How Indonesian Extremists Regroup
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HOW INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS REGROUP Asia Report N°228 – 16 July 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE LEGACY OF THE ACEH CAMP ......................................................................... 3 III. THE EMERGENCE OF MEDAN AND POSO ............................................................. 5 A. SABAR’S GROUP IN MEDAN ......................................................................................................... 5 B. SANTOSO’S GROUP IN POSO ......................................................................................................... 7 C. THE SANTOSO-LED MILITARY TRAINING (TADRIB) ...................................................................... 8 D. THE MOTORCYCLE ROBBERIES .................................................................................................... 8 E. BACK TO MEDAN ......................................................................................................................... 9 IV. DULMATIN’S CIRCLE AND THE POLICE POISONING PLOT ......................... 10 V. THE LINK TO ABU UMAR .......................................................................................... 11 VI. THE BIMA CONNECTION .......................................................................................... 13 VII. THE SOLO BOMBING AND TIM HISBAH’S RETURN TO MEDAN ................ 15 VIII.THE BALI PLOT .......................................................................................................... 16 IX. HOW EXTREMISTS REGROUP ................................................................................. 17 A. FLIGHT ...................................................................................................................................... 17 B. PRISONS AND PRISON VISITS ...................................................................................................... 18 C. MILITARY TRAINING (TADRIB) ................................................................................................... 19 D. INTERNET FORUMS .................................................................................................................... 19 E. MARRIAGE ................................................................................................................................. 19 F. TAKLIM ...................................................................................................................................... 20 X. LESSONS THE EXTREMISTS HAVE LEARNED ................................................... 21 XI. LESSONS THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD LEARN ................................................ 23 A. MORE ATTENTION TO RECRUITMENT ......................................................................................... 23 B. ZERO TOLERANCE FOR RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED VIOLENCE ........................................................ 23 C. BETTER PRISON MONITORING .................................................................................................... 23 D. MORE TRAINING IN NON-LETHAL ARREST OPTIONS .................................................................. 24 E. BETTER AIRPORT SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 24 F. MORE ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL LINKS ........................................................................... 24 G. MORE LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLICY INSTITUTES ..................................................... 25 H. EVALUATION OF EXISTING DERADICALISATION, DISENGAGEMENT AND COUNTER-EXTREMISM PROGRAMS ............................................................................................................................... 25 XII.CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF INDONESIA .......................................................................................................................... 26 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 27 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 28 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 30 Asia Report N°228 16 July 2012 HOW INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS REGROUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terror- Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to ism in Indonesia to international attention, the country’s Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to Islamiyah (JI) as the country’s largest and most active ji- regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, hadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, ac- cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old cused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influ- networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have ence through its schools, however, and many disaffected been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does former members remain active through other organisations. not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often com- that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and posed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundrais- discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained ing. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 lead to more effective counter-radicalisation programs. and produced the Bali bombers. The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on educated extremists have learned important lessons from the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to estab- the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by lish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and the “enemy” – the Indonesian state. They conclude that a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, they must be much more careful about vetting members, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police op- were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could erations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the become much harder. desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training cen- tres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has There has been less introspection within the government been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Po- about why recruitment continues to take place or why there so, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground ac- poorly conceived. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes tivity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting become skilled at identifying and arresting those respon- grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia sible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective pro- views play a similar role. grams are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish. Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fu- gitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can RECOMMENDATIONS move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase To the Government of Indonesia: arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows 1. Design a study to examine the networks extremists how much basic preventive work still needs to be done. use to find sanctuary when they believe they are being pursued by police or that the place they are living has How Indonesian Extremists Regroup Crisis Group Asia Report N°228, 16 July 2012 Page ii become insecure. Such a study could help define the 7. Design and implement a policy of zero tolerance to- support base for violent extremists in a way that could ward any religiously-inspired violence, including max- inform counter-extremism programs. Prisoners arrest- imum sentences for vandalism, assault and threats of ed in connection with the Aceh camp would be one violence, with clear