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The Long Term Storage of Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (Agr) Fuel Xa9951796 P.N

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The Long Term Storage of Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (Agr) Fuel Xa9951796 P.N IAEA-SM-352/28 THE LONG TERM STORAGE OF ADVANCED GAS-COOLED REACTOR (AGR) FUEL XA9951796 P.N. STANDRING Thorp Technical Department, British Nuclear Fuels pic, Sellafield, Seascale, Cumbria, United Kingdom Abstract The approach being taken by BNFL in managing the AGR lifetime spent fuel arisings from British Energy reactors is given. Interim storage for up to 80 years is envisaged for fuel delivered beyond the life of the Thorp reprocessing plant. Adopting a policy of using existing facilities, to comply with the principles of waste minimisation, has defined the development requirements to demonstrate that this approach can be undertaken safely and business issues can be addressed. The major safety issues are the long term integrity of both the fuel being stored and structure it is being stored in. Business related issues reflect long term interactions with the rest of the Sellafield site and storage optimisation. Examples of the developement programme in each of these areas is given. 1. INTRODUCTION British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) has been contracted to manage the lifetime irradiated AGR fuel arisings from British Energy reactors1. The agreement formulated is a mixture of reprocessing (covering the planned life of the Thorp reprocessing plant) and interim storage for the remainder of the fuel arisings. Interim storage is projected to be up to 80 years to comply with direct disposal acceptance criteria and projected repository availability. Eighty years represents a significant increase in storage times compared to current operational experience; of around 18 years. Confidence that AGR fuel can be stored safely for extended periods has been provided by our experience of storing AGR fuel to date and the supporting research and development programmes initiated in the late 1970's for wet storage and 1990's in the case of Scottish Nuclear (SNL) dry storage project. AGR fuel elements comprise 36 stainless steel clad fuel pins, containing uranium dioxide fuel pellets, are held together by stainless steel braces enclosed in an open ended graphite sleeve which acts as part of the neutron moderator. Normally 8 fuel elements (7 in the case of Dungeness NPP) are held together by a tie rod running through the central tube of each fuel element to make up what is referred to as an AGR stringer. After irradiation the stringer is dismantled into individual fuel elements before being wet stored in fuel skips. The main differences between AGR long term storage as proposed as part of the SNL dry storage project and BNFL (Sellafield) taking on such a contract are:- SNL was limited by reactor site operating licences (which do not allow the transfer of fuel between sites, and therefore the need for a store at each reactor site), ARTICLE 372 effectively does not allow the removal of graphite sleeve, (and simplification of the dry store technology) as this would be viewed as waste, and existing storage facilities are limited. In comparison BNFL (Sellafield) already manages fuel from national and international reactors prior to reprocessing, operates fuel dismantling and associated waste store facilities and has three existing large pools (AGR Storage Pond, Fuel Handling Plant and Receipt & Storage) which are utilised for AGR fuel storage. 2. PROPOSED STRATEGY Figure 1 outlines the available storage options and the main Pros and Cons of each. Based on compliance with the principles. of waste minimisation and the avoidance of high initial capital 1 British Energy reactors comprise of the former generating companies Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear Limited. 2 ARTICLE 37 of the EURATOM Treaty is plant specific, it relates to the impact of operations on neighbouring member European states. Changes to ARTICLE 37 would require reapplication. 215 STANDRING expenditure the approach to be taken in the first instance is to use existing facilities and storage techniques; i.e. wet storage. This approach dictates development requirements to demonstrate that long term storage can be carried-out safely and to resolve business related issues. These can basically be divided into two main development areas:- Fuel Integrity and Pool Storage Management. Decision For/Against -Conforms to the principles of waste minimisation -No major initial capital investment and cost of any modifications can be phased Use of existing facilities - Existing facilities with operating licences (e.g. Fuel Handling Plant, AGR Storage Pond) (Receipt & Storage ) AGR Interim Storage - Need to demonstrate viability for extended life - Storage regimes reflect safety issues related to frequency of handling - Not stand alone units -Built to latest building standards -Designed for maximum storage duration -Designed for storage only -Stand alone Purpose built interim store -High initial capital investment (either dry or wet) -Does not conform to the principles of waste minimisation -Application for planning permission may not be granted -Operating licence inquiry/Public relation issues FIG. 1. Available storage options If the initial option becomes untenable on safety grounds the alternative of constructing a purpose built facility will be taken. The decision then will either be to go down the existing wet technology route or to develop a variation of the SNL dry store technology. 3. FUEL INTEGRITY Spent AGR fuel cladding performs two functions; as primary containment barrier, and for mechanical handling of individual fuel pins for rod consolidation/reprocessing purposes. The final recovery and conditioning of the fuel after 80 years storage in principle is the more restrictive of the functions, based on a minimum requirement of half original wall thickness, compared to localised cladding perforations which can be resolved by encapsulation. Figure 2 outlines the bounding cladding thickness, the margin between post irradiation and minimum clad thickness to allow for mechanical handling, and provides a very simplistic comparison with the long term wet storage of BWR fuel. Whilst wet storage of zircaloy clad fuel can be considered to be unlimited, in the absence of any other failure mechanism except general corrosion, AGR wet fuel storage is limited to a maximum predicted to be -152 years or even less (see below). It has been well reported [1-3], that irradiated AGR fuel elements 1-5 of the original irradiated stringer are known to be susceptible to irradiation induced intergrannular stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel fuel cladding and structural components. To inhibit this failure mechanism AGR fuel is stored in pool water dosed with sodium hydroxide to pH 11.5. Sodium hydroxide was chosen as a result of a corrosion inhibitor development programme undertaken early 1980s and has been used since 1986 for the interim storage of all AGR fuel at Sellafield. Operational experience to date indicates that fuel cladding perforation has been totally prevented. 216 IAEA-SM-352/28 The technical case for the storage of AGR fuel for up to 80 years is reliant upon the continued use of corrosion inhibitors. With changes to the front end of the fuel cycle, such as increasing fuel burnup, combined with a significant increase in proposed storage duration there is a need to revisit the original corrosion development work. One aspect of AGR fuel corrosion to be investigated as part of the development programme is the underlying corrosion rate of stainless steel in sodium hydroxide to pH 11.5. BWR AGR 860 y.m as manufactured 388 \im as manufactured 750 ^m worst case post pile 270 (im worst case post pile Wet storage in deionised water Wet storage in deionised water general corrosion rate general corrosion rate 0.5 i/ 7.3 x l(T'(im/year [4] [5] 430 Jim half original wail thickness 194 |im half original wall thickness assumed worst case to allow for worst case to allow for mechanical handling mechanical handling Maximum wet storage duration 4.4 xlO10 years " 152 years" U assumes storage in deionised water and there are no other failure mechanism except general corrosion FIG. 2. Simplistic comparison of maximum wet storage duration During the original corrosion inhibitor development programme it was noted that there was an additional anodic (corrosion) reaction occurring in caustic solutions. Limited work was undertaken which identified that this reaction was associated with enhanced dissolution of the surface oxide layer. As this reaction was not associated with localised corrosion, and because pool storage duration prior to reprocessing was typically ~ 10 years it was not considered to constitute a threat to the integrity of either the cladding or braces and was therefore never quantified. Given the current storage duration being proposed, such low corrosion rates could ultimately result in significant reduction in the cladding thickness. A Direct Current Potential Drop technique Field Signature Method (FSM) is currently being used to establish the general corrosion rate in sodium hydroxide; the principles of this technique are given in Appendix 1. Given a minimum resolution of 0.05% of metal thickness, a monitoring period of around a year (~ 0.19 urn limit of detection over measuring period) will be enough to establish whether general corrosion in sodium hydroxide is an issue. In the event of general corrosion in sodium hydroxide not meeting the safety criteria then alternative corrosion inhibitors will be investigated in the first instance. In the longer term some form of condition monitoring during the long term storage of AGR fuel is required; both the condition of the fuel pins and the fuel element braces needing to be assured. Currently the integrity of dismantled AGR fuel stored in the AGR Storage Pond is monitored by means of an activity release model. The technique is retrospective and the application of non destructive techniques such as Electrochemical Noise (see Appendix 1) and FSM to give predictive information will be investigated as alternative methods. 217 STANDRING 4. POOL STORAGE MANAGEMENT The use of existing facilities primarily raises two issues:- Firstly the need to provide confidence in the integrity of existing facilities for such extended periods of time.
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