The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School Department of Communication Arts and Sciences THE LONG TWILIGHT STRUGGLE: PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE COLD WAR, 1945-1974 A Dissertation in Communication Arts and Sciences by Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury © 2011 Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2011 The dissertation of Sara Ann Mehltretter Drury was reviewed and approved* by the following: J. Michael Hogan Liberal Arts Research Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences Dissertation Advisor Chair of Committee Jeremy Engels Assistant Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences J. Philip Jenkins Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Humanities Department of History and Religious Studies Thomas W. Benson Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Rhetoric Head of Department of Communication Arts and Sciences *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School iii ABSTRACT This study explores the discourse of U.S. presidents as they defined and redefined the concept of “national security” during the Cold War. As commander-in- chief and the most visible spokesman for the United States in world affairs, the president has enormous power to shape understandings of national security strategy and foreign policy. The project consists of a series of four case studies in presidential speech making on national security: Harry S. Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” speech; Dwight Eisenhower’s “Age of Peril” radio address; John F. Kennedy’s “Inaugural Address”; and the speeches of Richard Nixon during his February 1972 trip to the People’s Republic of China. I argue that each of these episodes marked a significant moment in the rhetoric of national security, as each president promoted a new understanding of the nature of the threats to U.S. national security interests and the motives and ambitions of the nation’s enemies. Each president’s national security rhetoric in turn had significant implications for the nation’s diplomacy, defense policy, economic policy, and role in world affairs. The study demonstrates how national security has been a rhetorically malleable construct, and it contributes to ongoing scholarly conversations about the rhetoric of foreign policy, the history of the Cold War, the intersections of foreign policy and political campaign rhetoric, and the implications of national security rhetoric for democratic theory and practice. iv Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS V CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC 7 PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC DURING THE COLD WAR 12 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 17 ENDNOTES 23 CHAPTER TWO TAKING “IMMEDIATE AND RESOLUTE ACTION”: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE SPEECH 31 THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT, 1946-1947 33 THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE SPEECH 47 RESPONSES TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 55 CONCLUSION 60 ENDNOTES 61 CHAPTER THREE SECURITY IN THE “AGE OF PERIL”: DWIGHT EISENHOWER, AMERICAN VALUES, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 73 EISENHOWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW LOOK 76 FINDING SECURITY IN AN AGE OF PERIL 87 EISENHOWER AND THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 96 CONCLUSION 100 ENDNOTES 102 CHAPTER FOUR “PAY ANY PRICE, BEAR ANY BURDEN”: NATIONAL SECURITY IN JOHN F. KENNEDY’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS 112 KENNEDY, THE MISSILE GAP, AND THE ELECTION OF 1960 114 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NEW FRONTIER 122 THE LONG TWILIGHT STRUGGLE 133 CONCLUSION 140 ENDNOTES 141 CHAPTER FIVE “BUILDING A BRIDGE” TO CHINA: RICHARD NIXON’S NATIONAL SECURITY RHETORIC 151 PLANNING THE TRIP TO CHINA 153 NIXON’S TRIP TO CHINA 167 MUTUAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 178 CONCLUSION 181 ENDNOTES 183 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION 195 NAMING AND FRAMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT 201 NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. ELECTORAL POLITICS 205 THE SCOPE OF NATIONAL SECURITY RHETORIC 209 THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR NATIONAL SECURITY RHETORIC 215 ENDNOTES 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY 230 VITA 242 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In writing this dissertation, I was fortunate to have an outstanding committee of faculty mentors. This project is far better as a result of their guidance and suggestions. First and foremost, my advisor, Dr. J. Michael Hogan, was a constant source of inspiration. He pushed me to be a better thinker, writer, and scholar. I am grateful for his direction. My committee members each demonstrated incredible commitment to my graduate training. The enthusiasm of Dr. Jeremy Engels was contagious and motivating. Dr. Thomas Benson asked questions that initially left me pondering my project and resulted in more comprehensive arguments. Through his courses and our many conversations, Dr. J. Philip Jenkins offered me opportunities to more comprehensively explore the history of the Cold War and U.S. foreign policy. I thank them each most sincerely. I am also grateful to several institutions for their support of my work. The Center for Democratic Deliberation at Penn State awarded me a dissertation fellowship in 2009-2010. I very much appreciated the efforts of the Center writing group, Center Directors Dr. J. Michael Hogan and Dr. Cheryl Glenn and Center Fellows Una Kimokeo-Goes and David Green, who offered first-rate feedback on many (not so first-rate) drafts. The Center for Democratic Deliberation, the Communication Arts and Sciences Department, and the College of Liberal Arts also supported this dissertation through generous research grants. In the final year of my graduate work, I served as an ABD Research Associate at the Kettering Foundation. I am thankful for these individuals and organizations for their support of my research endeavors. My journey in rhetoric began at Boston College, where I benefitted from—and still receive—encouragement from Dale Herbeck and Bonnie Jefferson. I completed my graduate vi work in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at Penn State, and am grateful for the wonderful community of graduate students there, especially Una Kimokeo-Goes, Jessica Sheffield, Mary Haman, Hillary Jones, Bonnie Sierlecki, Jessica Bargar Kupervage, and Sarah Stone Watt. Dave Tell and Ned O’Gorman had moved on from Penn State, but they remain exceptional colleagues and I am thankful for our enlightening conversations and friendship. Anyone who has finished a dissertation knows that support comes in many forms, and I am grateful for the love and prayers of my friends and family. I would like to particularly thank Lindsay Jansen, Matt and Sarah Shervey, Tiffany Mansfield, Lisa Whitaker, Rana Yared, Jana Checa Chong, and my friends from BCIV. My family has always been my greatest—and loudest—cheering section. My grandparents, George and Dorothy Kaczmarek and Alfred and Arlene Mehltretter, taught me that my education was an opportunity, and their love motivates me to do my best each and every day. My sister Rachel has always supported my endeavors, and she reminds me to find balance in everything I do. My father, Joseph Mehltretter, instilled in me a passion for learning and a love of reading. His example reminds me to ask the difficult questions, because they often have the most interesting answers. My mother, Kathleen Mehltretter, is the strongest woman I know. She inspires me to find and use my voice, and to work as hard as necessary to achieve my goals. Finally, I thank my husband, partner, and best friend, Jeffrey P. Mehltretter Drury. He encouraged and believed in me every step of this process, especially during the times when I needed it most. Each day, he blesses me with his love, faith, intelligence, patience, and good humor. Whatever flaws this project contains are my own, yet I hope that it might be offered Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam. 1 Chapter One Introduction On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman addressed a concerned and somewhat hostile joint session of the United States Congress. The speech was the culmination of the Truman administration’s efforts to convince Congress that Soviet expansion threatened the national security of the United States. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union had rapidly established “satellite” states—communist nations in Eastern Europe that expanded Soviet power and influence. In early 1947, it appeared that Greece and Turkey would be the next two nations overtaken by Soviet- backed communist forces. According to a memo written by State Department official Joseph M. Jones, the Truman administration was determined to respond to this situation with “prompt and vigorous action.”1 Key members of Truman’s cabinet met with congressional leaders on February 27, 1947. During that gathering, Secretary of State Dean Acheson grew frustrated with the Congress’s failure to fully appreciate the communist threat. When faced with a less-than-positive response from the congressional leadership, Acheson launched into “a full analysis” of “the situation throughout the world, the pressure of communist parties everywhere, and the necessity, in the interest of the security of the United States, in taking a firm stand.” Jones wrote that Acheson’s analysis left the congressional leadership shaken and concerned about the future of democracy abroad. In turn, the congressional leaders promised to support the Truman administration’s 2 plan to offer aid to Greece and Turkey “on the condition that the President should explain the situation to Congress in a special message and to the people by radio.”2 Over the next two weeks, the administration rushed to prepare that special message. On March 12, Truman took his plan to Congress, to the U.S. public, and to the world. The speech would later be known