Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis

Inside

Understanding the Radical Mindset: Factors Motivating Terrorism and Political Violence - Prof. Rohan Gunaratna and Orla Hennessy

“What is that Buzz?” The rise of Drone Warfare - Ahmed S. Hashim and Grégoire Patte

Challenges to Evolution of a National Terrorism Policy in Pakistan - Abdul Basit

Understanding Islamic Moderation: The Wasatiyya Imperative - Taufiq bin Radja Nurul Bahri

Volume 4: Issue 9, September 2012 2 Understanding the Radical Mindset: Factors Motivating Terrorism and Political Violence*

By Prof. Rohan Gunaratna and Orla Hennessy

Based on personal interviews, this paper explores the mindset of Ali Imron and Umar Patek, two of the masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombing.

“My friends went to fight in the because of means “The Islamic Group” in Arabic. The group these stories. This is what inspired international was loosely formed by Abu Bakar Bashir and terrorism...... If they want to kill, there are verses Abdullah Sungkar in Indonesia throughout the in the Quran.” - Ali Imron seventies and eighties. It has its roots in Darul , a radical movement that called for the es- “When they kill Muslims, surely my heart is sad tablishment of Islamic law in Indonesia. Bashir as to why they do it. I like to make self defence to and Sungkar were imprisoned for nine years in protect them. We have to explain to the enemies the eighties for political disobedience and it has of NATO, U.S. or Israel to go out of Muslim coun- been argued that their period of incarceration try. Without fighting, they better leave, otherwise was the tipping point towards their adoption of by force, we will kick them out.” - Umar Patek radical Islam. This growing militancy was in paral- lel with the rise of other Islamic groups like the Introduction Muslim Brotherhood or the Palestinian Liberation On 12 October 2002, the terrorist group, al Ja- Organization throughout this period. In 1984- maah al Islamiyyah (JI), planted bombs in 1985 they also raised groups of volunteers to Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club in the Bali resort fight in Afghanistan. Originally, they assumed this of Kuta. The blasts killed 202 people from 21 would be good training for jihad for recruits once countries, including 88 Australians, 38 Indone- they returned to Indonesia. However, returning sians and 28 Britons. The attack was funded by recruits in fact influenced Bashir and Sungkar to Al Qaeda and originally planned to coincide with think in global terms – rather than just the re- the anniversary of 9/11. It was the worst terrorist gional context. Since then, the network has attack ever to take place in Southeast Asia. grown to include cells across the region, includ- ing in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sin- One of the principal questions in terrorism studies gapore and Thailand. is “what are the factors that motivate individuals to participate, advocate, and support political vio- Bashir and Sungkar kept up to date with the lence?” The above quotes by Ali Imron and Umar Global Salafi jihad movement through their asso- Patek, both involved in the Bali bombing and self‐ ciates in Afghanistan. By the mid to late nineties, described mujahids/jihadists, provide some in- both were talking not only about establishing a sight into the working of violent extremist’s minds. Muslim state in Indonesia, but also a Daula This paper is based on personal interviews with Nusantra (a regional Pan-Islamist state). Imron and Patek at the Police Headquarters in Jakarta in April 2012. Understanding Umar Patek and Ali Imron’s Al Jamaah al Islamiyyah (JI) World View

To understand Patek and Imron’s individual moti- Umar Patek was born in 1966 in Pemalang, Cen- vations it is also important to understand the JI tral Java. In the early nineties he joined JI and and Indonesian context. Al Jamaah al Islamiyyah trained in militant camps in Afghanistan before

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returning in the mid‐1990s to Indonesia. As a known as “Mukhlas”) and Ali Amrozi bin Haji member of JI he was known as “the demolition Nurhasyim, both of whom were convicted and man” as he specialised in assembling explo- executed for their roles in the bombing. sives. After the Bali attack he fled to the Philip- pines where he joined the Moro Islamic Libera- Throughout the interviews, it was evident that tion Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group each of the men subscribed to the general JI (ASG) before moving to Pakistan to fight, or, in and Al Qaeda ideologies. However, each em- his own words, “wage jihad” against foreign phasized different aspects and it was over- forces in Afghanistan. On 25 January 2011, whelmingly evident that both had different per- Patek was captured in , Pakistan, spectives of “the cause”. the same city where was hid- ing, although Patek has denied ever meeting Disillusionment with Political Process him. He was extradited to Indonesia on 11 Au- gust 2011. Patek has been sentenced to 20 Both, of course, referenced political grievances years of imprisonment by the West Jakarta Dis- in varying degrees. Referring to non‐Muslims trict Court in June 2012 for his role in the Bali Patek said, bombings and for his role in the bombing of nine churches in Jakarta in 2000, which killed at least “They kill Muslims in Palestine and in 19 people. Among his charges are premeditated other places. About Palestine, I knew murder, bomb‐making and illegal firearms pos- from the newspapers and radio when I session. was in Sada camp in Pakistan. I heard about Pattani in 1991. I met Pattani Ali Imron was found guilty on 18 September people in Sada. They came for training. 2003 of planning the Bali attacks and is currently They told me about the massacre of serving life in prison in Indonesia. He is the Muslims in Pattani by the Thai military. I younger brother of Huda bin Abdul Haq (also felt sad when I heard. I did not say any-

Ali Imron (left), sentenced to life imprisonment for the , at the trial of Umar Patek (right), at the West Jakarta District Court in Jakarta on 22 March 2012.

Photo credit: Tatan Syu- flana / AP :http:// www.stamfordadvocate.co m/news/article/Militant- denies-making-Bali- bombs-at-trial- 3426394.php#ixzz250AA MEKD

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thing. About Bosnia and Chechnya, I Invoking Religion to Justify Acts of Violence knew from the radio when I stayed in Torkham camp in Afghanistan. They did In terms of religion, both men differed in their not teach in the class [at Sada]. I knew knowledge of theology and the extent to which it from news that Philippine military was motivated them. Perhaps because he has killing Moros. When I was fighting greater religious knowledge of the Quran and against the Philippine military, I saw because he was less motivated by political with my own eyes. Then I knew the ac- grievances, Imron greatly emphasized religious tual suffering. JI did not send me to the duty. Quoting from Verse 60 of surah Al‐Anfal in Philippines, I volunteered and went. the Quran, Imron argued that this was the key When they kill Muslims, surely my heart verse and also one of his key motivational texts. is sad as to why they do it. I like to per- He claimed “My ideology is the laws of Islam”. form self defence to protect them. We Patek also referenced the Quran but far less have to explain to the enemies - NATO, clearly and admitted “My theology is Surah al U.S. or Israel- to go out of Muslim coun- Tawbah… I forget the verse. I did not memo- tries. They better leave, without fighting. rize.” He explained that his limited knowledge of Otherwise, we will kick them out by religion was due to his poor education. But when force.” referring to other group members, he used their level of religious knowledge to rank them saying Patek spoke at length on this theme and within “Mukhlas, Ali Imron and Samudra had a the overall context of the interview it appeared high level of theology, but Maulana was the that political grievances i.e. his perception of the same level or lower, and Heri Kuncoro is even global persecution of Muslims by the west (in lower [than me].” keeping with Al Qaeda’s narrative), particularly drove him toward radicalization. Furthermore, So, although religion is important for Patek, it is while Patek was moved by those stories he not his key narrative. Nevertheless, he does heard, actually seeing violence in reality selectively call upon it, using such verses as the strengthened his commitment further. Imron, on Surak al Tawbah, to justify violence. It is also the other hand rejected this outright saying “I am evident that one’s level of religious knowledge is not motivated by Muslim massacres”. important within the group itself and those with higher levels of knowledge garner greater re- Both also displayed disillusionment with the po- spect. For Imron, it seems that the restoration of litical process. For Patek, the only realistic solu- a strong Islam throughout Europe and the world tion to stop Muslim persecution is using force is chief among his priorities. He believes this against the enemy, referring to this several should be done by force but, at the same time, it times as “self‐defence”. Imron is also disillu- should strictly adhere to the rules laid out in the sioned with political and democratic processes Quran and the . For Imron, the laws of but, interestingly, he blames this more on the Islam not only justify his use of violence but im- decline of Islam itself. He said “The Islamic Em- plore him to use it. pire inspired the Muslims to fight for the lost glory. In the past, Islam in Europe was strong. Interestingly, although both men clearly place a Now it is going down.” high value on theology both conceded that burn- ing the Quran does not motivate them to fight, with Imron saying “We can print more Quran, when they burn al Quran we do not have to burn the people”. Considering Imron’s emphasis on

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the religious narrative and his interpretation of Quran. He later added, “jihad is the responsibil- his religious duty, this statement seems to be ity to live up to Islam.” somewhat contradictory – something that was the case regularly throughout the interviews. Heroism, Glamour and Remorse

Both also differed greatly when questioned on Patek raised the issue of heroism, or the ex- the meaning of jihad. Umar Patek said “jihad is pected “glamour” of joining a terrorist group, in a implementing Islamic law seriously, sternly and surprising way. Originally he had not told his consistently in a place by a nation of people us- wife that he was a Mujahid and she only found ing force.” He added: “If Muslims can implement out on his arrest in Abbottabad in 2011. Patek Islamic law in a country without fighting, that is assumed that on hearing this she would be im- also jihad. In the Philippines and Afghanistan, I pressed or love him more but was surprised to practiced jihad musallah [armed jihad] or jihad find that neither were the case. Patek also by force by guns and other weapons.” For Patek spoke of the conflict between his role as a hus- his personal identity is important and he clearly band and his role as a mujahid. His wife con- identifies himself as a mujahid rather than a ji- verted from Catholicism to Islam but as Patek hadi. It is very possible that for Patek, “jihad said “She embraced Islam… but she did not subscribes to a corrupt understanding of jihad understand the purpose of Islam. She said “do and a mujahid performs correct jihad”. Ali Imron, not go to other countries to do jihad. Just stay however, was much more succinct. Perhaps with your brother, uncle and with me”. He contin- referencing the author Faraj here, he said, “The ued, “I love her, so I have to do everything and meaning of jihad is war”, although he also admit- anything for her. As a husband, I have an obli- ted there was no single interpretation of the gation to my wife. I think sometimes, “Is jihad more important?”

People stand at the scene of a bomb blast in Kuta, Bali on 17 October 2002. Photo credit: Jonathan Drake/ Reuters. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-11-08-bali-bombings_N.htm

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interested in me. He was kind to me and empa- It is interesting to compare the social pressure of thized with me. I said to him, “I want [you] to the group to that of Patek’s family. It would meet my wife.” While in prison, Imron has re- seem he was not willing to “let the group down” canted some of his former beliefs but his views by refusing to play a role in the Bali attack but remain radical. He would like to reform JI to its when his wife asked him to stay with the family original intent and position himself as its leader. and give up jihadism, he was torn. He said if he gets out of prison he will continue to teach others about JI saying, “If I get out of Although both men are committed jihadists, both prison, I will go to Singapore and . I have said that they regret their participation in want to spread ideas and educate people.” the Bali attacks, and claim they never agreed with them in the first place. While both have Conclusion been quite persistent with these statements, it should be borne in mind that (at the time of the This paper sought to explore the narratives that interview) Patek was undergoing trial and Imron motivates those who commit acts of extremist hoping for a reduction in his 20 year sentence. violence in order to bolster knowledge of the At the same time however, these statements phenomenon and to be better able to counter provide an interesting insight in the social dy- such motivations. When interviewed, both men namic of JI. Patek said “I did not agree with the expressed different reasons and motivations for Bali bombing. I told Imam Samudra: “Let us not joining with and fighting for JI. They also both do attacks in Bali or Jakarta.” And Imron, placed emphasis on different aspects of the JI equally, was of the same mindset saying, “I be- ideology and both had clearly different priorities. lieved it was JI activity. But I never wanted to, as As mentioned earlier, it is evident that both sub- it is not proper jihad. I was junior to Mukhlas. I scribe to the Al Qaeda and JI narratives in vary- went along with it. As it was a JI program, I fol- ing degrees. Many of their statements were in lowed as I was a member of JI. Although in my line with known Al Qaeda and JI doctrines; how- belief, it was wrong, I went ahead.” In this case, ever neither could clearly elucidate their opin- both argue that they were just following orders. ions. Both would jump backwards and forwards The fact that they claim that they did not agree citing political grievances or religious scripture with the act, nor think it was correct jihad, did and often contradicted themselves. The contra- not matter. If true, it would seem that the obliga- dictory nature of their speeches seemed to di- tion to the group superseded their own opinions. lute their motivations and it would appear that In this case it was a sense of duty to follow or- they have a superficial understanding of their ders but also the need to conform and kowtow own narratives and motivations. During the inter- to social pressure. view for instance, Patek admitted: “I know what ideology is. I do not know how to explain it.” Disengagement Overwhelmingly, it is acknowledged that there is When asked about his treatment in prison, no single, “one size fits all” reason for turning to Patek was full of praise for the system. He ad- terrorism and so the differences between both mitted that although he had not been expecting men’s opinions are hardly unexpected. But it is it, he was treated well and had formed a close still surprising that neither detainee had a suc- bond with an officer of the Inter Services Intelli- cinct, clear idea or message. In terms of individ- gence (ISI) Colonel Zakariya whilst imprisoned ual differences, although both spoke of political in Pakistan. Patek said: “He was close to me. I grievances, Patek’s view seemed less highly saw him like a grandfather. He became very developed than Imron’s as he spoke of particu-

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lar scenes he had witnessed, whether in the tions should be a key tool when informing any field or on the TV or Internet. Witnessing the attempts to counter violent extremist narratives. actual persecution of Muslim communities gal- vanized him and this is arguably one of his key * This is an edited version of a Research Paper motivational narratives. His understanding and originally published by International Centre for knowledge of theology was limited and so while Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. The original religion plays a role in his decision making it version can be accessed at http://www.icct.nl/ appears he uses it selectively to justify his publications/icct-papers/through-the- cause. The Islamic writer Abdullah Azzam’s in- militant-lens-the-power-of-ideology-and- fluence can also be seen when Patek speaks of narratives. reclaiming “lost” Muslim lands and ejecting infi-

dels. It seems likely that Patek subscribes to Azzam’s more traditional form of jihad, and this was perhaps also demonstrated by his reluc- tance to take part in the Bali bombing.

In contrast to Patek, Imron prioritized the resto- ration of Islam to the glory days of the middle ages. Religious duty and knowledge of the Quran are extremely important to him. The fact EDITORIAL STAFF that neither man mentioned economic incentives is also interesting. Over the course of the inter- Editor view neither mentioned salaries or payments or Dr. Arabinda Acharya any kind of financial incentives while operating

with JI. This would indicate that political/religious and moral motivations were far greater priorities Associate Editors for both men as opposed to financial incentives. Uday Ravi Nadisha Sirisena It was also interesting to see the human/ mundane side of Patek – when he discussed his wife. While the same was not the case for Im- ron, did not have these circumstances, the im- For inclusion in the CTTA mailing list, please portance of family is clearly evident and one that email your full name and the name of your or- could be utilized when attempting to implement ganization with the subject “CTTA Subscription” de‐radicalization or counter‐narrative pro- to Uday Ravi at the following address: grammes. Another point to note is how both [email protected] men’s opinions on the Bali attacks themselves

have changed since their incarceration and they have perhaps become clearer and more vocal in Disclaimer: their opposition to the attacks. The views presented in the articles are those of the authors and do not reflect or represent the This provides a window of opportunity to per- views of the editors or the organizations to suade both to completely disengage from vio- which the editors and authors are affiliated. lence and join the mainstream. However coun- tering a person’s ingrained narratives is not an easy task, and the individual’s personal motiva-

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 8 “What is that Buzz?” The rise of Drone Warfare

By Ahmed S. Hashim and Grégoire Patte

This article highlights the limits of the constant increase of the use of drones by the militaries or the homeland security forces.

These days the last sound a terrorist often hears century, the legality of such warfare, and the risks is a distinctive buzz of an armed drone above him associated with the extensive use of these instru- before it fires the missile that kills him — and ments for targeted killings. many unfortunate civilians. “Drones” or Un- manned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as they are offi- The rise of machine warfare cially and more accurately named have emerged as one of the most important military systems of The West has been particularly intrigued and se- early 21st century warfare. They are being exten- duced by the notion of unmanned machine war- sively used in the so-called Global War on Terror fare. Several decades ago at the end of World (GWOT) by the United States which is also con- War II, U.S. Army Air Force General Henry “Hap” sidering using them in domestic law enforcement Arnold said what at that time seemed to be a fan- and border security. However, the U.S. is not the ciful prediction: only possessor and user of UAVs; according to “We have just won a war with lots of he- the Military Balance of the prestigious Interna- roes flying around in planes. The next tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 50 war may be fought by airplanes with no countries have acquired drones and many have men in them at all… Take everything used them in conflict situations; especially for you’ve learned about aviation in war, reconnaissance and surveillance, maritime and throw it out of the window, and let’s go to border patrol as well as for targeted killings. Two work on tomorrow’s aviation. It will be prominent examples include Israel – a pioneer in different from anything the world has UAV development and Australia which has ac- ever seen.” quired reconnaissance drones from Israel for use in Afghanistan. The small Indian Ocean island- The general would have been truly amazed if he nation of Sri Lanka used drones effectively in the were alive today to see the stunning evolution of final phases of the war against the formidable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Drones, or insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil UAVs in the arcane language of the military, are Eelam between 2006 and 2009. remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV). Equipped with sophisticated sensors, they are used for intelli- It is the U.S., however, which has the largest in- gence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) ventory of different types of UAVs – both armed and attack on personnel and infrastructure. When and unarmed. The Central Intelligence Agency armed, drones are referred to as Unmanned (CIA) and the U.S. armed forces have used these Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). Drone crews machines most extensively in Afghanistan, Paki- usually consist of a team of at least three opera- stan, Somalia, and Yemen. In 2002, the U.S. mili- tors — a mission chief, a pilot and an intelligence tary spent around USD550 million on drones. In analyst, without mentioning the technical teams 2011, the figure was nearly USD5 billion. The to install radio station to transmit and receive in- emergence of the drone as an instrument of war- formation from the drone and in some case the fare has generated a tremendous amount of con- catapult station. Those crews can view a target troversy over the past few years concerning the for hours or days in advance of a strike, they can evolving nature of Western warfare in the 21st identify terrorists more accurately than ground

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troops or conventional pilots whose time on tar- get is limited by the constraints of the human body (fatigue) and the constraints of their air- craft. UAVs remove a pilot from danger. In addi- tion, drones have much longer flying times, or “loiter” time, than manned aircraft; some are able to operate continuously for more than 24 hours. This loiter time provides militaries with U.S. Drone AQM-34. Photo credit: Headless Fighters: the ability to stay above and thus observe the USAF Reconnaissance-UAVs over Vietnam. battlefield continuously. In the 1970s Israel began R&D into UAVs. Dur- Already, more U.S. armed forces personnel are ing the 1982 war in Lebanon it used unarmed being trained as drone operators than air force drones to get information on Palestinian and pilots. Currently, about 33% of the total aircraft Syrian forces. Israel’s early lead in this small in the U.S. military inventory are unmanned ae- inexpensive military platform was due to three rial vehicles; this represents a dramatic increase things: a strong culture of scientific and techno- from 2005 when they constituted only 5% of the logical innovation, sustained combat experience, total. What is also astounding is that UAVs ac- and an operational environment that allows it to count for around 10% of the total budget allo- put a military system into immediate use and cated for military aircraft of all kinds. At a price then modify it almost immediately based on les- tag of $10.5 million, an armed Predator drone is sons learned. The John Lehman, the then Sec- significantly cheaper than a manned jet. For ex- retary of the U.S. Navy, was very impressed by ample, a single F-22 Raptor fighter jet cost as the Israeli’s operational use of UAVs in Lebanon much as 14 drones. Drones are clearly a cost- and impressed upon the Reagan Administration effective instrument of war. For many strategic the need for the U.S. to devote resources to the analysts as well as military technology enthusi- development of UAVs for future contingencies. asts the future of air war belongs to drones, re- mote-controlled UAVs equipped with even more The MQ-1 Predator drone was developed by a sensitive reconnaissance electronics and power- Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency ful precision weapons. (DARPA) team led by an Israeli air force engi- neer. An unarmed reconnaissance version en- The U.S. was the first country to engage in re- tered into service in 1994 and saw action in search and development (R&D) into UAVs; 1995 and 1999 against Serbian forces. The re- these efforts began in 1917. During World War con and surveillance drones were distantly pi- II, both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army engaged in loted for the Central Intelligence Agency by the extensive research to develop combat drones; Eleventh Reconnaissance Squadron operating but the efforts were not consummated by the from Nellis Air Force base in Nevada. The end of the war in 1945. U.S. use of drones came Predators were able to loiter for hours providing decades later during the Vietnam War when the NATO with real-time monitoring of Serbian AQM-34 Firebee was used as an intelligence- forces they were not equipped to fire at poten- gathering vehicle. tially hostile forces.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. was al- ready extensively looking for Bin Laden and was already using drones to do so. However, while

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the drones may have been able to find him – and indeed, on one or two occasions they alleg- edly did spot him, an unarmed drone could not do anything except report the information back to its handler. By the time any military mission could be mounted by Special Forces or cruise missiles the target would have moved miles away from his original location. The “kill chain” had to be shortened and the best, indeed, the MQ-1 Predator. Photo credit: AP/Kirsty Wig- most logical way to do this was to arm the in- glesworth. strument which could spot and locate the in- tended target and destroy the target. The deci- Indeed, the Obama administration has devel- sion was taken in 2000 to innovate and begin oped a new doctrine of warfare against terror- the process of arming the Predator so that it ists; and the use of UAVs figures very promi- could become an offensive weapon in the global nently in this doctrine. The “National Strategy on war on terror. Although Bin Ladin was killed by Counterterrorism," commits the country to members of U.S. Navy Seal Team 6, armed "disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat Al drones have been used with deadly effect Qaeda affiliates and adherents" in any part of against terrorist personnel beginning the world. In places like Pakistan and Yemen, “experimentally” with the George W. Bush Ad- drone warfare has moved from being on the se- ministration; however, it was under the admini- cret fringes to the very center of the White stration of Barack Obama that drone warfare in House's strategy. President Obama, himself has the shape of war-time targeted killings in- taken a direct and personal interest in the evolu- creased. tion of his administration’s aggressive and hard- hitting counter-terrorism strategy which can be referred to as Militarized Counter-Terrorism (MCT) this eschews boots on the ground in a major way in a conflict zone and instead prefers

Figure 1: Drone strike in Pakistan by Year. Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. http:// www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Strikes-Per-Year-Dash8.jpg

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long distance targeted killings of terrorist leaders Risk of technological transfer and intelli- and operational personnel by special operations gence loss forces and armed drones. Critics argue that the Obama administration’s love affair with targeted In 2011, the U.S. lost two drones in rapid suc- killings has allowed it to avoid the complications cession. The first one is now in the hands of the of taking Al Qaeda personnel as detainees and Iranians, the second one crashed in the island then agonizing over their legal status pending nation of the Seychelles. The latter crashed on trial. The preferred policy is to take out high its return to the airport, few minute after its take- value targets (HVTs) instead of capturing them. off, because of a “technical failure.” The MQ-9 Reaper drones are used in the Seychelles to Hundreds of militants have died in attacks monitor piracy in the Indian Ocean and in the launched by UAVs such as the Predator over maritime areas off the Horn of Africa. The drone the course of this war. Eleven of the top twenty was unarmed, it crashed on a secured airport, Al Qaeda leaders who have been eliminated and there were no casualties. But if one pays have been killed by drone strikes such as Anwar attention to the global picture, some of the al-Awlaki, a U.S. born Al Qaeda figure and a crashes are far more worrying. According to the leading Islamist propagandist who was killed in Drone Crash Database of the Drone Wars U.K., Yemen in September 2011. Also on the list are 25 crashes have occurred so far this year, and well-known terrorist leaders associated with or more than 90 since 2007. sympathetic to Al Qaeda, such as Baitullah Mehsud of the Tehrik-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan. Ac- On December cording to the New America Foundation, be- 4, 2011, Iran tween 1,424 and 2,184 militants have been claimed to killed in Pakistan since 2004; this is an average have downed of 5 militants killed per drone strike. an RQ-170 Sentinel run The drone attacks have pressured Al Qaeda by the Central and associated groups and forced them to focus Intelligence more on their survival than on recruitment and Iranian officers in a TV broadcast next Agency (CIA). to the U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone. operations. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiede- Photo credit: AFP/ Iranian TV. The Iranian mann, noted that there was a decrease in the TV broadcast output of the Al Qaeda propaganda journal As pictures of the CIA drone, apparently undam- Sahab during 2008, a time which coincided with aged, being inspected by soldiers of the IRGC. an increase in drone strikes. Drone strikes were Brig General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, head of the used relatively sparingly during the campaign’s IRGC Aerospace Unit claimed that his unit had early years - only nine drone strikes were re- been able to “electronically hijack” the drone. corded between 2004 and 2007. The 34 air- The U.S. claims that “technical failure” led to the strikes conducted by U.S. drones in 2008 nearly downing of the drone. If the Iranian claim is ac- quadrupled the total number of previous drone curate, the consequences are serious for the strikes during the entire history of the war. The U.S.: its enemies could manipulate target coor- U.S. further escalated the drone war in 2009 dinates, jam communication between the drone and 2010, conducting 53 drone strikes in 2009 and its ground control station (GCS), or simply and 118 in 2010 respectively. There were 70 capture more drones. Apart from the diplomatic drone strikes in 2011. “flap” of a CIA drone flying over Iran, this event highlights the risk of losing a high intelligence value vector on enemy territory. Furthermore,

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China and Russia – two of America’s top tech- Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, calcu- nological competitors – have already expressed lated that since 2006 the number of civilians interest in inspecting the drone. It is highly prob- killed was between 31 to 33 percent of the total able that those countries will soon develop new casualties. drone capabilities based on the U.S. technology within the RQ-170. In a so-called “surgical war,” the death of civil- ians from allied nations is simply turning out to On February 8, 2011 a U.S. Predator crashed be unacceptable and has caused a significant near the town of Loder, Yemen. Soon after the spike in anti-American sentiment among Paki- crash, the Yemeni police collected the debris, stanis and Afghans. A Gallop poll published in but was attacked on its way back by Al Qaeda August 2009 revealed that only 9 percent of the members, who hijacked the wreckage. The Pakistanis favoured the strikes, while two-thirds Predator is both a reconnaissance and attack opposed them. One issue that bedevils the drone and carries Hellfire missiles. Afghanistan Obama administration is the fact that it has is the main crash zone, as the majority of drones adopted a disputed method for counting civilian are engaged to support the operation Enduring casualties. In effect, it counts all military-age Freedom. According to the Drone Wars UK web- males in a strike zone as combatants. Counter- site, more than 30 drones crashed in Afghani- terrorism officials insist this approach is one of stan and most of them are Predators. The simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist causes of the crashing drones may be diverse: activity or in close proximity to Al-Qaeda opera- mechanical failure, pilot failure, and weather tives, are deemed to be “up to no good.” This conditions. But the consequences are always seems to be the Israeli approach as well. In the the same: loss of intelligence, loss of sophisti- incidents investigated by Human Rights Watch, cated and sensitive technology to terrorist Israeli forces either failed to take all feasible pre- groups or other enemies. cautions to verify that the targets were combat- ants, apparently setting an unacceptably low The risk of collateral damage threshold for conducting attacks, or they failed to distinguish between combatants and civilians There are also risks associated with the suc- and to target only the former. cessful use of drones: they kill civilians. There is an ongoing debate over this issue. Some claim Overall, the drone strikes present strategic, op- that the majority of the casualties are civilians, erational and tactical problems. First, some others dispute that assertion. According to a commentators argue that the U.S. drone cam- New York Times in February 2006 that drone paign is illegal under international law and vio- strikes to date had killed some 700 civilians for a lates both the sovereignty of states and the mili- total of 14 militants killed. This worked out to 50 tary rules of engagement which prohibit strikes civilians for every militant killed, a hit of 2 per- when civilian casualties are highly probable. cent. The Israeli-Hamas war of December 2008 Second, in Pakistan the militant groups are now and January 2009, also witnessed the extensive moving into central provinces that are heavily use of drones by the Israeli Defense Forces. populated to avoid being targeted. The result is According to Human Rights Watch, Israel used to expose a greater part of the Pakistani popula- a total of 42 drones which killed 87 civilians. Bill tion to the risk of terrorist attacks, thus poten- Roggio, the editor of the Long War Journal, esti- tially weakening the fragile Pakistani govern- mated, however, that civilians casualties were ment or worsening relations with it. But what is around 10 percent of the total casualties. An- the alternative to the militarized counter- other, more recent, study conducted in 2009 by terrorism that the U.S. is currently engaged in?

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 The rise of Drone Warfare 13

The U.S. cannot just walk away and leave its ians have also died as a result has enlarged national security in the hands of third parties. support for AQ among the local populace. Some Nor should it continue to maintain boots on the say it has; but they merely quote media or Yem- ground in the Global South in any large num- eni government sources who assert – somewhat bers. Third, the drones are just a tool in the tac- unscientifically that this form of warfare encour- tics against terrorism; they are not counter- ages militancy. Others say it has not and argue terrorism’s ultimate panacea. Making drone war- that the structural environment (weak state insti- fare the ultimate counter-terrorism solution will tutions and lack of government legitimacy or create the illusion of risk-free war for Western effective rule over the population) is what en- powers. courages the breeding of militancy, not drone strikes. The jury is still out. But what is clear is In the Western Just War tradition, a ruler or a that drones like machine-guns, submarines, air- state is supposed to wage war as a last resort. craft and nuclear weapons before them have But there is a fear that the relative “low-cost” of generated and will continue to generate consid- drone warfare lowers the threshold; and that erable discussion for a long time to come. drone warfare has become a default strategy to be used anywhere in the world against “bad guys” and so-called “recalcitrants”. With no sol- diers on the field, without any state-borders to respect, Western governments and populations will automatically be disconnected from the reali- ties of war; the state of “permanent war,” will become their reality and they will be trapped in the “forever war.” This seems to apply to Yemen where the debate focuses on whether the use of drones in that theatre of operations where civil-

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis is now open for contributions from researchers and practitioners in the field of terrorism research, security, and other related fields.

Topical areas of interest are terrorism and political violence, organized crime, homeland security, religion and violence, internal conflicts and all other areas of security broadly defined.

Article length could be anywhere between 1,000 to 2,000 words. Submissions must be made before the 15th of every month for editing purposes and for inclu- sion in the next month’s edition. Please refer to the guidelines.

Electronic copies of the articles (MS Word format) may be submitted to the Asso- ciate Editor, Uday Ravi at the following address: [email protected]

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 14 Challenges to the Evolution of a National Counter-Terrorism Policy in Pakistan

By Abdul Basit In the absence of an elaborate and threat-specific counter-terrorism policy, Pakistan’s successes against militants in its tribal regions remain fragile and reversible. The political narrative in Islamabad that the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan will lead to reduction in terrorist violence in Pakistan is flawed and misplaced. Without developing a national-level counter-terrorism policy, the country will continue to suffer at the hands of home grown terrorists. Despite suffering a decade-long spate of terror- Various components of current counter-terrorism ism, after the 9/11 incidents, Pakistan still lacks a strategy of “clear, hold and build” are not comple- coherent and effective national counter terrorism menting each other. In the face of a military of- policy. Even though in the last two years terrorist fensive, terrorists’ tactical retreat enables the se- incidents have declined considerably in Pakistan, curity forces to clear an area in quick time. How- still the problem remains serious. ever, the hold stage prolongs as militants start pouring back into the area as soon as the military Since 2009 Pakistan has made significant gains operation finishes off. With the exception of against the terrorist networks in Malakand Divi- Malakand Division this pattern can be found in sion of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the entire tribal belt of Pakistan where military the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). operations have been conducted. Coupled with However, in the absence of an elaborate and this slow reconstruction of conflict-hit areas, less threat-specific counter-terror policy than impressive rehabilitation of internally dis- these gains remain fragile and reversible. The placed person (IDPs) and lackadaisical perform- government continues to rely almost exclusively ance of civil institutions have also undermined on military solutions to internal security chal- the gains made in the fight against militancy. lenges instead of developing long-term institu- tional responses which also factors in political, The current counter-terrorism approach in Paki- development and ideological responses. stan is geared towards containment of violence in peripheral tribal region rather than its elimination.

A cloud of smoke from the building of Islamabad’s Marriot Hotel, located close to Pakistan’s parlia- ment, which was completed destroyed in a suicide bombing in 2008

Source: Jihad Watch http:// www.jihadwatch.org/2 008/09/pakistan-al- qaeda-behind- marriott-attack.html

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 National Counter-Terrorism Policy in Pakistan 15

Impediments to National Counter-Terrorism sincerity of current counter-terrorism approach Policy in Pakistan. Despite open admission by the LeJ of its involvement in massacre of ethnic Hazara A number of factors hinder the progress on evo- Shia community in the Balochistan province, no lution of a national counter-terrorism policy: effective measures have been taken against the group. Selective Counter-Terrorism Questions also remain about the effectiveness The “good Taliban” vs “bad Taliban” debate lies of military operations conducted in Malakand at the heart of this issue. Being hard to some Division and tribal areas. With the exception of terrorist outfits while totally ignoring and over- very few notable commanders like Sufi Muham- looking the others groups has eluded the efforts mad, the head of the banned Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e- to develop a comprehensive national level Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), and Muslim counter-terrorism policy based on the principle Khan the former spokesperson of TTP Swat of zero tolerance for terrorism. Despite enor- chapter, no high profile terrorists have been mous pressure from the US and international killed or captured in these military operations. community Pakistan’s refusal to destroy the No trials have been initiated against the arrested sanctuaries of the Haqqani Network in North ones. Waziristan and allowing certain terrorist groups to use its soil to carry out attacks against the Ownership Dilemma international coalition forces in Afghanistan un- derscores this dilemma. Lack of political consensus among various stakeholders is a major stumbling block in ef- Appeasing some groups like the anti-Shia sec- forts to evolve an effective counter-terrorism tarian outfits Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahl-e- policy. Two kinds of opinions exist among the Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), formerly known as political parties. Firstly, the religious-political Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the Kash- parties believe that the Pakistani security forces miri jihadi outfits has raised eye-brows about the are fighting American war in FATA. Despite los-

A protest rally of Defence Council of Pakistan, an alliance of 40 religious-political parties and jihadi groups, organized to oppose the reopening of NATO supply routes through Pakistan. Photo credit: Chowrangi http://www.chowrangi.com/the-defence-of-pakistan-phenomena-a-bitter-factsheet.html

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 National Counter-Terrorism Policy in Pakistan 16

ing around 30,000 civilians and 5,000 security justice system. personnel in home grown militancy, they believe terrorism is not Pakistan’s indigenous issue. Neither the judiciary nor the executive is satis- According to them, terrorism in Pakistan is a by- fied with the existing anti-terrorism laws and the product of US invasion of Afghanistan. The US- performance of the anti-terrorism courts. The led drone strikes in the tribal areas and Pakistan former Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yousuf army’s decision to deploy troops in the semi- Raza Gilani admitted in the National Assembly autonomous tribal regions for the first time ever that anti-terrorism laws needed to be tightened in country’s history, on American behest has and was concerned that terrorists apprehended generated a lot of anger in these areas. They by the law-enforcement agencies had been argue that the current wave of terrorism will sub- bailed out and that they again indulged in terror- side as soon as Pakistan distances itself from ist activities. Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) the U.S.. Iftikhar Chaudhry has also shown his dissatisfaction with the poor functioning of Second, the centrist parties like Imran Khan led anti-terrorism courts (ATCs). Pakistan Tehrike Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), a major oppo- Reliance of anti-Taliban Tribal Militias sition party in the center and ruling party in the Punjab province, believe that the issue of mili- Another factor worth mentioning in this regard is tancy and terrorism has its roots in FATA and the government’s reliance on anti-Taliban peace the terrorist incidents happening on mainland committees (locally knows as lashkars) to fight are a spillover effect of the same. the Islamist militancy instead of introducing a professional police force in the tribal areas. In an environment of such divided political opin- These tribal militias are effective in short term ions on grave internal security challenges hinder but less useful in long-term perspective of the evolution of a national counter-terrorism pol- counter-terrorism. Undoubtedly, the anti-Taliban icy. A bipartisan approach - a must for realiza- peace committees have assisted the govern- tion of such a policy hardly exists in Pakistan. ment in cubing the militancy and maintaining peace and harmony but at the same time gov- Poor Functioning of Anti Terrorism Courts ernment’s overreliance on such militias has af- (ATCs) fected efforts to look for permanent solutions. The government’s overreliance and sustained Deficiencies in the judicial system also remain support to anti-Taliban peace committees, at the one of the most pressing challenges in develop- cost of a regular police force, will create prob- ing a national-level counter-terrorism policy. In- lems for the government to disband them once stitutional weakness in the judicial system often the militancy has subsided. results in ineffective protection leading to the release of arrested terror suspects. Deficiencies of the Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) Many high profile terrorists have been acquitted by the Anti Terrorism Courts (ATCs) despite Various studies of counter-insurgencies have compelling evidence against them. Acquittal of shown that a state’s police and law enforcement Malik Ishaq and Akram Lahori, founding mem- agencies play a critical role as the first line of bers of the banned sectarian terrorist group defense against the threat of terrorism and in- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, in 45 cases because of poor surgencies. However, Pakistan continues to rely prosecution, are examples of a weak criminal on its military and paramilitary troops to fight the

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 National Counter-Terrorism Policy in Pakistan 17

insurgencies in FATA and the Balochistan prov- stan has its origins in the ideological, political ince. Hardly any attention has been paid to po- and sectarian narratives developed by religious- lice force, one of the most poorly managed or- political parties, jihadi groups and the state itself. ganizations in the country. Pakistani police is ill- equipped, poorly trained, politicized and corrupt. Conclusion The state of preparedness of the Pakistani po- lice force can easily be gauged from the attack As the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan on Bannu Central Prison in Khyber Pakhtunk- progressively ends, American funding for Paki- hwa (KP) province on 15 April this year. More stan military’s counter-terrorism operations will than 100 militants mounted a multiple coordi- decline in the coming years. Due to high cost, nated attack on the prison center and freed Pakistan will not be able to sustain its operations around 400 militants, including Adnan Rashid, against the militants in tribal areas on its own. convicted for attempted assassination of of So instead of relying exclusively on this costly Pervez Musharraf. Militants’ job was made eas- option of military operations for counter- ier by the fact that there were only 36 poorly terrorism Pakistan should invest in its civilian equipped police guards on duty instead of 150 law enforcement agencies along with removing that was necessary. None had any formal train- deficiencies in its anti-terror laws and judicial ing. They quickly gave up any resistance and framework. police reinforcements arrived only after the at- tackers had withdrawn. Also, contradicting political narratives which por- tray the indigenous issue of terrorism and mili- Poor Threat Perception tancy as a by-product of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan should also be done away with. The conventional approach to threat perception This thinking pre-supposes that the U.S. with- in Pakistan is also a major obstacle to evolution drawal from Afghanistan will automatically result of a counter-terrorism policy. The qualitative in reduction of terrorist violence in Pakistan. difference in strategies to counter a tribal insur- However, none of the terrorists in Pakistan have gency and urban terrorism lies at the heart of mentioned giving up their attacks after American this dilemma. Pakistan’s counter-terrorism re- departure from Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, sponses presuppose that major internal security most of the groups are fighting the U.S. and threats to Pakistan from the Islamist militancy Pakistan army because of Islamabad’s siding have their origins in FATA. Thus, the attacks on with the U.S. forces. Pakistan will do well to re- the mainland are the handiwork of militants who visit its current strategy to counter-terrorism and travel all the way from FATA to major cities of develop long-term institutional responses to ter- the country. Therefore, a victory against the mili- rorist threat. tants in FATA holds key to peace and stability in urban centers. This is why the threat of urban terrorism has been neglected. For the latest reports and com- Due to dissimilarity of the threat this one-size-fits mentaries on terror- -all approach will not suffice. Presently, Pakistan ism and political faces a growing threat of urban terrorism, which violence, please visit is inherently different from Taliban-led militancy www.pvtr.org in FATA. The Taliban insurgency has local and regional context (war in Afghanistan) while the challenge of urban terrorism in mainland Paki-

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 18 Understanding Islamic Moderation: The Wasatiyya Imperative

By Taufiq bin Radja Nurul Bahri Terrorism has been and is increasingly becoming more complex. While many would equate terrorism with physical chaos, one cannot but acknowledge the existence of other elements involved in terrorism and radicalization. A basic but important component of terrorism is ideology that serves as motivation for terror acts. While the physical aspects of terrorism could be curbed through military and law and or- der strategies, counter-ideology entails the twofold approach of refuting radical ideology as well as the promotion of anti-extremist and moderate values in society. Scholars have recently admitted the ex- panding spiritual-moral role of world religions in postmodern times. Religions carry values needed for rectification of moral decay that has caused much of contemporary problems. Wasatiyyah is a virtue inherent in the Islamic tradition that needs to be highlighted.

There is no doubt that modernization, globaliza- time in the U.S.. He is also an Asian who under- tion and Islamophobia are major factors that af- stands and lives the culture of his people. These fect the manner in which the international audi- facts make him relatable and his suggestions ence perceives Islam and Muslims. Demonization practical and effective especially for the Asian of Islam and Muslims has become a trend and as context of counter-terrorism and peace building. a result, Islam has consistently been equated to violence, intolerance, anti-democratic and anti- human. Understanding the term wasatiyyah

Of late, many efforts have been initiated to cor- The term wasatiyyah derived from the word wa- rect the distorted perception about Islam in gen- sat, is extracted from the Qur’an and carries a eral and Muslims in particular. The Global Move- deep meaning of a combination between justice ment of Moderates (GMM), is an example of such and moderation between excessiveness and lax- attempts. The idea of the GMM was suggested in ity. Muslim scholars such as asy-Syafi’e, Al- 2010 by Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak, the Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyah have deliberated on Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 65th United the issue of wasatiyyah emphasizing its impor- Nations General Assembly in his speech. This tance in ensuring just and prosperous living. In was followed up at the International Conference modern Islamic literature, the term has been rein- on Global Movement of Moderates, its first con- troduced in the 1970s by Muhammad Abu Zah- ference was held on 17 January 2012 The aim of rah and Muhammad Al-Madani who both wrote the conference was to drown the voices of ex- extensively on the topic. Their works have tremism and reclaim the “center and moral high opened doors for and inspired later scholars such ground” for Islam. as Al-Qaradawi and Ghannushi.

One of the highlights of Kamal Hassan’s “Voice The term wasatiyyah yet has not achieved a con- of Islamic Moderation from the Malay World” it is sensus in meaning and acceptance. Scholars a five chapter opus that covers the issues of the have intermittently utilized a number of terms to impact of globalization on Southeast Asia, the refer to wasatiyyah. In Islamic literature, numer- meaning of wasatiyya and its application in the ous terms such as i’tidal (fairness), tawazun Malay world. Hassan’s insights on the issues of (balance) and insaf (rightful) are often used to moderation and utilizing it as counter weight describe and represent the term wasatiyyah. against extremism are precious. Aside from his academic credence, Hassan has spent much Muhammad Assad, a renowned Muslim thinker, designed his theory of the “middlemost commu-

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 The Wasatiyya Imperative 19

nity” as appropriate to help understand wasatiy- ance, integrity yah. The “middlemost community is a commu- and justice which nity that keeps an equitable balance between are components extremes and is realistic in its appreciation of of wasatiyyah. man’s nature and rejecting both licentiousness Wasatiyyah obli- and exaggerated asceticism”. gates that people should maintain Hassan speaking at the Students’ Hassan coins his own term, “justly balanced” as Representative Council. Photo peaceful relation- an alternative. In “Voice of Islamic moderation credit: International Islamic Univer- ships with others from the Malay world”, Hassan insists that sity Malaysia. and the only rea- “moderation has often been equated with al wa- son for hostility is satiyyah whereas it is, in fact a part of the quali- in the instances of oppression and tyranny. Be- ties of al-wasatiyyah”. In other words, wasatiy- ing devout in Islam does not in any way prohibits yah is a much broader and moderation is one of the pursuit of wealth. Wasatiyyah however em- the meanings it carries aside from justice, bal- phasizes the need to keep away from wasteful- ance and other meanings. ness and excessiveness.

The need for wasatiyyah Utilizing wasatiyyah to combat extremism

Hassan theorizes that the notion of wasatiyyah Hassan was greatly denies the view “that there is an inherent conflict influenced by Yusuf Al- between the spirit and the flesh and a bold affir- Qaradawi who is a mation of the natural, God-willed unity of this leading advocate of twofold aspect of human life”. One of the largest Islamic moderation and problems of humanity in current times is the ab- promoter of the con- sence of ethics and morality as a result of a de- cept of wasatiyyah. Al- cline of religious and spiritual orders. This ethi- Qaradawi has had his cal-spiritual vacuum then is filled with ideologies personal struggles with of extremism and hostility that has been masked numerous strands of with religious fervor. In such circumstances, This is an example a publica- Muslim extremists. Al- The need for spirituality and ethics has never tion by Al Qaradawi. Photo Qaradawi has de- been greater, wasatiyyah is not a mere ethical credit: Amazon signed numerous value like many would assume but a rather a frameworks and action fundamental imperative of understanding the plans on how to promote the wasatiyyah to nature of man and how he ought to perceive life. counter extremism of ideas, attitudes and ac- Wasatiyyah is a code of conduct that applies for tions. the individual as well as the collective. Picking up the thread, Hassan stresses that one Wasatiyyah urges people to firstly identify the important transformational strategy to maintain dimensions of life and then attend to its require- wasatiyyah is through eradicating violence and ments and needs. The manner in which these extremism. “Muslims who use violence in pro- requirements and needs are to be met must be moting the cause of Islam are in fact violating just and appropriate. Three facets of human life the teachings of Islam and do great disservice to as Hassan suggests are: social, economy and it”. Hassan emphasizes that extremism in relig- spiritual. Social living requires people to possess ion is strongly prohibited by the Prophet Muham- and display great moral values such as toler- mad.

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 The Wasatiyya Imperative 20

Hassan suggests that to eradicate extremism, societies need to focus on building ethical val- ues and accountability and instilling them in the GLOBAL PATHFINDER hearts of the people. The deterioration of moral- ity, according to Hassan, is a primary cause for The ICPVTR Terrorism Data- moral and ethical corruption and intolerance and base – Global Pathfinder - is a extremism. He lists three key players that could one-stop repository for infor- determine the success or failure of people; edu- mation on the current and cators, media and civil society. In modern times, emerging terrorist threats. The education has been diluted and become incom- database focuses on terrorism prehensive due to the absence of teaching of and political violence in the moral values. Media on the other hand has its Asia-Pacific region – compris- focus excessively set on entertainment. Even ing of Southeast Asia, North when it comes to news and journalism, religious, Asia, South Asia, Central Asia political and cultural prejudices and bias is evi- and Oceania. dent often inhabits society from knowing the truth, fuelling confusion and conflicts. Civil soci- Global Pathfinder is an inte- ety that include Non- Governmental Organiza- grated database containing tions, grassroots organizations and religious comprehensive profiles of ter- institutions play an important role in molding the rorist groups, key terrorist per- society and should serve as checks and bal- sonalities, terrorist and counter ances provided they themselves imbibe “moral -terrorist incidents as well as values and exhibit transparency and account- terrorist training camps. It also ability in their operations”. contains specific details and analyses of significant terrorist Wasatiyyah is the basis of this moral revival attacks in the form of terrorist plan. While police and military operations could attack profiles. erode the tactical threats of terrorism, ideologi- cal extremism tends to seep into society with the For further inquiries regarding accessibility of extremist materials through print subscription and access to the media and the internet. There is a growing un- Global Pathfinder database, derstanding that counter-terrorism today must please email Ms. Elena Ho not only comprise military reactionary response Wei Ling at the following email but precautionary and educational empower- address: [email protected] ment that will serve as barriers against the threats of extremism and radicalization. In this respect, the concept of wasatiyyah as promoted by Al-Qaradawi, Hassan and others could be a role model for promoting .

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012 21

The International Centre for Political Violence and Ter- rorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

ICPVTR conducts research, training, and outreach pro- grams aimed at reducing the threat of politically moti- vated violence and at mitigating its effects on the inter- national system. The Centre seeks to integrate aca- demic theory with practical knowledge, which is essen- Nanyang Technological University tial for a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically-motivated groups. Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 The Centre is staffed by academic specialists, religious scholars, as well as personnel from the law enforce- Phone: +65 6316 8925 ment, military and intelligence agencies, among others. Fax: +65 6791 1941 The Centre is culturally and linguistically diverse, com- prising of functional and regional analysts as well as Website: www.pvtr.org Muslim religious scholars from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America.

Events and Publications

 Terrorist Rehabilitation: For upcoming events The US Experience in Iraq (CRC Press Taylor and at ICPVTR, visit Francis Group, 2011) by www.pvtr.org Dr. Ami Angell and Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

 Ethnic Identity and National  Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Conflict in China Zero (Reaktion Books, 2011) (Palgrave Macmillan 22 June by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna and 2010) by Dr. Rohan Guna- Mr. Khurram Iqbal ratna, Dr. Arabinda Acharya and Mr. Wang Pengxin

 International Aviation and  Targeting Terrorist Financing: Terrorism: Evolving Threats, International Cooperation Evolving Security and New Regimes (Routledge 2009) (Routledge 2009) by Dr. Ara- by Dr. John Harrison binda Acharya

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 9, 2012