Intellectualism in Aristotle David Keyt University of Washington, Keyt@U.Washington.Edu

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12-1978 Intellectualism in Aristotle David Keyt University of Washington, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Keyt, David, "Intellectualism in Aristotle" (1978). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 87. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/87

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David Keyt University of Washington 1978

When Aristotle returns to the topic of happiness at the end of the Nicoma chean Ethics (X.6-8) presumably to give us his final and best thoughts on the matter, he says that perfect happiness (he. teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical activity (the�retik� energeia), that happiness and contemplation (theoria) are coextensive, and that the life of reason (ho kata ton � bios), also called 1 the philosophic or theoretical life (I.5.1095bl9, �.E. I . 4. 1215bl-2, �passim), is the happiest life (X. 7.1177al2-18, 1178a4-8, 8.ll 78b7-32). He goes on to say that the life in accordance with the other excellence (ho kata tl!'n allen areten bios)--namely, the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue, elsewhere called the political or practical life (I. 5. 1095bl8, Pol. VII. 2.1324a40)-

is the second happiest life (X. 8.1178a9-22). An'd he draws a sharp contrast between the activities that characterize the two lives: theoretical activity is leisured, aims at no end beyond its elf, and is loved for its own sake whereas practical ac tivity is unleisured, aims at an end (other than itself), and is not chosen for its own sake (X. 7.1177bl-26). As for the relation between the two sorts of activ ity, Aristotle implies that practical activity is merely a means to theoretical

activity: " •••we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order that we_ may have peace" (X. 7 .1177b4-6).

These remarks raise a major and well-known interpretive problem about Aris totle's· ethical ideal. and his conception of the best life for a man, for they seem to conflict with things he says earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere. They seem to conflict, in particular, with his account of the distinction between making (poiesis) and doing (praxis) and with the conclusion of the function argu ment. In distinguishing making and doing, Aristotle says that "the end of making is something different from the making, but not the end of doing; for good action (eupraxia) itself is� end" (VI.5.1140b6-7); and in arguing that the goodness of an action is unlike the goodness of a product of. one of the arts, he insists that for an act to be good it must be chosen for its own sake. The goodness of a pro duct of one of the arts (a shoe or a statue) is a quality of the work itself; but, Aristotle argues, the goodness of an act is not a quality of the act itself. Orte must also consider the agent's state of knowledge, his motive, and his character. For an act to be good it must be done with knowledge, it must be chosen and chosen for its own sake, and it must issue from a stable character (II.4.1105a26- b9). This account of good action appears to directly contradict Aristotle's statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that practical activity, in contrast to theoretical, aims at an end (other than itself) and is not chosen for its own sake.

The conclusion of the function argument is that "the good for man turns out to be activity of·soul in accordance with virtue (kat' areten), and if there are sev eral virtues, in accordance with the best and most final" (or "tnost complete", teleiotatc§n)(I. 7.1098al6-'18). There are two interpretations of teleiotate arete. v v

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issu� raised by the apparent conflict of Aristotle's remarks in the of the.Nicomach�an Ethics with those expressed earlier in the treatise 9 irt other works is that of the relation of the life of practical wisdom and virtue t o the best life for a man--the relation of moral action to happi- Does Aristotle abandon in Book X the view of Book I and elsewhere that nibral activity is a subordinate end, a component of happiness, in favor of the view tha:t it is merely a subservient end, only a means to happiness?

The difference between a component and a means may be iilustrated by the difference between the activity of an ancient choregus in selecting the members of a chorus, outfitting it with costumes and masks, and providing for its training, · which is one of the means to a dramatic performance, and the activity of the chorus in the performance of a play, which is a component. though perhaps a . secondary component, of the dramatic performance itself 10 This distinction is similar to one that Aristotle himself draws between a part (meros) and a neces� sary conditionll that is not a part (E.E. I.2.1214bll-27, Pol. VII.8.1328a21-b4, - 9.1329a34-39). A citizen� for example, is a part of a po li"S"'(Pol. III.Ll274b38-41) whereas property is not a part but only a necessary condition (Pol. VII. 8.1328a33-35). Eating meat and taking a walk after dinner are for some people necessary conditions of health without being themselves parts of health (E.!. I.2.1214bl4-24).

In Book X Aristotle seems to be espousing the view, which I shall call ''strict intellectualism," that theoretical activity is the sole component of the best life for a man and that practical activity has value only as a means to theoretical activity. Some scholars have attributed this view to him without 2 hesita£�on: Alexander Grant, 1 for example, in the nineteenth century and John Cooper today . But some hesitation is in order. For strict intellectualism, as 14 is well known, in addition ta being inconsistent with the doctrine of Book I, has unpalatable moral consequences, which Aristotle (at least in his more worldly moments) would not accept;. According to strict intellectualism it would be right. for one person to steal from or to defraud another in order to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for theoretical activity, for Qn this vitlw the end justifies the means. But Aristotle says that theft is always wrong: "It is not possible ever to be right with regard to these things [namely, such things as adultery, theft, and murder], but to do them is always to be wrong"(II.6.1107al4-15). Aristotle may be espousing strict intel'le.ctualism in Book X without being aware of its unpalatable consequences or in spite of them. Still, it niay be worthwhile to try once more to rescue Aristotle 1 s ethical philosophy from inconsistency and immorality.

One possibility is that Aristotle is embracing a moderate rather than a strict intellectualism in Book X. By "moderate intellectualism" I mean the view that theoretical activity is the primary but not the sole component of the best life for a man, moral action being a secondary component. Moderate, unlike strict, intellectualism is consistent with the doctrine of Book I. But there are several versions of moderate intellectualism corresponding to the various ways of com bining moral and intellectual activity while preserving the primacy of the latter. And some of these have consequences almost as unpalatable as those of strict intellectualism. So it will be well before turning to Book X to sort and grade the various possibilities.

Suppose that moral action; as moderate intellectualism affinns, has value in

· . .,-, ,, ,., . ' - 5 -

itself and not simply as a means to theoretical �ctivity. The value it has 1 independently will then either be commensurable with the value of theoretical

activity or µot. Suppose it is commensurable. · In this case the independent value of moral action can always be weighed against the value of theoretical . activity; and when a situation arises in which one must choose betWeen engaging in contemplative activity and performing some moral action, the activity of lesser value can bes.acrificed for that of greater value with the aim of maxi mizing the total value in one's.life. I shall call this the "trade-off" view. According to it, the value of theoreticaLa.ctivity, which for Aristotle resembles the activity of God, is related to the independent value of moral activity, activity that is wholly human, as the value of gold is to silver. The details of this view--namely, how to measure the value of moral and theoretical activity and how to balance the value of the one activity against the value of the other- are difficult to envisage, but the view is sufficiently precise for one to see some of its consequences. Since on the trade-off view the value of a morai action can sometimes exceed that of a competing theoretical activity, an adherent of the view will sometimes sacrifice theoretical for moral activity. He wight, for example, trade an hour of contemplative activity for an·act of liberality or munificence. Similarly, the owner of a silver mine might pay his workers in gold. On the other hand, it would be right according to the trade;..off view for a person ·who is poor but intelligent to steal from or to defraud another person if this were the only means he had to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for theoretical activity. For the value of an act of honesty (in this case refraining from theft or fraui\) can, on this view, be outweighed by the value of a certain amount of theoretical activity. An adherent of the trade-off view will, of course, have scruples in many cases where the strict intellectualist will not since the former, unlike the latter, needs always to consider whether the end of theoretical activity can be achieved without acting contrary t.o the moral virtues and, if not, whether the theoretical activity sought is worth the moral cost.

Suppose, to take the other alternative, that moral action has value in itself and not simply as a means to theoretical activity but that the value it has independently is incommensurable with (and thus cannot be weighed against) the value of theoretical activity. One will want to consider in this case whether theoretical activity is absolutely prior to moral activity or not. If it is, we have the "absolute priority" view. An adherent of this view will act on the precept, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral activity. Thus he will perform moral actions for their own sake but only when they do not interfere with his theoretical activity. He will never, for example, sacrifice a moment of theoretical activity, however uninspired, for a disinterested moral action, however noble. The consequences of this view are only slightly less unpalatable than those of strict intellectualism. Unlike the strict intellectualist, whose attitude toward any action that neither promotes nor hinders his theoretical activity is indifference, an adherent of the absolute priority view will act in accordance with the moral virtues when unable to contemplate or to do anything that will promote his theoretical activity; but, like the strict intellectualist, he will do anything, however base, that promotes his theoretical activity.

Suppose, to take the final case, that theoretical activity is the primary and moral action a secondary component of the· best life for a man, that the value that moral action has in itself is incommensurable with the value of theoretical activity, but that theoretical activity is not absolutely prior to moral action. There is a view that fits this description. According to it, - 6 -

theoretical activity is more desirable .than moral activity--one would spend all of one's time engaged in it if that were humanly possible, which it isn' t--and is in :this sense the primary component of happiness. But what is most desirable must be pursued within the constraints placed upon a person by his bodily nature, . by his family and friends, and. by his polis. The idea is that theoretical ac tivity is to be maximized but only within the constraints of the life of practi cal wisdom and moral virtue. Moral activity is the foundation and theoretical activity the superstructure of the best life for a man. Moral action will not, on this view, be absolutely prior to theoretical activity. This view is not simply the converse of the preceding one. The demands of civic and domestic life are so indehni te and potentially s.o all consuming that there would few, if any, opportunities for contemplation if moral activity were given absolute priority over theoretical. Such a priority would violate the primacy of theoretical ac tivity. According to the "superstructure" view, the moral life sets certain minimum requirements that must be satisfied before one is· to engage in theoretical activity; but the view does not demand that one should riever shirk a duty, how ever trivial, for an opportunity to contemplate. Where the line is drawn will (ho presumably be determined by the moral intuition of the practically wise man - phroniinos).

The fol1owing table displays the various possibilities:

Moral action

component of happiness� not a component (moderate in (strict intellectualism)

F - value of, commensurable with � that of theoretical activity not commensurable (trade-off view)

theoretical activity not absolutely absolutely prior to prior to (absolute priority view) (superstructure view)

III

Ackrill's and Cooper's acute but divergent discussions of Aristotle's account of eudaimonia exemplify in various ways each of the four specific possi bilities.

Ackrill maintains that "the question [how theoria and virtuous action would combine in the best human life] is incapable of even an outline answer that Aristotle could accept" ("Eudaimonia", p. 357). Ackrill reaches this conclusion because it seems to him that Aristotle's theology and anthropology together - 7 -

yield a consequence that is irreconcilable with his respect for ordinary moral views. Ackrill's argument, as I interpret him, goes like this. According to Aristotle's theology, the divine is incommensurably more valuable than the merely human. And, according to his anthropology, man is "a compound of 'something divine' and much that is not divine"(p.358). Theoria is the activity of man's divine component while virtuous action belongs to his earthly nature. Therefore, theoria is "incommensurably more valuable" than virtuous action (p. 357) and in the best life for man must be given absolute priority over it (pp. 357-58). Aristotle's anthropology and theology thus lead to what I called the "absolute priority" view. But this view, Ackrill points out, has the consequence "that one should do anything however monstrous if doing it has

the slightest tendency to promote theoria •••"(p.358)--a consequence that Aristotle must find "paradoxical" (ibid.) since he wishes to adhere "reasonably closely to ordinary moral views" (p. 35 7).

"The only way to avoid such paradoxical and inhuman consequences," Ackrill believes, "would be to allow a certain amount of compromise and trading between theoria and virtueus action, treating the one as more important but not incom parably more important than the other" (p. 358). Ackrill thus for his own part endorses the trade-off view. But he seems to be mistaken in supposing that this view does not share some of the paradoxical consequences of the absolute priority view and in supposing that the trade-off view is the only alternative available.

Cooper, in fact, attributes to Aristotle a view different from any that Ackrill considers. He finds what I have called the "superstructure" view in the Eudemian Ethics, in Books VII and VIII of the Politics, and in the middle " books of the Nicomachean Ethics--namely, a conception of human flourishing [eudaimonia] that makes provision for two fundamental ends--morally virtuous activity and intellectual activity of the highest kind. Neither of these is subordinate to the other; moral virtue comes first, in the sense that it must be provided for first, but once moral virtue is securely entrenched, then intellectual goods are allowed to predominate" (.£E._. cit., pp. 142-43). Cooper believes, however, that Aristotle adopts an intellectualist ideal of the best life in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics and that he paves the way for this ideal in Book I (pp. 100, 14 7-48, et passim). By "intellectualism" Cooper means "the view that human flourishing consists exclusively in pure intellectual activity of the best kind" (p. 90)--the view that I have called "strict intellectualism." What leads Aristotle to embrace strict intellectualism, according to Cooper, is his doctrine that "one is his theoretical mind" (p. 168). Aristotle does not, on Cooper's interpretation, completely abandon the superstructure view; the life described by this view is simply downgraded in the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics from best to second best (pp. 177-80).

Cooper ·is led to this interpretation of Book X partly by a philological consideration--namely, by what he thinks Aristotle can and cannot mean by the Greek word bios ("life"). This matter needs to be examined since it raises a fundamental issue of how Aristotle is to be read.

What does Aristotle mean by a "life," a bias? The traditional answe;r · is 6 that each of the various "lives" that Aristotle mentions--the apolaustic, 1 the - -

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'qua') locution as part of his standard terminology to signify one aspect of a .. . thing in abstraction from all others. He says, to take a simple example, that "the infinite qua infinite is unknowable" (Phys. I.4.187b7; see also III.6.207a25..;. 26) meaning by this that an infinite object need not be completely unknowable but only in the respect in which it is infinite� if a surface were infinitely long but only an inch wide, one could know its width but not its length. Or, to con sider another example, speaking of natural science Aristotle says that "there are (he many statements about things merely qua moving kin()umena), ,apart from what . each thing is and from their incidental properties" (Met. M. 3.1077b23,....24). .

There is now an answer, or a sort of answer, to a puzzle that arose in ana- lyzing the function argument. It seemed that of all living things God alone . lacked a distinctive function since his only activity, contemplation, is an activ ity in which man can share. The answer is that man does not engage in this activ ity as man but only as possessor of someth ing divine--namely, reason or nous.2 3 In so far as man can contemplate he is a god himself.

The way is now clear for an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics X. 6-8 that minimizes· th e co nflict between it and the rest .of the work. Aristotle begins his final and consummative discussion of happiness by considering whether happiness lies in play (X. 6). This preliminary discussion raises at least two interpretive questions. First, what exactly is the view that Aristotle is considering? And, secondly, what contribution, if any, does this discussion make to Aristotle's ultimate conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity?

The word paidia, along with two other words that figure in the .discussion in chapter 6, paidikos ('childish') (1176b33) and paizein ('to play like a child'-'- ' then: 'to play', 'to jest', 'to dance , 'to sing', 'to play at a game') (ll76b30, 33), is derived from the word pais ( ' child ' )(l176b22, 23). This derivation undoubtedly assists the conclusion of chapter 6 that happiness does not lie in play (1176b27-28): since a pais is ateles (undeveloped) (see Pol. I.12 .1259b3-4), paidia Gan hardly be the telos (end) of a man (see !·!· II. l.1219b4-8).

The ran ge of application of the word paidia is very wide. In Plato, for example, paidia covers among other things children's games (Polit. 308D3-4, Laws 64 3B4-D4, 793E3-794A4), war games (Laws 829B7-Cl), singing and dancing (Laws 803El-2), the mimetic arts from dancing to drama (Soph. 234Blff., Rep. 602B6-10, Polit. 288Cl-10), religious sacrifices (Laws 803El), puns (Grat. 406C3-4), and carousing (Prot. 347D6, Laws 673E8ff.). Human life for Plato is divided into just two ph�--play (p"rldia) and seriousness (spoude) (for the dichotomy s ee Rep. 602B8, Polit. 288C9-10, Laws 643B6, 647D6-7, 732D6, 797A7ff., 942A8).:...;.play being a prep arat ion for, a means to, or a relaxation from serious endeavors (Laws 643B4-D4, 796Al-D5, Phil. 30E6-7). It is not so clear what act ivitie s Aristotle counts as paidi ai , for he is not as lavish with examples as Plato. But a few examples may be gleaned from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. He mentions children's games (Pol. VII.17.1336a21-30) and urbane and witty conversation (eutrapelia) (!.N. II. 7.1108a2 3-26 and IV.8) and reports the common view that the purpose of sleep, drink, music, an d dance is play and relaxation (Pol. VIII.5. 1339al4 -21) . Interestingly, in chapter 6 Aristotle alludes to the things valued among boys (1176b22), to those who are ready-witted (eutrapeloi) in the E

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(102lbl4-23, Phys. VII. 3. 246al3-16). (3) having reached its end (telos): captured in English by such expressions as 'fully realized' and 'fully developed' and predicated, for example� of an adult in contrast to a child (102lb23-30, Pol. I. 12. 1259b3-4).2�

If teleia has sense (1) in the expression he teleia eudaimonia, then Aristotle's conclusion expresses the strict intellectualist view that complete (or total) happiness is theoretical activity. If teleia has either sense (2) or sense (3), then his conclusioh can be given a weaker, moderate intellectualist interpretation- that perfect or fully realized, as distinct from complete, happiness is theoretical activity.

Both formulations of Aristotle's conclusion will thus bear a moderate intel lectualist interpretation. Although such an interpretation even seems indicated for one of the two, the perfect ambiguity of the other makes one hesitate to claim on the basis of an analysis of the verbal formulations alone that such an interpretation of Aristotle's conclusion is demanded. One must also consider Aristotle's argument. What sort of intellectualism does it entail--moderate or strict? If Aristotle's argument entails one view but not the other, this is a 3 good reason for attributing the one rather than the other to him. 0

On one interpretation strict intellectualism is entailed by that part of Aristotle's argument which is based on the philosophical idea that the activity that constitutes happiness is activity in accordance with excellence. This subargument opens (ll 77a12-21) and closes (1177b26-1178a8) chapter 7, though its leading ideas are introduced at the end of Aristotle's discussion of play (6.1177al-ll). Most English translations of these passages obscure the simple relations between the key terms of the argument and make it almo,st unintelligible, so a few elementary comments about its terminology are in order. The argument is based on the noun arete ('goodness', 'excellence', 'virtue')(see 1177a2, 10, 12, 17, b29) and three forms of the comparative and superlative of its simple adjective agathos ( 1 good'):

comparative: 'better' superlative: 'best' belti�n (1177a3, 4, 6) beltistos kreitton (1177a6, b26) kratistos (1177al3, 19, b34, 1178a5-6) ameinon (1178a3) aristos (1177al3)

Rendered literally, the argument of ll 77al.-21 runs as follows:

1. Happiness is activity in accordance with goodness (al-2, 12). 2. And the activity of the/ better part of a man is better and hence more conducive to happiness (a5-6). 3. So the activity of the best part is best and most conducive to happiness (see al2-13). 4. Reason (nous) is the best thing in us, and its objects are the best of knowable objects (a20-21, see Stewart, ad loc.). 5. Therefore, the activity of reason is the best activity and the one most

conducive to happiness. As Aristotle expresses it, " •••the activity [of reason] in accordance with its proper goodness will be -he teleia eudaimonia" (al6-17).

The premisses of this argument entail, not that theoretical activity is complete happiness, but only that it is perfect or fully realized happiness. - 13 -

But when Aristotle returns to this theme at the end of chapter 7, he seems to advance beyond his earlier c laim that reason is the best (but not the only) thing in us and to claim now that a man and his reason are identical: "This [viz. reason] would also seem·to ·be each man, since it is the authoritative and better part. Thus it would be-;ddif he were to choose not his own life but that of someone else" (1178a2-4). Similar assertions occur in two earlier passages in Book IX (4.1166al0- , 23 8.1168b28-1169al8). However, the element or faculty with which a man is (or seems to be) identified is not the same in the two books. In Book IX the thinking or reasoning element (to dianoetikon, to nc;>oun, nous) w:i.th which a man seems to be identified (1166al6-1"'7," 22-23, 1168b35), since it1i"as the abilit to guide action 31 and to control the passions, must be either his practical reason or his intellect as a whole32--practical, productive, and theoretical. In Book X, on the other hand, the reason in question must be the theoretical reason alone. 33 For its activity is said to be theoretical (ll 77al7-18 et passim), and practical wisdom (pronesis) is explicitly distinguished from it (8. 11 78al6-22). 34 But, in spite of these dif ferences, the passages in Book IX, as we shall see, provide the clue to the proper interpretation of 1178a2-4.

Now, if a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason and if practi cal reason is not a p.art of theoretical reason, . then practical· reason is not a.· part of a man. On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be merely something without which a man cannot exist, like food (Met. b..5 ,.. 1015b20-22)--not a part of man but only a necessary condition of his existence. 3:> Practical and theoretical reason will be related as the lower and higher order in Aristotle's ideal state (see Pol. VI. 4.129la24-28 and VII. 8-9). The warriors, officeholders, and priests who compose its higher order are its parts. The farmers, craftsmen, and tradesmen who compose its lower order, though the state cannot exist without them, are not parts of it: their role is to serve the members of the higher order. On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be subservient to theoretical in just the same way; and Aristotle will, as Cooper claims (£E_. cit. pp •. 162-63), · be embracing strict intellectualism.

But does Aristotle really mean to claim that a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason? There is good reason for thinking not since his statement that reason "would also seem to be each man" (ll78a2) is immediately qualified: " •••for man, then, the life according to reason [is best and pleasantest], since this ·[viz.· reason] most of all (malista) is man"36 (a6-7). To be most of all man is t� be less than, and so nonidentical with' man. That this reservation is seriously intended is indicated by its earlier appearance in the two passages in Book IX where a man is identified with his thinking faculty. In the first of these Aristotle says that "the reasoning element would seem· to be, or to be most of all (e malista), each man" (4.ll66a22-23); · and the reservation is repeated in almost the same words in the second--"That this [viz. reason] is, or is most of all (e malista), each man is clear" (8.1169a2). But to claim that reason is the�st-important, but not the sole, part of a man is simply to reiterate a premiss--namely, line (4)-.;..of the argument of 1177al-21, an argument that does not entail strict intellectualism.

Other parts of the overall argument of chapter 7 that need to be examined are those in which Aristotle tries to show that theoretical activity is leisured and alone loved for its own sake whereas military and political activities (the pre eminent practical activities) are not chosen for their own sakes and are unleisured (1177bl-24). Aristotle offers the same consideration in support of both conclu sions--namely, that military and political activities aim at an external end but

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and theoretical activity• The moral virtues have a role to play in both phases of life: "Bravery and endurance are needed for work, philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice at both times, and more especially when men observe peace and have leisure; for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjdyment of good fortune and the possession of leisure accompanied by peace makes them rather insolent"

VII

Chapter 8 contains three additional arguments for the conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity. (1) The gods are paradigms of happiness but their lives consist entirely of theoretical, rather than practical or productive, activity; "so of human activities that which is most akin to this is the most conducive to happiness" (1178b 7-23). (2) The whole of the life of the gods, con sisting as it does of ceaseless contemplation, is blessed (makarios); so too is the life of man in so far as it is spent in such activity; but none of the lower animals are happy since they in no way share in contemplation. "As far, then, as contemplation extends, so also does happiness; and to those to whom contemplation more fully belongs happiness also more fully belongs, not incidentally but in virtue of the contemplation." Therefore, happiness is a kind of contemplation (b24-32). '3) He who exercises his (theoretical) reason is most loved by the gods; those most loved by the gods are the happiest; therefore, the wise man is the happiest (1179a22-32).

The second argument requires examination, for the part of it that is directly quoted seems to identify happiness and contemplation straightforwardly and, con sequently, to be an unambiguous expression of strict intellectualism. But the argument will, I think, bear another interpretation. The second argument follows

directly upon the first and begins with the words "A proof, too, is that ••."

(s�meion de kai •••) . This indicates that it is intended to establish the same .conclusioU-as the first--namely, that he teleia eudaimonia is theoretical activity (1178b7-8). Now, if he: teleia eudaimonia means, as it seems to, perfect or fully realized rather than-Complete happiness throughout X.7-8 and if makarios and eudaimonia mean teleia audaimonia in argument (2), then Aristotle's statement that happiness and contemplation are coextensive will mean simply that perfect or fully realized happiness is coextensive with contemplation. But this assertion is com patible with a moderate intellectualism that allows a place for the secondary happiness of moral and political activity. This interpretation also resolves a small puzzle about the argument--namely, that Aristotle's explanation of the fact that happiness is not attributed to the lower animals seems inadequate. They are incapable of happiness, one would suppose, not simply because they are inca pable of �ontemplating but also because they are incapable of practical thinking.47 But if Aristotle is thinking only of perfect or fully realized happi ness, his explanation is completely adequate.

VIII

Thus with the exception of the one statement that theoretical activity "alone would seem to be loved for its own sake" (1177bl-2) there seems to be nothing in X.6-8 that is inconsistent with a moderate intellectualism and with the rest of - 16 -

the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a fairly weak conclusion. Can it be strengthened? Is there anything in these three chapters that can be taken to be an expression of moderate intellectualism? In particular, can anything be taken to be an expression of the only reasonable version of moderate intellectualism;...... ,namely, the super structure view according to which theoretical activity is to be maximized within the constraints of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue?

Aristotle's famous injunction ''as far as possible to inunortalize oneself and to do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best thing in oneself [viz. the theoretical reason]" (7 .1177b33-34) is an expression of the superstructure view if the restriction signified by the words "as far as possible" includes moral restrictions as well as those of mind, body, and estate. Does it? The answer to this question can be gleaned, I think, from a passage in chapter 8 where Aristotle is discussing the extent to which the theoretical life and the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue need external equipment and where he seems for once to combine the two lives: "The person who contemplates has no need of such things [viz. external goods] for his activity; but they are ao to speak even impediments-:Bt least to contemplation; however, as he is a man and lives with a number of others, he chooses to do those things that are in accord ance with [sci!. moral] virtue; he will therefore need such things with a view to living as a man" {ll 78b3-7). Here Aristotle states explicitly that the person who contemplates {ho theoron), qua man, chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue. 48 Arthur Adkins in a recent article remarks, however; that Aristotle "does not tell us when he chooses: he may well mean 'chooses when theoria is not available. 'n49 On Adkins' interpretation the author of this passage might without inconsistency condone the conduct of a man who refused to interrupt his theoretical activity in order to rescue a neighbor from a burning building. Thus Adkins believes the passage to be consistent with what I have called the "absolute priority" view-- the view whose precept is, Maximize theoretical activity first; then maximize moral activity. But there are at least two reasons for rejecting Adkins' interpretation. First, Aristotle says that the person who contemplates, qua�' chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue. But a person is not a man--that is to say, a human being--at one moment .. and at another not. He is a human being all of his life just as he is always an animal and always a living thing. Thus once the moral virtues are acquired he is always prepared to act in accordance with them. Secondly, possession of the moral virtues would seem to be inconsistent with their erratic exercise. The brave man defends his polis whenever the enemy attacks, not just at his convenience. Thus if the person who contemplates, qua man, chooses to act in accordance with bravery, he must always be prepared to sacrifice theoret ical activity for battle. So this passage does not seem to be consistent with the absolute priority view. It seems better to take it as picking up the theme of the function argument, the centerpiece of Book One: namely, that the various aspects of a person's total life...,-his life as a living thing, as an animal, as a man, and as a demigod--form a hierarchy with the higher aspects resting on and presupposing the lower.

If my interpretation is correct, Aristotle does indeed subscribe to the superstructure view: one should seek to immortalize ones�lf but only within the bounds of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue. O ~ ǪU

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35. See p. 4 above.

36. See Daniel Devereux, ''Aristotle on the Active artd Contemplative Lives, " Philosophical 'Research ·Archives 3, no .. l.118. (1977), p. 7.

3 7. See p. 1 above.

38. See D. F. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, III (1978).

39. On to kalon as an end of action and to aischron as an object of avoidance see nt-:7".1115bll-13, 23-24, 1116all-12 ,15; 8.1116a28-3 2 ' b2-3, 19' �0-31, . 1117a 8, 16-17; 9.1117b9, 14-15; 12.1119bl6; IV.1. 1120a23:-24, 112lb4-5; 2.1122b6-7, 1123a24-25; IX.8.1169a21-22, 28, 32, 35; X.8.1178bl3; and E.E. III.l.1229a2, 1230a29-33.

40. See I.l.1094a6-9 and III.9.1117b7-8. When Aristotle says in speaking of bravery that "it is not the case, then, with all the virtues that their exercise is pleasant, except in so far as one attains the end" (III.9. 1117bl5-16), the end in question is the external end. See also III.3.1112b33.

41. On Hector's motivation see III. 8.1116a21-29.

42. On this topic see also Ackrill's notes on 1139bl, 1176b7, and 1177bl-26 in Aristotle's Ethics.