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UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 9

UK Civil Nuclear Energy: What Lessons?

In 2008 –09, the British Academy, the Science Although I am in this lecture to draw lessons conductors, whose commercial introduction Museum and the Mile End Group of Queen from the history of in Britain, I could hugely diminish transmission losses Mary, University of London have jointly am a shade sceptical about all such exercises, and so substantially transform the overall sponsored a series of lectures on ‘Politics and for the following reason. Attacking Prime picture by increasing effective supply. This energy’. On 6 May 2008 at the Science Minister Stanley Baldwin, Winston Churchill innovation would obviously be of greatest Museum, Professor Sir Roger Williams once asserted that ‘History will say the right benefit where long distance transmission is began the series – listing the lessons to be honourable gentleman was wrong in this required, as for example in bringing learned by those planning a nuclear solution to matter,’ adding after a brief pause, ‘I know it from solar arrays in the Sahara to will, because I shall write the history.’ I Europe, a scheme which has its advocates our future energy needs. recognise, in other words, that mine is simply even with existing transmission methods. one view of past events, and that other Unfortunately, superconductors of this sort, if I WAS FLATTERED when asked to give this equally valid views are perfectly possible. not perhaps as distant a prospect as fusion, are still hardly on the immediate horizon. lecture. An ex-Vice Chancellor who has And there is yet a third introductory point I compounded his academic sin by going on to must make. With most topics it is hardly To complete these somewhat personal chair a higher education funding council is necessary for a speaker to say where exactly observations, I ought finally to admit that, usually invited to speak only about higher he is coming from, what his biases might be. although in the mid 1960s I worked in education. My nuclear credentials are also But such an approach will not do here. operational research for the National somewhat long in the tooth: my book Rather, I feel that, to be taken seriously, it is Board, was in fact safety-trained in the Kent analysing Britain’s and AGR nuclear incumbent upon me to start by being as coalfield at a time when there were many power programmes was published in 1980, honest as possible about my own personal hundreds of coalmines, I have never held and the House of Lords inquiry on research approach to nuclear power. much of a brief for coal as an energy source and development in nuclear power, for which either, because I grew up in a South Wales I did not spend years researching a book and I was a specialist adviser, reported as long ago mining village and so knew at first-hand publishing numerous papers about nuclear as 1987. The other specialist adviser on that about both pneumoconiosis and the power because I was technocratic or gung-ho occasion was Sir John Hill, former Atomic propensity for accidental death underground. Energy Authority chairman, who sadly died for this new technology. On the contrary, in January 2008. while deeply interested in nuclear power as I am then, someone with no great natural science, technology and policy, at root I began love for either nuclear power or coal. It The remarkable thing, after the early decades by sharing the man-in-the-street’s worries follows that I firmly support careful policy of hyper-activity, is how relatively little has about it. Frankly, I had been uncomfortable encouragement of all three current energy since happened to nuclear power, at least about since discovering casually one hopes: enhanced efficiency (including im- until the last few years. From the late 1970s to day in Oxford’s Clarendon Laboratory that, proved heat insulation), decentralised supply, the late 1990s in particular, when new Asian among us physics undergraduates, it was my and renewable sources, provided naturally orders began to be placed, the nuclear particular luminous wristwatch which that, in each case, the carbon footprints as industry worldwide was in the doldrums. emitted by far the most radiation. Further, in well as the economics of all relevant artefacts Nuclear power’s share of expanding world 1964 I initially accepted a junior research are correctly treated. For what it is worth, my electricity demand did nevertheless hold up, position at Culham, from Bas Pease no less, own greatest hope among the renewables is at around 16 –17 per cent. This was because, because, in my youthful idealism, I believed of , whether in barrage or free despite all, there were a few start-ups as well there had to be a better route to energy than standing form, since this renewable is both as shutdowns, while growing experience with , and that was predictable and potentially substantial. Really nuclear stations permitted increases in plant probably it. Fusion, you will recall, was then to let my prejudices show, I believe that only ratings, load factors and projected lives. But just forty years away from successful for better reasons than I have yet seen should in the years of cheap gas and oil, when for exploitation – as of course it still is. we not proceed with some version of the most people carbon dioxide was something proposed . which they encountered only in fizzy drinks, Actually, romantic that I remain, I still have nuclear power in Britain became almost passé , hopes of fusion: that after all is how the stars I am also, however, a comfortable member less considered even than coal as we rapidly shine. But even if in the end fusion does of the middle classes, who wants his shrank that industry. prove a viable energy source on earth, such a descendents to enjoy at least the same level of development is well outside the current affluence and access to energy as he currently Having begun by acknowledging the vener- policy timeframe. As well as fusion, my other does, and wants them to do this on a planet able character of my credentials, I want as a great speculative hope in the energy field whose temperature is stable. Furthermore, I second initial point to enter a reservation. centres on the new, or warm, super- am someone who can see no reason why all

British Academy Review, issue 13 (June 2009). © The British Academy 10 UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS?

human beings should not aspire to precisely its past in this country is that nuclear policy the same advantages as I enjoy, and in a must be ‘owned’ by the public to a much TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL timeframe which is not excessive. greater extent than it ever was in the past. NUCLEAR ENERGY This does not, and realistically could not, I am making here, of course, what seems mean that everyone must be in favour of 1908 presently by far the safest working assump- nuclear power. It does mean that there is British physicist and future Nobel Prize winner, tion in respect of global warming, that Frederick Soddy proposes potential importance brought about, as a minimum, a broad public mankind needs to tackle it with substantially of atomic power in lecture at Glasgow acceptance that nuclear power is a rightful University, subsequently published as The more commitment and urgency than we are part of the way forward. I therefore believe it Interpretation of Radium (John Murray, 1909): as yet demonstrating. I am also moved in ‘The energy in a ton of would be essential that those who espouse nuclear passing to observe that since, on only a little sufficient to light London for a year’. power take the trouble to ensure that at least more extreme warming projections, the room this minimum acceptance comes about. 1945 in London where this lecture is being Unfortunately, nothing like enough such July. Labour Party elected to government. delivered could itself sooner rather than later trouble was taken in respect of the Magnox August. Explosion of two US atomic bombs at be under water, significant defensive steps or Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) pro- Hiroshima and Nagasaki. will eventually be needed outside, as well as grammes, or as regards the later introduction 15 November. Cabinet discusses draft of within, the energy field. of light water reactor technology into Britain. telegram to be issued that day by US President Harry Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Unfortunately, many of us, having examined It also needs to be recognised that public Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie the contemporary dilemma facing Britain inquiries like those at Windscale in 1977 –78 King, promising utilisation of atomic energy for and the world, remain unconvinced that and Sizewell in 1982 –85 are, at best, peaceful and humanitarian ends, and disclosure of ‘detailed information concerning energy efficiency, decentralised supply and tangential to this objective. the practical industrial application of atomic renewable energy sources between them, energy just as soon as effective enforceable One hundred and forty years and two World however hard they are pressed, can guarantee safeguards against its use for destructive Wars separated Waterloo and the purposes can be devised. ... It was explained energy security, at least on the requisite announcement of the Magnox programme. that the present statement was confined to the timescale. Energy security here, of course, disclosure to other countries of information Nevertheless, British government in 1955 implies both absolute supply and freedom possessed by the United States, Great Britain remained permeated by many who would and Canada.’ CM (53) 45; National Archives, from political problems in relation to access. fully have shared the Duke of Wellington’s CAB 128/2 Britain in particular faces a somewhat tight strong disapproval of soldiers cheering, as 22 November. The Prime Minister, Clement energy situation in a relatively short period being too nearly an expression of opinion. Attlee, reports to Cabinet that talks with and, with new energy facilities mostly having Truman mean ‘there was no question of any Even constructive criticism was unwelcome long lead times, has correspondingly limited restriction on our liberty to exploit the in the 1950s and 1960s, as I know from direct industrial application of these researches into room for manoeuvre. And like it or not, much experience. In my book I described the the use of atomic energy.’ CM 55 (45); of a rapidly growing world electricity demand National Archives CAB 128/2 politics of British nuclear power in its first over the next century, above all in China and decades as essentially ‘private’ to the 1946 India, is going to be met either by generation institutions concerned, the Atomic Energy 1 January. Dr John Cockroft establishes the from coal, with carbon capture only if we are Authority and British Nuclear Fuels, the ‘Atomic Research and Experimental very lucky and the requisite technology Establishment’ at Harwell on former RAF site, electricity generating boards, the con- advances more rapidly than currently seems near Oxford. struction consortia, the Nuclear Inspectorate likely; or else by nuclear power. It is against 17 January. ‘The Prime Minister informed the and the various associated government this domestic and international background Cabinet of a statement which he was departments. Only in the 1970s did the proposing to make in the House of Commons that it seems to me both responsible and politics of nuclear power become genuinely on the 22nd January regarding the prudent for the British Government to have establishment of an organisation under the ‘public’, to both the dismay and the made the general provision in respect of Ministry of Supply for the production of fissile disadvantage of those who until then had material required for the development of the nuclear power which it has now done: better conducted only the ‘private’ form. Government’s programme for the use of even as late as this provision was, than never. atomic energy. This would make it clear that The nuclear industry’s worst single failure in the Government’s object in establishing this So much by way of preamble, necessary I feel production plant was to make available as regard to public attitudes was undoubtedly its if you are to be in a position properly to judge speedily as possible in sufficient handling of the nuclear waste issue. In respect quantity to enable us to take advantage rapidly the credibility of what follows: in the balance of the science and technology underlying this of technical developments as they occurred, of the 30 minutes allowed me, let me turn and to develop our programme for the use of problem, the industry was doubtless right in properly to my topic, the real lessons from atomic energy as circumstances might require. the position which it took: the radioactive He would announce at the same time that the history of British civil nuclear power. waste volumes being generated were perfectly Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Portal of Hungerford had been chosen as head of this Public acceptance manageable with the ad hoc arrangements in production organisation; and that Professor J. place, and it was best to delay the adoption of D. Cockcroft had been selected for the post of For nuclear power to have a successful future any final solution to the nuclear waste in Britain a first vital lesson to be drawn from UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 11

TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY cont

Director of the Research and Experimental Establishment at Harwell.’ CM 6(46); National Archives CAB 128/5

6 November. Atomic Energy Act gives authority for atomic power to Ministry of Supply.

GLEEP (Graphite Low Energy Experimental Pile) is constructed at Harwell, Europe’s first reactor (operated for isotope production at 100 kW, but for most of its life at 3 kW). Went critical 1947.

Construction of BEPO (British Experimental Pile 0) of 6000 kW begins. Used , graphite moderator and air coolant. Went critical July 1948.

1947 Figure 1. Key documents: the 1955 White Paper ‘A Programme of Nuclear Power’; the 1965 Appraisal of Beginning of design of Pippa (Pressurised Pile Dungeness B; the 1976 Flowers Report on ‘Nuclear Power and the Environment’. for Producing Power and ).

1951 problem as long as possible, so that that There are in fact three main aspects to the October. Conservative Party elected to solution, when eventually it was selected, nuclear waste issue: settling upon a government. could benefit from the most up to date technology, determining a site or sites for 1952 technical knowledge. This position, however, final disposal, and ensuring the provision of 30 September. Paper by the Paymaster General had the disadvantage of leaving nuclear the necessary finance. With the creation of [Lord Cherwell] presented to Cabinet proposes power vulnerable to exactly the criticism the Nuclear Liabilities Financing Assurance transfer of atomic energy out of civil service to a nationally owned corporation. ‘The made by the Royal Commission on Board, the government has moved to provide exploitation of atomic energy is the most Environmental Pollution in its 1976 report, for the third of these aspects. Echoing the important step taken by man in the mastery of the famous, or notorious, Flowers Report Royal Commission of 1976, it would not be nature since the discovery of fire. In civil life it offers us the prospect of supplementing, (Figure 1). This Royal Commission wanted a unreasonable, a full third of a century after during the next few decades, our straitened major commitment to nuclear power that Commission reported, to argue that, coal resources. Less than 100 tons of uranium ‘postponed as long as possible, in the hope urgent as may be the need for new nuclear yearly may generate the whole of the nation’s electricity. In the military sphere it will soon that it might be avoided altogether’, and in stations, none should be approved for dwarf all other weapons and perhaps effect one of its most quoted passages stated that ‘it construction until the first two aspects have changes in international relations as great as would be irresponsible and morally wrong been equally firmly assured. those once wrought by gunpowder in the to commit future generations to the con- political structure of Europe.’ C (52) 317; To meet the public concern about the waste National Archives CAB 129/55 sequences of fission power on a massive scale issue, and any other concerns like it, what unless it has been demonstrated beyond 3 October. Britain conducts successful test of ideally there would be in the energy field is an atomic bomb. reasonable doubt that at least one method an institutional source capable of holding the exists for the safe isolation of these wastes 1953 public’s trust as ministers, and governments, for the indefinite future.’ The nuclear com- 26 January. Minister of Supply [Duncan come and go, a bastion against both the Sandys] announces British nuclear programme. munity took this stricture ill, its earlier inevitable tide of challenging events and the neglect of this dimension having left it quite White Paper on the ‘The Future organisation of undercurrent of distrust now all too evident unprepared to respond properly to such a the UK atomic energy project’ proposes non- in most things governmental. Here, for departmental Atomic Energy Corporation. charge. But, one might say, all that was thirty Established as the United Kingdom Atomic example, are just four important points years ago and the lessons have long since Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 1954. which a really trusted source, but only such a been learned: perhaps they have, and then source, might usefully make immediately March. Government announces first 50 MW again, perhaps they have not. This waste issue reactor based on Pippa design optimised for about nuclear power: plutonium production to be built at Calder needs now to be put to rest in the only way in Hall. which that can be done: by saying to the First, we do not create a major new waste problem by building further nuclear stations. 1954 concerned public ‘There, in all necessary We already have that problem, whether one 16 December. Lord President of the Council detail, is the watertight solution which we [Lord Salisbury] presents to the Cabinet a will apply, and we will move from that characterises it as major or otherwise, as a memorandum on ‘The Trend Report’, the solution if and only if at some time in the result of our nuclear weapons programme future we discover an even better solution.’ and the nuclear power stations we have 12 UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS?

already built. Another way of presenting the meaning that such locations constitute an waste problem is to note that new nuclear already exhausted set. TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL stations will both produce much less waste NUCLEAR ENERGY cont More points like these four could, and than those they replace, and will also should, be made, but let me now turn back to generate revenue to help fund whatever report of an interdepartmental committee, other lessons from the British nuclear story. chaired by Burke Trend, on ‘the production of approach is judged best for dealing with all power from nuclear energy’. The generation of the waste, old as well as new. Healthy scepticism electricity by nuclear methods can now be accepted as technically feasible and has a good Second, we do not wholly avoid whatever Hardly less important than a real public chance of proving, within the next 10 years, hazards there still are in contemporary ownership of nuclear power policy is for competitive with electricity generated by conventional methods. C 54 (395); National nuclear reactors simply by building no more policy makers to resolve to be completely Archives CAB 129/72 of them, because France, which currently honest with themselves, and also adequately generates 80 per cent of its electricity from sceptical about all claims made by whatever 21 December. Lord President of the Council [Lord Salisbury] brings plan for civil nuclear the atom, will certainly persist with nuclear agency. Once again, it was not so in the past. programme to Cabinet. Asks for £50 million for power, many French nuclear sites are located The worst single example here was the two power stations to be completed by 1960. along the Channel coast, and in the event of announcement in May 1965 that, in a The Chancellor of the Exchequer [R.A. Butler] ‘said that the successful development of atomic an accident the prevailing winds are from the nominally fair competition, the British AGR power for civil purposes was of crucial west. Nor, it should be recalled, were we had decisively beaten off the challenge importance to the future of the national untouched by the much more distant disaster offered to it by American light water reactor economy’, and welcomes proposal. The Cabinet agreed. CC 90 (54); National Archives at Chernobyl in 1986. What is more, if Britain technology. Politics being what it is, it was CAB 128/27. is to help ensure the highest possible perhaps forgivable for the minister 1955 standards of construction and operation in responsible to claim publicly that this was 4 February. The Lord President of the Council ‘the greatest breakthrough of all time’. And it nuclear facilities worldwide, then this is not [Lord Salisbury] presents to the Cabinet the something we can expect to be able to do was also understandable that, conscious of draft white paper ‘A Programme of Nuclear from the sidelines. their responsibility as a shop window for Power’. Proposes 4 commercial stations on Calder Hall pattern, followed by 4 more British technology, the electricity authorities Third, proliferation and Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (1963-64), had the outline of their comparative reactor followed by 4 liquid-cooled reactors. ‘Nuclear nuclear power should no longer be bracketed appraisal translated into six languages. But energy is the energy of the future. … Our together because, even if all nuclear power civilization is based on power. Improved living those close to the decision had no business development were halted worldwide, the standards both in advanced industrial countries fooling themselves as to the imperfect like our own and in the vast underdeveloped nuclear genii is anyway long out of the bottle integrity of the assessment process which countries overseas can only come about and in consequence proliferation has for through the increased use of power. The rate they had gone through, with its highly some years been much more dependent upon of increase required is so great that it will tax dubious, and as it turned out in some the existing resources of energy to the utmost. political will than it has been upon the instances plain wrong, assumptions. I have Whatever the immediate uncertainties, nuclear availability of technical knowledge. The energy will in time be capable of producing quoted the Duke of Wellington once already human race will have escaped lightly if power economically. Moreover it provides a in this lecture. Let me do so again. It seems source of energy potentially much greater than Hiroshima and Nagasaki end up the only that a Mr Jones, secretary of the Royal any that exist now. The coming of nuclear instances of nuclear weapons being used in power therefore marks the beginning of a new Academy, was occasionally mistaken for the anger, but even if one day these weapons are era. … The stakes are high but the final reward Duke but that on one occasion it happened will be immeasurable. We must keep ourselves used again, nuclear power per se will not be the other way round, a minor civil servant in in the forefront of the development of nuclear to blame. Indeed, one might equally well power so that we can play our proper part in Pall Mall raising his hat to the Duke and advance precisely the opposite argument, harnessing this new form of energy for the saying ‘Mr Jones, I believe’, to which the great benefit of mankind’. C 55 (31); National that a world from which nuclear power has man immediately replied ‘Sir, if you will Archives CAB 129/73. been banned, and which is short of energy, or believe that, you will believe anything.’ So experiencing uncontrolled global warming, is 1956 certainly it was with the AGR decision of likely as a result to exhibit a greater July-November. Suez crisis and British/French 1965: if you believed that you really were takeover of Suez Canal. Oil crisis. propensity for conflict. capable of believing anything. Inevitably too, 17 October. Queen opens Calder Hall, Fourth, we have in Britain, and throughout the self-delusion behind this decision had to proclaimed as the world’s first civil nuclear the world, communities which have now be paid for, the Dungeness B station, the . lived in proximity to nuclear facilities for, in initial prize which the AGR’s controversial 1957 some cases, more than half a century. This is win had secured, taking 20 years to complete. Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor prototype design a fact of considerable social and political approved. Though this was the worst single example of significance. Furthermore, while these 28 February. Cabinet approves trebling of British wishful thinking, it was regrettably far locations tend naturally to be the first places nuclear power programme: ‘the unit cost of from unique. In the same category must be electricity from the earliest nuclear power considered when new nuclear facilities are included the persistence with all-purpose being proposed, this should not be taken as UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 13

nuclear construction consortia to build the was urgently needed for the weapons TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL stations, no less than five having initially programme; the United States had abruptly NUCLEAR ENERGY cont been encouraged to form. This was wishful ended war-time atomic co-operation; thinking because the competition to which was not readily available as station might prove to be slightly higher than the consortia gave rise, when not outright fuel, nor was heavy water as moderator; and that from conventional stations; but technical spurious, tended to produce expensive light water reactors, being then thought less development, which might be expected to be rapid, should succeed in eliminating this excess diversity rather than efficient design safe, were judged to need remote sites, a cost.’ CC 14 (57); National Archives CAB replication. The consortia system also led to a difficult problem for a small country like the 128/31 ‘Buggins’ turn’ principle which, when it UK. But despite these reactors initially being 1 August. Following a recommendation that failed, caused much political embarrassment, off-limits, the underlying attractions of water the government borrow from the International notably over the second reactor at the Wylfa cooled reactors did not go unrecognised in Bank for Reconstruction and Development [part of the World Bank] to fund nuclear station, and then that affair’s knock-on effect Britain, and the 1955 White Paper which power, the Minister of Power [Lord Mills] tells at Dungeness B. Competition is well worth announced Britain’s first nuclear power Cabinet ‘a decision to borrow from abroad on the having, but only when it is genuine, and programme (Figure 1) in fact looked to the behalf of our nuclear power programme, which had become a symbol of our industrial in the context of high technology, last four stations of that programme possibly leadership in the post-war period, would be a competition’s scope will often be quite being liquid cooled, with the liquid likely considerable shock to public opinion.’ C.C. limited. This again is something to remember being water. What then changed was that as 60(57); National Archives CAB 128/31 for the future. the first programme got underway, the October. Fire at Windscale Pile, next to Calder potential of gas-graphite reactors began to Hall. Some would also describe as wishful thinking look much better, so that by the time that the long British persistence with gas-cooled 1958 first programme was effectively quadrupled, reactors, but there is a more important lesson Concentration on four types of reactor: Steam in 1957, it had been decided to standardise Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), of contemporary relevance which this on these gas-graphite reactors. Even so, as the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR), Fast persistence illustrates. It is well understood (FBR), High Temperature gas- increased availability of enriched uranium that Britain felt pushed into gas-cooled, cooled Reactor (HTR). began to make enriched, as opposed to graphite-moderated, natural uranium natural, uranium a more feasible fuel, a reactors by the circumstances which the switch might have been made to water country faced in the late 1940s. Plutonium cooling for a second nuclear programme. By then, however, the Atomic Energy Authority was well along with research on an enriched Figure 2. An engineering model of an Advanced uranium gas-graphite reactor, the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor, at Gas-cooled Reactor, and after the 1965 Heysham II. Photo: Science Appraisal, which was undertaken to compare Museum/SSPL. the AGR against light water reactor designs specifically for the Dungeness B site (Figure 1), it was of course the AGR which was used for Britain’s second nuclear power programme (Figure 2).

Instructively, France, like Britain, also began with gas-graphite reactors, but switched much sooner, and far more decisively, to light water ones. Sizewell B, completed in 1995 (Figure 3), remains Britain’s only light water reactor station, and as things currently stand, when the last AGR closes in 2023, Sizewell B will then be the only nuclear station still operating in Britain, supplying some 3 –4 per cent of total UK electricity demand. The international mainstream Whatever the wishful thinking about the virtues of gas-graphite in this two decade saga, the really significant consequence was that Britain’s choice of gas-graphite cut it off from the international mainstream. By 14 UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS?

Figure 3. An engineering model of the Pressurised Water Reactor at TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL Sizewell B. Photo: NUCLEAR ENERGY cont Science Museum/SSPL. 1959 HTR becomes international Dragon project.

White paper ‘Control of Radioactive Wastes’. Leads to the ‘Radioactive Substances Act’ of 1960, which establishes national control of discharge of .

1960 2 June. Minister of Power [Richard Wood] told the Cabinet that ‘the original ten-year programme announced in 1955 for the development of civil nuclear power had been accelerated in 1957, with the object of providing 5,000-6,000 megawatts in commission by the end of 1966. There had since been changes in the fuel position, and it was now estimated that conventional fuel supplies would be adequate for ten to fifteen years, even if no nuclear power stations were ordered in the next few years. The capital costs of nuclear generation had been higher than had been expected, but the cost of generating nuclear power was now falling faster than the cost of generating electricity from conventional fuels. A nuclear power programme on the 1957 scale was therefore no longer necessary, but it was essential to find out as soon as possible how to build a fully competitive nuclear power station and to provide for an industry which would in due course be capable of expanding at the necessary rate. It was ‘international mainstream’ here, of course, These early years were indeed what Lorna proposed to spread the nuclear power one really means ‘American’, because it was Arnold has called Britain’s ‘era of illusion’. programme over a longer period, by proceeding at the present rate of ordering above all the American commitment to water They underline that international isolation which was roughly one station a year. This reactors which made them the world must definitely be avoided in any nuclear would provide 3,800 megawatts by the end of standard. The result is that today two-thirds future. Circumstances happily have much 1966, and 5,000 megawatts in 1968. It would fully maintain the rate of technological of world capacity is based on the Pressurised diminished this particular risk, almost now to Water Reactor, with another quarter based on the point where it could be described as the other water reactor version, the Boiling negligible. Water Reactor. This is not to imply that had A stable commercial future the Americans opted instead for gas-graphite, then gas-graphite would have become the With mention of Britain’s first and second world standard, because the deeper point is nuclear programmes we encounter other that, with greater freedom of choice than unhappy features of the country’s nuclear Britain initially enjoyed, it was for water story, its rigidity and ‘lumpiness’. The basic reactors that the Americans decided. cause of these features was that this was a tale Intriguingly, according to Lord Hinton, written, and rather badly written, by outstandingly the initial architect of British government. The core lesson is that if nuclear nuclear power (Figure 4), there was at the power is to be part of UK energy supply over beginning an informal understanding with the next half century and beyond, then the Canadians that, if their heavy water nuclear construction wants to be much more reactors proved better than Britain’s gas- commercial than political, with companies graphite ones, then Britain would switch to taking commensurate responsibility. A new them, and if the reverse happened, then the beginning after the long interval will Canadians would make the switch. In sharp obviously impose extra costs and create its contrast, as regards US light water reactor own problems – as regards regulation as well technology, there was always in Britain as construction. In sharp contrast to the towards it something of the ‘not invented 1950s, adequately qualified manpower in Figure 4. Christopher Hinton (1901 –1983). Photo: here’ syndrome. particular is likely this time to be initially in The Institution of Mechanical Engineers. UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 15

short supply. Nonetheless, the clear aim consequences were not effectively contained TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL should be to achieve in due course a steady within the reactor itself: including naval NUCLEAR ENERGY cont state, with the nuclear component of energy operation would double this figure. That one supply, and thus nuclear construction, accident, Chernobyl in 1986, was though, as development, and would be sufficient to keep changing only gradually thereafter. One we all know, devastating, with 47 immediate three industrial consortia employed.’ CC would not normally prefer soap opera to deaths and around 10 child deaths so far 34(60); National Archives CAB 128/34 drama but the record makes clear that in the from thyroid cancer, plus an unknowable 1963 nuclear case, the soap opera of business is number of additional cancers to date and to US companies claim cost breakthrough in light much to be preferred to the drama of politics. be expected over coming decades, and these water reactors. right across Europe. As is also well known, This leads on to the economics of the various 1964 this accident occurred with a reactor type forms of . It is natural to 10 April. Minute by the Chancellor of the which would not have been licensed in the Exchequer [Jim Callaghan] to the Prime ask that competing energy sources be West, and which in addition was at the time Minister: ‘The Nuclear Power Programme’. compared on the same basis. Regrettably, it is ‘The Economic Policy Committee was troubled being operated improperly. Both Chernobyl difficult to ensure genuine comparability, by the possibility that an announcement that and the world’s second worst nuclear we were willing to contemplate reactors of complications arising in respect of subsidies, accident, at a reprocessing facility in 1957, American design would kill the prospects of operating assumptions and a wide range of our own nuclear power industry and involve us took place in the , a country externalities. It is also legitimate for govern- in writing off the very substantial sums of where the safety culture was especially poor. money which have been devoted to nuclear ments to take a broader view, for instance After these Soviet accidents the next two in power research in the past. They took the putting their own valuation on security of point that if, at this stage, no nuclear system order of gravity have been Windscale in the supply, or deliberately choosing to set an was competitive with the latest conventional UK in 1957, and Three Mile Island in the US power stations the choice should lie between a international example, or insisting upon a in 1979. Windscale involved a primitive air- British nuclear system, even if this were more mixture of energy sources rather than expensive than an American alternative, and vented, and thus uncontained, military allowing economics alone to determine conventional power.’ Supports draft white reactor, there were no immediate deaths but paper which said that the Central Electricity policy. What were not in evidence in the past there was a significant radiation release, Generating Board would ‘issue an enquiry for were efforts to make the economic and tenders for an Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor though fortunately less than a thousandth political dimensions absolutely explicit. This station’ but also be ready to consider tenders that at Chernobyl. At Three Mile Island there ‘for water-moderated reactor systems of proved again should be rectified in the future. were again no immediate deaths and in this design ’. The decision for the first choice of the Specifically, these dimensions must include next generation of reactor systems would be instance only a relatively minor and short- rigorous consideration of all carbon foot- deferred. CP (64) 86; CAB 129/117 term radiation release. Still smaller radiation prints, and in the nuclear case, the financial October. Labour Party elected to Government. releases occurred at reactors in the US in implications of full decommissioning and 1961, Switzerland in 1969 and France in 1965 waste disposal as well. Only with all the 1980. May. The AGR developed by the Atomic economic and political assumptions made Energy Authority chosen as the basis for the completely transparent will it be possible to But this lecture is being given on 6 May. This second generation of British nuclear power stations. An AGR to be built at Dungeness B. have confidence in UK energy policy and its is the date on which in 1626 Manhattan evolving options. Island was bought for the equivalent of $24, 11 October. Minister of Power [Fred Lee] and to demonstrate the power of political circulates to Cabinet draft white paper entitled Safety ‘Fuel policy’. ‘Although the earlier expectations pressure, I will, a little mischievously, recall about the economics of nuclear power have If the lessons I have so far suggested from just one more nuclear disaster. What proved premature, there has been a steady fall Britain’s nuclear past all seem rather in the capital costs of successive stations in the happened at Shoreham on nearby Long first nuclear power programme, and the tender negative, there were also positive features Island was, however, only a financial (an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor - A.G.R.) which fully deserve re-emphasis in any calamity and not really a nuclear one at all. recently accepted for the second nuclear . Outstanding among station at Dungeness (1,200 MW) suggests Here the utility company concerned decided that it should give cheaper base-load electricity them is the country’s nuclear safety record. in 1966 to construct a nuclear plant for an than future coal-fired stations on the present To see this in context we should begin with estimated $75 million. The plant was duly price of power station coal… The programme the international picture. From the start, will be based on the Advanced Gas-cooled completed in 1983 but then, under Reactor developed by the Atomic Energy nuclear engineers have had to live with the continuing political pressure, was finally Authority, but at this stage the possibility of discipline that, unlike most other abandoned in 1989 without its having another reactor type making a contribution is technologies, theirs is not one which dare not excluded. It is estimated that on these generated a single unit of electricity, and this assumptions, and with further developments in rely on the principle of learning mainly from at the staggering cost of $6 billion: a much and expected increases in its mistakes. With civil reactors the resulting worse case even than Dungeness B! the size of stations, a total of 8,000 MW might safety figures are now highly impressive: in be in commission under the second nuclear The Chernobyl accident helped significantly power programme by 1975.’ C (65) 130. 12,000 reactor years of operation in over 30 to bring down the Soviet Union, and that at National Archives CAB 129/122 countries there has been only one Three Mile Island severely blighted the commercial reactor accident where the American nuclear industry. The event at 16 UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS?

Windscale, which like Chernobyl has been fast reactor’s day may yet come, though it described as ‘an accident waiting to happen’, will not be soon. TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL was certainly nasty and could easily have NUCLEAR ENERGY cont Over and above my initial caveat about been much worse, but it at least had the drawing conclusions from history, is the advantage that it happened at the outset of 1966 world now so different as to invalidate even commercial reactor construction in Britain. Prototype Fast Breader Reactor at the most well-founded historical lessons? On ordered. Seen as potentially key component of Its impact on the UK’s nuclear safety culture the one hand, this century seems still more third generation of nuclear power stations. was therefore both far-reaching and lasting. favourable towards complicated technology Precisely because there has been no recent 1967 than was the 20th, above all because of the nuclear construction in the UK, it is vital that 23 October. ‘Fuel Policy’ Draft White Paper remarkable strides in computing power, submitted to Cabinet. Affirms 1965 plans. the country’s former safety culture be fully which benefit both the design and the ‘Nuclear power stations cause no air pollution. reasserted. Categorically, this must not be They can be sited near areas of consumption operation of complex facilities. But on the taken for granted. In addition, unlike without affecting the cost of generation, and other hand, there has been one wholly so there is less need for additional high voltage construction, safety and its regulation are, in malign 21st century development, the transmission lines. A regular sequence of new the last analysis and completely inescapably, nuclear stations is desirable if the full emergence of major international terrorism. government responsibilities. development potential of this new technology Incidents of the 9/11 kind were just not part is to be realised.’ C(67) 165; National Archives Confidence of orthodox thinking before that date. CAB 129/133 Happily, studies since 9/11 have shown that What seems to me another positive feature of 1970 nuclear plants are unattractive targets for Britain’s nuclear past may seem in conflict June. Conservative Party elected to even sophisticated terrorists. A fully-fuelled government. with the negative point in regard to self- jumbo jet crashing into a modern reactor or delusion which I made earlier, but it is not 1972 waste facility would be an extremely really a case of entering the same item on 8 August. Statement in Parliament approved unpleasant event, but it would not lead to by Cabinet. Secretary of State for Trade and both sides of the ledger. This is the a , or in all probability to Industry [John Davies], entitled ‘Future of the confidence with which, in the early decades, Nuclear Industry’. He summarises the paper to anything like the loss of life more easily so many difficult nuclear goals were tackled Cabinet: ‘It emphasised the Government’s achieved, as unhappily has been demon- intention to press ahead rapidly with the simultaneously. Thus in reactor development strated, against much softer targets. development of the fast breeder reactor (FBR) alone, apart from Magnox and the AGR there in the hope of placing the first full scale order Historically, nuclear reactors were provided were also developed the High Temperature for it in the late 1970s and of using it with containment against substantially worse thereafter for the major part of , the Steam Generating Heavy Water accidents than experience suggests are now generating plant orders from the mid-1980s Reactor and the Dounreay and Prototype Fast onwards.’ The statement itself begins likely to occur, and of course that Reactors. There was much other civil work ‘Decisions in the field of nuclear reactor policy containment would work equally well against have immense importance for the future too, on enrichment, reprocessing and waste human evil. strength of British industry and for the security disposal, all spun off the original military and cost of energy supply. The government is programme. Britain may have had no To sum up, no inventory of lessons from the resolved to build upon the major achievements of the AEA in the past and to ensure the business investing so heavily or so soon in so history of UK nuclear power can be definitive, development of a powerful capability for the much nuclear technology. That is a political but at best only suggestive, so let me, in forty future in which the AEA will continue to play a issue. On the ground, however, the striking words, summarise mine: vital part. We have decided therefore to intensify the installation of nuclear plants as far aspect was the almost Victorian élan with – take the public along with the policy as technological progress, environmental which the scientists and engineers carried constraints, industrial capability and generating forward their work. Britain needs to – be sceptical towards all claims plant requirements permit.’ Presentation, CM (72) 40; National Archives CAB 128/50/41. rediscover more such self-belief, and beyond – get in the international mainstream Statement, CM (72) 90; National Archives CAB as well as within the nuclear field, provided 129/164/15 – only that it does not again tip over into self- strive to make decisions commercial 1973 delusion. – be scrupulous about the economics 20 March. Cabinet agrees to formation of a National Nuclear Corporation established with I have now mentioned the fast reactor. – aim for steady state dominant participation by GEC. The Secretary Capable of either burning plutonium or – firmly re-establish a culture of safety for Trade and Industry (Peter Walker) confirms breeding it for later burning, this is an elegant that ‘The Electricity Council, the CEGB and the AEA had confirmed their view that GEC were reactor concept, but technical problems, low – recover élan the only company at present capable of uranium prices and politics between them This prescription will not guarantee success leading the new organisation’. CM 17 (73); derailed the American, French and German National Archives CAB 128/51/18 second time around, nothing could do that, fast reactor programmes in the 1990s, as well but after reflecting at length on the past, it October. ‘Yom Kippur’ War in the Middle East as the British. The Russians and Japanese, leads to oil shortages and four-fold price rise. represents my own best shot. however, continue with the technology, and also India with its near-breeder. The UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 17

Sources 2nd Report, Research and Development in Nuclear Power (London: HMSO, December 1987), HL TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL The only direct quotations are from Lorna Paper 14-I. NUCLEAR ENERGY cont Arnold, Windscale 1957 (London: Macmillan, 1992): ‘era of illusion’, p. 159 and ‘an accident On global warming, where the literature is now December. CEGB tells Parliament of plans to waiting to happen’, p. 124; and Royal huge, I have been particularly influenced by order 32 PWR reactors over the subsequent Commission on Environmental Pollution, 6th Gabrielle Walker and Sir David King, The Hot decade. Report, Cmnd. 6618, September 1976, Nuclear Topic (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008). 1974 Power and the Environment , paras 181 and 511. For up to date figures, other than the internet I 28 February. Labour Party elected to I have naturally relied heavily on my own book: have mainly used Ian Hore-Lacy, Nuclear Energy government. Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions in the 21st Century (London: World Nuclear University Press, 2006). 13 June. Secretary of State for Energy [Eric (London: Croom Helm, 1980). Varley] reports, ‘No option commanded Britain’s first nuclear programme was For Shoreham I have relied upon David P. general agreement, and any choice would announced in the White Paper A Programme of McCaffrey, The Politics of Nuclear Power (London: entail some commercial risk; but in his view the Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). primary considerations were safety, reliability in Nuclear Power , Cmd. 9389 of February 1955; and operation, and the need to support British An Appraisal of the Technical and Economic Aspects Among other sources to which I owe a debt is technology, and on these grounds he of Dungeness B Nuclear Power Station , published W.J. Nuttall, Nuclear Renaissance (London: Taylor considered that the Steam Generating Heavy by the Central Electricity Generating Board in & Francis, 2005). Water Reactor (SGHWR) should be adopted for May 1965 led on to Britain’s second nuclear the next nuclear orders. In this judgment he power programme. was fortified by the fact that the [Cabinet Professor Williams retired as Chairman of the Higher Office’s] Central Policy Review Staff had The House of Lords inquiry for which I was a Education Funding Council for Wales in May 2008. independently reached the same conclusion; specialist adviser reported as Select Committee He is a former Vice Chancellor of the University of and although the weight of argument had on Science and Technology, Session 1988 –89, Reading. seemed compelling even before the recent disaster to the chemical plant at Flixborough, that event further reinforced the need to ensure that the Government’s choice of nuclear reactor would command public BETWEEN 1976 and 1980 , Richard Wilson was the assistant secretary within the Department of confidence.’ Energy responsible for nuclear power policy, including thermal reactor choice, fast reactor policy, 10 July. Secretary of State for Energy [Eric and the financing of the UK atomic energy authority. Now Lord Wilson of Dinton offers his own Varley] announces SGHWR chosen as basis for list of lessons from the past. third nuclear programme

1976 AFTER HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI , scientists Any new programme of nuclear power stations Nuclear Power and the Environment, Sixth and politicians who had been involved in the will have advantages not available thirty years Report of the Royal Commission on the Environment chaired by Sir Brian Flowers development of atomic energy felt a ‘dark ago. There is now far more operating experience (Flowers report), expresses anxiety about foreboding’. 1 This was succeeded by a desire to of all types of nuclear reactor than in those early environmental dangers of plutonium. use the new science to generate electricity for years; and the debates about thermal reactor June. Pound Sterling reaches record low p eaceful purposes. A Government White Paper choice have been settled decisively in favour of against the dollar. of the early 1950s described atomic energy as the pressurised water technology. But experience 19 July. As part of general public expenditure most important development since the with these earlier programmes still offers lessons cuts, SGHWR programme put on ice. ‘In discovery of fire, and led to a surge of research for contemporary policy makers. discussion it was argued that the deferment of and construction which made Britain’s nuclear the SGHWR could mean the collapse of the Political will industry itself, which employed some 25,000 programme a world leader into the 1970s. people. Deferment of the SGHWR would revive Stations in the original Magnox programme are, Perhaps the first lesson is the importance of demands for its cancellation, although on amazingly, still in use. political commitment and drive. Each nuclear present plans the reactor was needed in power station is a huge construction project, Scotland and could not be replaced.’ CM 16 Increasingly, however, the programme aroused (76); National Archives CAB 128/59/16 very expensive and technologically complex. strong passions. Some were carried over from Given their potential for controversy, new December. British Government forced to opposition to nuclear weapons. Some reflected borrow from IMF. nuclear power stations will not be built unless environmental concerns which carried there is single-minded political will behind 1978 increasing weight after the Flowers Report in them, whoever builds them and however they January. SGHWR cancelled. Two AGRs ordered. 1976, reinforced by the Three Mile Island and are financed. The first nuclear power programme Chernobyl incidents. Witnesses at the Windscale Windscale Inquiry under Justice Parker gives of Magnox stations, announced in 1953 –55, had green light to Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Inquiry expressed deep anxiety about radiation. that support. It also benefited from strong Plant (Thorp). And within the nuclear industry, the long debate leadership under Lord Hinton and a sense of about the relative merits of American water- 1979 excitement exemplified by The Queen opening cooled technology and British gas-cooled March. Accident at the the Three Mile Island the first Magnox station Calder Hall in 1956. reactor near Harrisburg, . technology had not much less intensity than a Even so, it needed all these favourable war of religion. conditions to carry it through a host of 18 UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS?

problems, including design changes (such as the Energy Authority, to Mr Tony Benn, the new switch to on-load refuelling), escalating costs Secretary of State for Energy, in the summer of TIMELINE OF UK CIVIL and delays in construction times. 1976. NUCLEAR ENERGY cont

A nuclear power programme without continuing Establishing the economics of nuclear stations is May. Conservative Party elected to political drive will not be built. The Thatcher difficult. Even with the co-operation of all government. government committed itself in 1980 to the parties and determined political support from December. Secretary of State for Energy [David construction of one new nuclear power station the Thatcher government, it was very hard in Howell] announces to Parliament programme order each year for a decade. After Sizewell the 1980 to establish reliable figures. What is clear is of 10 reactors over decade from 1982 laid out commitment evaporated without comment, for that having a tested design which can be by CEGB with support of the government. a variety of reasons. replicated does much to help contain those costs 1981 and the risk of delays in construction. Iran-Iraq War causes oil price to increase from Established design $14 a barrel in 1978 to $35 a barrel. Public consultation A second lesson is the importance of having a 1986 reliable established design whose safety case can A third lesson is not to promise more by way First half of year. Oil price collapse to about be demonstrated and which can be replicated. of public consultation than can realistically $11 a barrel.

Although the UK’s early nuclear programmes be delivered or afforded within the planned Inquiry on establishing the first British based on gas-cooled technology and the timescale. Sir Roger Williams is of course right Pressurised Water Reactor at Sizewell reports. breeding of fuel in the Fast Reactor were to emphasise the desirability of trying to take April. Explosion in the Soviet Union’s intellectually elegant, they were bedevilled in the public along with policy, and one can Chernobyl plant leads to radioactive practice by the difficulty of having too many sympathise with his wish for nuclear power to contamination of British soil. construction consortia building different be ‘owned’ by the public. But it is easier said 1987 designs. than done. Sizewell B, the first British PWR, ordered. The last nuclear power station of the 20th century This was illustrated by the 1965 decision on Tony Benn, faced with the demand to choose a in Britain. Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs) which new thermal reactor system for new nuclear 1989 turned out to be disastrous. The Minister for power station orders after Sir John Hill’s CEGB privatised, but nuclear power stations Supply, Fred Lee, told the House of Commons demarche, wanted a major public consultation withdrawn from privatisation because of ‘we have hit the jackpot ... we have the greatest exercise. anticipated costs of decommissioning. break-through of all time.’ 2 But the wish for – He took evidence from every interested party, 1990 competition in design and speedy construction ranging from departmental officials through born as nationalised led to the adoption of inadequately worked-up all industrial interests to environmental government-owned company. designs. Consortia began construction too soon, groups. 1996 technical problems emerged, costs escalated and Non-Magnox reactors (AGRs and PWR) companies began to collapse. The first station, – He consulted the French Government as they transferred to which is floated on embarked on a major sustained programme of Dungeness, suffered major delays because of the Stock Exchange, and Magnox reactors problems with the containment, pressure vessel building Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs). transferred to the government-owned British and boilers: making it work was ‘watch-making (When asked how they conducted public Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). by the tonne’ as one participant observed. It was consultation, their Minister replied: ‘We have 1997 ordered in 1965 for completion in 1970 –71 and a saying: when you are draining the swamp, May. Labour Party elected to government. eventually came on stream in 1983, thirteen you do not consult the frogs.’) 1999 years late. The fact that the station did – He was open with the press, and published an British production of oil and gas peaks. eventually generate electricity – and is still doing extensive Thermal Reactor Assessment which so – was a considerable achievement for British compared the designs, costs and relative 2006 engineering, but not the sort which is easily safety cases of the Advanced Gas-cooled Steep rise in world price of energy. advertised. Reactors, Pressurised Water Reactors, and the 2008 Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor. January. White Paper on Nuclear Power Linked to the importance of a settled design is proposes ‘new’ nuclear power programme. the need to avoid escalating costs. The eventual – He held a summit over several days at cost of Dungeness B was four times the original Sunningdale to which all parties, including 2009 estimate, after allowing for inflation. The Steam environmental groups such as the Friends of 2 February. Two former sites of the UKAEA, Harwell and , combine to become one Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR), the Earth, were invited. company, Research Sites Restoration Limited chosen in 1974 for the next generation of (RSRL). (Harwell Press Release) Despite his political gifts, it is not clear that this nuclear power stations, was similarly abandoned effort really made much difference to public Timeline prepared by Professorr Robert Bud two years later because of the excessive cost of opinion. The same may be said of the Sizewell (Science Museum and Queen Mary University the design, a message conveyed bravely by the of London) and Professor Pete r Henness y FBA Inquiry, which the Thatcher Government late Sir John Hill, chairman of the UK Atomic (Queen Mary University of London). intended should be finished before the end of UK CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY: WHAT LESSONS? 19

1982 but which lasted three years longer than One advantage enjoyed by earlier programmes design changes and lack of skilled manpower that, until 1985. Three Mile Island and but not available now was the good supply in can all contribute to delay. Asking the private Chernobyl had more impact. this country of scientists and engineers with the sector to build competing designs was a experience of building nuclear stations. The serious mistake which consumed much On the other hand, fifty years of safe operation generation who built the earlier programmes of ministerial time in earlier programmes. of nuclear power stations may perhaps have a nuclear power has largely died out. One can – The public holds government responsible for more positive influence on public opinion than sympathise with Sir Roger Williams’s wish for a the safety of nuclear power stations. A strong anything which governments may say. So too new generation of engineers and scientists with research capability is important to underpin may concerns about global warming and about élan, but it takes time to generate such a breed. the nuclear programme, not least the safety the prospect of a shortage of electricity In the meantime there is a skills shortage to be aspects. generating capacity. If nuclear power is overcome, probably from abroad. – understood to be the best hope of meeting There has to be progress on the long-term demand for electricity without making global Safety disposal of highly radioactive waste. Underestimating the importance of environ- warming worse, the public may come to ‘own’ it A fifth lesson is the need for government to mental issues was another mistake of the in a way which government exhortation on its ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to 1970s. own could not achieve. safety and radioactive waste management. – The scale of finance for nuclear stations, In short, one may sympathise with the desire to One potential area for delay for instance is the including the cost of decommissioning, is secure public acceptance of nuclear power, and need for the Nuclear Directorate of the Health great. Governments usually come under governments must make the effort to achieve it; and Safety Executive to be satisfied with the pressure to support the private sector in the but there may be a limit to what governments safety case for a station and to give a site licence end. can do unless events happen to be moving their for its construction. The availability of sufficient Notes way. Here as elsewhere, timing is all. resources in the Directorate’s predecessor, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, was a serious 1 Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy Timescales 1939 –1945 (Macmillan, 1964), p. 386. headache in the past and may be so again. The A fourth lesson is that the construction of main problems in the past related to the 2 Official Report , 25 May 1965; Vol. 713, c. 237–8. nuclear power stations tends to take longer from availability of qualified staff, but they can also announcement to commercial operation than require a strong capability to do research in governments expect. The White Paper of 1955 support of the safety case. Even with a settled announced that twelve Magnox stations would design, questions requiring research can Lord Wilson of Dinton is Master of Emmanuel be on stream by 1965: in the event the last unexpectedly arise. College, Cambridge. station came on stream in 1971. The AGRs announced in 1965 aimed at completion of the The need to resolve the issue of the long-term last station in 1975, whereas the last one was in disposal of radioactive waste is a further area fact connected to the grid in 1983 and the where government involvement is inevitable. Sir Roger Williams summarised the position. It is a stations were not all in commercial operation problem that will not go away. until the late 1980s. Admittedly these first programmes were handicapped by the fact that The role of Government stations were often prototypes. The two further In conclusion, it will be clear from all the above AGRs announced in 1978 came into commercial that government has a central role in the operations at around the same time as stations development of nuclear power. in the first programme, demonstrating the importance of standardising design. – Building new nuclear stations requires sustained and determined political Planning too may contribute greatly to delay. commitment on every front. Sizewell B, announced in 1980, did not come on – Although the public has tended to be stream until 1995, largely due to the planning immune to government pronouncements process. Its actual construction was to time about nuclear power in the past, there is a and cost. duty on government to articulate the case Past experience suggests that as a rule of thumb clearly, in terms of both energy policy (not construction of a nuclear power station in this least at any planning inquiry) and climate country takes at best a decade from change. It may be that the public may give announcement to commercial operation if the case a fair wind now. conditions are right and can take much longer if – The timescale for building new nuclear there are problems, for instance with planning stations tends to be longer than expected and or design. is a trap for the unwary Minister. Planning,