DOCSLIB.ORG

The Emerging Investment Landscape of Post-Sanctions Iran: Opportunities, Risks, and Implications on US Foreign Policy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Emerging Investment Landscape of Post-Sanctions Iran: Opportunities, Risks, and Implications on US Foreign Policy Fordham International Law Journal Volume 39, Issue 4 Article 4 The Emerging Investment Landscape of Post-Sanctions Iran: Opportunities, Risks, and Implications on US Foreign Policy Christopher Beall∗ ∗Fordham University School of Law Copyright c by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj NOTE THE EMERGING INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE OF POST-SANCTIONS IRAN: OPPORTUNITIES, RISKS, AND IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY Christopher Beall* INTRODUCTION: A NEW CHAPTER IN IRAN ........................... 841 I. IRAN UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME ............................... 845 A. Background & Historical Overview .................................. 846 1. Pre-Revolutionary Iran ................................................ 848 2. The Islamic Revolution & Regional Turmoil ............. 850 3. Reconstruction & Reform ........................................... 858 4. The Ahmadinejad Years ............................................. 865 5. Climax of Sanctions: Rouhani, Obama, & the JCPOA ........................................................................ 872 B. Legal Framework of the Iran Sanctions Regime ............... 874 1. The US Sanctions Regime Targeting Iran .................. 875 2. International Sanctions: Multilateral Resolutions ....... 891 C. The Costs of Sanctioning Iran ........................................... 894 1. Economic Costs .......................................................... 895 2. Political Costs ............................................................. 899 3. Humanitarian Costs ..................................................... 904 D. The JPA ............................................................................. 906 II. IRAN’S POST-SANCTIONS TRANSITION .............................. 908 A. The JCPOA ....................................................................... 909 1. The Agreement ............................................................ 909 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; M.S., 2013, Arizona State University; B.A., 2011, University of Colorado. I would like to thank Professor Susan Franck for inspiring me to think about the intersection of international relations, human rights, and foreign investment, as well as for her feedback and everything learned in her course on International Investment Law. I would also like to thank Stephanie Torkian and the Editorial Board of the Fordham International Law Journal, whose suggestions and edits made this note a reality. Finally, many thanks to Jessica Beall, whose love and patience was absolutely vital throughout the entire publishing process. 839 840 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 2. US Sanctions Lifting Under Section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA: The “Footnote Six” Issue.................... 911 B. Investor Opportunities ....................................................... 915 1. Key Investment Sectors: Oil, Natural Gas, and Automotive ................................................................. 918 2. Alternative Sectors: Aviation, Finance, Consumer Goods, Tourism, and Renewable Energy .................... 926 C. Investor Risks in Iran ........................................................ 934 1. Commercial Risks ....................................................... 935 2. Political Risks ............................................................. 938 D. Iranian Investment Law ..................................................... 943 1. National Investment Law ............................................ 943 2. International Investment Law ..................................... 950 III. IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY ........................... 953 A. Engagement Generally: The Post-WWII European Engagement Model ........................................................... 959 B. Engaging Iran: Europe’s Model of Critical Dialogue ....... 962 C. Engagement Today: Can the United States Engage with Iran? .......................................................................... 966 D. Steering Engagement Toward US Foreign Policy Interests ............................................................................. 971 1. Limiting Iran’s Nuclear Capacity & Regional Non- Proliferation ................................................................ 971 2. Encouraging Reform Within the Islamic Republic and/or Regime Change ................................................ 974 3. Enhancing Regional Counterterrorism........................ 981 4. Protecting Traditional US Allies: Saudi Arabia & Israel ............................................................................ 986 a. Ensuring the Interests of Saudi Arabia ................. 987 b. Ensuring the Interests of Israel ............................. 992 5. International Cooperation & Collective Security Across Today’s Middle East Conflicts ....................... 997 6. Old Friends & Old Enemies: Bolstering Europe and Curtailing the Regional Influence of Russia and China .................................................................. 1001 7. Advancing US Economic Interests ........................... 1005 8. Protecting Human Rights in Iran and Abroad ........... 1006 2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 841 CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOUND US- IRAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY ................................... 1011 “[N]ot only should all friendships be safeguarded with the greatest devotion and good faith, but especially those which have been restored to goodwill after enmity.”1 INTRODUCTION On September 28, 2015, in his address before the United Nations General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “a new chapter has started in Iran’s relations with the world.”2 This development emerges from the conclusion of over a year of negotiating efforts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program with the P5+1, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).3 By relaxing decades of trade and investment sanctions in exchange for the imposition of strict limitations on the development of Iran’s civil nuclear program, the JCPOA, according to Rouhani, “showcased the potential for constructive dialogue.”4 Within the United States, the terms and details of the JCPOA have been—like the sanctions regime that preceded it— 1. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 476 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012) (1625). 2. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the General Debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 28, 2015), http://gadebate.un. org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_Iran_en.pdf [hereinafter Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly]. 3. The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France—as well as Germany. In European parlance, the P5+1 is alternatively called the EU+3. See Joshua Keating, You Say P5+1, I Say E3+3, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 30, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/you- say-p51-i-say-e33/; see also Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lesson With Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long- negotiations.html; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www. state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (providing a basic overview of the JCPOA). 4. Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; see also John Mecklin, The Experts Assess the Iran Agreement of 2015, BULL. ATOMIC SCI. (July 14, 2015), http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 (summarizing how the JCPOA works). 842 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 controversial.5 The days and months following the signing of the JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2015 witnessed a deeply polarized array of high-profile comments and criticisms, from a wide variety of official and unofficial commentators.6 One way of explaining this controversy is the sizeable diversity of JCPOA stakeholders, each with uniquely situated interests and expectations concerning the deal’s aftermath. For the Obama Administration, which purportedly sought to halt Iran’s nuclear program in a way that would avoid another US war in the Middle East, the JCPOA was envisioned as bringing “extraordinary benefits to our national security and the peace and security of the world.”7 For the State of Israel, which has long considered Iran to be its most threatening regional rival, the JCPOA consisted of a “very bad deal,” representing a victory for “death, tyranny and the pursuit of jihad.”8 Lost in this simplistic dichotomy of “for the deal” or “against the deal” are the contours of those various interests, and how their architecture might influence, or be strategically used to influence, the post-sanctions environment emerging with the JCPOA’s implementation.9 The purpose of this Note is to explore the body of interests that comprise one such stakeholder group: international 5. See Daniel R. DePetris, A Frustrating Iran Deal for Republicans, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/254756-a-frustrating-iran-deal-for- republicans (elucidating Republican opposition to the JCPOA); see also Peter Beinart et al., Is There a Viable Alternative to the Iran Deal?, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2015), http://www.the atlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/iran-nuclear-deal-goldberg-frum-beinart/398816/
Load more

Recommended publications
  • IRAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the Islamic Republic of Iran
    IRAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Islamic Republic of Iran is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy and political leaders vetted by the clergy dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei’s writ dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majlis. The unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majlis passes to ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also screens presidential and Majlis candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control. Demonstrations by opposition groups, university students, and others increased during the first few months of the year, inspired in part by events of the Arab Spring. In February hundreds of protesters throughout the country staged rallies to show solidarity with protesters in Tunisia and Egypt. The government responded harshly to protesters and critics, arresting, torturing, and prosecuting them for their dissent. As part of its crackdown, the government increased its oppression of media and the arts, arresting and imprisoning dozens of journalists, bloggers, poets, actors, filmmakers, and artists throughout the year.
    [Show full text]
  • Country Report Iran March 2017
    _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Iran Generated on November 13th 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Case File (April 2021)
    IRAN CASE FILE April 2021 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 Executive Summary .....................................................................................4 Internal Affairs ........................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File .............................................................................................8 1. Women and the “Political Man” ............................................................................... 8 2. Khatami and the Position of Women ......................................................................10 The Political File ............................................................................................... 12 1. The Most Notable Highlights of the Leaked Interview .............................................12 2. Consequences and Reactions .................................................................................13 3. The Position of the Iranian President and Foreign Ministry on the Interview ..........14 4. The Implications of Leaking the Interview at This Time..........................................15 The Economic File ............................................................................................. 16 1. Bitcoin’s Genesis Globally and the Start of Its Use in Iran ........................................16 2. The Importance of Bitcoin for Iran
    [Show full text]
  • Hostage Crisis in Iran May Or May Not Have Been a Proportionate Response
    AP United States History Document-Based Question Note: The following document is adopted from the AP U.S. History College Board Examples United States History Section II Total Time – 1 hour, 30 minutes Question 1 (Document-Based Question) Suggested reading period: 15 minutes Suggested writing period: 40 minutes This question is based on the accompanying documents. The documents have been edited for the purpose of this exercise. In your response you should do the following: Thesis: Present a thesis that makes a historically defensible claim and responds to all parts of the question. The thesis must consist of one or more sentences located in one place, either in the introduction or in the conclusion. Argument Development: Develop and support a cohesive argument that recognizes and accounts for historical complexity by explicitly illustrating relationships among historical evidence such as contradiction, corroboration, and/or qualification. Use of Documents: Utilize the content of at least six documents to support the stated thesis or a relevant argument. Sourcing the Documents: Explain the significance of the author’s point of view, author’s purpose, historical context, and/or audience for at least four documents. Contextualization: Situate the argument by explaining the broader historical events, developments, or processes immediately relevant to the question. Outside Evidence: Provide an example or additional piece of specific evidence beyond those found in the documents to support or qualify the argument. Synthesis: Extend the argument by explaining the connections between the argument and one of the following o A development in a different historical period, situation, era, or geographical area. o A course theme and/or approach to history that is not the focus of the essay (such as political, economic, social, cultural, or intellectual history).
    [Show full text]
  • Whitlam and China
    WHITLAM AND CHINA Prime Ministers Series November 2014 FRONT COVER IMAGE: Gough and Margaret Whitlam visit the Temple of Heaven in Beijing November, 1973. © File photo/NLA/Xinhua CONTENTS Introduction 4 Whitlam and China: 6 Transcript of Panel Discussion, Sydney, November 6 2014 A Note from Graham Freudenberg - Terrill and Taiwan (November 9 2014) 35 Whitlam Timeline 38 Further Reading 40 The Panellists 42 Published by Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) University of Technology, Sydney PO Box 123 Broadway NSW 2007 Australia t: +61 2 9514 8593 f: +61 2 9514 2189 e: [email protected] w: www.acri.uts.edu.au © Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI) 2015 ISBN 978-0-9942825-0-7 The publication is copyright. Other than for uses permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without attribution. INTRODUCTION ACRI is proud to have hosted this discussion of Gough Whitlam’s 1971 visit which opened up the contemporary relationship between Australia and China. It is sad that we weren’t able to interview Gough Whitlam about China in the way we intend to interview other Australian Prime Ministers. But we are honoured to add this transcript to the many tributes to Australia’s 21st Prime Minister. In our panel conversation, a long-term Whitlam advisor and friend, 81 year old Graham Freudenberg, recreated the tension around the visit. Mr Whitlam was Opposition Leader; he was taking a political risk in going to ‘Red China’. Mr Freudenberg, a master of story- telling, captured the sense of excitement felt by the Whitlam party encamped at the Peking Hotel.
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations Semira N
    Timeline of Iran's Foreign Relations Semira N. Nikou 1979 Feb. 12 – Syria was the first Arab country to recognize the revolutionary regime when President Hafez al Assad sent a telegram of congratulations to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution transformed relations between Iran and Syria, which had often been hostile under the shah. Feb. 14 – Students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but were evicted by the deputy foreign minister and Iranian security forces. Feb. 18 – Iran cut diplomatic relations with Israel. Oct. 22 – The shah entered the United States for medical treatment. Iran demanded the shah’s return to Tehran. Nov. 4 – Students belonging to the Students Following the Imam’s Line seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The hostage crisis lasted 444 days. On Nov. 12, Washington cut off oil imports from Iran. On Nov. 14, President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 ordering a freeze on an estimated $6 billion of Iranian assets and official bank deposits in the United States. March – Iran severed formal diplomatic ties with Egypt after it signed a peace deal with Israel. Three decades later, Egypt was still the only Arab country that did not have an embassy in Tehran. 1980 April 7 – The United States cut off diplomatic relations with Iran. April 25 – The United States attempted a rescue mission of the American hostages during Operation Eagle Claw. The mission failed due to a sandstorm and eight American servicemen were killed. Ayatollah Khomeini credited the failure to divine intervention. Sept. 22 – Iraq invaded Iran in a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pennsylvania State University
    The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School Department of Communication Arts and Sciences THE LONG TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE COLD WAR, 1945-1974 A Dissertation in Communication Arts and Sciences by Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury © 2011 Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2011 The dissertation of Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury was reviewed and approved* by the following: J. Michael Hogan Liberal Arts Research Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences Dissertation Advisor Chair of Committee Jeremy Engels Assistant Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences J. Philip Jenkins Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Humanities Department of History and Religious Studies Thomas W. Benson Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Rhetoric Head of Department of Communication Arts and Sciences *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School iii ABSTRACT This study explores the discourse of U.S. presidents as they defined and redefined the concept of “national security” during the Cold War. As commander-in- chief and the most visible spokesman for the United States in world affairs, the president has enormous power to shape understandings of national security strategy and foreign policy. The project consists of a series of four case studies in presidential speech making on national security: Harry S. Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” speech; Dwight Eisenhower’s “Age of Peril” radio address; John F. Kennedy’s “Inaugural Address”; and the speeches of Richard Nixon during his February 1972 trip to the People’s Republic of China. I argue that each of these episodes marked a significant moment in the rhetoric of national security, as each president promoted a new understanding of the nature of the threats to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Cold War Guided Viewing Unit.Pdf
    ©Reading Through History Excerpt from The Cold War by Jake Henderson & Robert Marshall ©2012 To this videos series, click one of the links below!: Reading Through History on YouTube: The Cold War Reading Through History: The Cold War ©Reading Through History Name________________________ Communism: Guided Viewing: Fill in the blanks below to create complete sentences. 1. For many years, communism was the dominant economic system used in many countries across __________________________ and Asia. 2. The modern idea of communism was first proposed by German philosophers __________________________ and Friedrich Engels. 3. Together, they wrote a short book known as The Communist _______________. 4. One of the key principles of communism is the concept of a _____________________ society. 5. More importantly, the salaries of employees, regardless of the job performed, were all _____________________________. 6. The eventual goal of this 'classless society' would be a state in which there was no _____________________ at all. 7. In a true communist nation, there is to be no private ownership of _______________________. 8. This would also mean that the state controlled all means of producing __________________________. 9. Finally, in 1917, a group of Communists in Russia, known as _______________________, started a revolution. 10. At one point during what came to be known as the Cold War era, a full ___________ of the world’s population lived under some type of communist rule. ©Reading Through History Page 1 Name________________________ The Soviet Union: Guided Viewing: Fill in the blanks below to create complete sentences. 1. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were the world's only two “___________________________”.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Page 1 of 43
    2010 Human Rights Report: Iran Page 1 of 43 Home » Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs » Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor » Releases » Human Rights Reports » 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices » Near East and North Africa » Iran 2010 Human Rights Report: Iran* BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices April 8, 2011 The Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of approximately 77 million, is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy, and political leaders vetted by the clergy, dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not directly elected but chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei's writ dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majles passes to ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also screens presidential and Majles candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, a member of the Alliance of Builders political party, was reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.
    [Show full text]
  • The Changing Dynamics of Middle East Politics: Implications For
    The Changing Dynamics of Middle East Politics: Implications for Pakistan 2001-2015 This thesis is submitted to University of the Punjab in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in International Relations Submitted by Uzma Naz Roll no 01 Supervisor Prof. Dr. Iram Khalid Department of Political Science University of the Punjab, Lahore. 2018 IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST BENEFICENT AND THE MOST MERCIFUL Declaration I hereby declare that thesis is a presentation of my original research work and I have not submitted this thesis to any other University or Institute for any degree whatsoever. Wherever contributions of others are involved, every effort is made to indicate this clearly, with due reference to the literature, and acknowledgement of collaborative research and discussions. The research work was done under the Supervision of Prof. Dr. Iram Khalid, at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Researcher’s Name: Uzma Naz Signature: _______________________________________ Date: ___________________________________________ In my capacity as supervisor of the candidate’s thesis, I certify that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge. Supervisor’s Name: Prof. Dr.Iram Khalid Signature: ______________________________ Date: ___________________________________ i Research Completion Certificate This is to certify that MissUzma Naz, Roll No: 01, Doctor of Philosophy research scholar, Session (2014-18) has successfully completed his thesis under my supervision. I also certify that the research has been carried out and completed by the researcher. Supervisor: Professor Dr. Iram Khalid Department of Political Science University of the Punjab, Lahore Signature: Date: ii Certificate of Approval This is to certify that, Mrs.
    [Show full text]
  • Anderson Cooper and Situation Room (CNN)
    US-Iran Media Resource Program National Iranian American Council 9 month report Program supported by: Connect US Fund, OSI, Colombe Foundation, Ploughshares Fund The US-Iran Media Resource Project is aimed at ensuring that the national media has the best information and interpretation available in a timely manner on the sensitive negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The project has provided the news media with objective, balanced and well-documented analyses of important developments, highlighting potential openings for a peaceful settlement that might otherwise be unnoticed and deepening the understanding of the motives of involved actors. The fundamental goal of the program has been to prevent war between the US and Iran. The proposed solution towards preventing war has been to push for direct US-Iran negotiations through overwhelming public and media support for such a shift in policy. Evaluation: The project has made a significant impact on the debate in the US by producing unique analysis disseminated widely both to the media and directly to decision makers, briefing journalists in order to improve the accuracy of their reporting, advising TV and radio producers, and giving interviews to the media. The evaluation of the project during its first 9 months is based on both qualitative and quantitative measurements. Quantitatively, the project has produced an impressive number of deliverables, including seven (7) in depth Issue Briefs, twenty-two (22) Editorial Memos, and eight (8) statements. These written analyses have addressed a variety of issues, all pointing to the superiority of direct US-Iran negotiations versus military or economic warfare. These analyses, in turn, were either quoted or influenced otherwise reporting in major newspapers as well as important news shows, such as Meet the Press (where NIAC’s analysis was directly quoted by Tim Russel).
    [Show full text]
  • Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy
    Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs August 14, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran’s ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region’s several conflicts. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation.
    [Show full text]