts. We must subordinate ourselves to the interests of the Regiment it it is to be successful. In other words the Regiment lives on where we pass on.52

While Precy upon his departure from India in 1946 noted the intense camaraderie between the British and Indians.

For me there had always been a bond, a feeling of mutual respect, a common sense of humour, an inherent kindness on bothsides, a tolerance and a brotherhood that transcended colour of skin, religion and social position…53

Regimental histories also formed an essential role in the creation and continuance of the Regiment’s martial myths and hence promote the combat motivation of the men serving in the Regiment by emulating those heroes of the past with inconvenient truths rewritten into more palatable forms.54 The influence of the British Regimental Culture is located within theories on military culture that apart from noting that a group of people must have stability and requisite common history to allow a culture to form notes that;

…military culture may be said to refer to the deep structure of organizations, rooted in the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs, and traditions which collectively over time, have created shared individual expectations among the members.55

The functional approach to military culture also includes consideration of how an Army’s warfighting determines their central beliefs as well as how war is invested

52 David French, Military Identities – The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People, c.1870-2000, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.79. French’s work explores the significance of British Regimental Culture and the influence and transmission of that culture over generations. 53W.H.Precy, A Passage to : Misadventures of an Indian Army Officer 1944-1946, Woodfield Publishing, Bognor Regis, 2002, p.149. 54 French, Military Identities, pp.80-85. 55 Don M.Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture……p.118 23

with meaning and significance. For example the role of the religious motif in the Pakistan Army, the influence of the Officer Coprs as well as the development of sub- cultures within the military such as the Islamist and moderate being an example of military culture factors examined in this thesis.56

These inheritances from the British sustained powerful myths of Muslim martial race exceptionalism by the Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated Officer Corps as well as contributing to an army culture that at times drew slavishly from the British Indian Army Regimental culture.

This chapter though is not a detailed history of the British Indian Army but is intended to highlight a number of salient features of that Army’s management of religion, culture and advocacy of martial race. The purpose of this is twofold. First, to provide a contextual background to understand the progenitor of the Pakistan Army in regard to these issues, and secondly as a means of comparing any change in the Officer Corps over the course of the succeeding chapters. As the Pakistan Army was formed out of the dismembering of the British Indian Army into the respective Pakistan and Indian Armies it is essential to understand the nature of the British Indian Army. It is important to have an understanding of how the British Indian Army was managed and what its role was in the socio-political context of the early to mid- twentieth century up to partition and the creation of the Pakistan Army in 1947.

The historical context is important in tracing the antecedents of political, religious and cultural management practices of the British Indian Army and whether these practices had any influence on succeeding generations of Pakistan Army Officers. As the Pakistan Army carried these traditions over to its service it is useful to understand their provenance. While the Pakistan Army did continue with many of the practices and cultural aspects of the British Indian Army it departed significantly in a number of aspects, perhaps most significantly with its involvement in politics, which was anathema to the British Indian Army Officers.

Part one of this chapter considers the treatment of religion in the Army. Part two examines martial race and part three observes attitudes to politics in the Army. In drawing together the conclusions of these three sections the chapter argues the manner

56 Snider, ‘An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture, p.118 & pp.125-127 24

in which the British Indian Army managed and manipulated religion and ethnicity are critical to understanding the subsequent development of Pakistan Army culture. As the British Indian Army could not use nationalism as a means of motivation they successfully manipulated political, ethnic and religious aspects of their armies by introducing notions of martial race and Muslim exceptionalism that were taken up by the Punjabi and Pakhtun Officer Corps of the new Pakistan Army. For the Muslim members of the Army these notions of martial superiority linked to their Muslim Punjabi and Muslim Pakhtun ethnicity were embedded in the Pakistan Army from its outset as these Officers had obtained these beliefs in their transmission from the British Indian Army.

The British Indian Army was one of the empire’s main engines of war and provided the empire with its largest reservoir of military manpower. 57 Indian soldiers in the service of Britain had protected the empire’s borders and fought in wars throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in theatres throughout Asia, including Burma, Java and Afghanistan. 58 Indian soldiers also fought for the empire in both world wars, inter-war conflicts and in actions aimed at restoring the French and Dutch colonial possessions in Indo- and the Dutch after the Second World War.59 Apart from its external duties, the primary duty of the Indian Army was internal security, which accounted for up to one third of its duties. Upholding the Raj’s authority when civil authorities could not, in the instance of large scale communal rioting and unrest, was one of its most significant functions.

Extinguishing communal violence between and Muslims, as well as intra-Muslim violence, was one of the primary responsibilities of civil authorities, which had usually resulted from gross insults to respective religions or the disturbances created by major religious festivals such as Muharram. 60 In the decade prior to independence the Army had been called out to attend, and assume control of

57 Ashley Jackson, The and the Second World War, Hambledon Continuum, London, 2006, pp. 352-353. 58 Major J.J. Snodgrass, The Burmese War (1824-1826), John Murray, 1827, London, This reprint by AVA Publishing House, Bangkok, 1997. 59 LHCMA, General Sir papers, 5/6 October 1945. 60 S.T. Hollins, C.I.E., No Ten Commandments – Life in the Indian Police, Hutchison, London, 1954, pp. 141-144. 25

numerous civil disorders where the civil authorities could not, such as the rioting in Kanpur which had left over 600 persons dead.61

Religion and the British Indian Army

Maintaining the integrity of Indian religion and culture was of paramount importance to British Officers. British Officers were committed to ensuring Indian units were not troubled by cultural and religious problems that could degrade their effectiveness as well as escalate into major conflagrations. It was a vital security imperative of the colonial power with memories of the apocalyptic impact of the .62 There had been earlier albeit short lived rebellions against the British as had occurred at against the in 1806 in which suspicions were cast upon the activities of those wandering faqirs who had “frequently attached themselves to sepoy ”.63 The Madras Government had been concerned these faqirs were involved in an anti-British conspiracy, and Hoover noted that the ignorance of the British officials was problematic in understanding the religion of their sepoys.

In 1806, the daily devotional life of south Indian Muslims was not well understood, and this lack of understanding was to lead to gross misintepretations, false accusations of sedition…64 Awareness of the importance of maintaining Vigilance against the impact of sustained insensitivity, indifference or worst of all religious and cultural offence that could lead to catastrophic results was important for this multi-ethnic and religiously diverse army. The Army included British of different denominations, Muslims of different sectarian origins, Sikhs and the diversity inherent in . The British Army though, which was situated in India alongside the British Indian Army, was not always viewed as the paragon of religious sensibilities.

Historically the British public may have celebrated the heroic feats of arms by the British Army but it did not view the Army as a particularly moral or religiously

61 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘In Aid of Civil Power’: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919-42’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004, p. 54. 62 George Townsend Warner & C.H.K. Marten, ‘The Groundwork of British History, Blackie and Son Limited, London, 1920, pp. 692-693. 63 James W. Hoover, Men without Hats: Dialogue, Discipline and Discontent in the , 1806-1807, Manohar, New Delhi, 2007, p.210. 64 Hoover, Men without Hats, p.211. 26

imbued institution. Early nineteenth century views of the British soldier perceived them as godless pariahs and the profession of soldiering as inherently sinful. 65 Even towards the end of the nineteenth century there were circles who still viewed the profession of soldiering as a disgrace.66 Perceptions persisted of someone choosing to be an Officer in the Army as being suspect of the same-shared failings of the common soldiers’ penchant to drunkenness, immorality and criminality.

In India the temperance minded Roberts attended to the more brutish aspects of life for the British soldier in the British Indian Army. Roberts gained the cooperation of the different Christian denominations in setting up the Army Temperance Association. Roberts also inaugurated ‘The Regimental Institute’ to replace ‘canteens’ which did much to provide the soldier recreations beyond simple drinking, though Master’s noted that the British soldier’s life was still very brutish in 1930s India. 67 The perception of morality and piety within the Army were regarded dismally by the public but Roberts and others did devote attention to the spiritual succour of its British and Indian army personnel in India during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.68

In the nineteenth century the spiritual needs of the Army’s British personnel in India were met by the Church of through the Army Chaplains department. The Army commissioned Church of England Chaplains as well as providing official recognition of other denominations as the nineteenth century progressed into the twentieth. The relationships between the dominant Church of England, Roman Catholicism and Protestant denominations were at times acrimonious in securing

65 Kenneth Henderson, ‘Making Saints: The Role of Religious Pluralism and Tolerance in the Reshaping of the British Army, 1809-1885’, (PhD Dissertation, University of Iowa, 1993), pp. 223-224 & Robert Graves, ‘Goodbye to all that’, Penguin, UK, 1960, quoted in Michael Snape, The Redcoat and Religion, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 71. 66 Michael Snape, The Redcoat and Religion, Routledge, London, 2005, pp. 71-73. 67 Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in India from Subaltern to Commander- in-Chief, Macmillan and Co., London, 1901, pp. 519-521. Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts was Commander-in-Chief India between 1885-1893 and Commander in Chief British Army between 1901- 1904.

68 Oriental and India Office Collections (hereafter referred to as OIOC), L/MIL/7?3089-3134 Collection 73, British Army in India: Religious Instructions, Chaplains etc., 1871-1943. 27

dominion of their spiritual flocks from the attentions of other denominations administe r ing to the .69

During the First World War British units had their chaplains provided by the Indian Ecclesiastical department while the Army provided Hindu, Sikh and Muslim troops their own clerics, though these clerics did not accompany Indian troops overseas. The administering of battlefield religious duties, such as burials for the Indian troops during the First World War, was left to their co-religionists who had the requisite religious knowledge appropriate to the occasion. Religious welfare services for soldiers serving in were supported by the Indian Soldiers Comforts Fund Charity, which for instance provided copies of the Holy for Muslim soldiers in France.70 Britain was also serious in ensuring the religious dietary requirements of its Indian personnel in France were met. Kitchener had demanded the Foreign Office supply 10,000 live goats a month to service this requirement.71

The Army was sympathetic to the religious sensitivities of its Muslim, Sikh and Hindu troops and enforced a non-interference policy upon the spiritual beliefs of the Indian soldiers as well as strictly policing any attempts at proselytisation by British or other religious entities—usually Christian—as well as any unwanted attempts amongst the sectarian groups in the Army. German propaganda attempted to destabilise the Army with claims the English planned the forcible conversion of all Indian soldiers to while emphasising the fact that ’s ally was Muslim Turkey. 72 Germany had also made similar attempts on France’s North African Muslim troops to desert by appealing to Islam.73 Germany’s Turkish Allies had also attempted to initiate a Jihad against the Triple Entente through a dubious

69 For example, OIOC L/MIL/7/3109, the complaint by the Protestant Alliance to the Army about British Soldiers being involved in Catholic services in Madras in 1894. Farwell notes this as well. Byron Farwell Mr Kipling’s Army – All the Queens Men, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1981, pp. 220-221. 70 Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches – The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-15, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 1999, pp. 201-202. 71 Max Hastings, Catastrophe – Europe goes to War 1914, William Collins, 2013, p. 413. 72 Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches, pp. 201-202. 73 Driss Maghraoui, ‘The Grande Guerre Sainte: Moroccan and Workers in the First World War’, in The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2004), p. 3 & Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France – Colonial Subjects in the French Army 1914-1918, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, in particular pp. 189-201 ‘Germany, the , and Islam in the French Army. 28

Fatwa that selectively excluded the Germans and Austrian-Hungarians and sought to wed pan-Germanism with an anti-imperialist pan-Islam. 74

The German attempts were generally unsuccessful with only a few examples of Muslim units objecting to being deployed against the Turks or being deployed in the direction of or in close proximity to Holy Mecca. Muslim troops made it known they would still fight so long as it did not infringe these or other religious sensitivities. Muslim troops who were forced—despite their protests to serve in areas objected to— sometimes mutineered. Some of the mutineering troops were executed or imprisoned while others were punished by deportation to the Andaman Islands.75

After the First World War the issue of Muslim troops being deployed by the empire to the Middle East remained an issue passionately debated in India. The British Empire was identified by numerous Muslims as being closely connected to the disintegration of the Turkish Khilafat.76 The was a response of both political and religious in India to the allied dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Muslim sensitivities in India had been heightened during the Chanak crisis with Turkey in 1922 when the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, attempted to have the Dominion troops including Indian troops eject the Turks for their contravention of the Treaty of Sevres. Muslims in India were incensed that Britain was so insensitive concerning an issue of Turkish territorial sovereignty that had such important religious implications for Muslims, that France with its own colonial Muslim soldiers had opted not to pursue.77 In the Second World War the Muslim

74 Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power 1898-1918, Penguin Books, London, 2010, p.24 & p.124. 75 The Muslim cavalrymen of the 15th Cureton’s Multani Cavalry after distinguished service in France were sent to Mesopotamia and refused to be transported further inland, Jack Gannon, Before the Colours Fade, Polo, Pig, India, Pakistan and some Memoirs – A collection from the writings of Brigadier Jack Gannon, J.A. Allen, London, 1976, p. 89. 76 There was considerable concern about the impact of the Treaty of Sevres on the Ottoman Empire and Holy Land. PRO-CAB/24/111, the Secretary of State for India on 16 September 1920 draws Cabinet attention to the negative press and correspondence concerning Indian Troops in the Middle East, in particular a letter from the All-India Moslem League Lucknow to the Secretary of State for India complaining that Indian Muslims could not tolerate or be involved in the destruction of the Khilafat and desecration of the Jazirat-ul-Arab. 77 M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918- 1924, Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, 1999, p. 327. 29

League addressed this problem by lobbying for assurances that Muslim Troops would not be sent against any Muslim country or power.78

Between the world wars the Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Christian troops were all provided separate kitchens, places of worship and were encouraged to observe their religious festivals. Christian traditions were also rigorously adhered to with Christmas being celebrated by British units and their Officers.79 All British Officer Cadets at Sandhurst in the early 1930s attended Anglican Church Services unless the Cadets originated from any one of a number of groups known colloquially as the ‘RCs, Parsees and others’.80 The Victorian era ban on proselytisation or evangelism was expected to be strictly adhered by British Officers serving in the Indian Army and continued into World War II. A British Officer commissioned in the Baluch Regiment noted that his in guarding the religious integrity of his non- Christian unit had made a Christian missionary persona non grata due to the absolute necessity of protection from even the whiff of proselytis ing. 81

The British since the apocalyptic events of the mutiny had developed an effective management strategy for their ethnically and religiously diverse Indian soldiers borne out of sheer necessity for their survival and security. This section briefly addresses the impact of the mutiny on the development of Army practices in managing the ethnic and religious divides of the Indian soldiers.

British views of their Indian soldier’s religions were to varying degrees rooted in the threat to British rule that had arisen because of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 where issues of religion overlapped issues of ethnicity, culture and geography. 82 In the case of Muslims the British feared the underlying religious unity of Islam and that Muslims political consciousness of their former rule in India was more a threat to

78 The Presidential address of Mohammed Ali Jinnah at the Twenty-seventh Session of the All India Muslim League, Lahore, March 1940, in Syed , (Ed), Foundations of Pakistan, All- India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947, National Publishing House, Karachi, 1970, p. 334. 79 National Army Museum, (hereafter referred to as NAM), Sound Cassettes, Oral History, Lt. Colonel A.G.S. Alexander & Lt. Colonel David Gillians, service in the British Indian Army. 80 John Hislop, A Soldier’s Story from the Khyber Pass to the Jungles of Burma – The Memoir of a British Officer in the Indian Army 1933-1947, Newhaven Publishing, 2010, pp. 23-24. 81 Brigadier John Randle, OBE MC, Letter dated 16 June 2010. 82 The British and/or Western preference for the ‘Indian Mutiny’ is referred to as the ‘Indian Rebellion’ by many South Asian and other writers on the events of 1857. 30

them than the allegedly ‘caste riven’ Hindus. 83 Belief in this threat had been noted soon after the mutiny in 1859 where it was believed prudent to mix the Muslim classes through the regiments,84

That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment. 85

In 1862 the efficacy of this policy of mixing religions and ethnicities was encapsulated by Sir Charles Wood in emphasising that a ‘divide and rule’ approach toward the organisation of the regiments would be in the strategic interests of continued British rule,

…depend upon it; the natural antagonism of races is no inconsiderable element of our strength.86

The fear of a united Muslim soldiery was a critical element of post-mutiny army planning. Additionally, the assassination of the acting Chief Justice in Calcutta by a Wahabi Muslim in 1871 followed by Governor General Lord Mayo’s assassination by another Wahabi Muslim strengthened this belief that the Muslim threat was real and was the subject of popular and official analysis at the time. Hunter’s Indian Mussulmans published in 1871 warned of the failure of not understanding the Muslim populace of India and raised the bogey of what was described as the standing camp of hostile Muslims in adjoining countries. 87 The stigma of distrust of the Muslims had resulted in their being no complete Muslim regiments in the post-mutiny army as there were for other classes, while there were

83 John Ferris, ‘The Internationalism of Islam’: The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840- 1951’, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 2009, p. 59. 84 ‘Classes’ in the sense that it is referred to in official documents and literature concerning the British Indian Army is an amorphous term encompassing, to varying degrees, the ethnicity, religion and geographic location of Indian soldiers. For example the class ‘Punjabi Mussulman’ refers to a number of Muslim peoples from different tribes and geographic locations. 85 Recommendations of the Indian Army Organisation Commission, in ‘Organisation of the Indian Army Report, 1859, C.2515, pp. XIV-X V. 86 OIOC, Private Letter of Sir Charles Wood to Lord Elgin, 19 May 1862, in Wood Papers, Vol. 10, pp. 246-252. 87 W.W. Hunter, The Indian Mussulman’s 3rd Edition, Trubner & Co., London, 1871, (Reprint by Sang- e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1999). 31

also suspicions as to the loyalty of Muslim troops when pitted against their co- religionists on the Afghan frontier.88

The recommendations decided on in the aftermath of the mutiny formed the basis of the Army practice of managing the threat of a unified native army by the institution of ‘mixed class composition’ regiments. Mixed class composition regiments diluted the threat and with the advent of martial race provided a doctrinal basis to justify the classification and separation of Indian soldiers. The deep imprint of the mutiny remained evident in military planning up until and including the 1920s and 1930s where planning was still predicated on the fear of another widespread revolt some seventy years after the mutiny. 89 Kincaid wrote of how in 1938 he had still taken a rifle and ammunition to church to prevent a reoccurrence of the surprise of the 60th rifles at church at Meerut in 1857.90

Muslim Officers who formed the first generation of the Pakistan Army expressed bitterness at the British practice of excluding all Muslim units, but seemed to be alleviated by and supported the British inspired notions of their martial propensities to be accepted wisdom.

There was an understanding amongst certain Muslim Indian Officers of the time of the rationale behind the British practices. One Officer reflecting on his time at the Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun noted,

It always struck me as strange that the British who ran the school and were so anxious to keep religion as far away as possible from the boys during the day, would in the evening without fail, undertake the duty of separating us into various religious groups. This I presume was to impress upon us that we were really different people following different religions. 91

The nineteenth century management decisions on ‘promiscuous division of the nationalities’ made in the aftermath of the rebellion together with martial race

88 General Mohammed Musa Khan, Jawan to General – Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier, Eas t & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984, p. 74 & David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940, MacMillan, London, 1994, p. 129. 89 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘In Aid of Civil Power’: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919-42, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004, p. 50. 90 Dennis Kincaid, British Social Life in India, 1608–1937, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. xviii. 91 Brigadier Hamid Hussain, The Battle Within, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2003, p. 73. 32

were also echoed in the Indian Statutory Commission Report of 1930.92 The report commonly referred to as the ‘Simon Report’ was published during the period of the independence movement of the Congress Party and Muslim League. The report, arguably in seeking to prolong British rule, recommended continued British governance of India as prudent. In ‘martial race’ parlance the report was concerned that should independence be granted, the ‘gentler peoples of India’ would be left to the predations of the martial classes.93 These ‘martial classes’ were those same classes developed in response to the threat posed by the mutiny and as shortly to be shown produced to maintain British rule.

The paradoxical nature of the British regarding Muslims as both the sword arm of the Raj, as well as constituting a threat to the security of the Raj, was not lost on Officers who fought for the British and who became the first generation of Pakistan Army Officers.94

The British had developed an entire architecture of martial race for the British Indian Army. British Officers joining the Indian Army were introduced into their units through army briefing notes that emphasised the special aptitudes required of an Indian Army Officer in regard to Indian religion, language and culture. 95 Officers received mentoring from peers, senior Officers, Indian Officers, NCOs, and Munshis with manuals specifically published to address matters of ‘religion’, ‘race’, ‘class’ and ‘ethnicity.’

The British interest in the religious and cultural background of their troops was necessarily utilitarian to manage troops, and maintain troop morale and efficiency by not being culturally ignorant. As early as 1806 British East India Officers had charged a Muslim sepoy with blasphemy as well as initiating a civll trial upon the alleged heresy against a group of faqirs96. A few Officers though became exceptional

92 Indian Statutory Commission Volume 1, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, HM Stationery Officer, London, May 1930. 93Address at the Twenty-first Session of the All-India Muslim League, Allahabad, December 1930, in, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, (Ed), Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906- 1947, National Publishing House, Karachi, 1970. 94 F.M. Khan in his history argued the British recognised the martial qualities of the Muslim soldier though suppressed the Muslim to the benefit of the Hindu, in Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, pp. 8-9. 95 ‘Notes for Officers wishing to join the Indian Army, Military Department of the India Office, London, 1942. 96 Hoover, Men without Hats, pp.228-231. 33

adepts in matters of religion and culture and became fluent in a number of Indian languages apart from Urdu required by the Army. 97 British Officers took interest in their troops’ religious practices including participation in or support of significant Muslim and Hindu ceremonies while adhering to the Victorian edict of no proselytising or interference with native religion. 98 Some Officers’ interest in the cultural and religious background of their men was marked by an extraordinary immersion and affinity with the religious practices of their men.

For some Indian regiments British Officers were the subject of holy status drawn from a tradition of regional religiously inspired martial myths. Brigadier John Nicolson killed during the mutiny and known for his audacious behaviour on the battlefield was one such British Officer, commemorated through a minor cult known as Nikalseynism amongst his Sikh troops.99 The veneration of Nicolson persisted after his death into the twentieth century. A British Officer noted how the people of Nowshera in present day Khyber Pukhtunkwa of Pakistan popularly associated the sounds of thunder with that of Nicolson’s warhorse galloping like thunder into battle. 100 The award of mythical status as noted was regionally evident in other examples where ability or even pure fear inspired such tales. The martial depredations of the Sikh also persisted in areas of Pakistan’s Khyber Puktunkwa into the mid-twentieth century. The threat that, “Hari will get you” was used to mildly frighten misbehaving Pakhtun children and was redolent of the early nineteenth century use of Napoleon Bonaparte to similarly scare British children.101

The tendency towards affixing religious and supernatural status on British Officers was evident until the end of the Second World War. One noted how his Muslim NCOs and troops believed him to be favoured by Allah and to be under the almighty’s protecting hand. 102 This Officer, arguing from the perspective of twenty-six years’ service in the Indian Army, noted the innate importance of

97 NAM, 1996-08-1851, Sound Cassettes, Oral History, Tape One, Brigadier W.M.T. Magan, interview. 98 Lt. Colonel D.M. Killingley, Farewell the Plumed Troop – A Memoir of the Indian Cavalry, 1919- 1945, Grevatt & Grevatt, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990, p. 57 & John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger, Michael Joseph, London, 1956, pp. 182-183. 99 Richard Holmes, Sahib – The British Soldier in India, HarperCollins, London, 2005, p. 206. 100 Mark Channing, India Mosaic, J.B. Lippincott Company, London, 1936, p. 244. 101 James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1962, p. 31. 102 Lt. Colonel D.M. Killingley, Farewell the Plumed Troop – A Memoir of the Indian Cavalry, 1919- 1945, Grevatt & Grevatt, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990, p. 27. 34

religion to his personnel. The same Officer argued that the piety of a British Officer together with his respect and interest in his unit’s religion was of elemental importance in maintaining the respect of the troops.103 Other British Officers engaged in more esoteric interests in their soldiers’ religious background by pursuing studies of Indian religions and philosophy during their service in India. 104 Though the British did at times act in a manner prejudicial to the political and religious interests of their Muslim subjects, British Officers with an appreciation of the strategic importance of the Islamic world also sought to garner favour with some ambitious plans. Such plans had included one Officer’s vision to secure the favour of the pan-Islamic community and enhance British Imperial prestige by constructing a chain of mosques between Jeddah and Mecca for Muslim pilgrims. 105

According to the census of 1941 there were 96 million Muslims out of a total Indian population of 388 million.106 Islam was not monolithic in India as it was not monolithic in the Army. Islam in India encompassed populations in diverse regions of the subcontinent from Pakhtun tribes in the peaks and plains of the Afghan frontier in the west, to the Muslims inhabiting tropical Bengal in the east. Expressions of Indian Islam also varied from the literalist Deoband to the syncretic and diverse practices of and Islam. Some Muslims were austerely literal in their devotion to Islam while others worshipped Muslim Saints at Mazars, wore sacred lockets, venerated ‘footprints of the prophet’ at qadamgah (shrines) and reliquaries such as hairs of the prophets beard, as well as adopting some Hindu traditions. 107 Other Muslim traditions celebrated the burial of Jesus Christ in Kashmir, while Adams Peak in was associated with other variants of Muslim tradition. Celebrated festivals such as Basant in present day Pakistan and others that were Hindu in origin were representative of Indian Muslim religious diversity.108

103 Lt. Colonel D.M. Killingley, Farewell the Plumed Troop, p. 29. 104 Mark Channing, India Mosaic, J.B. Lippincott Company, London, 1936. 105 OIOC 425/1511, L/MIL/7/18483, Correspondence of Lt. Colonel Carter to Maj. General Sir Havelock Charles, Military Adviser to Secretary of State for India, India Office. 106 Percival Spear, India, Pakistan and the West Oxford University Press, London, 1949, p. 78. 107 Anita C. Ray, ‘Varuna, Jhulelal and the Hindu ’, in ‘South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies, Routledge, Vol. XXXV, no. 2, June 2012, pp. 233-234. 108 Nile Green, ‘Migrant Sufis and sacred space in South Asia Islam, Contemporary South Asia, Vol.12/4, December 2003, pp. 495-496. 35

That first generation of Officers who joined the Pakistan Army were similarly diverse from the austere to the syncretic, though most were from the or Pakhtuns from the North West Frontier Province. The veneration of Muslim saints was important for Muslim Officers of more syncretic religious traditions who subsequently joined the Pakistan Army upon its establishment. 109 The Sufi Pirs and Sajjada Nisshins who kept the Mazars had also been important to the British as these Muslim holy persons had commanded significant religious influence among the Muslims of the western Punjab with followings of 200,000 Muslims and more. Such Muslim holy persons had encouraged their followers to serve the British cause and hence their favour was vitally important for the British in the management of religion. 110 The diversity in Islam was sometimes expressed in its disputes. Islam in India was not free of the sectarian troubles that also existed sometimes between the Muslim and Hindu communities. The Army had been required to assist civil authorities in violence between the Sunni and Shia Muslim communities in Lucknow during the late 1930s.111 The Muslim community in India was vibrant and in the last two decades of British rule active politically and religiously in competition with Hindu proselytis ing movements such as the Arya Samaj.

In 1941 Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi established the Jama’at-i Islami (JI) while the Tablighi Jama’at (TJ) was formed in the late 1920s by Muhammad Ilyas in Delhi with the aim of proselytising and bringing people to Islam without the divisiveness of theological or political activities. 112 Islamic activists such as Abu l- Azad had also recommended Jihad against the British, and if that failed then a Hijra to Muslim ruled Afghanistan should be considered, and he was credited with having rehabilitated holy war as the forgotten pillar of Islam. 113

109 Maj. General S. Shahid Hamid, Autobiography of a General, Ferozsons (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 1988, p. 14. 110 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State – The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, p. 130. 111 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘In Aid of Civil Power’: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919-42’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004, p. 54. 112 Marc Gaborieau, ‘A Peaceful Jihad – South Asian Muslim proselytism as seen by , Tablighi Jama’at and Jama’at-i Islami’, in David Taylor (Ed) Islam in South Asia – Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 152-153. 113 Marc Gaborieau, ‘A Peaceful Jihad – South Asian Muslim proselytism as seen by Ahmadiyya, Tablighi Jama’at and Jama’at-i Islami’, in David Taylor (Ed) Islam in South Asia – Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 155. 36

The Islam of the soldier and the Indianised Officer Corps from the 1920s onwards accordingly ran the gamut from the austerely religious to the perfunctory. Even literalist strands of Islam revealed themselves to be somewhat flexible from the memoirs of Muslim Officers of this period. There are few works though on the diversity of Islam within the Army. One exception is the study of soldiers’ relationships with their Faqirs in the Hyderabad Army of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 With the diversity of Islam and ethnicity in the subcontinent, since the mutiny the British had promoted the idea that certain classes of Indians were better soldiers than other classes.

Martial Race and the British Indian Army

Moving from a consideration of religion in the British Indian Army to martial race it is first important to note that not all Muslims were considered to be a ‘martial race’, and neither were Muslims the only martial race from within or outside the Punjab. The Sikhs, Dogras and were significant martial race groups raised by the British in India and Nepal. The Yeoman martial races of the Punjab were derived from and Jat extraction and could be Muslim, Sikh or Hindu.115 The celebration of the ‘Punjabi Mussalmans’ though had significant consequences on those ethnic groups who would be recruited and would not be recruited to form the future Pakistan Army. 116 The idea of martial race, though not uncontested, endured from its beginnings in the late nineteenth century to the and after. Two of those martial race classes were the Muslim known as the ‘Punjabi Mussulmans’ and the Pakhtuns who would constitute the bulk of the Officer Corps of the future Pakistan Army.

The labelling of martial race attributes to the British Indian Army’s favoured recruits in the Punjab and North West Frontier selectively mythologised the martial history and propensities of soldiers from certain ethnic and religious backgrounds and geographical locations. Martial race was though not an unknown concept in India where caste stratifications such as the Kshatriya varna saw themselves essentially as

114 Nile Green, Islam and the Army in Colonial India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 115 J.H.Hutton, Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Origins, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1946, pp.32-33. 116 ‘Punjabi Mussalmans’ was the term used for those Muslims from the Punjab frequently abbreviated to simply ‘PM’s’ in much literature of the time. 37

fighting men as well as there being a distinct military labour market within India. 117 Furthermore there were established traditions of both spiritual Sufi Muslim ghazi’s as well as more traditional Muslim soldiers in the south of India including Mysore and Vellore where Muslim troops including those led by “spoke of conflict in terms of Jihad and sh{a}hadat martyrdom”. 118 Martial race also amplified divisions and competition between martial classes in the Army, as well as the non-martial classes. These practices ultimately supported British interests in promoting the ethnic and religious divisions in the Army believed so essential by Sir Charles Wood as noted earlier. In a period of Imperial anxiety martial race was a “consciously manipulated linguistic and performative tool” to maintain British rule. 119

Martial race was an important tool in providing pseudo-scientific justification for the preferential recruitment of certain groups in the Indian population by the British, and aspects of it would be retained by the Pakistan Army. The British justifications of martial race, included politically pragmatic interests based on the fear of a united and trained body of Muslim Indian soldiers that ‘divide and rule’ policies would ensure there would be no second Indian mutiny. These Muslim martial race soldiers from the Punjab as well as their Sikh, and Dogra martial race counter-parts, “were used to disguise a policy that sought to limit armed service to only those Indians who could be trusted with unfailing loyalty”. 120 The first generation of Muslim soldiers in the Pakistan Army were aware of how the British both valued and feared them in equal measure.121

Martial race theory may be described as a set of beliefs that a particular race or section of a race or group of peoples have the natural propensity and temperament to be better soldiers than other races or groupings of people. The theory is pliant and susceptible to expedient theoretical ‘add ons’ and has at times included elements of religion, social Darwinism, physiology, climate, geography, disease susceptibility and

117 Omissi considers the antiquity of martial race concepts, while Kolff examined the history of the military labour market and its contribution to sect formation. David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj – The Indian Army, 1860-1940, MACMILLAN, Basingstoke, 1994, pp.24-25 Dirk H.A.Kolff, Naukar, Rajput & Sepoy: The ethnohistory of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450-1850, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.Varna refers to the four original castes of Hindu society. 118Hoover, Men without Hats, pp.211-212. 119 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914, Manchester University Press, 2004, p.7. 120 Heather Streets, Martial Races, p.178. 121 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1967, p. 32. 38

resilience to justify exclusive recruiting policies. Historically, the British sought to manage their Indian troops by emphasising unit loyalties, religious difference, and distinctive martial race attributes that often encompassed traditions that the British had themselves indoctrinated into their troops.

The Army kept detailed records of ‘class composition’ throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to better facilitate and manipulate the management of sectarian and ethnic divides. The British belief in the validity of martial race was not something that disappeared over the course of the Second World War. The persistence of martial race’s influence is detectable in the margins of World War Two recruitment analysis documents that lamented the exhaustion of martial race recruits.122 Such documents were replete with the minutiae of categorising Muslims. Muslims were described as ‘Mussulman Rajput’, ‘Punjabi Mussulman’, ‘Baluchi’, ‘Pathan’ and ‘Hindustani Mussulman’, as well as sub-classifications that included clan and tribal information. The respective merits of the classification and religious affiliations of the same ethnic group often were argued as making one recruit superior to another by virtue of religion or caste though both being ethnically the same.

Martial race was not peculiar to the British and was a concept that other nineteenth and twentieth century colonial powers adhered to. British measures were believed particularly adept as even the French with their vast colonial possessions and large Muslim populations had sent a mission to India in 1913 seeking guidance in the management of its colonial Muslim soldiers. 123 The French martial race recruitment policy in North African colonies idealised and politicised the quality of the ‘martial Berbers’ at the expense of their supposedly more politically nationalist and martially deficient Arab countrymen.124 The French had also applied martial race categories derived from the ‘biological determinism’s of the age’ upon their West African troops

122 OIOC WS 1680-L/WS/1/136, Recruitment in India 1939-1944, for instance, notes that as of October 1943 the overall ‘class composition’ of the Indian Army was 34.03% Mussulman’s, 51.6% Hindus, 7.69% Sikhs & 6.67% miscellaneous, including Madrassi Christians, Anglo-Indians, other Christians and Santhals. This document notes that 36.7% of the total personnel for the Army were recruited from the Punjab. 123 OIOC L/MIL/7/17080, Sub-heading, ‘French Government would like to send Officer to study system of utilising Mohammedans in Indian Forces’, ‘Captain Aymand’ (French Army) study of the employment of Mohammedans in the Indian Army, 1913. 124 Ethan M. Orwin, ‘Of Couscous and Control: The Bureau of Muslim Soldier Affairs and the Crisis of French Colonialism’, Historian, Vol.7 0, issue 2, 2008, pp. 263-284. 39

that referred to the innate ‘warrior instincts that remain extremely powerful in primitive races’and made them especially valuable as shock troops.125

…their savage impetuosity in attacks with the bayonet would prove decisive….the warrior qualities of the black race were hereditary and that in the prevailing conditions of modern warfare, their cold blooded and fatalistic temperament would render them irrestible in the attack.126 The French in this way had done much the same as the British had in the feting of the Punjabis, Pakhtuns and other martial races of India at the expense of the more politically aware Bengalis or Madrassis. Similarly, the Dutch preference for the Ambonese in the and the American preference for the Macabebe in the and their enmity for the Tagalogs was useful in the American defeat of a nascent independence movement. 127

The British had tried to introduce the concept into other imperial possessions including a failed attempt to raise a levy of ‘Muslim’ martial race troops in in the late nineteenth century. 128 The belief in the superiority of the ‘martial race’ recruit persisted in the interwar years despite a mass of arguments and evidence levied by Indian and British commentators on the excellent military performance of other Indian classes during the First World War.129 Martial race “…continued to shape Indian military policy through the 1930’s”, and persisted throughout World War II

125 Joe Lunn, ‘Les Races Guerrieres’: Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vo.34. No.4, 1999, pp.519- 521. 126 Lunn, ‘Les Races Guerrieres’, p.525. 127 Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig, ‘Imperial Systems of Power, Colonial Forces and the making of Modern South-east Asia’, in, Karl Hack & Tobias Rettig, (Eds), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 12-13 & Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream, New American Library, New York, 2012, pp.148-149. 128 Andrekos Varnava, ‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite’, in, The Journal of Military History, Volume 74, Oct 2010, pp. 1047-1067. 129 General Menezes notes that at least 75 other classes of Indians had proven their mettle in the First World War with the British failing to learn their lesson, in Lt. General S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 304-305. British literature lauding the performance of all Indian troops after the First World War included, Edmund Candler, The Sepoy, John Murray, London, 1919, and the dismissal of martial race theory in World War II, F. Yeats-Brown, Martial India, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1945, pp. 33-34. 40

and beyond and was well known to those Officers who would form the first generation of the Pakistan Army in 1947. 130

Martial race was not only applied to Indian soldiers, with the doctrine also being manipulatively applied to the Scottish Highlanders and the Irish to serve imperial interests. 131 One theory arguing the invented nature of martial race claimed Highland Regiments were populated by Scottish lowlanders and English recruits, while Gurkha Regiments were made up of disparate tribal groups in which the Gurkha identity had to be taught by the British. 132 Similarly, in noting the contested nature in the constitution of ethnic or sub-national regiments, Robert Graves noted that his Welsh Regiment did not contain more than one Welsh speaking Welshman in fifty. 133 These anomalies existed in Indian Regiments where Baluch Regiments rarely contained any significant portion of ethnic Baluchis.

Field Marshal Lord Roberts was the pre-eminent martial race protagonist of the nineteenth century and he had actively worked to alter the racial complexion of the Army. Robert’s justification was derived from his belief that in a war against what was described as a first class enemy such as Imperial Russia certain classes of Indian soldiers would not be able to meet the challenge.

It is no use our trying to persuade ourselves that the whole of the Native army is capable of meeting an enemy from , or of taking their part in a campaign anywhere out of India. They are not capable of this, and nothing will ever make them so. It is not a question of efficiency, but of courage and physique; in these two essentials the sepoys of lower India are wanting. 134

Roberts had argued, for instance, that the ancient military spirit of the South Indian Madrassi had dissipated because of extended peacetime and Britain had to look elsewhere for better troops.135 This may have had more to do with evolving strategic

130Heather Streets, Martial Races, pp. 101 & General Molesworth claimed that Indian classes except for those of the Northwest had lost their appetite for war in OIOC L/WS/1/136 July 21 1943. 131David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, p.24. 132 Heather Streets, Martial Races, pp. 176-178. 133 Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That, Cassell & Company Ltd, London, 1929, p. 70. 134 Roberts to Stewart, Ootacamund, 30 June 1882, in Brian Robson (Ed), Roberts in India – The Military Papers of Field Marshal Lord Roberts 1876-1893, Alan Sutton Publishing for the Army Records Society, Gloucestershire, 1993, p. 256. 135 Field Marshal Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in India – From Subaltern to Commander-in- Chief, Macmillan and Co., London, 1901, p. 499. 41

concerns and threat perceptions of the British in the second half of the nineteenth century in which the new Punjab recruiting grounds were also closer to the Russian threat and proved a powerful incentive for the British to re-select their native allies.136 Evidence though supporting martial race recruitment in the late nineteenth century was adduced through the use of comparative surveys on the fitness and hardiness on campaign of different classes of Indian troops. For instance, a survey presented to the Secretary of State for India in 1881 sought to identify those classes of troops that had best withstood the hardships of Afghanistan.137

While the overall finding of the survey was that the Pakhtuns, Punjabi Mussulmans and Sikhs had fared best, a close reading of these surveys reveal the contested nature of these findings which ran counter to Roberts’s opinion. Omissi notes that Sir was a significant example of a senior officer who had served in Madras who would not accept the policy inspired by Roberts to cateogrise the Madrassi soldier as inferior.138 Roberts, during his long tenure as Commander in Chief of the British Army in India, was able to successfully manipulate the racial composition of the native Indian Army in favour of the martial races from one quarter in 1881 to one half by 1893.139

Lieutenant General Goddard commissioned into the Indian Army in 1915 illustrated this change in recruitment and the significant importance of the Punjab and northern areas to the Army quoting the comparative statistics between infantry units by regions and class (racial composition) between 1862 and 1914 illustrated in the following table and which by the end of the First World War had reached 80%, though Leigh of the Indian Civil Service maintained that the Punjab supplied half of the soldiers for the war.140

136 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: the Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849- 1947, SAGE Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp.32-33. 137 OIOC L/MIL/7/7018, Indian Army – Strength, composition and fighting efficiency. 138David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, p.35 139 Brian Robson (Ed), Roberts in India – The Military Papers of Field Marshal Lord Roberts 1876- 1893, Alan Sutton Publishing for the Army Records Society, Gloucestershire, 1993. 140 , ‘The Indian Army – Company and Raj’, Asian Affairs, Vol.7, No.3, 1976, p.273 & M.S. Leigh, The Punjab and the War, Superintendent Government Printing Lahore, 1922 (reprinted by Sang-E-Meel) Lahore, 1997, p.7. 42

Region Ye ar Region Ye ar 1862 1914 Punjab 28 Punjab 57

East of the 28 East of the 15 Ganges Ganges Madras 40 Madras 11 Gurkha 5 Gurkha 20 (Nepal) (Nepal) Bombay 30 Bombay 18

The Punjab for this very reason in supplying Muslim, Sikh and Dogra soldiers was of pivotal importance to the British who referred to the Punjab as the ‘Sword Arm of India’ and credited the Punjabis together with themselves as having saved India from the mutineers.141 Tan Tai Yong also emphasizes the importance of the Punjab to the British Indian Army in a study that considers the politics and practicalities of the recruitment of Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers in the Punjab. 142 The Punjab would retain this pre-eminence in the new state of Pakistan.

Only fifteen years prior to partition MacMunn, the soldier scholar and martial race acolyte, had argued on the validity of martial races such as the Punjabis and Pathans in India. In one of his books MacMunn argued that certain fair skinned races inhabiting usually cooler northern climates in India were hardier and more vigorous than south Indian communities subject to the enervating impact of hot weather, indolence, disease, immorality and the impact of varying religions. 143 These theories were arguably derived also from British perceptions of beauty and fair skin which such northern Indian races possessed compared to the darker skinned southerners as well as the geographic implications of these men from the hills echoing the Victorian cult of . This does not explain the adoration of

141 M.S.Leigh, The Punjab and the War, pp.7-8. 142 Yong, The Garrison State. 143 Lt. General Sir George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India, Sampson Low, Marston & Co., LTD, London, 1932, pp. 1-3. 43

the British for their arguable overall preference for the short, stocky and Mongolian featured Gurkhas as a martial race.144

MacMunn had encapsulated his thoughts,

It is one of the essential differences between the East and the West, that in the East, with certain exceptions, only certain clans and classes can bear arms, the others have not the physical courage necessary for the warrior. 145

At the time MacMunn’s martial races of India was published the Statutory Commission Report—or Simon Report referred to earlier in the chapter—had maintained that India would fall victim to these same martial classes without the restraining hand of Britain. 146 Books such as MacMunn’s that contained vitriolic denunciation of Gandhi may also have been published at this time with a view to dampening the nationalist ardour of the Congress Party and Gandhi’s agitation for independence from Britain. 147 MacMunn’s book was also published in the period of Indianisation of the Officer Corps. The content of his book may also have proved of interest to those Indian Officers from martial race classes undergoing Officer training who would form the future Pakistan Army Officer Corps.

Martial race beliefs were so pervasive at the time that they were held by British Officers who had only undertaken limited deployments in India. British Officers held these views on martial race long after the cessation of their service in India. For instance, Montgomery with only limited service in India between 1908 and 1913 and apart from a visit at the time of partition was confident in opining on the essential differences between the Hindu and the Muslim martial traditions,

The Turks were able to defeat the Hindus because they lacked in outstanding measure those essential martial qualities which the Hindus lacked. They found complacency

144 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, p.29 & p.33. 145 Lt. General Sir George MacMunn, The Armies of India, Lancer, New Delhi, 2009 (reprint of 1912), p. 129. 146 The Simon Commission on Army Recruitment, 1930, Indian Statutory Commission, Cmd.3568 (1930), Vol. 1, pp. 96-98. 147 Lt. General Sir George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India, Samps on Low, Marston & Co., LTD., London, 1932, see the preface of this work for an early demarcation of the difference between the virile martial races and ‘Ghandi poison’, p. V and where MacMunn refers to the “gentle yet merciless race of hereditary moneylenders from which Lala Ghandi springs, only kept within bounds by an occasional flaying and roasting…” pp. 2-3. 44

and tolerance and opposed these with the vigour of a barbaric people fired by fanatical devotion to the faith of Islam.148

Churchill who had served in India also admired the warlike Muslim peoples of the northwest, while British officials like Sir Steuart Pears and Sir Olaf Caroe the Governor of the North West Frontier Province until 1947 were infatuated with the warlike Pakhtuns. 149 Caroe, Governor of the North West Frontier Province until 1947, had reportedly stated that the frontier was a ‘brotherhood of arms’ where, “Englishmen and ‘Pathan’ looked one another in the eyes, and there they found – a man”. 150 With such eminent Officers throughout the Army and Indian Civil Service expressing such virile beliefs eulogising certain classes of the Indian population it is difficult to imagine a multitude of Officers holding an openly contrary view. Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who had been training in the British Indian Army since the advent of Indianisation could hardly have been immune to these views held by these senior Officers and civil servants who trained, commanded and mentored them.

I also learned that the people of India were divided into two classes – one was supposed to be martial and the other non-martial. This intrigued me and I came to know the British rulers had grouped Indians on the principle of their ability to fight. 151

It is important for this thesis in understanding that on the creation of Pakistan in 1947 only the Punjabis and Pakhtuns were considered ‘martial race’ while the Sindhis, Baluchis, Bengalis, Muhajirs and other ethnic groups, with some exceptions, were considered non-martial or unsuitable to Army life. The Officers who would form the Pakistan Army had been exposed to British indoctrination on martial race throughout their service with some of the more senior Officers from the early 1920s

148 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, ‘A History of Warfare’, William Collins, Sons & Company Ltd, London, 1968, p. 402. 149 Churchill admired the reputation for courage, tactical skill and marksmanship of the Muslim tribals he encountered on the Malakand Field Force in 1897, Winston S. Churchill, Frontiers and Wars, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1962, p. 125. Pears was noted for his cultural and linguistic ability in managing tribal populations in Waziristan, in B.J. Gould, The Jewel in the Lotus, Chatto & Windus, London, 1957, pp. 116-121. 150 High Noon of Empire – The Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Tyndall 1895-1915, B.A . ‘Jimmy’ James (Ed), Pen & Sword, Barnsley, UK, 2007, p. 31. 151 Brigadier Mirza Hamid Hussain, The Battle Within, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2003, p. 74. (Brigadier Hussain was commissioned into the British Indian Army in 1935). 45

onwards being repetitively reminded of their proud Muslim military heritage and traditions.

The belief in the martial race attributes of certain Indian classes was certainly a notion that large numbers of British Officers carried to the end of their service, with British Officers casually referring to martial race sometimes as the ‘warrior races’ just prior to partition.152 Sixty-five years after service in the British Indian Army one veteran attested,

I certainly accepted the prevailing concept in the Indian Army that there were martial races … and even that the further north you went, the more martial they were… 153

This is significant because at partition and the establishment of the Army in 1947 the most populous ethnic group, the Bengalis, were not considered martial and were excluded militarily and politically by Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers dominating the Army. Shorthand descriptions of the qualities separating the martial from the non- martial were deployed as common sense stereotypes. Punjabis and Pakhtuns though considered unsophisticated were thought ‘martial’ by the British while the Bengalis were considered effeminate and subservient. Fatally for the Bengalis to British post- mutiny sensibilities the Bengalis were considered intelligent and politically sophisticated.

In order to ameliorate problems in understanding the unique or exotic aspects claimed for a particular ‘class’ and to induct the uninitiated British Officer into his unit the government produced ‘martial race’ handbooks. These handbooks addressed those ethnic groups that would later form the rump of the Pakistan Army, such as the ‘Punjabi Mussulmans’ and ‘Pakhtuns’.154 Handbooks were published on all martial races Muslim, Sikh and Hindu and provided a pithy informative guide to the history, ethnology, customs and characteristics of these ‘martial races’ inclusive of their superstitions as well as means of managing their temperament.155 It is important to

152 George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out There, Harvill, 1992, p. 133. 153 Brigadier John Randle, OBE MC, (British Indian Army WWII), Letter dated 16 June 2010. 154 Lt. Colonel J.M. Wikely, Handbooks for the Indian Army – Punjabi Mussulman, Government of India Printer, Calcutta, 1915 & R.T.I. Ridgway, Pathans, compiled under orders of the Govt. of India, nfd. 155 There were handbooks produced for other Muslim martial races as well as for Hindu and Sikh, for example, W. Fitz. G. Bourne, Hindustani Mussulman and Mussulman’s of the Eastern Punjab, Compiled under the Orders of the Govt. of India, Supt. Govt. Printing, Calcutta India 1914 as well as 46

note that the focus on ethnology also coexisted with cruder rascist perspectives and that by the 1930’s recruits “were described as if they were so many breeds of dog or horse”.156

The Pakhtun for instance was stereotyped as possessing some of the worst human character traits of treachery, blood thirstiness and revenge which was thought however to be more than offset by his manliness, courage and natural understanding for the art of cover in combat.157 Other books provided compendiums of all martial races and served as single reference points for Officers in commanding mixed-class formations. 158

The stereotypes in such handbooks were supplemented by the experience of serving Officers as well as other publications, and drew upon existing Indian stereotypes on caste and ethnicity.159 Brigadier Magan who served in India between 1928 and 1945 and Brigadier Bristow who served in India between 1919 and 1947 viewed Sikhs as energetic but subject to deviousness if left idle, Dogras as steady and easy to command, and Punjabis as simple and uncomplicated.160 Others had characterised the Punjabi as the backbone ‘everyman’ of the Army because of their reliability and the numbers in which they were recruited.161 Similar views were accepted by British and some future Pakistani Officers who believed without rancour these qualities as the relatively true merits and failings of different Indian communities, much as stereotypes upon European nationalities as the Germans, French, Swiss and Italians also existed.162

These handbooks and other sources assisted the creation of a belief in the essential legitimacy that underwrote martial race theory and importantly, as later chapters reveal, were transmuted into the Pakistan Army by Officers who also

Dogras revised edition 1918 and Gurkhas 1933, Maj. R.M. Bentham, Marathas and Dekhani Mussulman, compiled under the Orders of the Government of India, Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 1908. 156 Omissi,The Sepoy and the Raj, pp..31 - 32. 157 R.T.I. Ridgway, Pathans, compiled under orders of the Govt. of India, nfd, pp. 14-17. 158 P.D. Bonarjee, A Handbook of the Fighting Races of India, Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1899. 159 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, p.26. 160 NAM, 1996-08-1851, Sound Cassettes, Oral History, Tape One, Brigadier W.M.T. Magan, interview & Brigadier R.C.B. Bristow, Memories of the : Soldier in India, Johnson, London, 1974. 161 Edmund Candler, The Sepoy, John Murray, London, 1919, pp. 55-59. 162 NAM, 1999-12-115, Sound Cassettes, Oral History, Tape One, Khanzada Sultan Mohammed Khan, interview. 47

believed these qualities to be largely true. An important aspect of these guides and other books extolling the attributes of the martial races was the emphasis on the links with a glorious military past. The Punjabi’s for instance dated their martial heritage to pre-Islamic tales of their bravery against Alexander the Great, a belief held by future generations of Army Officers and repeated in Pakistani history texts.

We had soldiers who traced martial tradition from Scythian, Turkish, Mongol and Afghan ancestors. 163

The British encouraged the celebration of martial legends and pedigrees with some arguing in the case of the Sikhs that without the British insistence on Sikh traditions in the Army that Sikhis m would have dissolved into Hinduis m. 164

Officers argued that the result of intense British indoctrination and the process of celebrating the distinctive identities of martial race units was a two-way process that did not only consist of some British Officers predilections for an interest in oriental religions. While British Officers closely identified with their martial race units some were more profoundly attached to their units to the extent that they were believed for instance to be more a Sikh or Gurkha than the men of their units. 165 Emphasising the distinctiveness of the unit’s class and highlighting its loyalties and associations underpinned the unit’s identity according to Muslim Army Officers of the period.166

Indicative of the two-way process of identifying and celebrating respective martial pedigrees and legends, a Scottish Officer of the Baluch Regiment during the Second World War Burma campaign emphasised to his Pakhtun soldiers their respective martial race heritages in having both fought the English, they now fought the Japanese together for the English. 167 Six years after the end of the Second World War on the occasion of Ayub Khan becoming the first Pakistani Commander in Chief, another British General who had commanded 7 Division of the Pakistan Army,

163 Maj. General Shaukat Riza, Izzat-O-Iqbal, Published by School of , Nowshera, 1980, pp. 4- 5. 164 Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 128 & Heather Streets, Martial Races, p. 214. 165 Maj. General Sher Ali Pataudi, The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan, Syed Mobin Mahmud & Co., Lahore, 1988, p. 36. 166 Maj. General Sher Ali Pataudi, The Story of Soldiering, p. 36. 167 Interview conducted with Major Thomas Bruin (Baluch Regiment), London, 9 February 2010. 48

publically extolled the martial pedigree of the Pakistan Army in an English newspaper popular with Army Officers,168

Pakistan possesses the nucleus of potentially the best Army in Asia ... certainly they are troops with a long fighting tradition. 169

And specifically linking Muslim rule over India to these martial qualities,

Pakistan is notably distinguished by that homogeneous spirit which promotes military strength and fortifies morale – the pride perhaps of ancient rule across the plains of India. 170

The chapters that follow will draw the connection on how indelible an influence martial race has been on the Pakistan Army. While martial race has remained an indelible aspect of the Army introduced by the British, the attitude to politics in the British Indian Army would prove to be substantially in contrast to that undertaken by the Pakistan Army.

Politics and the British Indian Army

The British Indian Army purposely isolated itself from politics between the wars as well as trying to distance itself from providing riot control. Euphemistically referred to as ‘aid to the civil power’, the political implications of the Army involvement in controlling riotous assemblies were apparent after the Amritsar massacre of 1919. The British Indian Army in the late 1920s consisted of 60,000 British troops and 150,000 Indian troops as well as 34,000 reservists organised into a Field Army for overseas operations, covering troops for guarding the frontiers and internal security garrison; as much as one third of these soldiers were committed to the internal security functions in India. The internal security forces alone consisted of twenty-two out of the total of one hundred Indian infantry battalions and as many as twenty-eight battalions of British infantry during the late 1920s.171

168 Major General F.J. Loftus-Tottenham, CBE, DSC is listed as Commander of 7 Division in, ‘Appointments held by British Officers in Pakistan, OIOC L/WS/1/1673. 169 LHCMA, LH15/5/425, Major General F.J. Loftus-Tottenham, in Telegraph Newspaper, London, 15 January 1951. 170 LHCMA, LH15/5/425, Major General F.J. Loftus-Tottenham, in Telegraph Newspaper, London, 15 January 1951. 171 Gyanesh Kudaisya, ‘In Aid of Civil Power’: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919-42’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004 pp. 41-43. 49

Politically, the British had sought to divide and separate the disparate ethnic and religious groups that constituted the Army. Politically, the notion of martial race was largely derived from the post-mutiny management decisions of the Army, that had sought to exclude those who had revolted, and recruit those who had supported the British and were perhaps less politically aware. With the advent of Indianisation of the Army in the last two decades before partition the British sought to populate the Army with the politically conservative who were removed from the Congress Party and Muslim League agitation.

Politically, the Indian Officer Cadet’s chosen to attend Sandhurst were not decided by educational merit alone, but also by social affiliation with the British objective to obtain the ‘right type’ of conservatively disposed Indian Cadet who was reliant if not favourable to the Raj. Traditional elites were considered far more desirable than any from the educated Indian middle class. The educated class in such ethnic groups as the Bengalis for instance were perceived by the British to be politically suspect and ideologically unreliable and unsuitable for the Army. Barua argued that even though some senior British Officers undertook a form of social engineering in their preference for the scions of Indian royalty, these attempts failed because numbers of these elite Indian youths lacked the ability and aptitude necessary.172

Politics furthermore was not an appropriate subject to be discussed in clubs by the British Officers, or thought appropriate to discuss with the Indianised Officers of the 1930s or the Indian ranks. These discussions were not appropriate except for what Chevenix-Trench, who served in the Indian Army between 1935 and 1946, related as acceptably derisive references to the Congress Party during the independence movement before the war.173 Fraser though notes that during his time at an Officers Training School just before partition there was substantial and free discussion of politics and religion. Fraser claimed that most of the Indian Officer Cadet’s were

172 Pradeep P. Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj – The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949, Praeger, USA, 2003, p. 57. 173 Charles Chenevix Trench, The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies 1900-1947, Thames and Hudson, 1988, p. 120. 50

firmly against independence, perhaps understandable though by the fact that these Officer Cadets were going to a British Officer School.174

Masters’s recollections of his service does not note politics as being a significant issue; it was simply not discussed, though he was in a Gurkha Regiment. Masters noted the overarching focus of loyalty to the regiment that he claims both British and Gurkha alike adhered to which left no time for inappropriate chatter on politics. 175

Indian Officers though enjoying the benefits of the slow Indianisation of the Army over the last two decades before independence were aware of the stark political realities of their situation. Indian Officers were particularly attuned to the explicit racism, exclusion and snobbery they suffered from numerous but not all the British. Allen who served in Burma with the Army noted how this alleged bias felt by Indian Officers accounted for their susceptibility for recruitment into the Japanese sponsored Indian National Army during the Second World War.176 Marston noted that the involvement of Indian officers and troops in the Indian National Army could also be considered proof an unusual kind of latent political sentiment.177

Allen, also ruminating on the political awakening of Indian soldiers, noted they were sentimentally admired by the British, but were not allowed to be the equal of their British Commanders.178 While the Pakistan Army in time would develop a reputation for coup d’etat and intervention in government the British Indian Army loved their sovereign, though were described as contemptuous of nearly all politicians including prime ministers and secretaries of state.179 Senior Officers though interested in the acts of parliament that affected them had no desire for power outside of the Army and believed that soldiers should have no politics.180

174 George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out Here; A Recollection of the War in Burma, Harvill, 1992, London, pp. 133-134. 175 John Masters, Bugle and a Tiger, Cassell Military, London, 2002. 176 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941-45, Guild Publishing, London, 1984, p. 606 & p. 634. 177 Daniel Marston,‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947’, War in History, Vol.16, No. 4, 2009, p.474. 178 Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941-45, p.634. 179 Byron Farwell, Mr Kipling’s Army – All the Queen’s Men, W.W. Norton, London, 1981, p. 112. 180 Farwell, Mr Kipling’s Army, pp. 110-112. 51

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore how the British Indian Army managed religion in the Army, belief in martial race and the place of politics within the Army. The chapter is more descriptive than analytical. The subject of the next chapter is the formation of the Pakistan Army from the British Indian Army in 1947 and the analysis and identification of how some of these concepts such as the management of religion, martial race, ethnicity and the culture of the British Indian Army came to exert a powerful influence on the early development of the Pakistan Army.

52

53

Chapter II Turbulent Birth: the Pakistan Army 1947–1951

Partition, division of the British-Indian Army, Kashmir, Islam and the foundations of the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army

...nations and classes have individual characteristics which should be emphasized to the full and commanders must study these characteristics and adapt their methods to make the most of them - Pakistan Army Battle Instruction No. 2 Sept. 1948.

(C-in-C Pakistan Army General Sir Douglas Gracey) 181

Introduction

Upon Pakistan and India gaining independence in 1947 parts of these countries became engulfed in a maelstrom of violence between migrating Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities. The Pakistan Army, which was formed from the Muslim elements of the British Indian Army, was at its outset poorly equipped and because of a lack of senior Officers was led by seconded British Officers until 1951. Though the Indianization process had been undertaken in the previous two decades and there had been an exponential increase of Indian Officers during the Second World War including three brigadier-generals, the Armies of the two respective dominions lacked officers necessary for the operation of an independent Army. The newly independent Pakistan Army was involved in assistance from its outset while members of the Army were also involved in the first Kashmir War of 1947–48.

This chapter examines the first four years of the Pakistan Army from its formation in 1947 under the command of its first two British Commanders in Chief until January 1951 with the assumption of command of Mohammed Ayub Khan the first Pakistani Commander in Chief. Initially the chapter discusses the ramfications of the Indianization program upon the newly independent armies and a brief history of the time period in order to provide appropriate context to the discussion. Then in four

181 IWM - Army Training - Pakistan Military Training Pamphlet, Pakistan Army Battle Instruction No. 2, September 1948, Ministry of Defence, Pakistan. 54

sections this chapter considers the tribulations involved in the partition of British India in 1947, the division of the British Indian Army, the British Officers who became part of the Pakistan Army’s predilection for ‘martial race’ and the of 1947–48 which all contributed to the establishment of a strategic culture within the Officer Corps in which Islam became the central element of a national and martial identity.

Indianization grew out of a sense of obligation to India for its sacrifices it had made during World War One as well as part of a British policy through the Montagu- Chelmsford reforms of 1918 to allow greater devolution of responsibility to elected Indian politicians. 182 The Indianization process was always modest in its scope and earned the ire of Indian nationalists with the initial ten places offered to Indian officer cadets at Sandhurst being criticised by Indian nationalists as ineffectual. The Indian legislature eventually secured the creation of the Indian Military Academy (IM) at Dehra Dun in 1932 whose graduates would be known as Indian commissioned officers (ICOs’) unlike the Sandhurst graduates who were known as KCIOs’ (Kings commissioned Indian officers). 183

Apart from its glacial progress problems with Indianization also included issues of equity from comaparitive wages, command and control issues over British other ranks to social snobbery and exclusion from the clubs British officers frequented.184 Some IMA graduates also noted differences between themselves and their KCIO colleagues whom they believed to more British than Indian in their manner and way of thinking. 185 Auchinleck had undertaken considerable effort before and during the war to address the inequities of Indianization whose solution he believed was critical to the success of the Army during the war. 186 Auchinleck’s work on these problems as well as tackling the bias towards the martial races and opening up recruitment to other classes had by the end of 1941 resulted in, “the ratio

182 Daniel Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign, Praeger, Westport, 2003, p.16 – 17. 183 Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, pp.16-20. 184 Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, pp.20-23 & the snobbery of some British officers and treatment as second class officers was thoroughly hated especially so when some claimed the British were trying to manufacture according to a 1935 IMA Officer Graduate, ‘Kala Sahibs’, (black gentlemen), Brigadier Mirza Hamid Hussain, The Battle Within, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2003, pp.90 & p.109. 185Mohammed Zaman Kiani, Memoirs of Major General Mohammed Zaman Kiani, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994, p.3. 186 Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, p.47-49. 55

of Indian officers to British officers” rising by 4 per cent early in the war, “an upward trend that continued throughout the war”. 187 The experiences gained during the war whether in North Africa, Italy or Burma provided a tremendous boon to the esprit de corps of the British Indian Army. The morale of the Army had been extremely high in Burma after the initial turnarounds at the beginning of the campaign. 188 The Indian Army had defeated the Japanese comprensively. The Japanese at the beginning of the war had been believed unbeatable after their outmanoeuvring and defeat of allied armies. Officers of the new Pakistan Army who had fought in these campaigns were proud of their contributions and the awards they had won during the war with their sense of esprit de corps and contributions to the war recorded in subsequent military histories of the Army.189 This esprit de corps derived from the hard won battles against the Axis as well as the equally hard won battles of recognition of their skills was an element present in both the new Indian and Pakistani officers who took up their new roles in the new dominion armies.

Chapter One noted that the Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers believed themselves to be the inheritors of a martial tradition promoted by British Officers leading up to the foundation of the Pakistan Army. Strategic culture it was noted argues the importance of an organisation’s history that has been involved in the defence of the country, and the particular importance of major shocks and disasters that may overcome such an organisation in this role, and how they adapt to the security environment. It is important to note here that strategic culture within Lantis and Howlett’s description noted in the first chapter applies to organisations involved in the security and defence of a nation, such as is the case with the Pakistan Army. Lantis and Howlett’s description does not limit this theory to the entire edifice of national security structures as for instance Snyder’s analysis of Soviet strategic culture.

National identities are forged out of adversity and the impact of the events of partition and the 1948 War in Kashmir acted powerfully in this way to establish an

187 Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, p.49. 188 Marston, The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, p.471. 189 Lt.General A.A.K.Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998, p.10. & Khan’s history of the Pakistan Army records the esprit de corps of the Muslim soldiers and the mutual respect between the British and Muslim soldiers. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, 1963, p.2. Rahman devotes one chapter to participation in the Burma campaign and his trials, tribulations and successes.M.Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, pp.39-54. 56

identity and strategic culture derived from Islam. The tragedies perceived and otherwise during this period established national myths and creation stories in which the Army as defender of Islam featured prominently.190 This was the case with Pakistan where the varied threats both real and imagined to the new nation’s existence gained deep purchase in the psyche of the first generation of Pakistan Army Officers.

Pakistan was achieved by Jinnah and the Muslim League’s efforts against congress and British opposition to create a Muslim homeland in the subcontinent. Pakistan consisted of two wings separated by over one thousand miles of Indian territory and three hundred and fifty six million Indians 191. The new country of approximately seventy five million people established its capital in Karachi in the western wing of the country. 192 East Pakistan the numerically greater of the two wings consisted of forty two million people with a distinct cultural, linguistic and demographic outlook that included a much larger percentage of non-Muslims. 193 The new country with no authentic claims to a past history was immediately beset with internal and external problems ranging from the tensions inherent in its disparate ethnic, religious and geographical divides to the geo-strategic conundrums of being faced by a hostile India in the East, a hostile Afghanistan in the West and an Army still under the control of British Commanders.

Though the Muslim League’s objective of Pakistan was achieved against significant obstacles, paradoxically upon its achievement there were Pakistanis believed their objective had not been fully realised. These Pakistanis believed Pakistan to be a partially fulfilled achievement spoiled by alleged Indian recalcitrance, interference and the failure to provide Pakistan its full territorial inheritance, which included parts of the Punjab, Kashmir and some other areas.194 Because of this, an

190Smith’s ethno-symbolism and nationalism theory emphasises the importance of conflict in creating myths of battle and heroism that later generations may emulate, a theme that is prevalent in Pakistan, Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism, p. 47. The term ‘Myth’ is also usefully considered from the sense described by Marwick of a ‘Myth’ being a version of the past containing an element of truth in it that distorts what actually happened in support of a vested interest, Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History, Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, p. 292. 191 Population estimates derived from estimates of 1951. Joseph E Schwartzberg (Editor), A Historical Atlas of South Asia, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p.77. 192Joseph E Schwartzberg (Editor), A Historical Atlas of South Asia, p.77. 193 1 in 5 of East Pakistan’s population was non-Muslim compared to 1 in 30 of . Ian Talbot, Pakistan – A New History, Hurst & Company, London, 2012,, p.16. 194Major General S.Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, Ferozsons (Pvt.) Ltd, Lahore, 1993, p.26 & pp.41-53. 57

irredentist Hindu India bent on extinguishing the new state and its re-absorption into Mother India was established as truth, at least in the beliefs of the political and military elite of Pakistan.195 The Army believed India to be the core threat to the new Muslim state’s existence.

In this manner the story and legends of the new army from its beginning focused on its Muslim character and its heroic achievements in overcoming the tribulations believed by the Pakistanis to have been thrust on it in these early years by a Hindu India. The exhilaration of Pakistan’s independence was further tempered by its tenuous claims to existence as a nation both contemporaneously and historically with its claims to be South Asia’s Muslim homeland belied by the fact that thirty-five million Muslims had remained in India. Indian diplomats astutely made it a point to remind others of India’s own Muslim heritage. 196 The Army, the most organised state entity with its claims to have defended the Muslim homeland against alleged Indian aggression in Kashmir, quickly established itself as the paramount institution of the new state.

This first generation of Officers were trained and indoctrinated by the British within the multi-ethnic and religiously diverse British Indian Army. The Pakistan Army shed this diversity almost from its very beginning, despite Jinnah’s early desire for Pakistan’s national institutions to be representative of its minorities. The communal fears involved in partition acted on those Hindu Officers in the Army to seek their careers and security in India while Muslims desirous of remaining in India were also rejected.197 Officers noted how the Army was being destroyed by politicians with one Muslim officer lamenting the loss of his beloved Sikh troops. 198 The Army quickly became an Army of Muslims assured of their heritage as the ‘sword arm’ of the Raj consisting largely of Muslim martial race soldiers from the Punjab and NWFP.

195 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-58, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1998, p.67. 196 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 47. 197 Major General S.Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan p.37 & Marston notes the process how Muslim officers were denied commissions in the new Indian Army and Hindu Officers in the Pakistan Army, Daniel Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition and the Punjab Boundary Force’, p.485. 198Daniel Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition and the Punjab Boundary Force’, p.499. 58

Pakistan had become independent on 14 August 1947 amid tumultuous violence, territorial dispute and recrimination with India over possession of capital assets and supplies left by the British.199 Born out of the exhaustion of Britain after World War II, which had at various times cajoled, threatened and made promises of independence to India during the war, the two new states of Pakistan and India were born in an era of decolonisation, nationalism and the burgeoning environment. The success of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League in prevailing and obtaining independence on the basis of the two nation theory of a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims, was soured by disputes with India over the accession of a number of the Princely States who were required to devolve their power to either Pakistan or India. The accession of Kashmir to India was met with outrage in Pakistan, which had expected to receive the territory of this Muslim majority state and Pakistan refused to recognise Kashmir’s accession.200

The invasion of Kashmir by tribal invaders that India alleged was orchestrated by the Pakistan Army was eventually repulsed in early November 1947 with India effectively gaining control of and Kashmir while Pakistan gained control of those areas it would describe as free or ‘Azad’ Kashmir.201 Continued Pakistani protests at the United Nations resulted in a security council plan to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir in March 1948 which was never held, while it took until July 1949 for India and Pakistan to agree on a ceasefire line for Jammu and Kashmir. The UN mediator Sir Owen Dixon announced on 22 July 1950 his failure to bring India and Pakistan together to solve the Kashmir dispute. Physical manifestations of these hostilities involved troop concentrations at the border with Pakistan producing a white paper on Indian troop concentrations in September 1951.

The nebulous sense of identity for the new multi-ethnic state in which two wings of the country was separated by India was made apparent in March 1948 when

199 For literature on the violence of partition see, SPARC, Partition: Surgery Without Anesthesia, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), Islamabad, 1998, Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition – The Making of India and Pakistan, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007, Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition – Violence, Nationalism and History in India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, Ian Talbot & Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India, Cambridge University Press, 2009, Cambridge and Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight – The Last Years of the British Empire in India, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 200 Major General S.Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, pp. 41-53. 201 Maj.General S.K.Sinha, Operation Rescue – Military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977 (originally penned in 1955),p.21. 59

Jinnah made a speech at Dacca University. Jinnah announced to an East Pakistani audience proud of their Bengali language and identity that Urdu, a language native to neither West nor East Pakistan, would be the for Pakistan. Later that same year there were communal riots in Karachi involving masses of the Mohajirs or Muslim settlers from India who had emigrated during partition resulting in a state of emergency.202 To complicate the already tenuous existence of the new country, Jinnah—the architect of Pakistan—died in September 1948. Pakistan already indignant at the loss of Kashmir also protested to the United Nations concerning India’s invasion of Hyderabad a Hindu majority state ruled by a Muslim in August 1948.

Internationally, with a view to establishing its Muslim credentials, Pakistan hosted the first international Islamic conference in Karachi in December 1949. The leader of the , Khaliquzzaman, had also suggested a pan- Islamic unity of countries to be known as ‘Islamistan’. 203 Pakistan and India also engaged in bilateral talks in 1949 concerning a host of disputes including Kashmir, evacuee property and the Punjab water dispute concerning India stemming the flow of water into Pakistan.204

The disputes and enmities begun at independence continued into 1951 with Pakistan believing India to be inciting Afghan hostility against Pakistan. Afghanistan had not recognised Pakistan’s independence and held irredentist claims on Pakistani territory that Britain had taken from Afghanistan. India had also to Pakistan’s mind provocatively hosted the all India Pakhtoon Jirga in Delhi, as well as allowing the Afghan Ambassador to use ‘All India radio’ to deliver an anti-Pakistan speech in May 1951. Pakistan’s woes continued with the assassination of in October 1951 who was perhaps after Jinnah, Pakistan’s most able politician capable of articulating a coherent vision and identity for Pakistan.

202 Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence, Verinder Grover & Ranjana Arora (Eds), Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1997, p. 23. 203 Anas Malik, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, Taylor & Francis, 2010, p. 42. 204Aaron T. Wolf & Joshua T. Newton, ‘Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: The Indus Water Treaty’, Oregon State University, Institute for Water and Watersheds, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Indus_New.htm, accessed 24 September 2013. 60

Pakistan’s formation and identity were loosely tied to the idea of a Muslim homeland by a secular elite that had largely not been supported by the Ulema of the day while a Pakistan identity was still being negotiated. 205 Those interested in pursuing a more Islamic basis to the state moved towards this objective almost from independence. A number of the including Maududi had been opposed to Jinnah and felt that he aimed to secularise the Muslims of India, while nationalist Muslims were opposed to the idea of Pakistan as proposed by the Muslim League.206 Some Muslims felt even more strongly and described Jinnah in hostile terms as the great Kafir-i-Azam’ (the greatest of infidels). Despite this opposition numerous north Indian Ulama, including Maududi, joined the mass migration to Pakistan during partition and some Ulama who had become members of the league pushed for the adoption of an Islamic constitution.207

The Partition of British India and the Pakistan Army

It is to the next section of this chapter that the partition of British India into the dominions of Pakistan and India shall now be considered, and why this process provoked strong sentiments of distrust and betrayal in Pakistani Army Officers. Officers who would constitute the new Pakistan Army did not trust the Viceroy Mountbatten and believed him to be biased against Pakistan in considering the partition, while the Vicereine’s allegedly improper relationship with Nehru were believed by Pakistanis to be another example of the improper Hindu influence on the Viceroy.208

Similarly, the departure (before his due date) of the Supreme Commander of the British Indian Army Auchinleck at Mountbatten’s urging, because of allegations of Auchinleck’s bias towards Pakistan, infuriated the Pakistanis who saw themselves as out-manoeuvred by the Indians largely out of their leaders special relationship with

205 There was significant opposition to the idea of Pakistan amongst a number of religious groups with figures in the Deoband School believing that men like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan would be incapable of building an Islamic state in Pakistan, in Ziya-Ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, Navana, Calcutta, 1963, pp. 118-121. 206 Osman, ‘The Ulama in Pakistani Politics’ p. 232 & Akhtar, ‘Pakistan Since Independence, p. 236. 207 Akhtar, ‘Pakistan Since Independence, p. 234. 208 The poor view of Mountbatten by Pakistani Army writers is prolific including an almost de rigueur reference in regimental histories, for example in Maj. General Rafiuddin Ahmed, History of the , The Naval & Military Press Ltd, East Sussex, 2005, p. 189 & 197 & Colonel M.Y. Effendi, Punjab Cavalry –Evolution, Role, Organisation and Tactical Doctrine 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) 1849-1971, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 147. 61

Mountbatten. 209 Mountbatten had informed Auchinleck that too many Indian Ministers resented Auchinleck and he had accordingly taken advantage of Auchinleck’s offer to resign. 210 Pakistanis believed the early departure of Auchinleck left Pakistan at the mercy of India who held most of the government and military stores and they would not honour the agreed division. This belief was shared by a perhaps embittered Auchinleck who thought Indian intentions were,

... too strongly imbued with the implacable determination to remove anything which is likely to prevent their gaining their own ends, which are to prevent Pakistan receiving her just share, or indeed anything. If we are removed there is no hope at all of any just division of assets in the shape of movable assets belonging to the former Indian Army. 211

Auchinleck’s beliefs were supported by those Officers who formed the new Pakistan Army, and though respectful of British Indian Army higher command, were outraged by Mountbatten’s actions, as well as disgusted with India for the violence during the process of partition.

The process of partition poisoned what trust had existed between Hindu, Sikh and Muslim communities in the Punjab. Pakistani, Indian and British Officers who had served together in the British Indian Army were witness to a carnage and brutality that fundamentally polarised communal perceptions between Muslim, Sikh and Hindu communities. The brutalities were not one sided, but those caught up in the maelstrom of violence could see it only as evidence of hate perpetrated on their co-religionists. Hindus, like Sikhs and Muslims, were shocked. The personal and communal experiences of violence experienced by Muslim Officers invoked an epiphany in numerous Officers, which separated them from their past perspectives on relations with other communities they had lived side-by-side with during service with Sikh and Hindu Officers. The experiences shared by these Muslim Officers who were mainly

209 LHCMA, General the Lord Ismay Papers, 3/7/67/38, Letter from Viceroy Mountbatten to Field Marshal Sir dated 26 September 1947 at Government House to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. 210 LHCMA, General the Lord Ismay Papers, 3/7/67/38, p. 4. 211 John Connell, Auchinleck – A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1959, pp. 920-921 & Auchinleck’s private secretary Maj. General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight – A personal record of the partition of India, Leo Cooper, 1986, London, pp. 260-261 Auchinleck’s papers in the John Rylands Library at the University of Manchester, Doc.1262, 28 September 1947 refer to this quote. 62

Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers amplified their sense of Muslim identity and the threat posed by the Hindu’s and Sikh’s. These experiences seemed to fulfil the Muslim Leagues pre-partition fears of being dominated by a Hindu India.212

Major Musa, a Senior Staff Officer in Lahore between September and December 1947, noted his psychological shock of having witnessed a train full of slaughtered Muslim and the influence this had on his perceptions of the Indian state and its political objectives.213 Similarly, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq had related how the vision of his exhausted mother crossing the border into Pakistan carrying their worldly possessions produced an indelible impact upon him.214

The Punjab experienced the worse violence during partition and involved a three way process of killing and destruction amongst the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities. 215 The violence though could have been worse except for the involvement of the Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) which had been instituted out of elements of the British Indian Army in order to counter anticipated problems during the course of partition. Approved by the Partition Council on 17 July 1947 the PBF was constituted of elements of the 4th Indian Division and led by Major General Pete Rees together with a Sikh and Muslim officer as senior Indian military advisors.216

The PBF though having performed its role to the best of its ability had to perform a role in a highly communalised atmosphere where a significant proportion of the population had been militarised with large numbers of demobbed Sikh, Muslim and Hindu soldiers experienced in the recent combat of World War II and passionately committed to securing their communites. Overlaid onto this were the organisational abilities of the Sikh communities who feared being marginalised and together with demobbed Sikh soldiers provided their Jatha’s a particularly aggressive and tactical propensity for success in evicting and killing Muslim refugees and

212 Wajahat Husain’s Indian Commander attempted to persuade him to remain in India but Hussain who had served on the Punjab Boundary Force was convinced by witnessing the carnage brought on Muslims in the to opt for Pakistan, in ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Major General (Retd) S. Wajahat Husain, Defence Journal, August 2002. 213 General Mohammad Musa, From Jawan to Genera, East & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984, p. 77. 214 Quoted in Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988’, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1084. 215Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, p.470. 216Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, pp.489-490. 63

villagers. 217 Ths “gave the character of the violence a distinctiveness that was both extraordinary and unparalleled anywhere else in India”.218 The PBF furthermore had to contend with the collusion of a number of the Princely states in providing support to communal elements engaged in the violence as well as the criticism of British and Indian politicians alike at being seemingly unable to prevent the scale of violence as well as calling for the PBF to be reinforced.219

The ferocity of the violence also left a searing impact on British Officers who served in the Pakistan and Indian Armies at this time. The brutality meted out by the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities on each other generated introspection on the nature of humanity and altering previously held beliefs of the British Indian Army. Though innumerable officers had witnessed and even policed communal violence in the past, the experience of partition was apparently a level of violence on a previously unimagined magnitude for all concerned.

I have served in what I regard as the finest infantry in the world and I have had much pleasure and happiness in India, but I have now plumbed the depths of human degradation ... I now know that we are not basically far above animals. 220

Auchinleck’s own household comptroller witnessed the killing of a group of Muslim women and children close to Auchinleck’s headquarters, while the British Comptroller General of the Pakistan Army had his Muslim bearer murdered in front of him. 221 Explicit accounts from India and Pakistan have recorded the brutality, extent and manner of violence that accompanied partition.222 There is evidence though of Pakistani and Indian soldiers who prevented further bloodshed by rescuing

217 Brigadier R.C.B.Bristow, Memories of the British Raj, Johnson, London, pp.159-168. 218Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947, p.486 & Swarna Aiyar, ‘August Anarchy’: The partition massacres in Punjab, 1947’, South Asia, Vol.XVIII, 1995, p.27. 219 Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947’, pp. 486-.487 & p.493. 220 OIOC MSS EUR.D.1030/1-33, Hudson Papers & the recollections of Major James on the dismemberment of women and children by Sikh Jathas. Major James, ‘Transfer of Sovreignty’, Royal Engineers Journal, August 1997 p.118, quoted in Marston, “The Indian Army, Partition and the Punjab Boundary Force, p.493. 221 E.W. Robinson-Horley, Last Post – An Indian Army Memoir, Leo Cooper, 1985, pp. 124-125 & 140-145 & Letter of Major General J.B. Dalison to Field Marshal Auchinleck on 30 August 1947, in AUC/1251, Auchinleck Papers at the University of Manchester, John Rylands University Library (hereafter JRUL). 222 See for instance SPARC, Partition: Surgery Without Anesthesia, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC), Islamabad, 1998 & Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition – The Making of India and Pakistan, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007. 64

refugee populations from their own co-religionists, outside of the efforts provided by the Punjab Boundary Force that had been tasked with policing the Punjab border.223

Division of the British Indian Army

Given the communal violence and mass killings that occurred it is important to note that there had originally been a concerted effort to prevent the division of the British Indian Army. Senior British Political and Military figures believed a single army could have served both dominions for a time. It is to this section that the thesis now examines.

The uncompleted nature of the division was due in part to this resistance to divide the Army by the British and some Indian Officers, with some British Officers believing that the majority of Indian Officers were against the division of the Army and even against independence.224 The division was resisted by Mountbatten the last Viceroy, Auchinleck the Supreme Commander in Chief, as well as senior Officers of the new Indian army. 225 Lord Ismay who had served in the British Indian Army and who was Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff stated,

The problem which caused many of us the greatest grief was the decision to divide the Indian Army on communal lines before partition took place … I did my utmost to persuade Mr Jinnah to reconsider his decision ... but Jinnah was adamant. He said that he would refuse to take over power on 15 August unless he had an army of appropriate strength and predominantly Muslim composition under his control… 226

223 See for instance Chapter VIII of Maj. General Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Wajidalis, 1989, Lahore, pp. 249-257 & Qureshi’s recollections of more general Muslim efforts to prevent violence against Hindus and Sikhs, in Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 190. 224Brigadier Bristow wrote that most Hindu and Sikh officers were strongly opposed to the partition of India and became enraged when Pakistan declared itself Islamic, Brigadier R.C.B.Bristow, Memories of the British Raj, Johnson, London, p.157 & Fraser claims this from his time with Indian Officer Cadets at an Officer Cadet Training School after World War II. George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out There, Harvill, 1992, p. 133. 225 Ayub Khan notes that he was approached by General Cariappa the first C-in-C of the Indian Army in a bid to seek Ayub’s support in not dividing the Army, in Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 19. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali a member of the Armed Forces reconstitution steering committee during partition also makes this claim, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, p. 187. 226 Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of the General the Lord Ismay, Heinemann, London, 1960, pp. 425-428. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Robert Hale Limited, London, 1951, p. 137, Johnson was Mountbatten’s ADC wrote that Mountbatten thought the partition of the armed forces to be “the biggest crime and the biggest headache”. 65

Auchinleck had opposed an early plan for the division of the forces in April 1947 by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan. The Pakistanis had resented this and saw the reluctance as contributing to the failure of Pakistan receiving its share of military stores. 227 Other Pakistanis saw the reluctance in more sinister terms with the ‘save the united army campaign’ as a Hindu plot to sabotage the partition of India and deny the creation of Pakistan.228 The ‘Hindu plot’ to deny the formation of the Pakistan Army established itself as an established Army myth held by the Officers of the new Pakistan Army, though it was never convincingly proven amongst the opportunism and initiative laden Officers of the new armies seeking to obtain the best outcome for their new services.

The ‘myth’ was established though,

To sabotage partition, a campaign to save the Army was stepped up. Senior Hindu Officers went round persuading the Muslim personnel not to accept the division … at the back of their minds was the hope that without an Army of its own Pakistan would not be able to last very long. 229

Other Officers saw the situation as the hand of British strategic expediency with Britain trying to maintain a united army in terms of its strategic value to the Commonwealth. 230 The issue had been the subject of British cabinet considerations, which had considered the potential of future Indian and Russian intrigue and the necessity for contingency planning. 231 The issue had also been explored in the May 1947 India Burma committee where it was recommended that Britain should insist that Pakistan and India should not lease bases to any power outside the

227 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, p. 187. 228 Maj. General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, OUP, 1961, pp. 17-18. 229 Brigadier S. Haider Abbas Rizvi, Veteran Campaigners – A History of the 1759- 1981, Wajidalis Lahore, 1984, p. 105. 230 Maj. General Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Services Books Club, 1989, pp. 118- 119. See also Brigadier D.H. Cole, Imperial Military Geography – the geographical background of the defence problems of the British Commonwealth, Sifton Praed & Co., LTD, London, 1953, pp. 159-182, where Cole writes of the importance of India as a potential base for Britain and the particular problems of Pakistan pp. 172-176. 231 National Archives of the United Kingdom – Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) CAB 128/7- Confidential Annex to reference CM (46) 55, India Constitutional Problem, p. 23. 66

Commonwealth otherwise than in pursuance of a scheme of regional defence approved by the UN.232

Chaudhri Muhammad Ali a member of the armed forces reconstitution steering committee chaired by Auchinleck claimed that the attachment to the undivided army by British Officers and plenty of Indian Officers was so great that they could not emotionally reconcile themselves to the Army’s division even after the matter had been decided.233 The profound impact of even using the term ‘division’ in describing the actual division of the British Indian Army was felt to be psychologically harmful by Auchinleck.234

Though the British were resistant to the division of the Army, future Officers of the Pakistan Army though proud of the martial achievements of the old Indian Army fervently desired the division. Auchinleck arguably was also cognizant of the impact of partition on communal lines would affect the desires of officers to be affiliated to their new national armies and expressed concern in September 1946.

Already many Muslim officers, for example, consider themselves as Muslims first and Indians second, though they may be proud to belong to the present Indian Army 235 In this atmosphere Officers of the new Pakistan Army were distinctly against retaining a single army and stated their preferences to the British in terms of the religious chasm between Muslim and Hindu. Niazi who had won the during the Burma campaign noted the rejoicing and elation of his fellow Muslim Officer colleagues in Clement Town near Dehra Dun upon learning that Pakistan had been achieved and that they could now serve the Army of their new Muslim homeland. 236 The Commanding Officer of the 7/ stated to

232 Anita Inder Singh, ‘Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946-1947, in The International History Review, Vol. 4, No. 4. (Nov. 1982), pp. 568-588, Taylor and Francis, 1982, pp. 584-585 & Maj. General Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Ferozsons & Wajidalis, 1989, Lahore, p. 125. 233 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 186-187. 234 Field Marshal Auchinleck to Chiefs of Staff and British Cabinet, in John Connell, Auchinleck – A Biography of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1959, p. 889. 235Quoted in Marston. Marston, ‘The Indian Army, Partition and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945- 1947, p.478. 236Lt.General A.A.K.Niazi, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998, pp.11-12. 67

General Messervey who was to be the first Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army the Islamic nature of the proposed new Army in contradiction to the Indian Army,

Sir, my grandfather, my father and I have fought for your empire. I have no wish that my sons and grandsons fight for the Hindus. 237 As noted earlier in this chapter the desire for the division of the Army by those future Pakistani officers was noted by Ayub one of the most senior Muslim officers of the time. Ayub wrote that he was approached by General Cariappa the first C-in-C of the Indian Army in a bid to seek Ayub’s support in not dividing the Army.238

The Muslim Officers though were increasingly influenced by the impact of the communal violence experienced during the exodus of populations during partition. Furthermore, there were instances of the Army’s discipline and unity unravelling with episodes involving Muslim units engaging in fatal skirmishes with Sikh and Hindu units being witnessed by British Officers. 239 British officers began to note their concerns about the reiliability of Punjabi troops with instances of troops failing to respond to instances of gross butchery of civilians.240 These skirmishes were part of the tribulations of partition that were acting as a form of cohesiveness upon these newly independent Muslim units being coordinated to form the Pakistan Army.

Other instances such as the mutiny as well as communal troubles on board troopships returning with Muslim and Hindu troops from overseas were also

237 Maj. General Rafiuddin Ahmed, History of the Baloch Regiment 1939-1956, The Naval & Military Press Ltd, East Sussex, 2005, pp. 187-188. 238 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p.19., the future Defence Minister and Prime Minister of Pakistan Chaudhri Muhammad Ali also makes this claim in his book, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, p.187.

239 An Officer of the 2nd of the Black Watch witnessed a fatal skirmish between the Muslim troops of the 3/8 Punjab and the Sikhs and Hindus of the 19th Lancers on 7 September 1947, in Roy Humphries, To Stop a Rising Sun – Reminiscences of wartime in India and Burma, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire, 1996, p. 203. 240 Brigadier Bristow refers in this instance to an example of Punjabi Dogra troops failing to respond to the massacre of Muslim vilagers. Bristow himself spent most of his service commanding Dogra troops. Brigadir R.C.B.Bristow, Memories of the British Raj – Soldier in India, Johnson, London, 1974, p.156. 68

reported.241 The British too were also beginning to suffer casualties from being involved in the escort of refugees between India and Pakistan.242

The rapidity of partition and the division of the Army was confusing to the few senior Officers who would constitute the Pakistan Army. Brigadier Akbar Khan in his response to an armed forces committee question responded,

I don’t even know whether there will be one or two India’s. It will depend on whether there will be internal troubles or war... 243

The confusion as to whether or not there would be a partition into two separate homelands or a Federation in which there would be substantial Muslim autonomy was incomprehensible to those who had little information as to whether or not they would be required to choose which Army they would serve in. This confusion was something familiar to junior Muslim Officersl, who had no idea as late as March and April 1947 that the Army would be divided.244

The resistance to divide the Army was perhaps amplified by the fact that a number of senior British Officials were critical of Jinnah with Ismay even sharing his confidential notes of discussion between himself and Jinnah with Nehru. 245 Jinnah himself was likewise critical of some British Officials. Jinnah informed Ismay that a number of British Officials were dangerously susceptible to providing concessions to the Indians due to their inability to understand the wiles of the Hindu mind and the

241 LHCMA – Boyle – Reports and Messages re: tensions between Muslim and Hindu troops on board H.M. Troopship ‘Empire Pride’, Suez-Bombay, October 1947. Boyle reports via ‘Marconigrams’ of his and fellow British Officers (Maj. Walker & Maj. Mitchell) belief in imminent violence on board the vessel between the Muslim majority and Hindu minority if the vessel did not dock at Karachi before Bombay. 242 The Commander of the 33 Field Squadron Engineers reported the death of two British Officers escorting Muslim refugees in Amritsar, in Roy Humphries, To Stop a Rising Sun – Reminiscences of wartime in India and Burma, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire, 1996, pp. 201-202. 243 NAM.1982-04-797-1, Brigadier Akbar Khan’s response as witness to the Armed Forces Naturalisation Committee (AFNC), (from minutes of AFNC at 14th meeting on Wednesday 9th April 1947). 244 Maj. General Tajammal Hussain Malik, The Story of My Struggle, Jang publishers, Lahore, 1991, p. 7. 245 Ismay and Montgomery were critical of Jinnah and even Montgomery with his contemporary lack of familiarity with India pronounced that Jinnah had a deadly hatred of Hindus Field-Marshal Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Collins, London, 1958, p. 457; Ismay blamed the troubles of partition on Jinnah in British Library sound recording, C940/19 General Lord Ismay (1887-1965) interviewed by Henry Vincent Hodson & Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter LHCMA), General the Lord Ismay Papers, 3/7/68/45. 69

Hindu determination to prevent the creation of Pakistan.246 Jinnah’s distinctly religious rhetoric in describing the Hindu mind was incongruent with a number of his notable addresses on the nature of Pakistan’s inclusiveness.

Despite the resistance by the British the Army was divided. Pakistan became a nation on 14 August 1947 and the Army it inherited was constituted from the Muslim elements of the former regiments of the British Indian Army. For a very short time before the violence of partition escalated there were also in keeping with Jinnah’s vision of the Army Hindu Officers whose home was in Pakistan and who had opted to serve in the Pakistan Army. 247 In August 1947 the undivided Army had been over 400,000 in number. On partition, India’s share was 280,000 personnel, excluding state forces, and Pakistan’s about 150,000.248 The Officers and men who were to make up the Pakistan Army were scattered throughout the regiments in India and overseas.

The Pakistani Officers forming the new Army though nearly all Muslim and nearly all originating from the Punjab or the North West Frontier Province came from a complex sociological melange of tribes, clan and religious adherence. Most Officers came from families with traditions of to the British. A prominent issue with the new Pakistani officers was the belief that there had been no all-Muslim regiments in the British Indian Army while there had been eight all Hindu Regiments and ten Gurkha Regiments. 249 The argument centres on recruitment into the Army and the matter of mixed composition regiments and units. Arguably though there were smaller Muslim units numerous officers, including British officers believed there to be no all Muslim regiments, though the term Regiment can be imprecise.250

246 LHCMA, General the Lord Ismay Papers, 3/7/68/45. 247 Jinnah’s inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August 1947, in his capacity as its first President, in G. Allana (Ed), Pakistan Movement Historic Documents, , pp. 407-411 & Maj. General S. Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan: Including the Period from August 1947 to 1949, Ferozsons Pvt. LTD, Lahore, 1993, p. 37 & Chaudhri Muhammad A li, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, p. 186. 248 Lt. General S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1999, p. 446. 249 Maj. General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, OUP, 1961, pp. 24-25. 250Brigadier Bristow who commanded a certainly believed there to be no all Muslim regiments as did Fazal Khan (noted below) and Ayub Khan. Brigadier R.C.B.Bristow, Memories of the British Raj, Johnson, London, 1974, p.190. David French notes that British military terminology is cursed by words with imprecise meanings and none more so that the word, ‘regimenta’, “that is so shot through with anomalies that to talk of a ‘regimental system’ is itself almost a misnomer”. David French Military Identities: The Regimental System, The British Army, and the British People, c.1870- 2000, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.7. 70

The principles of the division of the British Indian Army for the two respective dominion armies was unanimously agreed on 30 June 1947 to be undertaken on a communal basis upon the proportionate strength of two armies with Pakistan receiving thirty-six per cent and India sixty-four per cent.251 The process of the division of the British Indian Army was outlined in guidelines provided by the Partition Council under the auspices of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee chaired by Field Marshal Auchinleck.252 The division process for the Army involved a two-step plan that would initially divide the existing forces on a communal basis followed by a complicated ‘comb out’ process in which Muslim and non-Muslim personnel had to be separated and units reconstituted.253 Apart from the grief in dividing the Army, senior British officers thought the process in undertaking the division complicated and as having caused the “biggest headache’ involved in Partition. 254 Individuals who were Muslim and from the area that would be Pakistan would be entitled to join the Pakistan Army and not the Indian Army, and if from an area that was to make up India they could opt for either India or Pakistan with the converse applying to non-Muslims. 255

British Officers in the Pakistan Army and the Division of Assets

The first two Commanders in Chief of the Pakistan Army were British. Upon independence in 1947 there were one hundred and twenty British Officers serving in the Pakistan Army in Command, senior Staff Officer positions, Commandants of schools, administrative units, training centres, and record offices as well as being Commandants of active units, technical units and first grade staff appointments.256 The British who stayed on in the Pakistan Army believed the most severe problem was the lack of able Staff Officers in the Pakistan Army. 257 Apart from the respective personnel strengths in India’s favour, India also inherited more whole units with more

251 Maj. General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, pp. 28-29. 252V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, pp.260-264. 253 V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p.264. 254 Lord Ismay apart from noting the division of the Army was a crime noted its complexities as did Field Marshal Auchinleck. V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p.265 255 Maj. General Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Services Book Club & Wajidalis, Lahore 1989, pp. 127-128. 256 OIOC L/WS/1/1673 – Appointments held by British Officers in Pakistan and List of and above – Pakistan Army. 257 NAM.1992-03-162-1) Oral History series, Cassette one – Lieutenant William Langdon Farrow. 71

senior ranks than Pakistan. India’s first commander in chief General Sir Rob Lockhart was also British and together with four hundred and eighteen British officers served in the Indian Army. 258 Lockhart was replaced by India’s first indigenous commander Lieutenant General Kodandera Cariappa in December 1948 and only six British remained by April 1956.

The majority of the Muslim Officers who constituted the Army were junior in rank and experience. With the loss of Officers during partition due to the combat in Kashmir and accidents, as well as the small number of remaining British Officers meant that large numbers of officers were rapidly promoted to fill gaps in the new Army. 259 Ayub Khan for instance advanced within the space of six years from Colonel to be the Army’s first Commander in Chief. This was a familiar experience to the new Pakistan Army Officers with for example an Artillery Officer commissioned in 1946 receiving an accelerated promotion to Major due to the shortage of qualified Officers.260

While the division of Army personnel was confused, the division of the military weapons, stores and assets of the British Indian Army between the two new dominio n’s armies was fraught with ill will and subterfuge.

The division of assets involved countless claims and counter claims between Pakistani and Indian sources as to the dastardly acts performed by each other. Complaints from Pakistani Officers alleged nearly every conceivable crime and act of infamy from plain theft of stores to fraud and the alleged sabotage of equipment. In keeping with the ‘Hindu myth’, there were Pakistani Officers who believed the Indians premeditatedly starved them of supplies to prevent the establishment of the Pakistan Army. 261

Brigadier Ansari, commissioned in 1943, oversaw the emergence of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps at partition and claimed that India had disarmed

258 V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, pp. 277-287. 259 For instance one serious loss was Major General who was believed would be the first Pakistani Army Chief who together with Brigadier Sher Khan, another experienced Officer, was killed in an air crash on 13 November 1949. 260 Brig. Syed Shah Abul Qasim, Life Story of an Ex-Soldier, Publicity Panel Publishers, Karachi, 2003, p. 73. 261Interview of Maj. General Wajahat Hussain, in ‘Remembering our Warriors’, Ikhram Seghal (Ed), Pakistan Defence Journal, August, 2002. 72

repatriated troops bound for Pakistan, while the non-Muslim members of the Punjab Boundary Force had been briefed to demand as many stores as possible regardless of needs.262 Ansari’s perspective as an Officer who formed the first generation of the new Pakistan Army is consistent with others of this generation who believe in the hostile premeditated nature of India’s denial of stores and assets. These beliefs were linked religiously to the context of a vengeful Hindu India engaged on a deliberate initiative to ruin Muslim Pakistan.

Allegations existed furthermore that the Indians had for instance deliberately forwarded redundant equipment such as oversize World War II era clothing meant for West African Troops. The individual inequities of such actions though became thoroughly infused with the politics of religion and that of the spiteful Hindu. Despite Indian complaints of their own problems the Pakistanis viewed their problems as continuing elements of a sinister and premeditated Indian attempt to extinguish the Pakistan Army at birth. 263 The sabotage of equipment left behind in Pakistan—such as the rendering of the Poona Horse’s few in-operational by fouling their fuel tanks—were seen as warlike in their intention, especially so when it had prevented these tanks subsequent deployment in the 1948 border hostilities.264

For the newly formed Pakistan Army the inescapable reality was that during the Second World War Army depots had been situated near the main supply routes for the war in South East Asia. The location of the majority of these depots had absolutely nothing to do with Indian intentions at partition and everything to do with the pragmatism of such centres being close to operational theatres during the war. India had correspondingly been left the bulk of military materiel and production facilities.

Pakistani claims were countered by Indian arguments that the division of assets was impossible to achieve given the immensity of trying to sort out records from 1857 onwards within the limited time frame of partition thrust upon them by the

262 Brig. M.A.H. Ansari, Brig. M.H. Hydri & Colonel Mahboob Elahi, History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps 1947-1992, Ordnance History Cell & Ferozsons, Rawalpindi, 1993, pp. 89-90. 263 Brig. M.A.H. Ansari, Brig. M.H. Hydri & Colonel Mahboob Elahi, History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps 1947-1992, Ordnance History Cell & Ferozsons, Rawalpindi, 1993, p. 90. 264 Brigadier Z.A. Khan, The Way it Was, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, p. 44. 73

British decision. 265 Pakistani Officers argued that they were not assisted by either Indian or British Officers in their tasks and had to leave New Delhi, due to the mounting violence against Muslims, without achieving their objectives. 266

Indian Officers’ counterclaimed that the Pakistan Army was not the only service to suffer as most of the military intelligence material was uplifted to Pakistan, which had left India with little intelligence capability. 267 Indians also noted they did not inherit a functioning headquarters as had Pakistan, as well as noting the loss of training institutions such as the Quetta Staff College to Pakistan. Equally problematic for both new dominion’s armies were the return of military stores to the United Kingdom. 268

Nevertheless, the Pakistanis were bitter at what little stores and infrastructure they did receive. A Pakistani Officer commissioned in 1947 noted the Army at partition did not possess any armour, artillery, or infantry regiments or battalions that were fully Muslim. Pakistan he noted had to cobble together units made up of a patchwork of individuals, platoons and oddly constituted companies that had trickled into Pakistan. 269 India also suffered organisationally in this regard with both suffering reorganisation problems with the breakup of the old regiments. The regimental histories of both dominions provide examples of this process of the separation of the regiments into their respective national units, with for example the 1st Punjab Regiment transferring its Sikhs and to India, leaving the regiment to entirely consist of Punjabi Mussulmans and Pakhtuns from the Hazara District of Pakistan. 270

The tribulations of partition arguably had an even greater impact on the first generation of PMA Officer Cadets. Unlike earlier generations of Officers who had served with Hindu and Sikh Officers during the two world wars and frontier

265 Maj. General S.K. Sinha, Operation Rescue – Military Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977 [1955], p. 4 notes how he and a Pakistani Officer ended up destroying a number of files due to their impossible task. 266 Maj. General Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, Services Book Club Lahore, 1989, pp. 145-146. 267 Lt. General L.P. Sen, Slender was the Thread – Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1988, p. 19. 268 V. Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green – A History of the Indian Army 1600-1974, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1974, pp. 276-277. 269 Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti, Betrayals of Another Kind – Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1996, p. 399. 270 Major Mohammed Ibrahim Qureshi, History of the First Punjab Regiment 1759-1956, Gale & Polden LTD, Aldershot, 1958, pp. 430-431. 74

operations, the first batch of PMA Officer Cadets would no longer have this opportunity. With this lack of inter-faith and cultural familiarity and experience, these new Officer’s worldviews became more limited than earlier generations of Muslim Officers. This limited worldview possibly made them more susceptible to beliefs of their own superiority outside of any other faith to compare themselves to, unlike the multi-faith Indian Army, and secondly more susceptible to the idea of the ‘Hindu plot’.

Pakistani Officers of the British Indian Army generation still perceived India as the primary threat to Pakistan, but from their history of having served with Hindus and Sikhs it is apparent that they still held these former colleagues in warm regard, a phenomenon the Officers commissioned after 1947 did not experience and which served to polarise their view of India.271 Balancing to some degree the myopia of many newly trained Officers was the communal connections other older Officers still had in India. A number also had relations in Indian military service as well as friends in the Indian Army, matrimonial agreements andh communal connections in India. 272

Furthermore, there were some Officers who did not view the tribulations of partition as necessarily a one sided matter of Hindu atrocity against Muslims. A few Officers, perhaps because they originated from the south of India where the compulsion for Muslims to move or be driven out was not the same as in the Punjab, had different perspectives than their Punjabi, Pakhtun and Mohajir north Indian colleagues. Some of these Officers frankly noted with disgust the violence, reprisals and destruction of non-Muslim property meted out by their co-religionists. 273 The violence directed against the non-Muslim population in Pakistan was something also noted by those remaining British soldiers in the new dominion.274

271 Rahman fondly recalled visiting India and meeting old British Indian Army colleagues such as , an Indian Army Officer, Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, p. 81. 272 Qasim notes despite the tense atmosphere between Pakistan and India when he returned to Bangalore in 1953 to be married, Syed Shah Abul Qasim, Life Story of an Ex-Soldier, Publicity Panel, Karachi, 2003, p. 73; Lt. General Rahman’s brother was in the Indian Government, in M. Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 156 and Brigadier Hussain lamented the profound impact of the death of his Sikh friend an officer of the 11th Sikh in Kahsimr in 1948. Hamid Hussain, The Battle Within, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2003, p.125. 273 Brig. Syed Shah Abul Qasim, Life Story of an Ex-Soldier, Publicity Panel Publishers, Karachi, 2003, p. 69. 274 Roy Humphries, To Stop a Rising Sun – Reminiscences of wartime in India and Burma, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire, 1996, p. 203. 75

The majority of the first generation of Officers at the new Officer training school at the PMA though were thoroughly convinced of the hostile intentions of India. This newer generation of Officers derived these beliefs on their tribulations experienced during partition and were convinced India did not want Pakistan to exist. 275 Additionally, this new generation of Officers, like their forefathers, were being nurtured on the same notions of their inherent martial race superiority by those remaining British Officers as their forefathers had. Their martial race identities were being conflated with the Muslim nature of the new state and contributing to a martial race Muslim exceptionalism. The Indians too continued to preference martial race recruits such as the Sikhs despite pronouncements that their army would be more representative of the Indian population.276 Thoough disputed by some including Stephen Cohen that the Indian Army has indeed become more representative of the nation as a whole others argue that the Sikhs and non-Sikhs from the Punjab continued to be proportionally over-represented in the Indian Army.277 Kundu for instance argued that Sikhs “accounted for 10-15 per cent of all ranks in the army despite the Punjab containing just 2.45 per cent of the population in 1981”, with a 1991 report estimating that the Sikhs constituted a fith of all Indian Army Officers. 278

The dominant narrative remained outrage at India’s alleged perfidy in not honouring the division of the forces agreement. The new Pakistani Officers may have been aware that their British Commander had also bitterly complained about India’s alleged failure to honour agreements. General Gracey, the Army’s second Commander in Chief, had complained directly to the Commonwealth Relations Office of India that India was, “continuing to do its best to sabotage Pakistan”, with this complaint possibly not lost on the Pakistani Officers who worked closely with him, such as his ADC Lieutenant Husain. 279 Other British Officers in the Pakistan Army

275 Lt. General Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 8. 276 V.Longer, Red Coasts to Olive Green: A History of the Indian Army 1600-1974, Allied Publishers, Bombary, 1974, pp.288-289.Longer quotes General Cariappa Commander-in-Chief that he will not tolerate communalistic ideas and that the idea of martial races was abhorrent. 277 Stephen P.Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990, pp.183-191. 278 Apurba Kundu, Militarism in India: The Army and Civl Society in Consensus, Tauris, London, 1998, pp.169-171. 279 OIOC L/WS/1/1652 (7), From General Sir Douglas Gracey to General Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Commonwealth Relations Office, London & Interview of Maj. General Wajahat Hussain, in ‘Remembering our Warriors’, Ikhram Seghal (Ed), Pakistan Defence Journal, August, 2002. 76

also noted their misgivings with one believing the Indians maliciously turned trains around east of Lahore back to their points of departure.280 Gracey though criticised by Pakistanis for not deploying the Army into Kashmir to prevent its accession to India was admired for his support of Indian troops during World War II and his Punjabi Indian troops in Indo-China after the war.281

This section now examines how Gracey and some other British Officers in the Pakistan Army had pronounced preferences for particular martial race units obtained during their service with the British Indian Army before, during and after World War II. These preferences were significant in their influence upon the Punjabi and Pakhtun rump of the newly formed Officer Corps.

Class composition limiting army recruitment to Punjabis and Pakhtuns while identified as not appropriate in a new national army was still evident in the newly formed Pakistan Army. The epigraph commencing this chapter quoting the Army’s second Commander in Chief is indicative of the persistence of the martial race ‘class and composition’ makeup that was an inherent part of the British Indian Army. Gracey who had served most of his career in the British Indian Army was thoroughly familiar with such concepts. The foreword written by General Gracey in 1950 in the centenary publication of the Punjab Field Force Regiment noted recruitment had of necessity changed because Sikhs, Dogras and Gurkhas could no longer be recruited.

Since partition the class composition has been changed to 50% each of Punjabi Mussulmans and Pathans and the recruitment of only special areas and tribes has been done away with. 282

The changes though only concerned a matter of choice between classes of Punjabi and Pakhtuns. There is for instance no mention of Pakistan’s majority population of Bengalis or that of the other Pakistani ethnic populations from , Baluchistan or the Muhajir migrants from India.

280 LHCMA – Devereux Papers ACC.197, ‘My tour with the Pakistan Army. Devereux commanded 3 SP Regiment Royal Pakistan Artillery, pp. 1-2. 281 Gracey a former Gurkha Officer was hailed by Field Marsahl Slim as an energetic officer with a great hold on his Indian troops. Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory: An abridged edition, Corgi Books, 1971, UK, pp.128-129. Gracey wrote in his papers of an incident in Indo-China, “Things did not look good but events were to show that a handful of Punjabi’s even when wounded, are worth an army of Annamites”, LHCMA, Gracey Papers, 5/6, October 1945 282 Maj. General M. Hayaud Din, One Hundred Glorious Years – A History of the Punjab Frontier Force 1849-1949, Civil and Military Gazette Ltd, Lahore, 1950, p. 9. 77

The matter of martial race and ‘class’ composition was an issue of some importance to British Officers in deciding whether or not to stay on in Pakistan. Apart from preferences for particular units the decision for British Officers to serve in Pakistan rather than India was according to Ian Stephens the pre-partion Indian based publisher because of a firm dislike for the Indian National Congress.

…their attitude orginated from the previous struggles between the British Raj and the Congress party. Some of them looked upon the Indian leaders now in power at Delhi as permanently their foes; they had bitter remembrance of the party’s policies in 1942283 Stephens notes that this reason though could not account for the enthusiasm amongst so many of the youngest British Officers he was aware of who chose Pakistan.284 Additionally Nehru wished to have the Indian Army thoroughly nationalised as soon as possible and had even stated that he would have sooner have every village in India put to flames rather than keeping the British Army on any longer than August 15 in response to a proposal of Auchinlecks to keep British troops on to maintain law and order and protect British citizens until January 1948.285

It is perhaps not difficult to believe that these British Officers so immersed in favourable views of martial race would not continue to utter and promote these beliefs to those same martial race Officers now being groomed to assume leadership of the Army. As late as 1945 Colonel Birdwood had argued for the immutable logic of martial race, despite protests of its racially discriminatory presumptions. 286 The Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers arguably provided a receptive audience to these senior British Officers so enamoured with martial race. The positive views of these British Officers would have arguably gone some way in confirming these beliefs of exceptionalism in the older generation of Pakistani Officers, as well as indoctrinating the newer generations being trained at the PMA. In so doing, these British Indian Officers ensured the continuation of these beliefs in the Army.

283 Ian Stephens, Horned Moon – An account of a Journey through Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, Chatto & Windus, London, 1954, p.88. 284 Stephens, Horned Moon, p.88. 285 V.Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p.267. 286 Lt. Colonel The Hon. C.B. Birdwood, M.V.O., A Continent Experiments, Skeffington & Son, London, 1945, pp. 112-113. 78

...the thought of commanding a regiment composed of Punjabi Mussulmans and one to be regarded as the equivalent of an R.H.A regiment in the British Service was a choice I could not resist. 287

That British Officers continued to hold such beliefs even after the expansion of recruitment to ‘non-martial’ groups during World War II is not surprising. Given the pre-eminent place of martial race in the British Indian Army from the late nineteenth century onwards—when Officers had served in regiments where these preferences were developed and encouraged—it was natural for an Officer to perhaps prefer Punjabis over Gurkhas, or Gurkhas over Sikhs and so on amongst the range of martial races in the British Indian Army.

Problems with the parochialism of Officers who held such beliefs and strong affiliations for their preferred units meant there had to be a degree of caution exercised over the potential for such Officers to cause offence in the new and sensitive security environment involving the two new dominion armies. The Congress party politicised the entire issue of bias with Sir Olaf Caroe—the Governor of NWFP replaced in 1947 at the urging of Nehru for his perceived preference for Pakistan. Auchinleck was also caught up in these arguments and though demonstrably against any form of martial race preference in his efforts during and after the war was attacked on his neutrality.288 Because of the allegations arising out of the process of partition and attacks on the neutrality of and alleged partisan involvement of British Officers within the dominion armies British Officers were carefully monitored from Britain.

British Officers identified strongly with their units and perpetuated martial race beliefs in the new environment of the two new dominion armies in a manner sometimes deemed inappropriate with London. In one instance an article by Major General Cawthorne in September 1948, who had at times acted as Chief of the Pakistan Army, was believed to be too incendiary against India and a decision was

287 LHCMA – Devereux Papers ACC.197, ‘My tour with the Pakistan Army’. Devereux commanded 3 SP Regiment Royal Pakistan Artillery, p. 1. 288In regards Auchinleck’s early departure because of Indian political agitation against him see p.56 above. Auchinleck sought to dismantle martial race in the Army during and after the war. Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes, pp.49-50 & pp.219-220.. 79

made not to publish it. 289 This identification by British Officers with the men of the Pakistan Army was not unusual, and as noted in Chapter One was an element of the two way process of glorification and identification with the martial race unit that had occurred in the British Indian Army. 290

A number of British Officers in Pakistan during the period 1947 to 1951 continued to believe in the veracity of martial race and transmitted this to their largely Punjabi and Pathan audience in the now independent Pakistan Army. 291 The Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who formed the rump of the Pakistan Army were indoctrinated by the British to define themselves by religion and ethnicity and believed this to be accepted wisdom. Now that these Officers had been separated from the Hindu and Sikh martial classes their worldview of martial race was reduced to themselves. They took up wholeheartedly their territorial and ideological mantle as Islamic Ghazis and soldier saviours of the newly created Muslim homeland from the Hindu enemy. Though Pakistan had never been a nation in the past and had inauthentic and tenuous links to the , the influence of British martial race rhetoric glorified and confirmed their perceptions of identity as glorious Islamic warriors. The accession of Kashmir to India invoked the call of ‘Islam in danger’ and the official and unofficial involvement of the Army. Elements of the Army supported and were involved with eclectic bands of and tribal Lashkars bent on taking Kashmir back from India. This section of the chapter now examines the impact of the Kashmir War on the Officer Corps.

Kashmir, Islam and the foundations of Pakistani Strategic Culture

Kashmir provided the grounds for further myth making in the tale of a battle in which the former British Indian Officers, newly commissioned Officers and Officers

289 OIOC IOR L/WS/1/1608 – Articles on India, Pakistan written by ex-I.A. Officers and British Army Officers and vetting of articles on India and Pakistan. 290 Maj. General Sher Ali Pataudi, The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan, Syed Mobin Mahmud & Co., Lahore, 1988, p. 36. 291Major General Loftus-Tottenham the Commander of the Pakistan Army 7 Division publically quoted his belief in the unique martial qualities of Pakistani troops in 1951. LHCMA, LH15/5/425, Telegraph Newspaper, London, 15 January 1951, while Devereux made his decision to stay on in Pakistan because he believed that commanding a regiment composed of Punjabi Mussulmans was the equivalent of an R.H.A. Regiment in British Service. LHCMA – Devereux Papers ACC.197, ‘My tour with the Pakistan Army, p.1. 80

in training became thoroughly immersed in a war in which ‘Islam in danger’ was the rallying cry and cast all into a conflict overlaid with religious themes.

The tribulations of partition had amplified the divide between Muslim and Hindu on which the entire premise of the two-nation theory on which the basis of Pakistan had been created. The signing of the instrument of accession by the Maharajah of Kashmir confirmed the new Pakistani Officers views of the abject treachery on India’s part in securing the Muslim majority state for the Indian Union. The accession was bitterly argued by the Pakistanis who denounced India’s perfidy and Mountbatten and his Hindu clique’s bias. Officers also lamented the failure of Gracey to commit the meagre though available resources of the Pakistan Army into the conflict in its early stages. All of these factors contributed to a narrative of Hindu oppression, perfidy and lost opportunities in which Pakistan should have acquired Kashmir. It also served as a useful motif for consolidating the Army’s identity with the Hindu enemy defining the Muslim nature of the Pakistan Army.

The Indian view of their military action as the result of a request by the Maharajah to save Kashmir from the predations of the marauding raiders was not accepted by Pakistan who saw the matter as a hegemonic Indian denial of Muslim self-determination. Sources amply record that the tribal raiders did commit egregious predations, including: rape, murder, looting, and forced religious conversions. 292 The infamy of the raider’s actions was of such magnitude to inspire contemporaneous fiction. H.E. Bates the author who had visited India during the 1940s, and possibly influenced by British Indian Army military stereotypes of martial race of the time, infused his tale with martial race myth and racial categorisation that would have been familiar to the British trained Pakistan Army Officers of the time,

Pathans were not like the people of Bengal: to be crushed by famine and overbreeding and the wretchedness filth … they were a mountain warrior people, proud, loving blood, thriving on war… 293

292 See for instance OIOC IOR MSS EUR C 705 – A 1947 Tragedy of Jammu and Kashmir State: The Cleansing of Mirpur by Amar Devi Gupta (Retired Headmistress). Ms Gupta a former headmistress at Muzzafarabad relates how Pathan raiders robbed, raped and murdered Hindu and Kashmiri Muslims alike. 293 H.E. Bates, The Scarlett Sword, Cassell Military Paperbacks (Evensford Productions, London [1950]), p. 7. 81

What this section of the chapter will briefly make evident is that irrespective of the ultimate argument concerning the accession of Kashmir to India is the enduring influence that the accession had upon this first generation of Pakistani Officers. The manner that India obtained Kashmir as well as the alleged subjection of a Muslim majority area to Hindu India from this point became a core element of Pakistan Army strategic culture in which Islam was pitted against Hinduism. The narrative by army Officers maintains that a vengeful Hindu India—thwarted by its designs of a unified subcontinent by the creation of Pakistan—undertook to dismantle, diminish and de- legitimise Pakistan’s existence until it was absorbed back into the fold of India.

The Indians argue that it was inconceivable that the atrocities committed by the tribesmen were not organised from the beginning by the Pakistan Army.

Indian participants rebutted the entire notion of a spontaneous uprising of tribesmen in the call to Jihad as some Pakistanis claimed,

...the enemy was no ill-organised rabble nor was he like the tribesmen of the Northwest frontier of pre-partition days. These raiders were led by regular army officers conversant with tactics and they were equipped with modern weapons like machine guns and mortars. 294

The Indians claimed there was also reliable intelligence that a British Officer transferred to Pakistan assisted the tribesmen, a claim that in the instance of the Skellon and Milne matters examined later in this chapter were not without some merit. 295

Pakistanis counterclaim that the tribes responded because of the massacre of Muslims in Kashmir. Significantly, in religious terms, Pakistani Army Officers understood the situation of Kashmir explicitly as one of ‘Islam being in danger’ from the Hindu Indians. 296 ‘Islam in danger’ in Kashmir became a rallying cry acquired by

294 Maj. General S.K. Sinha, Operation Rescue – Military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977 (originally penned in 1955), p. 21. 295 Maj. General S.K. Sinha, Operation Rescue – Military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977 [1955], p. 18. 296 Maj. General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, p. 96 & in regard to the notion of ‘Islam in danger’, chapters three and four discussing Pathan tribal custom on rebellion in the name of Islam, in Alan Warren, Waziristan – The Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army the North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000. 82

the Pakistan Army. The notion of ‘Islam in danger’ was probably familiar in its tribal context to Officers who came from Pakhtun backgrounds. Tribal Jihad involved remarkable coordination and assurances of good will between tribes that they would not commit predations on each other while the other was engaged in the Jihad.297 Captured communications between Mullahs in previous conflicts had illustrated this level of goodwill, as well as realistic appraisals of their ability to inflict defeat. Tribal Mullahs would urge Jihad to the best of their ability and resources reasoning this would be enough on their day of judgement. 298 The powerful unifying aspects of the Jihad on this basis drew from a tradition of Southwest Asian Muslim resistance where, “religion was used to define the enemy”. 299

Numberous Pakistani Officers of this generation note how they participated, or knew of others who had participated, with tribal Lashkars in the invasion of Kashmir. Officers justified their break from professional training and involvement in the Jihad specifically in terms of ‘Islam in danger’. The response to ‘Islam in danger’ entailed a religious obligation of Jihad against a Hindu aggressor believed to be guilty of atrocities upon the Muslim population. 300 Tribal Jirgas of the Afridi and Mohmands had initially and unsuccessfully sought the permission of Sir George Cunningham, the Governor of the North West Frontier Province in late October 1947, to go to the assistance of their brethren in Kashmir.301

297 Colonel H.D.Hutchinson, The Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898: An Account of the Expedition Against the Orakzais and Afridis, MacMillan and Co., London, 1898, pp.152-153. 298 Colonel H.D.Hutchinson, The Campaign in Tirah, p.153. 299 Warren, Waziristan, p. 120. Ahmed’s anthropological study of Waziristan including the role of Jihad and mysticism is illustrative as well. Akbar S.Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and conflict in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 94-99. 300 “The belief that Islam is under threat politically and/or religiously is shared by different Islamic movements and scholars across various Muslim countries”, in Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the ‘Threat to Islam: Al-Wala’Wa Al-Bara’, in Salafi Discourse,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, Fall 2008, p. 4. & a number of scholars have placed the concept of ‘Islam in danger’ as central to the formation of Pakistan, Sayeed argued in 1963 that even Jinnah with all his brilliance could not have achieved Pakistan without the two cries, “Islam in danger!” and “Pakistan an Islamic State!”, Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, in South Asian Politics and Religion, (Ed) Donald Eugene Smith, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, p. 412. 301 OIOC IOR L/WS/1/747 – British High Commission, Political Movements within the State, dated 28 November 1947. 83

Their leaders, both religious and secular, were unanimous in their belief that it was their duty to go to the help of their brethren in the Punjab and Kashmir Jihad or holy war was being discussed in every hujra and Jirga.302

The first generation of Officers being trained at the PMA, which was not officially opened until November 1948, were also alert to the call of ‘Islam in danger’ and were eager to participate in the ‘Jihad’ in Kashmir. 303 Some went to Kashmir without the knowledge of the PMA staff and led tribal Lashkars.304 One notes that he and other Officers volunteered when it became apparent that the commitment of regular forces would not cause the Indians to spread the conflict into the Punjab. 305 Others went because they recognised that the Jihad of the tribesmen would not succeed without their skilled assistance.

Soon after the tribesmen invaded Kashmir it became imperative to have some control over them to defend effectively. To that end Pakistani officer volunteers were inducted immediately to take care of these Lashkar’s. This number kept increasing... 306

Islamic martial myths were important to the Army Officers who joined the Jihad. Religious and martial imagery are evident in accounts of the fighting in Kashmir during 1947 and 1948. Akbar Khan’s account of leading tribal Lashkars under the nom de guerre General Tariq, the famous Moorish invader, were evidence of the importance of connecting such heroic Islamic myth to the exploits of the new Muslim Officers of the Pakistan Army. Hafeez Jullundhri who was to become the national poet of Pakistan during this period was also wounded in Kashmir and would write the heroic lyrics to the Pakistan National Anthem. Religious and martial symbolisms in this first generation of Pakistani Officers are imbued with the myth of Muslim exceptionalism as Ghazis defending and overcoming the enemies of the faith.

302 Maj. General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxfo rd University Press, Karachi, 1963, p. 88. 303 Maj. General Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 11. 304 Interview of Major General Naseerullah Khan Babar, in, ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Babar the great’, in Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal, (Ed) Defence Journal, April 2001, Vol. 4 No. 9, Karachi, 2001, p. 9. 305 Brigadier S. Haider Abbas Rizvi, Veteran Campaigners – A History of the Punjab Regiment 1759- 1981, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1984, p. 121. 306 Interview of Maj.General Wajahat Hussain, in, ‘Remembering our Warriors’, Ikhram Seghal (Ed), Pakistan Defence Journal, August, 2002. 84

…the spectacle before us was like a page out of old history. Memory flashed back many centuries. This is what it might have been like when our forefathers had poured in through the mountain passes of the Frontier … men of all ages, grey beards to teenagers good to look at and awe inspiring … these men had come to fight, in their blood ran the memory of centuries of invasions and adventure … above the rumble and din could be heard a chorus of war songs … ahead lay glory.307

Akbar’s glory though was short lived as the Indian Army repulsed the mixed force of tribesmen and soldiers both by virtue of their organisation and the tribesmen’s penchant for ‘male-e-ghanimat’ (booty).308 The significance of Akbar’s account as well as the less florid accounts of others is important in their emphasis on the joint tribulations and camaraderie experienced by these fellow Muslim Officers in the new Army of a new country with no historical antecedents.

It was a formative experience at the very beginning of these Officers’ army careers, and it encouraged a number of them such as Hakeem Qureshi who had assisted the Mujahideen, to join the Army and continue the fight against India. 309 Veteran Officers such as Akbar and Officer Cadets alike engaged in a Jihad against the perceived threat of a Hindu India bent on denying Pakistan its birthright. The excitement apparent at the beginning of many conflicts played a part, but equally the experiences of the Jihad in Kashmir made lasting impressions on these Officers’ individual and group identity. This was especially so for those Officer Cadets and newly commissioned Officers whose first experience of combat would be against India in a conflict infused with religious overtones.

The Jihad in Kashmir tied with the communal and religious violence that had occurred during partition became infused with powerful elements of religion, historical experience and myth that contributed to the creation of an identity for the Pakistan Army and foundation of the Army’s strategic culture. Defending Pakistan for the Army became synonymous not with any concept of a constitution or political

307 Maj. General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970, pp. 34-36, corroborated in part by Wajahat Hussain upon Akbar adopting the nom de guerre of the Muslim conqueror of Spain ‘Tariq’, Interview of Maj. General Wajahat Hussain, in ‘Remembering our Warriors’, Ikhram Seghal (Ed), Pakistan Defence Journal, August, 2002. 308 Maj. Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 191. 309 Maj. Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 246. 85

ideology but explicitly in terms of defending Islam, and the loss of Kashmir tempered by the heroism of the Jihadi tribesmen and their Pakistan Army brethren, was established as the key element of the fledgling Army’s strategic culture.

The overarching centrality of Islam to the older and new generation of Officers was apparent with ‘Islam in danger’ inspiring these Officers to place in abeyance their professional military precepts. ‘Islam in danger’ called on the new Army Officer’s to respond in a manner inimical to their inherited traditions and training received in the British Indian Army, with the psychological impact of combat tied with the religious aspects of combat profoundly influencing this generation of Officers.310 The fears of the loss of Kashmir to India galvanised Officers such as the Sandhurst trained Akbar as well as others to join and lead tribal Lashkars in an unconventional religiously inspired war against India.

The unconventional nature of this war was also evident in how senior members of the Pakistan Army, Police and Air Force—all still under British Commanders—were able to covertly provide supplies and assistance to the tribal Lashkars without the British being alerted. 311 Another significant aspect of the plan to take Kashmir was through the use of former Muslim Officers and other ranks of the disgraced Indian National Army (INA). The INA though never more than 30 000 in strength predominantly from captured British Indian Army soldiers in Malaya during the war, had included a female combat unit and civilians recruited in Malalya, Burma and believed they would have inspired a spontaneous uprising upon their entry into India with the Japanese. 312

The INA’s importance though had been inflated due to nationalistic overtones involved in trying INA officers after the war.313 These soldiers, though discredited in the eyes of the British, Pakistan Army Officers and their former Japanese allies were

310 On the existential transformation from experiencing combat, see Rune Henriksen, ‘Warriors in combat – what makes people actively fight in combat?, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30 No. 2, April 2007, pp. 188-189. 311 Maj. General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970, p. 19. 312 Leonard A.Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists, Sarat & Subhas Chandra Bose, Rupa & Co., Calcutta, 1997, pp.497-498. 313Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes,p.237. The INA led ideologically by Subhas Chandra Bose, see Peter Fay Ward, The Forgotten Army – India’s Armed Struggle for Independence 1942-1945, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1993. 86

sympathetically viewed by other Officers. 314 De-mobbed INA Officers also operated during partition on both sides with the effectiveness of the Sikh Jatha’s being attributed to their command by former Sikh INA Officers Mohan Singh and Naranjan Singh Gill. 315 The former INA Officers proved a boon to the Lashkars with former senior INA Officers such as Major General Kiani a veteran of both pre-War North West Frontier Operations as well as during the Second World War involved in the operation.316

Kiani claimed that Jinnah had wanted the former INA officers inducted intot he Army but that opposition from the British, some Muslim Leaguers as well as senior Pakistani Officers prevented this.317 Such efforts to escape attention from their commanding British Officers in planning flagrant breaches of command, arguably illustrates the overarching belief in the religious imperatives of these Muslim Officers responding to the call of ‘Islam in danger’. These Officers wilfully subverted their accumulated British Indian Military heritage of discipline and response to command to react to this religious imperative.

There was also a strategic territorial imperative in wishing to obtain Kashmir by any means necessary but it was the religious call of Islam in danger that motivated these Muslims. The call to Jihad saw serving Pakistani Officers act jointly with disgraced INA Officers, deserters, entire units of forces—such as the three hundred men of the of Swat’s Army—and even adventurers sympathetic to Pakistan’s cause, such as the case of a former American serviceman who allegedly led a Lashkar of eight thousand tribals.318

314 Maj. General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970, p. 1 & Captain J.W. Pennington, Pick up your Parrots and Monkeys and fall in facing the Boat, Cassell, London, 2003, p. 359. The Japanese were dismissive of the INA militarily and questioned their value as turncoats as a number of INA officers did desert back to the British when provided an opportunity which had infuriated Bose. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p.515. Slim noted that he had to provide orders to allow INA soldiers to surrender as Indian and Gurkha troops were not disposed to allow them to surrender. Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory, P.289. 315Swarna Aiyar, ‘August Anarchy’, p.30. 316 JRUL AUC/1231 & AUC/1232, Correspondence between Lady Edwina Mountbatten and Field Marshal Auchinleck on pleadings of former INA Officer Kiani to return to service in British Indian A rmy. 317Mohammad Zaman Kiani, Memoris of Major General Mohammad Kiani, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994, pp.204-209 & p.xv. 318 Maj. General Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970, p. 72 & p. 58 & Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence – America’s role in Kashmir, The Brookings 87

A British Officer was also arrested in Rawalpindi and suspected by the British of leading Pakistani troops in Kashmir. 319 The arrested Officer had threatened to reveal the alleged involvement of other British Officers in Kashmir including the bombardment of Indian positions on behalf of Azad Kashmir forces by a British Officer. 320 As noted, some British Officers were strongly attached to their units and may have been involved out of solidarity with the new Army. Though the British Officers had clear instructions not to participate in the hostilities they were permitted in the early period of the conflict to undertake what was perhaps euphemistically described as ‘administrative visits’ to the conflict area.321

British observers of the conflict prior to approved Pakistan Army involvement in May 1948 noted evidence of assistance being provided to the invading tribesmen by official Pakistani sources.322 Others, while noting the apparent official assistance from unknown official parties, had noted the less than pious aspects of the liberating tribesmen. One observed tribesmen transporting loot of all descriptions, including abducted Hindu women, an observation supported by a British journalist reporting from Kashmir at the time. 323

The official commitment of Pakistani forces was finally approved in May 1948 by Gracey after what he perceived was the dangerous proximity of Indian forces advancing towards the -West Punjab border.324

Conclusion

This chapter examined the first four years of the Pakistan Army from its formation in 1947 under the command of its first two British Commanders in Chief

Institution, USA, 2009, p. 21 & a photograph of Haight appearing in uniform wearing a ‘Pagri in Life Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 7, February 16, 1948, p. 42. 319 OIOC IOR L/PJ/7/13851 – Captain Skellon I.E.M.E. Arrest at Rawalpindi and the matter of Col. Milne Pakistan Artillery. 320 OIOC IOR L/PJ/7/13851 – Captain Skellon. 321 LHCMA – Devereux Papers ACC.197, ‘My tour with the Pakistan Army. Devereux commanded 3 SP Regiment Royal Pakistan Artillery, p. 6. 322 OIOC IOR L/WS/1/747 – British High Commission, Political Movements within the State, dated 28 November 1947. 323 Lt. Colonel Patric Emerson, OBE, conversation, Saturday 20 February 2010, London. (Lt. Colonel Emerson was at the border to make these observations) & Sydney Smith, ‘Ten Days of Terror’, Daily Express, 11 November 1947, (Smith noted the Pathans hunting for women while in captivity at Barramula). 324 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir – A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1992, p. 162. 88

until January 1951. The chapter explored and analysed the impact of the partition of British India on the newly independent ’s Army Officers. This chapter illustrated how the searing impact of partition felt by all involved, had created particular beliefs in the new Pakistan Army Officers. These Officers who had served with Sikhs and Hindus experienced epiphany like situations arising out of the horrors of partition that reinvigorated their sense of Islamic identity.

The chapter also argued those British Officers who undertook service in the Pakistan Army, including their Commanders, were thoroughly imbued with beliefs in martial race. General Douglas Gracey and Major-General Loftus-Tottenham were argued as indicative of these beliefs. The chapter argued that these senior and influential Officers’ views on martial race would have received a receptive audience in an Officer Corps consisting of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who had been generationally feted as superior soldiers. The impact of partition together with the perpetuation of beliefs in martial race was then joined by the impact of the 1947–48 Kashmir War. ‘Islam in danger’ was noted in the chapter as a cry to the faithful to join battle against the Indians in Kashmir. The convergence of these three elements established a Pakistan Army strategic culture derived from shared tribulations, disaster and the unitary call to Islam. The next chapter examines the period 1951 to 1958 and the assumption of command of the Army’s first indigenous Army Commander in Chief. The chapter considers how domestic and international politics impacted on the role of the Army, as well as the persistence in British Indian Army culture, the impact of American aid and how the Army was evolving more indigenous and Islamic concepts.

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Chapter III Independence and Evolution: 1951–1958

After nearly two hundred years a Muslim army in the sub-continent would have a Muslim Commander- in-Chief.

(General Mohammed Ayub Khan – first Pakistani C-in-C of Pakistan Army)325

Introduction

Mohammed Ayub Khan who had been a Colonel in the British Indian Army barely six years previously was appointed as Pakistan’s first indigenous Commander in Chief of the Army on 17 January 1951.

Pakistan was still in a parlous state of development when Khan succeeded Sir Douglas Gracey as Pakistan’s first Commander in Chief of the Army. Jinnah had died barely after the new state had begun while Liaquat was assassinated in 1951. The death of Liaquat who was possibly the second most highly regarded political figure after that of Jinnah left Pakistan’s political future in the hands of a number of Muslim League veterans whose rule up until 1958 would be characterised by fragile and fleeting tenures of government. Though a number of these politicians had been leaders in their own right prior to partition, they lacked the political gravitas of Jinnah and Liaquat.

This chapter begins with a historical overview of the period 1951 to 1958 from Ayub’s appointment to the Army coup that installed him as leader of Pakistan. This chapter consists of three sections, which examine the impact and place of Islam on the Army during this period. This will be achieved firstly through an examination of the impact of domestic and international politics globally and within the Islamic World on Pakistan. This is important as the Army would become the pre-eminent institution and drive domestic political discussion on defence, which had become thoroughly infused with religious themes due to the recent war with India. Additionally, the Army’s Islamic and martial race nature became a mechanism by which the Army sought to gain valuable materiel and support from the Americans who were interested in Pakistan as a Cold War ally. Secondly, an examination of

325 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p. 35. 91

Army culture considers the persistence of British influence on the Army, as well as the impact of increasing American political courting of Pakistan. Lastly, institutional development of the Army in regard to structure, training and Islamic symbolism is considered in light of British, American and indigenous influences. The conclusion considers the evolution of the Army over this period of time and how Islam had at this point become an important identity factor to those in the Army. The chapter notes the contradictions and paradoxes of those wishing to induct more of an Islamic and indigenous ethos into the Army while others in the Army still closely mimicked British habits and social mores unacceptable to Islam.

Throughout the period of this chapter Pakistan and India engaged in continual mutual recrimination, intransigence and general hostility on issues such as Kashmir, the Indus water dispute, and unresolved evacuee and refugee matters. India, for instance, attacked Pakistani treatment of the Hindu minority in East Pakistan, while there were also continuing border clashes, attacks and demonstrations against respective diplomatic facilities. 326 Pakistan attempted to leverage UN support during the period by noting that Pakistan could not contribute armed forces personnel for UN service so long as the Kashmir impasse continued. During the course of 1953 martial law was promulgated in Lahore due to anti-Ahmediya agitation throughout the city with the Jamaat-i-Islami leader Maulana Abul Ala Maududi initially sentenced to death.327 The belief that India was not reconciled to the independence of Pakistan was revisited and publicly broadcast repeatedly. At a speech in Abbotobad in May 1953 Governor General Ghulam Mohammed stated that relations with India would only improve when India ceased its opposition to Pakistani sovereignty and independence.328

October 1953 also saw new impetus to shape the Islamic nature of the country with a decision that the head of state would be a Muslim and the country should be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The constituent assembly decided that no law repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah would be legislated, provoking Nehru to label

326Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence, Verinder Grover & Ranjana Arora (Eds), Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1997 p.30. 327Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence, p.32. 328Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence p. 32. 92

these developments as mediaeval.329 In 1954 Pakistan joined the SEATO Pact and a defence agreement with the US. In 1955 Pakistan took its first step in pursuing atomic energy with the constitution of the atomic energy expert committee and entered the in July. Pakistan’s regional security problems continued with the sacking of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul and consulate in . Pakistan and India were even more intransigently opposed when Marshal Bulganin announced Soviet recognition of Kashmir as constituting a part of India.

Hostilities with India continued throughout 1956 with alleged violations by India occurring in the Rann of Kutch. Protest days were organised in Pakistan protesting the alleged persecution of Muslims in India, and nationwide protests against Israel and the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. Nationally, Pakistan concluded its constituent assembly with the proclamation of the 1956 Constitution and Pakistan being proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.330

Pakistan requested the security council discuss Kashmir in January 1957 as well as Prime Minister Suhrawardy warning of Kashmir’s propensity to escalate into a nuclear war, while Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali warned of the dangers of too much dependence on the US. Clashes and hostility with India continued into 1958 with border clashes occurring in June. Pakistan acquired the territory of Gwadar on the Maccran coastline from the Sultan of and in September 1958. On 7 October 1958 Major General the Governor General declared martial law, dissolved central and provincial cabinets, abrogated the Constitution, banned all political parties and appointed General Mohammed Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. The first section of this chapter addresses the impact of domestic, international and Muslim world politics on Pakistan and its ramifications for the Army. As the contextual background has illustrated the domestic and international affairs of Pakistan were thoroughly immersed in the politics of religion and continuing hostility with India. The Army had vital interests and stakes in these politically significant matters infused with religious themes.

329Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence p. 34. 330Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence, pp.44-45. 93

The Impact of Domestic, International politics and Islam on the Army

In domestic politics the demise of Jinnah and Liaquat so early in the establishment of the political culture of the new state was disastrous to the legitimacy of the political class, as those political figures that came after them took nine years to provide a constitution. This was in comparison to India, which achieved a constitution in 1950 and had not experienced the tumult of unstable governments that Pakistan experienced during the same period. Soon the door was opened to other political voices in Pakistan whose voices had been earlier muted by the dominance of Jinnah. The issue of Islam and its relationship to the identity of Pakistan became a contested issue. Muslim groups in these years saw their chance and their prospects of attaining an Islamic state best served by democracy.331 Previously quiescent or ambivalent Muslim groups now had inklings of a greater role in the new state.

Jinnah and other Muslim League leaders had used Islam as a motivating force to rally Muslims to the cause of Pakistan. The state the league was committed to create would be secular not theocratic, as Jinnah was determined to make Pakistan a constitutional democracy, with democratic control over government bureaucracy and military. 332 Despite the democratic and secular visions of the new state the fact was that Pakistan, together with Israel, would be one of only two modern states to derive their basis on their adherence to one religion.

The tension between the perspectives adhered to by those who tended towards the arguably more secular and Westernised ideals of Jinnah and Liaquat and those of the religious leaders became more pronounced with the departure of these two commanding figures. For instance, the East Pakistani Khwaja Nazimuddin, who became prime minister, was critical of Western ways, though like other Pakistani elites was not able to articulate what Pakistan would be.333 Political figures with more

331 Safir Akhtar, ‘Pakistan Since Independence: The Political Role of the Ulama’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of York, Department of Politics, May 1989, pp. 168-169. Akhtar explores the role of the Ulama at this time and notes that there was indeed considerable objection to the of 1940. 332 Mohamed Nawab bin Mohammed Osman, ‘The Ulama in Pakistani Politics’, in, ‘South Asia – Journal of South Asian Studies’, Volume XXX11, Number 2, August 2009, p. 232. 333 Ian Stephens, ‘Horned Moon – An account of a Journey through Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan’, Chatto & Windus, London, 1954, p. 64. 94

pronounced religious inclinations such as Sir Zafrullah Khan noted for his erudite pleas for Palestine, and other Muslim causes were amongst those seeking to attach the identity of the new state to its Muslim heritage. Paradoxically, Zafrullah would be cast as an unbeliever and be virulently denounced by the Ahrars, Jama’t i-Islami and other conservative Islamic sects that instigated martial law in 1953 through their rioting.

The agitation in 1953 against the Ahmadis would be by far the most serious religious disturbances in the country and one that illustrated the frailty of Jinnah’s dream of a Muslim homeland tolerant of its minorities and religious and ethnic diversity. The report on the anti-Ahmadi riots commonly referred to as the ‘Munir Report’ clearly identified a number of theological fissures the country had to reconcile. The definition of a Muslim failed to be agreed upon and was contested. 334 These intra-Muslim fissures though seemingly dormant at first with and Barelvi streams of South Asian Islam working together, succumbed to sometimes minor theological differences.335 Furthermore, secularly minded Pakistanis maintained an ‘indignant contempt for mullahs’ and did not desire a greater infusion of Islam into the country or government agencies. 336 The tensions between the secular and religious also overlapped and encompassed the ethnic and provincial tensions in the new state that had historically never constituted a state.

In his address upon the proposal of consolidating the four provinces of West Pakistan into the East Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali labelled the fissiparous tendencies the ‘venom of provincialism’.337 Bogra highlighted the danger to the integrity of the state if people did not overcome thinking of themselves as Punjabis, Sindhis or Bengalis but rather as Muslims first and then Pakistanis, which would result in the disintegration of Pakistan.338 These messages upon the possible disintegration of Pakistan were intolerable to the Army dedicated to

334 Report of the Court of Enquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953, Lahore, printed by the Superintendent of Government Printing Punjab 1954. 335 Akhtar, ‘Pakistan Since Independence, p. 235. 336Ian Stephens, Horned Moon, Op.Cit., pp. 96-97, the example Stephens cites is a Muslim ‘Muhajir’ refugee originally from Patiala. 337 ‘One Unit’ refers to the merging of the four West Pakistani provinces into one province. One aspect of one unit was to arguably offset the Bengali majority from the province of East Pakistan. 338 Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra’s address on proposal of one unit on in 1953, in, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_Nb_s9sojY&feature=related, accessed 31 May 2012.

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maintaining the structural integrity of the state. While Islam was being promoted as the unifying element of identity, to many Bengalis, Baluchis and Pushtuns it was a secondary factor to their ethnic, linguistic, tribal and clan loyalty and many were dissatisfied with Punjabi domination of the government and military. 339 The entire notion of ‘one God’, ‘one Prophet’, ‘one Pakistan’, and ‘one language’ was proving problematic to the new nation as a unifying feature of the nation in the wake of deaths during the language riots in East Pakistan in 1952 and the Ahmadiyya riots in 1953 where issues of language, ethnicity and even who was a Muslim were driving the population apart.340

The Army understood itself as the only body capable of maintaining internal order and cohesion due largely to its homogeneous culture that maintained its own vision of national unity. The Army believed from the experiences of partition and the 1948 War in Kashmir that Islam was central to the identity and motivation of the Army. Islam was also central to the Army’s religious and nationalist vision of Pakistan, though the Army was not representative of the major ethnic groups of the new nation.

During government debates between 1952–54 defence and the capability of the Army to defend the country were successfully projected as the priority of the nation by the Army. The Army’s ability to control this debate became paramount with Ayub the Army Commander in Chief having his tenure renewed as well as being concurrently awarded the duties of Minister of Defence.341 In all except for two occasions, when an East Pakistani recommended the idea of martial races be discarded, the entire defence policy formulation process promoted by the Army was not questioned by members of the constituent assembly.342

Because the narrative focused on the fear of India and as the Army was the physical manifestation of protecting the Muslim homeland members did not question the defence policy. Everyone it seemed recalled the tribulations of partition and the

339 Michael B. Bishku, ‘In Search of Identity and Security: Pakistan and the Middle East, 1947-77, The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 30-31. 340 K.M. Arif, Khaki Shadows Pakistan 1947-1997, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001, p. 96 & Mussarat Jabeen, Amir Ali Chandio & Zarina Qasim, ‘Language Controversy: Impacts on National Politics and Secession of East Pakistan’, South Asian Studies, Vo l. 25, No. 1, January-June 2010. 341 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Defence Policy, 1947-58’, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1998, p. 126. 342 Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Defence Policy’, pp. 126-127. 96

1947–48 War. The Army was appearing to promote a proposition as truth that there was a confrontation of ideologies in the religious sense between the Army defending an Islamic Pakistan and the threat from Hindu India.

This belief by the Army and political elites was accepted as part of the strategic culture they inherited as the price of partition. Increasingly the Army believed itself the only guarantor of this security. With no opposition from the constituent assembly the Army also believed itself the only professional service free of the miasma of political corruption that the Army believed would ultimately cause Pakistan to fail. This perspective took root in the Army with Officers lamenting the bribery and corruption that had become rife upon the departure of the British. Though successive governments were not given the chance to work through the cycle of these problems inherent of a fledgling political environment, the Army believed themselves to be the solution. 343

Ayub the Commander in Chief of the Army, Minister of Defence and favourite of the Americans viewed the continuous political upheavals and changes of government as an unmitigated disaster. Ayub’s views were shared by his American sponsors anxious to secure Pakistan’s place in the US arsenal of Cold War allies. 344

Internationally, Pakistan worked towards establishing its Islamic credentials in the Muslim world and identifying with Muslim causes. 345

343 Shafaat Ali, ‘Memoirs of Colonel Shafaat Ali’, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2007, pp. 177-183 & NAM 7203-33-6, Pakistan Diary Vol.1 by C.J.W., pp. 47-48. 344 Roving Report: Ayub Khan (1)’, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iPtL0jgC0o&feature=related, accessed on 30 August 2012. Ayub Khan talks of the corruption endemic in the country prior to the coup & U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume VIII, (hereafter USDOS), Document 224, Letter from the Ambassador (Langley) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Rountree), Karachi, December 27, 1957. 345 Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, p. 162. 97

Liaquat Ali Khan though seemingly more secular minded as one of the elites of the Muslim League had stated in 1951 that,

To us in Pakistan nothing is dearer than the prospect of the strengthening of the world-wide Muslim brotherhood … part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself [is] to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and co-operation between Muslim countries.346

Between 1947 and 1954 Pakistan worked to consolidate its credentials in this regard by hosting conferences attended by other Muslim majority states. 347 Pakistan also sided with Muslim causes such as Tunisia in her dispute with France, condemned Israeli aggression between 1951 and 1953, as well as receiving military goodwill missions from other Muslim countries such as Turkey, and Egypt. 348 Pakistan was thoroughly immersing itself in pan-Islamic political and cultural interests.

Pakistan’s pretension at becoming a leader amongst other emerging or newly independent Muslim states was not always validated. King Farouq reportedly ridiculed Pakistan’s Islamic pretentions, while other Muslim nationalist leaders from Egypt and publically stated that they preferred to look to India, which also had a large Muslim population for nationalist support.349

The Suez Crisis in 1956 resulted in Pakistan experiencing the largest demonstrations since partition protesting the actions of Britain (Pakistan’s Baghdad pact ally) and France. Crowds attacked British and French ffices in both wings of the country in support of their Muslim brethren. 350 The most acrimonious international relations for Pakistan during the period though was reserved for its eastern and western neighbours, one Muslim and one from Pakistan’s perspective as Hindu.

In 1951 Pakistan countered Indian allegations of Pakistani violations of the cease fire line and accusations that Pakistan was propagating Jihadist propaganda by

346 Government handout, E.No.484, 9 February 1951 as quoted in S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1974, p. 116. 347 Pakistan hosted the first International Islamic Economic Conference in 1949, again in 1954 as well as the third and fourth sessions of the World Islamic Conferences in Karachi in 1949 and 1951, noted in Bishku, ‘In Search of Identity and Security’, p. 35. 348 ‘Chronology of Pakistan 1947-1957’, Kamel Publications, Karachi, 1957. 349 S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy – An Historical Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 66 & Bishku, ‘In Search of Identity and Security’, p. 35. 350 Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 185-188. 98

arguing this was an Indian excuse to justify moving troops near the Pakistan border.351 In June, July and October 1951 troop concentrations and tensions with India had nearly resulted in war.352 These international political relations with India confirmed numerous Army Officer’s beliefs of India’s enduring hostility and enmity for Islam. Seen as yet more proof of Indian attempts to extinguish Pakistan was the alleged Indian conniving with Afghanistan to create simultaneous border incidents. Fears of the Indian influence on Afghanistan contributed to the foundations of the two front fears of the Pakistan Army and the search for options to alleviate this threat.353 Pakistan perceived itself wedged between a hostile Afghanistan allied to India’s grand designs in the West and India itself in the East.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan featured almost continuous hostility due to Afghanistan’s irredentist claims to much of the North West Frontier Province. Afghanistan claimed large portions of Pakistani territory with significant trans-border populations of Pakhtun tribes. This territory that Britain had excised from Afghanistan was a primary source of Afghan hostility towards Pakistan.354 In Pakistan’s view India promoted this irredentism in a politically explicit and manifestly antagonistic manner. From the Pakistani perspective this meant that India would commit to any length in which to extinguish or in this case abet the seizure of those Afghan contested portions of Pakistani territory.355

The security concerns on its eastern and western borders fed Pakistan’s search for security while igniting greater attention to forging an identity that would establish cultural themes and traits distinct from their existential enemy: India. Islam could clearly perform this role in regard to India but was problematic in regard to Afghanistan.

351 Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963, p. 130. 352 Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, p. 132. 353 Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army, p. 133. 354 See ‘Pathanistan’ as promoted to an American in Afghanistan during the mid-1950s, in Edward Hunter, An account of life in Afghanistan to-day; The Past Present, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959, p. 21 & pp. 342-347. 355 Chronology of Pakistan 1947-1957, Kamel Publications, Karachi, 1957, notes in June 1951 Pakistan protested to India for allowing Sardar Najibullah Khan to make an anti-Pakistan speech on All-India Radio, p. 71. 99

Pakistan had sought British assistance in arms provision to effectively establish all branches of its military, as Pakistan had consistently argued despite contrary Indian arguments that they had not received their full share of military stores at partition. 356 British Cabinet submissions—though noting that Pakistan had been unfairly treated in the provision of arms, and though amenable to Pakistani requests— were wary that Pakistan and India would use any weapons supplied to them against each other.357 The British tread carefully as they desired the economic opportunities that relations with Pakistan and India would provide in the economically bleak 1950s. Cold War realities also meant the British desired the military support of both nations against communism. Britain was able to provide some supplies of materiel though it was in no way comparable to that the US could provide with its surplus.

In the early 1950s Pakistan’s search for security would overlap with the US’s search for Cold War allies in South Asia. The Americans lauded the martial character and religious piety of the Pakistan Army. The American plaudits arguably acted as another validation to the Pakistani Officers’ views of their inherent martial superiority, inculcated by the British and intrinsically linked to Islam.

Admiral Radford, the US Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, visited Pakistan in 1952 and believed Pakistan important for US Cold War strategic interests with its location close to Soviet Central Asia as well as communist China. 358 US Republican minority leader William Knowland echoed Radford’s sentiments that Pakistan is on par with Turkey, while he attacked India’s neutrality.359 The Army had also made a positive impression in regard to their apparent mix of British Regimental military efficiency and Islamic martial traditions. Radford stated that Pakistan possessed, “a trained armed force which no other friendly power can match, not even the Turks”.360

356 Liaquat Ali Khan had written to Attlee for help in meeting Pakistan’s urgent defence requirements in August 1951, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) CAB/129/49, Secret, C (52) 50, 20th February, 1952, Cabinet, Supply of Arms to India and Pakistan, Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. 357 PRO, CAB/129/49, Supply of Arms. 358 James W. Spain, ‘Military Assistance for Pakistan’, ‘The American Political Science Review’, Vol. 48, No. 3 (September 1954), p. 738, & S.M. Burke, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy – An Historical Analysis’, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 152. 359 Burke, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’, p. 159 & Spain, ‘Military Assistance for Pakistan, p. 742. 360 Arthur Radford in, USDOS, Document 185, Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State – Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, January 14, 1955. 100

Such statements arguably resonated strongly with the Army indoctrinated on these same beliefs by their British training Officers.

The Americans courted the Pakistanis to secure a South Asian ally to help thwart what John Foster Dulles in 1952 had referred to as the ongoing offensive by communism. Dulles had stated that the US was just about ready to assist any power- resisting communism.361 The Americans understood their provision of weapons to Pakistan would offend India who believed the weapons would be used against them to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

The US did appreciate the propensity of the Pakistanis to use their weapons against India. Prior to the announcement of the US-Pakistan pact Eisenhower explicitly informed Nehru that the US pact was conditional on the weapons only being provided for a communist threat.362 Nehru though possibly aware of American Cold War motives in eulogising their allies abilities was still alarmed at the tone of American media hyperbole on arming a “gallant Pakistan Army of a million men to fight communism”, which the British sought to assuage in discussions with Nehru. 363 The USSR, China and Afghanistan were also critical of Pakistan being armed by the US with Afghanistan claiming the pact would turn Pakistan into a ‘colonial power’. 364

The Army’s promotion of its Islamic heritage was advantageous in this period of the Cold War where the struggle was sometimes presented as being one between the godless of communism and the free world. Islam was a valuable political tool for the Army at this point in time in securing valuable military aid. Fortuitously for the Pakistanis the Western view of Islam’s repugnance of communism coincided with Pakistani efforts to imbue Islam as the unifying ideology

361 John Foster Dulles interviewed by Henry Hazlitt and William Bradford Huie on, ‘Longines Chronoscope’, CBS Television, 1952, at, www.youtube.com/watch?v=swd9HXt1rUQ, accessed 7 June 2012. 362 Eisenhower informed Nehru of the US’s intentions to improve both Pakistani and Turkish defence capability as well as offering India a similar opportunity. Contained within, ‘Letter to Prime Minister Nehru of India Concerning U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan’, dated February 24, 1954, & ‘Statement by the President on Military Aid to Pakistan’, February 25, 1954, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1954, Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Service, Washington, 1960, pp. 284-286. 363 ‘Record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Prime Minister of India, Mr Nehru, on 16th November, 1953’, in, PRO CAB/129/64, Secret C.(53) 335, 27th November, 1953, Cabinet, Relations with India. 364 Spain, ‘Military Assistance for Pakistan’, pp. 740–741. 101

for their ethnically disparate country. Dulles, a devout Christian with an academic interest in religion, was impressed with the Pakistanis. On his return to the US Dulles delivered an address in which he stated his admiration for both the piety and martial vigour of the Pakistanis. 365

Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and the martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism. 366

Again such favourable statements were arguably not lost on the Officers of the Pakistan Army from yet another powerful American politician. Such statements arguably added to the establishment of the Army’s heroic self-image, where martial race heritage and Muslim exceptionalism continued to be accepted wisdom.

The American rhetoric on the Army’s superior attributes, whether legitimate or the excesses of diplomatic license, nevertheless provided a degree of comforting external validation to Officers already saturated in belief of their martial prowess. Rhetoric or not, the accolades coming from the great military superpower was welcomed by Ayub and the Officer Corps. Dulles additionally ought to emphasise the ideological ties between Pakistan and the US by referring to the strong religious faith of both countries making them opposed to communist atheism. 367

American declarations of Pakistan’s impeccable martial qualities had also been alluded to by Vice President Richard Nixon in his 1953 visit to South Asia. Nixon dismissed Indian complaints in his belief that Ayub Khan was more anti- communist than anti-Indian. 368 Nixon attributed Indian objections to Nehru’s own thirst for influence in the developing world. 369

The US was critical of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment compared to the willingness of the apparently martial Pakistanis. Views critical of Nehru were also

365 Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his times, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 117 & p. 120. 366 From text of speech delivered by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles upon his visit to the Middle East and South Asia, in ‘Text of Secretary Dulles Report on Near East Trip, in ‘New York Times’, Tuesday, June 2, 1953. Accessed by ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2008). 367 Burke, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’, pp. 161-162. 368 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1978, p. 133. 369 Nixon, The Memoirs, p. 132. 102

evident in the Truman administration where Nehru’s ‘holier than thou views’ and lecturing to the US on their policy in French Indo-China was intensely disliked. 370

Accolades about Pakistan’s Islamic martial propensity as a US partner in South Asia were widely reported and hardly able to be missed by the British trained and English newspaper reading Pakistani Officers. These views of a pious martial Pakistan, impervious to communism with an Army popularly promoted as a valiant Army of redoubtable Muslim soldiers were doubly useful. Firstly, though the American’s primary aim was seeking an ally close to Soviet Central Asia, the American admiration seemed to be useful in securing American military largesse. Secondly, the American plaudits again validated the Army’s self-image of itself as a superior force that combined the best elements of its British Indian Army pedigree and martial race Islamic heritage. For an Army of a nation with tenuous links to an authentic national past these bouquets from Dulles were valuable precisely because of their external validation of the Army’s connection to an Islamic martial heritage.

American enchantment with Pakistan though did wane towards the end of the decade. By 1957 the perceptions of those closely involved in administering US largesse from the pact came to increasingly view the positive generalisations about Pakistan as a bulwark of strength against communism much more circumspectly. Some of the Americans by this time, had with a more sober analysis, accurately assessed the level of obsession and fear the Army had of India, and the Army’s absolute willingness to entertain nearly any strategy with a view to finding additional strategic counters to the Indian threat. In particular, Ambassador Langley argued the questionable utility of the Pakistan Army to the US should even India fall to communis m. 371 Langley had noted acerbically,

I fear that it would not be too difficult to make a rather convincing case that the present military program is based on a hoax, the hoax being that it is related to the Soviet threat.372

370 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War – Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1988, p. 195. 371 USDOS Document 224, ‘Letter from the Ambassador in Pakistan (Langley) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree). 372 USDOS Document 224. 103

Langley in analysing the motivations of the Pakistanis came to believe that Pakistan’s pro-Western posture in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO was clearly dictated in part, if not totally, by its hatred of India.373 This was true with senior Pakistani Officers confirming their materiel aims in obtaining American largesse and their belief in the primary threat to them being India. Pakistani’s viewed the alliance precisely as some degree of security against the Indian threat, as well as a means to modernise its armed forces courtesy of American military aid. 374 There had been a brief moment when there had been an element of truth to early Pakistani fears of a communist Chinese threat through to East Pakistan, prior to the establishment of friendly relations with China. 375 Though Pakistanis understood the US considered SEATO actionable only in terms of communist aggression, some Pakistani’s argued they would not have received defence aid under the pre-existing pact unless Pakistan had joined the alliance.376

Hans Morgenthau did not allow any diplomatic niceties to interfere with his 1956 analysis of Pakistan’s utility and prospects,

Pakistan is not a nation and hardly a state. It has no justification in history, ethnic origin, language, civilization or the consciousness of those who make up its population. They have no interest in common save one: fear of Hindu domination. It is to that fear, and to nothing else that Pakistan owes its existence, and thus far its survival, as an independent state. 377

Morgenthau furthermore argued that even Jinnah did not believe in Pakistan’s viability, a proposition later supported in part by Jinnah’s own daughter.378

373 USDOS Document 224. 374 Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, p. 146 & Rahman a Pakistani Officer who attended these meetings claims regional pact members discussed with him how much arms and materiel they could extract from the Americans, in M. Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 90. 375 Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Defence Policy, p. 143. Pakistan as a member of SEATO had up until as late as November 1962 considered a real PLA threat to East Pakistan from Tibet, in, Damien Marc Fenton, ‘SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965, PhD thesis (unpublished) ADFA@UNSW, 2006, p. 102. The Pakistani’s argued their membership placed them in an exposed position to the communists. The British though believing the claims exaggerated did not want Pakistan to fall into the neutral camp, in PRO CAB/129/79, Secret C.P/(56) 24, 28th January, 1956, Cabinet, Provision of equipment at concession prices to certain commonwealth countries. 376 Burke, ‘Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’ p. 167. 377 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy – II Military Illusions, in, The New Republic, March 19, 1956, p. 15. 378 Morgenthau, ‘The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy’, pp. 15-16. Dina Jinnah in an interview claimed that her father had maintained that he did not ultimately want to break away from India and had utilised 104

A former US Ambassador to India had also criticised the US logic in entering the pact with Pakistan believing this had contributed to the insecurity of the subcontinent. 379

Pakistan’s relations with the US and its apparent misconceptions about the responsibilities of the signatories to the treaties and pacts was indicative of more than just the substantive terms of the treaties. The misunderstandings and expectations also had a great deal to do with respective strategic interests and two very different military cultures. In this regard, it is important to understand the Army culture during the period 1951 to 1958 and how British inspired ‘martial race’ beliefs converged with Muslim exceptionalism and a mimicry of British Indian Army practice to foment a uniquely Pakistani Army culture.

The Persistence of British influence on the Pakistan Army

The 1948 War with India had provided a much needed impetus to accelerate the nationalisation of the Armed forces and imbue them with a national outlook. 380 As noted in the previous chapter the importance of the shared tribulations during partition and the Kashmir War helped to promote a group and national identity derived from notions of India seeking to extinguish Pakistan. 381 The British influence on the Pakistan Army remained tangible even after the departure of the last British Commander in Chief acted upon the culture of the Army. This section is important in understanding the seemingly paradoxical nature of an Army seeking to utilise Islam as identity as well as elements being wedded to the practices of the departed colonial master.

A number of British Officers stayed on, some returned to Pakistan for visits to their old regiments, and Pakistani Officers visited former British colleagues in the United Kingdom during the 1950s. Field Marshal Auchinleck returned to Pakistan on a number of occasions until the end of the decade to lecture and visit Officers who

the imagery and symbolism of Islam to win the Muslim masses to his cause to gain concessions from India, in, ‘The Secret Life of Mr Jinnah’, Hugh Purcell (Executive Producer), As It Happened, SBS Television, Australia, 1999. 379 Spain, ‘Military Assistance for Pakistan’, p. 746. 380 Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, p. 90. 381 The sacrifice in war and religions role in preserving beliefs of common origins provide examples of collective sacrifice for emulation by subsequent generations in Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism – A cultural approach, Routledge, United Kingdom, 2009, p. 47. 105

had served with him. 382 These senior British Army figures were greatly respected, with some like Auchinleck and Gracey being especially revered, with their opinions sought during meetings in the United Kingdom and on their visits to Pakistan. 383

Though many British Officers had left the Pakistan Army by the early to mid- 1950s British influence on Army culture persisted in official and unofficial aspects, including in matters of professional orientation, and influence on dress, sporting and social activities. Their persistence in Army culture was maintained even while the Army was experiencing the tribulations of partition and Kashmir and realising Islam’s pivotal role in Army identity and strategic culture. As noted earlier, Officers identified that their British Indian Army heritage and their martial race reputation was a powerful commodity in the early negotiation of the pact with the US.

The combination of martial race, Muslim martial exceptionalism and the British Indian Army heritage were all part of the admired and accepted cultural heritage of the Pakistan Army Officers of this period. Officers of the early 1950s noted the continuity of British Indian Army social and cultural traditions. The Peshawar Vale Fox Hunt for instance included senior Pakistan Army Officers from Ayub down to junior Officers participating in and facilitating the hunt. 384 Officers mimicked their former British Officers practice by dressing in English hunt clothing such as ‘pinques’ and ‘tan top’ boots and following the hounds. 385 Arif recalls that his Pakistani Commanding Officer in the early 1950s spent most of his time with polo and hounds while leaving the work to his Captains which is remarkable given the Islamic legal, though contestable, injunctions concerning the handling of dogs. 386 The culture though diminishing, survived for some time after the departure of the British

382 Hamid the former secretary to Auchinleck notes Auchinleck visited on a number of occasions including in 1956 when Shahid was General, in Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan – Including the period from August 1947 to 1959, Ferozsons, Karachi, 1993, p. 126 & Ian Stephens the Pakistan Army’s official historian between 1957-1960 recounts meeting with Auchinleck in Pakistan just after the 1958 coup, in Ian Stephens, Unmade Journey, Stacey International, London, 1977, p. 341. 383 Wajahat Husain relates going to England on leave in 1956 and staying with Gracey the last British C-in-C, in ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Maj. Gen. (Retd) S. Wajahat Hussain,’ in Defence Journal, Karachi, August 2002 & British and Pakistani Officers continued to attend regimental reunions in both countries for instance the attendance by Pakistani Officers at the 16th Punjabi’s reunion in Britain in 1951 chaired by the former Indian Army Officer Lt. General Sir Ralph Deedes, NAM1951-11-33. 384 Shafaat Ali, Memoirs of Colonel Shafaat Ali, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2007, p. 138. 385 Ali, Memoirs of Colonel Ali, p. 138. 386 K.M. Arif, ‘Khaki Shadows Pakistan 1947-1997’, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001, p. 16. 106

with Officers in Quetta appearing in formal blue patrols for dinner as well as ladies’ nights where Pakistani ladies dressed in their finest Western wear.387

Some social events included Officers demonstrating their stamina for such un-Islamic practices such as drinking alcoholic beverages, while alcohol also featured in the Gymkhana where winners were rewarded with bottles of beer.388 According to Stephens while alcohol consumption was lessening, it was still very evident during his period as Army historian at Rawalpindi between 1957 and 1960 where he noted the presence of the British Indian Army Regimental habit of evening whiskies amongst Officers.389 The party after Operation ‘Handicap’ in 1954—the largest training exercise held in the subcontinent to that point and witnessed by foreign observers and defence attachés—featured, it was claimed, tremendous levels of inebriation. 390 There was still a club life as well during the mid-1950s within the liberal atmosphere of the Rawalpindi club, where Army Officers, foreign men and women would drink, dance, gamble and fight. 391

The Garrison in Quetta held distinctive formal black tie dinners hosted by the Pakistani Commandant and included Officers pairing off with their colleague’s spouses to prepare dinners.392 A Pakistani Officer on the directing staff of the Staff College wrote of the liberal atmosphere and freedom to mix socially between the Pakistanis, foreign students and the remaining British. 393 The perceptions of a casual liberal atmosphere among the Pakistani Officers were shared by a British Officer who

387 A.O. Mitha, Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldiers Life, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2003, p. 118 & Memoirs of Colonel Ali, pp. 156-157. 388 Memoirs of Colonel Ali, p. 138. 389 Ian Stephens, Unmade Journey, Stacey International, London, 1977, p. 333 & Ayub Khan was reportedly fond of whiskey in moderation and apologised to those more pious colleagues, in Maj. General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, ‘The Story of the Soldiering and Politics in India & Pakistan’, Wajidalis, Karachi, 1978, p. 114. Alcohol of course was not unknown to Muslims in the subcontinent with some Muslims indulgence in it noted from the first periods of British involvement with the Moghuls, Deniis Kincaid, British Social Life in India, 1608-1937, Routledge & Kegan Paul, UK, 1973, pp. 15-16.

390 Pakistan Army web portal, ‘1949-1957 Introduction’, http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=187, accessed 23 August 2012 & Laftif notes those inebriated Officers being marshalled for dinner at 2.00 am for the band to play ‘for he’s a jolly good fellow’ to the official guest, in Rahat Latif, ‘Plus Bhutto’s Episode – An autobiography’, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1994, p. 56. 391 Latif, Plus Bhutto’s Episode, pp. 62-65. 392 Memoirs of Colonel Ali, p. 161. 393 M. Attiqur Rahman, ‘Back to the Pavilion’, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 84. 107

noted the mixing of males and females during social occasions.394 The mixing of males and females also transgressed a number of Islamic injunctions concerning the mixing of the sexes. Attitudes to alcohol and some of these more liberal practices more familiar to pre-partition times were changing though as the same Officer noted the introduction of alcohol permits. 395

Stephens who was employed by the Pakistan Army as their historian between 1957 and 1960 noted,

In accent and turn of phrase in the kind of jokes they like or their mental approach to a problem, these soldiers ... whatever their inward thoughts were outwardly patterned on their former comrades-in-arms from an Island 4000 miles away. Close your eyes at a Pakistani party in ‘Pindi’ and you might almost suppose yourself in Aldershot.396

Listening to Ayub’s clipped British accent goes some way to understanding Stephens’s perceptions in this regard.397 Conversely, the Army still had a number of ‘Pakistani-British’ being those British Officers who like earlier generations of the Britis h Indian Army considered themselves more Pakistani than the Pakistanis. 398

It was with these types of Officers that the enduring concepts of martial race and Muslim exceptionalism in martial culture were transmitted to the newer generation of Pakistan Army Officers, while reinforcing these beliefs amongst the older generation of Officers. The fact that some of these British Officers converted to Islam, and others considered converting to Islam was another factor in the two way cultural process, and attraction Officers had for the religion and culture of their units. 399

Stephen’s perceptions are echoed by Slessor who after his visit to Pakistan in the mid-1950s noted how he met Pakistani Officers who were more English than the

394 NAM 7203-33-6, Pakistan Diary Vol. 1 by C.J.W., p. 33. 395 NAM 7203-33-6, p. 11, & Cheema notes the emergence of a parallel tradition with the British and changes in army culture towards the end of the 1950. email from Dean of Pakistan National Defence University, Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 14 June 2012. 396 Ian Stephens, Horned Moon – An account of a Journey through Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, Chatto & Windus, London, 1954, p. 87. 397 President Ayub Khan Interview on conflict with India in the Rann of Kutch, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUp3cFGZfGg&feature=related, accessed 23 August 2012. 398 Stephens, Horned Moon, pp. 87-88. 399 Stephens, Horned Moon, p.88. 108

English and of the regimental blazer wearing Sandhurst trained ‘Muslim Englishman’. 400

During the 1954 national horse show in Lahore the Army’s British image was further enhanced in a martial spectacle, with Officers resplendent in regimental ties and sports jackets entertaining an international audience of diplomats with drinks around a bonfire.401 The show gave a tremendous boost to the military’s national and international image though in a seemingly incongruent manner as being simultaneously a ‘chip off the old block’ of the old British Indian Army as well as being lauded for their martial attributes and austere Islamic piety. 402 The sense for more indigenisation of the Army was apparent though in light of the continued hostile relationship with India in which Islam was needed to define the character of the Pakistan Army as India could also refer to its own British Indian martial heritage.

Though the British connection with the Pakistan Army remained strong at the PMA and JSPCTS new combinations of indigenous and Islamic symbolism were gradually added to these institutions to replace the older British Indian Army inheritance. The First Commander of the PMA, Brigadier Ingall, had himself recognised that the PMA must instil in the Officer Cadets an appropriate esprit de corps, and as Pakistan had no history or common heritage Ingall believed the motivation had to come from Islam. 403

Ingall in concert with Muslim religious teachers, scholars and Officers decided on the PMA’s Cadet company’s to be named after famous Muslim soldiers of the past. The companies were named after Muslim military luminaries such as Khalid, Tariq, Kasim and Salahuddin, while regimental colours, Cadet badges and the motto of ‘Nasroon minihalhi wah fatroom quarib’ equating to ‘When God is with you then victory is near’ was selected as an appropriate Islamic motto.404

400 Tim Slessor, First Overland – The Story of the Oxford and Cambridge Far Eastern Expedition, Readers Book Club, London, 1957, p. 96, p. 106 & p. 119 & ‘A Scots tradition that is still flourishing ten years after independence’, in Iskander Mirza, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O9IZUa1gIw&feature=fvwrel, accessed 23 August 2012. 401 A.R. Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality’, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, p. 41. 402 Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan, pp. 39-41. 403 Francis Ingall, The Last of the Bengal Lancers, Presidio Press, California, 1988, pp. 127-129. 404 Ingall, The Last of the Bengal Lancers, pp. 127-129. Studies and biographies of these famous Muslim soldiers were also published by the Army Book Club. 109

As the US relationship developed in the afterglow of Dulles’s eulogies of the Army’s piety and martial pedigree the Army embarked on major training and equipment acquisition programs that exposed them to the Americans.

The Army acquired more insight into American military culture. With the signing of the pact with the US in 1954 and joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955 Officers started noting the influence of American culture initiated by the United States Information Service (USIS).405 The benign introduction of American periodicals and journals were believed intended to wean the Officers from their favourite British newspapers and periodicals and introduce the Pakistani Officers to American military and popular culture. 406 It was a culture shock for the Pakistanis and probably the Americans. Pakistani Officers used to British Indian Army Officers who learnt Urdu and who participated in religious and cultural festivals, and in a few instances converted to Islam, thought the Americans to be insensitive to Pakistani customs, which incurred resentment during their deployment to Pakistan. 407

American defence assistance during the 1950s provided opportunities for Officers to undertake army courses in the US with some actively promoting Pakistan, Islam and their martial race to the Americans.408 At the time these Officers were negotiating a course between the cultural pathways of the Western and Islamic in the US these tensions were also being negotiated in Pakistan.

Though there was mimicry of aspects of British Indian Army culture there was also evidence of tensions between Western, indigenous and Islamic culture noted by Officers during the 1950s. Some junior Officers lamented that it was not considered Officer like to wear non-Western clothes outside one’s home or the Mess. Others noted that senior regimental Officers had maintained an aloof snobbishness that some equated to the most pompous British practices.409 The Mess at this time maintained its British traditions by ensuring conversation centred on matters of professional interest while discussion of politics and women were taboo.410 In keeping with the older British practices Urdu newspapers were not kept in the Mess and the

405 Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan, p. 45. 406 Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan, p. 45. 407 A.O. Mitha, Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldiers Life, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2003, p. 213. 408 Ali, Memoirs of Colonel Ali, pp. 168-183. 409 Arif, Khaki Shadows, p. 8. 410 Arif, Khaki Shadows, p. 9. 110

Officers talked amongst themselves in English, with an Anglicised Urdu accent, of matters in the British newspapers.

The British Officers had been replaced by the brown sahibs who took visible pride in imitating them. 411

Others noted more imperia l pretensions creeping into the Officer Corps,

...we seemed bent on copying the outward trappings of power, and also in attempting to graft on to our own society a largely alien culture. We adopted dress, language, deportment, and all the assumed appurtenances of position – large cars, flags, star plates, and the rest. 412

Tarzie Vittachi had coined the term ‘Brown Sahib’ in his critique of South Asian elites in their failure to differentiate between their newly independent role and that of their colonial predecessors.413 The ‘Brown Sahib’ was a sentimental copy of the former colonial masters adopted by the newly independent in the absence of their own identity, or a belief that their indigenous identity was inimical to a particular role.

The Army continued older British Indian Army practices of ethnic exclusion, which were consistent with British martial race preferences on the suitability of certain ethnic groups as being fit for the Army, as noted in Chapters One and Two. During the 1950s the Army remained resistant to the inclusion of other major ethnic groups including the Bengalis who numerically constituted over half the population. A number of officers in the Army were furthermore resentful of the few Bengalis who exercised any political power over them. Prime Minister Nazimuddin was the subject of ridicule by such officers in the Army with his portly figure and alleged gluttony being equated with his greedy un-martial Bengali persona, which served as evidence to Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers of their innate superiority over the Bengalis. 414 Senior Officers of the time claimed that Ayub, himself a Pakhtun, maintained ‘shades of martial and non-martial class’ in his preference for Punjabis and Pakhtuns, while Ayub later in his career is shown in his diaries to be clearly critical of Bengalis in his

411 Arif, Khaki Shadows, p. 9. 412 M. Attiqur Rahman, ‘Our Defence Cause’, White Lion Publishers, London, 1976, pp. 29-30. 413 Tarzie Vittachi, The Brown Sahib, Andrew Deutsch, 1962, p. 9. 414 Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan, p. 20. Ayub Khan criticises Nazimuddin, Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq all former Bengali Chief Ministers of the undivided Bengal, where he alleges they were poor decision makers and especially so Nazimuddin, in Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 23-24. 111

‘martial race’ references of their suffering from the impact of their humid climate and marshy terrain that allegedly made them “mother-attached” and “inward looking”.415

Officers believed that the security of the Muslim homeland could only be ensured by the martial races, so lauded by existing and earlier generations of British Officers and highlighted by the more recent approbations received from the Americans.

Some in the Army did think the disproportionate representation from the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province compared to that of Sindh, Baluchistan, East Pakistan and the Muhajirs could be a problem. Suggestions of rectifying these problems during the period included the establishment of a separate recruitment standard for Bengalis, as well as additional military academies being established in East Pakistan though these plans were largely unsuccessful. 416 An Army reform in 1956 had also considered the matter of ethnic recruitment and a number of recruiting fairs were organised. Recruitment was opened up to a number of frontier classes that had not been previously accepted in the Army, though even this simply opened up recruitment to additional classes from the Punjab and NWFP.417 Even if Officer candidates were from Baluchistan or Sindh they could still be Punjabi or Pakhtun due to internal migration and their better education standards.

Despite similarities suggesting the Pakistan Army was a replica of the British Indian Army from which it had been formed, the Army was exhibiting behaviours in stark contrast to the traditions and culture of the British Indian Army. The discovery of the Rawalpindi conspiracy in 1951 when the Chief of General Staff of the Army, ten other Officers and a number of civilians planned to overthrow the government and military leadership was a shock to the political and military hierarchy.418 The ringleader of the conspiracy, a popular Sandhurst trained Officer, had led the covert aspects of the 1948 Kashmir Operation and had been allegedly bitter of the failure to

415 M. Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 91 & Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan, p. 35. Pataudi claims Ayub was biased against Bengali’s, Pataudi, ‘The Story of the Soldiering, pp. 135-136 & Craig Baxter (Editor), Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966-1972, Oxford University Prerss, Dhaka, 2007, p.364. 416 Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, p. 125. 417 Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan – Including the period from August 1947 to 1959, Ferozsons, Karachi, 1993, pp. 122-123. 418 Cheema, Op.Cit, p. 117, & Hasan Zaheer, The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998. 112

liberate the Muslims of Kashmir as well as being passed over for command of the Army. 419

That a number of senior Army Officers so early in the new Army’s existence could undertake such a radically uncharacteristic action on the part of Officers who relished their British traditions illustrated the strong influence of religious attachments below the ostensibly professional surface of the Army. The conspiracy and other institutional weaknesses of the Army were driving tendencies more often seen in less developed militaries. Officers were seeking early and unqualified promotions as well as being more generally involved in a careerism that would have been viewed as extremely gauche in the manners of the old British Indian Army. 420 It is to the matter of Army development that the next section considers.

The disquiet within the Army was noticed by a senior British Officer and was attributed to the new Officer class’s ignorance of higher order military organisation and lack of experience.421 The lack of experienced Officers was noted by foreign and Pakistani officer with the US military pact a factor in hopefully improving the effectiveness of the Army, with over two hundred artillery Officers for instance attending training courses in the US between 1955 and 1958.422 The Army also embarked on a program to improve its organisational effectiveness as well as attempting to instil more of a Pakistani identity into the Army.

Institutional Development – structure, training and Islamic symbolism

From Ayub’s assumption of command in 1951 he commenced an Army reorganisation that was wide ranging and included amongst other developments

419 Akbar Khan the Officer involved adopted the nom de guerre ‘Tariq’ after the Muslim conqueror of Spain, offers an account of his exploits during the first Kashmir war and his subsequent arrest for his role in the coup, Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, Waifai Printing, Islamabad, 1970 & Zaheer, Rawalpindi Conspiracy, p. xvi. 420 Ayub Khan refers to this phenomenon at the time in which he claimed Officers had raised expectations and fantastic ambitions, in Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 37-38, while Hussain stated that when visiting General Gracey the former Commander of the Pakistan Army in Britain in early 1956 Gracey had warned of the younger Officers unrealised ambitions, in ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Interview with Major General Wajahat Hussain’, in Defence Journal, (Ed) Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal, Karachi, August 2002, p. 6. 421 NAM 7203-33-6, Pakistan Diary Vol. 1 by C.J.W. (1949), p. 10 & p. 28. (The Officer concerned was Maj. General Loftus-Tottenham). 422 Maj. Gen (Retd) Shaukat Riza, Izzat-O-Iqbal, Published by School of Artillery, Nowshera, 1980, p. 122 & Qasim was one of these Officers who undertook Artillery training at Fort Sill, in Syed Shah Abul Qasim, Life Story of an Ex-Soldier, Publicity Panel, Karachi, 2003, p. 73. 113

establishing training centres, refitting old training centres, as well as developing new military schools of instruction and attention to military doctrine. 423 An Army planning board was formed and set about designing new operational concepts and reviewing regulations and procedures. The board also addressed the reorganisation and amalgamation of regiments of similar tradition and territorial affiliation that reduced the existing eleven regiments into four, which was achieved in April 1956.424

With Pakistan becoming a republic in 1956 the British Crown, a symbol of the imperial past, was removed from most army nomenclatures, with battalions removing old titles and affiliations with British Royalty, though this process was not universal and some units chose to retain some old popular martial titles. 425 The amalgamation process caused some distress in the regimentally traditionally inclined Officers of the British Indian generation, but was ameliorated to some extent by retaining a few old traditions and combining them with new religious and national identity motifs. 426

In planning to introduce religious and national identity motifs a committee examined the system of awards, decorations, ceremonial standards, marching songs and tunes. The committee planned to replace those British Indian Army standards with more symbolic manifestations of Pakistani religion and culture. It was hoped these changes would resonate with the Islamic ethos of the country and unify and motivate the Army as Brigadier Ingall had sought to undertake at the PMA. 427 For the Army the process initially involved the inscription of the words ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ (God is Great) in Urdu upon Unit standards as well as having the Army Service Corps identify poems and statements from national poets to add to marching tunes. The national anthem for Pakistan was chosen because of its emphasis on Pakistan as the citadel of Islamic faith while its author Hafiz Jullundhri, the Urdu poet wounded fighting in Kashmir, was appointed Director of Army Morals by Ayub Khan.

The Army instituted an eclectic mix of the Islamic and Imperial British with suggestions on martial themes being elicited from old British Indian Army luminaries

423 Arif, Khaki Shadows, p. 13. 424 Rafiuddin Ahmed, History of the Baloch Regiment, The Naval and Military Press Ltd, East Sussex, 2005, p. 234. 425 Ahmed, Baloch Regiment p. 236. 426 Ahmed, Baloch Regiment pp. 236-238. 427 Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, pp. 121-122. 114

such as Field Marshal Auchinleck who was again visiting Pakistan. 428 These initiatives though initially modest served to reinforce the Islamic nature of the new Army onto its developing cultural identity, while also seeking to emphasise belief in its professionalism and martial traditions. The Army was nurturing martial race themes concurrently with Islamic themes and in this way martial tradition and Islam were one and the same.

The changing nature of the Army was also manifested in how Officers were selected, trained and indoctrinated in their professional education, religious and martial heritage. The Cadet body originating from the families of earlier generations of Officers, consisted of unmarried young men, as well as some from the ranks, and a few with wives and family. 429 Training as an Army Officer in the 1950s began with an initial six month assessment undertaken with potential Officer recruits from the Navy, Air Force and Army at the JSPCTS at Quetta. 430 Life at the JSPCTS reflected both indigenous and inherited traditions with meals being taken with knife and fork in the British tradition, while dress included regimental style blazers in the British tradition, as well as a ‘militarised’ version of the Sherwani in the indigenous Muslim tradition.431

Life at the PMA while austere included Western conveniences and cultural traditions such as cinema nights as well as access to a canteen, billiard tables and a variety of sporting and hobby clubs. 432 The attrition rates were moderate with the seventh PMA Long Course that graduated on 14 February 1953 for instance passing out with seventy-four Cadet s out of a total of one hundred and three that had begun the course. During the heightened tensions with India in 1951 the fifth PMA course was passed out six months prematurely in order to help deal with the Indian threat.433

The PMA during this period still had a complement of British Officers, NCOs and a British Regimental Sergeant Major for drill and discipline. 434 More direct

428 Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan, p. 122. 429 Akhtar Khan, 7th PMA Long Course. 430 Interview of Lt. General Imtiaz Waraich, in Ikhram ul-Majeed Seghal (Ed), ‘Defence Journal’, October 2001, Vol. 5, No. 3, Karachi, 2001, pp. 7-9. 431 Muhammad Akhtar Khan, ‘7th PMA Long Course & 4th Pre-Cadet Training School’, in I.Ikhram Seghal, ‘Defence Journal’, Karachi, February, 2002. 432 Akhtar Khan, 7th PMA Long Course. 433 Akhtar Khan, 7th PMA Long Course. 434 Akhtar Khan, 7th PMA Long Course. 115

British Army connections continued as well with some Officer Cadets, including Ayub’s own son, undertaking their Officer training at Sandhurst. 435 Apart from Islamic appellations being introduced to the PMA the institution became known as ‘The First Pakistan Battalion’ (Quaid-e-Azam) to promote the nationalist ethos in the PMA in honouring Jinnah the creator of Pakistan. The curriculum at the PMA like the JSPCTS was divided between military and academic training that emphasised Western battles and leaders.436

Islamic appellations and the names of famous Muslim leaders and battles were however used at the PMA for other purposes. Officer Cadets were assessed on week long outdoor exercises with names derived from Islamic martial themes such as the exercise ‘Yarmuk’ named after the battle in which Khalid Ibn al-Walid ‘the Sword of Islam’ (also the name of a Cadet company at PMA) defeated the Eastern Roman Empire in battle in . The passing out ceremony for PMA Cadets in the early 1950s included a mix of British-Indian Army traditions as well as more overt symbols of Islam and . These parades drew on a Muslim military pageant style that had been evolving since partition. The Army ceremonies introduced Islamic elements such as the consecration of the colours by a Maulvi and an Islamic prayer program that had been evident as early as 1948 in a presenting the colours ceremony.437

Conclusion

This chapter described how the combination of early domestic and international political factors combined with partition and the tribulations endured by those Officers who had served in Kashmir contributed to a national culture of insecurity. Politically, the early collapse of any real apparent embrace of Jinnah’s vision of a secular, tolerant, democratic Pakistan because of internecine religious and ethnic violence induced the Army to undertake functions of the state normally left to other civil agencies. The Army’s implementation of martial law in Lahore in 1953 and

435 , Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007, p. 23. 436 Akhtar Khan, 7th PMA Long Course. 437 See for instance the ceremonial booklet with prayer lists and consecration ceremony details for the presentation of the colours to Quaid-I-Azam’s sister Fatimah Jinnah on 15 April 1948 in NAM1965- 04077-2. 116

the Army’s recognition of its own superiority in administering justice in this and other occasions amplified an increasingly critical view of the politician’s ability to secure the stability and interests of the country.

Internationally, Pakistan’s enduring hostilities with India, though perhaps overstated, and problems with Afghanistan enabled the military to dominate the political discourse of the country. The military’s domination of a political discourse centred on security and military development that was attuned to a growing lack of confidence in the political system to maintain national cohesion. This enabled the military from the early 1950s to establish itself as the dominant arm of government on which the Muslim homela nd either flour is hed or fell.

Military domination of the government was established through Ayub’s gradually increasing role and importance in government from Commander in Chief, to Defence Minister to eventually assuming full power in 1958. This enabled the military to virtually control the economy, through its domination of budgetary expenditure, as well as dominating foreign policy in managing the security threat from India which was the ‘myth’ that maintained the primacy of the Army while they courted the US.

Senior Army Officers during the period 1951 to 1958, though still imbued with much British tradition, commenced a process of structural reform as well as beginning to imbue the Army with a more national and Islamic outlook believed as necessary and fundamentally important in building on the binding experiences of the Kashmir war and hostility with India.

The next chapter addresses the period 1958 to 1970 and encompasses a period of successive Army rule. The chapter explores the impact of the Army’s continued involvement in politics as well as the influence of conflicts with India and Afghanistan in which peculiarly Islamic notions of warfare were instituted.

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Chapter IV Birth of the Praetorian State: 1958–1970

The Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where Muslims could build a homeland of their own. All their military preparations during the last 18 years have been directed against us.

(President and Field Marshall Ayub Khan, 1965)438

Introduction

On 7 October 1958 Ayub Khan, Commander in Chief of the Army and Defence Minister, was asked by President Iskander Mirza to establish martial law and rule the country. Mirza informed Ayub that the country had reached such a point of political chaos that it needed the military to take control. Mirza’s concerns may have been less about chaos and more about a belief that leftists and politicians from the East Wing were gaining too much influence. Ayub nevertheless took control in a bloodless action and within three weeks he had also bundled off Mirza, whose allegedly fickle and conspiratorial dealings he decided the country could also do without, to exile in London. 439 Ayub would remain in power until protests and strikes against his rule reached a crescendo in March 1969 and he was replaced by Pakistan’s second military ruler General Agha Mohammad who had been applying pressure on Ayub to step down.440

This chapter considers the history of the Pakistan Army over the period 1958 to the commencement of political agitation in East Pakistan in 1970 in four sections. Initially, the chapter examines the impact of Ayub’s political and cultural experiments in Pakistan and their impact on the Army. This is followed by an examination of the Army’s problematic relationship with the US.

In the third section an examination of doctrinal and training developments in the Army, including the Army’s consideration of a number of asymmetrical warfare

438 ‘Go Forward and meet the enemy: call to the nation on India’s Aggression, Special Broadcast to the Nation, September 6, 1965’, Speeches and Statements Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan President of Pakistan, Volume – VIII, July 1965 – June 1966, Din Muhammad Press, Karachi, 1966, pp. 24-25. 439 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp.74-75. 440 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords – Pakistan – Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008, pp.242-243. 119

methods including Islamist and Maoist methods of warfare, is undertaken. Some examination is also made of Chinese assistance to the Army. This section also includes a consideration of the impact of martial law upon the professional ethos of the Army, as well as internal criticism of Ayub’s succession planning. Some attention to training conducted in the Army during this period is also provided.

The last section of the chapter concerns the Army’s engagement in armed conflicts with India and Pakistan, including the Islamically motivated strategies in Operation Gibraltar and faulty Army appreciations of anticipated Indian responses.

Together these issues traverse the political, cultural, religious and purely military aspects of this period of the Army’s history. The chapter concludes that the Army at the end of this period had, by its involvement in politics, fundamentally broken with the established British Indian Army traditions of no involvement in politics that was addressed in Chapter One. Similarly, the Army’s explicit use of Islam in the 1965 War and beforehand contributed to the Army’s developing strategic culture that discovered solutions to the Indian threat by recourse to these innovative solutions founded in notions of Islamic resistance. The Indian threat to the Islamic homeland remained the essential element of the Pakistani strategic culture founded in the tribulations of partition and the 1947–48 Kashmir War revealed in Chapter Two.

Islamic solutions to Pakistan’s security problems arose as well from the disappointment with the US alliance. The alliance had been degraded from the effects of the American response to India’s defeat at China’s hands in 1962. There was also declining interest from a Democratic Party not as enamoured with Pakistan’s credentials as the Republicans had been, and increasingly drawn into a focus on South East Asian political developments in the containment of communism. It is to a discussion of the overarching political context that the thesis now moves.

An examination of the politics of the period dominated by Field Marshal Ayub Khan and subsequently by General Yahya Khan is imperative in understanding how the assumption of power by the Army influenced Pakistan and the Army. Ayub’s social and political experiments in the form of basic democracies, policies on East Pakistan, his tinkering with religious law and cultural practices, as well as his brokering of alliances and relationships with the US and China, had very real

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implications for the Army, which this chapter explores. An examination of these themes provides insight into what was occurring in the Army some twenty years after its inception, by examining the cultural changes that increasingly came to cut the Army adrift of its singular professional culture inherited from the British Indian Army.

Chapter Three noted the paradoxical elements of Pakistani Army culture during the period up to 1958 in which the Army was balancing American views of its piety and superiority against residual and popular elements of British Indian Army culture. Chapter Three also noted that the threat from India remained the Army’s primary security concern and to a lesser degree that presented by Afghanistan. In this regard the Army sought to develop its own particularly Islamic culture in the early developments of Brigadier Ingall at the PMA as well as the Army committees that considered other simple measures from ‘marching songs’ and the eradication of imperial symbols with Pakistan becoming a republic in 1956. Advantageously for Pakistan, the chapter noted that the American relationship was providing Pakistan with valuable materiel and training to develop the Army as well as a validation of their martial and Islamic nature. The chapter noted that the Army had effectively assumed control of the debate on domestic and international security policy, with the Army increasingly concerned over the ability of politicians to maintain the territorial and ideologica l integr ity of the state.

The Army increasingly drew upon a parallel culture that rationalised the Army’s role as saviour of the state. This culture rationalised the usurping of the politicians to save Jinnah’s Pakistan as well as the more visceral call of rescuing the subcontinent’s Muslims from Hindu hegemony. The expedient use of nationalist and religious themes to cement the unity of the state, or as a casus belli in its skirmishes and wars with India over Kashmir, served the Army well in its justification for control of the state. The first section of this chapter addresses these political and cultural experiments of Ayub’s regime.

On 7 October 1958 President Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution, proclaimed martial law throughout the country, dismissed central and provincial governments and assemblies and appointed General Ayub Khan, Commander in Chief

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of the Army and Defence Minister as Chief Martial Law Administrator. 441 Ayub’s contempt for the politicians was as profound as was his belief in the Army being the sole guarantor of Pakistan’s continued sovereignty, with his contempt for politicians being well known to many in the Army prior to his assumption of power. 442

Ayub Khan’s coup, political rule and Islam

Ayub’s assumption of power was portrayed by him as a ‘revolution’, with Pakistan to be revolutionised in terms of a new democratic system free of colonial accretions and more suitable to Pakistan’s Islamic and cultural heritage. 443 Ayub, according to one of his Martial Law Administrators, was of the opinion that most of the country’s political ills to date were attributable to the Western democratic system that the country had tried to institute. 444 A British diplomat who knew Ayub said Ayub possessed a view that democracy only worked for ‘cool and phlegmatic people in cold climates’, a view remarkably aligned to aspects of martial race theories. 445 Toynbee who had met Ayub and was admired by Pakistani Officers, possibly arising from his lectures at the Pakistan Military Academy, had concurred with Ayub.

...that the majority of the people of Pakistan are still immature politically to be able to make a success of Anglo-American parliamentary democracy.446

Ayub was determined that his democratic system would be one that the people of Pakistan could understand free of the complexities and dominance of the former political class that he deemed had failed the country so much. Even in the twilight of his reign in 1968 Ayub had continued to critique Western style democracy and asserted that he had liberated the country from a burdensome legacy of colonial

441 Ayub had been Minister of Defence in the Cabinet since 1954 & Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, pp. 70-71. 442 Ayub’s distrust and disappointment with the politicians and the political process in Pakistan more generally is a consistent theme throughout his memoirs and diaries & Interview with Tajammal, p. 14. 443 See page one in, Bureau of National Reconstruction , Introduction of basic democracies in Pakistan, Ferozsons, Pakistan, where it quotes Ayub referring to, ‘...the Revolutionary Government...’ 444 Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 39. 445 Sir Morrice James (Lord St. Brides), Pakistan Chronicle – edited with an introduction by Peter Lyon, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993, p. 61. 446 Between Oxus and Jumna, p. 183. 122

days. 447 Ayub’s new system was known as ‘basic democracies’.448 He noted in his first address to the nation on 8 October 1959,

Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy, but of the type that people can understand and work. 449 [my emphasis]

Ayub believed that democracy needed to come from the base upwards and in this regard his revolutionary government announced plans for a four-tiered system of representative government that,

...basic democracy can ensure real representation of the people. Our existing percentage of literacy being lamentably low, the Western pattern of democracy becomes socially untenable. 450

Ayub was driven by a ‘modernising mission and reformist zeal’ to exploit the natural advantages of the Pakistani people.451 While not secular he also sought to address what he thought of as the ‘ill-effects of Islamic orthodoxy’.

Ayub believed Islamic orthodoxy was inimical to progress and contributed to inertia, fatalism and sectarianism when what Pakistan needed was a proportionate balance between Islam and secularism.452 Ayub himself was arguably an Islamic modernist, with a liking for the poet Iqbal who he credited as a symbol of Muslim renaissance, and he vigorously promoted the idea of the progressive use of science to advance Muslim nationalism. Ayub ultimately failed and the resistance he was met with from the orthodox Muslims he equated with the earlier resistance against such

447 President’s broadcast to the nation, 23rd March 1968, Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan [booklet], Karachi, p. 4. 448 The objectives, functions and role of ‘Basic Democracies’ and ‘Basic Democrats’, is fully detailed in ‘The Basic Democracies Order, 1959’, Government of Pakistan Printer. 449 Ayub Khan quoted in Bureau of National Reconstruction Government of Pakistan, Introduction of basic democracies in Pakistan, Ferozsons, Pakistan, p. 1. 450 The Department of Films and Publications Government of Pakistan, Guidelines – basic democracies Karachi, p. 5. 451 Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan - A Study of Political Developments: 1947-97, Maktaba Jadeed Press, Lahore, 1998, p. 70. 452 ‘Islam – A Dynamic and Progressive Movement’, convocation address at the Darul Uloom Islamia, Tando Allahyar, on May 3, 1959, in Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements – Volume 1: October 1958-June 1959, publisher [nfd], 1961, pp. 110-114. 123

other South Asian Muslim luminaries as Jinnah, Shah Walliullah, Sir Syed and Allama Iqbal. 453

Ayub’s attempts at tinkering and improving Pakistan’s burgeoning population problem through amendments to family law were calculated to improve Pakistan’s economic and lifestyle standards. His government tried to educate the public about these issues through programs that highlighted the impact of uncontrolled population growth on Pakistan. The importance of this issue to Ayub was one he maintained throughout his rule and one that he raised within the international community. 454 Ayub’s government had tried to reform the family laws through drawing upon arguments that other Muslim countries had previously done so. 455 Ayub’s government produced booklets that refuted customs against contraception by citing eminent Islamic jurists such as Al-Ghazzali as well as the strategic impact of unregulated population growth on the nation’s progress.456 Ayub hoped to drag Pakistan from feudalism to an enlightened Muslim nation state and was fighting a battle within the religious domain that the Ulema were not ready to concede. Ayub’s frustration is evident in his diary entries over the course of his years in power,

...the followers of Maududi, the Deoband group, the Ahrars, etc., are spreading all sorts of dissatisfaction against me. They are criticizing the family law which has brought so much relief to the poor women ... The idiots or rascals are calling these things anti-Islamic ... their religion and their philosophy has not the slightest affinity into the true spirit of Islam... 457

453 ‘Speeches and Statements, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan President of Pakistan, Volume – VII, July 1964 – June 1965, Din Muhammadi Press, Karachi, 1965, p. 172, pp. 7-9 & pp. 208-209. 454 Ayub had raised the problem of Pakistan’s population growth to the Americans, see for instance where population growth formed part of Ayub’s speech to President Johnson, December 14, 1965, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, Book II, June 1 to December 31, 1965, Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Service, Washington, 1966, p. 1155. 455 For instance in The Department of Films and Publications Government of Pakistan, Guidelines – Muslim family laws ordinance, 1961, Karachi, a number of examples from the Arab world as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan & are noted as well as Iran. ’s abolition of act (1963) is also cited. 456 From a booklet produced by the Ayub government on the risks of uncontrolled population growth which sought to identify the risks to the country’s development as well as dispel misconceptions of the policy, in The Department of Films and Publications Government of Pakistan, Guidelines – family planning in Pakistan, Karachi, p. 7. 457 Ayub Khan’s diary entry from 6 September 1966, in Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, 1966-1972, Edited and annotated by Craig Baxter, The University Press Dhaka & Oxford University Press, Dhaka, 2007, p. 5. 124

Ayub’s laments about the nature of the religious opposition were arguably predictable and emanating from the degree of contested religious and national identity amply illustrated within the Munir Report on the 1953 Ahmadiyya rioting noted in Chapter Three.

Ayub’s opposition to Maududi who had rebounded remarkably after the annulment of his death penalty and the Jama’at-i-Islami (JI) was well founded as the JI were as keenly opposed to Ayub as he was opposed to them. The JI were disappointed in his new constitution and its lack of Islamic qualities.458

Internationally, the 1962 China-India War was a disaster for India as well as Pakistan. When the Indians had been decisively beaten in the field by the Chinese, the anti-communist free world rushed to supply weaponry and assistance to the ostensibly neutral India. Pakistan remained suspicious of the West’s assistance to India and charged the West with a naiveté in arming India, as the Indians had previously charged when Pakistan was being armed by the Americans. It is to the American relationship that this chapter now addresses.

Ayub, the Army and the United States

The importance of the US relationship to Pakistan continued to be a dominant theme. Ayub was determined to cement his utility to the Americans and gain moral, political and military support, and aid to bolster the country’s economy and his Army. As noted in the previous chapter Ayub, the Army and Pakistan had made an impression upon Dulles, Nixon and Eisenhower before the 1958 coup. Ayub continued to court the Republicans during the early years of his rule, though the incoming democratic administration were not so enamoured with the Pakistanis. The Republicans though maintained their practice of lauding their ostensible Cold War ally for their martial qualities and Islamic piety, despite some questions over who the defence materiel would be used against, as well as not venturing significantly into the ’s stalled democracy.

458 Kalim Bahadur, The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan, Progressive Books, Lahore, 1978, pp. 102-103 & The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, Government Printer, Karachi, 1962, pp. 95-96. 125

The approbations of President Eisenhower, the American victor who had conquered the Germans in Western Europe, was equal to anything Dulles had offered and equally well appreciated,

In the deepest values of life, we feel with you a very close kinship ... We have always admired the courage .... of the Pakistan people, and have respected them because of their religious and spiritual devotion. Our two countries both believe in human dignity and the brotherhood of man under God. 459

Eisenhower had also emphasised the role of US military assistance to Pakistan and how this was contributing to the collective security of the free world.460Ayub attuned to the US strategic focus on communism continued to highlight Pakistan’s strategic value to the US. During Ayub’s 1961 visit to the US and perhaps cognisant of a lessened US interest in Pakistan after the administration change stated to the Americans that “...any country that falters in Asia, for even a year or two, will find itself subjugated to communism”.461

Officers of the time knew very well that apart from Ayub’s concern at the communist aspects of the Rawalpindi conspiracy that his real motives were not any fear of communism. The Indian threat remained paramount even after Khrushchev’s threats over Pakistan’s role in the U2 incident.462 A senior Pakistani Army representative at the CENTO meetings noted that the regional members of the pact, including Pakistan, were indeed in the pact to see how much arms they could extract from the Americans, to qualitatively and quantitatively improve their armed forces. 463 As noted in the previous chapter the Americans were beginning to be more circumspect about Pakistan’s claims of prowess and fidelity as a Cold War ally while the Pakistani’s were disturbed by aspects of American assistance.

459 Contained within, ‘Remarks at the Citizens’ Welcome for President Eisenhower, the Polo Field, Karachi, December 8, 1959, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1959, Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Service, Washington, 1960, p. 302. 460 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Ibid, pp. 816-818. 461 Public Papers, John. F. Kennedy, Ayub speech, p. 503. 462 Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 36. The U2 aircraft had commenced its flight from a Pakistani airfield near Peshawar. 463 M. Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 90. 126

Ayub maintained an acute awareness of the Army’s deficiencies of arms and equipment, and in this regard had been pivotal in countering American USMAAG attempts to shape all the Pakistani capabilities into a purely defensive role. The Americans had also tried to direct the Pakistanis to scrap their older equipment with one Officer noting that Ayub had prevented the Army suffering a relative loss in strength with India. 464 How the Americans coordinated the USMAAG agreement was objectionable to sovereignty minded Officers with it being especially galling at how American aid came with intolerable pre-conditions. Apart from American equipment being subject to technical inspections by US technicians, Officers complained that,

...the US military assistance advisory group ... Officers interpreted ‘assistance’ and ‘advice’ to include supervision of Pakistani chain of command... 465

As the Americans had to report to the Pentagon upon the distribution of military aid, they believed this entitled them to also control the deployment of Pakistan Army Officers returning from US courses, with this sometimes leading to tense confrontations. 466 The Commander of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps noted how the Americans had even tried to reclaim spares such as armoured recovery vehicles and armament that they believed Pakistan were not using during the 1965 War.467 It was at this time that the Army, allegedly starved of equipment by the Americans, had shipped in equipment and ammunition from other countries.

The US had stopped the provision of arms and materiel to Pakistan progressively after the Rann of Kutch encounter with India and then completely after the 1965 War.468 The American embargo was not relaxed until 1966 by which time Pakistan had begun to acquire weapons from North Korea, the Soviets and

464 September ‘65, pp. 20-21. 465 Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza (Retd), The Pakistan Army – War 1965, Services Book Club, Lahore, 1984, p. 47. 466 Riza, The Pakistan Army – War 1965, p. 47. 467 Brig. (Retd) M.A.H. Ansari, Co. (Retd) Mahboob Elahi & Brig. (Retd) M.H. Hyrdri, History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps: 1947-1992, Ordnance History Cell, Pakistan, 1993, p. 145 & p. 151. 468 History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps: 1947-1992, p. 154. The ‘Rann of Kutch’ is a small area between and Karachi covered for much of the year in brackish water with little economic or other interest that was nevertheless the site of a small tactical success in April 1965 for the Pakistan Army in pushing out a small Indian force. The real significance of the small campaign was the inordinately high sense of superiority of Pakistan arms over the Indian arms it gave the Pakistanis and the belief in a demoralised and inept Indian military which had only just three years previously been also trumped by the Chinese. 127

Czechoslovakia, paradoxically while Pakistan was still a member of SEATO. 469 Pakistan’s intent on making an alliance with the Chinese was greeted with incredulity by Pakistan’s Western allies in SEATO who thought the Pakistanis “either extremely naive or extremely duplicitous in its pursuit of Chinese support against India”.470

After the 1965 War with India, Pakistani indignation at the failure of the US to assist them in their war against India resulted in Pakistan—despite their membership of SEATO—seeking Chinese military assistance. Ayub never recovered from the 1965 War or his belief in American perfidy despite the explicitly clear terms of the SEATO alliance making it clear that Pakistan could not expect any US assistance where the aggressor was not communist. The next section of this chapter addresses the impact of developments in Army culture, training and doctrine.

Ayub Khan was determined in creating the best-equipped military Pakistan could attain within the limits of its own meagre resources, as well as leveraging off American and Western largesse. Ayub maintained throughout his rule that India posed an enduring threat to the state of Pakistan. The discourse on the ‘Indian threat’ largely revolved around Pakistani indignation of India refusing to commit to the United Nations plebiscite on Kashmir. Pakistan continued in its failure to grasp the realist imperatives of India in declining to negotiate Kashmir in terms acceptable to Pakistan. The notion of the threat from India persisted in the Pakistani imagination as a real threat and was reproduced as an inherent element of strategic security concerns held by the Army. The threat was maintained as not simply a threat from an adjoining country harbouring irredentist claims, though this was also an aspect of fear in the Pakistani strategic culture. The fear remained couched in terms of the Hindu threat to the territorial and ideological integrity of Muslim Pakistan. This factor, noted in Chapter Two as having developed from the Army’s outset, remained a thread of continuity in the strategic culture of the Army in which Islam remained as identity with their notions of martial race to the Army in their quest to deter and defeat any challenges from the Indian hegemon.

469 History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps: 1947-1992, p. 154. 470 Ayub Khan’s diary entry from 2 September 1966, in Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, 1966-1972, Edited and annotated by Craig Baxter, The University Press Dhaka & Oxford University Press, Dhaka, 2007, p. 5 & Damien Marc Fenton, ‘SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia’, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2006, pp. 249-250. 128

On 27 October 1958 Mohammad Musa Khan succeeded Ayub as the second indigenous Pakistani Commander in Chief of the Army. 471 Musa, a Shiite Hazara born in Quetta, had joined the British Indian Army in 1926 and had served with many of the Indian Officers who were to be his contemporaries and adversaries.472 Musa though a pious and humane Officer was resented for his perceived subservience to Ayub with beliefs Ayub had promoted him precisely because of this quality over much more effective Officers.473 Lieutenant General Habibullah, his main rival for the position, had been claimed to be a superior candidate and who was allegedly disqualified because he would have represented a professional threat to Ayub.474 Some Officers attributed Ayub’s practice in selecting ‘safe’ generals to have been the onset of institutionalised nepotism and sycophancy over-riding merit in the selections of senior Officers for the Army.475

The promotion of Musa was a disappointment to most of us and was interpreted that efficiency was not important for promotion only personal loyalty counted.476

A senior Officer did concede however that Ayub’s practices may have been derived from the fact that that there remained fears of a reoccurrence of another Rawalpindi conspiracy.

During the late 1950s there was claimed to be endemic dissatisfaction and unrest within what was described as the ‘megalomaniacal corps of senior Officers’ who believed themselves to be just as equally qualified to be the Commander in Chief. 477 Gul claims that suspicion of Officers after the Rawalpindi conspiracy and the general suspicion of anyone who may deviate from accepted opinion resulted in

471 Mohammad Musa, Jawan to General – Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier, East & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984, p. 132. 472 Musa, Jawan to General, p. 12. 473 Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993, p. 134. 474 Interview of Naseerullah, p. 17 & see for instance the claims made by Ali Kuli Khan about Musa’s appointment, in A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Lt-Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan, in I. ul-Majeed Seghal, (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5, Karachi, December 2001, pp. 10-11. 475 A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Lt-Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan, in I. ul- Majeed Seghal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5, Karachi, December 2001, p. 7. 476 Interview of Zahir Alam Khan, p. 5 & the Adjutant General and former ADC of Auchinleck claims he was consulted by Ayub upon the merits of Habibullah and Musa and that he informed Ayub that if he wanted someone independent to choose Habibullah, and if he wanted someone to do what he said to choose Musa, in Major General S. Shahid Hamid, Early Years of Pakistan – Including the Period from August, 1947 to 1959, Ferozsons, Karachi, 1993, p. 128. 477 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 132-133. 129

unwelcome attention from military intelligence. 478 An Officer in the ISI at Lahore during this period noted that Ayub did rely on the ISI for internal and external intelligence concerning anti-state activities.479

Gul notes that in removing potential threats from the Army Ayub had disposed of both the mediocre and the talented. Ayub’s action inspired a fear of the ‘purge’ within the Officer Corps that also contributed to what was described as a “blind obedience bordering on obsequiousness”.480

Doctrinal and training developments in the Army

The Pakistan Army in its continuing strategic focus upon India in 1958 established a cell to study and prepare indigenous tactical doctrines more attuned to their terrain, conditions and personnel. The plan featured the introduction of ‘empowered’ leadership at the lower levels of command, in a move designed to create a culture of initiative amongst Officers fearful of undertaking any alternative outside of the chain of command.481 The plan seemingly contradicts what Gul argued was occurring in the Army during the time, though other opinions also claimed the time to be one of immense productivity and initiative; for example, the Director of Weapons and Equipment at GHQ from 1959 to 1961 believed the period following Ayub’s martial law to be characterised by productivity and in the streamlining of the Army to make it more mobile and hard-hitting. 482

The idea of being a potential solution to Pakistan’s security problems was mooted in a theory put forward in 1960. The theory drew on an older study arguing Afghanistan and Pakistan’s security lay in their fusion, by force if necessary.483 The theory maintained that Mao’s guerrilla warfare theories when combined with the ‘Jihad’ tradition of Pakistan’s martial races would prove to be an irregular warfare advantage.484 The consideration of such innovations was outside the ken of previous British Indian tactical and strategic notions though that Army had

478 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 153-154 479 Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 31. 480 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, p. 133. 481 Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, p. 160. 482 Amjad Ali Khan, September ’65: Before and After, Ferozsons Ltd, Lahore, 1977, pp. 20-21. 483 W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, pp. 299-300. 484 Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, Lahore, 1960, pp. 52-66. 130

established an excellence in aspects of irregular warfare in combating the tribesmen of the Anglo-Afghan Frontier. The nomination of such theories though was interesting in their dilution of Jihad tactics of the tribals with Maoist insurgency practices.

The Army was moving towards the adoption of a number of irregular warfare solutions that were not dissimilar and drew upon tribal methods and Islamic motivation. Before the 1965 War Musa sought to inspire morale and unite the Army through Islamic motivation in the Army and a focus on the martial themes of Islamic injunctions upon warfare. Musa instituted the distribution of specially marked versions of the Quran that highlighted the warfare and motivational portions of the Quran referring to martyrdom, integrity and justice prominently. 485 Musa believed the Pakistan Army had performed well in the 1965 War and that much of this success had been attributable to the Army’s Islamic culture that he had sought to indoctrinate it with.

In the war, the real motivating force for the superb performance of the armed forces was their spirit of Jihad. In the final analysis, Islam and the concept of ‘Ghazi’ or ‘Shaheed’ provides the motivation, the esprit de corps, the élan and the fighting spirit for the Pakistani soldiers and this concept must be nurtured and preserved. 486

The Army had in response to the war inducted a number of strategies to exploit the martial ardour of the tribals called to Jihad. The British Indian Army pedigree did not prevent the Pakistani adoption of more expedient and indigenous forms of military culture and development during this period. Such developments were borne of a frustration and desperation in their inability to acquire needed materiel from the Americans. The increasing recognition of the necessity of capitalising on indigenous elements in Pakistan that could become force multipliers was also becoming the subject of serious consideration.

The very nature of unconventional warfare being developed by the Army was typified in the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ plan prior to the 1965 War and discussed more fully in the next section. During the war Musa approved a number of irregular warfare formations including: a Mujahidin volunteer company, tribal Lashkars from the NWFP, and a Lashkar of Hur tribesmen under the guidance of their spiritual leader

485 My Version, pp. 97-98. 486 My Version, p. 111. 131

the Pir of Pagara.487 These formations were diverse in their ethnic as well as sectarian differences with the tribal Lashkars and Hur tribesmen’s organisation representing different traditions of Islamic adherence and cultural difference. The Army utilised Islam as a means to motivate all of these irregulars with calls to Jihad and raising the hue and cry of ‘Islam in danger’ in its presentation of the Indian enemy in religious terms as the Hindu aggressor.

Additional material and doctrinal assistance was provided by the Chinese. The Chinese offered weapons and defence materiel including the establishment of a small arms factory in East Pakistan.488 The Chinese also provided strategic guidance to Pakistan and advised the Pakistanis that their war establishment was too cumbersome and fatally based on the British pattern, which needed rectification.489 The Chinese suggested that the Pakistanis endeavour to defeat any invading Indian Forces by attrition. 490 The Pakistani’s, concerned with their lack of ‘’, believed success was intimately tied to being able to deliver a decisive counter-attack. The Army believed that conducting a defence near their borders was a great risk as Pakistan was a geographically narrow country with its major cities near its borders. 491 It was felt that for the enemy to move west of Lahore would mean the loss of the country. Though not taking up these Chinese suggestions on non-traditional warfare, the Pakistanis, as noted, strove to develop their own unorthodox methods of strategy and fighting. 492

The Army also looked to expand its recruitment base and its training as another means of addressing the comparative numerical strengths with the Indian Army, which was a realistic imperative, though incongruent with supposed Islamic superiority in overcoming great odds.

During the 1960s the Army attempted to diversify recruitment of ethnic groups into the Army, which was still dominated by Punjabi and Pakhtun personnel. An Adjutant General endeavoured to recruit more Sindhis and Balochis into the Army

487 M. Attiqur Rahman, Back to the Pavilion, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005, p. 122. & My Version, pp. 72-83. 488 History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps: 1947-1992, p. 154. 489 Muhammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1983, p. 27. 490 My Version, p. 27. 491 My Version, p. 28. 492 My Version, p. 28. 132

through a publicity campaign in these provinces. The campaign failed due to what was claimed to be cultural problems with Balochi tribal elders, recruits not wishing to be posted out of their province and refusals to undertake basic induction requirements such as medical examinations.493 It was claimed the recruitment of Bengali Officers was hampered by language problems and poor physical standards.494 Such alleged problems with the Bengali Officers may also have been derived from martial race perceptions on the allegedly inadequate physiognomy of the Bengali, and the fact that the Bengali’s were proudly attached to Bengali culture and language. Nevertheless in the period up to 1965 there were three East Pakistani infantry units raised, with more being raised after 1966.

Training within the Army during the late 1950s and early 1960s largely remained the same as that for the period prior to 1958. Officers graduating in 1959 noted the hard physical training and austerity of the PMA, with their training continuing during the Muslim holy period of Ramadan. 495 Ayub Khan delivered a passing out parade address at the PMA in 1959 and drew attention to the necessity of its austerity. Ayub encouraged the graduating Officers to live as unostentatious Muslims and warned them how greed and corruption had led to the stagnation of the Muslim world. 496 While Ayub encouraged Officers to live a Muslim lifestyle, Officers such as Musharraf who entered the PMA in 1961 noted the continuance of some British Indian Army traditions including offensive ones such as ‘ragging’. 497

Officers of this generation discovered other continuities with the British Indian Army with an Officer of the 12th Baloch in 1964 noting he was taught by a whose father had trained his own father thirty years previously in the British Indian

493 Back to the Pavilion, p. 115. 494 A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Brig. (Retd) Zahir Alam Khan, in I. ul- Majeed Seghal (Ed), Defence Journal, at, http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/april/zakhan.htm, accessed 2 October 2012, p. 6. 495 A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Lt-Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan, in I. ul- Majeed Seghal, (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5, Karachi, December 2001, p. 9. Remembering Our Warriors – Interview of Brig. (Retd) Saeed Ismat’, in I. ul-Majeed Seghal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, November 2001, p. 14. A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Interview of Maj. Gen (Retd) Hidayatullah Khan Niazi’, in I. ul-Majeed Seghal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, August 2001, pp. 11-12. 496 ‘Address to Pakistan Military Academy’ – passing out parade at the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul on April 25, 1959, in Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements – Volume 1: October 1958-June 1959, publisher [nfd], 1961. 497 , In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Free Press, New York, 2006, pp. 40-41. 133

Army. 498 Some compared the Army unfavourably with the period 1947 to 1958, and argued that the Army had been ruined by the implementation of martial law and the assumption of power of Ayub.

Officers with this perspective argued that after 1958 loyalty to Ayub became of primary importance while training came second. Some claimed that examinations in the Army had become simple rote tests of memory rather than the application of acquired knowledge.499 Some also alleged there developed a propensity for senior Officers to indulge in wealth accumulation. Such practices were clearly incongruent with the statements made by Ayub in the previous paragraph on the necessity of austerity. 500 There were other complaints about how the training infrastructure was organised, with arguments that the Staff College be moved to the Punjab or Sindh. Students could then familiarise themselves in the terrain they believed they would actually fight India in, instead of the wilds of Baluchistan where the British had instructed them on Western conflicts.501 Other problems existed with inter-arm rivalry, personality cults and patronage networks believed to have been endemic.502 With Yahya Khan succeeding Musa in September 1966 it was believed the management of the Army began to improve. 503

Training and deployment opportunities became more varied after the 1965 War with Officers undertaking training in the USSR and deployments to the Arab world, such as Jordan, as well as UN missions to such locations as the Congo. 504 Officers in the technical branches also gained experience from their involvement in the great civil engineering schemes of the day with the Army Field Engineers working on the Indus Valley Road (Karakorum Highway). Officers also benefitted from Chinese technical assistance as well as calling upon the skills of those remaining veterans of the 14th Army road building operations in Burma. 505 Domestically, the Army continued to perform in such variegated tasks as locust destruction, anti-

498 Interview of Ali Kuli Khan pp. 13-15. 499 Interview of Zahir Alam Khan, p. 7. 500 Interview of Tajammal, p. 13. 501 Interview of Hidyatullah, p. 21 502 Interview with Naseerullah, p. 12. 503 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, p. 295. 504 Interview with Kuli Khan, p. 21 & Naseerullah, p. 17. Interview with Zahir Alam Khan, p. 11. History of the Pakistan Army Ordnance Corps: 1947-199, p. 147. 505 Interview with Hidyatullah, p. 12. 134

smuggling operations and cyclone relief—such as that provided in East Pakistan during December 1970.506 The Army had also been involved in hostilities with Afghanistan and India. The next section considers the hostilities that Pakistan was involved in during this period.

The Army, Islam and Conflict

Between 1958 and 1970 the Army continued to respond to border incursions on its eastern and western borders. Afghan propaganda and incursions kept the relationship between the two countries in an atmosphere of foment with the Afghans attempting on one occasion to infiltrate a Lashkar of 25,000 men into Pakistan.507 These operations were fraught with military and political sensitivities in dealing with tribal populations inhabiting both sides of the border with tenuous links to national identity and sensitive attitudes to religion. These Pakistan Army operations were conducted deftly to instil a sense of awe so as to maintain relations with tribesmen on the Pakistan side of the border.508

Pakistan primed the 1965 War by initiating an insurgency action in Kashmir code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’. In brief the plan in keeping with the Army’s developing Islamic ethos was predicated on notions of pan-Islamic religious unity and Muslim nationalist aspirations. Operation Gibraltar’s ultimate success resided on a spontaneous uprising of Muslims in the Vale of Kashmir who would eject the Indians and await liberation from their Muslim brethren in the Pakistan Army. Pakistani intelligence on the Kashmiri Muslims’ propensity to actually undertake such an uprising was disastrously miscalculated. The Kashmiri’s neither participated in any large measure and furthermore had on some occasion’s actually notified Indian Security Forces of the presence of Pakistan Army in the Vale.

The reality between what had been achieved by Gibraltar and the stirring Islamically themed announcements by Ayub were striking. Statements by Ayub in a public broadcast on 1 claimed that a popular revolt was underway in Kashmir led by local freedom fighters. Ayub stated that India could hardly blame any

506 Interview with Naseerullah, p. 17. 507 Back to the Pavilion, p. 105. 508 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 105-106. 135

Pakistani from wanting to go to the assistance of their Muslim brethren. 509 Operation Gibraltar and the following military response ‘Operation Grand Slam’ resulted in a stalemate with India and a legion of recriminations within the Army for the indifferent outcome.

One Special Forces Officer claimed that the covert operation designed to inspire the revolt had—even before its commencement—been suspected as a potential fiasco greater than the ‘Bay of Pigs’.510 Musa, the Commander in Chief, was the primary target of blame. Musa in turn blamed Bhutto the Foreign Minister and Ayub the President, for not heeding the Army’s warnings on the lack of preparation, or propensity for the operation to inspire a generalised revolt against the Indians. 511

The policy-makers thwarted the professional assessment and advice on a matter having grave military implications because of their miscalculation of the politico- strategic situation and over-ambitiousness of a few individuals involved in the decision making who were prompted by their desire to achieve some quick and spectacular results in Kashmir by clandestine operations. 512

Gul claimed that Musa and the Chief of General Staff Sher Bahadur had viewed Gibraltar from its inceptio n negatively,

...as a bastard child born of the liaison between the foreign office and HQ 12 Division. 513

The Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was blamed by Musa and a number of other Officers for Bhutto’s hawkish attitudes and his misconstrued views upon the morale of the after earlier Pakistani successes against the Indians in the Rann of Kutch encounter. The plans for the Gibraltar operation had been cloaked in secrecy with no written records being kept by the Kashmir cell established by the government to oversight the strategy. Gul, who had been DMO at

509 Speeches and Statements – Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan President of Pakistan, Volume – VIII, July 1965 – June 1966, pp. 20-21. 510 The ‘Bay of Pigs’ here refers to the April 17, 1961 failed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles. The operation like ‘Gibraltar’ was meant to be covert and reliant on its success by the anticipated support of the Cuban population and elements of the military & Zahir Alam Khan, Op.Cit, p. 11. 511 My Version, p. 4 & Musa’s account is corroborated by the DMO Gul Hassan who though highly critical of Musa’s leadership did note that Musa had sent ‘unambiguous’ advice to the government that the Indians would not limit their retaliation to Kashmir alone, in Gul Hassan Khan, Op.Cit, p. 181. 512 My Version, p. 4. 513 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, p. 223. 136

the time, acknowledged his own role in the debacle, and noted that the entire operation been hampered by the confusion created by multiple levels of secrecy and information silos. As a result confusion reigned as to the levels of estimated assistance that could be expected from Kashmir, as well as the amount of communications and preparatory work that had been undertaken. Gul acerbically noted,

...continuous references to Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and a host of other leaders from the Indian held part of Kashmir. This raised my morale because I gained the impression that the civilian members of the cell and these leaders were inseparable chums! And that the latter were more than anxious to rid their part of Kashmir of the Indian Army with some help from us... 514

The opinions on Operation Gibraltar and the 1965 War that it prompted were divisive and riven with bitter claims and counter-claims of fault and alleged responsibility. Some of the material written shortly after the war though was still saturated with jingoism celebrating the superiority of Muslims and the innate martial qualities of the Pakistan soldier. Ayub himself had claimed in a public broadcast that the war had caused a resurgence of Islamic faith in Pakistan. Ayub the modernist Muslim announced that the blood of Pakistan’s martyred soldiers had purified the country by their sacrifice against the Indian aggressors. 515 For the East Pakistanis all the war indicated was a confirmation of their second-class status in the country with the Army’s strategic notion of their defence lying in the West.

Officers persisted in their belief that the Indians had been comprehensively beaten and that this victory was obtained precisely because of the allegedly Islamic qualities of Pakistan’s Army. Some drew analogies between the Pakistan Army and the Islamic Ghazi’s of antiquity in battles in which the prophet had overcome hordes of the enemies of the faith in the battles of Uhud and Badr.516 More vitriolically, some extolled the superiority of the martyrdom seeking Pakistani soldiers compared to the allegedly ‘rum’ soaked, whining Indian soldier, and played upon bigoted caricatures

514 Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 115-116. 515 Speeches and Statements, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, Volume- VIII, July 1965 – June 1966, Din Muhaamed Press, Karachi, 1966, p. 66 & p. 156. 516 A.H. Amin, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Maj. (Retd) Raja Nadir Pervaiz, in I. ul- Majeed Seghal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, Karachi, October, 2002, p. 17. Brig. (Retd) , Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge, Al Mukhtar Publishers, Rawalpindi, 1967, p. 7. 137

of the Hindu being inspired by the teachings of the ancient Hindu strategist Kautilya. 517

Many though thought less jingoistically and believed that Pakistan should have won the war comprehensively and attributed blame to the personality cult that Ayub had allowed the Army to become invested with.518 Others were disgusted with what they claimed was the Army’s culture of narcissism in awarding what one described as bogus service awards in the aftermath of the war. Such views were prominent amongst that group of Officers who considered Ayub’s impact on the Army to have been entirely damaging to its professional development.519

Operation Gibraltar had initially caught the Indians off guard until they had become aware of armed intruders entering Kashmir. The Indians had received accounts of “...armed men approaching Kashmiri herdsmen and offering them money for information on deployment of Indian troops”.520 While the operation itself ultimately failed, the intruders did manage to recruit some locals as guides and to achieve some level of disruption but did not succeed in causing the rebellion on which the success of the operation hinged.521 In this the Army had significantly miscalculated both the appeal and ability of the Kashmiri’s to undertake such an Islamica lly martial revolt.

Others more pragmatically saw cultural lessons in the outcome of the war. One regimental history in rebutting the jingoism prevalent during and immediately after the war argued that the war had in fact dispelled the myth prevalent at the time about the alleged lack of fighting prowess of the Hindu Army. These myths and perceptions of the Hindu soldier were redolent with martial race stereotypes and had been rampant in the Army, and in Pakistan more generally, immediately after the Pakistani success in the Rann of Kutch encounter.

517 Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge p. 50. Kautilya’s major work was the Arthasastra a treatise on statecraft that is often provided as an example of the allegedly inherent treachery of the Hindu, while Beg argued the nature of Hinduism was essentially intolerant and full of hatred for those who were not Hindu, Aziz Beg, Pakistan Faces India, and Amer Publications, Lahore, 1966, p. 194. 518 Zahir Alam Khan, p. 8, Muhammd Taj, p. 13 & Naseerullah, p. 16. 519 Interview with Tajammal, p. 18. 520 R.D. Pradhan, 1965 War The Inside Story – Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan’s Diary of India- Pakistan War, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 2007, p. 5 & 1965 War The Inside Story, p. 5. 521 Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967, p. 472. 138

The bubble of a myth was pricked, that Indian soldiers were incapable of fighting, that they had no staying power, and so on. This had been inculcated among the younger lot, both Officers and me, by those who should have known better. Once in combat they received a rude jolt, and realised that the Indians were as good or as bad as anybody, and that both sides made the same blunders in combat. 522

Conclusion

Ayub’s rule had increased the divisions between West and East Pakistan in his natural assumption of the locus of political and military control in West Pakistan by West Pakistanis. Ayub also wrongly assumed his program of basic democracies, an allegedly revolutionary system of controlled democracy, to be the solution to Pakistan’s political woes. Ayub also miscalculated the countries preference for parliamentary democracy over presidential rule. Despite the amount of politicking and explanation in which Ayub would promote his progressive policies he failed to prevent a religious and social backlash to his programs aimed at addressing problems such as population growth and the inequities of Islamic family law. Ayub had also significantly miscalculated Indian responses to what the Pakistani’s hoped would be a localised response to Operation Gibraltar. Ayub would not recover from the indifferent result obtained by the Army in the war.

The next conflict the Pakistan Army was involved in was in the eastern wing of their country where the increasing clamour for representation and rights would develop into a full-blown movement for independence. While the next chapter shall address the war and its impact upon Pakistan and its Army, it can be briefly recounted that the war, which was by its nature initially a civil war, was one of unremitting brutality. Both sides committed atrocities, but the ideological slant with which the Army would undertake the operations in East Pakistan would invest the conflict with religious and ethnic undertones. The Army would commit prodigious human rights violations and mass murder that their detractors would label a form of genocide. The martial race persona of the Officers involved was a significant element in the debacle that followed where these same Officers believed they were engaged in a Jihad to save the unity of Pakistan. These Officers believed they were engaged in the

522 M.Y. Effendi, Punjab Cavalry: Evolution, Role, Organisation and Tactical Doctrine, 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) 1849-1971, Oxford University Press, 2007, Karachi, p. 198. 139

eradication of Indian inspired fifth columnists amongst the Hindu population as well as the pernicious effects of Hinduism. These Officers would also view their fellow East Pakistani Muslim citizens as having been tainted by these elements and that they were all now somehow failed Muslims.

140

141

Chapter V War, Islam and Dismemberment: 1970–1971

We believed that we were men of destiny, selected for special service in defence of Pakistan –

a country created in the name of Islam. We became convinced of our indestructibility...

(Major General Arshad Qureshi on beliefs of the Army in East Pakistan in 1970) 523

Introduction

In response to the West Pakistani denial of Mujib—the leader of the in being able to take up his position as Prime Minister in the wake of his decisive election win—agitation in the East against the West Pakistani government increased dramatically. East Pakistani grievances were expressed through the East Pakistani media and Free Bangladesh media in Calcutta, which seemed particularly adept at demoralising the West Pakistani troops. The flying of Bangladeshi flags as well as the isolation of West Pakistani officials and military in Pakistan was enacted to impress upon the West Pakistani authorities the extent of East Pakistani grievances. The Army sought to counter this via an unsuccessful media campaign that sought to emphasise the alleged Indian, communist and atheist identities of the East Pakistanis as opposed to the Islam for which the state had been formed and which the Army still guarded.

The aim of this chapter through four sections is to explore how Islam became the centrepiece of the contested struggle to maintain control of East Pakistan, through its mobilisation by the Pakistani military government and its connection to the motivation of its Army in East Pakistan. Initially, some background to the conflict between West and East Pakistan shall be provided. Secondly, the chapter will examine the role of Islam in the Army during the late 1960s, leading into the conflict with a particular focus on how Officers had begun to exhibit a more pronounced

523 Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 111. 142

Islamic consciousness. This will be undertaken by considering, amongst other evidence, Army Officers submissions to Army publications in which they argued for a greater role for Islam in the Army. Additionally, the comparisons some of these Officers made upon the religious nature of the Pakistan Army and Israel Defence Force(IDF) and their respective strategic environments shall be examined.

The comparisons between Israel and the Army are important in comprehending how Army Officers had internalised beliefs in regard to how the Army could exploit its Islamic character as they claimed the Jewish state had comparatively undertaken with Judaism within the Israel Defence Forces. The comparison with the IDF was driven by the realisation that Israel like Pakistan had been formed as a religious homeland and a belief that without a contemporary Islamic model the Pakistan Army could derive lessons from the Israeli’s in how to integrate religion into the military and use it as a model for cohesive nationalisation and sacralisation of the military. The third section will explore how certain elements of the Army became involved in unmitigated brutality and how some of these brutal responses sought justification in religious terms. Lastly, an examination of how religion was invoked in the conflict in an attempt to attribute blame for the secessionist Awami League on Indian influence. Attention is also given to what the benefits to the Army were in having their role Islamised in opposition to the alleged Hindu, socialist and atheist nature of the East Pakistani opposition.

Sheikh Mujibur ur-Rehman the leader of the Awami League in opposition to the military government of Ayub and then Yahya Khan sought greater representation and provincial autonomy for the East Pakistanis who had a distinct culture and ethnicity. East Pakistan also had a substantial Hindu population. Mujibur desired the cessation of ethnic and institutional discrimination of East Pakistanis and in 1970 he had won a populous following. Mujibur’s popularity was translated into electoral success in 1970 and he should have been invited to form a government. 524 Ultimately Yahya Khan’s decision not to invite Mujibur to form a government triggered a popular uprising that protested yet a further example of West Pakistani discrimination.

524Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League emerged as the single largest party in the Pakistan National Assembly followed by Bhutto’s PPP. Pakistan 1947-97 – 50 Years of Independence, p.154. 143

The civil unrest in turn prompted a West Pakistan security response that involved the Army. Large numbers of civil police and other government functionaries who were East Pakistani had left their posts out of fear of the West Pakistani response and or support for Mujibur. The Army had been placed into a difficult position and while its own Commander, Yahya Khan, prevaricated and Bhutto remained obstinately against allowing Mujibur to form an Awami League dominated government that he could not control, the Army was taking on the invidious complexion of an Army of occupation. Furthermore, though placed into this position, not all Army Officers viewed the East Pakistan situation as one simplistically involving treacherous elements challenging the writ of the national government that were inspired by revolutionaries and the Indians.

Some Officers disagreed with what they perceived as Yahya’s and the governments poorly conceived and inept management of the situation. Internally these differences were exhibited in response to ignoring specific orders in East Pakistan, or by refusal to undertake duty in East Pakistan, or ultimately by resigning rather than executing duties they saw as incongruent to their roles as professional Army Officers.525

East Pakistan, Islam and Identity

The belief that the situation in East Pakistan was escalating into a Civil War also affected the willingness of Officers to deploy to East Pakistan. Other senior Officers of the time saw such actions by Officers as derelictions of duty that were incrementally contributing to the emboldening of the Bengalis. 526 Some were evolving or already maintained theories that involved blame of the East Pakistan Hindu minority for politically influencing the minds of the Bengalis against Pakistan. Still others frankly concluded that Islam with the vast cultural difference between the two wings had simply never been enough to hold the two wings together. Such

525 The Officer commanding East Pakistan, Lt. General Yaqub Khan refused Yahya’s orders to fire at the mobs and resigned his command, in Brig. (Retd) A.R. Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality’, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, pp. 184-185; former Pakistan Commander in Chief Musa described Yaqub as ‘morally courageous’, in General Mohammad Musa, ‘Jawan to General – Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier’, East & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984 & Interview of Muhammad Taj, p. 14.

526 Memoirs of Lt. Gen . Gu l Hassan Khan’, OUP, Karachi, 1993.

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opinions were arguably correct as there were stark differences between the West and East culturally, linguistically and religiously. There were doubts held as to whether Islam in a manner acceptable to both wings of the country would ever be an effective bond. Such attitudes were supported by some research undertaken during the mid- 1960s. This research suggested West Pakistanis’ believed Islam to be a far more effective bond than did their fellow East Pakistani citizens.527 The research had shown Islam to be an effective unifying bond only if it could be proven that ‘Islam was in danger’.528 Islam in danger in context of the 1947–48 Kashmir War was analysed in Chapter Two.

To Mujibur and the East Pakistanis the issue was not about whether or not they were good Muslims, but rather why they were treated as second-class citizens by their numerically inferior fellow Muslim citizens from the western wing of the country. Decades of suffering, low representation in the government, especially so in the Officer Corps of the Army, as well as a belief that the West was profiting from such Eastern based industries as Jute were issues of abiding importance to the East Pakistanis who had never had an effective voice in government. East Pakistani lack of representation had been near total with the successive military governments of Ayub and now Yahya effectively closing out any political representation. These concerns, together with a perceived lack of response to the cataclysmic 1970 cyclones that had ravaged East Pakistan, had deeply embittered the East Pakistanis. These grievances had exponentially increased the popularity of Mujibur’s Awami Party, and their claim for autonomy and parity. The East Pakistani political agenda was articulated in their ‘Six Point’ claim that was rejected outright by the Yahya regime as a device to break up the nation. 529

Mujibur and the Awami League had described their grievances in the language of politics and their lack of representation. The West Pakistani’s who refused to

527 Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, in South Asian Politics and Religion, (Ed) Donald Eugene Smith, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, pp. 408-409. 528 Zahir Alam Khan, Ibid, pp. 15-16, & Khalid Bin Sayeed, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, pp. 408-409. 529 The ‘Six Points’ included demands for provincial taxation and revenue collection as East Pakistan had always felt discriminated against in regard to profits for their Jute industry, and while seeing Defence and Foreign Affairs as a Federal responsibility desired their own or paramilitary force, an aspect perhaps of East Pakistani rejections of West Pakistani notions that the East’s defence lies in the West. 145

acknowledge Mujibur’s decisive win in the 1970 election and who were determined to maintain West Pakistani dominance over the East came to increasingly describe Mujibur’s and the East Pakistani protest as one driven by a melange of interests opposed to West Pakistan and critically opposed to Islam. The West Pakistanis harried by East Pakistani domestic propaganda domestically as well as that from East Pakistani patriots in Calcutta had no effective response. The Bengali propaganda had also contributed to the development of West Pakistani Officers keen mistrust of their East Pakistani Army colleagues. This mistrust would prove to be fatal in many instances. Some Special Force Officers had wanted to take the fight to the Indians very early on in the disturbances, to strike back at the ‘Hindu’ inspired propaganda. One Officer suggested an innovative raid on Calcutta to attack the support network of the East Pakistani separatists.530 The Pakistanis, seeking a decisive response to quash the East Pakistani unrest, decided on a major operation in to eradicate the anti-state forces. This initiative was to be known as .

Concerns over the reliability of the East Pakistani members of the Army led the Army hierarchy to institute the separation of Bengali personnel into small contingents. The Army effectively created West Pakistani defence perimeters within compounds shared by personnel from both wings.531 The eventual forcible disarmament of their Bengali colleagues led to pitched battles being fought within unit lines, with Bengali prisoners who had served in some units since their inception being taken out and shot by their erstwhile colleagues. 532 Other Bengali members of the Pakistan Army fled and joined the Mukhti Bahini and subsequently planned and executed offensive operations against their former comrades.533

Internationally, the West Pakistanis had become isolated with the Indians successfully drawing world attention to the burgeoning refugee crisis that the conflict was generating. India was subject to a massive refugee influx of East Pakistanis fleeing the Army and their Islamist paramilitaries. Though the West Pakistani’s held out hopes for either their Chinese or American friends to aid them it was never really

530 Interview of Zahir Alam Khan, pp. 11-12. 531 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, pp. 259-262.

532 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998 533 Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War-1971, Chittaranjan Press, Dhaka, 1974. 146

forthcoming though American warships did reach the Bay of Bengal ostensibly to protect American interests.

Signficant figures in the US Administration, though hopeful that Pakistan would retain its unity, were bemused by the attitude General Yahya Khan and his clique of Generals persisted with. Kissinger, who had come to acknowledge the American faults in US perceptions of Pakistan as an ally against communist aggression, had not appreciated the extent of the Pakistani focus on India.534 As Pakistan approached war with India in 1971 the Americans were surprised at the arrogance and naiveté of the Pakistan Army Generals’ belief in their martial race identity and Islamic exceptionalism to rescue them from their developing debacle,

When I asked as tactfully as I could about the Indian advantage in numbers and equipment, Yahya and his colleagues answered with bravado about the historic superiority of Moslem fighters. 535

India who was at the forefront of the crisis and sheltering the refugees exiting East Pakistan continued to lay much blame on American decisions. The Indians blamed the US for accelerating tensions on the subcontinent and by their provision of arms to Pakistan between 1954 and 1965. , echoing Morgenthau’s critical 1956 appraisal of Pakistan noted in Chapter Three, opined that the only thing holding Pakistan together was its hatred for India.536

The widespread reporting of the brutalities that the Army was perpetrating including by one of its own former army journalists had effectively made the Army a pariah in world opinion. In executing Operation Searchlight the Army undertook a number of highly criticised operations aimed at neutralising the East Pakistani opposition. India eventually provided support to these opposition separatists and created logistics and training cells in India close to the East Pakistani frontier. The Army apart from its in-direct suppression operations had included the disproportionate use of lethal force including tanks firing against the lightly or unarmed Bengalis in Dhaka. The Army had also initiated a number of unconventional warfare tactics in seeking to extinguish the East Pakistani opposition.

534 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, Hodder and Stoughton, Sydney, 1979, p. 845. 535 The White House Years, p. 861 536 The White House Years, p. 881 147

These tactics had their foundations in those asymmetric operations noted in the previous chapter in which the Army had organised Mujahidin units and the recruitment of the Hur tribesmen in West Pakistan. The Army now co-opted members of the Chakma Hill tribes in the south of East Pakistan to inform upon rebel activity. Similarly, the Army also employed Mizo tribesmen who had recently moved to the Pakistani side of the border after their militant activity against the Indians, and organised three battalions of these tribesmen to help clear the hill tracts area.537 The next section of this chapter examines how Islam was itself gaining political momentum in the late 1960s and into the early 1970s.

The invocation of Islam by Yahya for an Army consisting nearly entirely of Muslims had not been unusual in itself, though the contested nature of this conflict, which in the first instance was against fellow Muslims, made it so.

Islam and the Army from the mid-60’s to the cusp of War

The emergence of Islam as something more than a discrete identity factor in the Army had been emerging and was already apparent in internal Pakistan Army publications written by mid-ranking Officers from the mid-1960s onward. Notions of faith enabling Muslim soldiers to overcome disparities in comparative strength of their adversaries, as well as materiel and technological strength were common themes in Army publications. These themes were popularly discussed in the Pakistan Army Journal. This was despite some Officers having viewed the 1965 War as an opportunity to dispense with the notion of inherent Pakistan Islamic martial race superiority over the inferior Hindu Indian. 538

Such introspection was not apparently widespread as many Officers persisted in believing in and promoting the idea that Islamic piety as well as their martial heritage provided them an authentic comparative advantage over their adversaries. The Army, some argued, required a robust Islamic indoctrination process through

537 Interview with Zahir Alam Khan, pp. 14-15. Zahir writes that the alliance with Mizo’s was dependent upon the supply of food and medical support. Zahir notes that he employed one Mizo battalion with an SSG company to clear Mahalchari and Khagrachari up to the border with India. 538 Though COAS Musa had made notable comments about ‘Martial spirit’ and Islam in the wake of the 1965 war others saw it differently. See for instance the comments made upon the myth of Indian martial incapability being ‘pricked’, in M .Y. Effendi, Punjab Cavalry: Evolution, Role, Organisation and Tactical Doctrine, 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) 1849-1971, Oxford University Press, 2007, Karachi, p. 198. 148

Officer Corps and enlisted personnel alike. This process required a dedicated and methodical process of indoctrination by Maulvis and committed Army Officers pious in outlook and qualified in religious instruction. It was argued that this would revolutionise the Army and allow it to break free of its colonial rituals, pompous British Indian baggage, practices, and pageantry that had shackled the innate advantages of an Islamic inheritance that Pakistani Army Officers had not totally exploited to date. 539

Officers also considered other methodologies from beyond the Muslim world and cited examples from the communist bloc similar to those arguments made in 1960 and discussed in the previous chapter combining Maoist and South Asian Jihadist traditions. In this way some Officers cited the tactical and strategic success of the Vietcong during this time against the US as worthy of careful analysis. However, these publications contained a significant emphasis on how religious and ideological indoctrination could contribute to success. Whether the focus on religious themes in these journals was the impact of the mounting protests at West Pakistani dominance by autonomy minded East Pakistanis is unknown. Equally unknown is whether this was part of the nascent Army process of psychological and ideological inoculation against the rampant secularism and socialism they associated with the Awami League. The Army’s interests in analysing the role of religion in establishing an effective Army were diverse and from unexpected quarters.

Arguing the ideological similarities as being valid, some Officers during the period drew analogies between the Pakistan Army and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). A number of Officers devoted considerable thought on these matters delving significantly below shallow comparisons, arguing that Israel had similarly been formed in the late 1940s as a religious homeland and attained only after great tribulations. Officers argued that Pakistan—like Israel—was outnumbered and encircled by enemies. Though Officers acknowledged that Islam was clearly the superior of the three Abrahamic religions in being the final revealed message, there were valuable lessons to be drawn from the Jewish state and its acknowledged

539 Major Masud Akhtar Zaigham, ‘Of Nerves and Guts’, in Maj. Moinuddin (Ed), Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 1, June, 1971, pp. 46. 149

military successes. Equally important were the Israeli successes in utilising the IDF as a vehicle for national cohesion.

These analogies in some ways were not unusual as Pakistan’s revered poet, philosopher and politician Sir —credited with having inspired the idea of Pakistan before his death in 1938— had drawn comparisons between the plight of South Asia’s Muslims and the Israelites. Iqbal had written on such comparisons in comparing the tribulations of the Muslims and Jews in his poem the Rumuz-e Bekhudi (Mysteries of Selflessness) in which Iqbal’s focus on the endurance of the Jews in the diaspora was used as an example that South Asia’s Muslims could usefully follow. 540

Officers interested in this analogy between 1967 and 1971 likewise believed the lessons to be gleaned from how the Jews had established their nation against tremendous opposition were comparable to the tribulations experienced by the Muslims during partition. 541

It is detestable for us to find anything in common with this mischievous state but we must admit that we are similarly small in area and badly outnumbered in men and material by our most implacable potential enemy.542

The analysis by these Officers clearly identified the fact that while the state of Israel was repugnant there could be aspects of its strategic organisation and means of defence of clear use to Pakistan. The analogies between the two states, especially the belief in being surrounded by enemies bent on their annihilation, forged by initially poorly equipped armies against more numerous enemies had in fact generated martial myths of similar context in both states. Similar to Pakistan’s objectives, the Israeli myths worked to maintain awareness of their heroism, sacrifice, loss and grief from Israel’s existential 1948 War and subsequent conflicts. 543 This was precisely

540 Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion – Pakistan as a Political Idea, Hurst & Company, London, 2013, p. 116. 541 See for example articles in the Pakistan Army Journal in 1970-71 that reflect this interest, Maj. Moinuddin, ‘The Lesson – An analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War’, in (Ed) Maj. Moinuddin, Pakistan Army Journal, Vo l. XII, No. 1, June, 1970, GHQ Rawalpindi, pp. 17-33, Major Masud Akhtar Zaigham, ‘Of Nerves and Guts’, in Maj. Moinuddin (Ed), Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 1, June, 1971. 542 Maj. Anis Ahmed, ‘A case for an Integrated Defence Force in Pakistan’, in (Ed) Maj. S.A.A. Abidi, Pakistan Army Journal, Vo l. IX, No. 2, December 1967, GHQ, Rawalpinid, p. 6. 543 Martin Van Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey – The Rise of Modern Israel, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010, p. 66. 150

how the Army’s strategic culture also inducted religion, grief and loss into their narratives of the lost opportunities of their own 1948 Kashmir War. The effective management and conflation of religion and martial myth by the Israeli’s in creating a national identity was a particularly appealing aspect of the Israeli example.

Some saw an almost miraculous nature in the Israeli successes of the late 1960s with this being attributed to the skilful Israeli management of religion and national ideology. One Officer argued in a case study of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War that the foundations of Israeli success were certainly attributable to their effective religious and ideological indoctrination. This Officer argued that Pakistan could learn from the Israeli example and that Pakistan had been negligent in having not exploited the ‘martial’ advantages of Islam. The Officer concluded that this advantage could be reclaimed by the Army embarking on a more authentic religious indoctrination of the Officer Corps and Army than had occurred to date.544

The consideration by these Officers of the IDF which had experienced celebrated victories and success during the 1960s is instructive on how these Officers sought comparison in a state formed as a religious homeland like themselves. These Officers in comparison had not chosen the example of their larger Chinese or ostensible American allies whose martial myths were significantly different. Communist China was ideologically atheist and America’s frontier myths had little similarity to Pakistan except for some comparisons with the North West Frontier. Ironically, in another similarity between the two nations formed as religious homelands was the mimicry and devotion of Pakistani Officers for their British Indian military heritage. Eminent Israeli Army Officers such as Haim Laskov who had founded Israel’s first Officer School also shared an admiration for British Army culture. 545

The Pakistanis, in lamenting their tardiness in attempting to combine religious and ideological motivation to their Officer Corps in comparison to the Israelis, were perhaps referring to the role of the IDF rabbinate the ha-rabbanut ha-tzeva’it formed in 1949. Ben Gurion had envisioned the rabbinate undertaking a role in the unification

544 The Lesson – An analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War’, in (Ed) Maj. Moinuddin, Pakistan Army Journal, Vo l. XII, No. 1, June, 1970, GHQ Rawalpindi, p. 30. 545 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars – War and Peace in the Middle East, Arms and Armour Press, 1982, p. 48 & p. 63. 151

and homogenising of the newly formed Israeli society.546 Israel formed from a single religious group like Pakistan possessed a population of different sectarian divides as well as different languages and traditions, also like Pakistan.

The Israelis had emphasised in their early wars the religious themes inherent in their efforts to seize and protect the holy land gifted to them by Yahweh. The Israeli successes in the 1956 Suez campaign—as noted in Chapter Three so abhorred by Pakistanis—were for the Israelis particularly redolent with ‘religious-mythical’ connotations. 547 Israel had also undertaken a process to unify the disparate linguistic, religious and ethnic divide of their country by a dedicated process of education and the promotion of the unifying aspects of Hebrew for which the IDF was especially prominent. 548 The Pakistan Army had not followed a similar inclusionary path as had the IDF and the Army remained dominated by the Punjabis and to a lesser degree the Pakhtuns. The efforts devoted to instituting Urdu as their national language had collided with the cultural preferences of the Bengalis for their own language and culture.

While Hebrew resonated with the antiquity of Jewish claims to the holy land, Urdu could not fulfil the same holy space for Pakistan. While Urdu had been the language of the British Indian Army it was not even native to West Pakistan. Arabic also could not be pressed into service as the national language, despite some who had suggested this, as it was simply not achievable in terms of trying to re-educate the teeming populations of East and West Pakistan in a language that was foreign to them, except in its recital of the Quran. Essentially the example of Israel and the IDF were a model of what could be achieved if a new state founded on religion could effectively harness religion as an integrational and motivational force for military and state notwithstanding the significant differences between the two states.

Pakistan continued to experience troubles in promoting Urdu beyond the upper echelons of military and civil service in the western wing of the country where a number of distinct regional and sub-regional languages existed. Pakistan, in

546 Stuart A. Cohen, ‘From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF’, Armed Forces and Society, Vo l. 25, No. 3, Spring 1999, pp. 388-389. 547 Martin Van Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey – The Rise of Modern Israel, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010, p. 123. 548 Martin Van Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey – The Rise of Modern Israel, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010, pp. 92-93. 152

promulgating Urdu like Indonesia had in promoting Bahasa Indonesia, was attempting to introduce a language foreign to a large number of its citizens. Pakistan was also hamstrung by the fact that its exercise in uniting the people by religion and language was being undertaken within a much larger and less educated population than Israel had to manage. The Indonesians, like Pakistan and its Punjabi domination, had problems securing unity driven from a Javanese powerbase. The Indonesians also had ruminated on their identity and whether they should pursue a doctrinaire form of Islam or become a secular state with guaranteed freedom of religion.549 Religion had initially only been considered by the Indonesian revolutionary forces “as a factor contributing to the morale and morals of individual fighting men”.550 Indonesia though independent continued to suffer from internecine rebellions and autonomy movements that the Army was perennially seeking to subdue. 551

Pakistani Officers in the late 1960s and on the cusp of the war with India were attempting to inculcate a sense of awe and appreciation of great military leaders from within the Islamic world. Acknowledging their indigenous and Islamic characters they desired valid models from the Islamic world instead of the Western military figures and battles that had been the standard in both the British Indian and early post-partition period of the Army. Such arguments were in effect attempting to normalise the celebration of indigenous and Islamic military leaders as the benchmarks of a Pakistani and Islamic tradition instead of Frederick the Great, Wellington (who had regrettably obtained a great deal of his renown from his actions in the subcontinent) and others who had achieved their fame in crushing colonial adversaries.

Instead of these Western figures the Muslim Officers of this generation called for the genuine celebration of examples from the history of renowned Muslim military leaders such as Saladin. Officers also argued renewed attention as to why these Muslim leaders were successful and reminded their audience of the importance of attention to the qualities and spiritual details of true Mujahids and their achievements in the early battles of the Muslim community. These were not glib or crank references

549 Howard M. Federspiel, ‘The Military and Islam in ’s Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, Vo l. 46, No. 3 (Autumn 1973), p. 409. 550 Federspiel, ‘The Military and Islam in Sukarno’s Indonesia’, p. 410. 551 Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, Equinox Publishing, Indonesia, 2006. 153

to Islam. The arguments of these Officers were presented passionately and authentically within the pages of Army journals urging their fellow Officers to a return to the pure ways of Islam and to cleanse the Army of cultural and military practices that were un-Islamic. 552

These articles published in 1971 on the cusp of the greatest debacle to befall the Pakistan Army, were almost prescient in their calls for a greater inclusion of Islam into the Army. These same arguments would attain an unprecedented popularity amongst other middle ranking Officers less than one year after their publication. The East Pakistan debacle would be blamed on the slavish debaucheries and thoroughly un-Islamic practices of Yahya Khan and his coterie of alleged sycophants populating Pakistan Army headquarters and command positions in East Pakistan.

It must be noted that not all Officers desired the thorough Islamisation of the Army but rather expressed opinions along a continuum of moderate to significant inclusion of Islam into the Army. Islam seemed to be becoming more relevant to the culture of the Officer Corps amid some of the regional and global development inherent in the resurgence of Islamic consciousness during the late 1960s and rapidly increasing into the 1970s.553

Aiding this Islamic consciousness was perhaps the earlier mentioned phenomena of the younger generation of Officers born from 1947 onwards having, unlike their predecessors, not lived in close proximity to large non-Muslim communities. These Officers who had never served in a multi-ethnic and a religiously diverse army as the British Indian Army and the post-independence Indian Army, lacked a familiarity of who the Indians were. These Officers had been fed on a near continuous rhetoric of Muslim exceptionalism, as well as patently jingoistic, biased and bigoted literature denigrating Indian military prowess and India more generally. The Indian Army itself could not indulge in such practices as it consisted of Sikh, Hindu and Muslim elements.

552 Col. Sirdar Hasan Mahmud, ‘Tradition – a spur or a shackle’ and Brig. Sardar Ahmad, ‘The Shining Star of Islam’, in (Ed) Maj.Muhammad Tariq, Pakistan Army Journal, Vo l. XIII, No. 2, , GHQ, Rawalpindi. 553 For a discussion of the Islamic resurgence globally from the late 1960s to early new millennium as well as Pakistan during the 1970s to 1988 see, Gilles Keppel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London, 2002, pp. 98-105 and especially, Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995.

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It was because the Army was so thoroughly infused with a sense of religious righteousness, in the belief they were preventing the disintegration of the country from non-Muslim and allegedly Indian inspired fellow citizens engaged in an unmitigated savagery that in some respects was justified on religious grounds. It is to this subject that the final section of this chapter now moves.

Brutality and righteousness in the 1971 conflict

It became apparent that some in the Army were determined to eradicate all opposition from Mujibur’s Awami League and other perceived enemies, in a conflict that had become coloured by notions of religion and ethnicity. Officers noted how they had received orders to kill any Hindus they found and that they were assisted in these killings by members of the paramilitary al-Badr and al-Shams groups of the radicalised East Pakistan branch of Maududi’s Jama’at-i-Islami.554 Officers acknowledged the imperialistic nature of the Army in East Pakistan and noted the differences and foreign customs of the Bengali’s. The majority of senior ranks hailed from the Punjab and North West Frontier Province where the geographical, ethnic and religious dissimilarities were strikingly different. There was a stark contrast from the riverine environment of East Pakistan where the population were physiologically different as well. Numerous Officers manifested a striking level of bigotry towards the Bengalis, and a profound contempt for the Chairman of the Awami League. Many Officers believed Mujibur to be nothing more than a stooge of the Indians, while the large native Hindu population were considered fifth columnists in the employ of the Indians. 555 Like earlier generations of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers serving in areas beyond Dacca they thought of themselves as being immersed in a foreign country. The most bigoted thought the country to be populated by a contemptuous population of aliens speaking

554 One of these Officers was Colonel Nadir Ali, ‘A khaki dissident on 1971’, in Viewpoint, Online Issue No. 129, November 2012, http://www.viewpointonline.net/a-khaki-dissident-on-1971.html, accessed, 6 December 2012. Ali had served under Z.A Khan (also a source in this chapter) in the Special Forces and with Khan took part in the arrest of Mujib & Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution – The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1994, pp. 168-169. The Jama’at-I-Islami was opposed to the nationalist aspirations of the Bengalis, which they saw as anathema to the more important objective of creating an Islamic state. Al- Badr and Al-Shams units were paramilitary units recruited from the local Bihari population to counteract the impact of the Mukhti Bahini they were oversighted by the Pakistan Army. 555 Brig. (R) Karrar Ali Agha, Witness to Carnage, Salman Art Press (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 2011, p. 28. 155

a foreign language and practising a suspect form of Islam influenced by overfamiliarity with and close proximity to Hindu culture. 556

An Army public relations Officer considered the West Pakistani soldiers to have been thoroughly imbued with these notions of their own superiority. The Officer furthermore noted the Army believed themselves to be the invincible and righteous soldiers of Islam reflecting the attitude noted in the epigraph that began this chapter. Such beliefs had made nearly any act legitimate if it served to rout out the rebels, and could be justified as preserving the unity of the sacred Muslim homeland of Pakistan.557 The murder of Bengalis including the mass killings at such places as Santahar in North East Pakistan, were in this way justified as legitimate retribution for the killing of West Pakistani soldiers committed by mutineering East Pakistani personnel and the Mukhti Bahini.558 The Bengalis had become perceived as simply mutinous and their claims for autonomy as Indian inspired. In this way the Muslim Bengalis had been transformed in the view of the West Pakistani soldiers as somewhat akin to Hindus, and hence worthy targets of punishment. 559

The level of ferocity and violence meted out to the Bengalis though was far from the nature of a righteously waged Jihad. The mass rape of Bengali women and their abduction to be kept as sex slaves in army camps by some Officers was simple criminal barbarism, and completely outside the ken of any Sunnah on the waging of Islamic warfare. These behaviours were also abhorred by other West Pakistanis who came to know of them. Anguish was felt at the irreligious brutality meted out on

556 Brig. (R) Karrar Ali Agha, Witness to Carnage, Salman Art Press (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 2011, p. 15 & Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, p. 188. 557 Brig. A.R. Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, p. 197.

558 Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 104. 559 See the interviews of one hundred and twenty three retired Pakistan Army personnel who had served in East Pakistan conducted in 2004, in Yasmin Saikia, ‘Listening to the Enemy: The Pakistan Army, Violence and Memories of 1971’, in Beyond Crisis – Re-evaluating Pakistan, (Ed) Naveeda Khan, Routledge, New Delhi, 2010, p. 192. & See interviews of upon the rapes, murders and other atrocities committed by the Al-Badr, Razakars and Pakistan Army in Amita Malik, The Year of the Vulture, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1972.

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fellow Muslims by an allegedly Muslim Army. 560 In many other ways the Army’s actions placed itself beyond the pale of a religiously conducted Jihad with behaviours not recorded in any Islamic guide to warfare. The atrocities committed by the Army during the course of the conflict had also included its use of unconventional methods, such as the distribution of poisoned food and booby-trapped weapons. The Special Forces (SSG) had also used child agents to identify rebels. A large proportion of these tactics initiated by the SSG contradicted the precepts of Jihad as well as the laws of the Geneva Convention. 561 Similarly, the Army’s recruitment of three Battalions of Mizo tribesmen in the southeast to fight the was an unconventional tactic that manipulated a marginalised community to achieve aims the tribesmen had little stake in and which was ultimately detrimental to their future.

The brutality of the Army response and its ethnic dimensions was evident to many foreign expatriates in East Pakistan. Many witnessed an array of brutalities committed by the Army from the systematic burning of Hindu villages to young Bengali women and men being abducted by the Army. 562 The breakdown in governance caused by the conflict and the Army’s targeting of Hindus also acted as an impetus to other sectarian and communal violence. Some Muslim Bengalis expediently took the opportunity to settle old grievances with Hindu neighbours and themselves engaged in the looting of Hindu properties and the rape and murder of Hindu women. 563

The atrocities being perpetrated by the Pakistan Army and their paramilitary right wing Muslim allies such as the Al-Badr units became the subject of a compelling literature of atrocity by the Indian and international press. Fatally for the Pakistan Army, the contemporary coverage of their atrocities was reported by one of their own journalists who had been tasked with presenting the Army response in East Pakistan as a legitimate response to an Indian inspired and supported insurgency. Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani of Goan descent, was deployed to the Army’s 16th Division Headquarters and accompanied detachments on ‘kill and burn’ missions.

560 Yasmin Saikia, ‘Listening to the Enemy’, pp. 192-196 & V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers – An Islamic Journey, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, p. 115.

561 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, p. 306-307. 562 Viggo Olsen, Daktar – Diplomat in Bangladesh, Kregel Publications, Grand Rapids, MI, USA, 1973, pp. 258-284 563 Olsen, Daktar – Diplomat in Bangladesh, pp. 258-284. 157

Mascarenhas, who subsequently sought and was provided asylum in Britain, claimed senior Pakistani Officers had stated they would cleanse East Pakistan of secessionists. These Officers swore that this objective would be lethally achieved even if it required the Army to kill two million people and rule the province for the next thirty years as a colony. 564 The brutality attested to was equated with genocide and the systematic rape of Bengali women even thought by some Bengalis to be some measure to alter the genetic pattern of East Pakistan.565 This merciless aspect seemed to exponentially increase as the conflict expanded and eventually encompassed the war with India.

The nature of the hostilities leading up to the outbreak of war in 1971 had taken on this merciless hue redolent with religious and ethnic tones. Officers viewed the ‘Mukhti Bahini’ not as freedom fighters but as tainted Muslims, as traitors trained by the Hindu Indians to break up the Muslim homeland. West Pakistani Officers inherently believing the Army to be the ideological saviour of the state thought these ‘traitors’ needed to be dealt with mercilessly, “They were faceless, cruel and merciless; they were therefore accordingly dealt with”. 566 It is to how the war came to be cast in such religious terms that the final section of this chapter now addresses.

War and the invocation of Jihad

During the course of the war the Army high command had sought to define the war in terms of a religious conflict between those who were righteous Muslims and were fighting for the united Pakistan of ‘Jinnah’s’ vision against those who were defined by their repudiation of the unity of the state and their alleged connections to India. An Indian diplomat in Karachi in April 1971 noted how the Pakistanis had tried to conflate the two evils of ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Judaism’ during the conflict. Lal noted that the Pakistani Urdu print media sought to equate India with Israel in order to generate support for Pakistan against India in the Muslim world. 567 Lal also noted that the press during this time in Karachi seemed to be engaged in an organised hate

564 Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 18-26 & pp. 116-117. 565 Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War-1971, Chitaranjan Saha, Dhaka, 1974 p. 165. 566 Interview of Pervaiz, p. 20 567 Kishori Lal, The Mind of Pakistan, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2010, p. 61. 158

campaign. Lal argued these actions specifically sought to use Islam in the creation of a popular ‘mass hysteria’ against a Hindu India.568

Such campaigns to stir up hate against the Hindus and India were arguably no doubt influential on a number of Pakistan Army Officers being deployed to East Pakistan. Many of these same Officers then experienced the impact of the East Pakistani propaganda campaign noted earlier in the chapter. The combined impact of both forms of propaganda perhaps induced some of these Officers to engage in the brutality discussed in the previous section.

Some did not need much convincing about the religious nature of the conflict and that the conflict was one in which ‘Islam was in danger’ from a Hindu India. Again both the anti-Indian propaganda noted by Lal as well as that directed on the Pakistan Army Officers deployed to East Pakistan were influential. Such emotional announcements not only effectively cast the conflict as one involving religion, but also acted to motivate retaliation arguably in the guise of Jihad. A Director of Staff duties at Army headquarters provided an example of the heightened emotional responses to the conflict imbibed by a number of the West Pakistani Officers,

One got the impression that ... East Pakistan would slip into Indian hands. I am a devoted Muslim and I became very emotional. I sent a personal letter ... to Chief of Staff ... saying we would not let East Pakistan become Spain in the History of Islam. 569

This same Officer—with a fine appreciation for Islamic military history— once deployed to East Pakistan noted that he endeavoured to inspire his troops with selections of appropriate Quranic Ayat. This Officer incited his soldiers to bravery with examples of Muslim military feats and prowess from the history of Islam. He particularly sought to incite his soldiers by the examples where Muslims had triumphed against overwhelming odds, as that was precisely the situation the Army found itself in, amidst a hostile population and a numerically superior Indian Army. 570

The use of Islam was curious in some respects, in that General Yahya Khan a hard drinking, womanising soldier of the old British Indian School mould was

568 Kishori Lal, The Mind of Pakistan, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2010, p. 66. 569 Interview of Tajammal, p. 19. 570 Interview with Tajammal, pp. 20-21. 159

reportedly far from being a devout Muslim. Yahya nevertheless perceived the benefits of actively promoting the invocation of Islam. Yahya cast the Army as soldiers of Islam conducting a holy campaign against Bengali traitors and their infidel Indian allies who sought to rent the country asunder. 571 The soldiers were encouraged to identify themselves as fighting in the tradition of true Mujahids against Kafir insurgents and a Kafir Indian army. 572

In the case of the Pakistan Army the call to Islam was pragmatic. The call to Islam resonated with the ideological basis of the formation of the state as well as the Army having already taken on the mantle as the ideological defenders of the Muslim state, which the Bengalis now sought to dismantle. Yahya had arguably also responded to the calls of right wing religious leaders in the call for the ‘Jihad’ against the rebels and the Indians.573

The religious nature of the war was emphasised with the Army co-opting the right wing Jama’at-e-Islami (JI) and it’s Al-Badr and Al-Shams volunteer corps to help the Army suppress the Mukti Bahini and other perceived enemies of Pakistan.574 Abul Ala Maududi, the leader of the JI, appealed to the ‘genuine Muslims’ in Bangladesh to help the Army identify and detain the Awami Leaguers. Maududi’s call to ‘genuine Muslims’ was an influential voice to an Army already assured of its martial and Islamic attributes by its leaders’ announcements. With the memory of the 1965 War and 1948 Kashmir Jihad formative experiences for numerous senior Officers who were not moulded firmly in the culture of the old British Indian Army. Maududi had further fed the Hindu conspiracy claims by having claimed the Bangladesh freedom movement was orchestrated by an array of the enemies of Islam that included Hindus, communists, and atheists, as well as agents of Western imperialism and Jews to eliminate Muslims. 575

571 Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War – 1971, Chittaranjan Saha, Dhaka, 1974, pp. 262-263. 572 Brig. (R) A.R. Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality’, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, p. 197. 573 See ‘A Desperate Man Hesitates in the face of War’, in The Economist, Vo l. 241, No. 6673, December 4, 1971, p. 33 & ‘India V. Pakistan’, The Economist, Vo l. 241, No. 6694, December 11, 1971, pp. 21-22. 574 Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War – 1971, Chittaranjan Saha, Dhaka, 1974, pp. ix-x. 575 Kalim Bahadur, ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan’, Progessive Books, Lahore, 1978, pp. 132-133.

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Conspiracies in the Pakistan Army were not lightly dismissed even such all- encompassing ones as that proposed by Maududi. The ‘Hindu myth’ of an irreconcilable Hindu India with the aim of re-absorbing Pakistan into its vastness was accepted by a large proportion of that first generation of Pakistani Officers as well as those in training between 1947 and 1951 noted in Chapter Two. Some of these same Officers—as well as ones such as Arshad Qureshi influenced as a youth in the 1947 Jihad and quoted in the epigraph beginning this chapter—were now senior Officers in the Army. Many of these had joined the Army precisely to smite India and prevent its anti-Islamic designs on Pakistan. In this regard the announcement of conspiracies against Islam, even if consisting of a doubtfully tremendous array of conspirators engaged in an unlikely alliance, was not necessarily dismissed. The subsequent actions of Maududi’s JI paramilitaries and elements of the Pakistan Army also attest to the unfortunate credence given to such conspiracies by those under the sway of a significant theologian such as Maududi and the Jihadist calls by its own leaders. 576

The demonisation of Bengalis, both Hindu and Muslim, was amplified by Maududi characterising all those in rebellion against the state as having suffered from the pernicious and degenerative affects imparted by Hindu professors and Hinduised Bengali literature.577 The Bengali love for their culture—be it Muslim or Hindu—and for such luminaries as Rabindranath Tagore had always been viewed suspiciously by right wing Islamists in West Pakistan who believed East Pakistani culture was thoroughly compromised by Hindu elements. Furthermore, the nationalist and socialist nature of Sheikh Mujibur’s platform for greater autonomy for East Pakistan was also inherently repugnant to the JI due to it being inimical to the growth of an Islamic state in Pakistan.578 On a visit to East Pakistan Tufayl Muhammad, the acting Amir of JI, had been more specific in legitimising violence in his call for those true Muslims to not delay in killing all those involved in the revolt against the government. 579 Major General Qureshi lauded the support provided to the Army of

576 A Bengali who had been a member of the Pakistan Army and subsequently joined the Mukhti Bahini noted that the lethal effect of the Al-Badar and Al-Shams coordinated by Major General were perhaps worse than the Pakistan Army, Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War – 1971, Chittaranjan Saha, Dhaka, 1974, p. 223. 577 Kalim Bahadur, ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan’, Progessive Books, Lahore, 1978, p. 133. 578 Ayed Riaz Ahmed, Maulana Maududi and the Islamic State, Peoples Publishing House, Lahore, 1976, p. 102. 579 Kalim Bahadur, ‘The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan’, Progessive Books, Lahore, 1978, p. 133. 161

these paramilitary Islamist groups influenced by the JI who he noted would have gone to their graves in the name of Islam if the Army had not surrendered.580

The alleged ideological failing of the East Pakistanis declaimed by JI religious leaders sealed their position as being complicit stooges of India, Hindus and unbelievers, especially so in light of Mujibur’s arrest for his involvement in what was called the conspiracy.581 In the eyes of the Pakistani High Command Mujibur and his Awami League Party’s socialist rhetoric together with the Hindu population constituted a large suspect population of individuals opposed to the continuance of Pakistan as the sacred Muslim homeland of South Asia.

As a result it was perhaps entirely understandable that at the beginning of the East Pakistan campaign General Niazi, the commander in East Pakistan, had taken up the religious theme enthusiastically by quoting from the Quran, Sunnah and history of Islam in his motivational talks and haranguing of the troops. 582 Niazi exalted in true martial race parlance the superiority of the West Pakistani soldier and his ability to overcome enemies many times superior in number.583 At one level this was a tactic of expediency in trying to motivate an army in a ‘foreign’ environment while it was also perhaps indicative of a nascent Islamic consciousness discussed earlier in this chapter becoming more apparent in the Army.

The Army had also extended its wartime Islamism to captured Indian soldiers. According to one Indian POW Officer the Army enforced religious observance upon the captured Indian soldiers. Muslim POWs were made to perform their Namaz (prayers) five times a day, arguably with a view to convince them of Pakistan’s Islamic credentials and induce them to desert to the Pakistan Army.584 Such an

580 Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 92. 581 The Agartala conspiracy in which Mujib and others were charged was named after a town just across the East Pakistani border with India in which he was alleged to have conspired with Indian authorities upon the secession of East Pakistan. 582 Brig. (R) A.R. Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality’, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, p. 204. 583 Brig. (R) A.R. Siddiqi, ‘The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality’, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1996, pp. 214-215 & Qureshi refers to this in regard to the impossible numerical odds as well as geographical odds in trying to defend East Pakistan in Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 95. 584 Lt. Colonel S.S. Chowdhary, I was a in Pakistan, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1985, p. 51. 162

outcome would also have served as a significant propaganda coup for the beleaguered Pakistan Army who was abjectly failing the war of ideas with India.

Upon the entry of the Indian Army into East Pakistan the Pakistan Army was decisively defeated and surrendered over 90,000 personnel to the Indians despite claims by its commanders that it would fight to the finish. It is to the aftermath of the war that the next chapter considers.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained how the Pakistan Army—still led by a generation largely made up of Officers from the British Indian era or commissioned shortly after partition—became involved in a conflict where Islam became a core motif in justifications to ensure East Pakistan remained part of a united Pakistan. The chapter noted how Islam was employed to galvanise and motivate the Army to view the East Pakistani claims for autonomy as un-Islamic and even Hindu inspired. The Army, together with assistance from Islamic right wing , engaged in a brutal suppression of the East Pakistani population in an attempt to retain the unity of the country. Not all West Pakistani Officers thought this prudent and in fact some resigned rather than become involved. Equally though, the chapter noted the heightened Islamic awareness in the Army and that a number of offficers desired a greater induction of Islam into the Army. Some viewed Israeli successes as linked to their effective religious indoctrination practices. These Officers saw this as a useful model for the Pakistan Army that could be more authentically imprinted into the strategic culture of the Army.

The next chapter examines the aftermath of the war and the strategic shock delivered to the Army by the defeat and the reasons the Army saw as contributing to its defeat. The chapter analyses how a number of Officers in the wake of the defeat viewed Yahya’s and the high command’s call to Jihad and other Islamic pronouncements as in-authentic and the high command to have contributed to the defeat by virtue of their irreligiosity and slavish devotion to Western devices. The chapter considers these elements within the context of the revitalisation and resurgence of Islam globally and regionally. In undertaking this, the chapter examines the brief rule of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and the subsequent Islamisation period of

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General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, and the convergence of this period with significant events in the Islamic world such as the assertiveness of OPEC, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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Chapter VI Bangladesh, Bhutto, Zia and the Institutionalisation of Islam: 1971–1988

...the professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, CANNOT {original

emphasis) become ‘professional’ if in all his activities he does not take on ‘the colour of Allah.

585 (General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq – Foreword to the ‘The Quranic Concept of War’)

Introduction

While the insurrection in East Pakistan had occurred over the course of 1970 and into 1971 the actual war with India lasted barely two and a half weeks. By the time the war ended the Pakistan Army was left defeated, discredited, humiliated and generally held culpable for committing genocide on its own population.

Chapter Five noted that during the course of attempting to suppress the insurrection occurring in East Pakistan, and the subsequent war against India—even before it was declared—that the Army had used religion to define their enemies. The Army had also utilised Islam as a means of motivation and as an inducement to right wing Muslim militias to act in support of the Army. This had effectively acted as a means of demonising and categorising East Pakistani Bengali Muslim opposition in the perceptions of many in the Army as being an enemy of Islam. The Army High Command and right wing religious parties had demonised the East Pakistanis as being tainted by the allegedly insidious nature of Hindu Indian culture and political influence, as well as blame also being cast on the large Hindu population. In this way the East Pakistanis, both Muslim and Hindu, became synonymous with intransigence and sedition with the Muslim Bengalis being cast as tainted Muslims and so both became a target for concerted Army violence.586

585 Brigadier S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1986, [1976]. 586 The Hindu population of East Pakistan was 23 per cent according to a 1951 census, in Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, p. 24 & According to Mascarenhas a Pakistani Journalist attached to the Army in East Pakistan prior to seeking asylum in England, the Punjabi Officers unceasingly questioned the loyalty of the Bengalis to Islam who they denounced as Kafirs (ungrateful unbelievers) and Hindus, in Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1971. 166

This chapter examines in three sections the period 1971 to 1988. The first section examines the aftermath of the 1971 War and how the impact of the loss of the war was a ‘strategic shock’ for the Army that caused it to question both its leadership and culture. A strategic shock or a strategic surprise may be explained as,

Strategic surprises … are those … events that, if they occur, would make a big difference to the future, force decision makers to challenge their own assumptions of how the world works, and require hard choices today.587

In particular, this chapter notes how a belief emerged that attributed blame for the loss to a great degree on the moral turpitude of the senior Officer Corps. These Officers came to be thought of as irreligious and slavish followers of the inherited culture from the British Indian Army. Some of the dissatisfaction with the senior Officer Corps had been demonstrated in uncharacteristically boisterous and vocal behaviour protesting the actions of the Army leadership as well as a number of senior Officers fearing a mutiny by disaffected more junior Officers.

The second section examines the brief, tumultuous rule of Zulfiqar Bhutto and his relationship with the Army, and his use of Islam in an attempt to shore up his power domestically and internationally. The last section examines the rule of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his eleven-year period of rule over Pakistan as well as his command of the Army during the same period. This section examines Zia’s Islamisation project for Pakistan during an intense period of a global resurgence of Islam that encompassed the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army, the Islamisation of the Army and his visions of a grand Islamic alliance. The chapter will also show how this turn towards Islam was part of a greater resurgence in Islamic identity globally. This desire to inculcate a more Islamic culture to the Army had already been manifested in the work of a number of mid-level Officers in the Pakistan Army during the late 1960s and early 1970s noted in the previous chapter.

587 A strategic shock may also be explained as an event that has an important impact on the country and/or stretches conventional wisdom with fundamental implications, or as Freier explains more informally, “a game changing event that changes the nature of the game”, Nathan Freier, ‘Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development’, United States Strategic Studies Institute, November 2008, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, pp. 4-5. 167

Strategic Shock – the aftermath of the 1971 War

Islam had been called upon as a means of motivation and justification for the war in East Pakistan, and the loss of the war in 1971 was similarly understood in terms of religion as the issue of irreligiosity and moral decay and Western vices allegedly rampant in the high command that were the subject of vehement complaint.

The defeat in 1971 was a thorough shock and unexpected to the population of West Pakistan who had been led to believe the Army would be victorious. Crowds furiously expressed their dissatisfaction for Yahya Khan for bringing defeat upon the nation and losing half the country. 588 The shock of the loss of the East was compounded by the ceasefire two days later of the hostilities that were occurring in the West, especially so after Yahya had announced that the war would go on. 589 The humiliating defeat by India became a national tragedy lamented by the public and Army alike of West Pakistan.590

The Officer Corps were traumatised and shocked by the war’s outcome as well. The aftermath of the war was disastrous for the Army with the Officer Corps in near revolt with indignation amongst more junior ranks as to how the war had been conducted. The Army suffered on a number of levels, the reputation and morale of the Army was grievously affected, while the organisational impact from the loss of Officers killed and interned amongst the over 90,000 prisoners of war in India. The tumult and malaise inspired conflicting views upon the role and culture of the Army and indeed the nature of the Pakistani state now that effectively half of it had been lost less than twenty-five years from its inception as the sanctuary for South Asia’s Muslims.

In the search for scapegoats there was an almost immediate attribution of blame to General Niazi, the Officer commanding the Army in East Pakistan, who was not allowed to forget that he had sworn to fight to the end. Niazi had told newsmen on December 13 three days before he surrendered with over 90,000 Army personnel that

588 M. Attiqur Rahman, ‘Back to the Pavilion’, OUP, Karachi, 2005, pp. 187-188 & see this reporting by the Rawalpindi based correspondent for ‘The Economist’ in The Economist, Vol. 241, No. 6696, p. 27.

589 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998,p. 349. 590 Dervla Murphy, Where the Indus is Young, Arrow Books, London, 1977, pp. 21-22. 168

Dacca would fall only over his dead body.591 Niazi previously nicknamed ‘Tiger’ in recognition for his decoration for bravery during the Second World War was now renamed less flatteringly the ‘Jackal’.592 The Army though had hardly performed much better in the west and had in fact suffered a number of grievous setbacks, with Officers who were in this theatre of operations complaining of how the Army’s plans were haphazard and undefined. Officers in the west had noted other problems including poor morale. Some Officers experienced trouble with their unit’s reluctance to deploy and took additional security precautions in fear of a mutiny.593

Significant in Officers’ commentaries on the defeat, such as Major General Qureshi, was the reference to a lack of identity in the Army with many referring to the lack of Islamic values in public and private conduct of the Officer Corps.594 Junior Officers in response had demanded the eradication of un-Islamic practices. Many Officers demanded that the Messes be declared ‘dry’ and had criticised the social habits of senior Officers whose behaviour was believed incongruent to a Muslim state. Within the junior Officer Corps a perception had formed that the failure had been inextricably linked to these moral failings and the superficial religious adherence and general irreligiosity of the senior Officers.595 In this regard it was symbolic of these beliefs in the Army and with the general public that liquor stores and Yahya’s own house were burnt down by mobs humiliated by the defeat. 596 Yahya whose professional abilities were respected by most senior Officers had a poor moral image with many believing his utterances concerning Islam to be a hypocritical pretence as he was claimed to be widely known as a notorious lecher and drunk. 597

591 Maj.-Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 177. 592 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, p. 349. 593 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, p. 335. 594 Maj.-Gen. Hakeen Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 26. 595 Gul Hassan Khan, ‘Memoirs of Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, OUP, Karachi, 1993, p. 341. 596 Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership’, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1973, p. 248. Maj. General Qureshi notes that the consumption of alcohol at this point in time though not Islamic was not as socially unacceptable as it would become in later years, Maj.-Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 88. 597 The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War, Vanguard, Lahore, ND, Chapter Twenty Six of the report titled ‘The Moral Aspect’ notes the almost universal belief in the moral degeneration of the senior army Officers of this period, p. 291. 169

Yahya Khan stood down after significant pressure from many more junior officers in the Army and rule of the country was returned to civil society with the passing of power to the leader of the the Pakistan People’s Party Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on 20 December 1971.598 Pakistans demographic and strategic outlook were significantly altered by the loss of East Pakistan, with the country losing the majority of its non-Muslim population and Bhutto reorienting Pakistan’s geo-strategic outlook towards West Asia and the Muslim Middle East for monetary support.599 Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan was appointed the new Commander in Chief of the Army on 20 December 1971. The Army, suffering from the impact of the Officers killed during the insurgency and subsequent war as well as those Officers amongst the 90,000 prisoners of war, had to replenish itself. Many Officers had also been dismissed from service once Bhutto took power and Gul took over command as an immediate response to the Army’s poor performance and as casualties of political infighting.

The impact of the defeat and imprisonment on many on those prisoners of war incarcerated in India had also induced an epiphany in many Officers. Many previously tepid Muslims became much more devout with Major General Qureshi undergoing such an experience during his time with the Pakistani prisoners of war in Agra Jail. 600

It is important to understand that the perception of moral failure in the Army in the wake of the defeat and more specifically moral failure of the leadership of the Army was profound. The failure in the war had produced a significant shock to the entire edifice of confidence and superiority of the Army, and Officers were anxious to discover where the fundamental flaw in the Army lay.

To many they attributed it to a belief that senior Officers who led them during the debacle were slavish followers of Western vices who had in-authentically made Islamic exhortations during the war more out of expediency than real belief. These calls for a more authentic Islamic leadership of the Army, which were more congruent with societal standards of Islam, coincided importantly during a nascent

598Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, pp.320-321. 599 Ian Talbot, Pakistan a New History, pp.97-98. 600 Maj.-Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 211. 170

period of global Islamic resurgence. Significantly, the Army was concerned that its stability had been irreparably damaged from the outcome of the war with the complaints against the senior Officer Corps at risk of developing into a rebellion by more junior Officers.

The acrimony within the Army had been palpable with Gul Hassan Khan noting that during an address on the terms of the surrender by General Hamid that Officers “were near rebellion and had unprecedentedly shouted down, abused and interrupted Hamid”.601 Qureshi had earlier noted similar incidents upon Niazi’s surrender in the east.602 Gul similarly relates receiving telephone calls from commanders worried their personnel were mutinous and who were demanding they be addressed on the loss of East Pakistan.603 In one instance the 6th Armoured Division had threatened to march on Rawalpindi if Yahya did not immediately hand over power.604 This acrimony was felt by devout and non-devout Officers alike and transgressed professional and personal enmities with all being described as being in a state of ‘seething anger’.605

Despite the alleged moral failings of those who led the Pakistan Army into the 1971 War, not everyone subscribed to this argument that laid the blame purely on the morality and religious failings of the senior Officer Corps. Some Officers argued that the problem was not derived from any lack of piety in the Army. Some argued that the Army’s malaise could be traced to a much more pragmatic explanation. Muqeem, a former Major General and author of books on the Army, argued the blame lay with the internal politics of the Army caused in large part by Ayub’s actions in staving off challenges to his power.

Those who follow this argument believed Ayub had left the Army populated by a large senior corps of allegedly obsequious sycophants. Furthermore, Muqeem argued that the lack of experienced Officers was directly attributed to the engineered retiring of forty Generals between 1955 to November 1971 in which only four

601 Gul Hassan Khan, ‘Memoirs of Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, OUP, Karachi, 1993, pp. 339-341. 602 Maj.-Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2002, p. 177. 603 Gu l, ‘Memoirs of Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, pp. 339-341. 604 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, pp. 359-365. 605 A.O. Mitha, ‘Unlikely Beginnings A soldiers life’, OUP, Karachi , 2003, p. 353.

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Generals had reached their retirement age.606 If such a state existed in the terms that Muqeem described and without further explanation as to the retiring of these Officers it would indeed have supported his ideas of a deficit of leadership experience, as well as those remaining senior Officers possibly fearful of who would next be retired on Ayub’s whim. Muqeem believed that any Officer who had showed any distinctive flair or even some initiative were those who were retired first. Conversely, he contentiously agued those that lacked moral integrity were the most obsequious ‘yes men’ kept on by Ayub. 607 In support of Muqeem’s contentions, Chapter Four did note a number of Officers who held Ayub responsible for the declining efficiency of the Army after Ayub’s coup and his alleged cult of personality in his promotion of only those he deemed would provide him blind obedience. Gul was one of these critics of Ayub’s leadership style noted in Chapter Four. Gul the incoming Chief of Army Staff appointed by Bhutto in 1971 was himself unceremoniously retired by Bhutto and did not serve his full term.

Due to the pervasive fear of mutiny at the time many of those innocent of such conspiracies had their careers ruined by being retired prematurely from the Army. 608 Inter-services intelligence and military intelligence undertook the surveillance of Officers in fear of another Rawalpindi type conspiracy. The fears were widespread and included new measures for every unit to submit an intelligence report on their Officers’ politica l beliefs. 609

The defeat resulted in Pakistan’s second military Head of State, General Yahya Khan, resigning as Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Army. The Army returned to barracks and made way for the charismatic leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This section of the chapter now addresses Bhutto’s period as president of Pakistan from 1971 to 1977.

Bhutto, the Army and Islamisation

Bhutto led the country for nearly six years in a period that saw him struggle to establish an ascendancy over the Army. Bhutto established his own parallel

606 Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership’, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1973, p. 258. 607 Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership’, p. 258. 608 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, pp. 371-374. 609 Brig. Z.A. Khan (R) ‘The Way It Was’, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998, p. 380. 172

security force the ‘Federal Security Force’ in order to have a personal and malleable form of coercion so he would not be reliant on the Army. Bhutto ultimately had to rely on the Army to crush yet another self-autonomy movement in Baluchistan.

In an era of rising Muslim consciousness Bhutto also understood the power and influence available to those who could successfully court the conservative Muslim power base in Pakistan as well as those abroad. Bhutto undertook a number of initiatives in order to capture for Pakistan a leading role in the Islamic world. In 1974 Bhutto promoted himself as a leader of the Muslim world by hosting the 1975 Islamic summit in Lahore. Bhutto took the opportunity to recognise Bangladesh so Mujibur could attend the summit. Religious groups such as the JI were still bitter over the loss of East Pakistan and were vehemently opposed to Bhutto’s recognition of Bangladesh and his allowing the socialist Mujibur to attend the summit. 610

Bhutto had also cannily understood the destabilising effects of militant Islam against struggling secular minded governments in the Muslim world. Bhutto actively fomented Islamism as a means of destabilising Afghanistan and its persistent attempts to reignite its Pukhtunistan claims on Pakistan. In this way Bhutto sought to utilise Islam as a spoiler to Afghanistan’s continuing secularly motivated irredentism.

In the demise of the Army’s reputation in the aftermath of the 1971 War, Bhutto, in his continuing objective of acquiring a pliant Army subject to democratic oversight, had attempted to obtain leverage over the Army by injecting himself into the process of selecting senior Army Commanders. More pragmatically, such objectives were also hoped to be an effective pre-emptive tactic in acquiring intelligence of any incipient Army coups.611 In pursuing this goal Bhutto employed a national security advisor, ironically the disgraced former Major General Akbar Khan who was himself the architect of the 1950 Rawalpindi conspiracy and 1948 Jihadi leader in Kashmir described in Chapter Two.612

In highlighting the Islamic card though Bhutto had also reignited older prejudices. Officers noted that the renewed attention to Islam resulted in the

610 Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, ‘Pakistan Leadership Challenges’, OUP, Karachi, 1999, p.140.

611 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 139. 612 Gul Hassan Khan, ‘Memoirs of Lt.General Gul Hassan Khan, OUP, Karachi, 1993, pp. 361-363. 173

amplification of prejudices against groups in the Officer Corps such as the Ahmadis, previously the victims of right wing Islamist fury noted in Chapter Three. The renewed attention by Bhutto to alleged Islamic purity culminated in Bhutto’s declaration in 1974 that the Ahmadis were not Muslim. The declaration caused further fractures in the Army and the loss of more talented Officers who in this case happened to be Ahmadiya and who found continued service in the Army intolerable. 613

Bhutto also turned to education as another area in which to take the initiative to prove his Islamic credentials by making the teaching of the Quran a compulsory subject in education on 17 April 1977. Bhutto’s initial euphoric popularity as leader built on his charismatic qualities declined as the religious right and opposition parties contested his rule. Bhutto in his last throes of power announced bans on drinking alcohol, horseracing and the closure of nightclubs. 614 Media of the day saw these announcements by Bhutto as sops in an attempt to undercut the opposition from the religious right. Bhutto enacted a number of initiatives believed to be transparently aimed at retaining his power. Bhutto raised the pay of the Army, police and civil service to retain their support amidst mounting civil disobedience protesting his rule. 615

The Pakistani ‘Shurafaa’ (the middle class) did not believe Bhutto’s Islamic posturing. The Shurafaa were thoroughly disenchanted with Bhutto who they believed was essentially an un-Islamic socialist, who was anti-middle class and who had upset many by his nationalisation of industry, while his posturing’s on Islam were opposed to the ideology of Pakistan.616

Eventually Bhutto’s leadership was perceived as despotic and there was a contested election and increasing domestic turmoil, much of it driven from the religiously conservative. Amidst the civil disobedience Bhutto had his Chief of Army

613 V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers – An Islamic Journey, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, p. 202 & Sana Haroon, “The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and its implications in Colonial India and Pakistan 1914-1996’, in David Taylor (Ed), Islam in South Asia, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2011, p. 151. 614 Lt. Gen. Fais Ali Chishti (Retd) ‘Betrayals of another kind – Islam, democracy and the army in Pakistan’, Jang publishers Lahore, 1996, p. 79 & p. 98. 615 The Economist, Vol. 263, No. 6973, April 23, 1977, pp. 65-66. 616 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1087. 174

Staff General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq declare martial law. Martial law was declared, an election was promised, and Pakistan’s third military ruler in thirty years assumed power for the next eleven years. Ironically, the General who took power from Bhutto had been chosen by Bhutto because of his alleged submissiveness and willingness to enforce Bhutto’s policies.617 Bhutto would become embroiled in allegations of electoral fraud and murder and despite international pleas for his clemency was tried and executed by Zia.

Zia was not a Punjabi or a Pakhtun or from a martial race which Bhutto had thought acted against Zia’s propensity to mount a challenge to power, but the General was known to be pious and possess a pronounced sympathy for the Shurafaa and the Jama’at-i Islami.

Zia and Islamisation

Though many attested to Zia’s piety and humility, others such as Lieutenant General Chishti noted that he had to stay in power to simply save his own life after the arrest of Bhutto. 618 Chishti did concede though that Zia was known as being pious though this had not caused any undue concern to the senior Officer Corps.619

Zia’s assumption of leadership of Pakistan coincided roughly with a number of cataclysmic events in the Islamic world. OPEC’s rise in power after the 1973 oil crisis had provided a number of Muslim countries previously unrivalled influence as well as the finance to assist poorer Muslim nations. There were two influential events in two Muslim countries neighbouring Pakistan. The Iranian revolution of 1979 had installed an Islamist government bent on Islamising the country and its institutions. Confrontationally, Iranian Islamist revolutionaries had also taken a number of American hostages in the United States Embassy in Tehran. A militant takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca had also seized the attention of the Muslim world. The mistaken attribution of American involvement in the takeover of the Grand Mosque had resulted in the storming of the US Embassy in Islamabad and the killing of a

617 Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 139. 618 Lt. Gen. Faz Ali Chishti (Retd) Betrayals of another kind – Islam, democracy and the army in Pakistan, Jang publishers Lahore, 1996, p. 203 & analysis of those who thought Zia pious and those who thought he had cynically manipulated Islam, Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, pp. 246-248. 619 Chishti, Betrayals of another kind, p. 140. 175

number of American citizens.620 These actions were generally symptomatic of contemporary Islamic militancy challenging their own secular domestic governments, as well as the writ of the West. Arguably, Zia though a pious Muslim was responsive to these portentous events and the expediencies they offered in securing power.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 would provide Zia with much needed recognition by a US keen to exploit and disrupt the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The realpolitik of the day allowed the US, in providing such assistance, to overlook such issues as Zia’s recent execution of Bhutto, his pursuit of nuclear capability and his introduction of Islamic law. The punishment and evidentiary provisions in Zia’s promulgation of Islamic law were particularly abhorred by Western jurists, Amnesty International, and feminists alike.621 The promulgation of the and their prescribed Hadd punishments involving death and amputation captured the imagination of the West.622 Though some argued that the harsher aspects of these laws involving the death penalty and amputations were rarely implemented, it is arguably hard to deny that the application of a public flogging in front of a large crowd for adultery was not barbarous no matter how often it was inflicted. 623

The following section of this chapter addresses Zia’s program of Islamisation of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army including his visions of a grand Islamic military allia nce.

The Soviet invasion provided the raison d’etre for a holy war. It institutionalised army support for clandestine and insurgent warfare as an accepted form of warfare, funded and provided for by Saudi Arabia and the US. Arguably, the onset of the war and Pakistan’s frontline utility to the US added to Zia’s longevity.

620 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Penguin Books, London, 2004, pp. 21-37. 621 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, p. 250. 622 ‘Off with their hands’, The Economist, Issue 6985, London, England, July 16, 1977, p. 61 & ‘Stressing the soft side of Islam’, The Economist, Issue 7058, London, England, December, 9, 1978, p. 721. 623 Sardar describes a dinner in which Zia explicitly described the Islamic punishments that lawbreakers would incur while explaining that the was being demanded by the people. Ziauddin Sardar, Desperately Seeking Paradise – Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim, Granta Books, London, 2004, pp. 218-219 & Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah – Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy, Viking Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1991, p. 85. Lamb notes Zia’s implementation of the repressive Islamic laws and argues there was a reluctance to enact them, while Talbot notes the public floggings in Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst & Company, London, 1998, p. 250. 176

The insurgency against the Soviets allowed Zia to promulgate warfare in religious terms. Zia had provided the imprimatur for the use of specific Islamic injunctions as to the conduct of war and the promotion of what amounted to ‘total war’ in his approval of a work published on the subject during the period by a Pakistan Army Brigadier. 624

More generally, Officers at the commencement of Zia’s period of rule could not have failed to notice the manifestations of political Islam occurring not only in Iran but also throughout much of the Muslim world. Chapter Five noted how many Officers in the Army had already been displaying a desire for a greater inclusion of Islam into the Army as a motivational and ethical element. Officers had been writing explicitly on arguments for a greater role for Islam as well as the expunging of colonia l customs from the late 1960s.

The revolution in neighbouring Iran had ushered in a regime that had thoroughly rejected the Shah’s attempts to Westernise the country. The Islamic revolution had prompted significant changes in the Iranian military. Many of their higher ranks had been executed or forced to flee while the new Islamic Army was indoctrinated with Quranic injunctions interpreted to justify Iran’s national security. 625 Article 144 of the Islamic Constitution of Iran for example had mandated that the Army be one of believers committed to Islamic revolutio n. 626

The Iranian revolutionary authorities after having instigated the purge of the Officer Corps had sought to rebuild the Officer Corps upon an ideological basis. The Iranians allocated nearly forty per cent of their training towards the Islamic ideological and political curriculum. The Iranian objective was to fully integrate the Officer Corps with the Islamic Ummah (community) of Iran. The newly installed Iranian Islamic revolutionary government endeavoured to ensure the piety and allegiance to the revolution of the armed forces was of such a level that they would enthusiastically martyr themselves in defence of the new Islamic Republic. Those Basij recruited from the Iranian Ummah to repel the Iraqi’s during the Iran-Iraq War

624 See Zia’s approval for an Islamic way of warfare in his foreword to, Brigadier S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, (First Indian Reprint 1986). See the Islamic outline of total war on p. 144. 625 Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 136. 626 Zabih, The Iranian Military, p. 136. 177

displayed this willingness to martyrdom.627 Though these changes occurred in context of a Shia revolution it was viewed favourably by many in the Islamic world.

Zia, arguably aware of the Iranian desire to eradicate the imperial characteristics of the Iranian Army, and expunge all traces of the Shah’s rule, may have considered some of these developments in the context of his own Islamisation plan, and his dislike of the inherited British Indian Army culture. 628

My faith in God and his teachings was strong enough to be able to resist adopting the life style common among the officers of the British Indian Cavalry and the Pakistan Armoured Corps. 629

Many of Zia’s early political announcements, like the Iranian changes, were aimed precisely at the eradication of the Imperial characteristics of both civil and military practice inherited from the British. Zia’s method of Islamising the Army was less dramatic though than what had occurred during the Islamic revolution in Iran. Zia’s purges of the Army were not by firing squad but by having less piously minded Officers overlooked and quietly removed. Zia did though imprison many of his opposition, and above all had Bhutto executed. Zia also imprisoned those Officers guilty of conspiracy to overthrow him or who had committed other substantive offences. Major General Tajammal Hussein Malik for example wished to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state based on the pattern of the Khulafah-i-Rashidun after he had disposed of Zia and the high command. Malik’s planned coup though was foiled when his Colonel staff informed on him and had Malik arrested.630

Zia had implemented an operation coordinated by the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate to identify, arrest and imprison dissidents within the military. Operation Galaxy was instituted with the objective of identifying and arresting

627 Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 146. 628 Zabih, The Iranian Military, pp. 136-137. 629 Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988’, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1085. 630 Maj. General (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik, The Story of my struggle, JANG publishers, Lahore, 1991, pp. 205-206. On the Khulafa-i-Rashidun note its reference in Chapter One of this thesis as well as, Cyril Glasse, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, Harper-Collins, Essex, 1991, pp. 84-85. 178

dissident military Officers. A number of Officers were arrested and imprisoned for their plotting against Zia, which he had termed as ‘waging war against Pakistan’. 631

Zia instituted an Islamisation plan for Pakistan and the Pakistan Army aimed at redressing those colonial hangovers from the British days. Zia sought to install a more authentic Pakistani and Islamic culture to the nation as a whole as well as the Army and all other state institutions. Zia also believed that Pakistanis wanted Islamisation and he sought to introduce both Islamisation as well as a return to some indigenous Pakistani customs, some of these indigenous programs were as mundane as a simple return to indigenous clothing. 632 To expedite Islamisation Zia announced changes across a wide range of cultural and educational areas from the revision of school textbooks and replacing English language instruction in English medium schools to Urdu as the .

Zia’s Islamist agenda also included the introduction of new economic reforms that would abolish usury and embed Islamic tithing into the economic system, which intensified Islamic sectarian differences between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan.633 Under Zia, Islam in Pakistan became more fractious and Zia incurred the wrath firstly of the Shia community by introducing Zakat provisions, and then the Sunni community in their response to his retraction of the Zakat provisions to the Shia community. Zia’s tinkering with the laws had even exacerbated the differences between the more literalist and the more syncretic folk minded the two dominant streams of in Pakistan. 634 Zia also introduced changes to radio and television content to encourage positive reflections on the state and the Islamisa tio n process.635

631 Major Aftab Ahmed, General I Accuse You, Jumhoori Publications, Lahore, 2004, pp. 15-18. 632 Zia notes this ‘shyness of people talking about Islam and the propagation of un-Islamic ideologies as well as the need to identify non-Islamic aspects of law inherited from the imperialist power’, in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, The President on Pakistan’s Ideological Basis – Address by President General Mohammad Zia-Ul-Haq, at the inauguration of Shariat Faculty of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, October 8, 1979, Barqsons’ Printers, Islamabad, [nfd], pp. 2-5. 633 Introduction of Islamic Laws – Address to the Nation, pp. 6-12. 634 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan – Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke, 1997, pp. 158-159. 635 Ministry of information and Broadcasting, Introduction of Islamic Laws – Address to the Nation, President General Mohammed Zia-Ul-Haq, Islamabad, February 10, 1979, Printing Corporation of Pakistan, Islamabad, [nfd], pp. 3-4. 179

V.S. Naipaul visiting Pakistan during Zia’s regime argued that Zia’s Islamisation program had set out to re-interpret the role and history of Islam in Pakistan. Naipaul claimed that Zia’s Islamisation included the fabrication of the historical identity of the Pakistanis with Zia now proposing that the Pakistanis were the progeny of Islamic conquerors and heirs of the Turk, Arab or Mogul conquerors of the subcontinent.636 Naipaul’s contention effectively grasped one of the most significant paradoxes of Zia’s Islamisation. While Zia wished to cleanse Pakistan of Western and non-Islamic influences, he relied to some extent on the propagation of martial myths that had been essential props to British Indian Army concepts of martial race noted in Chapter One of this thesis.

As noted in Chapter One the British had used these concepts for an entirely different reason in the wake of the mutiny. The British had instigated martial race to exclude the politically active and as a measure of division within ethnic and religious communities to support the continuance of British rule. Zia, who himself would not have been categorised as one of the ideal martial races within the preferred British categories, conflated these heroic concepts of martial race with Islam in Pakistan. As noted above, Zia though had created more turmoil than unity in the case of the Shia and Sunni communities. Furthermore, in his reconstruction of history referred to by Naipaul, Zia had neglected some facts on the emergence of Islam in South Asia. The Pakhtuns and others including Hindus had indeed been noted for their warlike propensities long before ‘martial race’ became accepted doctrine in the late nineteenth century. Contentiously though, many of those same ‘martial races’ feted by the British until 1947 and the Pakistan Army afterwards, had in fact been converted from Hinduism after the onset of Muslim invasions as well as the active proselytisation activities of Muslim Sufi orders. Some of the conversions to Islam as well as to had been in order to escape the life choices of being a lower caste Hindu.

As with Naipaul’s observations others who had visited Pakistan during Zia’s era noticed the demarcations in martial and ethnic identity. There were substantial divergences between not only Muslim and non-Muslim but also between Pakhtun and Punjabi. Some Pakhtun beliefs were highly critical of Punjabi martial identity, and

636 V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers – An Islamic Journey, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, pp. 134- 135. 180

were redolent of martial race parlance that would have been familiar to such arch martial race theorists such as Lieutenant General MacMunn noted in Chapter One. Some Pakhtuns for instance, considered even the differences in diet between the ‘meat eating’ Pakhtuns and the ‘pulse eating’ Punjabis as contributing to the Pakhtuns martial superiority. 637 During Zia’s period the sloganeering and announcements on Islamisation, indigenous identity and government policies had sometimes become so prolific, confusing and contradictory that the acronym for Zia’s title of ‘Chief Martial Law Administrator’ (CMLA) was instead referred to as ‘cancel my last announcement’.

A number of Pakistanis during Zia’s period of rule noted that Zia’s Islamisation was riven with facile sloganeering about Islamisation and that it had led to a bureaucratisation, which in turn had led to claims of it being thoroughly compromised by hypocrisy and intolerance.638 Perhaps the most demonstrative aspect of the new Islamist system and certainly in the way of international attention was Zia’s vision for the introduction of Islamic law in Pakistan. Zia had also attempted to capture international attention in his quest to garner alliances for Pakistan.

Militarily, Zia harboured a grand strategic future for an Islamised Pakistan and Pakistan Army that included an eventual confederation amalgamating Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually the five Muslim Soviet Republics. It was claimed that this vision—which seemed to share aspects of the Afghan Jihad by having Saudi Arabia fund a Jihad to oust India from Kashmir—would in a twofold manner avenge the defeats by Hindu India, garner Muslim martial pride as well as providing strategic depth to Pakistan.639 In this vision Zia, like those Army Officers noted in Chapter Five, believed Pakistan’s strategic predicament and its establishment in terms analogous to Israel.640 It is to the specific Islamisation of the Army that the next section of this chapter addresses.

637 Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of God – With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vintage Books, New York, 1990, pp. 32-33. 638 Ikram Azam, Pakistan Reflections, Nairang-E-Khayl Publications, Rawalpindi, 1987, pp. 87-90. 639 Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan – Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failures of Great Powers, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, p. 243. 640 ‘An engaging dictator who wants to stay that way’, in The Economist, Issue 7215, London, December 12, 1981, p. 48. 181

The size of the Army grew during the Zia years’ from 5 July 1977 to 17 August 1988 from 400,000 to 450,000 while its inventory of equipment also grew in quantity and quality, especially so after the advent of US and Saudi funding for the insurgency against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ethnically and territorially the recruiting grounds for the Army remained the same in the mid-1970s, as they had been for the British with those from the martial classes disdainful of other classes who joined the Army.641

Zia never relinquished command of the Army during his tenure in power and devoted special attention to the Islamisation of the Army. Zia introduced ‘holy war’ doctrine as a subject to be taught at Pakistani training establishments and the Pakistan Army Officers 1978 handbook made this obligation explicitly clear with its admonition,

Do not forget, your wars will be “Jihad”, for the defence of your Country. Therefore, your role is that of a Ghazi, with a moral code unmatched in the annals of ancient and contemporary history. 642

Many in the Army perhaps still incensed at the loss of the 1971 War were positive in welcoming Zia’s process of Islamisation. Officers who held such perspectives believed that Zia had finally ‘righted a wrong’ and that three decades of inadequate cultural indoctrination was being corrected by Zia. Even Zia’s promulgation of the new Islamic motto for the Army in 1976 of ‘Iman’, Taqwa’ and ‘Jihad-fi-sabeel-illah’ was believed to finally be an example of an Islamic motto attuned to the indigenous desires and cultural preferences of Pakistan.

Zia indoctrinated the Army by instituting Islamic philosophies of leadership and ethics with the publishing and distribution by the Army in 1978 of a pamphlet titled General Staff publication 10260, Akhlaqiaat that sought to provide Officers with the doctrinal basis of Islamic leadership. Another pamphlet in Urdu titled Aeen- e-Sarfaroshi, an English approximation being ‘The Constitution of Valour’, was promoted as a motivational anthology of Quranic verses in Urdu with English

641 Lieutenant-General M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause – An Analysis of Pakistan’s Past and Future Military Role, White Lion Publishers, London, 1976, p. 64. 642 Hand Book of Army Officers Terms and Conditions of Service and Personal Affairs – Restricted, Issued by Regulations and Forms Directorate, Pakistan Army Headquarters, 1978, p. iii. 182

translations relating to soldiers and soldiering. 643 While to some degree these developments were external trappings they did represent to many Officers a sincere effort at Islamis ing the Army.

Other visitors to Pakistan noted the impact of his Islamisation. Professor Ziauddin Sardar noted in a visit to the fundamentalist Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania seminary that its principal Maulana Samiul Haq, believed to have been an influence on Zia, claimed that numerous graduates of the seminary had been placed in the Army.644 A British diplomat who served in India and Pakistan recalled Zia’s enthusiasm for Islamisation of the Army informing him that Islam was an eminently practical military belief, while there were positive psychological benefits for the Army in a greater induction of Islam into the Army. 645 Zia’s Islamisation of the Army also encompassed the introduction of ‘outward manifestations of Islamic piety such as beard allowances’. Zia also actively targeted Officer recruitment upon the lower middle class Shurafaa who were religiously conservative, as well as rewarding Officers with an Islamist bent, while overlooking secular or less religiously inclined Officers, many of whom retired due to their being sidelined. 646

Pakistani Officers continued to attend Western military courses in the United Kingdom as well as other Western countries. Importantly for Zia, Officers also undertook duties in Saudi Arabia. Pakistani Officers undertook training duties, as well as being part of a US brokered arrangement for Pakistan to provide troops for Saudi security and the Saudis in exchange facilitated Pakistani arms purchases.647 Their deployment would largely cease after Zia refused Saudi requests to remove Shia members of the Army deployed to the kingdom. The Saudi’s had been concerned about the influence of the Shia members of the Army on the Saudi’s own minority Shia community. The Saudi relationship had served an important purpose for Zia as

643 Major General Syed Tanwir Husain Naqvi, ‘Doctrine of Leadership for the Pakistan Army’, Green Book, 1990, pp. 18-19. 644 Ziauddin Sardar, Desperately Seeking Paradise – Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim, Granta Books, London, 2004, pp. 222-224. 645 Sir Morrice James, Pakistan Chronicle, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993, p. 205 & p. 219. 646 Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army – Wars and Insurrections, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, p. 272 & Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan – Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failures of Great Powers, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, p. 244. 647 Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983, p. 449 & Navdav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Belknap Press, USA, 1985, pp. 363-364. 183

he believed it provided some legitimacy for Pakistan’s Islamic credentials as well as providing a psychological shift towards its Islamic roots. For the Officers themselves the opportunity of being deployed to Saudi Arabia in the Islamic holy land and the more literalist form of Islam was influential for some Officers. Those familiar with the Deoband form of Islam in Pakistan may have been a little more familiar with the more austere Saudi practices while those more familiar of the more syncretic and somewhat folk Barelvi may have been influenced by the more austere practices.648

Those remaining Officers of the British generation noticed the demographic and ideological shifts in the Army and sought to add their own ideas on the place of Islam within the Army. From the late 1960s onwards the Officer Corps was incrementally being drawn from the religiously conservative Shurafaa middle class who brought to the Army different attitudes than the British Indian generation. 649 For example, Lieutenant General Attiqur Rahman a prolific author on the Pakistan Army had already noted in 1972 the attitudinal change to Islam occurring in the Army. Such a change was perhaps in large measure from the shock arising out of the 1971 defeat. Attiqur for his part encouraged discussions on the contribution of Islam and emphasised the importance of sectarian tolerance. Attiqur arguably did not view as helpful the possibility of literalist interpretations of Islam dominating arguments for greater Islamisation of the Army. Attiqur made a plea for unit Maulvis to guard against dogmatism, and to prevent vilification in the cases where men may possess Barelvi or various localised beliefs from the veneration of Pirs to wearing amulets from favourite shrines. 650 Such pleas were prudent for those interested in a more inclusive Islam. As noted earlier, Bhutto’s adoption of a more Islamist agenda had contributed to igniting prejudices against the Ahmadiya community, while Zia himself had antagonised both Sunni and Shia in his Zakat experiments.

In 1976, Attiqur had continued his consideration of the role of Islam by recommending the codification of various Surah’s from the Holy Quran as a source of military ethics. Significantly, in regard to the Army’s actual combat performance

648 ‘The Saudi-Pakistani Military Relationship and its Implications for US Strategy in South West Asia’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1 October 1981, pp. 8-9. 649 Akhtar, ‘The Political Role of the Ulama’, p. 623 & Shah, ‘Religion and Politics’, p. 254. 650 See Chapter VIII ‘Our Religion’, pp. 85-95 in Lt. General M. Attiqur Rahman, Leadership Junior Commanders, Ferozsons, Lahore, 1973. 184

Attiqur recommended the inculcation of Islamic religious fervour to benefit the offensive tactics of the Army.651 The introduction of respect for the unit Maulvis and Mullahs who had been previously treated by some as comical figures was another element of a new consciousness seeking to re-establish the Islamic roots of those in the Pakistan Army. 652 Zia personally added to the promotion of the Army undertaking warfare in a more distinctly Islamic manner, and as noted earlier in the chapter had recommended and wrote the forward to an Army Brigadier’s work on the Quranic way of warfare.653

Throughout Zia’s term during the 1980s the Army and services book clubs printed materials for the Officer Corps on Islamic warfare, Islamic military heroes as well as a large corpus of works on conflicts in which the Army had participated in.654 Military publishers also reproduced works written by foreign military writers including Professor Brian Bond, the British academic who had taught previously at the Pakistan Military Academy, as well as the modern military classics by Fuller and Liddell Hart and works from Indian Muslims.655

Exemplars of Muslim character and Islamic military heroes who had overcome powerful adversaries, such as Imam Shamil’s nineteenth century Jihad against the Russians, assumed a new relevance with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The publication on themes that linked the necessity and use of Islam to consolidate the Army and the nation were not new as Chapter Five revealed, as the

651 Lieutenant-General M. Attiqur Rahman, Our Defence Cause – An Analysis of Pakistan’s Past and Future Military Role, White Lion Publishers, London, p. 187. 652 Rahman, Our Defence Cause, p. 200. 653 Brigadier S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, First Indian Reprint 1986. 654 The 1965 War with India for instance generated much commentary in Pakistan with some of these works produced by Pakistan Army figures being published by the Services Book Club, for example, Maj-Gen. Shaukat Riza (Retd), The Pakistan Army War 1965, Services Book Club, 1984. 655 For instance the following three works among many others featuring both Islamic and Western military commentaries were produced during the early to mid-1980s by the Army Book Club and Services Book Club, see, Beha Ud Din, The Life of Salah Ud Din Ayyubi, Army Book Club, 1983, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Services Book Club, Lahore, 1986 (under authority of Methuen) and Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon, Services Book Club, 1987 (under authority of Greenwood Press). See for instance a Muslim Indian scholars work, in Dr Muhammad Hamidullah, The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1983. 185

resurgence of a globalised Islam transcended the regional developments in south and southwest Asia. 656

Not all Officers supported Zia’s Islamisation, though his rule over the country and continued command of the Army meant that any Officer strongly exhibiting any such disaffection would at the very least have a shorter career in the Army. A number of the older generation of Officers from partition thought that Zia’s long tenure in power had negatively impacted upon the Army’s professionalism due to being diverted to undertake non-military duties such as staffing government institutions. 657

In this regard some Officers noted that many soldiers felt uncomfortable with Zia’s enforcement of prayers and felt that it was incongruent with a professional army, with some eventually claiming prayers had become an excuse to end the day at prayer time and to not return to duty. 658 Many Officers argued of more serious implications, with many believing Zia himself to be honest and pious believed that during his tenure that corruption had become institutionalised and the professionalism of the Army deteriorated. Outwardly, the Army had more equipment and was better educated but was undermined by the politicisation of the Army. Zia’s intervention in providing extensions of service and personal foibles being used as the basis of promotion was also argued as deleterious to the Army’s professionalism.659 Zia’s attention to corruption seemed limited to a White Paper produced upon the corruption, purges and general maladministration of the Bhutto government, which possibly was more important as a justification and defence for the subsequent execution of Bhutto. 660

656 For a discussion of the Islamic resurgence globally from the late 1960s to early new millennium as well as Pakistan during the 1970s to 1988 see, Gilles Keppel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam, I.B.Tauris, London, 2002, pp. 98-105 and especially, Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995. 657 Lt. Gen. (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan, ‘Remembering Our Warriors’, in I. ul-Majeed Sehgal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5., Karachi, December 2001, p. 29. 658 Brig. (Retd) Muhammad Mehboob Qadir, ‘Of Good Order and Military Discipline’, in I. ul-Majeed Sehgal, Defence Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, Karachi, October 2002, p. 67. 659 Maj. Gen. (Retd) Hidyatullah Niazi, in I. ul-Majeed Sehgal, Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, Karachi, August 2001, pp. 26-27. 660 See the four volumes, Government of Pakistan White Paper in which Bhutto’s’ administration is castigated in particular, White Paper on The Performance of the Bhutto Regime Vol. II Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, January 1979. 186

Conclusion

While Zia’s Islamisation of the Army did not incur any of the overtly cataclysmic changes that the Iranian Army were enduring during the same period, the culture and nature of the Army were indelibly altered due to his Islamisation program.

The impact of the aftermath of the 1971 War discussed earlier in this chapter had only occurred a relatively short time before his Islamisation program. This impact overlapped with the global resurgence of Islam, noted earlier in such events as increased OPEC assertiveness, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which incrementally added to the nascent desires for a greater inclusion of Islam into the Army. Earlier chapters noted that Islam had been previously utilised by Ayub as a means of promoting Pakistan as a nation possessing an Army consisting of Islamically pious martial races during the 1950s. Musa had then claimed that the Army’s performance in the 1965 War had been attributable to their spirit of Jihad, while Chapter Five noted the arguments by many Officers for a more authentic induction of Islam into the Army. Zia’s contributions were more influential than that of Ayub, Musa, Yahya or other COASs had been up until the time of his appointment. Zia’s contributions were a much more overt injection of Islamisation into considerations of alliance formation, expunging of foreign military customs, notions of Islamic warfare; and importantly his selection, recruitment and training of a more conservative population of Army Officer candidates carried implications for the future character of the Army.

Zia’s preference for the recruitment of Officer candidates from the Shurafaa as well as the selection and promotion of many Officers sympathetic to a greater role for Islam in the Army was serendipitously occurring at the same time that Islam was asserting its political and cultural influence regionally and globally. That the war in Afghanistan was cast in the nature of Islamic resistance being fought by Mujahidin fighters righteously conducting a Jihad to expel foreign invaders from an Islamic land had a profound impact on the Pakistan Army. That the conflict had overlapped within the period of Zia’s Islamisation program amplified notions of ‘Islam in danger’ that many in the Army readily responded to in their coordination of the Afghan Jihad.

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Chapter Two noted the importance of ‘Islam in danger’ as an important aspect of South Asian Islamic resistance.

The Army and those Army Officers in the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate coordinating the logistic supplies for the Mujahidin as well as those Officers on the ground in Afghanistan became a generation of Officers infused with the righteousness of Jihad. As the next chapter illustrates many of these Officers developed an inflated belief in the superiority of their own abilities and the role Islamic motivation and the Mujahidin had in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan.

The Zia period encompassed an internal and external validation of Islam much more profound than the approbations offered by Dulles and Eisenhower in Chapters Four and Five. Validation of Islam during Zia’s period was by virtue of the aforementioned events in the Islamic world that ushered in a more robust and assertive Islam evident in the Iranian revolution regionally and domestically by Zia’s proactive Islamisation. While some Islamisation of aspects of the Army culture had occurred beforehand, Zia departed from these experiments in his proactive program of Islamisa tio n of Army and state.

The next chapter shall examine the period 1988 to 1999 and examine what the implications of Zia’s eleven years’ of rule and Islamisation had upon the Army. The chapter explores the impact of what is argued as the perpetuation of Islamisation within the Army despite the fact that during the period only one of the COASs could have been characterised as an Islamist. In particular, the chapter considers the impact of Islamism on the leadership and culture of the Army as well as the Army’s involvement in Jihadist activities.

The chapter also considers the role of the Army in politics during this period of ostensible non-involvement, including the machinations of the COAS and the ISI to destabilise the government of as well as significant roles of senior retired Army Officers in secularly minded and Islamic political parties. The strategic culture of the Army is also examined in context of the Army’s threat perception during this period. Chapter Seven seeks to above all provide what the impact of Zia’s Islamisation period had upon succeeding generations of Pakistani Officers, and argues that this impact was significant. Perhaps most flagrantly the evidence of influential

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Islamic elements in the Army willing to expedite Islamisation was most evident in the arrest of over forty Army Officers led by a Major General who had conspired to undertake a coup (the Khilafat conspiracy), murder Bhutto, the COAS and other high ranking Army personnel and establish a fundamentalist Islamic system in Pakistan.

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Chapter VII The Army and Islam in the ‘Democratic Interregnum’ 1988–1999

The renaissance of Islam and Islamization process had a positive effect on military culture.

(Brigadier Sultan Habib, Infantry Commander, 1990) 661

Introduction

General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army and President of Pakistan died in an air crash near Pakistan, together with the United States Ambassador and all others on board the aircraft in a still unexplained accident on 17 August 1988. Zia’s popularity, though contested, remained popular with many Pakistanis and immense crowds attending his funeral in Islamabad. Unlike Ayub and Yahya Khan, his two former Army predecessors who had ruled Pakistan, Zia was still firmly in control of the Army as well as Pakistan at the time his tenure was unexpectedly cut short. The time period this chapter sets out to examine commences with the death of Zia in 1988 and ends in 1999 with the ousting of Prime Minister and the beginning of another period of Army rule by General Pervez Musharraf.

The chapter examines a period of time in which the Army while not ruling the nation was still nevertheless an arbiter of government power. The chapter sets out to describe the place of Islam in the Army after eleven years’ of rule by Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his process of Islamisation of Pakistan and the Army. Chapter Six noted that during Zia’s rule in Pakistan, and the Islamic world more generally, there was a resurgence of the political and cultural assertiveness of Islam. The chapter also noted that Zia’s longevity had arguably been in part due to the legitimacy he was accorded by the West for Pakistan’s role as the primary conduit for the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

661 Pakistan Army Green Book, ‘Year of the Junior Leaders 1990’, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 1990, p. 215. 191

This chapter argues that Zia’s legacy of Islamising Pakistan and the Army managed to thoroughly imbue many Officers in the Army with an Islamist disposition that even after his death was evident during the period 1988 to 1999. Despite the apparent secular character of a number of the succeeding COASs during this period, it is a contention of this chapter that Islamism of differing hues had been firmly established in the Army by the actions of Zia and coalesced with the prevailing Islamic resurgence in this period of history.662

The chapter is organised into four sections. The first section provides some outline of the history of Pakistan from 1988 to 1999 in order to provide some contextual insight into the political and cultural milieu in which the Army existed. The second section of the chapter examines the influence of Islamist Generals upon the Army as well as the succession of the Commanders in Chief of the Army. This section also considers the impact of an Islamist coup, and the involvement of former Army Officers in Islamist and mainstream political parties in Pakistan. The third section then explores the Islamic nature of the Army in light of its perceived threats, alliances and hostilities it was involved in. The last section considers the influence of Islam upon Army culture and development during the period.

What is apparent from the analysis in this chapter is that Officers approached the role of Islam from differing perspectives from the Islamist to more secular and professional approaches. Islam nevertheless despite personal attitudes to piety among Officers remained the essential pillar around which the Army’s strategic culture was wedded. The Army in 1988, as it would in 1999 and as it had in 1947, remained convinced that a Hindu India wished to extinguish Pakistan because of its Islamic nature. In this way Pakistan’s strategic culture remained one in which ideas of ‘Islam in danger’ continued to retain its vitality and validity within the Officer Corps.

As part of this process of examining the culture of the Army during this time period the chapter draws links to previous chapters, especially Chapter Six, in examining the influence of Zia’s simultaneous rule of the country and his command of the Army. In particular, the chapter notes how the Islamisation pursued by Zia,

662 , ‘Islamism and the Pakistani State’, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, http://www.currenttrends.org/prinVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=171, accessed 8 December 2013. Dr Haqqani argues that efforts to counteract Zia’s Islamisation have not been successful because of the rise in militant Islamism. 192

though not universally accepted by the Army, did raise the profile of Islamic discourse in the Army and normalise such discourse on the role of Islam within the Army.

In appreciating the context of the post-Zia years it is important firstly to consider the tumultuous domestic and international political situation of Pakistan during this time. In 1992 there had been a risk that Pakistan would be formally labelled a state sponsor of terrorism by the US for its official support of Islamic extremist terrorist and insurgency groups. 663 The country had experienced the murders of politicians, foreign citizens—including American oil contractors— Egyptian and Iranian diplomats, and visiting Iranian Air Force Cadets to Pakistan by domestic Islamist terror groups. Ethnic sectarianism was also rampant in Karachi between the MQM and its opponents, which the Army was drawn into. 664

Additionally, there were significant crime problems including large-scale ‘dacoity’ in the Sindh province in which travel by road, rail or boat could be interrupted by gangs armed with sophisticated automatic weapons, many of them obtained from Afghan war surplus. 665 The criminal economy had been expanded by virtue of the conflict in Afghanistan. Funded by opium and the expanded access to weapons criminal gangs engaged in lethal rivalries while the attraction of large profits corrupted public and military officials alike. In one flagrant instance an Army Officer had murdered nine persons in rural Sindh while small numbers of Officers were also involved in drug trafficking. 666

During the period Pakistan had sought to engineer favourable strategic outcomes through their militant Islamist proxies in Afghanistan and India. Sanctions on Pakistan instigated under the US Pressler Amendment, instituted in 1985 as a

663 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, I.B. Tauris, New York, 2010 [2000], p. 186. 664 On sectarian violence in Karachi, Chapter ‘8’ ‘Dial a Kalashnikov’ in Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah – Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy, Viking/Penguin, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 138-166 & her chapter on ‘Dacoit’ (Bandit) culture in Sindh during the late 1980s early 1990’, ‘Sindh – Land of Robin Hoods and Warrior Saints’, in pp. 118-138. Aminah Mohammad-Arif, ‘The Diversity of Islam’, in Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed), A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, Anthem Press, London, 2008, pp. 235- 235 on sectarian violence in the 1990s in Pakistan. 665 See Lamb’s chapter on the ‘Dacoit’ (Bandit) culture in Sindh during the late 1980s early 1990s in her chapter, ‘Sindh – Land of Robin Hoods and Warrior Saints’, in Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah – Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy, Viking/Penguin, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 118-138. 666 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p. 455. 193

means of aligning military aid to guarantees that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon, were finally implemented after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. This angered many in the Pakistan military. Pakistan believed itself to have been selectively discriminated against by the US, which had previously certified military supplies under the Reagan and Bush administrations between 1985 and 1989. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1990 had changed Pakistan’s frontline status the US’s nuclear proliferation focus became the main US concern. Especially galling for Pakistan was the impact the Pressler Amendment had in withholding pre- existing and paid for defence aid, including aircraft. 667 The next section of the thesis shall address the immediate aftermath of Zia’s death.

With Zia’s death General Aslam Mirza Beg became COAS and handed over power to civilians for the country’s next leader to be decided by election. Benazir Bhutto won the election despite the efforts of Islamist General and the COAS (Beg) in the setting up of an Islamist Bhutto resistance front in the formation of the eight party Islamic Jamhori Itehad (IJI). Sharif (the former Punjab Chief Minister selected by Zia) won the following election in November. In 1991 the National Assembly adopted the Shariat Bill, which arguably illustrated that the Islamist themes of the previous Zia era were being pursued by his civil protégé Sharif. For the Army, the period witnessed the completion of the ‘Al-Khalid’ project in 1991 jointly undertaken with China. The tank was named after the Islamic conqueror of the Eastern Roman and Persian Empires.

In 1992 military operations against MQM in Sindh commenced in an effort to end the cycle of sectarian violence in the city. In December 1995 the dismissed the appeal case against the arrest of Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbasi in the Khilafat conspiracy case discussed more fully in the next section. The Bhutto and Sharif governments periodically were sworn into power and sacked during the period while on 28 May 1998 Pakistan successfully conducted nuclear tests in the Chagai Hills in Baluchistan. The nuclear tests were rapturously celebrated in Pakistan and condemned in the West. Pakistan subsequently conducted successful tests of a nuclear capable short-range ballistic missile in 1999. In the last six months of 1999

667 Tehmina Mahmood, ‘Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Security Concerns’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No. 4, October 1994, pp. 103-104. 194

the War was concluded between Pakistan and India. On 12 October 1999 General Pervez Musharraf executed a coup against the government of Nawaz Sharif in part because of conflict and blame over Kargil and for Sharif’s attempt to dismiss Musharraf. The next section examines those Commanders in Chief of the Army that succeeded Zia, as well as the influence of a number of Islamist Generals, and an attempted coup.

Islam and the Generals

With General Aslam Beg succeeding Zia as COAS there was a generational changing of the guard with Beg becoming the first Army Chief commissioned after Pakistan had been established.668 Beg though was the progeny of Zia and he did not usher in any great ideological change within the Army during his tenure and continued to propagate Zia’s Islamisation.

Beg’s tenure was conspicuous for his inflamed Islamist statements made in contradiction of the declared policies of the government. Beg notably made statements of support for Saddam Hussein during the . In Islamist terms Beg described the US and Western military action against Saddam as having been a Western-Zionist game plan to neutralise the Muslim world. Beg’s statements bore a great deal of similarity to those of the Islamic fundamentalist party: the JI. 669 Beg’s statements were sympathetically viewed by many in the Army and in Pakistan who thought Saddam to be the aggrieved party in the conflict and who was to be admired for his defiance of the US led coalition that had attacked a fellow Muslim nation. 670

Despite Beg’s statements the Pakistan Army did contribute to the Gulf War, albeit on the understanding that they would be purely a security force to guard the holy places. This was unlike other Muslim coalition members including Saudi Arabia that did participate in combat against the Iraqis.671 Beg and other senior Generals

668 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords – Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, Karachi, pp. 416-417. Shuja Nawaz writes from the perspective of his inclusion in a Pakistani Army family. Shuja’s late brother General Asif Nawaz was COAS during the period this chapter concerns between 16 August 1991 to 8 January 1993. 669 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p. 439 & Hussain Haqqani, ‘The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, USA, 2005, p. 20. 670 Brian Cloughley, War, Coups & Terror – Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2008, p. 6. 671 Cloughley, War, Coups & Terror, p. 63. 195

were arguably part of an influential cabal of high-ranking officers that had been Islamised during Zia’s tenure in power.

Bhutto’s confidante, Christina Lamb, argued in 1989 that Zia had saturated the Army with Islamist indoctrination and successfully cultivated a large Islamist faction in the Officer Corps.672 Cloughley, a former defence attaché to Pakistan, noted the doubts held about the cumulative effects of Zia’s Islamising the Army combined with the religious party’s proselytisation efforts upon the Officer Corps of the Army. 673

Bhutto had claimed there was a faction of Generals in the Army overawed by what they believed had been the effectiveness of Jihad. Bhutto believed many Officers were captivated by Jihadi successes in the expulsion of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan and were infected with what she described as the ‘Jihad’ bug. 674 These same Officers were claimed to be in favour of utilising the Islamic martial fervour of the Army to finally attain Pakistan’s aims against India as well as more ambitious forays into Central Asia. Bhutto believed these generals to be myopic in their fixation that the Soviets had been ousted from Afghanistan simply by ‘Jihad’ alone. She believed them to be politically naive and ignorant as to the influence of international economics, diplomacy and even the sophisticated weaponry such as the ‘Stinger’ missiles supplied to the Mujahidin as significant reasons for Soviet withdrawal.

Bhutto in her first term as Prime Minister claimed Beg’s Islamist ambitions for the Army were grandiose and pro-actively aggressive in their intent. Beg was alleged to have proposed a plan to undertake a pre-emptive strike on India to retake Kashmir with the assistance of the Army’s Islamist allies from Afghanistan. 675 Beg’s ‘grandiosity’ was apparent in the Army’s war games conducted in 1989. The war games were the largest ever held by the Army and provocatively titled Operation

672 Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah – Pakistan’s Struggle for Democracy, Viking/Penguin, New Delhi, 1991, p. 285. 673 Cloughley, Wars, Coups & Terror, p. 79. 674 Benazir Bhutto, ‘Daughter of the East – An Autobiography’, Simon & Schuster, UK, 2007 (original edition 1988), p. 404. 675 Bhutto, ‘Daughter of the East, p. 406 & p. 423.

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‘Zarb-e-Momin’ (Strike of the True Believer) adjacent India’s desert.676 In other ways Beg’s Islamist nature was evident with for instance his removal of Officers’ religious proclivities from their annual confidential reports, which essentially allowed Officers more freedom from possible sanction in their religious associations.

Bhutto claimed others had been converted to aggressively Islamist views by the avowedly Islamist and charismatic General Hamid Gul, an architect of the Afghan Jihad and passionate supporter of Kashmiri and Pakistani based Islamic militants.677 Bhutto’s criticisms and fears of Gul’s ‘messianic Islamist agenda’ and influence on many senior Officers were also believed to be true by Tomsen, the US special envoy to the Mujahidin between 1989 and 1992.678 Gul’s aggressive ‘Jihadism’ was also suspected by the CIA who thought him to be the architect of pro-active cross border Islamist attacks in the from Afghanistan. 679 The Russians also believed that the Pakistanis were exporting Islamic terrorism to Chechnya and former Soviet central Asian republics coordinated at training grounds provided by the ISI and Army in Pakistan. 680

Beg, though later in the decade categorised as a ‘headline grabber’ by the US officials, still worried Bhutto. 681 Beg remained an influential voice on army and national issues in Pakistan after his tenure as COAS ceased in August 1991, and thereafter in his capacity as the head of his own ‘think tank promoting Islamist themes’.

Despite an attempt to extend his time as COAS Beg was replaced by General Asif Nawaz a secularly minded General. Nawaz, unlike Beg, worked to reduce the

676 Nawaz, Crossed Swords, pp. 420-421. 677 Bhutto, ‘Daughter of the East, p. 406 & Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion – Kashmir in the Nineties, Penguin Books, India, 1999, p. 181. 678 Peter Tomsen, ‘The Wars of Afghanistan – Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failures of Great Powers’, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, pp. 255-257. 679 Bearden was the CIA station chief for Islamabad at the time. Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy – the Inside story of the CIA’s final showdown with the KGB, Century, London, 2003, p. 291. 680 Pakistan Fifty Years of Independence, Volume Three, Verinder Grover & Ranjana Arora (Eds), Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1997, p..516 & Pakistani training of Chechen Islamist militants during this period is reported in M. Ilyas Khan, ‘The ISI-Taliban Nexus’, in Aamer Ahmed Khan (Ed), Herald, Vo l. 32, No. 11, Karachi, November 2001, p. 26. 681 US Cable reference 0 310614Z August 1998 from US Embassy (Schmidt) Islamabad to Secretary of State Washington, paragraph 2. 197

emphasis on the role of religion in the Army though there was a propensity for senior Islamist Commanders to act outside the writ of his command. Just prior to his sudden death Nawaz removed an ‘Islamist Corps Commander’ who had orchestrated an unauthorised attack causing significant casualties during Beg’s tenure in 1990. 682 Nawaz was succeeded by General Abdul Waheed.

During General Waheed’s tenure in 1995 the presence and embedded nature of extremist Islamist factions in the Army had become apparent with the discovery of another Islamist coup attempt. The conspiracy became known as the ‘Khilafat’ conspiracy because the alleged objective of the coup sought to violently overthrow the government and establish Nizam-e-Mustafa, an objective also pursued albeit peaceably by the JI.683 Over forty Army Officers including Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbassi, Brigadier Mustansur Billan and Colonel Azad and thirty-eight others were alleged to have conspired to execute the political and military leadership of the country.

The coup leaders’ objective was to declare an Islamic revolution and dissolve the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan in a caliphate-like vision. 684 Though these Officers denied the conspiracy and claimed the allegations were politically motivated, Bhutto, as well as foreign military attachés present at the time, was convinced of its authenticity. 685 The coup attempt emphatically illustrated the objectives of a significant Islamic faction in the Army who were not interested in a tepid indoctrination of Islam into the Army. These Officers desired the inauguration of a fully-fledged Islamic revolution to fundamentally change the nature of the Army and the state. These Officers represented a rift in the Army between the secularly disposed and moderate Muslim elements and Islamist extremist elements. These

682 Brian Cloughley who knew Nawaz from his days as a Corps commander believed him to be secular in outlook. Brian Cloughley interview at ‘Voutenay-sur-Cure’, France, 17 February 2010 & Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p. 451. 683 The Nisam-e-Mustafa is an Islamic society that does not permit any separation between public and religious matters, an objective pursued ostensibly peacefully by the JI, in Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995, p. 288. 684 Bhutto, ‘Daughter of the East, p. 419. 685 Cloughley the Australian Army Defence Attaché to Pakistan in discussions with senior Pakistan Army figures noted that Abbasi had intended with his co-conspirators to kill all those attending a Corps Commanders conference chaired by the COAS and then eradicate the cabinet, email communication with Cloughley on 6 December 2013 & Brian Cloughley, War, Coups & Terror – Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil, Pen & Sword, 2008, p. 79. 198

extremist Army Officers were prepared to violently implement a vision far beyond that of Zia’s Islamis atio n project of the 1980s.

That an Officer of Major General rank with forty other Officers as co- conspirators could again instigate an Islamist coup fifteen years after Major General Tajammal Hussain Malik’s attempt on Zia was arguably indicative of the persistence and extent of the radical elements inhabiting parts of the Army’s Officer Corps. It was apparent that during this period there were many Officers who desired a new Islamic order for the Army and country and who were frustrated with incrementalist or token Islamic changes. The attempted coup was perhaps an indicative outward manifestation of the Islamist current nurtured by the Zia years and now maturing with its influence on the succeeding generation of Officers.

Waheed was succeeded by General Jehangir who would resign his tenure due to his tensions with Prime Minister Sharif who had taken umbrage with his public statements on national security. Karamat was replaced by Musharraf who in turn became involved in a conflict with Sharif over the failed Kargil operation. The Army had infiltrated Indian positions on the Kargil heights in the guise of Islamic Kashmiri militants. The resulting conflict had brought Pakistan and India to the verge of war and an embarrassing diplomatic imbroglio requiring the intercession of the US. The conflict between Musharraf and Sharif had caused Sharif to undertake an attempt to remove Musharraf who in turn ousted Sharif in a coup in October 1999.

Concurrent with the Islamist agitation in the Army was the Islamist current more generally in Pakistani society and reflected in popular politics where former Army Officers were prominent. In this way but not as decisively as the aforementioned attempted coup the Army was exhibiting both its Islamist nature as well as its now established break with the British Indian tradition of involvement in politics.

There were substantial numbers of former Army Officers involved in religious parties and political parties in government throughout this period. While a number were present in the more secular PPP there were also numbers in Zia’s protégé Nawaz Sharif’s PML, as well as the more avowedly Islamic parties.

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Sharif had four ex-Army Officers as ministers, including Gohar Ayub Khan the son of Field Marshal Ayub Khan the first Army Officer to stage a coup. Gohar was foreign minister and speaker of the national assembly during his first government term and was one of many other former Officers from the rank of Colonel to Brigadier in the party. 686 Similarly, the Bhutto led PPP who protested the martial law regimes of Ayub and Zia had a large number of retired Army Officers in its ranks, foremost of who was General Naseerullah Babar. Babar had been architect of an early Islamist insurgency in Afghanistan during the early 1970s, which Chapter Six noted Bhutto had instigated as a means to cripple Afghanistan’s irredentist claims on Pakistan. Babar had also coordinated the military and intelligence agencies against an alleged MQM conspiracy for Karachi to secede and be renamed ‘Jinnahpur’.

The fundamentalist Islamic Jama’at-i Islami had a number of retired middle ranking Army personnel who were active during the period this chapter addresses. 687 Major General Azhar an Army Officer originally commissioned in the British Indian Army was secretary of the Islamic Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, which included retired Army Officers, while the Islamic Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) included retired and Captains.688

Other retired Army Officers who were Islamists included Major General Tajammal Hussain formerly tried for the Islamist coup attempt to overthrow and kill Zia in 1980. Malik formed the Qaumi Riffah Party QUP which included former high ranking Officers such as Major General’s Ameer Hamza and Sheren Dil Khan, and others from the rank of Major to Brigadier.689 Arguably taken together with the evidence of significant Islamist factions in the Army, some who were extremist, the evidence of other retired Officers being active in avowedly fundamentalist political parties indicates the penetration of more than nominal devotions of Islam into the Army. The senior ranks also indicate that many were in a position to indoctrinate and

686 A. Mir, ‘Soldiers of Fortune: The list of retired army officials inducted into mainstream politics seems endless’, in R. Hakim (Ed) Newsline Magazine, Vo l. 9, No. 11, May 1998, pp. 27-28.

687 Arif, ‘Soldiers of Fortune’, pp. 27-28.

688 K.M. Azhar had fought in the 1948 Kashmir War, the 1965 War and 1972 War and was Secretary of the Islamic religious party the, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Dawn Newspaper, 30 October 2006 & Arif, ‘Soldiers of Fortune’, pp. 27-28. 689 Arif, ‘Soldiers of Fortune’, pp. 27-28.

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otherwise convince their peers and more junior Officers—if susceptible—to their more stringent Islamic ideologies. A feature of a number of these ex-Officers political concerns was the strategic security of Pakistan and who Pakistan should ideally engage in mutually beneficial military pacts which the next section shall now address.

Alliances, hostilities and Islam

The matter of military pacts involving Islamic alliances were argued throughout the decade by Officers from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel upward to the COAS. Beg, as COAS, favoured the concept of Islamic alliances as well as the concepts of ‘strategic defiance’ and ‘strategic depth’ favoured by his predecessor Zia. 690 Other senior Officers also believed in the merits of Islamic military allia nces. 691

Beg also argued the idea of ‘strategic depth’ included securing alliances with Afghanistan and Iran, which would allow the Pakistan Army access to their territory in which to stage a counter attack if Pakistan were overrun by India. 692 While innovative the concept was completely incongruent with the government’s concept of total defence of the border. Tomsen, the US special envoy, alleged that Beg, Gul and Major General Durrani envisioned a grand Islamic strategic alliance would not only be between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran but also ideally included Turkey, much as Zia had also envisioned.693

. The Generals believed these countries would act as a buffer to protect Pakistan from what they described, again in Islamist terms, as the anti-Islamic tyranny of the US, India and Israel.694 Proof of such anti-Islamic tyranny seems largely tied to grand conspiracy theories as well as possible disenchantment of the US in wake of its withdrawal from South Asia. The US CIA Station Chief, who worked with Gul at the

690 General K.M. Arif, Khaki Shadows Pakistan 1947-1997’, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 353- 354, Cloughley, War, Coups & Terror, pp. 59-60 & Peter Tomsen, ‘The Wars of Afghanistan – Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failures of Great Powers’, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, pp. 255-257. (Tomsen was an envoy for President George Bush to South Asia). Hussain Haqqani notes Beg’s call to ‘strategic defiance’ by middle powers, in Hussain Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military, 2005, p. 280. 691 Brigadier Muhammad Ayub Uppal, “Our Response to threat posed by India”, PAGB, 1998, pp. 112- 113. 692 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords – Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within, Oxford University Press, Karachi, p. 419 693 Tomsen, ‘The Wars of Afghanistan’ pp. 255-257. 694 Tomsen, ‘The Wars of Afghanistan’, pp. 255-257. 201

time, confirmed that Gul believed the US relationship with Pakistan to be characterised by expediency and perfidy.695

Despite the improbability of such grand strategic visions appealing to Iran or Turkey, the belief by Pakistani Officers in the efficacy of grand Islamic strategic partnerships, as well as militant actions derived from Islamic motifs appealing to Muslim populations, had displayed a remarkable history of optimism. The history of success for such alliances, plans and ideas for the Army had been dismal, except for their apparent contemporary success with the Afghan Mujahidin groups. These visions of Islamic military solidarity and spontaneous risings had never come to fruition in the past. As far back as the ill-fated Operation Gibraltar in 1965—noted in Chapter Four—in which Ayub, other Army figures and Bhutto believed that the Muslim masses of the vale of Kashmir would rise up to help the Pakistani infiltrators had found only tepid support from the . Furthermore, while some Muslim countries had supplied some materiel support to Pakistan during its wars with India, none excepting some of the Princely States in the 1947–48 War had committed substantially in terms of a united front of Islamic believers fighting the Indians.

The idea of such a confederacy between Pakistan and Afghanistan had been mooted in 1960 and originally inspired by a former British Army Colonel and Major General Akbar Khan.696 The continuity in these grand Islamic alliances was in suggesting that the solution to Pakistan’s precarious strategic situation was a forced union with Afghanistan. Such a union would also end the irredentist ‘’ calls intermittently made by Afghanistan as well and provide the ‘strategic depth’ consistent with Zia’s and Beg’s visions.

The idea of strategic depth and security was a longstanding issue for a Pakistan perennially fearful over these irredentist claims made by Afghanistan upon its territory. Since Pakistan’s establishment in 1947 Afghanistan had near

695 Bearden, The Main Enemy, p. 368. 696 Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, Lahore, 1960, pp. 52-66 & W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, pp. 299-300. 202

continuously been involved in destabilising Pakistan and Afghanistan’s partnership with India who had a history of advocating for Pushtunistan. 697

With the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US having vacated the region Pakistan saw its first real hope of extinguishing a hostile Afghanistan on its western border. Pakistan’s sponsoring of the victorious Mujahidin groups and then the Taliban was providing in part the strategic depth and security of a compliant Afghanistan that generations of Pakistan Army Generals had always desired.

Furthermore, the importance of acquiring ‘strategic depth’ near the end of the 1990s was argued as necessary against the backdrop of what Officers saw as the revival of a Hindu fundamentalist India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in power in India was believed to be overly influenced by the Hindu Nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), while the BJP had raised the threat to India from Islam. It was believed the RSS was committed to an ideology of Hinduising India. 698 Pakistani’s blamed the RSS for the destruction of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in 1992. India’s successful testing of three nuclear devices in 1998 amplified these fears of India engaged in a Kautilyan like strategy to reclaim a mythical Hindu empire encompassing Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. 699

Officers with these perceptions believed a Pan-Islamic military alliance as a valid response to resist what they believed to be an expansionist Hindu fundamentalist India with designs of re-absorbing Pakistan into India. Some Officers noted such a vision to be perhaps strategically fanciful, in that fellow Muslim nations such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, Iran and Turkey were linked to their own economic expediencies, which in turn was often linked to India.

697 India had also allowed the publication titled ‘Pashtunistan’ calling upon the Pashtun peoples in Pakistan to be reunited with their Afghan brethren to be published in India W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1950, p. 310. 698 Stuart Corbridge, ‘The militarisation of all Hindudom’? The Bharatiya Janata Party, The bomb, and the political spaces of Hindu nationalism’, Economy and Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, May 1999. Corbridge discusses the re-invention of India by the BJP and in particular the threat to India from Islam. 699 Brigadier Muhammad Ayub Uppal, ‘Our Response to threat posed by India’, in Green Book, 1998, pp. 112-113. Kautilya wrote the Arthashastra around 150 AD. Similar to Machiavelli Kautilya’s work is a comprehensive treatise on statecraft believed by many Pakistani Officers to be sought for guidance by Indians when intriguing. See, ‘Kautilya – The Arthashastra’, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1987 & Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Azeem Asif, ‘Mahabharata: Aspirations for a Grand Dominance in the Next Century’, in Green Book, 1998, pp. 129-132. 203

Throughout the 1990s India remained in the view of Pakistani Officers to be the existential enemy with continued clashes along the in Kashmir and amongst the heights of the fought and the rule of the BJP to confirm this to them. The chapter now moves onto a consideration of Islamic revival on the culture of the Army during the late 1980s and 1990s.700

Army development, Islam and Culture

Arguments on the role of Islam traversed a variety of opinion in the Army from 1988 to 1999. Opinions ranged from the expunging of foreign practices and traditions, to the level of piety an Officer should aspire to, and even suggestions that recruitment should be on the grounds of established piety and religious knowledge. Ideas on the induction of Islam into the Army were also contested by some Officers who saw the focus on Islam as being of less professional importance than secular and professional education. Other Officers saw the emphasis on Islam as being anachronistic and at its worst as promoting an Islamic fanaticism that was harmful to the internal harmony of the Army and society more generally.

During Zia’s eleven-year period of rule he had taken a particular interest in his primary constituency—the Army—and he had sought to imbue them with an Islamism favourable to his own religious and political desires. Officers serving during Zia’s period of rule were advancing in rank between 1988 and 1999. These Officers had primarily been commissioned during the 1960s, 1970s and late 1950s. The influences on these Officers had included the 1965 War with India and the strategic shock suffered in its defeat by India in 1971. These Officers had also served through a period experiencing a global resurgence of Islam, as well as the impact of Zia’s eleven-year period in which he sought to Islamise the Army and Pakistan.

Perhaps unsurprisingly the global and regional climate of Islamic resurgence had a more profound impact on some Officers. Most explicit in their pursuit of Islamisation of the Army were those Officers who argued that only those Pakistani’s

700 For a discussion of Islamic revivalism in politics, economics and culture in Pakistan in the late 1980s where it is concluded that Islamic revivalism is the result of both Zia’s Islamisation program as well as a preceding broad based Islamic movement, see, Mumtaz Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’, in The Politics of Islamic Revivalism – Diversity and Unity, Shireen T. Hunter (Ed), Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1988, pp. 229-247. 204

who knew the Quran and Sunnah by heart should even be recruited into the Army. 701 Cloughley also had commented on a few senior Officers of the Army who possessed overarchingly Islamic views and solutions to Army problems.

…whose approach to their military duties has been based entirely on their interpretation of Islam, to the point of subordinating the relevance and practicability of military doctrine. 702

The role of Islamic values in the Officer Corps was debated by Officers during the 1990s. The definition of Islamic values was variously defined dependent on the Officers’ philosophy, of the place of religion in the Army and society. The desire for a more authentic Islamic identity during the 1990s is written of in conjunction with expunging foreign influences from the Army, an issue many believed to have been a problem that had cumulatively accrued in the Army since 1947. Officers with this perspective believed Islam to be the primary element of Pakistani culture and it needed to be much more authentic than a facile theme uttered in glib obeisance to the Army’s corporate identity.

In regard to Islamic leadership, the Adjutant General of the Army argued in 1990 that Officers should study how the Prophet and his companions bore adversity in their military campaigns and they should be encouraged to reflect on their Islamic roots in the ethical and operational aspects of leadership.703 Arguments that sought a return to the more pristine religious environments of the past were those typically made by religious fundamentalists. Arguments that included a fundamentalist theme were made during the period by Officers up to and including the rank of Lieutenant General. The Director of Army Logistics for instance argued that the inherited models of leadership from the British Indian Army were incompatible secular models of leadership unsuited to Muslim Officers in Pakistan. Officers argued that such

701 For instance a Brigadier argued for a complete restructuring of the Army that would include selection and promotion upon piety and morality as well as exclusion of non-Islamic and non- indigenous practices, Brigadier Muhammad Aslam Khan Jami, ‘Careerism and Leadership’, Green Book, 1992, pp. 113-116. 702 Cloughley relates one example in which a senior Officer claimed speculation on solutions to military problems was redundant as events were preordained by the divine will. Cloughley, Wars, Coups & Terror, p. 79 & Interview of Colonel (Retd) Brian Cloughley at Voutenay-sur-Cure, France 17 February 2010. 703 Lieutenant General , ‘Islamic Concept of Leadership’, in Pakistan Army Green Book, ‘Year of the Junior Leaders 1990’, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 1990, p. 16. 205

inherited models of leadership were at any rate antiquated, as Officers now could not be isolated from the values of its Islamic society.

During the 1990s the desire for Islamic models of Army leadership led Officers to consider more contemporaneously robust models from the Muslim world and advocated, for example, the lessons to be drawn from the Palestinian Intifada and Hezbollah who were lauded for their bold tactics against the US and French forces in Lebanon in the previous decade.704

The concept of leadership in Pakistan in general and Army in particular has to be based on Islam, truly reflecting the aspirations of the majority of our people. Pakistan even if it tries cannot remain isolated from the worldwide Islamic revolutionary movement especially in view of the closer links that have developed between Islamicists at home and abroad. 705

It is clear that the Army included a number of senior Generals such as COAS Beg and Lieutenant Generals Gul and Nasir who were known Islamists during this period. In this regard the aforementioned statement of Brigadier Malik should perhaps be considered in the context of the ideological views of his superior Officers. Arguably, as part of patronage networks existing in the Army or simply through seeking favour by imitation of their superior Officers stances on religion, some may have uttered such statements in the erroneous belief it may assist career progression. As noted in Chapter Four a number of Officers argued that a culture of obsequiousness, sycophancy and narcissism had been cultivated in the Army during Ayub’s tenure while Chapter Six also noted Zia’s practices of favouritism. Some Officers, it will be argued shortly, simply attempted to present themselves as being more pious than others.

The Commandant of the Pakistan Army Staff College argued for the necessity of change in the leadership culture of the Pakistan Army and what he

704 Brigadier Askari Raza Malik, ‘Concept of Leadership’, Green Book, 1990, p. 10. & 241 US Marines and 58 French Paratroopers were killed on 23 October 1983 by ‘Islamic Jihad’ suicide bombers believed to have be coordinated by Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Brig. Gen. (ret’d) Dr Shimon Shapira, ‘Iran’s New Defense Minister Behind the 1983 Attack on the US Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,1 November 2013, http://jcpa.org/irans-new- defense-minister-behind-the-1983-attack-on-the-u-s-marine-corps-barracks-in-beirut/, accessed 10 December 2013 & ‘Marine Massacre’, Newsweek, 31 October 1983. 705 Brigadier Askari Raza Malik, ‘Concept of Leadership’, Green Book, 1990, p. 10. 206

claimed was the persistence of an imperialistic British leadership pattern. A number of Officers during the 1990s argued the presence of what they described as the culturally incongruent blasphemous ‘God’ image of the perfect incorruptible Officer that was inherited from the British. Officers argued that the British management culture they inherited encouraged allegiance to an infallible Officer, which had sought to blasphemously engineer sentimentality and loyalty to the regiment rather than Islam. The British had indeed sought to engineer loyalty to the regiment and did take particular care to nurture religious identity and cultural practices within the regiments as noted in Chapter One.706 Some Officers realised pragmatically that the British could not have offered much else as they could not offer nationalism without creating problems for themselves.

The British Indian culture of loyalty to the Officer and regiment was more generally argued as incongruent for Pakistan during the 1990s, which they described as an Islamic state and where Islam was essential to identity. Others referred to British patterns of leadership as analogous to a corruption that had weakened the Army. The British pattern had contributed to setting the Army morally adrift by holding onto blasphemous and foreign practices antithetical to Islam and had contributed to defeat in 1971, a factor also noted by Officers in Chapter Six.

The issue of moral decay more generally and the need to extinguish the haughty irreligious clone of the British Officer of days gone by were frequently revisited in works by Pakistan Army Officers during the 1990s. Officers were particularly critical of the perceived moral failings of the old British Indian Army regimental culture. Officers criticised the aping of habits inspired by the British and earlier generations of Pakistani Officers such as ‘drinking’ and the feting of the sexually ‘aggressive male’ believed offensive and demeaning of Muslim culture and unacceptable to an Army of Muslims.707 Zia himself had criticised such practices of drinking, gambling, dancing, and music and revelled in the fact that he had not succumbed to these vices of the British Indian Cavalry and Pakistan Armour Corps

706 Kaushik Roy, ‘Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II’, in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, April 2009, p. 499, p. 528. 707 Major General Syed Tanwir Husain Naqvi, ‘Doctrine of Leadership for the Pakistan Army’, Green Book, 1990, pp. 15-17. 207

despite being taunted by his Pakistani seniors and peers.708 Such practices are condemned in Islamic society and though not universally practiced by all Officers in the past were evident in earlier generations as noted in Chapter Three. There had been a vigorously open and inclusive social life involving mixed dinner parties, drinking and dancing in which Pakistani Officers participated. This generation though still having some Officers who did indulge in drinking did not do so as openly as had occurred up until 1971. As noted earlier in the thesis many Pakistani Officers of earlier generations were conspicuous for their British ways. The British appointed historian of the Pakistan Army between 1957 and 1960 had noted his difficulties sometimes in distinguishing between many Pakistani Officers and their British counterparts.709 Chapter Three records how some Pakistani Officers were aware of this mimicry of British military and social customs and referred to their own Officers as ‘Brown Sahibs’.710

There was a realisation by many Officers during the 1990s that previous attempts to Islamise the Army had been insincere.711 Officers were concerned that the Army’s Islamic motto of ‘Iman’, ‘Taqwa’, ‘Jehad-fi-Sabillah’ was used by many as a glib slogan instead of it being an aspect of the pathway to martial superiority.712 Distinctly fundamentalist themes were pursued during this period by Officers who insisted that it is only through a return to such Islamic authenticity and the removal of foreign accretions would the Army fulfil its potential.

Officers desired the authentic induction of the values of Islam, Islamic leadership and the Islamic military ideal of the Ghazi fearless unto death. The belief in the benefits of sincere faith in Islam was also not unsurprisingly repeated by fundamentalist groups involved in the Afghan Jihad. These Jihadists fervently

708 Burki interviewed Zia and had been selected by Zia to write his biography. Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988, Asian Survey, Vo l. 28, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1085. 709 Ian Stephens, Unmade Journey, Stacey International, London, 1977, p. 333 & Maj. General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, ‘The Story of the Soldiering and Politics in India & Pakistan’, Wajidalis, Karachi, 1978, p. 114.

710 Tarzie Vittachi, Brown Sahib, Andre Deutsch, London, 1962. 711 On the resurgence of Islam in Pakistan in a study undertaken at the time see, Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995. 712 There is a comprehensive literature on Jihad but for the purposes of this chapter see the Army’s own explanation taken from this time period and contained in the PMA passing out parade brochure, ‘The President’s Parade – 79 PMA Long Course’ Pakistan Military Academy on the occasion of the Review and pass out of Cadets by Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 9 March 1989, published by Packart Press, Lahore, 1989, p. iii. 208

believed that Islam provided them the spiritual succour to continue the fight when their enemies could not.713

...it is only then that we can be the claimants of the prize promised by God almighty, more than once, in the Holy Quran, fully armed with strength of character, a Muslim will prove superior to ten non-Muslims. 714

Despite this thesis noting that not all Officers subscribed to the idea of ‘one Muslim being superior to ten non-Muslims’ the notion of Muslim martial exceptionalism continued to exist at the beginning of the 1990s and is a continuation of this belief noted in earlier chapters and having been attested to since 1947.

Evidence of the Ghazi persona in the Pakistan Army has been noted by Indian Army personnel during the period this chapter addresses in combat against the Pakistan Army at Kargil. Tenacity is a quality many soldiers have been reported to display in desperate situations. Indian observers noted the Pakistani use of Islamic war cries was matched with an apparent willingness to become Shaheeds (die in combat for Allah) rather than enact a withdrawal or surrender that other soldiers may have conceivably considered.715 The combat between the Pakistan Army and Indian Army was conducted in harsh high altitude positions. There were significant difficulties in traversing the countryside as well as resupply. This was a particular problem for the Pakistanis that may or may not otherwise account for their resilience or inability to withdraw from the combat.

Such strident Islamic rhetoric of the 1990s perpetuated a tradition of Muslim martial exceptionalism evident in the Army since 1947. The more avowedly fundamentalist visions for the role of Islam in the Army were tempered somewhat by the opposing arguments of others. A study of the opinions of Officers revealed views on the role of Islam in the Army during the 1990s to be on a continuum from the secular/notional to the extremis t and everything in between.

The Chief Instructor of the National Defence College in 1992 argued for caution in the promulgation of Islam to ensure it was not infiltrated by fanaticism and sectarianism harmful to the unity of the Army and country. Some emphasised that it

713 Paul Overby, Holy Blood – An Inside View of the Afghan War, Praeger, USA, 1993, p. 19. 714 Brigadier Ashfaq Ahmad, ‘Cashing on Character’, Green Book, 1990, p. 105. 715 Srinjoy Chowdhury, Despatches from Kargil, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2000, p. 45. 209

was critically important that Jihad was understood in its fullest meaning, and not simply as a fanatical means of waging war.716 These Officers were arguably concerned about the detrimental effects of such rhetoric on Army unity. These arguments were not just theoretical concerns as Pakistan during the 1990s experienced tremendous sectarian violence involving primarily Shia and Sunni militant groups targeting each other as well as minorities. The 1995 coup attempt had also been made by Islamic extremists and it was important that sectarian tendencies not seep into and create fissures in the Army. Such arguments had been advanced by the Commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy who argued that Islamic education in the Army must be free of any notions of fanaticism. 717

Despite arguments on the deleterious impact of extremism the conflict on the line of control in Kashmir as well as Siachen Glacier and Kargil continued to generate a martial literature glorifying Jihad and the exceptional Muslim soldier. Similar to earlier Islamist works such as Brigadier Malik’s Quranic Concept of Warfare, which had extolled the virtues of the Pakistani soldier as a brave Ghazi and Shaheed, there was a new generation of Army sanctioned Islamist literature that had received the imprimatur of a COAS at the beginning of the decade. 718

General Beg wrote the foreword to Fangs of Ice written by a Lieutenant Colonel who had instructed Officer Cadets at the PMA for nine years as well as being a graduate of the Iranian Army Academy. This Officer was arguably an Islamist revealed by the nature of his book as well as the fact he had attended the Iranian Military Academy where it was noted in Chapter Six that up to forty per cent of time was allocated to inculcating an appropriate appreciation of Islamic ideology. It is not clear the subjects he lectured upon at the PMA but his Islamist perspective may have been influential on the generations of Officer candidates he instructed. Ali’s book was homage to the martial exceptionalism and heroic qualities of the Muslim Pakistani soldier fighting in Siachen. 719 Ali eulogised the Pakistani soldier and argued the

716 Major General Salim Ullah, ‘Not By Rank Alone’, Green Book, 1992, p.?? 717 Major General Malik Muhammad Saleem Khan, ‘Pakistan Military Academy – A Futuristic Training Vision, Green Book, 1994, pp. 88-94. 718 Brigadier S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, First Indian Reprint 1986. 719 Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice (Story of Siachen), Pak-American Commercial, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 1991. Ali provides a cross-section of interviews with soldiers recounting their 210

presence of intrinsic martial capabilities possessed only by pious Muslim soldiers, and displayed in this instance in the physical and spiritual mastery of the enervating challenges of war at high altitude against the Indian enemy. 720

Similarly, during the same period Brigadier Inamul Haq’s 1991 book Islamic Motivation and National Defence was written in the established tradition of maintaining the superiority of the Pakistani Muslim soldier while advocating Islamic indoctrination and Islamic forms of warfare.721

There were also more tangible manifestations of Islamism as well as the persistence in belief of the superiority of the Muslim soldier, the importance of Jihad, as well as the older concepts of the martial race soldier during the 1990s. A Pakistani Brigadier delivered a paper at Oxford in 1998 arguing the extraordinary contributions and qualities of Punjabi Muslim martial race soldiers in the Second World War. The Brigadier drew on an eclectic source of references as evidence for his argument of the linear continuity of the Islamic and martial race traditions of Punjabi Muslim soldiers from the Second World War up to and including the Pakistan Army of 1998.722

Officers contributed to the continuing glorification of the Islamic martial identity during service with the ISI. The ISI had been General Zia’s means of monitoring the country and by 1989 had become the most powerful foreign policy force in Pakistan, particularly so on matters related to Islamist agendas in Afghanistan and Kashmir where large numbers of Army Officers undertook their service.723

Populated with significant numbers of Army Officers the ISI mentored the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir in militant groups such as the Lashkar- e-Taiba (hereafter the LeT). According to one Army ISI Officer his fellow Officers in

actions against the Indians in which the spirit of ‘Jehad’, contempt for death and the superiority of the Pakistan Muslim soldier is extolled as an example to follow. Ali instructed at the PMA for nine years. 720 The conflict that commenced in 1984 and is fought at altitudes up to 20,000 feet amongst glaciers and mountains with Pakistan Army casualties numbering about 3000 soldiers killed primarily by the climate, conditions and the hostilities, see, the Army’s perspective on Siachen, http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=198&rnd=447, accessed 10 December 2013. 721 Brigadier Inamul Haq, Islamic Motivation and National Defence, Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, Lahore, 1991. 722 NAM 1999-12-36, Brigadier Noor A. Hussain, ‘The role of Muslim Martial Races of today’s Pakistan in the British Indian Army in World War II’, paper presented at St. Anthony’s College Oxford, 5-8 April, 1998. 723 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban – The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 184 211

the ISI were ‘more Taliban than the Taliban’ in their extreme Islamist outlook. 724 During the 1990s the LeT held well publicised annual gatherings near Lahore with public displays designed to glorify Islamic warfare traditions and highlight the deeds of the Shaheeds and Ghazis alike. These gatherings coordinated by the ISI mentored LeT provided an opportunity for proselytisation of potential members with their tales of holy war, bravery and grisly relics brought back from fighting the Indians. 725 Army Officers through their service with the ISI contributed to Pakistan’s strategic culture derived on the notion of ‘Islam in danger’ and the threat to Pakistan from India. ISI mentored insurgents engaged in Islamically justified violence in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Islamic indoctrination though was not seen as the panacea to motivation and combat effectiveness by all Officers, as many remained concerned about the future of army leadership if there was a disproportionate focus on Islam. A number of Officers during the 1990s dismissed Islamisation as a priority and saw problems of efficiency and effectiveness through the more secular lenses of educational standards and professional training.

Many Officers during the period did not believe Islam and piety as the primary qualities necessary for leadership or for improving the overall effectiveness and quality of the Army. 726 These Officers as Muslims naturally viewed their faith as an important moral quality necessary for the Officer Corps. They did not view it though as the primary focus to improve the professional competence of the Officer Corps with many seeing educational standards as a more important professional issue.727 Foreign military attachés had also noted problems with educational standards in the Army and Pakistan more generally. The PMA had to lower its standard of entrants and its quality of instructors during the period due to the increase in size of

724 On the ISI’s tactics and involvement with Islamic militants more generally including his interview of an ISI Officer see, M. Iilyas Khan, ‘The ISI-Taliban Nexus’ and ‘Allah’s Army’, in, Aamer Ahmed Khan (Ed), Herald Magazine, Vol. 32, No.11, November 2001, pp. 20-29 & Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, p. 188. 725 Z. Khan, ‘Allah’s Army’, in I. Malik & F. Pastakia (Eds) Herald Magazine (Annual Edition), Vo l. 29, No. 1, January 1998, Karachi Pakistan, pp. 123-133.

726 ‘Major General Shahzada Alam Malik, ‘Senior Leaders vs Junior Leaders, Green Book, 1992, pp. 55-56. 727 Brigadier Siraj ul-Haq, ‘Junior Leadership – In the Back Drop of Corps of Military Intelligence’, Green Book, 1990, pp. 311-312. 212

the Army to 450,000 during Zia’s time, as well as the adverse effects of Zia’s policy of the introduction of ‘Urdu medium schools’.728

Urdu medium schools emphasised Islamic education, whereas the English and secular subjects taught in the English medium schools was the language of instruction for Officers attending courses in the US, as well as being the language of advanced technical publications not available in Urdu.729

Some Officers saw the problem specifically as the inordinate stress on Islamic education, which was viewed as being anachronistic, ritualistic and of little practical use to their vision of the professionally capable Pakistan Army they aspired it to be. One senior Officer, in order to prevent problems arising out of the ideological content of the Friday sermons delivered by the Khateebs (a person who delivers the Friday ‘Jum’ah’ prayer), had personally commenced vetting their sermons.730

Other’s argued that religion was practised more for appearances than the spirituality of Islam, and believed the Army should simply focus on improving the quality and quantity of secular education to the Officer Corps. Many senior Officers of the 1990s held the belief that if the Army did not address these flaws in professional military education with less focus on Islamic indoctrination, the Army would suffer cataclysmic problems such as heightened risk of internal sectarianism. 731 While these Officers do not explicitly state it, their argument in part could also have entailed a rejection of Islam being used as a means of filling a training void unable to be provided by professional and secular education.

While many did not see Islam as the primary professional issue for the Army they did acknowledge its value as a motivational force to the Army. During the 1990s Officers searching for a balanced model of religion and professional training argued,

728 Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army – Wars and Insurrections, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, pp. 282-283 & interview Voutenay-sur-Cure, France. 729 Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, pp. 282-283 & Interview…. 730 Lieutenant General Mohammad Tariq, ‘My Days as Division Commander’, in Green Book, 1992, pp. 18-19 *translation of sermons from Arabic to Urdu. 731 Lieutenant Colonel Sardar Khan, ‘Higher Military Education – the Intellectual void’, in Lieutenant Colonel Baloch (Ed), The Citadel – Professional Magazine of the Command and Staff College Quetta, Vol. XIV, No. 1/97, p. 15. 213

as had earlier generations of Officers, the model of balance that Israel and the Israel Defence Force seemed to have achieved.732

General Jehangir Karmat perceived the matter of Islamisation as one that required an astute analysis of the evolving demographics, political and religious consciousness of Pakistan and the men recruited into the Officer Corps. Karamat’s argument in some way reflected the same arguments English parliamentarians had made in the seventeenth century on insisting the English military also reflect the changes underway in English society. 733 Lieutenant General Karamat in this way argued that the Army should not adopt a doctrinaire pursuit of Islam and should instead focus on the analysis of these evolving socio-religious contours of Pakistani society. Officers, he argued, must adjust their leadership to authentically resonate with their men, and in this regard it was vital for an Officer to possess an understanding of the contemporary importance of Islam to Pakistan. It was thought, despite the presence of militant Islamic sectarian groups Islamisation would occur without any violent revolution being necessary. Islamisation it was believed would become an irresistible tide that obviated the necessity for coercion or force.

General Karamat’s argument pivoted on the reasoning that religion had become the ‘sine qua non’ of Pakistani society, and hence it was not to be viewed necessarily as a risk if the Army aligned itself with the dominant societal mores instead of resisting them, which would then invoke a major backlash. Importantly, Karamat who was to become COAS in 1996 acknowledged, as earlier noted, that the Officer Corps during the 1990s, were being drawn from the religiously conservative Shurafaa middle class. It would be counter-productive in Karamat’s reasoning to have the Army place these Officers or force them into positions at odds with the dominant Islamic societal values and beliefs from which they had originated from.734

732 Brigadier Muhammad Iqbal Tajwar, ‘Intellectual Development’, in, Green Book, 1992, pp. 89-90, while Brigadier Sikandar Shami, ‘Targeting the Middle Leadership’, Green Book, 1992, pp. 25-27 also compares the Pakistan Army unfavourably against the Israeli Army and their examples of education, religious education in the Torah and and indoctrination linking their religious heritage to nationalism that the Pakistan Army could emulate. 733 Stephen Peter Rosen, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, International Security, Vo l. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), p. 16. 734 Lieutenant General , ‘The Senior Commander’, in Pakistan Army Green Book, ‘Year of the Senior Field Commander 1992, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 1992, p. 12 & the increasing religious conservatism of the Officer Corps is noted by Saif Akhtar, ‘Pakistan Since Independence: ‘The Political Role of the Ulama’, University of York (unpublished PhD), May 214

Karamat’s observations on the religiously conservative origins of the Officer Corps was a factor that had been incrementally occurring since the late 1960s. Officers from the professional urban middle and lower classes had been joining the Army in large numbers since the late 1960s because of the expanding role of specialised services in the education, medical and engineering corps; a group similar in origin to those young men who had also been joining the religious parties. 735

While Islamic parties polling records were still poor at this point in Pakistani history, the argument towards aligning leadership values with dominant societal values was pragmatic in light of the increasingly conservative religious origins of Officers being recruited into the Army. Additionally, the Pakistan Government during the 1990s was also Islamising the laws of Pakistan including the enforcement of the Shariah Act receiving assent in 1991. The Sharif government in 1998 had also sought a constitutional amendment to make the Quran and Sunnah supreme law, which all added to the pragmatic aims of aligning Army doctrine and values with the Islamising society it was drawn from.736

Strategically, the Army was sensitive to the inherent risks of adhering to inherited foreign traditions noted earlier in this chapter, as well as any perceptions of irreligiosity, which as Chapter Six noted had been so incendiary immediately after the Army’s loss in the 1971 War.

Writing in 1992 and having served through the ‘strategic shock’ of the 1971 War, Karamat was arguably cognisant of the lessons learned in 1971. Karamat was aware of the backlash against Yahya Khan and his coterie of Officers believed to have been isolated from the religious tenor of Pakistani society and the perception of their un-Islamic habits. Officers like Karamat believed there had to be a socially and culturally relevant form of Islamisation of the Officer Corps that was sensitive to sectarian affiliation to act against the germ of extremism.

1989, p. 623. & Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, ‘Religion and Politics in Pakistan: 1972 – 1988’, Quaid- i-Azam University, PhD Thesis (unpublished), Islamabad, 1994, p. 254. Shahid Javed Burki a senior figure and would be biographer to Zia ul-Haq also argued that the Officer Corps had been drawn from a different social groups than the Ayub Khan generation from 1976 onwards, Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988’, Asian Survey, Vo l. 28, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1086. 735 Akhtar, ‘The Political Role of the Ulama’, p. 623 & Shah, ‘Religion and Politics’, p. 254. 736 Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1995, p. 23. ‘Enforcement of Shariah Act’, Act X of 1991, assented to by President of Pakistan on 5 June 1991. 215

The risks of virulent uncontrolled extremist forms of Islam being allowed to infiltrate the Army was taken seriously by Officers like Karamat, aware of previous Islamist coup attempts. Karamat realised that there was a tension between not allowing the Army’s professionalism to be compromised by overly theocratic demand, as well as a nuanced appreciation of the increased pietism of those personnel who constituted the Officer Corps. Officers such as Karamat knew the unity of the Officer Corps would be fractured by sectarianism and that a rational accommodation with religious adherence and themes had to be maintained for the Army to capably deal with any external threats, which leads to the final section of this chapter.

The Army and political elite at the beginning of the 1990s felt themselves abandoned and isolated and that Pakistan had been manipulated expediently by the US simply as a base in which to bleed the Russians dry in Afghanistan. Having won the Cold War the US retreated from South Asia leaving Pakistan with a destabilised Afghan neighbour, millions of resident in Pakistan and a wartime legacy of weapons, drug crime and corruption.

The Army and ISI were indignant at what they believed was the punitive targeting of Pakistan with the previously moribund Pressler Amendment being enacted near immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. The American actions were proof to the upper echelons of the Army of US expediency. Pakistan’s utility having ceased with the Soviet defeat, the US decision to activate the previously inactive Pressler Amendment against them was viewed as malicious. Some US Intelligence figures concurred in believing Pakistan had some reason to feel abandoned and betrayed because of these actions.737 Some Officers saw American actions as the seeds of a conspiracy against Pakistan and they furthermore feared an Indian, US and Israeli alliance designed to destroy Pakistan’s atomic program.

A solution to this was believed by some in the Army for Pakistan to organise its own anti-Zionist Judeo-Christian pact with regional Muslim countries. 738 Whether these fears could be based on any solid proof or not some Officers validly viewed the West’s fear of Islam through the prism of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis.

737 Milt Bearden, The Main Enemy’, p. 368. 738 Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Farooq Maan, ‘Modernisation and Re-organisation of Pakistan A rmy, Green Book, 1992, pp. 223-225. 216

Huntington had theorised that post-Cold War fault lines would occur between the major civilisational groups of the world including the Western and Islamic. Huntington in his argument had included commentary on the Islamic Revival during the twentieth century and he maintained there would be a tendency for Muslim countries to more authentically align their societies with Islam. 739 The leader of the ISI proxy Islamist LeT later agreed wholeheartedly with Huntington and saw these premises in a positive light as a means to finally usher in Islamic societies as well as resolving issues such as Kashmir. 740 Officers saw the threat from the alleged US and Israeli alliance in more than military terms with suspicions of the US attempting to control Pakistan through its influence in the IMF and World Bank. 741

Quite outside the domain of previous alliance possibilities were the views of certain Officers who believed the Army should investigate forging closer extra- regional alliances with both Muslim and non-Muslim countries threatened by India. Indonesia and Australia were believed to be good potential alliance partners as both were claimed to be apprehensive of Indian naval expansion. 742

Pakistan’s vulnerability to internal issues of strategic resilience were also analysed by Officers including the Director of Intelligence for Joint Services Headquarters who provocatively argued the historically high defence expenditure, unattended population growth and internal sectarianism were critical threats to national security and resilience.743

During the late 1990s Officers increasingly anticipated threats to Pakistan originating from within Pakistan itself, with sectarian groups willing to engage in violence in Pakistan’s cities even with the Army and ISI’s putative control and

739 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, UK, 1997, pp. 109-121. 740 Mohammed Saeed chief of Lashkar-i-Taiba, in Zahid Hussain, ‘Inside Jihad’, Rehana Hakim (Ed), Newsline, Vo l. 12, No. 08, February 2001, p. 22. 741 Major General Tariq Bashir, ‘Growing Geopolitical Trends of the 21st Century’, in Green Book, 1998, pp. 34-37. 742 Lieutenant Colonel Maan, Green Book, 1992, pp. 223-224. 743 Brigadier Agha Ahmad Gul, ‘Training For War – Concepts For Future, Pakistan Army Green Book, ‘Training in the Army 1994, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 1994, pp. 39-40. ‘Resilience’ may be defined as a property of a system when hit by a shock to recover its original form, or adapt and transform into something different, or collapse and cease to function. Michael R. Raupach, et al, Negotiating Our Future: Living Scenarios for Australia 2050, Australian Academy of Science, Canberra, 2012, p. 8.

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influence over many of these groups. 744 A few saw this growth of sectarian violence as a means to broker peace with India while Pakistan cleansed itself of this fanaticism. 745

Nevertheless the Army had continued its involvement in low intensity conflicts that were distinctly Islamic in their justification, execution and objectives epitomised by the Army operation that seized the Kargil Heights. The Army, which first denied its involvement and claimed the fighters at Kargil were indigenous Kashmiri Muslim fighters, then conceded that the ‘indigenous’ Muslim freedom fighters that stormed the heights of Kargil were predominantly members of the Pakistan Army. Senior Officers had conceived a plan that involved members of the Army’s Northern gaining a strategic and tactical advantage by seizing control of the normally Indian held heights. 746 The Kargil adventure caused the unravelling of diplomacy between Nawaz Sharif and India’s Vajpayee and nearly provoked a war. The Kargil adventure also caused the fall of the Sharif government in the wake of recriminations as to who was responsible for the decision to undertake the operation.

External observers of the Army including an Indian Army General who was himself a Muslim and had been involved in the Indian response analysed the endemic nature of the problems within the Pakistan Army culture. This General, together with a number of other analysts including Pakistani academics, attributed the problems stemming from the dangerous Islamism in the Army. This Islamism was inherent in what was described as the Army’s continuing adherence to the ‘Muslim Cult of the Warrior’.747 In view of what has preceded this chapter, including the analysis of ‘martial race’ in Chapter One, the ‘Muslim Cult of the Warrior’ had long antecedents.

744 Major General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, ‘The Next Millenium: A Geopolitical Crystal Ball, in, Pakistan Army Green Book, ‘Pakistan Army in 21st Century, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 1998, pp. 1-5.

745 Major General Tariq Bashir, ‘Growing Geopolitical Trends of the 21st Century’, in Green Book, 1998, pp. 34-37. 746 General V.P. Malik, Kargil – From Surprise to Victory, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 92-93. General Malik as chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee coordinated the Indian response to Kargil. Malik describes the ‘jihadi militants façade’ by the use of radio transmissions in and Balti and the wearing the garb of militants which was implemented successfully early in the Kargil campaign by the Pakistan Army. 747 General V.P. Malik, Kargil, p. 47 & former Pakistan Ambassador to Washington and Academic Husain Haqqani, in ‘Why Muslims Always Blame the West’, http://www.husainhaqqani.com/2004/10/, accessed 12 December 2013, p. 2. 218

The ‘Muslim Cult of the Warrior’ could be attributed to a continuous belief in the ‘martial race’ beliefs propagated by the British into those original Punjabi and Pakhtuns who would constitute the Army, as well as the conflation of this over the course of the Army’s history with a belief in their ‘Islamic martial exceptionalism’.

Conclusion

This chapter noted how the outlook of many Army Officers had been influenced by the impact of the eleven-year period of Zia’s control of the Army and rule over Pakistan. The chapter also noted how Officers were being drawn from the religiously conservative lower middle class (Shurafaa) of Pakistan. This was a trend that had been incrementally occurring since the late 1960s when this technically more educated class sought opportunities in many technical arms of the Army. Amongst other decisions, in his Islamising process Zia engaged in the preferential selection of Officers based on Islamic sympathies and allowed the fundamentalist Jama’at-i Islami to proselytise in the Army, which served to amplify this trend.748

The chapter noted that this conservative outlook of many Officers together with the cumulative influence of Zia’s rule and his sponsoring of the religious right was influential on their outlook and evident in many responses from Officers for more authentic Islamisation. Furthermore, the involvement of many of these religiously conservative Officers or indirectly in the ISI in the conduct of a ‘holy war’ in Afghanistan caused many Officers in the Army to normalise, embrace and argue for a more thorough and deeply Islamised Army. The chapter also noted how this Islamisation was sometimes expressed via a questioning of the relevance of the inherited traditions from the British Indian Army. Notwithstanding these arguably significant trends, the chapter did note that Islam was expressed along a continuum from the notional to the extreme, and that Officers had questioned the relevance to the Army of an emphasis on Islam rather than professional education.

The next chapter is the last substantive chapter of the thesis and examines the time period from the assumption of General Pervez Musharraf’s control of the country

748 Zia permitted the distribution of Jama’at-i Islami literature to the Officer Corps and soldiers from 1976 onwards including copies of Maududis books being awarded as prizes at the Army Education School, in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution – The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, University of California Press, 1994, p. 172. 219

in 1998 to his resignation as the Commander in Chief of the Army in 2007. The chapter will examine the impact of Islam on the Army within the context of the alliance with the US in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York as well as analyse the role of Islam in the training, education and motivation of the Army during the same time period. The chapter also examines the role of religion more generally as an element of leverage in warfare.

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Chapter VIII The Anvil 1999–2007

The countless tales and traditions of victories in battle against heavy odds by their sub-continental

Muslim ancestors and by the Arabs, during the rise and spread of Islam, inspire and motivate the

armed forces of our country.

(Brigadier Jamshed Ali – Infantry Brigade Commander & Editor of Pakistan Army Journal 2002) 749

Introduction

The failed attempt by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to dismiss General Pervez Musharraf from his post of Army Chief—by having him replaced while he was engaged in an army meeting in Sri Lanka—ultimately ushered in Pakistan’s third military regime since 1947. The tension between the Army and the Prime Minister had been simmering ever since Pakistan had to undertake a less than gracious exit from their Kargil adventure. Nawaz Sharif was seen to have been admonished, castigated and finally rescued by US President Bill Clinton; while Sharif blamed the Army for the rapid escalation in tensions between Pakistan and India.

This chapter addresses the period from Musharraf’s coup in 1999 to November 2007 when Musharraf resigned as Army Chief. The time period was selected because the Army returned to national dominance in 1999 with General Musharraf’s coup and closes in 2007 with Musharraf’s cessation as Chief of Army.

This chapter consists of five sections. Firstly, a brief overview of the political and social context of Pakistan during this period shall be provided in order to situate the later discussion. The second section shall consider the impact of Islam on the Army which featured the adoption of Jihad in 2006 as the Army’s motivational philosophy, including understanding this correctly in light of the rewards of martyrdom and the role of the Ghazi, faith and steadfastness on the battlefield. The third section shall provide an examination of the impact of the US alliance on the Army from 2001 onwards. The fourth section is a consideration on the role of Islam in the Army during the period, focusing on the links between education and Islam in the

749 Brigadier Jamshed Ali, Defence Horizons, Mas Printers, Karachi, 2003, p. 243 & p. ii. 222

pre-admission phase, Cadet College, PMA and Staff College phases together with the place of Islamic ethics and the sociological background of the Army Officers will be analysed. Lastly, a consideration of how the Army utilises religion more generally as a potential means of tactical and strategic leverage shall be addressed.

The examination of these factors for the period 1999 to 2007 adds to those analyses of the role of Islam and the Army built upon in previous chapters. The chapter concludes that Islam’s place in the Pakistan Army in the first decade of the twenty-first century is one of significant importance in which the Army is fundamentally aware of the demographic contours of its Officer Corps drawn from a religiously conservative society. The Army is also aware of the importance of ensuring religious education and sensibilities are not displaced by more extremist expressions of Islam. The Army is finally cognisant of the hostility to the nature of the Army’s alliance with the US and the ambivalence manifested in combating Pakistan’s own terrorist problems by many of its Officers.

In providing some historical context to the following examination it is important to understand that Pakistan had been reeling from the negative reactions and sanctions to its 1998 nuclear tests. This negative impact was then magnified by General Musharraf’s coup that left the country ever more isolated and castigated in world opinion. Musharraf who had led the Army during the Kargil debacle with India initially denied any Army involvement. Issues arising out of the domestic imbroglio involving Kargil had subsequently toppled the corrupt, albeit democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif, with Sharif’s attempt to replace Musharraf.750

Significantly, Pakistan was also identified as a source of international terrorism with an international community wary of Pakistan’s newly minted military dictatorship as well as its nuclear weapons and terrorist sympathies. Part of this criticism involved Pakistan’s support for the fundamentalist Taliban regime in

750 At the beginning of this incident Pakistan strongly denied any formal army involvement in the Kargil episode, but after the Indian Army released compelling evidence this position changed. See for instance, General V.P. Malik (Indian Army), Kargil – From Surprise to Victory, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2006, p. 92 & p. 211, which includes photographs of Pakistani pay books from the , Pakistan Field Force and Sindh Regiments as well as captured Officers diaries, pp. 212- 215, & A succinct account of the corruption of the Sharif and Bhutto governments was provided by a CIA Officer stationed in Islamabad during the period in Gary C.Schroen, First In – An Insiders Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Ballantine Books, New York, 2005, pp. 53-54. 223

Afghanistan, as well as what were perceived as Pakistan’s own ‘Jihad factories’ claimed to be producing thousands of intolerant anti-Western and anti-Hindu zealots. Many of these Jihadis were involved in fighting for the Taliban as well as fighting in Kashmir against India for Pakistan.

The rationality of such support as well as the objectives and impact on Pakistan of these Jihadis was also being questioned in Pakistan.751 Influential retired Pakistan Army figures continued though to promote these Jihadi’s holy tasks and dismissed the entire notion of them constituting a problem for Pakistan. Islamists like retired COAS General Beg, noted in the previous chapter, argued the complaints against the Jihadis were driven by Jewish supported Indian propagandists to isolate Pakistan and the Islamic causes it supported.752 As also noted towards the end of the previous chapter there was a belief in an American, Indian and Jewish conspiracy against Pakistan held by many Officers as well.

Those in the Pakistani defence community had reverted to the rhetoric of religion in defending Pakistan. India was denigrated in terms of its alleged Hindu fundamentalist agenda, which was thought to be an inherent part of its continuing Kautilyan philosophy that harboured hostile designs against an Islamic Pakistan.753 Added bile to the defence community was the impact of the defeat at Kargil, which was bitterly resented by serving and retired Army Officers alike. Apart from gloating over their Kargil victory the Indians were perceived to have embarrassed Pakistan in publishing the salacious details contained in the ‘ Commission Report’ on the 1971 War a day before Pakistan’s . The publication of the report and its details on the drunkenness and licentiousness of the Army

751 See for instance, Zahid Hussain, ‘In the Shadow of Terrorism’, and Ismail Khan, ‘Terrorists or Crusaders?, in Rehana Hakim (Ed), Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 8, Karachi, February 2000, pp. 16-30, Taimur , ‘The Soldiers of Allah’, and Zahid Hussain, ‘Inside Jihad’, & ‘Jihad Begins at Home’, in Rehana Hakim (Ed), Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 8, Karachi, February 2001, pp. 20-32. 752 Maj. General (r) Rafiuddin Ahmed, ‘Indian Delusion for Power’, p. 114, & General (COAS) (r) , ‘Dialogue for Peace and Myth of Terrorism’, in Dr S.M. Rahman (Ed),‘National Development and Security’, Quarterly Journal, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35, Spring 2000, Foundation for Research on International Environment National Development and Security, Rawalpindi. *This Journal and the Organisation it represents were founded by General Beg after his term as COAS. 753 Maj. General (r) Rafiuddin Ahmed, ‘Indian Delusion for Power’, p. 106 & Lt. Colonel (r) Muhammad Zaman Malik, ‘Hijacking Stunt of Air India Aircraft’, in Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 7, February 2000, pp. 48-49, in which a terrorist hijacking of an Air India aircraft that resulted in the death of an Indian civilian and freeing of Kashmiri Islamic fighters was attributed to the Indians and Mossad (no evidence provided to substantiate the claim) claiming this was another example of the West, Zionists and Hindus targeting Muslims. 224

Officers was humiliating, insulting and even included a tortuous argument that it constituted blasphemy.754 Pakistan’s military were outraged at India’s baiting of Pakistan and what were seen as insults to Islam. Additionally, the Pakistani security elite was also rankled at what was believed to be a discriminative US policy favouring India.

Pakistani defence community outrage was evident, for example in one publication which featured an image of President Clinton depicted as a grotesquely proportioned cowboy sheriff shielding Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee who was shown pointing two pistols at a uniformed and helpless Musharraf. 755 Perceptions of an American preference for a Hindu fundamentalist India infuriated Pakistani strategic and religious sensibilities.

The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 in New York had, excepting the US itself, perhaps no greater impact than it did upon Pakistan and Afghanistan. In acceding to the US ultimatum to join the Global War on Terror, Pakistan and the Pakistan Army reversed an established objective only achieved in the last decade of securing a reasonably pliant Taliban regime that would provide strategic depth to Pakistan. The about face in policy also negated one of Pakistan’s few security successes in mentoring the Taliban as one of their clients. With the Taliban’s displacement an American friendly, and more disastrously an India friendly, Afghan regime was ostensibly in control of Afghanistan again. 756

The ISI and Army’s mentoring of the Afghan Taliban and allied groups had been a point of concern and interest by the US and the West prior to the September 11

754 Humayun Gauhar, ‘Line in the Sand’, in, Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Ed) Defence Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, Karachi, September 2000, pp. 26-27. The ‘salacious’ details of General Yahya had been hinted at in many memoirs and other publications but it was galling for Pakistan to have the full and ‘supposed’ secret document published in an Indian daily which added to the embarrassing details of Yahya’s alleged profligacy already provided in such books of the time as, Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan – Eye of the Storm, Vanguard Books, 2002, pp. 258-259. In regard to the publishing of the report being ‘blasphemous’ it is possible the Pakistani author may have viewed Pakistan’s national day also as a celebration of ‘Islam’ by virtue of Pakistan being a Muslim homeland. 755 Dr S.M. Rahman, ‘Clintonite Indian Tilt’, in Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Ed) Defence Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, Karachi, August 2000, pp. 16-19 & M.B. Naqvi, ‘Significance of Clinton’s diplomacy’, in Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Ed), Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 9, Karachi, April 2000, pp. 12-15. 756 ‘Global War on Terror’, hereafter referred to as GWOT & Sherard Cowper-Coles a British Ambassador to Afghanistan and later Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, noted President Hamid Karzai’s extreme distrust of Pakistan, his particular distaste for Pakistani Army Officers and his ‘binary’ position on Pakistan as one where one was either with Pakistan or Afghanistan. Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables From Kabul – The inside story of the West’s Afghanistan campaign, HarperPress, United Kingdom, 2011, pp. 68-69. 225

attacks. After the , Pakistan’s influence with these groups, their trans-border attacks, and the risks of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of these militants and/or sympathetic Islamists in the Pakistan Army became a subject of greater official, general media and academic scrutiny.757 Apart from the concerning instances of military personnel being involved in at least one of the assassination attempts against Musharraf, Pakistan seemed to be almost imploding under the weight of Islamist violence which raised questions of a Talibanisation of Pakistan. 758

Significantly to those concerned about the march of the Taliban on Islamabad, the writ of the Taliban had extended to supplying ‘Shuhada’ (martyrdom) certificates to the families of their Pakistani Jihadi’s killed fighting the US, ISAF and Afghan Army forces in Afghanistan and the establishment of their own parallel governance structures in some areas.759

The Pakistani’s were aware of the menace presented. The threat was highlighted in 2007 by the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Pakistani and foreign analysts sought to seek the cause of the violence engulfing Pakistan in the wake of Pakistan’s alliance with the US and their war against terror. Pakistan found itself torn between the necessity of being an active member in the GWOT as well as keeping lines of communication open with Islamic militants in order to negotiate in an increasingly lethal confrontation with those militants.760 The nature of Islam and who legitimately represented its authentic tenets were being hotly contested in Pakistan, and all too often via bombings, assassinations and sustained gun battles between government forces and Jihadis. The Army had always believed itself to be the authoritative voice representing and defending an ‘Islam in danger’ from the Hindu enemy. There were now groups who believed the Army had put Islam in danger.

757 Apart from numerous media reports on the dangers of an Islamist Army or Terrorists acquiring Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal. Scenarios were put forward hypothesising that powerful individuals sympathetic to al Qaeda in Pakistan could gain control of these weapons; David Jordan, James D. Kiras et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 318. 758 ‘Talibanisation’ is a term that highlights the prospects and chances of Pakistan being taken over by ‘Jihadi’s’, this definition acquired from Lt. Colonel Naveed Safdar, ‘Internal Security Threats to Pakistan, p. 18. 759 Shafiq Ahmad, ‘Unstoppable Taliban’, in Arifa Noor (Ed), Herald, Vol. 38, No. 3, Karachi, March 2007, pp. 76-78. 760 Oakley, ‘Radicalisation by Choice. p. 5. 226

During this period there arose militants who actively fought the Army because the Army was perceived as being anti-Islamic, while the Army also maintained alliances with other Islamic militant groups, and then others yet who the Army engaged in combat. The next section shall explore the role of Islam in the Army during the period.

Indian military analysts argued that a fundamental shift had occurred in the Pakistan Army in the generation of Officers commissioned after 1971. Pakistani Officers of this generation were attaining senior positions near the end of the 1990s and early into the first decade of the new century that this chapter considers. Some Indian analysts argued that there existed within this cohort a dangerously underestimated extremist element that were gaining rather than losing strength, despite the alleged purge of Islamist Officers by Musharraf in 2001.761 Indian perceptions it must be stated are influenced by a long history of acrimony with Pakistan commencing in 1947. The Indian history with Pakistan is also littered with countless examples of what India has claimed have been Pakistani inspired Islamist insurgencies. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Two, in examining the 1947–48 War India has from its inception believed in Pakistan Army complicity in these incidents. Islamist themed attacks against India during the period this chapter considers include the Pakistan Army masquerading as Jihadists in Kargil in 1999 just prior to Musharraf’s coup. Additionally, India held grave suspicions of ISI support of the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in 2002 and the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir.

Jihad and the Army

Whatsoever the accuracy of Indian perceptions of a radicalised Islamist Pakistan Army, Islamisation was of significant motivation to serving and retired Pakistan Army Officers during this period. Serving and retired army personnel were involved in the training of members of the Tanzeemul Ikhwan Islamic organisation in preparation for a future Islamic state.762 More specifically, the Army during this period prepared Officers and soldiers for warfare through the official adoption of Quranic injunctions in motivation, ethical guidelines and the waging of war,

761 R.S.N. Singh, The Military Factor in Pakistan, Lancer, New Delhi, 2008, p. 325. 762 Zahid Hussain, ‘Jihad Begins at Home’, p. 23. 227

Motivation is the most important factor, which takes a soldier to the battlefield for the ultimate, i.e. to lay his life for his motherland … Presently Jihad forms the basis of Pakistan Army’s motivation philosophy.763

The Army produced a significant report in 2006 on the motivational philosophy of the Pakistan Army which explored the efficacy of Islamic motivation in comparison with other philosophies of motivation utilised by the US, Chinese, Indian and Israeli Armies. Jihad was concluded in this study as the most effective and readily adaptable basis for Pakistani Officers and units in providing an all- encompassing motivational philosophy for the Army. The notion of Jihad was carefully explicated in the study and reflected on the necessity of ensuring a comprehensive understanding of what Islamic warfare entailed. This importuning was similar to that noted as being made by Officers in Chapter Seven who urged the informed introduction of Islamic warfare traditions was absolutely necessary for Officers to understand.

The study provided some contextual exegesis on the forms of Jihad and emphasised the importance of differentiation between the lesser and greater forms of Jihad. For example, the study differentiated between those forms of Jihad such as, Jihad bil Saif and Qital (combative Jihad, that is, Jihad by the Sword and War) and its comparison with Jihad bil (Jihad by Heart), Jihad bil Lissan (Jihad by Tongue), and Jihad bil Qalam (Jihad by Pen) to mitigate fanatical or misguided interpretations of the holy sources. It was recommended that Officers were effectively educated in the nuances of Jihad as well as injunctions found in the Quran and Sunnah on how to conduct warfare in an Islamic manner. Such clarity was required as the US actions in Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks had ushered in numerous publications in Pakistan celebrating Jihad and arguing for instance that Muslim disadvantage could be attributed to the fact that military power was not, “vested in the hands of the righteous”. 764

The study, also in considering other motivational and organisational factors such as group cohesion, comradeship and esprit-de-corps, concluded that Islam was superior. The Officers who authored the document argued that Islam provided an

763 Brigadier B.M, et al, Pakistan Army General Headquarters, ‘Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army’, 2006, (unpublished internal 24 page report), Rawalpindi, Pakistan, p. 1. 764 Husain Haqqani, ‘The Gospel of Jihad’, Foreign Policy, No. 132 (Sep-Oct. 2002), p. 72. 228

over-arching system that inherently inculcated all these values when a genuine faith in Islam existed, an argument that was also made in the previous decade and noted in Chapter Eight. The essence again of this belief of Islamic exceptionalism was encapsulated in the new millennium in much the same terms as had been in the last century.

The concept of Islam does emphasize on the ideological and spiritual dimensions thus giving a cutting edge over the non-believers. 765

Other benefits of Islam to the soldier, apart from the inherent superiority over ‘non-believers’, were noted in the Islamic concepts of reward and punishment in the hereafter should a soldier be killed on the battlefield in the way of Allah. Steadfastness is seen as especially important for soldiers under fire overcoming natural inclinations of self-preservation, and is one that correlates to the ideal attributes of a Muslim warrior. Al-Fughom was noted in the introduction of this thesis as also introducing the notion of ‘steadfastness’ as a primary factor in the spiritual motivation of the Muslim warriors in the time of the first four caliphs.766 In this way Officers arguing for Islamic exceptionalism by virtue of their faith as noted in the previous quote, are fundamentalists in the truest sense. Not only is there a direct line between their beliefs in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries there is a direct line to those essential beliefs and qualities that Al-Fughom described as qualities of Islamic soldiers in the age of the first four caliphs. This is fundamentalism in its truest sense by drawing inspiration from the Islamically pristine past.

This 2006 study devotes considerable attention in its analysis to what it describes as the ‘conceptual contours of the Islamic concept of Jihad’, including the obligations of Jihad. The study corroborates the arguments of Officers drawn from the Pakistan Army Green Book series and Pakistan Army Journal referred to in previous chapters in their analysis of the early battles of Islam. In this regard this study, completed early in 2006, adds to the continuity of a theme actively pursued by Army Officers from the late 1960s onwards on the place and relevance of Islam to the Army.

765 Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army, p. 5. 766 Nawaf Bedah Al-Fughom, ‘Factors in the Spiritual Preparation of Muslim Armies’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Leeds, April 2003.

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Officers knew these battles of antiquity not to be relevant in so far as the impact of modern technology involved in warfare, but did argue the timeliness of faith and resilience imparted by their religion was enhanced by the study and devotion to the ideals of these religious figures of antiquity. Especially important was the idea of creating spiritual resoluteness as a qualitative edge in potential conflicts involving fighting technologically and numerically superior opponents. As noted in Chapter Seven the US had been considered as a potential foe, one with an obvious technological advantage.

These Officers considered the importance of these battles of antiquity lay in their being a point of timeless reference for what is possible if piety is authentic and a Muslim soldier acts in the traditions of the fearless unto death Ghazi. Belief in the tradition of the Ghazi is evident in South Asian Islam as well as Islam more generally. The tradition of the Muslim Ghazi challenging the enemies of Islam with affirmations of their love of martyrdom, over earthly pleasures has a long history in Islamic martial history.

Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi had challenged the Sikhs of the present day province of Pakistan in the early nineteenth century by emphasising the fearlessness of his Muslim warriors and the rewards they would obtain by dying in battle.767 The antiquity of this tradition to die in Jihad had been uttered by the revered Islamic military figure of Khalid bin Al-Waleed, reputed to have admonished a Persian Governor prior to his invasion of Persia,

Submit to Islam and be safe: Or agree to the payment of the Jizya, and you and your people will be under our protection; else you will have only yourself to blame for the consequences, for I bring a people who desire death as ardently as you desire life. 768

The legend of Khalid’s resolute qualities as an Islamic warrior had furthermore been part of the Pakistan Army’s celebration of its Islamic military culture since its inception. Khalid’s qualities of tenacity and fearlessness unto death were qualities aspired to by the Pakistan Army, and as noted in Chapter Two were

767 Marc Gaborieau, ‘A Peaceful Jihad? South Asian Muslim proselytism as seen by Ahmadiyya, Tablighi Jama’at and Jama’at-i Islami’, in David Taylor (Ed), Islam in South Asia: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies Volume III, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 153-154. 768 Lt. General A.I. Akram, The Sword of Allah – Khaid bin Al-Waleed, Adam Publishers, New Delhi, 2006 [1970 Pakistan), p. 226. 230

drawn upon at the PMA where a founding Cadet company was named in honour of Khalid. In 2002, Khalid’s name was again appropriated in recognition of his faith and his Islamic martial qualities in the naming of Pakistan’s first indigenous battle tank as the Al-Khalid.

Khalid’s name and reputation are much more than a simple honour being bestowed by virtue of the reputation of a successful soldier or politician upon a battle tank. While in the West military vehicles such as tanks have been named after famous Generals such as Patton or Sherman, the importance of Khalid as a famous General is also equated with his innate Islamic qualities of martyrdom and Islamic purity. Khalid’s reputation had been eulogised in 1970 with the publication of a book upon him by a Pakistani General.769 It is the Islamic nature of Khalid and other Islamic figures of antiquity that the Army in seeking to draw inspiration from these pious martial figures of antiquity hope to inspire a Pakistan Army. The Army are aware that it may have to combat an enemy who is both numerically and technically superior to them, whether that be India or some other enemy.

No matter what we do to achieve numerical superiority over our adversaries, it will be impossible for Muslims to prepare a matching response with compatible arsenal [sic]. This was true of the past battles; it is valid for the present and may continue to remain as such for future, provided we are true Muslims. 770

The discussion of numerical superiority is a theme discussed in Army publications, memoirs and literature since 1947 concerning the Pakistan Army and its wars with India. While India has usually remained the focus of such studies, some attention, as noted in Chapter Seven, has considered the US, Western countries and Israel.

Over-archingly the adoption of Jihad bil-Saif as the established war fighting philosophy of the Army was recognised as the necessary qualitative distinction between Pakistan and their non-Islamic adversaries in the 2006 study. Earlier generations of Officers, as noted in previous chapters, had also asserted their belief of a qualitative difference between a spiritually motivated Muslim soldier and a non-

769 Lt. General A.I. Akram, The Sword of Allah. 770 Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army, p. 10. 231

Muslim adversary to be valid. This belief has been evident since the Army’s inceptio n.

These beliefs though noted throughout this thesis are perhaps most explicitly and perhaps most pragmatically stated by a Lieutenant Colonel in an issue of the Quetta Staff College Journal,

While one cannot negate the importance of training, the point we miss out here is that our enemy is also training hard as we are, or probably even better. So, if both the belligerents are training equally hard, then how we can [sic] expect to win once the enemy enjoys the preponderance of men and materiel. There has to be something else than mere training. This something else has to be a gradual indoctrination of our rank and file in spirit of Jihad and reliance on Allah’s help… 771

Despite the Lieutenant Colonel’s article being titled A radical view, it was anything but radical for an Army which had routinely published such arguments in its own journals and other military publications on the belief in Islamic exceptionalism in martial affairs since the late 1960s and beforehand with Ayub’s early statements.

Early in the new century a retired Lieutenant General and former ISI chief had asserted the importance of the ‘Jihadi’ zeal for the Army,

…while we enjoy the terror that our Islamist warriors strike in the unbelieving hearts, let us not forget the way the army functions: mission oriented, in unity and behind its commander. 772

Similar to other Officers noted in Chapter Seven and in the adoption of the findings of this report this General had emphasised the importance of such ‘Jihad’ being conducted and coordinated within the ambit of appropriate command and control standards in the Army. Some Officers also emphasised that Islamic zeal must be delicately separated from a tendency in some to attribute floridly celestial examples of the Almighty’s intervention in warfare.

There were some instances for example where Officers had claimed the hand of Allah had deflected rounds. Such tendencies were warned against as contributing to

771 Lt. Colonel Ali Khan, ‘Fighting Outnumbered – A Radical View’, The Citadel, 1/98, quoted in Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army, p. 18. 772 Lt. General (r) M. , An Un-historic Verdict, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 2001, p. 238. 232

a form of fatalism in which events occurred due to divine will outside the agency of army training, planning or intention. 773

There was an authentic belief in Officers who argue with great vehemence the importance of a true faith to Islam as an essential quality that would in the confusion, danger and fog of war allow the Army to prevail. The belief was believed equally valid in regard to a numerically superior foe such as India or a more technologically advanced foe such as the US. The memory of the Afghan Mujahideen’s success against the technologically advanced Soviets remained a model of the efficacy of Jihad as noted in Chapter Seven.

A Brigadier underscored the absolute necessity of this in a 2003 argument that the Army must cultivate a state of religious purity to enable the force multiplication benefits that only true piety would provide the Army. 774 This argument made by other Pakistani Officers over time, and noted in previous chapters, maintained that Islam must be more than a ‘gloss’ or a ‘corporate shine’ on the Army as this would not make the Army qualitatively different from other armies. The essence of these arguments is that it is only when the Pakistan Army can cultivate an army of pious soldiers committed to Jihad willing to embrace martyrdom (Shahada) for Islam would the Army experience a force multiplying qualitative difference over their adversaries.

Necessary for such piety is a love and devotion to Allah and his messenger Muhammad beyond that of any other earthly familial connection. The great rewards for martyrdom are found in the models of the great martyrs from the time of the Prophet and, “according to Islam, martyrs who sacrifice their lives for the cause of Allah are not dead. They remain alive in heaven”. 775

773 Hamid Hussain, ‘Martial Mind Pakistan Officer Corps thought process about Defence’, in Ikram ul- Majeed Sehgal (Ed), Defence Journal, July 2002. Divine intercession has been claimed as a factor in army success by a number of Officers over the course of the history of the Army from the statements of the ISI Chief Lt. General Ahmad to earlier generations such as Maj. General Tajammal Hussain Malik, ‘The Story of My Struggle, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1991, p. 48, p. 50 & p. 69. Cloughley also mentions instances of Officers believing in fatalism where solutions to tactical problems for instance are redundant as the outcome is preordained, in Brian Cloughley interview, Voutenay-sur-Cure, France, 17 February 2010. 774 Brigadier Jamshed Ali, Defence Horizons, Mas Printers, Karachi, 2003, p. 248. 775 Adil Salahi, Muhammad: Man and Prophet, Element Books, Shaftesbury Dorset, 1995, p. 337. 233

Such devotion arguably treads a fine line for those uninitiated to understanding the personal psychology of such devotion. Arguably, some conceive this level of faith to be lying somewhere along a continuum of a blind faith and a suicidal recklessness. This degree of faith and piety is stringent but not unknown in contemporary or historical records of Muslims involved in combat.

Martyrdom has occurred in the context of Muslim warfare in the outwardly reckless human wave attacks conducted by the Shia Iranian Basij paramilitaries in the Iran-Iraq War, to the suicide attacks by Islamic militants. This is not the only species of martyrdom though, as martyrdom may be incurred in hard fought combat where lives on each side are taken dearly. The frontier warfare against the Pakhtun tribesmen in campaigns spanning the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries involved a patience and cunning on the part of combatants to inflict casualties, and hence are qualitatively different from the aforementioned example of the Basij. What is being argued is that Islamic warfare does not come in one model and it may be subject to cultural and sectarian influences such as the aforementioned Shia human wave attacks.

The Pakistan Army concept of Islamic warfare recognises the Islamic concept of martyrdom but it also recognises that this will occur in the context of professional soldiers motivated by Islam employing their skills to engage in combat in the most skilful manner possible. If that means embracing martyrdom because they are isolated on a precipice in Kargil unable to be resupplied many soldiers are willing to do this as noted in Chapter Seven.

What the previous paragraph wished to establish is that these notions of martyrdom are far from foreign concepts, and they have a long history in Islamic warfare which has been displayed in different forms from the aforementioned human wave attacks to the more personalised casualties resulting in suicide attacks and combat skirmishing. In this regard the Pakistan Army, wishing to inculcate in its Officers and personnel a quality that would literally make them sell their lives skilfully and dearly in a Jihad, would set them apart from other armies personnel. This is rational in terms of their indoctrination into the steadfast aspects of Islamic warfare and the ultimate rewards obtained from such sacrifice.

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Implicit in the adoption of Jihad as a motivational philosophy of the Army in 2006 was a criticism of previous levels of the use of Islam as shallow and lacking a thorough conviction to Islam. Competing ideologies had diverted good Muslim Officers from becoming more authentically pious. The 2006 Philosophy of Motivation described the history of motivation in the Army until 1977 as a period in which the Islamic concept of motivation had neither been clearly articulated, accepted nor instituted as a practicable motivational philosophy for the Army. General Zia’s version of Islamisation as noted in Chapter Six was not acclaimed by all in the Army. The 2006 report nevertheless recorded Zia as having ushered in a ‘golden era of Islam that had encompassed a revival and adoption of Islamic culture and tradition in the Army’. Islamisation’s acceptance was initially lukewarm though it was accepted by the majority after the Afghan War the report argues.776

The Army still harboured concerns over competing secular and un-Islamic divergences such as materialism, careerism, class consciousness, sectarianism and caste consciousness, which were criticised and argued as factors which had dissipated an authentic Islamic motivation of the Army between 1988 and 1999.777

There were Officers who maintained there had to be a careful analysis of piety in the Army to prevent naive generalisations of the Army’s relationship to religion. Some noted what they perceived as the hypocritical and sycophantically manufactured nature of Islamic devotion in the Army. Though acknowledging Islam to be more evident in the new millennium than previous decades they ruminated on what sort of Islam this was. Some argued that, “the spirit and enthusiasm which is expected of a true Muslim is missing … people don’t practice what they preach”. 778 These Officers argued there was a general trend in the Army to feign a more religious appearance. Officers went to great trouble to present an impression of their Islamic piety that was patently false.

Some Officers opined that in such an environment where Islamic correctness was deemed a desirable quality in Officers, it remained in reality difficult to truly assess as piety and morality were difficult to gauge through the public exhibition of

776 Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army, p. 6. 777 Motivational Philosophy of Pakistan Army, pp. 18-19. 778 Lt. Colonel Ashraf Faiz, From First Post to Last Post – A Journey through Army Culture, Vanguard, Lahore, 2003, p. 41. 235

piety and participation in Islamic rituals. 779 Such perspectives had also been made by some foreign observers of the Army who had noted the difficulty in accurately identifying or even categorising an Islamist from the practicing or notional Muslim in a society where overt religious practices were an inherent aspect of the culture. 780 It is quite possible then that Army Officers in the new millennium may have adopted more pious attitudes because of the influence of factional and patronage networks where these qualities may be more favoured, or more simply out of a sense that it had become an organisational norm. Such possibilities were also noted in Chapter Seven.

That Islam had become more evident in the Army was acknowledged by a former COAS who maintained that this was simply reflective of increasing Islamic trends in Pakistani society from which the Officer Corps were drawn.781 These comments made in 2001 reflected a similar analysis he made on rising religious conservatism in 1992 and noted in the previous chapter. Some were concerned though with how the Army was perceived with its Officers’ overt displays of piety.

Some concerned with foreign perceptions of Islam in the Army argued there was a need for Pakistan’s allies to be provided real explanations as to what greater Islamic adherence in the Army and Pakistani society meant. These Officers were concerned to correct what many of them perceived as the ill-conceived Western media rhetoric in the wake of the September 11 attacks in New York, and sought to explain to their allies what ‘Jihad’ and Islamic warfare actually meant; for example, Officers from Pakistan and other Muslim countries undertaking military studies in the US argued that the concept of Jihad had to be understood within its fully mandated ethical guidelines within the Quran and not as an open warrant to engage in wanton killing and terror.782

779 Lt. Colonel Ashraf Faiz, From First Post to Last Post. p. 45. 780 Brian Cloughley interview, Voutenay-sur-Cure, France, 17 February 2010. 781 See the interview with former Pakistan Army COAS Jehangir Karamat who notes that conservative elements in the Army were becoming more pronounced and that this was a natural correlation to what was occurring in society and that the Army was not immune to these trends, especially so in the high representation rate where he notes that nearly every family has had someone in the Army. Karamat maintains this was not a point to be concerned about as the Army retained a strong tradition of obedience and discipline, in A.A. Khan, ‘Interview with General (r) Jehangir Karamat’, Herald, Aamer Ahmed Khan (Ed), Vol. 32, No. 3, Karachi, March, 2001, pp. 79-80. 782 For instance Pakistan Army Officers attending higher education in the US during this period wrote theses upon this very issue, including closely argued explanations of the role of Jihad and Islam and locating terrorism outside the ambit of religions, for instance; Major Ahmed Malik, ‘Islam, 236

The Army itself worked to present images of a moderate Islam and its meaning to the Officer Corps. One of the Army’s more innovative methods of displaying the ‘human’ side of the Officer Corps was a Pakistan television drama which traced the careers of three officers, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, made in 1998 and shown during the subsequent period this chapter addresses.783 Such presentations of the Army were positive. The Officers were represented as patriotic Muslim Pakistanis engaged in international efforts to serve Islam in their protection of Muslims in Bosnia as well as domestic security in the high altitude conflict against the Indians in Siachen. The message of the program reaffirmed the essential Islamic interests of the Army in a manner less extremist than those enunciated by more vocal Islamist groups in Pakistan. The next section considers how the Army may have achieved their aims of inculcating a moderate Islam in the education of its Officer candidates as well as in service training institutions.

Education, training and Islam in the Officer Corps

This section seeks to examine the role of Islam in the education of the Army during this period by exploring what Islamic knowledge potential Officer candidates are tested upon prior to their selection to the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). The section then explores the role of Islam within in-service training at the Army Staff College Quetta, as well as some indications of the study interests when attending overseas military institutions.

In Pakistan potential Officer candidates may prepare for the Inter Services Selection Board Tests by accessing study guides prepared to assist potential candidates for the written, individual interview and group discussion questions of their entrance examinations.784 Such guides provide insight into subjects and baseline

Terrorism and the Strategy of ’, Master of Military Art and Science Thesis (unpublished), US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005. Pakistani Army Officers were not the only Military Officers to prepare work along these lines with Muslim Army Officers from such countries as Malaysia also submitting theses seeking to correct Western views of the role of Jihad, e.g. Lt. Colonel Ab Razak bin Mohd Karim, ‘The Influence of Islam in the Military; comparative study of Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan’, Master of Arts in Security Studies thesis (unpublished), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March, 2004. 783 http://www.pakistanitvdrama.com/tag/drama-alpha-bravo-charlie/, accessed March 2012. 784 The Inter Services Selection Board (ISSB) holds tests and interviews and recommends candidates for official posts in the three services and as such is more a recommendation than a selection board. The ISSB test process is conducted in Kohat Cantt, Cantt, and Malik Cantt. A candidate not recommended by the ISSB can never be called for training. 237

knowledge the Army considered necessary prerequisites for their successful candidates. The 2007 guide for potential Officer candidates began with a statement emphasising the unity of religious and nationalist objectives to the potential Officer candidates,

…the most sacred profession is being a soldier in the Pakistan Army … the soldier of the Pakistan Army is the only physical symbol of national sovereignty[sic]. 785

The statement emphasises the sacred nature of the role of the Army Officer in protecting the sovereignty of the Islamic homeland. Additionally, the sacred aspect of the role then read in conjunction with the decisive pronouncement that the Army is also the only physical manifestation of national sovereignty, with no mention of any other political or cultural image also underscores this pillar of Army strategic culture. The Army has since the 1947–48 War emphatically believed this statement to be true. They are Muslim martial race soldiers who are the sole guarantor of the state’s ideological and physical frontiers.

The guides provide practice questions and suggested answers on a range of secular subjects that included computer science, English and mathematics. Questions pertaining to nationalism are included within the questions component. Potential candidates are advised to ponder questions on Islamic studies that sometimes overlap with Pakistani studies. Candidates’ attention is drawn to the Khilafat movement, the 1857 War of Independence and a variety of questions that address Sunni, Shia and Sufi traditions on the subcontinent. Expected areas of Islamic knowledge included questions on elements of Islamic law (Fiqh), and Sunnah (traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Candidates are also expected to have knowledge of the lives of other major prophets including Old Testament and New Testament prophets (including Isa ‘Jesus Christ’) to the history of Muslim Empires and their early dominance in South Asia.786 Socio-religious aspects of Islam in Pakistan are also explored with the military examination guides suggesting potential candidates consider such issues in group discussion and debate. Examples of

785 Major (r) M. Waris, Up-To-Date PMA Pakistan Military Academy, Dogar Publishers, Lahore, 2007, p. 4. 786 Major (r) M. Waris, Up-To-Date PMA, pp. 252-253 & pp. 274-310. 238

these types of subjects included the role of Islam in society, sexual consciousness and immora lity, and whether democracy is inimical to Islam.787

In this regard both the ISSB primers for those considering a military career as well as the literature produced on the Staff College and PMA suggest during this period that Islam formed an important part of a required body of knowledge to pass the entry selection tests. The guides also suggest that the Army requires cognitively thoughtful and considered responses to contestable issues regarding Islam’s role in society as well as pure religious knowledge. Successful completion of the ISSB tests, together with an interview, could then provide an opportunity for those who sit the test to be selected as an Officer Cadet.

Instruction in Islam and Islamic education continues their candidature as Officer ‘gentleman’ Cadets at the PMA and later on as Captains and Majors at the Staff College Quetta. This illustrates the pervasiveness and required components of Islamic knowledge Officers require, alongside that of secular and military subjects.

The PMA noted their training objectives during this period included to “foster and inculcate those attributes necessary for a gentlemen Cadet, as well creating an environment conducive to intellectual and creative pursuits”. The term ‘gentlemen’ is problematic for many who see it as un-Islamic. The term was objected to by many Muslim Officers during the 1990s and the new millennium who associated the term with the British ideas of the ‘God Image’ of the Officer noted in Chapter Seven. 788 Specific objectives for students included being provided education in Islamic studies and ethics, as well as social and cultural values.789

These social and cultural values are perhaps the ones noted by former COAS Jehangir Karamat in Chapter Seven as being important for the Army in aligning itself to the socio-religio us mores of Pakistan.

787 Tufail Mohammad Dogar, ISSB Tests – Master Guide, Lahore, 2002, pp. 284-295.

789 Brigadier Safdar Ali (Director of Studies, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, Abbotabad), ‘Quality Culture in Pakistan Military Academy – A Case Study’, National Conference on Quality Assurance in Education, PCSIR Auditorium, Ferozepore Road, Lahore, May 10-11, 2003, p. 4. 239

The Army Staff College in Quetta endeavoured to promote an image that it was a progressive institution for talented Pakistani and foreign Officers. The College curriculum was presented as being provided within a cosmopolitan environment that espoused a moderate Islam. The college noted that in its year long course conducted in English, with participants from over twenty-six countries, the reference to religion was noted as an Officer’s capacity in, “being able to thoughtfully apply modern leadership and management within a socio-religious setting”. 790 Given the primacy of and sectarian differences in the society such an objective is a practical necessity for an Officer to be effective. Additionally, such understandings would also equip a Pakistani or Western Officer equally well who was to be deployed to the culturally and religiously diverse locations as part of UN missions or international military coalition assistance programs.

Interest in pursuing Islamic subjects is also indicated by those Officers attending higher education programs at foreign military academies. Some of these Officers pursued post-graduate research qualifications in subjects directly or indirectly concerning Islam in Pakistan or its role in the Army. Pakistan Army Officers in foreign military institutions wrote on a diverse array of subjects during the period that had in some way Islamic themes. It is possible that such subjects may also have represented their own familiarity with subject matter on which they were to be examined, as well as the interests of their supervisors. For instance, the noted scholar of Islam Syed Vali Nasr was a supervisor on theses at the Naval Post Graduate School at Monterey, as was the former Pakistan Army Brigadier and scholar Feroz Hassan Khan. 791

The next section of this chapter addresses the impact of the alliance between Pakistan and the US in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US.

The Army and the U.S. Alliance after 11 September 2001

The terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001 were quickly sourced back to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s guest who

790 Command and Staff College’, Pakdef.info, Pakistan Military Consortium, http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/regiments/csc.html, accessed 24 April 2008. 791 Feroz was an advisor for instance on Lieutenant Colonel Safdar’s MA thesis during the period. Lt. Colonel Naveed Safdar, ‘Internal Security Threats to Pakistan’, Unpublished MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004. 240

had previously engineered attacks against the Americans in Kenya, and . The American request for Pakistan’s assistance was treated as an uncompromising ultimatum by Musharraf directed at Pakistan.792

Almost from the beginning of the new ‘alliance’ there was resentment from pronounced Islamists as well as other Muslims in the Army. Very quickly, within Pakistani society and in the Army, there was resentment against Musharraf and his siding of Pakistan with the US in a conflict viewed by many Muslims as a war against Islam. ISI and many Army Officers specifically resented the demand by the US for Pakistan to discontinue its support of the Taliban regime that they felt to be abject bullying by the US.793 The resentment in the Army concerning the American ultimatum was acute during these years with Officers seething at their emasculation by the Americans in support of their GWOT with benefits they believed only accruing for the US and their arch-enemy India. 794

The impact of the US ultimatum further amplified a nascent anti- Americanism held by many Officers commissioned during the Zia period, who were now being promoted into senior positions early in this new decade. Some explicitly expressed this anti-Americanism within military publications, where they argued the US of the new millennium was being driven by a desire to create a new ‘Islamic’ foe to replace its Cold War nemesis. 795 Though many of these arguments lacked compelling evidence, the fact that they were published by the National Defence

792 Musharraf notes in his memoirs that he was frustrated by the US and their threat to ‘bomb Pakistan back to the stone age’ was taken as a blatant ultimatum, and knowing the Army could never hope to confront the US had to accede to the US demands for the survival of the country, in Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire – A Memoir, Simon & Schuster, UK, 2006, pp. 201-205. 793 M. Ilyas Khan, ‘The ISI-Taliban Nexus’, & M. Ilyas Khan, ‘Allah’s Army?’, in Aamer Ahmed Khan (Ed), Herald, Vol. 32, No. 11, Karachi, November 2001, pp. 24-29 794 From interview with Brian Cloughley, Voutenay-sur-Cure, France, 17 February 2010 & see Cloughley at Bradford University Pakistan Security Research Unit in the United Kingdom; http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=750 795 Brigadier Waqar Hasan Khan, ‘Anti-Americanism – Rise of a Global Phenomenon’, in Professor Hayatullah Khan Khattak (ed), Margalla Papers 2007, National Defence University, Islamabad, 2007, p. 132; Air (Retd) Jamal Hussain, ‘Beware of the American Armageddon’, Defence Journal, Karachi, June, 2003. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan had been commented on by media correspondents. David Rohde and Kristen Mulvihill, A Rope and a Prayer, Viking, USA, 2010, p. 156 & p. 332. 241

University is arguably indicative either of the sentiments of these institutions or their remarkable liberalism in allowing Officers to engage in open debate.796

At the end of 2007 Pakistan and the Army was equally applauded and castigated in a confusing melee of politically driven rhetoric. Some US Military figures noted the difficulty for Pakistan in subduing Islamic militants by a Muslim Army, and argued the nature of these difficulties was exacerbated in a country so thoroughly infused with Islamic extremism. 797 The American General Wesley Clark shared the positive though qualified views of other senior American military figures on Pakistan’s cooperation in hosting US counter-terrorist activities. Clark concluded the Pakistani security apparatus to have been thoroughly compromised by Islamists who had “penetrated its security and intelligence networks”. 798

Possibly such positions influenced views that Pakistan was not doing enough and that members of the Army and ISI were aiding the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Such suspicions of fundamentalist penetration of Pakistani security services and intelligence networks had been noted during the previous decade. The death of five Pakistani Intelligence Officers and twenty of their trainees killed in the Tomahawk missile strikes against bin Laden’s Afghanistan compound in 1998 had been greeted with incredulity by the Americans. The Americans were perplexed as to why Pakistani Intelligence Officers were with bin Laden after the clear US dissemination of evidence that bin Laden had coordinated the attacks against the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the USS Cole in Yemen.

As the war on terror was prosecuted in Afghanistan subsequent US and European suspicions of Pakistani complicity with Islamist insurgents were publically

796 That the Army Green Book series noted in this and previous chapters has also included apparently anti-establishment critique by Officers arguably suggests that such open debate is allowed. 797 Senior military figures such as General Tommy Franks wrote of the problems Musharraf had in dealing with, ‘a heavy duty Islamic extremist population’ as well the little known role of the Pakistan 11th Army Corps in killing hundreds of al Qaeda members in the aftermath of Op. Anaconda in 2001, in General Tommy Franks (with Malcolm McConnell), American Soldier, Regan Books, 2004, p. 256 & p. 539. Franks’s views were supported by Lt. General DeLong, in Lt. Michael DeLong (with Noah Lukeman), A General Speaks Out – The truth about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Zenith Press, St. Paul Minnesota, 2004, pp. 56-58 & Gary C. Schroen, First In, p. 361. 798 General Wesley K. Clark, Winning Modern Wars – Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire, Public Affairs, 2003, USA, p. 153. 242

noted by senior officials who had served in Afghanistan. 799 US and British Military Officers had encountered Pakistani volunteers fighting against them in Afghanistan, which was admittedly difficult for Pakistan to prevent. More contentiously though the capture of Pakistan military ISI agents advising the Taliban on the conduct of offensive operations against US forces was more indicative of the Islamist agenda of the Pakistani security apparatus in Afghanistan. 800 Interviews with allied soldiers in Afghanistan had revealed a significant presence of Pakistani Jihadis actively engaged in the fighting against US and ISAF. Many of the allied soldiers had grave suspicions as to the identity of these better-trained and tactically aware Pakistanis.

The presence of the Pakistani Jihadi volunteers entailed suspicions as to whether they were simply volunteers or were they military volunteers. Such suspicions were reminiscent of Indian concerns as to the identity of the Pakistan Jihadis of the 1948 War noted in Chapter Two, the Pakistani special force soldiers masquerading as Jihadis during Operation Gibraltar during the 1965 War noted in Chapter Four, as well as the recent evidence of the Pakistan Army’s failed masquerade as Jihadis in the Kargil conflict of 1999.801

During this period the Americans were extremely concerned with Pakistan’s future. Similar to General Wesley Clark’s concerns of a compromised Pakistani security apparatus, Richard Clarke, the Clinton era US National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, had noted that,

799 Former British Ambassador to Afghanistan and Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative, Sherard Cowper-Coles noted the suspicions concerning Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence directorate collusion with the Haqqani terrorist network in attacks on targets in Kabul. Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul – The inside story of the West’s Afghanistan campaign, HarperPress, United Kingdom, 2011, p. 134. 800 A US officer claims that the 10th US Mountain Strike Brigade captured a female ISI officer with Taliban forces during a Taliban force attack on US forces near Khowst and other examples; in Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010, p. 67. A US development consultant working in Helmand, Afghanistan in 2005 claimed Pakistani intelligence assistance to the Taliban as well as Pakistani Officers involved in arms and drug smuggling, in Joel Hafvenstein, Opium Season – A Year on the Afghan Frontier, The Lyons Press, Connecticut, USA, 2007, pp. 307-308. 801 A British author interviewed British Paratroopers who claimed there was Pakistani based logistic services available to the Taliban as well as a proportion of Punjabi speakers in the Taliban and higher quality standards of combat tradecraft apparent in their combat against British troops, in Patrick Bishop, Afghanistan 2006 – This is War 3 Para, Harper Perennial, UK, 2008, p. 147, p. 212 & p. 217 & Ed Macy, Apache – the man, the machine, the mission, Harper Press, London, 2008. Macy a British serviceman notes the presence of Pakistanis from the Punjab and Tribal areas, p. 83. 243

Pakistan could become what bin Laden dreamt of; an Islamic nation controlled by radicals with popular support for fundamentalism and terrorism armed with nuclear weapons. 802

More emphatically, a former US Ambassador to Pakistan had argued that Islamic radicalism was an integral part of the Army inherited from the conflict against the Soviets,

The Afghanistan War was the pivotal event in radicalizing the Pakistani Army and the ISI. In sum it illustrated the power of combining Jihad, Nationalism and Guerrilla Warfare … Radicalism … is a rational means to achieve a particular end: the survival of the Pakistan state.803

Diplomatic positions such as the Ambassador’s provide great scope to understand the political, social and cultural environment in which they work. A US Ambassador is a credible source who has access to both open source and closed source intelligence supplied to them by Political Officers and Central Intelligence Agency Officers who are both declared and non-declared, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attachés.804 The previous chapter noted the published observations of former CIA Officers to Pakistan upon the Army and government. A US Ambassador’s arguments in this regard are equally if not more compelling in the aforementioned quotation.

The views of these senior security figures were not without some validity. The Taliban and extremist elements had gained control of large swathes of Pakistan in Waziristan as well as the Swat Valley; and the militant takeover of the ‘Lal Masjid’ Mosque in the national capital Islamabad had only been resolved with an Army assault.

The alliance with the US was resented by many Pakistanis with US and Western criticism of Pakistan’s performance in the war against terror only adding to

802 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies – Inside America’s War on Terror, Free Press, New York, 2004, p. 280. 803 Oakley, ‘Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistan Army’, pp. 4-6. 804 Open source refers to that able to be obtained in the marketplace, i.e. newspapers, magazines, other media and political contacts. Closed source refers to clandestine collection, which may include electronic surveillance, satellite imagery, and covert human sources sometimes referred to as informants. Declared refers to an Officer openly declared to the host government as a member of the intelligence services while undeclared means the person is ostensibly performing another role while collecting information. 244

the Pakistani resentment of their forced compliance with US strategic objectives. One American analyst had described the alliance in much the same terms by describing Pakistan as having been trapped into collaboration.805

Condemnation of Pakistan’s alliance with the US had been evident from the beginning with vigorous protests in the Urdu mass print media criticising the US attack against Afghanistan and Musharraf’s acquiescence in providing air bases to the US. Army Officers attached to the ISI and involved with the Taliban labelled the US attacks on Afghanistan as acts of terrorism and accused the US of using bin Laden as an excuse for the US’s own foreign affairs failures.806 While not altogether an impartial witness, an Afghan diplomat of the Taliban Embassy in Islamabad claimed that members of the Army dominated ISI had cried with rage over what they stated as Musharraf’s surrender to the Americans.807

Some ISI members believed Musharraf’s actions had been abject treachery to Pakistan’s Taliban allies who were as noted earlier part of the proposed newly compliant Afghan ally as well as providing the ‘strategic depth’ to Pakistan. Members of the ISI and Taliban more generally believed the US alliance as an attack on Islam and labelled Pakistan pejoratively as ‘Majbooristan’ (meaning the land obliged to fulfil America’s demands). 808 These views were part of a narrative in which Musharraf had become the decided enemy of Islam, while in contrast a number of Western sources continued to cast Musharraf as the arch Islamist. The byzantine network of alliances that traversed the tribal, political and religious groups in Pakistan made the characterisation or labelling of persons or entities as exhibiting any one major characteristic problematic.

While many of these aforementioned Western sources had argued Musharraf was sympathetic to or in league with the Islamists, Islamists argued that Musharraf was un-Islamic and that the Army had become un-Islamic. One such Islamist response, similar to that of the Taliban, was that Musharraf and the Army had become

805 Dr George Friedman, America’s secret war – Inside the Worldwide struggle between the United States and its Enemies, Abacus, United States, 2006, p. 336. 806 Interview of ISI Officer in Mubashir Zaidi, ‘Encounter with an Ideologue’, in Aamer Ahmed Khan (Ed), Herald, Vo l. 32, No. 11, Karachi, November 2001, pp. 24-25. 807 Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, Scribe, Australia, 2010, pp. 171-173. 808 Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, Scribe, Australia, 2010, pp. 171-173. 245

a stooge for the US and that they would suffer for this impiety both in the temporal here and now as well as with retribution in the hellfire of afterlife. 809

The impact of the US alliance had a profound impact on the Pakistan Army and the contested nature of what that alliance meant to Islam and the Muslims of Pakistan.

Over the course of the next six years between 2001 and 2007 the problems arising from the alliance with the US, the presence of US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan created apprehension inside and outside Pakistan as the Army, Musharraf and other state institutions became victims of numerous attacks as well as an open conflict in the Swat Valley.810 By the end of 2007 the Army had become the first target of choice of a sophisticated network of master bomb makers and a pool of would be bombers. 811

The Army, while losing men to this violence and itself attempting to understand the nature of the hostility, was still subject to an enduring criticism of its motivation as an ally. The Army had become mired in a conundrum involving the need to maintain connections to future Islamist allies in a post-US war Afghanistan, while also engaging in hostilities with other Islamist groups, who contested the Islamic credentials of the Army and the sovereignty of the state.812

Internationally and domestically it was alleged that Musharraf remained part of the problem in his support and appeasement of the religious right to offset

809 Typical of Islamist criticisms at the time on websites not taken down or disabled are; Musharraf: Tarnishing the reputation of the Army, in, http://www.khilifah.com/kcom/analysis/central/s- asia/musharraf-tarnishing-the-reput, accessed 11 December 2007.

810 ‘30 killed as Pak Troops pound militants’, in New Age, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 26 November 2007 & Zaffar Abbas, ‘What Happened – The inside story of the assassination attempts on General Musharraf’, in Saquib Hanif (Ed), Herald, Vol. 36, No. 6, Karachi, June 2005, p. 31. 811 The first suicide bombing of an Army (Punjab Regiment) recruiting centre killed forty-two recruits was thought to be retaliation for a military attack against a Mosque; Shafiq Ahmad ‘Dangerous Heights of Dargai’, in Arifa Noor (Ed), Herald, Vol. 37, No. 12, Karachi, December 2006, pp. 50-55 & Maqbool Ahmed, ‘Suicide Bombers Inc.’, in Arifa Noor (Ed), Herald, Vol. 38, No. 9, Karachi, September 2007, pp. 36-37. 812 200 soldiers were kidnapped in South Waziristan by the Taliban and over 300 security and military personnel were killed in the thirty days preceding Pakistan’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations, in Muhammad Badar Alam, ‘Extremism – How Real is the Threat?’, in Arifa Noor (Ed), Herald, Vol. 38, No. 9, Karachi, September 2007, p. 88. A Pakistani Lt. Colonel undertaking a higher education deployment to the US considered the nature of the internal security threats to Pakistan, in Lt. Colonel Naveed Safdar, ‘Internal Security Threats to Pakistan’, Master of Arts in Security Studies Thesis, (unpublished), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004, p. 53. 246

democratic elements.813 Such observations were correct as the Army and ISI had sponsored, mentored and even led insurgent and militant groups since their inception when Army Officers participated in and coordinated tribal Lashkars in the 1947–48 War to the LeT and Taliban in the latter period. Lastly, an examination of how the Army utilised religion as an offensive and de-stabilising tool is considered. Musharraf in particular had sought to neutralise the Baloch insurgency by the infusion of Islamic militancy into their tribal hierarchy. 814

Religion as leverage

Pakistani Officers furthermore maintained sophisticated views on the use of religion in regard to the strategic exploitation of religious aspiration as a method to destabilise an enemy. The Army saw value in considering such approaches as a means of debilitating India as they had previously undertaken in supporting Sikh separatists in India. Officers during the period recommended maintaining a ‘watching brief’ on the possible resurgence of the in the Punjab which the Army could exploit to Pakistan’s advantage.815

Volatile mixes of ethnicity and religion were considered by some Officers as legitimate potentialities for initiating and maintaining low intensity conflict to the Pakistan Army’s advantage. Apart from Kashmir Officers—who also ruminated on the possibilities of developing fissiparous tendencies in a number of other Indian states including Nagaland, and Tripura816—some of the most senior Pakistani Officers during this period saw these options as realistic responses to what they argued the Indians had previously visited on them in East Pakistan and in Baluchistan. Officers believed India had a historic predilection for practising these tactics.

813 See, Musharraf forges alliance of convenience with religious groups, in, International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, Islamabad/Brussels, 20 March 2003, pp. i-ii & pp. 1-3. As well as allegations of the appeasement of the Pakistani Taliban by Musharraf resulting in a barbaric ‘Taliban’ reign in North Waziristan, see, Zahid Hussain, ‘Terror in Miramshah’, in, Rehana Hakim (Ed), Newsline, Vol. 18, No. 10, Karachi, April 2006, pp. 18-24. 814 Saadia Toor, The State of Islam – Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan, Pluto Press, London, 2011, pp. 189-190 & International Crisis Group 9ICG, ‘Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Baluchistan’, Asia Report No. 119, Islamabad/Brussels, 14 September 2006, pp. i-ii. 815 Major Ijaz Ahmed, ‘How to Deal with the Challenge of LIC at National Level’, in Pakistan Army Green Book 2002 p. 214. 816 Major Ijaz Ahmed, ‘How to Deal with the Challenge of LIC at National Level’, in Pakistan Army Green Book 2002 p. 214. 247

This was again attributed, as noted in previous chapters, to a devious Hindu Kautilyan strategy by agencies such as RAW, which had a perpetual objective of sowing sectarianism and discord in Pakistan such as their alleged role in the Baloch independence movement.817 Musharraf though was himself also accused of attempting to destabilise Baluchistan in his efforts to extinguish Baloch militants seeking autonomy by his attempts to degrade tribal and social aspects of the autonomy movement through an introduction of Islamism.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a political overview of Pakistan between 1999 and 2007 and noted the international isolation of Pakistan after the Musharraf coup. A belief in an American preference for India was also voiced by many Pakistanis with a stake in defence matters. The September 11, 2001 attacks in New York were noted as ultimately placing Pakistan into an invidious position of supporting the US Global War on Terror (GWOT) while the Army also attempted to retain Islamist militant contacts as allies in a post-GWOT environment. As a result, the Army was in combat against some Islamist groups who had labelled the Army un-Islamic, while the Army also retained other groups as potential allies. The Army whose strategic culture was founded on its role as the protector of an ‘Islam in danger’ was the subject of sustained terrorism campaigns directed against it by those Islamists who judged the Army as ‘stooges’ of the US and as being un-Islamic. The US alliance was rejected as being in no one’s favour except the US and India, with many Officers outraged at what they thought to be excessive US coercion.

The US and others were equally outraged at what they believed was Pakistani complicity in supporting Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan despite the alliance. It was noted how many senior US military and diplomatic figures believed the Pakistan Army to be thoroughly compromised by Islamists. Some of the proof offered for this was the capture of an ISI Officer coordinating attacks against US forces and both US and British forces suspicious of the level and source of training and tactical skills of Pakistani Jihadist volunteers fighting with the Taliban.

817 Major General Muhammad Saleem, ‘Pakistan Army Green Book 2002, p. 6. This view is echoed also by Major General Muhammad Tahir, Pakistan Army Green Book 2002, p. 10. 248

The attitudes of Pakistani Officers to the US alliance and their attitudes to the Taliban are arguably not surprising given the level of Islamic indoctrination Officers are provided and assessed for in their initial selection, as well as Officer training at the PMA and in-service courses at the Staff College. Islamic indoctrination is also manifestly evident in the adoption of the Army of Islamic tenets and practices in waging war outlined in the Army’s 2006 Motivation Strategy examined in this chapter.

When General Pervez Musharraf’s resigned as Commander in Chief of the Army in 2007 the Pakistan Army Officer Corps implicitly believed in their role as the defenders of an Islamic Pakistan and that the Army originated from a martial race pedigree. The Army retained a constant vigil against the belief that ‘Islam was in danger’ which was an element of their strategic culture. The Army still viewed India as their existential enemy who was seen in the guise of a Hindu fundamentalist threat, which was another element of their strategic culture. When viewed collectively the Army’s adoption of Jihad as their official philosophy of motivation, Officer recruitment being primarily from the religiously conservative Shurafaa middle class, and the rejection of foreign accretions to the Army, together served to emphasise the Islamic nature of the Army.

That there were those in the Army who did not subscribe to the Islamist agenda has been shown to be evident through a number of chapters, but is less compelling than the weight of evidence indicating the Islamisation of the Army.

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Chapter IX Conclusion

In a time period when Western or other Asian powers may consider it anachronistic to call upon a religion and an uncompromising belief in a deity to provide an advantage in combat, many Officers in the Pakistan Army in the last decade of the twentieth century and in the first decade of the new century held these beliefs as innate truths and an essential element of their Army culture.

The most important original contribution made by this study was to provide a new interpretation of the history of the Army and contribute to a greater understanding of the Pakistan Army by examining the influence of Islam in the Army from its inception in 1947 to 2007. Central to this contribution was the contention that the influence of Islam upon the Pakistan Army Officer Corps had not been fully explored in a longitudinal study of the length and manner proposed by this thesis. While there have been a number of studies on the Pakistan Army that have included some discussion of the religious dimensions of the Army—especially after September 11, 2001—they have not addressed the time frame or sustained focus of the impact of Islam on the Army that this thesis has.

Another important element of this thesis was to argue the significance of martial race in the identity of the Army and how martial race was not an extinct concept for the Pakistan Army. In particular, the thesis argues on a number of occasions how this concept of martial race held by the Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers was conflated with the notion of Islamic exceptionalism. Simply put, is that by virtue of their Islamic faith and its martial traditions Muslim Army Officers believed they possessed a natural superiority over the Hindu. Chapter One noted how martial race had a questionable validity and how others had even argued its manufactured status to support imperial interests. In this regard martial race at times was intimately linked to ethnicity, which the opinions of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers revealed to be contemptuous towards their fellow Muslims who happened to be Bengali.

The thesis argued that the Army was influenced indelibly by inherited culture, concepts and beliefs from the British Indian Army that were outlined in Chapter One. Concepts of martial race were influential on the first generation of Pakistan Army 251

Officers who then conflated this concept with their beliefs in their Islamic exceptionalism in martial matters. This was reinforced primarily by British Officers who remained in Pakistan and soon after in the accolades of the Americans. In this way the thesis examined the early and evolving use and manipulation of Islam as a form of identity and basis of a strategic culture for the Army to adhere to. Despite the ethnic and cultural disparities within the population that made up the new nation of Pakistan the Army continued to rely on a rump of Punjabi and Pakhtun Officers who relied on their Army interpretations of Islam for identity. Furthermore, Islam would become equated as the basis of the Army’s superiority in comparison to other armies such as India.

The focus of this thesis while on the impact of Islam on the Army drew links between Islam and a number of other significant influences on the Army. This included the impact of Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic exceptionalism, martial race beliefs, ethno-nationalism and military professionalism; and praetorianism in the Army’s persistent seizure of political power was noted throughout the preceding chapters. An important method of understanding the role of Islam in the Army was argued through the prism of ‘strategic culture’ theory. Strategic culture it was noted argues the relevance of an organisatio n’s history.

The theory in particular emphasises the particular importance of major shocks and disasters that may overcome an organisation and/or a state involved in the defence of a country, and how those entities then overcome such shocks through explanation, adaptation or collapse. This thesis noted the tribulations of partition and the first Kashmir War of 1947–48, the 1965 War and above all the ‘strategic shock’ suffered in the Army’s humiliating defeat to India in 1971 that were influential in shaping an Army culture in which Islam was prominent. The 1971 War influenced this in particular as Officers interpreted the defeat as having arisen out of an in- authentic adherence to Islam and the prevalence of Western vices and culture.

The procedures used to conduct the research in this thesis included a literature review of written and oral history archival material located in the United Kingdom. Additionally, primary and secondary source materials and some interviews were undertaken in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Australia and France. Personal interviews and correspondence was also undertaken with former British Indian Army Officers and 252

other individuals with expertise, service in or otherwise connected to the former British Indian Army and Pakistan Army.

The thesis revealed a number of paradoxes in the Army over the course of its history between 1947 and 2007. The Army described in Chapters Two and Three where British Indian culture was most evident was decidedly different from the Army described in Chapter Eight in a time period when Jihad had been selected as the Army’s motivational philosophy. While this is outwardly correct the Army contains to harbour paradoxes that were evident in these early periods as much as they were in 2007.

Chapter Two established the foundations of the strategic culture of the Army having been derived from the searing impact of partition felt by many of the first generation of Army Officers. The chapter established that many Officers who had served with Sikhs and Hindus had experienced an epiphany-like experience arising out of the horrors of partition which invigorated their sense of Islamic identity. The chapter also established that the British Officers serving in the Pakistan Army, including their Commanders, were thoroughly imbued with beliefs in martial race and that they perpetuated this belief during their tenure. General Douglas Gracey and Major General Loftus-Tottenham were argued as indicative of these beliefs. The chapter importantly established that the impact of partition, together with the nature of the indoctrination of martial race, coalesced with the impact of the 1947–48 Kashmir War in forming an Army identity and its strategic culture out of these tribulations. ‘Islam in danger’ was noted in the chapter as a cry to the faithful to join battle against the Indians in Kashmir, which was conjoined to the fear of Hindu India as constituting that threat to Islam. The convergence of these three elements established a Pakistan Army strategic culture derived from shared tribulations, disaster and a unitary call to Islam.

It is evident in Chapter Three that the Scotch drinking, ‘clubby’ replica of the British Officer was one of the indicative examples of the Pakistani Officer of the early to late 1950s. Conversely though, this is the same period in which some of these same ‘clubby’ Officers had clearly departed to some degree from their British Indian heritage in their Islamist sympathies including in one notable instance an attempted coup (the Rawalpindi conspiracy of 1951). Such Islamist sympathies were shown to 253

have arisen out of the trauma of partition and the first 1947–48 Kashmir War which Chapter Two noted to have induced an epiphany and new recognition of the importance of Islam by many Officers. This trauma had also prompted an early and enduring visceral mistrust and hatred of India, which was viewed as not having reconciled ‘Muslim’ Pakistan’s independence.

Chapter Three explained how the Army became the pre-eminent institution to drive domestic political discussion on defence which had become thoroughly infused with religious themes due to the recent war with India. Additionally, the Army’s Islamic and martial race nature became a mechanism by which the Army gained valuable materiel and support from the Americans who had become enamoured with the Army as a Cold War ally. Importantly in regard to Islam’s role with the Army, many new Islamic appellations replaced older British Regimental and royal appellations, especially so after Pakistan declared itself a republic in 1956. The chapter importantly noted how Jinnah’s vision of an inclusionary Pakistan was deteriorating with the onset of Islamic fundamentalist agitation against the Ahmadi sect and the problems of articulating how a Muslim was defined and the nature of Pakistan in the subsequent Munir Commission enquiry.

Chapter Four continued the examination of Islam’s increasing role in the political life of Pakistan from Chapter Three. This was most evident in Ayub’s attempt to apply his modernist Islamic visions on Pakistan, which were ultimately defeated after concerted fundamentalist agitation. Importantly, the Army under the leadership of General Musa inducted Islamic concepts into the 1965 War with the modest introduction of Islamic literature on the conduct of war and his attribution of success in the war to the Islamic nature of the Army. This theme was also repeated by Ayub in national broadcasts that celebrated the Islamic purification of the country through the blood of the Army’s martyred soldiers. The Army had also innovatively attempted to ignite an Islamic revolution in Kashmir through the induction of Special Force Soldiers.

Chapter Five explicated on how Islam became the centre piece of the contested struggle to maintain control of East Pakistan through its mobilisation by the Pakistani military government and motivation of the Army in East Pakistan. In particular, the chapter noted the evidence of a rising Islamic consciousness in the 254

Officer Corps through the contribution by Officers to Army journals in the late 1960s through to the cusp of the war in 1971. The chapter argued the degree of contemplation of Islam’s role in the Army was also possibly evident through a number of Officers’ comparison of the Army with the Israel Defence Forces and the manner and method of Israeli ideological indoctrination and motivation of their Army. These Officers desired a similarly major role for Islam in the Army. A negative aspect of Army indoctrination was explored in analysis of brutalities committed by the Army. The chapter attributed several reasons for this including skewed responses to the Army’s Islamic motivation and the impact of Yahya’s call to Jihad. Bengali and Indian media highlighted these atrocities which were deplored by much of the international community as well as some West Pakistanis.

Chapter Six established that the Army loss in East Pakistan generated a strategic shock that initiated great introspection into the Army’s abysmal performance in both East and West Pakistan. In particular, it was established how a belief emerged that attributed blame for the loss on the moral turpitude of the senior Officer Corps who had been in-authentically and expediently referencing the conflict to Islam. These Officers came to be thought of as irreligious and slavish followers of the inherited culture from the British Indian Army and for a time a mutiny was feared in the Army. The chapter also established that domestically, regionally and globally Islam was experiencing a resurgence that Zulfiqar Bhutto attempted to link his fortunes to. The chapter significantly explored and established the influence and impact upon the Army arising from General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq’s eleven years’ of rule in which his Islamisation program was arguably buttressed by US support for Zia over the course of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets. At the end of this period Islamisation had thoroughly imbued an Army drawn from the religiously conservative middle class Shurafaa and which had been subject to Zia’s support of Jama’at-i Islami proselytisation and the sidelining of the less religiously disposed. This became a more identifiable aspect of the identity of the Army after this period even though there were still many which this and subsequent chapters revealed to be inclined to more professional military identities.

Chapter Seven established the enduring impact of Zia’s period of Islamisation on the Army including the impact of a number of significant Islamist Officers

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including COAS Beg and General Gul. Most explicitly, the penetration of the Army by Islamists is perhaps indicated by the discovery of a cabal of forty Islamist Officers who had conspired to overthrow the government, merge Pakistan with Afghanistan and establish an Islamist government based on the rule of the first four caliphs of Islam. More generally, the chapter established the presence of an Islamist theme by many Officers who desired the expunging of all foreign and un-Islamic practices from the Army.

Significantly, Chapter Eight noted an apogee for many Officers inclined to Islamisation with the adoption of Jihad as the Army’s philosophy of motivation in 2006. The chapter established that the induction of this philosophy was accompanied by a degree of exegetical consideration of the meaning of Jihad with a view to ensuring Officers received an accurate understanding and rendering of the term. The chapter established that the Army desired the philosophy to be understood in the context of the role of the Ghazi as well as the degree of piety necessary for the Army to exploit these benefits.

Officers were placed in an invidious situation because of Musharraf’s decision to ally with the US in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The chapter established that many in the Army believed the alliance to be an act of treachery to their Taliban Islamist allies, while the Army later became mired in conflict with domestic Islamist militants who viewed the Army as un-Islamic. The chapter established that Islam was a notable theme in required knowledge for individuals considering a career in the Army and was present in the content of army selection tests, as well as at the Pakistan Military Academy, and even in research subjects selected by Officers undertaking foreign military training.

The results obtained through the exploration and analysis of the research material over the course of the eight chapters of this thesis support the contention that Islam has constituted a significant and enduring influence on the identity, culture and strategic culture of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps. In addition, the thesis presented substantial amounts of other commentary upon Islam’s impact on these matters as well as the strategic policy of the Army in consideration of the Army’s alliances, enemies and threats. Islam was also revealed to have an enduring connection to and

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remain conflated with ideas of martial race and Muslim exceptionalism as well as combat motivation, unit and equipment appellations.

Several other conclusions or implications may be drawn that lie outside the research question. For example ethno-nationalistic and religio-nationalistic tensions are core aspects of Army identity and their impact was most clearly witnessed in the brutalities visited upon the Bengalis by the Punjabi and Pakhtun members of the Army in 1970–71. The continued dominance by Punjabi and Pakhtuns also attest to this. The Army has reported increases in recruits after 2007 from Sindh and Baluchistan but whether these are ethnic Sindhis or Baluchis, or Punjabi and Pakhtun internal migrants cannot with certainty be clarified. Further research into the impact of Pakhtun members of the Army being deployed to undertake duties against their own people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would usefully explore tensions if any exist between the two dominant ethnic groups that inhabit the Army.

Lastly the thesis noted the degree of interest shown by Pakistani officers in their comparisons of the Pakistan Army with the IDF. A dedicated comparative study upon the role of religion in these respective forces may usefully illustrate elements of the Pakistan Army not drawn out in this study as well as that of the IDF.

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Pakistan Army Green Book Annual Series ______Ahmad, Brigadier Ashfaq, Cashing on Character, 1990. ______Ahmed, Major Ijaz, How to Deal with the Challenge of LIC at National Level, 2002. ______Asif, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Azeem, Mahabharata: Aspirations for a Grand Dominance in the Next Century, 1998. ______Bashir, Major General Tariq, Growing Geopolitical Trends of the 21st Century, 1998. ______Gul, Brigadier Agha Ahmad, Training For War – Concepts For Future, 1994. ______Jami, Brigadie r Muhammad Aslam Khan, Careerism and Leadership, 1992. ______Karamat, Lieutenant General Jehangir Karamat, The Senior Commander,1992. ______Kidwai, Major General Khalid Ahmed, The Next Millenium: A Geopolitical Crystal Ball, 1998. ______Khan, Major General Malik Muhammad Saleem, Pakistan Military Academy – A Futuristic Training Vision, 1994. 265

______Maan, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Farooq, Modernization and Re- organization of Pakistan Army’, 1992. ______Malik, Lieutenant General Ghulam Muhammad, Islamic Concept of Leadership, 1990. ______Malik, Brigadier Askari Raza, Concept of Leadership, 1990. ______Malik, Major General Shahzada Alam, Senior Leaders vs Junior Leaders, 1992. ______Naqvi, Major General Syed Tanwir Husain, Doctrine of Leadership for the Pakistan Army, 1990. ______Shami, Brigadier Sikandar, Targeting the Middle Leadership, 1992. ______Tajwar, Brigadier Muhammad Iqbal, Intellectual Development, 1992. ______Tariq, Lieutenant General Mohammad, My Days as Division Commander, 1992. ______Ullah, Major General Salim, Not By Rank Alone, 1992. ______Uppal, Brigadier Muhammad Ayub, Our Response to threat posed by India, 1998. ______Ul-Haq, Brigadier Siraj, Junior Leadership – In the Back Drop of Corps of Military Intelligence, 1990.

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Ahmed, Major Aftab, General I Accuse You, Jumhoori Publications, Lahore, 2004. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967.

Ali, Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq, Fangs of Ice (Story of Siachen), Pak-American Commercial, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 1991.

Ali Shafaat, Memoirs of Colonel Shafaat Ali, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2007.

Arif, K.M., Khaki Shadows Pakistan 1947–1997, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001.

Bearden, Milt and Risen, James, The Main Enemy – the Inside story of the CIA’s final showdown with the KGB, Century, London, 2003.

Bhutto, Benazir, Daughter of the East – An Autobiography, Simon & Schuster, UK, 2007 [1988].

Birdwood, Lieutenant Colonel The Hon., A Continent Experiments, Skeffington & Son, London, 1945.

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Channing, Mark. India Mosaic, J.B. Lippincott Company, London, 1936. Chishti, Lieutenant General Faiz Ali, Betrayals of Another Kind – Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1996. Chowdhary, Lieutenant Colonel S.S. I was a Prisoner of War in Pakistan, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1985. Clark, General Wesley K., Winning Modern Wars – Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire, Public Affairs, USA, 2003. Clarke, Richard A., Against All Enemies – Inside America’s War on Terror, Free Press, New York, 2004. Cowper-Coles, Sherard, Cables From Kabul – The inside story of the West’s Afghanistan campaign, HarperPress, United Kingdom, 2011. DeLong, Michael (with Lukeman, Noah). A General Speaks Out – The truth about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Zenith Press, St. Paul Minnesota, 2004.

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Durrani, Lieutenant General M. Asad, An Un-historic Verdict, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 2001. Faiz, Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf, From First Post to Last Post – A Journey through Army Culture, Vanguard, Lahore, 2003. Fraser, George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out There, Harvill, 1992. Franks, General Tommy (with McConnell, Malcolm), American Soldier, Regan Books, 2004. Gannon, Jack, Before the Colours Fade, Polo, Pig, India, Pakistan and some Memoirs – A collection from the writings of Brigadier Jack Gannon, J.A. Allen, London, 1976. Gould, B.J, The Jewel in the Lotus, Chatto & Windus, London, 1957. Graves, Robert, Goodbye to All That, Cassell & Company Ltd, London, 1929. Hafvenstein, Joel, Opium Season – A Year on the Afghan Frontier, The Lyons Press Connecticut, USA, 2007.

Hamid, Major General S. Shahid, Autobiography of a General, Ferozsons (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 1988. Hislop, John, A Soldier’s Story from the Khyber Pass to the Jungles of Burma – The Memoir of a British Officer in the Indian Army 1933–1947, Newhaven Publishing, 2010. Holllins, S.T., No Ten Commandments – Life in the Indian Police, Hutchison, London, 1954. Humphries, Roy, To Stop a Rising Sun – Reminiscences of wartime in India and Burma, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire, 1996. Hussain, Brigadier Mirza Hamid, The Battle Within, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2003. Husain, Major General Syed Wajahat, ‘Memories of a Soldier: 1947, Before, During After’, Ferozsons, Lahore, 2010. Hutchinson, Colonel H.D., The Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898: An Account of the Expedition Against the Orakzais and Afridis, MacMillan and Co., London, 1898. Ingall, Francis, The Last of the Bengal Lancers, Presidio Press, California, 1988. Ismay Lord, The Memoirs of the General the Lord Ismay, Heinemann, London, 1960. Islam, Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions – Bangladesh Liberation War 1971, Chittaranjan Press, Dhaka, 1974. James, B.A. ‘Jimmy’, (ed.), High Noon of Empire – The Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Tyndall 1895–1915, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, UK, 2007. James (Lord St. Brides), Sir Morrice, Pakistan Chronicle – edited with an introduction by Peter Lyon, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993. 268

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Khan, Brigadier Z.A., The Way it Was, Ahbab Printers, Karachi, 1998. Khan, Gohar Ayub, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007. Khan, Gul Hassan, Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993. Khan, Lieutenant General Jahan Dad, Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999.

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Khan, Major General Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir, National Book Foundation, Islamabad, 1970. Khan, Mohammad Musa, Jawan to General – Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier, East & West Publishing, Karachi, 1984. Kiani, Mohammad Zaman, Memoris of Major General Mohammad Kiani, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994. Killingley, Lt. Colonel, D.M., Farewell the Plumed Troop – A Memoir of the Indian Cavalry 1919–1945, Grevatt & Grevatt, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990. Kissinger, Henry, The White House Years, Hodder and Stoughton, Sydney, 1979. Latif, Rahat, Plus Bhutto’s Episode – An autobiography, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1994. Leigh, M.S., The Punjab and the War, Superintendent Government Printing Lahore, 1922 (reprinted by Sang-E-Meel) Lahore, 1997. Macy, Ed, Apache – the man, the machine, the mission, HarperPress, London, 2008. Malik, General V.P., Kargil – From Surprise to Victory, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2006. Malik, Major General Tajammal Hussain, The Story of My Struggle, Jang publishers, Lahore, 1991.

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Roberts, Field Marshal, Forty-One Years in India – From Subaltern to Commander- in-Chief, Macmillan and Co., London, 1901. Shafer, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony, Operation Dark Heart, Thomas Dunne Books, New York, 2010. Siddiqi, A.R. (Brig. Retd), The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality, Vanguard Books, Lahore, Pakistan, 1996. Schroen, Gary C., First In – An Insiders Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Ballantine Books, New York, 2005. Slessor, Tim, First Overland – The Story of the Oxford and Cambridge Far Eastern Expedition, Readers Book Club, London, 1957. Slim, Field Marshal The Viscount, Defeat into Victory: An abridged edition, Corgi Books, UK, 1971. Snodgrass, Major J.J., The Burmese War (1824–1826), John Murray, 1827, London, This reprint by AVA Publishing House, Bangkok, 1997. Zaeef, Abdul Salam, My Life with the Taliban, Scribe, Australia, 2010. Published primary sources – interviews Babar, Major General Naseerullah Khan, Interview, ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Babar the great’, in Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (ed.), Defence Journal, April 2001, Vol. 4, No. 9, Karachi, 2001 Husain, Major General S. Wajahat, Interview, ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Interview of Major General (Retd) S. Wajahat Husain’, Defence Journal, August 2002.

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Ismat, Saeed, Interview, ‘Remembering Our Warriors – Interview of Brig. (Retd) Saeed Ismat’, in I. ul-Majeed Seghal (ed.), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4, November 2001. Khan, Ali Kuli, Interview, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Lt-Gen (Retd) Ali Kuli Khan, in I. ul-Majeed Seghal (ed.), Defence Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5, Karachi, December 2001.

Khan, Muhammad Akhtar, ‘7th PMA Long Course & 4th Pre-Cadet Training School’, in I. Ikhram Seghal (ed.), ‘Defence Journal’, Karachi, February, 2002.

Khan, Zahir Alam, Interview, ‘Remembering our Warriors – Interview of Brig. (Retd) Zahir Alam Khan’, in I .ul-Majeed Seghal (ed.), Defence Journal, April, 2002. Malik, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Zaman, ‘Hijacking Stunt of Air India Aircraft’, Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 7, February 2000.

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Waraich, Lieutenant General Imtiaz, Interview, ‘Remembering Our Warriors’, in I. ul-Majeed Sehgal (ed.) Defence Journal, October 2001, Vol. 5, No. 3, Karachi, 2001.

Primary sources – addresses and presentation Address at the Twenty-first Session of the All-India Muslim League, Allahabad, December 1930, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906–1947, National Publishing House, Karachi, 1970.

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Ahmed, Akbar S., Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and conflict in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983

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Ali, Brigadier Jamshed, Defence Horizons, Mas Printers, Karachi, 2003.

Azam, Ikram, Pakistan Reflections, Nairang-E-Khayl Publications, Rawalpindi, 1987.

Bahadur, Kalim, The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan, Progressive Books, Lahore, 1978.

Barua, Pradeep P., Gentlemen of the Raj – The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817– 1949, Praeger, USA, 2003.

Bates, H.E., The Scarlett Sword, Cassell Military Paperbacks (Evensford Productions), London [1950].

Bayliss, John, Wirtz, J. & Gray, Colin S., Strategy in the Contemporary World 4th Edition’, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2013.

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Bishop, Patrick, Afghanistan 2006 – This is War 3 Para, Harper Perennial, UK, 2008.

Brzezinksi, Zbigniew, Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983.

Burke, S.M., Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1974.

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Candler, Edmund, The Sepoy, John Murray, London, 1919. Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2002. ______‘Pakistan’s Defence Policy, 1947–58’, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1998. Chowdhury, Srinjoy, Despatches from Kargil, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2000. Churchill, Winston S., Frontiers and Wars, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1962. Cloughley, Brian, War, Coups & Terror – Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, United Kingdom, 2008.

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Cole, Brigadier D.H., Imperial Military Geography – the geographical background of the defence problems of the British Commonwealth, Sifton Praed & Co., LTD, London, 1953. Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars, Penguin Books, London, 2004. Colley, Linda, Britons: Forging the Nation, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1992.

Conboy, Ken, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, Equinox Publishing, Indonesia, 2006. Connell, John, Auchinleck – A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Cassell, London, 1959. Corrigan, Gordon, Sepoys in the Trenches – The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914–15, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 1999.

Devji, Faisal, Muslim Zion – Pakistan as a Political Idea, Hurst & Company, London, 2013.

Din, Beha Ud, The Life of Salah Ud Din Ayyubi, Army Book Club, Pakistan, 1983. Effendi, Colonel M.Y., Punjab Cavalry –Evolution, Role, Organisation and Tactical Doctrine 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) 1849–1971, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.

Esposito, John, L., The Islamic Threat – Myth or Reality, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. Fair, C.Christine, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014. Farwell, Byron, Mr Kipling’s Army – All the Queens Men, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1981. Fraser-Tytler, W.K., Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1950. Fogarty, Richard S., Race and War in France – Colonial Subjects in the French Army 1914–1918, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008.

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Gordon, Leonard A. Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists, Sarat & Subhas Chandra Bose, Rupa & Co., Calcutta, 1997

Grant, Robert M., Contemporary Strategy Analysis – Concepts, Techniques and Applications 4th Edition, Blackwell Publishers, Malden Massachusetts, 2002. Green, Nile, Islam and the Army in Colonial India: Sepoy Religion in the service of Empire, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009. Grover, Verinder & Arora, Ranjana (eds.), Pakistan 1947–97 – 50 Years of Independence, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1997. Guhin, Michael A., John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his times, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972. Hack, Karl and Rettig, Tobias, ‘Imperial Systems of Power, Colonial Forces and the making of Modern South-east Asia’, in Hack, Karl & Rettig, Tobias, (eds.), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2006. Hamidullah, Dr Muhammad, The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1983.

Hamid, Major General Shahid, Disastrous Twilight – A personal record of the partition of India, Leo Cooper, 1986. Hamid, Major General S. Shahid, Early Years of Pakistan: Including the Period from August 1947 to 1949, Ferozsons Pvt. LTD, Lahore, 1993. Haroon, Sana, ‘The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and its implications in Colonial India and Pakistan 1914–1996’, in, David Taylor (ed.), Islam in South Asia, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2011.

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Haq, Brigadier Inamul, Islamic Motivation and National Defence, Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, Lahore, 1991.

Herzog, Chaim, The Arab-Israeli Wars – War and Peace in the Middle East, Arms and Armour Press, 1982.

Holmes, Richard, Sahib – The British Soldier in India, HarperCollins, London, 2005. Hoover, James W., Men without Hats: Dialogue, Discipline and Discontent in the Madras Army, 1806-1807, Manohar, New Delhi, 2007. Hutton, J.H., Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Origins, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1946. Hunter, Edward, An account of life in Afghanistan today; The Past Present, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959. Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, UK, 1997.

Hunter W.W., The Indian Mussulmans 3rd Edition, Trubner & Co., London, 1871, (Reprint by Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore, 1999). Jackson, Ashley, The British Empire and the Second World War, Hambledon Continuum, London, 2006. Jordan, David Jordan, Kiras, James D. et al. Understanding Modern Warfare, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008.

Jones, Owen Bennett, Pakistan – Eye of the Storm, Vanguard Books, 2002. Jones, Gregg, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream, New American Library, New York, 2012. Kamel Publications, ‘Chronology of Pakistan 1947–1957’, Kamel Publications, Karachi, 1957.

Kaplan, Robert, Soldiers of God – With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Vintage Books, New York, 1990.

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Khan, Amjad Ali, September ’65: Before and After, Ferozsons Ltd, Lahore, 1977.

Khan, Major General Fazal Muqeem, The Story of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963.

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Khan, Ijaz, Pakistan’s Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2007. 276

Khan, Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition – The Making of India and Pakistan, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007.

Kincaid, Dennis, British Social Life in India, 1608–1937, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.

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Saeed, Khalid Bin, ‘Islam and National Integration in Pakistan’, South Asian Politics and Religion, Donald Eugene Smith (ed.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966.

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Schaffer, Howard B., The Limits of Influence – America’s role in Kashmir, The Brookings Institution, USA, 2009. Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Waging Peace and War – Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1988.

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Zabih, Sepehr, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, Routledge, London, 1988.

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Published secondary sources – journal articles Ahmed, Major Anis, ‘A case for an Integrated Defence Force in Pakistan’, Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. IX, No. 2, December 1967. Ahmed, Major General Rafiuddin, ‘Indian Delusion for Power’, Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 7, February 2000.

Ahmed, Major General Rafiuddin, ‘Indian Delusion for Power’, Rahman, Dr S.M. (ed.), National Development and Security, Quarterly Journal, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35, Spring 2000. Aiyar, Swarna, ‘August Anarchy’: The partition massacres in Punjab, 1947’, South Asia, Vol.XVIII, 1995. Barkawi, Tarak, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2006. Beg, General Mirza Aslam, ‘Dialogue for Peace and Myth of Terrorism’, Rahman, Dr S.M. (ed.), ‘National Development and Security’, Quarterly Journal, Vol. IX, No. 3, Serial No. 35, Spring 2000. 281

Bishku, Michael B., ‘In Search of Identity and Security: Pakistan and the Middle East, 1947–77, The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, Summer 1992. Burki, Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Pakistan under Zia, 1977–1988’, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 10, October 1988. Cohen, Stuart A., ‘From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 25, No. 3, Spring 1999. Corbridge, Stuart, ‘The militarization of all Hindudom’? The Bharatiya Janata Party, The bomb and the political spaces of Hindu nationalism’, Economy and Society, Vol. 28, No. 2, May, 1999. Daeschsel, Markus, ‘Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the spectre of colonial perceptions’, Contemporary South Asia (1997), Vol. 6, No. 2. Fair, C. Christine, & Nawaz, Shuja, ‘The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Routledge, Vol. 34, No. 1, February 2011. Federspiel, Howard M., ‘The Military and Islam in Sukarno’s Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3, Autumn 1973. Ferris, John, ‘The Internationalism of Islam’: The British Perception of a Muslim Menace, 1840–1951’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 2009. Gauhar, Humayun, ‘Line in the Sand’, Defence Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, Karachi, September 2000. Goddard, Eric, ‘The Indian Army – Company and Raj’, Asian Affairs, Vol.7, No.3, 1976. Green, Nile, ‘Migrant Sufis and sacred space in South Asia Islam, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12/4, December 2003. Haqqani, Husain, ‘The Gospel of Jihad’, Foreign Policy, No. 132 (Sep–Oct. 2002). Henriksen, Rune, ‘Warriors in combat – what makes people actively fight in combat? Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30 No. 2, April 2007. Hersh, S.M., ‘Defending the Arsenal’, The New Yorker, USA, 16 November 2009. Hussain. (Retd) Jamal, ‘Beware of the American Armageddon’, Defence Journal, Karachi, June 2003. Hussain, Hamid, ‘Martial Mind Pakistan Officer Corps thought process about Defence’, Defence Journal, Karachi, July 2002. Jabeen Mussarat, Ali Amir Chandio & Qasim Zarina, ‘Language Controversy: Impacts on National Politics and Secession of East Pakistan’, South Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, January–June 2010. Khan, Feroz Hasan, ‘Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan’, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 10, USA, (October 2005). 282

Khan, M.O., ‘Is there an Islamic Way of War”, Small Wars Journal, published by Small Wars Foundation, USA, 2010. Kudaisya, Gyanesh, ‘In Aid of Civil Power: The Colonial Army in Northern India, c.1919–42’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2004. Lunn, Joe, ‘Les Races Guerrieres’: Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vo.34. No.4, 1999. Maghraoui, Driss, ‘The Grande Guerre Sainte: Moroccan Colonial Troops and Workers in the First World War’, in The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Spring 2004). Mahmud, Colonel Sirdar Hasan, ‘Tradition – a spur or a shackle’ and Brig. Sardar Ahmad, ‘The Shining Star of Islam’, Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 2, December 1971. Mahmood, Tehmina, ‘Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s Security Concerns’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 47, No. 4, October 1994. Marston, Daniel P., ‘The Indian Army, Partition, and the Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947’, War in History, Vol.16, No. 4, 2009. Moinuddin, Major, ‘The Lesson – An analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War’, Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1, June 1970. Morgenthau, Hans J., ‘The Immaturity of Our Asian Policy – II Military Illusions, The New Republic, March 19, 1956. Oakley, Robert B. & Gady, Franz-Stefan, ‘Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistani Army’, Strategic Forum, National Defense University, No. 247, October 2009. Orwin, Ethan M., ‘Of Couscous and Control: The Bureau of Muslim Soldier Affairs and the Crisis of French Colonialism’, Historian, Vol. 70, Issue 2, 2008. Osman, Mohamed Nawab bin Mohammed, ‘The Ulama in Pakistani Politics’, South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies, Volume XXX11, No. 2, August 2009. Qadir, Brigadier Muhammad Mehboob, ‘Of Good Order and Military Discipline’, Defence Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, Karachi, October 2002. Rahman, Dr S.M., ‘Clintonite Indian Tilt’, Defence Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, Karachi, August 2000.

Ray, Anita C., ‘Varuna, Jhulelal and the Hindu Sindhis’, South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies, Routledge, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, June 2012. Rosen, Stephen Peter, ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995).

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Roy, Kaushik, ‘Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, April 2009. Singh, Anita Inder, ‘Imperial Defence and the Transfer of Power in India, 1946– 1947’, The International History Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Nov. 1982). Spain, James W., ‘Military Assistance for Pakistan’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, (September 1954). Thomas, S.M., ‘A Globalized God’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010. Varnava, Andrekos, ‘Martial Races’ in the Isle of Aphrodite’, The Journal of Military History, Volume 74, Oct 2010. Wagemakers, Joas, ‘Framing the “Threat to Islam: Al-Wala’Wa Al-Bara”, in Salafi Discourse’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, Fall 2008. Wilson, Peter H., ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 1, January, 2008.

Zaigham, Major Masud Akhtar, ‘Of Nerves and Guts’, in Maj. Moinuddin (ed.), Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 1, June 1971

Published secondary sources – think tank monographs, papers, reports and related material Delvoie, Lois, A., ‘The Afghanistan War: The Pakistani Dimension’s’, On Track, Vol. 13, No. 4, Conference of Defence Associations, Canada, Winter 2008. International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 49, Islamabad/Brussels, 20 March 2003. International Crisis Group (9ICG), ‘Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Baluchistan’, Asia Report No. 119, Islamabad/Brussels, 14 September 2006. Malik, Iffat (Dr), Noshab, Farzana & Sadaf, Abdullah, “Jihad in the Modern Era” Image and Reality”, Islamabad Papers, No. 18, 2001, The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. (SPARC). Partition: Surgery Without Anesthesia, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child, Islamabad, 1998. Soherwordi, Syed Hussain Shaheed, “Punjabisation in the British Indian Army 1857– 1947 and the Advent of Military Rule in Pakistan”, Papers in South Asian Studies, Number 24, (2010), Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh.

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Abbas, Zaffar, ‘What Happened – The inside story of the assassination attempts on General Musharraf’, Herald, Vol. 36, No. 6, Karachi, June 2005.

Ahmad, Shafiq, ‘Unstoppable Taliban’, Herald, Vol. 38, No. 3, Karachi, March 2007. Ahmad, Shafiq. ‘Dangerous Heights of Dargai’, Herald, Vol. 37, No. 12, Karachi, December 2006. Ahmed, Maqbool, ‘Suicide Bombers Inc.’, Herald, Vol. 38, No. 9, Karachi, September 2007. Alam, Muhammad Badar, ‘Extremism – How Real is the Threat?’, Herald, Vol. 38, No. 9, Karachi, September 2007. Azhar, K.M., Obituary, Dawn Newspaper, 30 October 2006. Hussain, Zahid, ‘Terror in Miramshah’, Newsline, Vol. 18, No. 10, Karachi, April 2006. Hussain, Zahid, ‘Inside Jihad’, Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 2001. Hussain, Zahid, ‘In the Shadow of Terrorism’, Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 8, Karachi, February 2000. Hussain, Zahid, ‘Jihad Begins at Home’, Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 8, Karachi, February 2001. Khan, A.A., ‘Interview with General (r) Jehangir Karamat’, Herald, Vol. 32, No. 3, Karachi, March 2001. Khan, M. Ilyas, ‘The ISI-Taliban Nexus’, Herald, Vol. 32, No. 11, Karachi, November 2001. Khan, Ismail, ‘Terrorists or Crusaders?, Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 8, Karachi, February 2000. Khan, Z., ‘Allah’s Army’, Herald Magazine (Annual Edition), Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1998, Karachi Pakistan. Life Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 7, February 16, 1948. Malik, A., ‘On the brink of an abyss’, Dawn, Newspaper, Karachi, 27 April 2009. Mir. A., ‘Soldiers of Fortune: The list of retired army officials inducted into mainstream politics seems endless’, Newsline Magazine, Vol. 9, No. 11, May 1998. ‘30 killed as Pak Troops pound militants’, New Age, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 26 November 2007. ‘US has plans to safeguard Pakistan’s nukes: report’, New Age,, Dhaka, 12 November 2007. ‘Marine Massacre’, Newsweek, 31 October 1983.

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‘Text of Secretary Dulles’ Report on Near East Trip’, New York Times, Tuesday, June 2, 1953. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851–2008). Purcell, Hugh (Executive Producer), ‘The Secret Life of Mr Jinnah’, As It Happened, SBS Television, Australia, 1999.

Siddiqui, Taimur, ‘The Soldiers of Allah’, Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 8, Karachi, February 2001. Smith, Sydney, ‘Ten Days of Terror’, Daily Express, 11 November 1947. ‘A Desperate Man Hesitates in the face of War’, The Economist, Vol. 241, No. 6673, December 4, 1971. ‘India V. Pakistan’, The Economist, Vol. 241, No. 6694, December 11, 1971. ‘Several killed hundreds arrested every day’, The Economist, Vol. 263, No. 6973, April 23, 1977.

‘Off with their hands’, The Economist, Issue 6985, London, England, July 16, 1977. ‘Stressing the soft side of Islam’, The Economist, Issue 7058, London, England, December 9, 1978. ‘An engaging dictator who wants to stay that way’, The Economist, Issue 7215, London, December 12, 1981. Zaidi, Mubashir. ‘Encounter with an Ideologue’, Herald, Vol. 32, No. 11, Karachi, November 2001.

Unpublished secondary sources – theses Akhtar, Safir, ‘Pakistan Since Independence: The Political Role of the Ulama’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of York, Department of Politics, May 1989. Al-Fughom, Nawaf Bedah, ‘Factors in the Spiritual Preparation of Muslim Armies’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Leeds, April 2003. Al-Shehri, Muhammad Awdah, ‘Pakistan-Saudi Relations: A Study in Bi-lateral Cooperation in Political, Economic and Military Fields: 1967–1991’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, , Lahore, 2007. Fenton, Damien Marc, ‘SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955–1965, Unpublished PhD thesis ADFA@UNSW, 2006. Hasan, Ashraful, ‘Islamic Political Culture and Authoritarian-Military Rule: An Analysis of the Nature of Rule in Pakistan’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Alberta, Fall 1989.

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Hendrickson, Kenneth Elton, ‘Making Saints: The Role of Religious Pluralism and Tolerance in the Reshaping of the British Army, 1809–1885’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Iowa, December 1993. Iqtidar, Humeira, ‘The Changing Role of ‘Muslim Fundamentalists’ in Pakistan’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, February 2008. Khairan, Ab Razak bin Mohd (Lieutenant Colonel), ‘The Influence of Islam in the Military: Comparative Study of Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan’, Unpublished MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 2004. Malik, (Major) Irfan Ahmed, ‘Islam, Terrorism, and the Strategy of Enlightened Moderation’, Unpublished MA thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Texas, June 2005. Rindner, Michael, T., ‘The Evolution of Religious Nationalism in Pakistan: Islamic Identity, Ideology, and State Power’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, September 2007. Safdar, Naveed (Lieutenant Colonel), ‘Internal Security Threats to Pakistan’, Unpublished MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004. Shah, Syed Mujawar Hussain, ‘Religion and Politics in Pakistan: 1972–1988’, Quaid- i-Azam University, PhD Thesis (unpublished), Islamabad.

Conference papers Ali, Brigadier Safdar (Director of Studies, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, Abbotabad), ‘Quality Culture in Pakistan Military Academy – A Case Study’, National Conference on Quality Assurance in Education, PCSIR Auditorium, Ferozepore Road, Lahore, May 10–11, 2003.

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