Fall 08 October 3 2011 The rise and fall of the fast breeder reactor technology in the UK: between engineering “dreams” and economic “realities”? Markku Lehtonen Jenny Lieu 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 6 II. The inception of the nuclear power programme (from 1940) 9 2.1 Military ambitions 10 2.1.1 The early pioneers (early 1940s) 10 2.1.2 The Atomic Project (mid-1940s) 11 2.1.3 Windscale reactors (from late 1940s to 1950s) 16 2.2 The civil nuclear power programme 17 2.2.1 Motivations for the nuclear programme and the creation of the AEA (1950s) 17 2.2.2 British reactor technologies (1950s to 1980s) 18 2.2.3 Plan to privatise the electricity industry... 21 2.2.4 ...and the withdrawal of nuclear from privatisation 23 2.3 Summary of the evolution of the UK nuclear sector 27 III. The fast breeder reactor dream: expectations for the future 29 3.1 FBR as the long term goal 30 3.1.1 Dounreay Experimental Fast Reactor, DFR (1950s to mid-1960s) 31 3.1.2 Prototype Fast Reactor, PFR (mid-1960s to 1970s) 33 IV. The long decline 38 4.1 AEA split-up and the erosion of institutional support for fast breeders? (1970s) 38 4.2 Towards a commercial fast breeder reactor (CFR) and international collaboration (1970s) 39 4.3 RCEP’s 6th report – the “Flowers Report” (1970s) 41 4.4 Reprocessing, proliferation concerns and the Windscale Inquiry (late 1970s) 43 4.4.1 The institution of public inquiry and the run-up to Windscale Inquiry 44 4.4.2 Reprocessing, FBRs and proliferation fears 46 4.4.3 The outcome of the Inquiry: landmark of participatory decision-making or a symbol of opposition against the ‘nuclear complex’? 47 4.5 CFR – an experimental or commercial reactor? (late 1970s) 49 4.6 "Thatcher the scientist" takes office: an interlude of optimism in the fast reactor community (late 1970s) 50 4.7 International collaboration - preparations for the 'fallback option' begin (late 1970s to 1980s) 51 V. The final coup de grace: changing external environment, Thatcher’s political ambitions and economic liberalism (1980s) 52 5.1 The (poor) economics of nuclear power 'revealed': calls for greater financial accountability (late 1970s to 1980s) 55 5.2 European fast breeder project – the last glimmer of hope (mid-1980s to 1990s) 57 5.3 Explaining Thatcher government’s decisions on fast breeders – economics, ideology, and politics 59 3 5.4 ‘Pure’ economics or political interests and strong personalities? Coal industry, miners' strikes and leaders of the UK nuclear establishment 60 5.5 Withdrawal of the UK from international fast breeder collaboration (early 1990s) 62 5.6 Shut-down and decommissioning at Dounreay (mid-1990s) 62 VI. Explaining the rise and fall of the fast breeder programme 63 6.1 Forecasts, predictions and expectations 64 6.2 Technological Arguments: problems inherent or external to the technology? 67 6.3 External factors 68 6.3.1 Uranium prices 68 6.3.2 Oil crisis 69 6.3.3 Risks, safety and security: radiation and proliferation 70 6.4 The role of policy actors and policy entrepreneurs: AEA and CEGB 71 6.4.1 Role of the AEA: from hegemony to decline and loss of mission 71 6.4.2 Institutional arrangements 74 6.4.3 AEA: united or internally divided? 75 6.4.4 The AEA and the CEGB 75 6.5 Policy and Politics 76 6.5.1 British industrial policy – or the absence of it? 76 6.5.2 Declining political support 77 6.5.3 Privatisation, liberalisation and the ‘economic dogmatism’ 78 6.6 NGOs and public opinion 80 VII. Conclusions: what and who killed the fast breeder reactors in Britain? 82 7.1 Economics and technology: autonomy or dependence? 82 7.2 Hype, disappointments and ‘the reality’ 83 7.3 External events 83 7.4 Social & safety concerns 84 7.5 Political power play and declining political support 85 References 86 4 ABBREVIATIONS AEA - United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority AGR - Advanced gas-cooled reactor AERE - Atomic Energy Research Establishment BEPO - British experimental pile ‘0’ BNFL - British Nuclear Fuels Candu - Canada deuterium-uranium reactor CDFR - Commercial Demonstration Fast Reactor CEGB - Central Electricity Generating Board CFR - Commercial fast breeder reactor DFR - Dounreay fast reactor DMTR - Dounreay materials test reactor EFR - European fast reactor ESI - Electricity supply industry FBR- Fast breeder reactor GLEEP - Graphite low energy experimental pile INFCE - International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Magnox - Magnesium non-oxidising reactor MOX - Mixed oxide fuel NDA - Nuclear Decommissioning Authority NGO - Non-governmental organisation NII - Nuclear Installations Inspectorate NNC - National Nuclear Corporation PFR - Prototype fast reactor PWR - Pressurised water reactor 5 REC - Regional Electricity Company RCEP - Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution SGHWR - Steam generating heavy water reactor SSEB - South of Scotland Electricity Board THORP - Thermal oxide reprocessing plant TNPG - Nuclear Power Group U235 - Uranium-235 ZEPHYR - Zero-energy test assembly TECHNICAL ABBREVIATONS KWh - Kilowatt hour MWe - Megawatt electrical MWt - Megawatt thermal 6 I. INTRODUCTION Over the past few years, nuclear energy has been experiencing somewhat of a “renaissance”: having for a long time been perceived as a source of environmental and safety risks, nuclear energy is today increasingly seen as a solution to the problems of climate change and energy security. While the Fukushima nuclear accident has again changed the context, with a number of countries imposing moratoria on the further construction of nuclear power, many Western countries nevertheless are continuing to renew their nuclear programmes (e.g. the USA, Finland, France, the UK), or revisiting their earlier policy of phasing out nuclear energy (e.g. Spain and Sweden). The renewed interest in nuclear energy brings to the spotlight the technical development of the so-called third and fourth generation nuclear reactors. The future of these new technologies is intimately linked to considerations concerning the perceptions and appraisal of risk, given the centrality of such considerations to the social acceptability of the new technologies. The history of nuclear energy demonstrates that the country-specific context significantly shapes the perceptions, appraisal and the management of risks. In the past, the evolution of nuclear energy has frequently experienced periods of “renaissance” and great expectations, associated with the promise of new, more efficient and less costly technologies such as fusion and fast breeder reactors. While the visions of the exploitation of nuclear fusion are situated in a relatively distant future, the fast breeder technology, by contrast, might become viable at a large scale within a few decades, provided that sufficient institutional support is in place. Yet, as the history of fast breeder reactors both in France and elsewhere has shown, the great expectations have often been followed by periods that have proven difficult – even traumatising – for the nuclear industry. However, we do not postulate determinism: hype-deception cycles are an outcome of a complex interplay of actors situated in their historical and social context. This report explores the evolution of the fast breeder nuclear reactor programmes in the UK, from the period of great promises and expectations in the 1950s and 1960s towards their progressive abandonment in the 1980s and 1990s. The project, of which this report is an element, aims thereby to draw lessons relevant for the current “nuclear renaissance” and medium-term planning on the future of nuclear power. Given that the fast breeder programmes were closely interlinked with the general evolution of nuclear power in the UK, this report includes a fairly detailed historical description of this more general ‘nuclear context’. This primarily chronological description of the evolution of the UK fast breeder programmes provides a basis for a comparison between the evolution of the British and French fast breeder reactor programmes. A central question in such a comparison concerns the lateness of the abandonment of the fast breeder programme in France, as compared to most other countries developing this technology. The cross-country comparison will explore the relative influence of the contextual and historical conditions within which the nuclear technologies have evolved in France and the UK on the one hand, and the ‘universal’ factors common to the evolution of socio-technical systems in general on the other. 7 This exploratory research was based on documentary analysis and eleven interviews of experts involved in, or with knowledge of, the UK fast breeder reactor (FBR) programmes. The interviewed persons and their primary affiliations (rationale for their selection as interviewees) were as follows: UK AEA 1. Gregg Butler, University of Manchester 2. Christine Brown CEGB 3. Leslie Mitchell 4. An anonymous former CEGB employee Academics 5. Steve Thomas, University of Greenwich, economics and energy policy 6. Gordon MacKerron, SPRU, economics 7. Andy Stirling, SPRU, science and technology studies 8. William Walker, University of St. Andrews, Professor in International Relations 9. William Nuttall, University of Cambridge, Judge Business School, engineering and technology policy 10. A social scientist wishing to remain anonymous Independent consultants/experts 11. Alex Henney 12. Walt Patterson An obvious challenge was of ‘temporal’ character: it was not always easy to find individuals that would have information and experience concerning the programme that was terminated almost two decades ago. Section 2 of the report traces the evolution of the UK civil nuclear programme since its origins in the 1940s. The report then explains the early development and the challenges in the construction and operation of the experimental and prototype fast breeder reactors in Dounreay. The chronological description ends by a presentation of the plans to construct a commercial fast breeder reactor – plans eventually abandoned in 1994. The report then concludes by a exploring a number of different explanations suggested by the interviewees and present in the documents concerning the reasons for the ups and downs in the evolution of the UK fast breeder programme.